NET ASSESSMENT OF NORTH VIETNAMESE AND SOUTH VIETNAMESE MILITARY FORCES

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP80T01719R000300100002-9
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 108
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: February 22, 2012
• Sequence Number: 2
• Publication Date: April 10, 1972
• Content Type: IM

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Memorandum
Net Assessment of North Vietnamese
and South Vietnamese Military Forces
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10 April 1972
41
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CONTENTS
Page
Introduction . . _ .
The Quantitative Balance . . . . .
Ground Forces - North Vietnam . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2
The Present Situation . . . . . . . . . . . 2
Outlook for 1973 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
Ground Forces - South Vietnam . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
The Present Situation . . . . . . . . . 8
Outlook for 1973 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
The Air and Naval Wars . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
The External Aid Factor . . . . . . . . . 10
The Qualitative Balance . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
Morale and National Will . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
Leadership . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Estimated Strength of Communist Regular Combat Forces
In or Targeted Against South Vietnam, Cambodia, and Laos
3 0 JUN 1972 25X1
Appendixes
I. A Manpower Overview of North and South Vietnam . . . . . . I-I
II. Growth and Development of the North Vietnamese
Armed Forces . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . II-1
III. Growth and Development of the South Vietnamese
Armed Forces . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . III-1
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Page
IV. Balance of Forces (Allied to VC/NVA),
1968-72, by Military Region . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . IV-I
V. Infiltration and Order of Battle Estimating . . . . . . . . . . . . V-I
VI. Pacification Trends and Prospects .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . VI-1
VII. Allied Air Capability . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . VII-1
VIII. North Vietnam Aid Capability . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . VIII-1
IX. Naval Capability . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . IX-1
X. Logistic Capabilities (South Vietnam and North Vietnam) . . . . . X-1
XI. Military Aid and North Vietnamese Strategic Stockpiling . . . . . XI-1
XII. Regional Assessment (Including Cambodia) . . . . . . . . . . . . XII-1
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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
10 April 1972
NET ASSESSMENT OF NORTH VIETNAMESE
AND SOUTH VIETNAMESE MILITARY FORCES
Introduction
1. This memorandum presents a net assessment of the North
Vietnamese and South Vietnamese armed forces. It considers the principal
strengths and weaknesses of both forces as of two dates -- early April 1972
and 1 January 1973. In addition to providing quantitative measurements
of the two forces, the memorandum examines certain intangible factors
such as morale,. national will, and leadership, as well as the contribution
which foreign aid has made to the military strength of both sides. Finally,
it contains a series of appendixes which treat specific parts of the problem
in greater detail.
2. During the preparation of this memorandum, the North
Vietnamese began a major offensive in South Vietnam which will almost
certainly evolve into a "net assessment" of the two sides' armed forces,
played out for real on the field of battle. Present evidence indicates that
the action will be heavier than anything which has occured in South Vietnam
since 1968, and that this offensive will involve an all-out effort by Hanoi.
If so, this campaign's results will clearly have major implications for the
military strengths of both sides by 1 January 1973, the later of the two
dates which we consider. If the North Vietnamese Army (NVA) is driven
back after a month or so with losses far heavier than those suffered by
the South Vietnamese Army (ARVN), Hanoi will have a substantially
weaker -- or at least less effective -- army in January 1973 than it has
at present, both absolutely and relative to the ARVN. If, on the other
hand, the ARVN suffers several major defeats, takes casualties as heavy
as those of the NVA, and seems in general to be unable to stand up to
the NVA, then it is the ARVN which will be in a substantially weaker
position, materially and psychologically, at the beginning of next year. We
have taken these factors into account to the best of our ability, but we
caution that the fluid, fast-evolving situation on South Vietnam's battlefields
precludes confident or certain Washington projections of future net
assessments.
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The Quantitative Balance
Ground Forces - North Vietnam
The Present Situation
3. As of early April 1972, the NVA had achieved a maximum
forward posture, in terms of the combat forces deployed outside the borders
of North Vietnam. Both the movement of NVA infiltration groups into
South Vietnam and Cambodia over the past half year and the deployment
of integral combat units of the NVA support this judgment.
4. So far this dry season (September 1971 through early
April 1972), Hanoi has dispatched about 120,000 infiltrators to the
southern war zones. This compares with some 106,200 during the entire
dry season last year (September 1970 through June 1971). The following
tabulation shows the areas to which these troops were sent.
1970/71 1971/72
(Sep-Jun) (Sep-early Apr)
GVN MRs 1 and 2
Tri-Thien-Hue 6,000
12,000
MR 5
14,200
16,000
B-3 Front
14,500
42,000
GVN MRs 3 and
4
and Cambodia
COSVN
45,000
36,000
Southern Laos
26,500
a/
14,000
Total
106,200
120,000
a. Including
some units
deployed
for Lam
Son 719.
5. The figures above include the movement of the NVA 320th
Division to the B-3 Front, and of the NVA 324B Division to Military Region
Tri-Thien-Hue (TTH). They do not, however, include other NVA forces
which have recently moved into South. Vietnam as organic combat units
rather than as infiltration groups. These will be discussed in paragraph 7,
below.
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6. Our best judgment is that this year's infiltration has resulted in
an expansion of the NVA combat order of battle (OB) in South Vietnam
by about 22,000 men, and in Cambodia opposite GVN Military Region
(MR) 3 by about 5,000 men. Most of the remaining 93,000 infiltrators
are to be used to provide a stock of fillers to offset combat casualties
and to expand the enemy's rear services system in southern Laos and
Cambodia. (Some infiltrators, of course, have been lost en route, either
because of disease or because of Allied interdiction efforts.)
7. A further expansion of the enemy forces in South Vietnam
occurred with great speed in late March and early April 1972 when 28,000
more combat troops deployed into the country in organic units from North
Vietnam, Laos, and Cambodia.* Since 12,000 of these troops were included
in the threat category of the December 1971 OB estimate, the net OB
increase from these unit redeployments amounts to 16,000. This increase,
together with the 22,000 OB increment resulting from infiltration, raised
the enemy's combat forces in South Vietnam to about 115,000-130,000
men in early April 1972 (see the table on p. 5).
* These forces include the 304th and 308th Divisions from North Vietnam, elements
of the 2nd Division from southern Laos, and three regiments from Cambodia which
have moved into MR 3.
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9. In addition to its commitment of manpower to South Vietnam,
southern Laos, and Cambodia, Hanoi has also sharply increased its
deployment of forces to northern Laos this season. Heavy infiltration to
this area in the last half of 1971 included the deployment of three infantry
regiments, improvements in the air defense system, and increases in heavy
artillery. By the end of 1971 the NVA enjoyed a combat force superiority
of about 2.5 to 1 over the Lao irregulars, Lao regular army
personnel in the Plaines des Jarres area. Since t en, the ratio has improved
somewhat for the Allied side as additional irregulars have been
introduced as reinforcements.
10. Overall, Hanoi has committed an exceptionally large portion of
its military assets this year to the various military fronts outside North
Vietnam. As a result of this year's infiltration, the recent unit deployments
into South Vietnam, and the earlier expansion of the force structure in
northern Laos, Hanoi now has on its home territory only some 15 regular
infantry regiments. This is the smallest reserve force retained at home during
any dry season since 1968, when the General Offensive was under way.
Actually, Hanoi now has even less of a reserve force in North Vietnam
than it had in 1968. Furthermore, there are clear signs that the three
regiments of the 325th Division (included in this total) are now moving
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Estimated Strength of Communist Regular Combat Forces
In or Targeted Against South Vietnam, Cambodia,and Laos
Thousands
December
December
Early
December April
1969
1970
1971 1972
VC/NVA
130-150
105-120
105-120 145-165
South Vietnam
130-150 a/ b/
85-95 b/
80-90 b/ 115-130
Cambodia
--
20-25
25-30 30-35
Khmer Communist
N.A.
10-20
15-30 15-30
Pathet Lao/NVA c/
55-65
60-70
70-85 65-80
Northern Laos
35-40
30-35
40-45 40-45
Southern Laos
20-25
30-35
30-40 25-35
a. This figure includes enemy main forces actually stationed
in Cambodia but targeted against South Vietnam. In later
years, separate estimates for South Vietnam and Cambodia have
been made, but this was not done for 1969, when all enemy
forces in Cambodia were considered to be part of the threat
against South Vietnam, and Cambodia itself was not regarded
as a theater of the war.
b. The figures for South Vietnam include those NVA forces
located in southern North Vietnam between Dong Hoi and the DMZ
which are considered to be targeted against South Vietnam.
These forces numbered 13,000 in December 1969, 10,000 in
December 1970, and 12,000 in December 1971. By late March
1972, this figure had jumped to 20,000. In late March and
early April, in conjunction with the new enemy offensive,
these 20,000 troops all moved into GVN MR 1. The enemy OB
figure for South Vietnam does not increase by the full amount,
however, since 12,000 of them had already been included in
the OB figure in December 1971. Another 8,000 enemy combat
troops, who are included in the early April 1972 OB figure,
have moved from Cambodia and Laos into GVN MRs 2, 3, and 4
since late March.
c. This figure includes troops in air defense units.
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southward and may be committed to action in South Vietnam. In addition,
there is some evidence that the combat capability of a number of these
reserve regiments is not very good.
Outlook for 1973
11. The total size of the NVA (including regional forces kept inside
North Vietnam) has grown from about 250,000 men in 1964 to 575,000
men at present. In the same period, North Vietnamese losses in the war
have amounted to roughly 900,000 men. Hanoi is able to induct about
100,000 men each year into its armed forces without further drawing down
its manpower pool, but - if historical precedent is a guide - its losses are
likely to be well over 100,000 men in. any year in which it launches
significant offensive action. Even with high losses, of course, Hanoi could
for several years induct men at the 1968 peak rate of about 200,000 per
year before its manpower reserves in the prime age group for military service
were exhausted. In terms of raw manpower, therefore, North Vietnam's
situation is tight and getting tighter, but not critical (see Appendix I).
12. Hanoi's ability to expand its force structure over the next year
will be determined by three factors: the availability of raw manpower, the
quality and quantity of available cadre, and the regime's willingness to
accept the cost of such an expansion. The evidence of the way that Hanoi
currently perceives its limitations on this front is extremely thin. In any
case, the costs of such an effort undoubtedly would be higher than they
have been in the past. The raw recruits would be available for such a
structural expansion of the army, but the NVA would face a far more
serious problem in finding qualified NCO's and officers. The attrition rate
on these has been severe in recent years, and what little evidence there
is suggests that North Vietnam does not have a reserve pool of men in
this category. It is probable that North Vietnam will not create any major
new combat units of divisional size in the near future. We believe they
still retain the option of generating at least a few main force units, although
it is doubtful that the force structure would be made significantly greater
in the next nine months than it now is.
13. This being the case, North Vietnam could not undertake a greater
military effort against South Vietnam next year than it is doing this year,
unless it were able to get additional manpower from other areas or sources.
There are five such potential sources:
a. Training Units in the North These contain some of Hanoi's
best cadre, and the North Vietnamese might send some
of them back to the front if they believed the need was
great enough.
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L
L
L
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b. Northern Laos The NVA combat OB in northern Laos
was expanded by a division during 1971 in preparation
for the current campaign. Hanoi's force level requirements
in northern Laos next year will depend in large measure
on the condition of Lao forces and the extent of Thai
involvement. If there was a reduction in the fighting in
northern Laos, the enemy might be able to free one of
the two divisions now committed there.
c. Cambodia The virtually complete reorientation of the
four enemy main force divisions in Cambodia toward
South Vietnam in recent weeks has been made possible
in part by the poor performance of FANK. The
development of Khmer Communist combat forces and the
formation of eight light territorial-type NVA regional
regiments in Cambodia have also made it easier for these
four divisions in effect to turn their backs on FANK. If
FANK's performance does not improve by next year, and
that of the enemy's regional regiments does improve, the
enemy might be able to upgrade some of these regional
forces and use them, in additional to the four main force
divisions, for attacks against South Vietnam. The number
of men likely to be available from this source, however,
is not great.
d. Air Defense The recently expanded air defense system
of North Vietnam is Hanoi's greatest potential source of
additional high-quality manpower. But so long as the US
air campaign -- or even the US air threat - continues, the
enemy probably will not reduce significantly the number
of personnel assigned to air defense.
e. Recruitment Inside South Vietnam Unless the war turns
badly against South Vietnam this year, the enemy's ability
to find new Viet Cong recruits in South Vietnam will
remain inconsequential.
14. The conclusion from all this -- assuming that the North
Vietnamese are unable to achieve significant and lasting military victories
in their present offensive -- is that it will be extremely difficult for them
to launch action inside South Vietnam on a heavier scale next year. If
their casualties are heavy this year, they will almost certainly be unable
to launch a campaign anywhere near as large as the current one.
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I I
Ground Forces - South Vietnam
The Present Situation
15. The total size of the South Vietnamese armed forces is about
1 million men, of which some 460,000 are main force ground troops of
the ARVN or the Vietnamese Marines. (The Regional Forces (RF), Popular
Forces ?(PF), and Vietnamese Air Force and Navy account for the
remainder.) The GVN's main forces are thus substantially greater in number
than the enemy's main forces ranged against them in South Vietnam.
Although the South Vietnamese have had fairly serious problems in building
up their armed forces to this level, their casualties in the war have been
much less over the years than have the casualties of North Vietnam. On
balance, the south's present manpower situation is probably somewhat
better than that of the north (see Appendix III). Because its casualties are
likely to be less, the south should have less difficulty than the north in
maintaining its forces -- numerically -- at their present levels.
16. In terms of equipment and training, as well as in terms of
numbers, the South Vietnamese ground forces must be rated as equal or
superior to the North Vietnamese forces whom they are fighting. The South
Vietnamese have made significant progress in the last several years both
in military doctrine and the utilization of manpower. While they still have
a long way to go, they are increasingly making military assignments and
promotions on the basis of merit. Leadership and training have both
improved on the whole, although here again deficiencies remain.
17. The strengthening and upgrading of the RF and PF and the
creation of the Peoples Self-Defense Forces have freed ARVN regulars to
perform the main force role formerly dominated by US troops. These local
forces have also provided the basis for more effective and integrated local
security protection. As local security has improved, leading elements of the
territorial forces have moved into the main force role. In some areas, RF
units -- both battalions and in some cases separate companies -- are now
operating across provincial boundaries. In two provinces of MR 4 where
security has been good (An Giang and Go Cong), all RF units have recently
been operating outside their home provinces.
18. In eight of MR 4's 16 provinces, responsibility for security has
rested entirely on the territorial forces. The ARVN regular units in the
region have been increasingly free to operate against the enemy's in-country
base areas and across the border in Cambodia.
