Soviet and Chinese Conduct in the Vietnam Crisis- -A View of the Next Several Weeks

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP80T01719R000300180001-2
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 11
• Document Creation Date: November 9, 2016
• Document Release Date: July 21, 1998
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: May 16, 1972
• Content Type: MEMO

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CSA ~ SAyA I'vnL-ono 7
G'fNTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
16 May 1972
SQviet and Chinese Conduct in the Vietnam Crisis -- A View
f the Next Several Weeks
udgments on the probable attitudes and actions of the two Communist
2
!e.rs' over the next several weeks. are obviously of a highly perishable nature.
i?ria~eipa~ factors which underlie our uncertainty at the present moment are: ? .
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It is a moving situation. Developments, accidental or
otherwise, in the war theater could suddenly unhinge the consensus
apparently reached in both Moscow and Peking to follow a course of
restraint for the present.
b. We have no knowledge of the estimate being made in Moscow
and 'Peking about the duration and intensity of our interdiction
campaign and its effectiveness. If they believe, as most analysts
have, so far, that adequate supply movements to the DRV can be
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maintained over land routes from China, they are under no pressure
.to confront the US with dramatic countermeasures or to try to
prevail on Hanoi to adjust its negotiating stance. If they believe,
or come to believe as the US air effort continues, that Hanoi's war
'effort will be seriously crippled, then the situation and choices they
face will be quite different.
We are uninformed as to what private communication may
be taking place between Moscow and Washington.
The Soviets have never had, and presumably do not have now, a
vital interest in the success of Hanoi's military campaign in South Vietnam
Indochina. They would prefer to have Hanoi accomplish its aims, partly
because they would welcome a setback for US policy and partly because they
would hope to t engthen their influence in Hanoi on the basis of a claim that
given loyal aid to the "liberation" struggle. But they have hoped
that the final resolution would be by a negotiated -settlement in which, again
or the sake of winning credit in Hanoi, they might play some role. In any
Moscow is not prepared to assume risks solely to insure the success
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The recent military escalation by both sides is full of awkwardness
fix broader Soviet policy interests. The pending Summit and agreements
presumably to be accomplished or advanced on that occasion -- SALT and
trade-in particular -- are key elements in the design of Soviet foreign policy
present. Equally important are the ratification of the German treaties
and the Berlin accords and further steps to develop the policy of detente in
Any significant risk that confrontation over Vietnam could sour the
s
t
f East-West relations and abort these Soviet policy Initiatives mu
It must have been mainly concern for these broader policy interests
Nch produced the initial mild Soviet reaction to the President's interdiction
moves. Moscow adopted a course designed to limit damage to these interests
while at the same time saying the minimum necessary by way of condemning
the illegality. of US actions and promising continued support to its Vietnamese
This is a delicately tuned response, devised in some haste in the
,,face of complex considerations, and one that it may not be possible to
austin as the new phase of action in Vietnam unfolds. The affront to Soviet
prestige in the denial of access to DRV ports is serious. We do not know
Whether support in the leadership for the course chosen was unanimous,
 restrained as the action in and around North Vietnam continues.
China's principal interests, in Vietnam are to insure that no
in&iendly, regime is installed in the North, to encourage the complete with-
rawal of US forces from the area, to limit Soviet influence in Hanoi while
haneing its owns and to see the eventual success of Hanoi's cause in the
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,nd we would suspect that opponents of Brezhnev would not be slow to exploit
n vulnerability he may have in consequence of the present turn of events.
t possible that if the air campaign against North Vietnam is sustained on
is present scale and intensity, the Soviets will conclude eventually that
they have no recourse but to react more harshly. Should the German treaties
aii In the Bundestag this week, which does not now seem likely, the pressure
o. so could increase. Elements in the leadership which for many reasons
the present direction of policy could ultimately gain the upper
andI3rezhnev himself might then sponsor a sharp turn which would put
sudden and threatening chill on relations with Washington,
In short, we think that the Soviets will prefer to continue on a
eburse aimed at containing and controlling the present crisis, but we are not
at all,' sure that they will feel able to keep their voices low and their actions
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None of these interests, save the first, is sufficiently vital as
tg cause Peking to confront the US directly with its own combat forces and
:tie secu~eity of the regime in Hanoi does not appear threatened in the
Ncurreat 'situation. Nor is Peking's "face" directly involved in the mining of
,the ports since little attention has been paid to China's seaborne traffic with
North Vietnam and the world tends to assume that all Chinese aid of
`=41tarq significance is delivered by overland means.
Peking will not wish to foreclose a continuing dialogue with the US
dt probably judges that current US actions do not mean a reversal of the
trend toward a reduction of the US military presence in Southeast Asia. Thus
basic posture will be one of caution and restraint so long as this
seems a feasible course in the light of attitudes and actions adopted by Hanoi
and Moscow. If Hanoi demands stronger action and Moscow responds,t ithe
ese. Will probably feel obliged to follow suit.
10. We do not believe that the present events in Vietnam will upset
Elie power relations among Peking factions, but what those relations are is
sotnethiing we know very little about. If the US actions against the DRV are
? ugtalEed and inflict greater damage than had been anticipated, we would
itAve o )edge that Chou-en-Lai's position would be placed under some strain
and that China mighe be led to react more harshly than it has thus far.
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The Summit. It seems very unlikely that at this late stage the
Soviets,vvill move from their side to cancel or postpone the Summit. They
aXdentiy prefer, if this is to happen, to leave it to the President's initiative.
may, have been a close decision, based on a calculation that an image of
zestxaint,and steadiness would benefit them more than the appearance of
eakness in the face of the US challenge would hurt them. Concern not to
ppset current bilateral dealings with the US in many areas and for the
;;+ iieeess'of their European policy would have weighed heavily in the balance.
the President himself should move to suspend the Summit, the Soviet
:preference would probably be for an agreed announcement of a postponement.
Assuming that the Summit goes forward, the Soviets will be correct
~d buinesslike, though they may want to omit public occasions where the
eado~smight be expected to show warmth and friendliness. The Soviet side
try t'o avoid any close coupling of Vietnam with other matters. They
will gt`bargain,on main bilateral issues with offers of or demands for
;'concessions on Vietnam. It seems unlikely that Hanoi would allow Moscow
, xoom for maneuver in this respect in any case.
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