Maps of Communist-Dominated Areas of Indochina: Their Limitations and Relevance to a Cease-fire

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP80T01719R000300210001-8
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 9
• Document Creation Date: November 9, 2016
• Document Release Date: July 21, 1998
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: June 21, 1972
• Content Type: IM

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Intelligence Memorandum
Maps of Communist Dominated Areas of Indochina:
Their Limitations and Relevance to a Cease-fire
Saw
21 June 1972
No. 2046/72
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WARNING
This document contains information affecting the national
defense of the United States, within the meaning of Title
18, sections 793 and 794, of the US Code, as amended.
Its transmission or revelation of its contents to or re-
ceipt by an unauthorized person is prohibited by law.
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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
21 June 1972
MAPS OF COMMUNIST-DOMINATED AREAS OF INDOCHINA:
THEIR LIMITATIONS AND RELEVANCE TO A CEASE-FIRE
1. The four maps accompanying this memorandum
are intended to depict, as of 6 June 1972, those
areas of Indochina dominated by the Communists and
those areas dominated by governments friendly to
the US. The first map shows the areas of direct
Communist military presence in Indochina as a whole.
The other three are separate maps of South Vietnam,
Cambodia, and Laos--and each attempts to show the
areas of predominant Communist or friendly influence
in more detail than does the overall Indochina map.
2. We have divided the territory of Indochina
into five categories on the maps, according to the
following criteria:
(a) Direct Enemy Military Influence:
These are areas, depicted by red
circles on the maps, where enemy
main force (i.e., NVA) infantry
units are concentrated.* The larger
circles have a fifteen-mile radius,
and are centered on the location
of the headquarters of each enemy
main force division, as of the date
of the map. The smaller circles
have a five-mile radius and are
centered on the headquarters of
*None of the Chinese units in northern Laos are
shown, nor do these illustrative maps show those
enemy units which are protecting the trails in
lower Laos.
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each "independent" enemy main force
regiment--i.e., those regiments which
are not subordinate to one of the
divisions depicted by the larger cir-
cles. The size of the circles was
derived. by establishing the minimum
radius which would encompass the op-
erating regiments of each division
and the operating battalions of each
independent regiment. The employ-
ment of the circles and their dimen-
sions are obviously fairly arbitrary
techniques of depiction. These cir-
cles are not intended to provide
tactical in'ormation about the spe-
cific areas of operation of each ma-
jor enemy unit. Frequently, one or
more regiments of a division will
operate at a distance considerably
greater than fifteen miles from its
divisional headquarters. Neverthe-
less, these circles do show in gen-
eral terms the concentration of NVA
main force infantry units, and they
do show the areas of Indochina where
the impact of the current military
offensive is being felt the most.
The overall map of Indochina shows
only these circles, and does not
depict other areas of lesser Commu-
nist influence, which-are contained
in the individual country maps.
(b) Predominant Communist Influence:
These are areas where the Communists
have a significant military and/or
administrative presence and the
friendly government does note There
may be occasional armed clashes in
these areas but, as of the given
date, Communist domination is not
seriously threatened. In the Commu-
nist-controlled parts of Laos and
Cambodia, armed clashes are infre-
quent although friendly patrols may
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quite regularly gather intelligence
and conduct clandestine operations.
(c) Predominant Friendl Influence: These
are areas where the friendly govern-
ment has a significant military and/
or administrative presence and the
Communists do not. Again, there may
be occasional armed clashes, but
friendly domination is not seriously
threatened. It should be noted, how-
ever, that the criteria for friendly
control tend to be more stringent than
for Communist control, primarily be-
cause we have more information about
the shortcomings of friendly control
than we do of enemy control.
(d) Contested: Territory is considered
contested if neither side has a
clearly superior military force or
administrative apparatus in the area.
In most contested areas, both sides
are present in some strength and
clash frequently. We have also in-
cluded in our definition, however,
some areas in which both sides have
few forces and do not exert much
military effort to exclude each
other. "Contested" territory thus
includes such disparate areas as the
current battleground to the north
and west of Hue, and parts of Cambo-
dia where most of the "contest" con-
sists of a competition between the
two sides to extort more goods, serv-
ices, and taxes from the local popu-
lations.