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L
L
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Outlook for 1973
19. The period of expansion for the South Vietnamese armed forces
is now over. Although some South Vietnamese officials desire a further
increase in the size of their army, such an increase, which would require
US assistance, is not in the cards. As is the case with the NVA, ARVN
will be fighting in 1973 with a force structure essentially no larger than
that which exists today. Any changes which are made will essentially be
readjustments within the existing force structure.
20. Assuming that the present enemy offensive is ultimately beaten
back by Allied forces without any lasting military gains to the enemy, there
wil' still probably be some additional manpower requirements placed on
ARVN in GVN MRs 1 and 2. An obvious requirement exists to replace
the 44,000 Republic of Korea (ROK) troops now in MR 2. Because these
troops are less effective in the pacification role than are Vietnamese
territorials - in some respects the ROKs are counterproductive -- and
because much of their support apparatus would be redundant, significantly
fewer Vietnamese troops would be required to replace them.
21. The local security problem in the coastal provinces of MR 1 and
MR 2 also may require some additional manpower. The requirement may
not be great, since there is considerable room for improvement in the
utilization of existing assets by local GVN officials. But to the extent that
these officials do not prosecute the pacification effort vigorously, both now
and after the current enemy offensive ends, more main force troops will
be needed in the area.
22. Our judgment is that the additional troops which may be
necessary in MR 1 and MR 2 could be provided fairly easily from the
ARVN forces now in the Delta. This assumes, once again, that the present
offensive ends without major military defeats or a lasting psychological
setback for the ARVN. It may prove difficult to move whole ARVN units
from their home areas in the Delta, but a sufficient cadre of officers and
men could be moved to form the nucleus of new units in locations where
they are more needed. In sum, both in the present period and in early
1973, ARVN should - from a quantitative point of view -- be able to.
handle the internal security demands which will be placed on it as well
as the main force threat from the NVA.
The Air and Naval Wars
23. North Vietnam now has only limited offensive air capability which
is deterred mainly by the continuing US air presence in Indochina. If this
US air presence remains, Hanoi's offensive air capability is unlikely to grow
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in the coming year. Defensively, Hanoi already has a well-integrated air
defense system consisting of surface-to-air missiles, antiaircraft artillery, and
MIG jet interceptors. Top Soviet air defense officials have recently been
in North Vietnam, and by 1973 it is likely that Hanoi's air defense network
will be further improved through the receipt of additional Soviet equipment.
(For a more detailed discussion of North Vietnamese air capability, see
Appendix VIII.)
24. South Vietnam has a fairly large and still growing air force, whose
combat capabilities are oriented primarily toward tactical air support. By
all yardsticks, this air force - the VNAF -- has become steadily more
effective as it has grown, although there are still deficiencies. A high level
of support is still required from the US Government and US contractors
for logistical management, maintenance, and training. Furthermore, neither
now nor in 1973 will the VNAF be capable of providing sufficient air
support during a period of high enemy, activity like the present. Nor will
it be capable of carrying out an active air interdiction campaign outside
South Vietnam in the enemy's well-defended infiltration corridors of
southern Laos. The VNAF has been designed primarily to handle "normal"
tactical air support requirements inside South Vietnam at a level of military
activity similar to that prevailing in 1971 (see Appendix VII). The above
comments relate to fixed-wing capabilities. The helicopter situation is
somewhat more complex as reflected in Appendix VII.
25. The navies of both North and South Vietnam are coastal defense
forces with little offensive punch. The South Vietnamese navy will
eventually assume the entire responsibility for MARKET TIME, the program
which has been largely successful in preventing North Vietnamese
supply/infiltration trawlers from reaching the South Vietnam coast.
Although this turnover will almost certainly impair MARKET TIME's
effectiveness, measures currently being taken may offset somewhat declining
US participation in the program. (For a discussion of the naval capabilities
of both North and South Vietnam, see Appendix IX.)
The External Aid Factor
26. Neither North Vietnam nor South Vietnam has an industrial base
capable of supporting the kind of war each side is now waging, and both
countries are heavily dependent on military aid from abroad. It is a truism
to point out that without US aid the South Vietnamese war effort would
quickly grind to a halt. But North Vietnam would clearly have similar
problems if Soviet and Chinese aid were to cease. For a wide variety of
10 -
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reasons, in monetary terms US aid to South Vietnam is larger than Soviet
and Chinese aid to Hanoi. In terms of real dependence, however, outside
aid is probably just as vital to Hanoi as it is to Saigon. The ordnance
industries of both countries are small, and each produces only a limited
number of light infantry weapons and some ammunition. Lacking resources
and a production capability, both countries must also import all the
petroleum and vehicles used in prosecuting a modern war.
27. In the case of North Vietnam, military aid deliveries from the
USSR and China reached a peak of $650 million in 1967 but have declined
since then to less than $200 million annually in 1970 and 1971. The decline
resulted mainly from a reduced need for sophisticated air defense equipment
from the USSR following the bombing halt and not from any limitation
imposed by the suppliers (see Appendix XI). The USSR and the People's
Republic of China (PRC) have always been willing to meet Hanoi's basic
military needs. Both reaffirmed their support for North Vietnam several
times during 1971 and early 1972, as evidenced by the dispatch of
high-ranking delegations to Hanoi last fall to sign the annual military and
economic aid agreements for 1972 and subsequent announcements of
supplemental military aid agreements for 1972. The March 1972 visit of
Soviet Deputy Defense Minister Batitskiy to Hanoi provides further evidence
of Moscow's continuing high-level interest in North Vietnam's air defense
capability. The monetary value of Soviet aid to North Vietnam will probably
rise as a result of this visit, and the Soviet Union may provide some new
types of military equipment.
28. Over the years, the military aid provided by the USSR and the
PRC has been more than adequate for North Vietnamese war aims as defined
by the North Vietnamese themselves. Moreover, there is no evidence that
North Vietnamese war strategy has ever been altered because of insufficient
military aid. Current levels of military aid fully meet the estimated current
requirements of the enemy. It is only prudent to assume that if those
requirements change, as may be the case now in the air defense field, the
volume of aid will also change.
29. A sharp reduction (e.g. 50%) in military aid to North Vietnam
would not affect its logistic capability to support a protracted warfare
strategy throughout Indochina for at least 12 to 18 months, although it
would affect Hanoi's ability to launch other all-out main force campaigns
of the type now beginning. A scarcity of petroleum might be the most
difficult problem for Hanoi if outside aid were slashed in this fashion.
Military reserves of petroleum would still be adequate, but an immediate
50% cut in oil deliveries by the USSR almost certainly would lead to
deterioration in the civilian transport sector of the economy, which
currently has only about a 90-day reserve supply of petroleum. For
"Nod
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exclusively military purposes, however, the Communists maintain generous
stocks of ordnance, petroleum, and trucks. There is ample evidence that
such stocks are large, dispersed throughout the logistic system, and would
be adequate to support a protracted war strategy to January 1973 even
if Soviet and Chinese aid were cut 50% today. In the longer run, of course,
a sustained aid cutback would force the enemy into an even lower profile
of guerrilla war with increasing dependence on indigenous logistic support.
The Qualitative Balance
Morale and National Will
30. The Vietnamese Communist passion for secrecy makes any
evaluation of morale and national will - among Communists either North
or South -- highly speculative. Nevertheless, in the broadest terms there
is little doubt about the trends of the last four years. Vietnamese Communist
human resources have been stretched in this period, and the military and
political apparatus that Hanoi can devote to the struggle is less resilient
and responsive, taken as a whole, than it used to be. The decline is best
documented among indigenous Communist assets in South Vietnam, who
are both less numerous and less well motivated than they were before the
1968 offensives. There has also been a scattering of indications of poor
morale among North Vietnamese soldiers, however, and it must be assumed
that such difficulties are cropping up with greater frequency. Moreover,
there are persistent morale problems among civilians in North Vietnam --
problems that have existed in one form or another as long as the war has
gone on but may be worsening as the costs of the North's commitment
become more apparent.
31. To date the fighters and commanders on the Communist side have
consistently seemed to be more thoroughly indoctrinated, more deeply
convinced of the righteousness of their cause, better disciplined, less prone
to desert, and more determined to fight hard and win than have the officers
and men on the South Vietnamese side. They still may be, but the difference
is no longer so clear nor so great. The winds of change have shifted; the
Communists no longer appear in so many Vietnamese eyes to be the wave
of the future. Today, many more Viet Cong cadre and regulars are filled
with doubts about their leadership and their destiny, and many more South
Vietnamese have gradually concluded that the Communists are indeed the
enemy and must be driven off.
32. When all this is said, however, it still appears that at least as
far as North Vietnam itself is concerned, the Communist will to prosecute
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the war is essentially unimpaired. Hanoi may not be expecting very much
for now out of its apparatus in South Vietnam, and it may be having more
trouble with the motivation of North Vietnamese troops and civilians alike
than it has ever had before. But the regime's own devotion to its cause
has not diminished, and it still seems able to get at least an adequate
response from the North Vietnamese populace.
Leadership
33. At the top of the North Vietnamese hierarchy, the fervor and
dedication of the men who for decades have set the tone for the Vietnamese
Communist movement appear undiminished. Most of these men are now
in their sixties and many of them apparently have periodic bouts of ill
health; moreover, there almost certainly are disagreements among them on
some issues. As a group, however, their quasi-religious commitment to the
cause of ridding Vietnam of non-Vietnamese, non-Communist influences -
and extending their hegemony to the rest of Indochina as well - seems
as strong as ever. The depth of this commitment apparently overrides any
differences among them. It also makes them unamenable, by and large,
to the notion of compromise with their adversaries. Communist leaders
apparently still believe that victory will be theirs if they fight long enough,
and they regard negotiations as simply one possible route to this goal. True
compromise is regarded as a serious possibility only when the movement's
very life is at stake, and there is nothing to suggest that the present
leadership believes their cause is in such straits today. Thus a significant
softening of their revolutionary line, even for tactical reasons, is unlikely.
34. The ruling group is unusually small by Communist standards, and
it has been exceptionally stable. As its members age, the problem of
succession looms increasingly large. What evidence there is on the subject
suggests that at least a limited effort has been made to move new men
into positions of authority -- men drawn from the Party, from North
Vietnam's nascent managerial bureaucracy, and perhaps also from the army.
Practically nothing is known about any of these men, but one or two seem
to have a relatively nondoctrinaire attitude and a good many are more
closely identified with domestic problems than with the war. It may be
that North Vietnam's priorities and strategies would change if such men
came to power. This is a risky speculation, however, since for them as
for today's ruling group, the Communist struggle has been the biggest single
consideration during their entire adult lives. In any case, the regime's
devotion to the "revolution" is not likely to diminish so long as the present
hierarchy remains intact, and there is nothing to indicate that anyone in
the hierarchy is about to leave the scene.
35. Among lower level military leaders, however, doubts about the
leadership and the destiny of the Communist cause seem to be cropping
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up with some regularity. We have good evidence of this among Viet Cong
cadres and regulars in South Vietnam, and there is little question that the
years of war have also taken their toll among experienced North Vietnamese
officers and NCOs. The last few years of relative inactivity may also have
impaired the combativeness of some Communist, main force units. The
extent of the decline, which almost certainly is most noticeable in infantry
units, is impossible to measure, however, and in some cases it may even
have been offset by an increased use of armor and artillery.
36. On the South Vietnamese side, there are leadership problems of
a different kind, which at least until recently have been considerably more
severe than those of the North. In the top governmental structure there
have always been some leaders just as dedicated to the cause of
anti-Communism as Hanoi's leaders have been dedicated to their cause.
Limitations of social class and educational background, however, have
hindered the advancement of many competent people with little formal
education, and have too frequently meant that incompetents with "proper"
backgrounds have held high positions.
37. These problems have been just as serious in the military services
as they have been in the government. (Since many of the leading
governmental posts are held by military men, the problems tend to be
identical in any case.) Historically, few promotions have been awarded for
excellence in the field, and aggressive combat leadership has too often not
helped the careers of field grade officers. Furthermore, corruption to one
degree or another has been almost routine with many, perhaps most, South
Vietnamese officers. This corruption, which also exists on a lesser scale
in the North Vietnamese army, makes it difficult for the troops to respect
their leaders and dilutes the professional dedication of the officers
themselves.
38. None of these deficiencies in the officer corps or among other
South Vietnamese leadership groups can be easily eradicated, and one of
them -- corruption - is probably as rampant today as it ever was. (It is
probably no more rampant, be it noted, than in various other Southeast
Asian countries.) At the same time, progress has been made in dealing with
some of the other deficiencies of South Vietnamese leadership. At the
Division and Regional (Corps) levels of ARVN, a number of hard driving
and aggressive officers have won recognition and positions which they
probably would not have won several years ago. Competence is increasingly
regarded as a necessary attribute for high rank or office - though exceptions
still abound. In both army and government, most middle- and top-level
leaders have become professionally more skillful as managers, planners, and
organizers, and the whole apparatus of government and armed forces runs
more smoothly. In general, many problems of leadership still exist in South
Vietnam, but it is no longer possible to make a clear judgment that they
are more severe than the problems which exist in North Vietnam.
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A Manpower Overview
of North and South Vietnam
1. Starting from roughly similar population bases -- an estimated
20 million for North Vietnam and 18 million for South Vietnam -- both
countries appear to have sufficient manpower reserves to continue the war
at current or even higher levels of intensity for several years to come.
2. South Vietnam has an estimated manpower pool of about
2-1 /2 million men in the prime military age group of 18-39 years of age,
and we believe that an additional 175,000-225,000 young men reach age
18 each year. The latter comprise most of the estimated GVN annual inflow
requirement of approximately 200,000 men. The principal mobilization
constraint faced by South Vietnam over time has been the lack of access
to manpower in areas dominated by the Viet Conga 1) During the critical
years of Vietnamization, however, this access improved dramatically,
enabling the South Vietnamese to recruit from a larger population base.
With no major new force augmentations planned, the GVN should be able
to meet military manpower needs for the foreseeable future without
significant economic dislocation.
3. North Vietnam, by way of comparison, has a manpower pool
of an estimated 1.3 million male civilians aged 15 to 39 who are fit for
military service. Approximately one-half million of these men are in the
17 to 25 age bracket that historically has provided most of the manpower
for the armed forces. The tabulation below indicates the decline that has
taken place since 1964 in the civilian reserve as a result of the induction
of an estimated 1.1 million men into military service. Hanoi can induct
up to 100,000 per year without further drawdown of its reserve, and it
would take several years of inductions at the 1968 peak rate of 200,000
to bring reserves in the prime age group to the point of exhaustion. Even
then, a new crop of more than 100,000 men would reach age 17 each
year. Hanoi thus has the manpower to continue the war indefinitely at
a substantial level of activity.
1. Obviously, the VC recruit from South Vietnam's manpower pool as well. In
Tet 1968 the VC recruited as many as 12,000 men a month. By 1970, recruitment
dropped to probably not more than 3,000 a month. Clearly, VC recruitment has declined
further and is at a level that can very nearly be dismissed when thinking of current
balances. Should the current offensive result in a marked increase in enemy control
over some areas of South Vietnam, the enemy's recruitment potential would be
enhanced.
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Thousand Men a/
As of
31 December 15-39 17-25
1964 2,010 760
1965 1,910 660
1966 1,700 480
1967 1,570 380
1968 1,430 310
1969 1,430 350
1970 1,420 390
1971 1,370 390
a. Physically fit males, within the
indicated age groups, who are not in the
armed forces.
4. Between 1964 and 1971, South Vietnam's regular and territorial
forces doubled, rising from 514,000 to more than one million -- most of
the growth occurring from 1966 on. During the same period, Hanoi's forces
also more than doubled in size, from an estimated 250,000 to a current
level of 575,000 -- including some 200,000-220,000 NVA forces located
in South Vietnam, Cambodia, and Laos in December 1971.
5. The most salient feature of South Vietnam's manpower, when
contrasting it with North Vietnam's, may be its lower level of combat
losses.(2) To date, about 140,000 South Vietnamese military personnel have
been killed. Other permanent losses include a fairly substantial number of
disabled, a few discharged for other reasons, and an unknown number of
successful draft dodgers. (It should be noted that whatever the size of the
latter group -- and it probably is not inordinately large - it almost certainly
has shrunk as the government's control over the population has grown.)
Total losses from these causes are estimated to be in the neighborhood
of 250,000. The desertion problem is a more serious one, undoubtedly
accounting for more losses than all other factors combined. However,
deserters also are a major source of "new" recruits. Although soldiers may
desert their original units for a variety of reasons, many of them
subsequently reappear with other units. Given the difficulty of keeping track
of these men, we cannot be sure of the numbers - but it seems clear that
they account for a substantial portion of annual recruitment.
2. A major reason for this situation in the past has been that the VC/NVA have
faced the vastly superior firepower possessed by US and the other Allied forces.
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6. To get a picture of North Vietnam's manpower management and
losses, it is useful to look at aggregate manpower flows. One way to
accomplish this is to analyze out-of-country flows compared with the
current order of battle (OB). Regular infiltration starts from 1964 (the year
prior to expansion of Hanoi's forces) through 1971 total an estimated
930,000. There were also a substantial number of men who moved south
in special skilled infiltration groups. The southern Laos OB prior to 1970
(when infiltration to southern Laos began to be reflected in COMINT) of
about 50,000 NVA combat and administrative services personnel should
be added to the infiltration totals. Although there is no time series on
infiltration to northern Laos, an NVA OB and filler estimate should be
included as a part of the out-of-country force augmentation. This combined
figure is estimated to be on the order of 100,000 troops, bringing total
augmentation to 1.1 million men. If the current OB in North Vietnam
(365,000) is subtracted from the total North Vietnamese OB (575,000),
a current out-of-country OB of 210,000 is obtained. Subtracting this from
the 1.1 million troops deployed out of country yields a result of about
900,000, which represents losses. While this methodology is very rough,
ignoring such factors as the number of exfiltrators not remaining in military
service, it probably is sufficient to indicate a gross order of magnitude of
enemy losses. However rough as a measure, it indicates at a minimum that
the manpower costs have been greater for the North Vietnamese than for
the South Vietnamese in both absolute and relative terms (against total
population and military manpower pool bases).
7. Analysis of comparative military training capabilities and results
provides yet another yardstick of relative manpower efficiency. As a result
of high and persistent loss levels (infantry units have a 50% to 75% annual
turnover rate, often for several years running) the quality of North
Vietnamese soldiers -- both cadres and troops -- has deteriorated during
the past several years. There is sufficient evidence from the testimony of
prisoners and defectors and from the analysis of US observers to support
this judgment. While this does not necessarily mean that the quality of
the basic training of North Vietnamese soldiers has eroded significantly,
it faces North Vietnamese infantry commanders with the problem of
operating with green troops and a reduced number of experienced cadre.
As a result there has been a perceptible decline in the elan and confidence
of both cadre and infantry troops. Nevertheless, North Vietnam's social
system provides a type of discipline that results in the carrying out of
orders -- even when morale is low -- in a vastly superior manner to most
armies and especially in contrast to ARVN.
1.
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8. Over the same period, ARVN has made qualitative improvements
in training, morale, technical skills, and leadership. These are enumerated
elsewhere in this memorandum. What is significant is that ARVN
performance clearly seems to be on an upward trend. The NVA infantry
performance appears to have declined, although the increased use of armor
and artillery may have offset this.
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Growth and Development
of the North Vietnamese Armed Forces
1. Since 1964, when Hanoi began to increase its military manpower
commitment to the war in the south, the North Vietnam Armed Forces
(NVNAF), including the regional forces, have more than doubled in size,
from an estimated 225,000-275,000 to currently about 550,000-600,000,
including some 200,000-220,000 NVA forces located in South Vietnam,
Cambodia, and Laos in December 1971. These latter forces serve to bolster
the estimated 140,000-150,000 indigenous regular combat and
administrative service personnel in those countries. The distribution of these
forces by geographic area is shown in Table 11-1.
2. One of the largest increases in NVAF strength occurred during
1966 when NVA regular ground combat (infantry, artillery, and armor)
forces in North Vietnam appear to have been expanded by some 100,000
to 150,000 men. This growth was necessary to support Hanoi's increased
manpower commitment to the war in the south and also to fill out upgraded
or newly created combat units in North Vietnam. During the period 1964
through 1966, for example, Hanoi upgraded four infantry brigades to
division level(l) and formed two new training divisions.
3. The expansion of the structure of NVNAF can also be seen in
looking at the growth in the number of regular ground combat regiments
throughout Indochina during 1965 through 1971. Despite the problems of
an increasingly weaker data base as one goes back in time, it appears that
the number of such regiments has grown during the period by about 50
(roughly from 55 to 105), most of which were infantry. In addition, many
of the currently designated VC regiments in South Vietnam and Cambodia
have received such a large number of NVA replacements during the period
that the VC designation has become nominal.
4. In addition to its growth, both numerically and structurally, the
NVNAF also has substantially improved its combat effectiveness through
the use of new, longer range offensive and defensive weapons as well as
military equipment. This is evidenced by the current campaign in MR 1
1. These units had previously held division status but were downgraded to brigade
level in the late 1950s and early 1960s.
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Communist Military Forces in Indochina
December 1971 a/
NVN
Armed
Forces
Indigenous
Forces b/
Total
Total
575
145
720
Regular Armed Forces
c/
315
-
315
Regional Forces
50
-
50
Out-of-country
210
145 d/
355
South Vietnam
80
60
140
Cambodia
30
45
75
Laos
100
40
140
a. Estimates are given as midpoints of ranges for
the sake of simplicity. In addition, NVA units in
the infiltration pipeline in December are counted as
part of the North Vietnam figures.
b. Viet Cong in South Vietnam, Viet Cong and Khmer
Communists in Cambodia, and Pathet Lao in Laos.
c. Army, navy, and air force.
d. Excluding local guerrilla forces.
in which the enemy is employing the strategic concept of an air defense
canopy together with the use of armor and heavy artillery. Almost certainly
if this capability exists now, it will be enhanced a year from now.
5. Despite all the growth in the NVNAF's military capability during
the period 1965 through 1971, however, there is continuing evidence of
increasing shortages of qualified company-grade officers and NCO personnel
for individual units. This shortage probably has resulted from the high
casualty rates incurred by NVA forces fighting in the south; the upgrading,
regeneration, and creation of new NVA units for either home defense or
deployment elsewhere in Indochina; and the increased demands for
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personnel in the air defense effort. In addition, Hanoi also faces the constant
drain of sending a large number of replacement personnel to the south
just to maintain its regular combat forces. Many of the filler personnel
in the last three years are less experienced and not as well prepared for
combat as they were earlier in the war, as evidenced by low morale and
high desertion rates among the newer recruits. Another indicator of
shortages of qualified cadre in "first line" regular combat infantry units
may be the increased willingness since 1969 to use North Vietnamese
provincial units to fight in Laos and the DMZ area.
6. Although the previous sections have taken an overview of posture
of North Vietnam's military forces during 1965 through 1971, there are
several points worth noting within the individual functional categories of
the armed forces within North Vietnam.
Infantry
7. While NVNAF has expanded its infantry structure throughout
Indochina, Hanoi appears to have attempted to maintain through the
creation, regeneration, and rotation of units about 30 regular infantry
regiments (either subordinate to a division or independent) within North
Vietnam during the last half of each year. During the first half of any
given year, however, Hanoi has been willing to draw down on the structure
to support its external forces by about ten regiments. For example, North
Vietnam is estimated to have had at least 27 infantry regiments in North
Vietnam (including those in the infiltration pipeline) in December 1971.
By early April 1972, the arrival in South Vietnam of 12 infantry regiments
of the 320th, 324B, 304th, and 308th Divisions reduced this structure to
some 15.
8. These deployments reduce the number of infantry divisions
available within North Vietnam for home defense or use elsewhere in
Indochina to its lowest level of the war (as shown in Table 11-2), including
early 1968 and the period in early 1971 when Hanoi deployed four of
the nine divisions to Laos to counter Operation Lam Son 719. In addition,
on a regimental basis if we consider the independent infantry regiments
together with those subordinate to divisions, the number available in North
Vietnam would drop to approximately the same level as existed in early
1968.
9. It is difficult to imagine at this time Hanoi further drawing down
on its home defense/reserve infantry structure without the regeneration or
creation of some new units. The last large regeneration of units occurred
in the latter part of 1968. This included the regeneration of the 325th
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Disposition of NVA Infantry Divisions
March 1968 April 1972
Division
North
Vietnam
North
Out-of-Country Vietnam Out-of-Country
304th
South
Vietnam
308th
x
South
Vietnam
312th
x
Laos
31 6th
Laos
Laos
320th
South
Vietnam
South
Vietnam
324B
South
Vietnam
South
Vietnam
325th
South
Vietnam
330th
x
350th
Division - for the fourth time in the unit's history - and the 36th Regiment
of the 308th Division. The former regiments of the 325th Division and
the 36th Regiment were left in South Vietnam when the 325th Headquarters
and the 308th Division rotated back to North Vietnam after the heavy
fighting in South Vietnam in 1968. Since then, the two known regenerations
of large units were the 52 "B" Regiment of the 320th Division by March
1971, after the 52 "A" had deployed to Cambodia in January of that year,
and in late 1971 a 166th Regiment was formed in Quang Binh Province
from elements of the 271st Regiment, which subsequently deployed to
Cambodia in early 1972. Despite Hanoi's increasing commitments of units
to the war in Indochina, these two regiments appear to be the only new
regimental infantry units created within North Vietnam since the end
of 1968.(2)
10. This raises the crucial question of Hanoi's current ability to form
new divisional or regimental infantry units. The previous upgrading,
regeneration, and creation of units; the large number of NVA casualties
incurred to date throughout Indochina; the apparently growing use of
2. Recent evidence suggests the NVA may have created a new division in 1971, now
apparently deploying into Cambodia.
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provincial and militia forces in roles previously reserved for the regular
combat units; and the continuing demands for qualified replacement
personnel -- are all factors which have reduced the pool of readily available
experienced cadre within North Vietnam from which to form new units
as well as to provide replacements for existing out-of-country forces.(3)
This is not to say categorically that Hanoi cannot create new units. However,
there would be some question concerning the combat effectiveness of such
new units.
11. In addition to the regular infantry forces within North Vietnam,
there are currently an estimated 50,000 troops in 17 regional regiments
that are considered to be part of North Vietnam's reserve forces. Although
these regional forces are generally considered "second line" troops, they
are full-time, armed, and actually engaged in military training and duties,
including, in some cases, air defense. While these are usually employed only
within their home province, they are mobile and can be deployed elsewhere
within North Vietnam if required.
Artillery
12. As of December 1971, there were an estimated ten NVA artillery
regiments in North Vietnam.(4) Contrary to past deployments, current
evidence indicates that those infantry divisions that have deployed to South
Vietnam this dry season - that is, the 320th, 304th, and the 308th -- are
doing so for the first time with a subordinate artillery regiment. Since
December, one such artillery regiment has arrived in the B-3 Front area,
and two others deployed into Quang Tri Province in April.
3. One illustration of the shortage of experienced NCO personnel is suggested by
the promotion record of a recently captured NVA sergeant of the 165th Regiment
of the 312th Division in Laos. He was drafted into the army in May 1971, promoted
to private first class in August, to corporal in October, and to sergeant one month
later after his infiltration into northern Laos as part of a 500-man replacement group
for the 312th Division. His unusually rapid promotions occurred despite the fact that
he had been expelled from the Labor Youth Group in early 1971 for evading the draft,
an obvious mark on the record against him.
4. This number excludes the four artillery regiments subordinate to the B-5 Front
that traditionally operate in the DMZ area and are carried as part of the enemy order
of battle for South Vietnam.
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Air Defense
13. North Vietnam's air defense (AD) system, including its air force,
has consumed a considerable amount of manpower. Currently, the AD forces
are estimated at nearly 100,000 men, including antiaircraft artillery (AAA),
surface-to-air missiles (SAM), air force, radar, and associated support
personnel. These persons are deployed in more than 65 regiments(5) and
a large number of independent battalions. Only recently has the Intelligence
Community been able to get a more complete picture of the AD structure
that now permits the identification of the numerical designation of AAA
units. (Previously, the number of AAA forces had to be estimated on the
basis of gun counts.) In terms of deployment, there was a major
north-to-south realignment of AAA forces within North Vietnam in 1971.
Of the 46 AAA regiments of the AD Command, nine shifted from the
Northern Air Defense Region (NADR) in the Hanoi-Haiphong area to south
of the 20th parallel during the third quarter of 1971. Currently, there are
15 AAA regiments in the NADR, 28 in the North Vietnamese and Laotian
Panhandles (elements of three of the 28 now have, for the first time,
deployed into northern SVN), and three in northern Laos.
14. The basic regimental structure for the various AD forces appears
to have been essentially established by 1968. Since that time, however,
the development of an integrated command and control system, as well
as additional and upgraded weapons and equipment, and increased
manpower and training have all contributed to a significant increase in North
Vietnam's AD capability. Part of the increased manpower alloted to AD
has served to increase the manning levels of AD units. Some of the
manpower has come from upgrading the status of some local militia forces
and integrating these into regularly constituted AAA units. The use of militia
forces in AD units results not only from the heavy regional emphasis on
AD but also from the lack of available qualified personnel in the regular
armed forces.