(e) Neither dominated nor seriously con-
tested by either side: This is ter-
ritorywhere there are practically
no permanent enemy or friendly forces,
practically no administrative appa-
ratus of either side, and not much
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interest on the part of either in
establishing a permanent presence.
In some cases, of course, such ter-
ritory is used by one side or the
other--or both--as a passage route
for the transport of supplies and
reinforcements. Most earlier maps
have put such territory into the
"contested" category, thus creating
an impression of military or polit-
ical confrontation over far wider
areas of Indochina than is in fact
the case. In South Vietnam, for
example, areas which we have placed
in this category have no significant
GVN regional, popular or police
forces in local villages and hamlets.
They also do not have hamlet or vil-
lage governments which are respon-
sive, in a meaningful way, to GVN
provincial administrations. At the
same time, there are no significant
enemy forces in these areas either.
3. It is important to note that all maps of
this type have certain built-in limitations in terms
of their value as tools to assist in formulating pos-
sible provisions of a cease-fire agreement. The prin-
cipal limitations are as follows:
(a) The maps at best can depict the con-
trol situation only at a given in-
stant in time. In a fluid military
situation where tactical control of
areas is constantly changing, the
maps may well depict divisions of
territory which could be politically,
militarily or economically untenable
after a cease-fire was declared, or
even after the-pace of military ac-
tivity slackened.
(b) The maps of necessity tend to equate
military occupation of an area with
control of the area. Yet there can
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(c
be a substantial difference between
occupying an area and controlling
it. Under reasonably stable condi-
tions, information systems such as
the HES can be devised to measure
"control" in a fairly meaningful
fashion. During a major military
offensive, however, the measurement
of control is increasingly dominated
by military deployment and battle re-
sults. This is adequate to portray
territorial control in the tactical
situation, but such maps cannot por-
tray with fidelity the degree of con-
trol which each side would have in
certain areas in a cease-fire en-
vironment.
A most important consideration af-
fecting all such maps is the fact
that, in Indochina, control of ter-
ritory and control of people are
two quite different matters. For
example, the enemy's territorial
gains resulting from his present
offensive are not matched, in any
immediate sense, by populations
gains. The present flow of refu-
gees to the GVN side testifies to
this. The fact that most of the
population has preferred not to
remain in areas occupied by the
NVA, however, would create new
problems for both sides if there
were a cease-fire. GVN-controlled
urban centers presently crowded
with refugees might become an eco-
nomic liability if, under the cease-
fire, the surrounding rural and
food producing areas were left under
enemy control. Conversely, from the
North Vietnamese standpoint, a cease-
fire might leave Hanoi's forces with
certain areas of limited value in
terms of political control because
they had been largely de-populated.
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(d) The attached maps also have an in-
herent limitation of scale--the
scale. is so small that information
cannot be presented in sufficient
detail.. In many areas of South
Vietnam it would be impossible--
even if we had the necessary infor-
mation--to depict the degree of con-
trol which each side now exerts in
particular provinces or districts,
without developing individual maps
of each province and in some cases
each district. In brief, we are
faced with the old leopard-spot
problem, and there are areas of
South Vietnam where at present the
numbers of spots, and their pattern,
cannot be depicted on one country-
size map. This also means, of
course, that a control situation
exists which would be exceedingly
difficult.to resolve in a cease-
fire agreement.
4. A final general comment: Much of the ter-
ritory in South Vietnam currently under Communist
influence is largely devoid of population or--at
best-thinly.populated. Also, in much of the South
Vietnamese territory which appears on our maps as
being under Communist influence, the degree of in-
fluence which the enemy actually possesses has not
been tested. (The same used to be said, with some
justification, of GVN pacification gains.) Many of
the North Vietnamese divisions now operating in South
Vietnam are doing so without the benefit of a strong
local organization, and their success in developing
a local administrative structure remains to be seen.
Many of the enemy's recent territorial gains which
are shown on the map of South Vietnam may be as
fragile and temporary as any ever depicted on a
pacification map.
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ATTACHMENTS:
1.
Map of Indochina: Areas of Direct Communist Mili-
tary Influence as of 6 June 1972
2.
Map of South Vietnam: Territorial Control as of
6 June 1972
3.
Map of Cambodia:
Territorial Control as of 6
June 1972
4.
Map of Laos: Territorial Control as of 6 June
1972
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