Armor
15. There is very little information available on armor units in North
Vietnam. The North Vietnamese Armor Command was formed in mid-1965
with the 202nd and 203rd Armored Regiments, the latter being formed
early that year from personnel of the 202nd. Although small NVA armored
5. Including elements of 14 AAA regiments and I SAM regiment deployed at this
time in northern and southern Laos.
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elements have been identified in Laos and South Vietnam in the past, these
have not been larger than battalion size. Evidence received in late 1971
and early 1972, however, suggests that North Vietnam may currently have
more than the two armored regiments identified above. This is supported
by the presence of a large number of tanks in Quang Tri and the B-3 Front
area, apparently the largest deployment of NVN armor outside North
Vietnam in the course of the war.
Training
16. During the period from late 1965 to early 1966, Hanoi increased
its training capability by upgrading one infantry brigade into a training
division and forming two other divisions. There are currently 14 training
regiments subordinate to these three divisions. In addition to the three
divisions, there is the 22nd Training Group with an estimated ten battalions,
one regiment of the 330th Division, and two regiments of the 350th
Division, which also provide basic and preinfiltration training. These units
are estimated to be capable of training some 40,000 men per training
cycle.(6) In addition, provincial regiments have been training substantial
numbers of recruits for the NVA since the summer of 1967 when
preparations for the Tet Offensive of 1968 were under way. Provincial forces
are estimated to be capable of training at least 20,000 men per cycle.
Moreover, these estimates understate the NVA training capability in that
some training is also performed within regular infantry units.
6. A training "cycle" is normally three to six months.
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Growth and Development of the South Vietnamese Armed Forces
1. Between 1965 and 1968, GVN forces were primarily used as a
pacification and security apparatus, while US forces conducted aggressive
combat operations designed to weaken and ultimately destroy VC/NVA
main forces. Following the 1968 Tet Offensive, the GVN mobilized its
military forces and expanded its authorized manning level to 1.1 million
men. The regular force structure was expanded from 341,000 in January
1968 to 514,000 in December 1971 for a 51% increase. The Regional and
Popular Forces were increased 75%, from 305,000 in January 1968 to
533,000 in December 1971.
2. The reduced military posture of VC/NVA forces after 1968
allowed the GVN to upgrade its forces and implement a successful
pacification program. The implementation of the Vietnamization Program
in late 1969 provided modern military equipment for GVN forces designed
to increase their mobility and firepower effectiveness. The GVN force
structure now has a complement of individual weapons and military
equipment that formerly characterized only US forces. The M-16 rifle has
been distributed to all RVNAF forces. Other small-unit weapons such as
the M-60 machinegun, M-79 grenade launcher, 60-mm mortar, and the
81-mm mortar provide lower echelon combat units with the necessary
firepower to conduct aggressive combat operations.
3. Since mid-1970, ARVN cross-border operations and in-country
combat operations have substantiated the GVN's ability to provide combat
support to ground troops with a minimum of US assistance under most
military conditions. Combat support in the form of artillery, tactical air
support (tacair), and logistics has demonstrated the dramatic growth and
development of the GVN military forces since the crisis months of late
1964 and early 1965.
Artillery
4. The GVN has significantly expanded its artillery support to
ground forces. Since June 1968 the number of 105-mm howitzer battalions
has been increased from 23 to 50. This development has increased the total
number of 105-mm guns available by 74% - from 414 to 720. The number
of 155-mm howitzer battalions has been increased from 7 in June 1968
to 18 during fiscal year (FY) 1972. The total number of 155-mm guns
subsequently increased from 126 to 324. In September 1971 the GVN
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activated its first 175-mm howitzer battalion with 12 guns, and subsequently
deployed it to northern Quang Tri Province in Military Region (MR) 1.0)
An additional battalion is scheduled to be activated during FY 1972, to
increase the total number of 175-mm guns to 24.
5. The expansion of the 105-mm and 155-mm howitzer battalions
almost equals the peak number of guns available to US forces in December
1968. The number of 105-mm guns was 738 and the number of 155-mm
guns was 342 at the end of December 1968, but the total number of
175-mm guns was 216. The fact that RVNAF has fewer 175-mm guns is
disconcerting, but the North Vietnamese heavy artillery threat is
concentrated in the DMZ area and MR 1 where GVN 175-mm artillery
is deployed. Some of the deficiency presumably will be alleviated, however,
by the continued presence of US tacair, B-52 aircraft, and VNAF close
air support.
6. The expansion of GVN territorial forces was complemented by
the development of 105-mm howitzer platoons designed to support
territorial forces. Since 1970 the number of 105-mm howitzer platoons has
been expanded from 100 to 176. This increased the total number of 105-mm
guns available to territorial forces by 76% from 200 to 352.
Armor
7. Before 1968 the GVN armor capability was quite limited with
only 11 armored cavalry squadrons deployed as separate units throughout
the four military regions. There were no organized tank battalions. In
mid-1970 the armored cavalry squadrons were task organized at the division
level and expanded to 18 squadrons, of which 11 are at the division echelon.
This development increased the total number of armored personnel carriers
available for combat from 132 to 216 between 1968 and 1972. Normally,
one armored cavalry squadron is assigned to operate with each ARVN
division. The first medium tank battalion was activated in September 1971
and has a complement of 54 tanks.(2) At the present time there are no
known plans to activate additional armored cavalry squadrons or tank
battalions.
Regular Forces
8. Currently the ARVN regular force establishment has primary
responsibility for parrying VC/NVA main forces while GVN territorial forces
1. A number of these guns apparently have been lost in the current action in Quang
Tri. These must be replaced to enable ARVN to return to authorized strength.
2. In the country as a whole, the tank inventory consists of 65 medium and 400
light tanks.
111-2
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are responsible for local security and implementation of the pacification
program. In addition to the dramatic expansion of regular forces since 1968,
there has been a general improvement in leadership at all military echelons
as a result of an active national policy, improved training, and changes in
military doctrine and tactics.
9. Several personnel command changes effected recently at the
division level should provide additional impetus to the combat effectiveness
of ARVN regular forces. However, chronic problems continue to exist, such
as desertions, marginal leadership, and the inability of maneuver battalions
to maintain authorized strength levels. Several ministerial directives have
been decreed recently providing for combat pay and the reassignment of
personnel from overstrength combat support units to understrength
maneuver battalions. Manpower reports of January and February 1972
indicate some progress had been made in bringing maneuver battalions up
to authorized strength levels.
10. The military role of the ARVN maneuver battalion has changed
between 1968 and 1972 from primarily a pacification and security mission
to one of active combat operations. Factors responsible for this development
have been the substantial withdrawal of US forces and the successful
implementation of many US military programs designed to improve and
modernize the GVN main force structure. Since the first quarter of 1968
the number of GVN maneuver battalions assigned to combat operations
has doubled, growing from 78 to 159 between 1968 and 1972. Maneuver
battalions assigned to security and pacification decreased by 65%, from 97
to 34, between 1968 and 1972. Lending additional support to this
development has been the success thus far of the pacification program in
South Vietnam in expanding GVN influence and control over the rural
population. The complementary factors of an erosion of VC/NVA Regular
Combat Forces and Guerrillas since 1968 and a concurrent upgrading of
South Vietnamese territorial forces aided and abetted the improvement in
GVN main forces, as has the overall qualitative improvement in the combat
performance of ARVN maneuver battalions.
Ranger Border Defense and Regional Force Battalions
11. The growth and development of territorial forces since 1968 have
generated a new echelon of forces that complement the ARVN regular force
establishment. In early 1970, 37 CIDG camps along the South Vietnamese
border were converted to Ranger Border Defense Battalions and placed
under the authority of the respective military region commanders. This
111-3
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policy significantly improved the capability of military region commanders
in intelligence gathering and in the interdiction of lines of communications.
12. During 1970 the Regional Forces were organized into battalions
and separate companies. The battalions were expanded from 31 to 46
between 1970 and 1972. The Regional Force battalion headquarters is based
on the headquarters organization of an ARVN maneuver battalion. Regional
Force battalion personnel are trained and equipped for mobile operations
within their province and across province boundaries under the control of
the province chief or military region commander. In many areas of South
Vietnam, particularly since 1971, Regional Force battalions have assumed
combat missions normally assigned to ARVN maneuver battalions. Fire
support for the Regional Force battalions is provided by 105-mm howitzer
platoons within the province.
13. The development of Ranger Border Defense and Regional Force
battalions probably has been one of the most significant military
developments within the RVNAF force structure. It has provided the ARVN
regular force structure with additional maneuverability and firepower.
Future Expansion
14. As of December 1971 the assigned strength of RVNAF was
approximately 50,000 men below the authorized manning level for FY 1972
of 1.1 million men -- about 30,000 in the regular and 20,000 in the
territorial forces. Once the force level of 1.1 million men is reached,
however, there are at this time no plans to expand the RVNAF further.
When this level is reached, any expansion of forces in a given area of South
Vietnam will be at the expense of the RVNAF elsewhere in the country.
The most likely sources for this type of reinforcement are main forces
elements in the Delta or from the upgrading of territorials. This is, in fact,
now taking place. Although the expansion of the regular forces is possible
within the RVNAF structure if one is willing to draw down on the size
of the territorials, such action could jeopardize some of the progress
previously made in pacification.
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Balance of Forces (Allied to VC/NVA), 1968-72,
by Military Region
Force Levels(1)
1. To explain changes in the relative military strength of the two
sides in South Vietnam, we have employed three force ratio concepts. These
are Main Force Ratio, Main and Local Force Ratio, and Total Force Ratio.
The force ratio concepts have been developed according to the roles of
particular friendly and enemy forces since 1968, rather than standard
organizational missions. This is most apparent in the Main Force Ratio
definition. For each of the three echelons, maneuver personnel only are
included. No combat support, combat service support, or headquarters
personnel are included on either side. To show the dynamics of the changing
relationship over time, three separate time periods were selected. The first
quarters of 1968, 1970, and 1972 were chosen because (1) 1968 includes
the General Offensive and the highest strength level reached by VC/NVA
forces, (2) 1970 includes the period of protracted warfare and the highest
strength level reached by combined Allied forces, (3) 1972 includes the
current buildup of enemy forces and a significantly improved GVN force
structure, and (4) the first quarter of each of the years reflects maximum
dry season forward deployment of North Vietnamese forces. In addition
a "maximum enemy threat" ratio for the beginning of the 1972/73 dry
season has been constructed to show the upper range of the enemy's combat
force expansion and its impact on the friendly versus enemy force ratios.
Main Force Ratio
2. This ratio includes those forces on each side employed in a main
force role and is calculated from aggregate maneuver battalion strengths.
Thus, on the VC/NVA side, although the number of battalions increased
over the four-year period, the number of personnel in the Main Force Ratio
1. All ratios are based on current VC/NVA main force deployments to South Vietnam
in early April 1972 and during 1968-70 include forces rotated into the DMZ, MR 1,
and the threat area south of Dong Hoi. Recent GVN planned main force deployments
are not reflected and would alter the ratios. However, they would be offset somewhat
by enemy and friendly losses during the current enemy offensive.
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declined because of the sharp reduction in the average number of men per
battalion.
3. The administrative subordination of units in the Main Force Ratio
was changed to reflect changes in roles and in the character of the war.
For 1968, on the GVN side, the strength of all regular Allied maneuver
battalions was included; on the VC/NVA side, all main force battalions
plus local force battalions were included. For the 1970 ratio, Allied
battalions on pacification status and VC local force battalions were dropped
on the grounds that because of their mission (and condition in the case
of the VC local forces) and the changed nature of the war, neither could
be considered to be in the main force role. The 1972 ratio was changed
further to include the personnel in the GVN's newly developed regional
force battalions. Thus, the Main Force Ratio reflects the current absence
of the VC local forces from the main force war and the upgrading of GVN
territorials. All US and Free World forces are excluded from the Main Force
Ratio for 1972.
Main and Local Force Ratio
4. This ratio expands the concept to include local force-type troops
on both sides. It is intended to include echelons that typically have some
limited mobility and greater firepower than lower echelon elements. It
includes friendly battalions on pacification status and separate regional force
companies. On the VC side are included the local force battalions. These
definitions hold for all years.
Total Force Ratio
5. To the above are added on the GVN side, the popular forces
and, on the VC side, the local force companies and platoons and guerrillas.
An argument can be made for including the local force companies and
platoons in the Main and Local Force Ratio in 1968. However, they are
small numerically and do not affect the ratios significantly. In any event,
by 1970 their status clearly had eroded sufficiently to drop them from
the category. Also, various small elements on each side could have been
included in this ratio, such as the police field forces and the VC
infrastructure armed units, but these would not meaningfully change the
ratios. Conceptually, the People's Self-Defense Forces -- also excluded --
belong in this ratio. They are of some significance from the security point
of view, but, more importantly, their existence shows that the GVN has
successfully mobilized massive numbers and denied them to the VC.
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Analysis of Force Ratios for South Vietnam
Main Force Ratio(2)
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6. The Main Force Ratio for South Vietnam increased from 2.9 to
4.2 between the first quarters of 1968 and 1970. This was primarily caused
by the severe erosion of VC/NVA main forces following the 1968 Tet
Offensive and the upgrading (from pacification status) of GVN maneuver
battalions to conduct combat operations. VC/NVA main forces decreased
approximately 50% between 1968 and 1970 while the percentage of GVN
maneuver battalions on combat operations increased from 47% to 77%
during the same period, causing friendly main forces to decrease by only
26% despite US troop withdrawals.
7. From the first quarter of 1970 to the first quarter of 1972 the
Main Force Ratio declined from 4.2 to 3.3. This trend reflects primarily
the accelerated withdrawal of US forces and the recent enemy main force
deployments from Cambodia to GVN MRs 2 and 3. Friendly main forces
were decreased by 22% while enemy main forces remained about the same.
A separate ratio is provided to show the impact of adjacent VC/NVA main
forces in Cambodia. Their effect reduces the 1972 Main Force Ratio from
3.3 to 2.8, about the same as the 1968 ratio.
Main and Local Force Ratio
8. The Main and Local Force Ratio again shows an increase between
1968 and 1970 and a decrease between 1970 and 1972. Even though
additional forces on both sides are included, the impact of changes within
the friendly and enemy forces since 1968 has the same effect upon the
Main and Local Force Ratio as the Main Force Ratio. Also if we include
adjacent VC/NVA main forces in Cambodia, the ratio declines to the 1968
level.
Total Force Ratio
9. The Total Force Ratio highlights the accelerated erosion of enemy
local forces and guerrillas and the rapid growth and development of GVN
territorial forces. The ratio shows a continued increase through 1972, going
from 2.6 in 1968 to 4.1 in 1970 to 4.8 in 1972. Total enemy forces
2. See Tables IV-1 through IV-3.
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decreased 48% while total friendly forces decreased only by 3% between
1968 and 1972. If we allow for adjacent VC/NVA main forces in Cambodia,
the ratio declines slightly to 4.5 but is still higher than in any previous
time period.
Military Region Force Ratio Analysis
Main Force Ratio
10. The ratios for military regions reflect interregional differences and
intertemporal changes. For example, the current MR 1 ratio is the lowest
for any military region in the period. This is in part due to an ever-present
North Vietnamese threat in the DMZ and to the fact that a majority of
US troop withdrawals have come from MR 1. Since the first quarter of
1968, friendly main forces have declined by 53% and enemy main forces
by about 42%. For 1972, we have included the entire VNMC Division in
friendly main forces and the 324B, 304th, and 308th NVA Divisions in
enemy main forces. The ratio increased marginally between 1968 and 1970
from 2.4 to 2.5 but has declined to 1.9 in 1972.
11. . In MR 2 the ratio increased between 1968 and 1970 from 3.3
to 7.0. This was primarily due to a significant erosion in the enemy's forces
and several enemy main force unit deployments out of the military region
in mid-1968. From 1970 to 1972 the ratio declined drastically from 7.0
to 2.1, reflecting accelerated US troop withdrawals and the current enemy
buildup of main forces in western Kontum Province. In fact, between the
first quarter of 1970 and 1972 enemy main forces increased by 220%, from
5,000 to 16,000. Friendly main forces have decreased by 6%, from 35,000
to 33,000. The 1972 ratio reflects the assumed deployment of the ARVN
Airborne Division from MR 3 to MR 2.
12. MRs 3 and 4 show that there is a friendly main force surplus
at the present time. The main force war in MRs 3 and 4 has diminished
since 1968. Since 1968 the ratio has increased from 3.9 to 7.8 in MR 3.
Factors responsible for this development have been the erosion of enemy
forces since 1968, the deployment of enemy main force units to Cambodia
in early 1970, and a general improvement in GVN military forces. Although
the withdrawal of US forces caused friendly main forces to be reduced
by 50% after 1968, enemy main forces were reduced by 75%. However,
if we include the adjacent VC/NVA main forces in Cambodia the ratio
falls somewhat below the 1968 level to 3.3. In MR 4, friendly main force
strength has not been significantly affected by US troop withdrawals and
the enemy's main forces have been significantly reduced. Friendly main
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forces were reduced by 15% between 1968 and 1970, but were increased
by 12% between 1970 and 1972. On the other hand, enemy main forces
have been reduced by 69% since 1968 primarily through the erosion of
forces and to a lesser extent main force unit deployments to Cambodia
in early 1970.
13. In the final analysis, it is quite apparent from the Main Force
Ratios that the GVN has a main force distribution problem that could be
alleviated, if necesary, by deploying main forces from MR 3 and/or MR 4
to MRs 1 and 2.
Main and Local Force Ratio
14. The 1972 ratios for MRs 1 and 2 again show that the GVN's
military posture has deteriorated from 1968 and 1970 levels relative to
MRs 3 and 4. The inclusion of additional friendly forces in the Main and
Local Force Ratio definition is not quite enough to increase the 1972 ratios
to 1968 levels. In MR I between 1968 and 1972, friendly main and local
forces were reduced by 41% and enemy main and local forces by only
26%. During the same time period in MR 2, friendly forces were decreased
by 5,000 men, from 95,000 to 90,000, and enemy forces were increased
from 18,000 in 1968 to 20,000 in 1972 because of the 1972 buildup in
western Kontum Province.
15. Ratios for MRs 3 and 4 suggest that a highly favorable military
situation has occurred in both regions since 1968. A large portion of the
erosion of enemy main and local forces and out-of-country main force unit
deployments have occurred within MRs 3 and 4. Between 1968 and 1972,
enemy main and local forces decreased by 40% in MR 3. Friendly main
and local forces decreased by 33% during the same time period. The ratios
reflect the drawdown of enemy forces in both regions. The MR 3 Main
and Local Force Ratio moves from a low of 6.0 in 1968 to 6.7 in 1972.
However, if adjacent VC/NVA main forces in Cambodia are considered,
the ratio falls below the 1968 level to 4.7. The MR 4 Main and Local
Force Ratio shows an increase from 6.1 in 1968 to 10.3 in 1972.
16. Application of the Main and Local Force Ratio definition has
provided additional evidence confirming that there is a surplus of friendly
forces in MRs 3 and 4. Except for rare threat periods the GVN advantage
in MR 3 is as high as in MR 4.
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Total Force Ratio
17. The Total Force Ratio definition probably provides the most
complete trend in the relationship between friendly and enemy forces over
time. Since the 1968 Tet Offensive, the war in South Vietnam has been
generally characterized as a period of protracted warfare. However, there
have been regional exceptions to this general characterization of the war.
In MRs 1 and 2, US and GVN military forces have been waging two kinds
of warfare, protracted warfare in the coastal lowlands and main force
warfare in the northern and central highlands. The net effect of the Total
Force Ratio concept reveals that friendly forces have achieved substantial
success in maintaining an adequate force structure in all military regions
since 1968 despite the withdrawal of large numbers of US forces.
18. The MR 1 Total Force Ratio increases from 1.8 to 2.5 between
1968 and 1970 and increases again in 1972 to 2.8. Total enemy forces
in the region had been eroded by 52% between 1968 and 1972 with local
forces accounting for much of the erosion while enemy main forces in 1972
were maintained at strength levels comparable to 1970. Total friendly forces
were reduced by only 25% between 1968 and 1972, with US troop
withdrawals responsible for much of the decline.
19. MR 2 ratios reflect an increase since 1968. Total enemy forces
have been eroded since 1968 particularly at the lower echelons, but total
enemy forces for 1972 have been augmented with substantial main forces
and infiltration causing the 1972 total force level of 37,000 to approach
the 1970 level of 38,000 -- lower than the 1968 level of 51,000. Total
friendly forces in 1968 were 134,000 compared with 1972 total forces of
141,000. This development has occurred because of the growth of territorial
forces and the assumed deployment of the ARVN Airborne Division from
the General Reserve to MR 2 during 1972. The total friendly forces in
1972 of 141,000 were less than the 174,000 in 1970, when substantial
numbers of US forces were present.
20. In MRs 3 and 4 the Total Force Ratio has shown substantial
improvement since 1968 (see Table IV-1). This is primarily due to the
significant erosion of enemy local forces and guerrillas and several main
force unit redeployments to Cambodia in early 1970. In addition the growth
and development of GVN territorial forces since 1968 has further enhanced
the military posture of friendly total forces in both regions.
21. Providing additional impetus to the friendly total force structure
has been the development of the People's Self-Defense Forces (PSDF). Since
w&
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Ratio of Allied and VC/NVA Combat Forces
in South Vietnam
First
b/
c/
South d/
Qtr MR 1
MR 2
MR 3
MR 4 -
Vietnam -
1968
2.4
3.3
3.9
2.4
2.9
1970
2.5
7.0
4.5
8.3
4.2
1972
1.9
2.1
7.8
7.4
3.3
(3.3)
(4.6)
(2.8)
1968
3.5
5.3
6.0
6.1
4.9
1970
3.3
8.3
7.5
10.2
6.5
1972
2.8
4.5
6.7
10.3
5.1
(4.7)
(7.8)
(4.7)
1968
1.8
2.6
4.1
2.5
2.6
1970
2.5
4.6
5.8
4.4
4.1
1972
2.8
3.8
7.4
6.8
4.8
(5.6)
(6.1)
(4.5)
a. Including NVA combat forces between the DMZ
and Dong Hoi, North Vietnam, which represent a
threat to the military region.
b. Data in parentheses include adjacent VC/NVA
combat forces in Cambodia, the 5th, 7th, and 9th
Divisions; the 24th NVA Regiment; and the 271st
Independent NVA Regiment. They do not include
the possible new division which fragmentary
evidence suggests may be in Cambodia.
c. Data in parentheses include adjacent VC/NVA
combat forces in Cambodia (roughly a divisional
equivalent of the Phuoc Long Front).
d. Saigon General Reserve forces have been
assigned as follows: the 369th VNMC Brigade to
MR 1 and the First and Third Airborne Brigades to
MR 2. Data in parentheses include adjacent VC/NVA
combat forces in Cambodia which may be deployed
to MRs 3 and 4.
IV-7
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1969 there have been more than 4 million organized throughout South
Vietnam with 1.5 million assigned to combat status and 2.5 million
assigned to combat support missions. The PSDF are a part-time irregular
force designed to replace territorial forces to conduct local security
operations. This development has permitted territorial forces to be
integrated with regular GVN maneuver and regional force battalions to
conduct combat operations. As this phenomenon occurs more frequently
in the future, the PSDF may be considered as a part of the total forces
structure which would increase the Total Force Ratio for each military
region.
22. To illustrate the roles of the various forces in the Main Forces
Ratio, the nationwide figures for first quarters of 1970 and 1972 are shown
below:
Strength
1st Qtr
1970
1st Qtr
1972
US forces
53,000
--
ARVN forces
83,000
106,000
Free World forces
14,000
--
Ranger Border
Defense/CIDG a/
34,000
18,000
Regional forces
--
20,000
Total
184,000
144,000
VC/NVA
44,000
44,000
Including adjacent
VC/NVA forces in
Cambodia
--
(52,000)
South Vietnam ratio 4.2 3.3
(2.8)
a. The decrease in strength of the
Ranger Border Defense/CIDG forces was
due to a reorganization in Zate 1970
when many of them were designated
Ranger Group battalions and Regional
Force companies.
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Probable 1973 Maximum Threat
23. To illustrate a situation of maximum possible threat to South
Vietnam going into the 1972/73 dry season (see Table IV-2), current enemy
main forces have been augmented with additional main force units from
North Vietnam, Laos, and Cambodia. In MR 1 the augmentation includes
the 325th NVA Division near Hanoi and several independent combat units
in southern Quang Binh Province, North Vietnam. MR 2 main forces have
been augmented by the 312th NVA Division in northern Laos. For MR 3,
we foresee no main force augmentations over and above the 1972 level.
Enemy main forces in MR 4 have been augmented by one additional
regiment from the Phuoc Long Front, complementing approximately three
regiments for the 1st VC Division included in our 1972 analysis.
24. Analysis of augmentations for each Military Region indicates that
there is not a highly significant decrease in any of the force ratios as
compared with the 1972 ratios. The largest decline occurs in MRs 2 and 4.
The MR 2 Main Force Ratio decreases from 2.4 to 1.7, while that of MR 4
declines from 4.6 to 3.7 between 1972 and 1973.
Battalion Strength Analysis
25. The erosion of enemy main forces between 1968 and 1971 is
shown by the decrease in average maneuver battalion strengths in
Table IV-3. During the first quarter of 1972 the average battalion strength
increases, reflecting the enemy buildup in MRs 1, 2, and 3. However, the
1972 averages are probably somewhat lower because of the casualties
sustained during the present enemy major offensive.
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Ratio of Allied and VC/NVA Combat Forces
in South Vietnam
(Maximum Threat 1972/73 Dry Season)
MR 1
MR 2
MR 3
MR 4 S/
SVN
Main Force Ratio
1.5
1.7
3.3
3.7
2.2
Main and Local
Force Ratio
2.2
3.9
4.7
7.1
4.0
Total Force Ratio
2.4
3.5
5.6
5.9
4.5
a. Including the 325th, 304th, 308th, 324B, and 711th
NVA Divisions.
b. Including the 312th NVA Division in northern Laos.
c. Including four regiments of the Phuoc Long Front.
VC/NVA Average Maneuver Battalion Strength
Yearend 1967-71 and April 1972
April
1967
1968
1969
1970
1971
1972
South Vietnam
375
260
225
185
160
230
MR
1
460
305
220
200
200
270
MR
2
325
275
270
185
175
290
MR
3
370
245
190
135
125
210
MR
4
355
245
245
225
135
160
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Infiltration and Order of Battle Estimating('
I. An important difference between infiltration starts and order of
battle (OB) augmentations results from the dynamics of the two
methodologies involved. The OB methodology produces an ex post (after
the fact) assessment by changes in the OB. Observed average battalion
strengths are multiplied by the number of battalions to make the OB
estimates. The infiltration methodology, on the other hand, provides an
ex ante (before the fact) estimate of personnel flows into the various OB
areas. Personnel are observed leaving North Vietnam or moving through
southern Laos and are projected for arrival in the OB areas. There is usually
a one-month to three-month lag between detection and arrival, even if the
infiltrators move straight through the system. There have been cases where
infiltrators have been delayed for one reason or another in the infiltration
pipeline and have not arrived for several additional months at their final
destination.
2. Even after an infiltration group arrives at its destination, it will
not immediately affect the combat OB unless it has been identified as a
new organic combat unit. The bulk of the remaining infiltrators fall into
three general types: combat services support units that will cause an
expansion of the NVA administrative services OB; filler personnel for rear
services units; and filler personnel for combat units. The majority of
infiltrators fall into the latter category.
3. These personnel are held in Recovery/ Replacement Regiments to
be used as replacements in combat units. Some are moved to combat units
directly to make up for losses incurred during the previous fighting season,
and others are held to be fed into units during the season in which they
arrive.
4. So far in the 1971/72 dry season, enemy personnel infiltration
departures for southern Laos, South Vietnam, and Cambodia have totaled
about 120,000 men as of 3 April 1972. Many of these personnel have
already arrived at their final destinations, and the remainder will arrive at
them by June at the latest. Table V-1 shows personnel infiltration starts
1. Over the years there have been differences of opinion over the
relationship of infiltration and order of battle estimating. This Appendix
is intended to shed some light on the relationship.
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by final destination and then regroups these final destination totals into
the areas used in OB estimates.
5. The augmentation in enemy combat forces by area from
December 1971 through 3 April 1972 is shown in Table V-2, below. This
augmentation was arrived at using the ex post OB methodology described
above.
6. Table V-3, below, shows infiltration compared with combat OB
augmentation resulting from infiltration by area so far this dry season. The
difference between the 120,000 infiltration estimate and the 27,000 OB
augmentation this dry season results from the factors previously discussed.
7. In MRs 1 and 2 and Cambodia, large numbers of infiltrators have
arrived who have not yet been included in the combat OB; 12,000 men
in MR 1, about 41,000 men in MR 2, and 21,000 men in Cambodia. In
each of these areas, there are indications that the enemy has been preparing
for substantial offensives which could produce heavy casualties requiring
large numbers of replacements. In the B-3 Front area of MR 2 and in
Cambodia, some of these infiltrators will undoubtedly be used to augment
the logistics structure and will not, therefore, receive combat assignments.
However, in those areas where heavy combat does not ensue in the near
future, we will expect to see some of these infiltrators reflected in the
reporting as forming new units or building up existing units. For example,
if there is not a substantial increase in combat activity in Cambodia, we
expect the OB there to be augmented by at least another 5,000 men unless
substantial numbers of combat troops deploy back into South Vietnam.
8. It is obvious from the preceding discussion that during the latter
half of each infiltration cycle, there are a number of enemy combat troops
physically located in the various OB areas but who are not yet included
in the OB. If we had perfect knowledge about enemy forces, many of these
personnel would still not be included in the OB. While they are resting
or training after infiltration and not yet formed into new units or filling
out existing ones, they are still part of the manpower flow used to maintain
the OB stock level.
9. Gains-loss methodologies for OB estimating using infiltration
estimates as gains in the OB and reported losses for deduction from the
OB have not been successful.
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1971/72 Dry Season Infiltration Starts
Thousands
Destination
Tri-Thien-Hue
Region
MR 5 a/
B-3 Front
COSVN a/
Southern Laos
Strength OB Area Strength
Total
December April Infiltration Augmena-/
1971 1972 Augmentation tation
a. The MR 5 and COSVN infiltrators have been
arbitrarily assigned to OB areas on the basis
of the OB already in these areas.
VC/NVA Combat Order of Battle
MR 1 b/ 22
MR 2 21
MR 3 12
MR 4 14
Cambodia 30
Southern Laos c/ 35
April from North Vietnam, Laos, and Cambodia.
b. In-country strength only. Excluding 12,000 men carried
in the threat area in 1971.
c. Including personnel in air defense units.
12 MR 1 20
16
42 MR 2 50
MR 3 5
Cambodia 26
14 Southern Laos 14
120 120
50
33
19
17
35
30
28
12
7
3
5
-5
a. Including unit redeployments in late March and early
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Infiltration and Combat Order
of Battle Augmentation
1971/72 Dry Season
Combat Order
of Battle
Infiltration Augmentation
MR 1 20 8
MR 2 50 9
MR 3 5 2
MR 4 5 3
Cambodia 26 5
Southern Laos 14 0
a. Infiltration estimated using 570-man gap-
fiZZs. Recent evidence indicates that 500-man
gapfilZs may be more accurate. Had that been
used, the estimate would have been 113,000 men.
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APPENDIX VI
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Pacification Trends and Prospects
1. During the 1965-71 period, although US forces were effective in
maintaining pressure on enemy forces, they appear also to have had an
inhibiting effect on some GVN main forces and local security forces. As
the US forces were withdrawn, however, some ARVN regular units whose
records were abysmal came to life. A good example is the ARVN 7th
Division, whose 12th Regiment did not take a single casualty during the
second quarter of 1969 when the 2nd Brigade of the US 9th Division was
located in its area of operation. The 7th Division has since that time
provided the main force clout for the pacification effort in Dinh Tuong
and Kien Hoa Provinces in upper MR 4. In addition, ARVN territorials
(Regional and Popular Forces) have become increasingly effective in their
local security role. This has resulted, at least partly, from reequipping them
with the M-16 and providing other equipment, support, and training.
2. Pacification over the period of US withdrawals may be
characterized as follows. During the first half of the period, the effect of
US withdrawals was on balance positive. Departures were made from areas
where good momentum was under way and enemy main force threats had
been reduced. Later, as more marginal security situations had to be faced,
it was found that GVN forces were not equal to the task in some areas.
These included several tough VC areas in the populated lowlands of MR 2.
More recently, during 1971 the withdrawals of the last two infantry division
equivalents from MR 1 have caused concern in the well-pacified areas, such
as Thua Thien, as well as the more difficult areas in the southern three
provinces of MR 1.
3. Table VI-l shows yearend trends in pacification using the VSSG
population control indicator.
4. We see the pacification situation and prospects for improvement
during the next year by military region as follows:
MR 4: The momentum that began immediately after Tet 1968
when General Thang took over and pushed ARVN forces into the
countryside continues. The able General Truong has an overwhelming
manpower superiority at all levels. Unless the present offensive destabilizes
the situation, gains should be made in several provinces where the VC were
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Percent of Rural Population
Under GVN Control a/
1967
1968
1969
1970
1971
MR
1
9
25
53
73
73
MR
2
19
26
45
55
56
MR
3
24
26
45
69
83
MR
4
23
28
48
69
82
Total
19
27
48
67
76
a.
The VSSG population control indicator is a
selective yardstick measuring the depth of each
side's presence and influence among the rural pop-
ulace. It is based on indices of the Main Force
war, the Local Force war, the respective political
apparatus, and popular attitudes and socio-economic
conditions. A shift in any of these four vari-
ables -- particularly the Main Force war -- will be
mirrored by changes in the VSSG indicator. Thus
the current enemy presence and activity in the
very fluid MR 1 obviously could alter the ratings
there rapidly and sharply.
traditionally strong. The requirement for regular ARVN troops should
become increasingly marginal, and, to the extent possible, they can be
utilized for tasks outside MR 4.
MR 3: It will be difficult to significantly improve security --
already the highest in the country -- until the border areas can be better
protected from the threat of enemy forces in Cambodia. Also, routing out
the weak but bothersome VC/NVA concentration in southern War Zone C
would help in the eastern part of MR 3.
MRs 1 and 2: MRs 1 and 2 have been the most difficult military
regions and the present offensive, of course, vastly complicates the situation.
The VC infrastructure is most resilient in the northern coastal provinces
of MR 2 and the three southern provinces of MR 1.
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5. In sum, for the most part local security forces have been doing
reasonably well. If ARVN main forces can protect populated areas from
enemy main forces, security probably will not deteriorate and in many areas
should improve. For pacification to advance satisfactorily, however, a better
job must be done to break the link between the populated lowlands and
the NVA manpower and materiel flow across the highlands in MRs 1 and 2.
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Allied Air Capability
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1. The profile of air assets available in Southeast Asia, shown in
Table VII-l, has changed markedly since the end of 1968. Gross air assets
of all kinds have been reduced by about one-third, from about 6,400
airplanes in 1968 to a scheduled level of about 4,250 by mid-1972. The
reduction of US presence has cut back the US inventory by one-half, while
the Vietnamization Program has expanded the assets of the South
Vietnamese Air Force (VNAF) to a level four times that of 1968 by
mid-1972. The sharpest increase in the VNAF inventory has been their
helicopter capacity and their tactical aircraft inventory. The growth of
VNAF will be nearly completed by mid-1972 following an expansion of
68% in 1970 and a further 59% in 1971. The growth of VNAF is
phenomenal given that in 1954, when the French pulled out, Vietnam
possessed only 32 old transport planes. By June 1973, VNAF is scheduled
to consist of 51 squadrons,(') a fleet that will rank VNAF as the seventh
largest air force in the world.
2. The aggregate inventory of fighters and attack aircraft has been
reduced by about one-half during the last three years, with 65% of the
US planes being withdrawn from Southeast Asia. The loss has been only
partly offset by an increase in VNAF assets, which accounted for only
4% of the total of 1968 but by mid-1972 will represent 42% of the total.
The major period of expansion of VNAF tactical aircraft (tacair) occurred
in 1970 and again in early 1972 with the planned augmentation of 36
A-Is (to a total of 96) and 30 A-37s (to a total of 120).
3. Non-attack fixed-wing aircraft have been reduced less sharply than
other assets. The VNAF fleet has expanded to 39% of the total, as its
possessed aircraft increased by 152% to 458 planes in 1971. The US
component has been decreased by 53% since 1968, but the United States
still supplied the great bulk of air transport. The principal VNAF aircraft
in this category are the 0-1 (155), C-123 (48), U-17 (42), AC-47/AC-1 19
(36), RC/EC-47 (24), T-41 (18), C-119 (16), and C-47 (16).
1. One transport, one reconnaissance, one liaison, and two attack squadrons will be
activated.
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Allied Aircraft in Southeast Asia
as of Yearend a/
Planned
June
1968 1969 1970 1971 1972
Fighter and
attack air-
craft 1,143 1,053 721 547 558
US 1,099 933 555 387 324
VNAF 44 120 166 160 234
Non-attack
fixed-wing
aircraft 1,731 1,752 1,429 1,187 1,187
US 1,549 1,562 1,194 729 729
VNAF 182 190 235 458 458
Helicopters 3,529 3,750 3,447 2,457 2,506
US 3,431 3,649 3,156 1,974 1,974
VNAF 98 101 291 483 532
Total air-
craft 6,403 6,555 5,597 4, 191 4, 251
US 6,079 6,144 4, 905 31090 33027
VNA F 324 411 692 1,101 1,224
a. Excluding B-52s.
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4. Helicopters have been reduced in number by 1,300 aircraft, or
34% of the 1969 high. The US inventory has dropped by 46% but still
has about 2,000 machines. VNAF has augmented its helicopter fleet from
only 100 in 1968-69 to 532 by mid-1972. Almost all of the VNAF
helicopters are UH-lHs (500) with the balance consisting of the heavier
CH-47s (32).
Helicopter Support
Helicopter Assets
5. Two-fifths of VNAF's inventory are helicopters. This is consistent
with the US doctrine under which technology (especially helicopters) has
served as a surrogate for men (and people's war). Helicopters have so
revolutionized ground warfare -- giving foot soldiers both unprecedented
mobility and aerial firing platforms -- that the US air assets inventory in
Vietnam has consisted of about three-fifths helicopters.
6. Many of these helicopters have been turned over to the VNAF
which is now very close to its goal of 500 UH-1H (Huey) and 32 CH-47
(Chinook). By the end of 1971, VNAF had phased out its limited inventory
of old reciprocal-engine H-34 (Choctaw) helicopters. The typical Huey
squadron of 31 helicopters consists of 20 troop carriers, nine gun ships,
and two command and control craft. Thus, VNAF will have shortly a total
of 320, 144, and 32 such helicopters, respectively. The Chinook medium-lift
helicopter can carry 44 men but normally is used to move equipment and
supplies.
Asset Management
7. A basic measurement of aircraft management is sorties per aircraft.
Table VII-2 shows the helicopter utilization rates for the US and South
Vietnamese Air Forces during 1971. By the end of the year, VNAF had
achieved a sortie rate per helicopter on a par with the US rate. While this
was achieved in part because of the decline of the US rate, VNAF managed
to improve its utilization rate by 59% during the fourth quarter of 1971
compared with the first quarter. This occurred despite a 25% increase in
the VNAF inventory. Moreover, the VNAF performance actually excels the
US performance since the computed sortie rates are not completely
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Helicopter Utilization Rates
in South Vietnam
1971
1st 2nd 3rd 4th
Qtr Qtr Qtr Qtr
US Army
Sorties (thousand)
1,274
1,144
1,041
724
Helicopters
possessed (units)
2,644
2,542
2,452
2,067
Sorties per aircraft
482
450
425
350
Sorties (thousand)
77
101
137
153
Helicopters
possessed (units)
361
419
428
451
Sorties per aircraft
213
241
320
339
VNAF sorties per air-
craft as a percent of
US Army sorties per
aircraft
44
54
75
97
compatible. In part because VNAF helicopters are based at more centralized
locations further from the front lines than are US helicopters, the average
VNAF sortie is about 30% longer in flying time than the US average sortie.
Thus, if utilization per helicopter were calculated by flying time rather than
per sortie, by the end of 1971 VNAF had achieved a utilization rate superior
to the equivalent US rate.
Operational Rates
8. The quality of support provided to an aircraft fleet is usually
indicated by three standard measurements. The most important of these
is the rate of Operational Readiness (OR) of aircraft, which is the percentage
of possessed aircraft capable of accomplishing their primary mission or
missions. The US standard OR rate for all helicopters in Vietnam is 76%;
the standard for VNAF is a less stringent 71%. Those aircraft which are
not operationally ready fall into two separate categories: failure because
of the supply system or because of the maintenance system. The
effectiveness of the supply system is measured by the Not Operationally
No
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Ready -- Supply (NORS) rate, or the percent of possessed aircraft not
operationally ready because of a lack of serviceable parts. The US and the
VNAF standard NORS rate is 5%. The effectiveness of the maintenance
system is indicated by the Not Operationally Ready -- Maintenance (NORM)
rate. While the US standard is 19%, the VNAF standard is that the NORM
rate should not exceed 24% of possessed aircraft. Table VII-3 shows the
appropriate operational rate data for 1971 for the two types of helicopters
in the VNAF inventory and the corresponding US helicopters.
9. The Vietnamese have encountered particular difficulties in
achieving the standard OR for their helicopters. During 1970-71, while all
other aircraft (except the F-5) were meeting or exceeding acceptable
standards, the entire helicopter fleet was below standards. The rapid increase
in helicopter inventory -- the number of UH-lHs tripled during 1971, from
135 to 413 aircraft -- should have been expected to and did cause the
OR rate to fall slightly below standards. In the last three quarters of the
year the logistical system proved more inadequate than the VNAF
maintenance personnel, despite the dilution of the experience level
associated with the inventory buildup.
Operational Management
10. Helicopter operations mounted by VNAF in 1971 more than
doubled those of 1970, which in turn were more than twice the level of
1969. Table VII-4 shows the trend of US and VNAF helicopter sorties
broken out by various mission types. Although the VNAF sortie rate has
quintupled and the level of US sorties has declined since 1968, the VNAF
load still represents only 10% of all helicopter sorties flown in South
Vietnam. In 1971, VNAF recorded a near six-fold increase in the number
of armed helicopter sorties and achieved a rate of armed helicopter sorties
relative to total sorties comparable to the equivalent US rate. Nevertheless,
qualitative assessments of VNAF helicopter operational performance from
all sources indicate a high degree of professionalism by the VNAF crews.
Their weakest areas are in mounting night and medical evacuation missions.
The Role of US Helicopter Support
11. The United States at the end of 1971 mounted nine times the
number of helicopter sorties of all types than did VNAF (Table VII-4).
An increasing proportion of the US sorties are being used to support
Republic of Vietnam Armed Forces (RVNAF) ground forces, although the
absolute level of such direct support is declining. Table VII-5 shows the
amount of helicopter support received by RVNAF from both the US and
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Helicopter Operational Rates
.
1971
Stand-
and
1st
Qtr
2nd
Qtr
3rd
Qtr
4th
Qtr
UH-1H (Huey)
OR
78
76.6
78.6
81.3
78.6
NORS
3
3.2
2.7
2.3
2.6
NORM
19
20.2
18.7
16.4
18.8
OR
71
72.4
68.7
67.2
69.3
NORS
5
4.6
5.3
6.1
8.9
NORM
CH-47 (Chinook)
24
23.0
25.9
26.7
21.8
OR
70
74.1
76.0
76.3
72.9
NORS
7
3.9
5.1
3.7
5.2
NORM
23
22.0
18.9
20.0
21.9
OR
71
71.9
66.7
58.9
59.2
NORS
5
3.7
12.9
15.0
15.8
NORM
24
24.4
20.4
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US and VNAF Helicopter Sorties in South Vietnam
by Type of Mission
1968 1969 1970 1971
Thousand
US 7%416 8,441 73564 4,212
Armed 863 915 799 423
Combat support 4,100 4,670 4,052 2,045
Non-combat support 2,453 2,856 2,713 1,744
VNAF 94 96 215 467
Armed 0 5 6 40
Combat support 68 65 121 253
Non-combat support 26 26 88 174
Armed 12 11 11 10
Combat support 55 55 53 49
Non-combat support 33 34 36 41
Armed 0 5 3 9
Combat support 72 68 56 54
Non-combat support 28 27 41 37
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US Army and VNAF Helicopter Sorties in South Vietnam
and RVNAF Helicopter Support
US Army Helicopter Sorties
Force supported
US
RVNAF
Other
Total
N
RVNAF as a per-
00
cent of US
RVNAF
US
VNAF
Total
VNAF as a per-
cent of US
3rd
Quarter
4th 1st 2nd 3rd
Quarter Quarter Quarter Quarter
4th
Quarter
1,398
1,014
876
753
660
429
387
327
342
312
312
252
90
60
57
78
69
43
1,875
1, 401
1,275
1,143
1,041
724
28
32
39
41
47
59
VNAF Helicopter Sorties
49
65
77
101
137
153
RVNAF Helicopter Support
387
327
342
312
312
252
49
65
77
101
137
153
436
392
419
413
449
405
13
20
23
32
44
61
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South Vietnamese Air Forces. Together, both have provided to RVNAF
a relatively constant level of 420,000 sorties per quarter for the past year
and a half. This level is about the same provided US ground forces alone
in the last quarter of 1971. US support to RVNAF has declined about
one-third, although as a share of total US sorties that portion assigned to
RVNAF has doubled. Nevertheless, RVNAF remains very dependent upon
US helicopters for support. Despite an enormous increase in VNAF
helicopter support, it still equals only 61% of the US contribution and
accounts for only 38% of the current level of helicopter support received
by RVNAF.
Assessment
12. The VNAF has greatly expanded its inventory of helicopters and
is now approaching the planned ceiling. Despite the high growth rate, these
assets have a utilization rate equal to that of the United States. VNAF
has encountered difficulty in achieving the standard operational readiness
rate, but by the end of 1971 it was off by only 2% for the principal UH-1 H
helicopter. Their primary weak spot in this regard is not maintenance but
supplies, a ,problem more amenable to alleviation. The United States still
provides the bulk of helicopter support to RVNAF. Assuming maximum
VNAF capability (inventory, utilization, and OR rates), they will be hard
pressed to provide one-half of the current level of combined US-VNAF
helicopter support.
Tactical Air Support
Tactical Aircraft Assets
13. The stable of VNAF attack aircraft includes the A-1, which they
have had for many years, and the A-37, since early 1969. The VNAF fighter
inventory is limited to the F-5A aircraft. The inventory of attack aircraft
will be increased significantly in early 1972 with the addition of 36 more
A-Is (a jump of 60%) and 30 new A-37s (up 33%). This will increase the
VNAF tacair assets from 160 aircraft at the end of 1971 to 234 in mid-1972;
by 1974 they will possess more than 300 attack aircraft. The one squadron
of 18 F-5As is not planned to be supplemented until fiscal year 1974.
At that time, VNAF will receive the F-5E international fighter. This
advanced fighter in clear weather can out-maneuver in combat the MIG-21 s
currently deployed in North Vietnam. All A-1 and A-37 attack squadrons
have become qualified in night and all-weather bombing techniques.
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Asset Management
14. Although VNAF has increased its inventory by one-third since
1969, and has switched from the A-1 to the A-37 as the primary aircraft,
VNAF has been able to maintain a satisfactory utilization rate. Table VII-6
shows the US and VNAF tactical aircraft utilization rate for the last four
years. By the end of 1971, VNAF had achieved a utilization rate of only
14%, below the US rate. This was a considerable improvement from the
previous year when VNAF sorties per aircraft fell off by 17%. It is probable
that VNAF can improve its utilization rates in the future (in January 1972
the rate was 291, or only 7% below the US rate).
1971
Sorties (thousand)
372 29
9
192
121
Aircraft possessed
1,099 93
3
555
387
Sorties per aircraft
338 32
0
346
313
Sorties (thousand)
23 3
3
38
43
Aircraft possessed
44 a/ 12
0
166
160
Sorties per aircraft
N.A.- 27
5
229
269
VNAF sorties per aircraft
as a percent of US
sorties per
aircraft N.A. 8
6
66
86
a. Abnormal figure because of exceptional A-1 air-
craft attrition which reduced fighter aircraft in-
ventory.
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15. Tactical air sorties in Southeast Asia are shown in Table VII-7.
The decline in US tactical air sorties since 1968 was 67% throughout the
region, while in South Vietnam the level of US sorties has plummeted by
92%. Fewer US sorties were flown in all of Southeast Asia in 1971 than
in South Vietnam alone just two years ago. The share allocated to Cambodia
now exceeds the number of US tacair sorties in South Vietnam.
US and VNAF Tactical Air Sorties
in Southeast Asia
US tactical air
sorties
372
299
192
121
South Vietnam
205
155
76
16
North Vietnam
92
Negl.
Negl.
Negl.
Laos
75
144
101
88
Cambodia
0
Negl.
15
17
VNAF tactical air
sorties
23
33
38
43
South Vietnam
23
33
28
31
North Vietnam
0
0
0
0
Laos
0
0
0
Negl.
Cambodia
0
0
10
12
US B-52 tactical
air sorties
21
20
15
12
South Vietnam
17
14
5
2
North Vietnam
1
0
0
0
Laos
3
6
9
9
Cambodia
0
0
1
1
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16. The same pattern of current activity is true for B-52 sorties. The
number of sorties in South Vietnam has dropped by 85`%, since 1968 as
a large proportion has been diverted to interdicting the Ho Chi Minh Trail
in Laos and supply concentrations elsewhere. In 1971, there were
approximately 1,000 sorties per month in Southeast Asia (as shown in the
tabulation below) -- the planned monthly rate through June 1973. However,
a surge capability to 1,500 sorties per month will be available. VNAF has
no matching B-52 ordnance delivery capability.
B-52 Sorties
(Thousand Sorties)
Jan
1968
1969
1970
1971
1972
Laos
3.4
5.6
8.5
8.8
0.7
South
Vietnam
16.5
13.9
5.3
2.4
0.2
North
Vietnam
0.7
0
0
0
0
Cambodia
0
0
1.3
1.3
0.1
Total
20.6
19.5
15.1
12.5
1.0
17. Two significant trends emerge from the data in Table VII-7. First,
attack sorties flown in Laos remain virtually the exclusive domain of US
air forces. VNAF began flying sorties in Laos last year, but to date these
sorties are only a small fraction of the total Allied interdiction effort.
Second, the percent of attack sorties flown by VNAF in South Vietnam
and Cambodia has increased steadily since 1968. In that year, VNAF flew
less than 10% of the total number of attack sorties in South Vietnam and
Cambodia; by 1971 more than 50% of total sorties were initiated by VNAF.
The share of VNAF sorties in South Vietnam has increased (while the
number of VNAF sorties has remained fairly stable) since 1969 because
of the marked decline in US sorties.
The Role of US Tactical Aircraft Support
18. The volume of tactical air strikes flown by both the US and South
Vietnamese Air Forces in both South Vietnam and Cambodia has fallen
by 67W during the last four years. By 1971, VNAF flew 30% more sorties
than the United States and in South Vietnam alone nearly twice as many
V1:1-12
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as the United States. These trends are shown in Table VII-8. Data for
January 1972 indicate a further substantial improvement in VNAF tacair
sorties to an annual rate of 38,000 attack sorties, up from 31,000 in South
Vietnam in 1971. The VNAF sortie rate flown in January 1972 accounts
for 95% of all attack sorties in South Vietnam. While 5,000 of the 7,000
sortie gain represent a shift from Cambodia, in January 1972 VNAF flew
42% of the total in Cambodia, the same as in all of 1971.
Tactical Air Support
1968
1969
1970
1971
Total sorties flown
In South Vietnam
US
205
155
76
16
VNAF
23
33
28
31
In Cambodia
Us
0
Negl.
15
17
VNAF
0
0
10
12
Total
228
188
129
76
Total sorties received a/
By US forces
154
116
49
10
By RVNAF
74
72
80
66
US (percent)
68
62
38
13
RVNAF (percent)
32
38
62
87
a. For calculation purposes, assumes (1) an average
of 25% in 1968-69 and 35% in 1970-71 of US sorties
in South Vietnam are in support of RVNAF, and (2)
all tactical air sorties in Cambodia are in support
of RVNAF.
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19. The lower half of Table VII-8 shows the relative amount of tacair
support received by US and RVNAF ground forces. The calculations are
based on derived data and, therefore, should be considered as only indicative
of trends over time. US ground forces - consistent with the redeployment
program -- have experienced a 94% decline in direct tacair support since
1968; RVNAF ground forces until late 1971 had been receiving a relatively
constant number of supporting tacair sorties. In percentage terms, in 1971
RVNAF received at least 87% of all tacair flown, whereas in 1968 they
received only 32%. By early 1972, nearly all attack air sorties were flown
in support of RVNAF.
Assessment
20. The VNAF capability to provide tactical air support has increased
and will continue to grow through mid-1972. VNAF has proved to be a
less efficient utilizer of its assets than the United States in terms of sorties
per craft, but not significantly so.
21. The sharp decline in air attack sorties flown in South Vietnam
in the last four years has apparently affected US combat forces more than
RVNAF. Table VII-9 shows a comparison of RVNAF and US ground forces
and the amount of attack air support received per maneuver battalion, per
large-size ground operation, and per man killed in action. The relative
"richness" of air support for US forces has declined appreciably in terms
of battalions and operations, but less so in terms of combat fatalities.
RVNAF on the other hand has not experienced such a reduction in air
support.
22. Nevertheless, when the amount of support received by RVNAF
is compared with that enjoyed by US troops, it is clearly evident that
RVNAF units in South Vietnam over time have received significantly less
support than the US forces. During 1971, however, the relative position
of RVNAF units improved considerably. Whereas they received only about
one-half as many sorties per battalion in 1968, they could count on 92%
as many sorties as US battalions. In terms of operations and men killed
in action, the RVNAF relative position is still significantly inferior to that
of US forces, but considerable improvement was made in 1971.
23. Based on January 1972 data, VNAF possessed 155 attack
airplanes and was mounting sorties at an annual rate of 45,000. By June
1972, VNAF is scheduled to possess 234 attack airplanes, which for the
125X1
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ILW
,L.W Comparison of US and RVNAF
Air Sortie Support Levels
1968 1969 1970 1971
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Total tactical air sortie
support received a/
Maneuver battalion b/
US 1,375 1,234 925 625
RVNAF 698 673 699 574
RVNAF as a percent
of US 51 55 76 92
Ground operation c/
US 158 133 81 23
RVNAF 11 6 8 7
RVNAF as a percent
of US 7 5 10 30
Allied killed in action
US 10.6 12.4 12.0 7.7
RVNAF 3.0 3.8 3.4 3.0
RVNAF as a percent
of US 28 31 28 39
a. As adjusted, see Table VII-8.
b. As adjusted. For calculation purposes, assumes one
ARVN battalion equates to 0.6 US battalion.
C. Battalion-size or larger.
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last half of the year could be flown at a rate of 68,000 sorties per year.
This could yield an average annual sortie flown figure of 57,000, which
amounts to an increase over 1971 of about 30%. Surges in enemy-initiated
activity will reduce the relative effectiveness of VNAF tactical air support,
and, obviously under such a situation, greatly increased assistance from US
tacair will be required. From June 1972 through June 1973, however, VNAF
is programmed to fly 98,400 tacair sorties and 9,600 gunship sorties. This
is a major improvement from current levels, although for tacair it is far
below the number of sorties flown by the US and VNAF combined in
1968 and 1969 and slightly below the 1970 total. Except during periods
of high enemy activity, it should be sufficient to accommodate tactical
air support requirements.
24. There are, in addition, qualitative factors which will constrain the
future role of VNAF. For example, recruitment and training of skilled
personnel continues to be one of VNAFs most pressing problems.
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North Vietnam Air Capability
Offensive Capabilities
1. North Vietnam has only a limited offensive air capability, given
a continuation of US air presence in Indochina. Nevertheless, its air force
could present an increasing threat to Allied forces over the next six months.
North Vietnam has about 250 MIG-15, MIG-17, MIG-19, and MIG-21 jet
aircraft.(1) Although these aircraft have been used exclusively in a defensive
role against US aircraft, they could be converted and used in a tactical
support role with little trouble.
2. The current level of North Vietnamese air activity, coupled with
the construction of two new airfields in the far southern Panhandle, strongly
suggests that Hanoi plans to utilize its air force in the war more fully in
the future than it has in the past. For the near term, Hanoi has three
options which it can exercise while US air power remains in Southeast Asia:
(1) increase MIG response to Allied aircraft interdicting the enemy supply
effort in both northern and southern Laos, (2) provide ground support to
enemy forces in Laos and northern South Vietnam, and (3) use its aircraft
in an interception role against Allied aircraft providing ground support to
ARVN.
3. The commitment of multiple fighter sorties against Allied aircraft
in Laos, staging from five bases south of the 19th Parallel and Bai Thuong
at the 20th Parallel, would increase the threat to Allied air operations.
Surface-to-air missile and antiaircraft artillery units now in place are available
to provide cover for enemy aircraft operations. By concentrating training
efforts on ground attack during the next several months, the North
Vietnamese could balance out their air threat to include tactical support
to their ground forces. Using the southern bases, this threat would be
positioned within striking range of targets in Laos, and, equally important,
in northern South Vietnam.
1. Including eight IL-28 bombers; however, given the current combat environment
in Indochina with the heavy employment of the F-4 fighter by the US Air Force, the
offensive threat of the IL-28 is considered insignificant.
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4. Factors which limit the size of operations by Hanoi are its tactical
doctrine calling for positive ground radar control of all fighter activities
and the apparent inability of North Vietnam's GCI controllers to direct
more than one to two flights simultaneously. Even if the North Vietnamese
doctrine on this point is changed, however, the principal deterrent to
large-scale North Vietnamese air operations in 1972 remains the threat of
US retaliation.
Defensive Capabilities
5. North Vietnam has a well-integrated and effective air defense
system embracing surface-to-air missiles (SAM), antiaircraft artillery (AAA),
and jet interceptors. Currently, in the southern Panhandle of North Vietnam,
there are more than 20 SAM battalions, 19 AAA regiments,(2) and an
increasingly aggressive MIG force. In southern Laos, at least eight AAA
regiments plus nine independent AAA battalions and three SAM battalions
protect the major lines of communication. Additionally, in recent months
MIG fighters have begun to overfly the Laotian border, providing even a
greater threat to US aircraft operating in the area.
6. North Vietnamese MIGs do not necessarily have to engage US
aircraft to have a significant impact on our ability effectively to support
friendly forces. The MIG intrusions into Laos have frequently caused us
to divert bombers and gunships away from primary targets. Hence, the use
of MIGs over northern South Vietnam could, depending on the US response,
cause a drop in our effectiveness in helping the South Vietnamese ward
off Communist ground attacks. North Vietnamese MIGs were used in this
way over northern Laos during the heavy fighting that took place in
December 1971, and the penetration of northern South Vietnam by a
MIG-21 on 30 March suggests that MIGs may be used in a similar role
in this area.
7. Hanoi's air defenses have inflicted an increasingly heavy toll on
US aircraft. From the start of the dry season in October 1971 through
January 1972, 18 US aircraft have been lost from hostile action -- a loss
rate of 0.33 per 1,000 sorties, compared with a loss rate of 0.24 during
the same period last dry season. The expanded air defense network has
been a factor in allowing the enemy to move significantly larger quantities
of supplies into South Vietnam and Cambodia this dry season compared
2. Elements of three of these AAA regiments have now moved to northern South
Vietnam.
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with a year ago. This supply movement has given the North Vietnamese
the capability of maintaining an augmented force structure in southern Laos
and the B-3 Front this dry season and of sustaining a major offensive in
northern South Vietnam and Cambodia.
8. The Communists continue to pay a high price for their logistic
successes, however. Even though the number of US sorties has been
decreasing throughout Indochina in recent years, the increased employment
of the highly effective AC-119 and AC-130 gunships has compensated for
the overall numerical decrease in sortie rates.
Prospects
9. During 1972, North Vietnam probably will continue to build up
its air defenses in support of its logistics effort. The recent visit to Hanoi
by Deputy Defense Minister Batitskiy, Chief of the Soviet Air Defense
Forces -- the first such visit since 1966 by a comparable Soviet official --
may indicate that additional deliveries of Soviet air defense equipment are
forthcoming.
10. Hanoi appears to have several options. It could ask the USSR
to provide the SA-3 SAM system, but this seems unlikely. The SA-3 missile
is designed to operate more efficiently than the SA-2 against aircraft flying
at lower altitudes. Thus, it would complement, not replace, the SA-2. On
the other hand, the altitude at which the SA-3 operates best is already
well covered by AAA in southern North Vietnam and southern Laos
(although the SA-3 has a longer range than AAA). Additionally, conversion
training on the SA-3 would probably take at least 9-12 months; thus, it
probably would not be operational until late next dry season.
11. A more likely course of action over the next nine months appears
to be a further deployment of SA-2 battalions and AAA from North
Vietnam into Laos (and probably northern GVN MR 1 as well). Additional
SAM battalions could be introduced into Laos and sites could be established
as far south as the tri-border area, should protection of supply flows require.
At the same time, the North Vietnamese will continue to beef up their
AAA posture by additional guns and fire control radar along the main lines
of communication in the Laos Panhandle, and possibly by moving some
of the highly mobile ZSU 57-2 self-propelled AAA weapons from North
Vietnam into Laos.
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12. More aggressive use of MIG aircraft probably will also add to
North Vietnam's defensive posture. Since October 1971, North Vietnamese
MIGs have penetrated Laotian air space more than 50 times, on several
occasions engaging US aircraft. In 1972 the Communists have begun
construction of two new airfields at Khe Phat and near Bai Due Thon in
southern North Vietnam. Khe Phat is nearing completion now, and the
other should be finished this summer. These airfields will give the enemy
two additional staging areas from which to launch MIGs against US aircraft,
thus enhancing his defensive aggressiveness and increasing the threat to US
or VNAF aircraft.
A
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Naval Capability
North Vietnam
1. North Vietnam's Navy adds little to the Communists' overall
military capability. The Navy is very small, utilizing only about 45
watercraft and some 3,000 personnel. Its responsibilities are limited; it is
primarily a coastal defense force charged with maintaining the security of
territorial waters. The largest ships in the North Vietnamese Navy are two
SO-i-class submarine chasers used primarily for training and extended patrol
duty because they can operate for relatively long periods without shore
support. Gunboats and torpedo boats compose the remainder of the North
Vietnamese inventory, which in February 1972 was as follows:
Number
Naval Craft of Units
L
L
L
L
L
L
L
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SO-1 class subchaser 2
Shanghai-class motor gunboat 11
Swatow-class motor gunboat 14 - 16
P-6-class motor torpedo boat 6
P-4-class motor torpedo boat 6
Miscellaneous gunboats 6
Total 45 - 47
Torpedo-carrying patrol boats serve a dual role in the North Vietnamese
Navy: they provide the North Vietnamese with a very limited military
offensive capability and, in addition, provide the main strike force for
defense against major surface units. Most of the above naval craft and
numerous readily available junks also can be employed in laying minefields,
an integral part of the defense in in-shore waters. 1)
2. The Navy's size and its total dependence on outside aid are its
principal weaknesses. The scant number, small size, and lack of diversity
of its naval craft, the lack of experienced cadre, and a generally inadequate
training program are obvious liabilities. The Navy does not have a
shipbuilding or extensive repair capability and is completely dependent on
the People's Republic of China and the Soviet Union for naval equipment
1. For data on North Vietnam's inventory of trawlers used for logistic/infiltration
purposes, see Table IX-1.
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and armaments. Thus any increases in its offensive and defensive military
capabilities will continue to depend on the training and technical and
material assistance given by China or the USSR.
South Vietnam
3. Like its North Vietnamese counterpart, the South Vietnamese
Navy does not add significantly to the nation's overall military capability.
The Navy's responsibilities are limited by its relatively small size and a lack
of experienced naval personnel. Because of these limitations, many of its
operations are conducted with a high degree of US cooperation and
supervision. The Navy's responsibilities include river and canal control within
South Vietnam, coastal patrol, naval gunfire support, mine countermeasure
operations, and naval maintenance. Its basic role is defensive: a deterrent
to North Vietnamese naval activity in and around South Vietnam. It
possesses little offensive capability. Part of the Navy's role requires
significant air support, which is shared by the South Vietnamese and US
Air Forces, the latter bearing a heavy share of the burden.
4. From the point of view of Communist military capabilities in
South Vietnam, one of the most important roles of South Vietnam's Navy
is its participation in the MARKET TIME program: a joint GVN-US
surveillance and deterrent program against Communist steel-hulled
infiltration trawlers attempting to deliver supplies to enemy forces in
southern South Vietnam (see Table IX-2). The program has been quite
successful to date: of the 46 detected infiltration attempts since 1965, only
two are known to have been successful. Although other successful sea
infiltration attempts may have escaped detection, MARKET TIME's record
remains impressive. However, much of this success has been a direct result
of the US role. MARKET TIME has in the past consisted of three lines
of defense: the outermost air barrier maintained by US Navy aircraft; an
outer surface barrier using US and Vietnamese Navy ships; and an inner
surface barrier under complete control of the South Vietnamese Navy. The
outer barrier has been extremely effective to date, while the two surface
barriers have had significantly lower effectiveness.
5. The important question for the future is the ability of South
Vietnam's Navy to offset the loss of the outer barrier as the US commitment
there declines and must be offset with indigenous resources. The US Navy
estimates that the South Vietnamese Air Force could develop a limited
but effective maritime air patrol if given the proper resources. Since the
US Navy believes that introduction of new types of aircraft is not feasible
(because of the training and logistic support required), aircraft presently
in the South Vietnamese inventory are considered more suitable for the
task. Other aspects must also be upgraded, including the establishment of
a new coastal radar surveillance system to offset the loss of US aircraft
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in the outer barrier. Although that system is now operational, South
Vietnam's Navy has shown slow progress in mastering its operation.
Similarly, the Navy is slated eventually to assume complete control over
the outer surface barrier to complement the radar surveillance system with
an effective reaction role. This will require additional ships, which a
preliminary US Navy estimate stated could be absorbed by the Navy in
FY 1973.
6. Overall, it appears that South Vietnam's Navy is being
strengthened and its capability increased. Its current major shortcoming is
its lack of leadership around which to build a viable naval force. The scarcity
of Navy management capability will be the pacing factor in its development
for some time in the future. Insofar as MARKET TIME is concerned, South
Vietnamese naval and air force participation in coastal surveillance as the
US effort is phased out will complicate the already difficult task of
preventing seaborne infiltration of supplies. The ideal solution to this
problem lies with the elimination of enemy rear services and support units
on the water's edge and the pacification of the coastal areas, particularly
in MRs 3 and 4. Unless this is accomplished, the South Vietnamese Navy,
operating largely on its own, will have a very difficult time maintaining
MARKET TIME's now excellent record of deterring sea infiltration.
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I I
North Vietnamese Inventory
of Logistics/Infiltration Trawlers, March 1972 a/
Speed
Capacity
Type
(Knots) (
M
etri
c Tons)
SL-1
33
14
200
SL-2
6
17-over 25
150
- 200
SL-3
2
14
100
SL-4
5
14
100
SL-5
1
14
100
SL-6
1
14
100
SL-7
4
Over 25
150
- 200
SL-8
9
15
400
Wu Hu
7
Unknown
75
a. The SL-1, SL-7, and Wu Hu have not been ob-
served attempting to infiltrate cargoes to South
Vietnam, but all the other types have.
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Detected North Vietnamese Seaborne Infiltration
Attempts by Steel-Hulled Trawlers
Since the Initiation of MARKET TIME Operations
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Destination
Number of Detection by Military
Year Detections Date Result Region
Mar-Dec
1965 1 31 Dec Aborted 4
1966 3 10 May Destroyed 4
19 Jun Destroyed 4
23 Dec Aborted 2
1967 3 1 Jan Destroyed 4
14 Mar Destroyed 1
11 Jul Destroyed 1
1968 5 22 Feb Aborted
28 Feb Destroyed
29 Feb Destroyed
29 Feb Aborted
29 Feb Destroyed
1969 3 24 Aug Aborted 4
16 Nov Aborted 4
23 Dec Aborted 4
1970 12 11 Mar Aborted 4
21 Apr Aborted 4
19 May Aborted 4 a/
29 May Aborted Unknown
10 Jun Aborted 4
6 Jul Aborted 4
2 Aug Aborted Unknown
28 Aug Successful 4
4 Sep Aborted 4
9 Oct Aborted Unknown
28 Oct Aborted 4
19 Nov Destroyed 4
1971 11 Late Successful 4
Dec 1970 -
Mar 1971
24 Feb Aborted 4
22 Mar Aborted 4
27 Mar Aborted 4
8 Apr Destroyed 4
3 Oct Aborted 4
17 Oct Aborted 4
28 Oct Aborted 4
16 Dec Aborted 4
19 Dec Aborted 4
26 Dec Aborted 4
1972 8 16 Jan Aborted 2
2 Feb Aborted 4
16 Feb Aborted 4
27 Feb Aborted 4
14 Mar Aborted 4
22 Mar Aborted 4
25 Mar Aborted 4
28 Mar Aborted 4
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Logistic Capabilities
(South Vietnam and North Vietnam)
South Vietnam
1. Approximately 20% of the in-country cargo tonnage for support
of South Vietnam's armed forces (RVNAF) is carried by US-piloted
transport aircraft (C-7s, C-123s, and C-130s). These US aircraft also carry
approximately 30% of the personnel moved in support of RVNAF
operations. The South Vietnamese Air Force (VNAF) air transport
capability will be increased significantly by the acquisition of 48 C-7s during
the period March through July 1972. These additional aircraft will be
sufficient to provide the cargo and passenger airlift now provided to RVNAF
by the USAF.
2. ARVN provides all of its own ground transportation. However,
about 40% of the RVNAF water-borne transportation is provided by the
United States. There are no plans to provide the South Vietnam Navy with
additional ships for this purpose since the Navy already possesses sufficient
ships but does not use them for cargo (they are used tactically).
3. Major shortcomings in the ARVN logistical capability are:
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a. Ability to overhaul and rebuild major items of
equipment. To improve the ARVN capability, 17 year olds are
being given draft deferments if they enter into a depot training
program and then continue working in ARVN depots. While
this program has been successful, it is expected that the ARVN
will not be self-sufficient in overhaul and rebuild capability for
several years.
b. Repair of communications, electronics, and other
sophisticated equipment. A self-sufficient capability is not
expected for several years.
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c. Supply management, inventory control, and
requisition processing operations. While there has been progress
in these areas, including use of data processing equipment,
much needs to be done to integrate the procedures of ARVN,
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VNAF, and the Navy. There is also the need to assume those
supply functions previously performed by the United States,
the most difficult being aircraft supply and maintenance.
North Vietnam
4. North Vietnam's logistic system is one of its greatest assets in
the continued prosecution of the war. It has performed extremely well under
severe pressure during the past several years to maintain an adequate flow
of supplies to Communist forces operating in Laos, South Vietnam, and,
more recently, Cambodia. It has evolved into a complex network of rail,
road, trail, and waterway routes, supplemented by petroleum pipelines and
overseen by logistical stations placed at strategic locations along the
traditional Ho Chi Minh Trail and its recent extensions. Overall, the system
now extends some 700 to 800 miles from central North Vietnam deep
into the southern reaches of South Vietnam. It employs tens of thousands
of men and thousands of vehicles to maintain the level of support required
by combat units in forward areas.
5. The northernmost half of the system is the best developed.
Supplies move primarily by rail into the North Vietnam Panhandle and
are offloaded into trucks for movement into the Laos Panhandle. In Laos,
they move south and east toward northern South Vietnam or directly south
to Cambodia and southern South Vietnam. It is this latter route that is
the least developed: only since mid-1970 have the Communists invested
substantial resources in the logistic network in extreme southern Laos and
northeastern Cambodia. This has paid off in the last year, and the area
now is a viable link between the north and the battle areas further south.
6. The greatest deterrent to Communist logistics through the course
of the war has been the Allied aerial interdiction campaign. The millions
of tons of bombs dropped in the Laos Panhandle have blocked routes,
destroyed or damaged thousands of vehicles, and destroyed large quantities
of supplies. This extra burden on the logistic system has been substantial.
Even this, however, has been overcome by Communist road and bypass
construction, camouflage, and defensive measures. Throughout the war,
despite the destruction, there has always been a ready reserve of vehicles
and supplies to offset losses. Simply stated, while the Allied bombing
campaign has made the Communist logistic effort costly, it has not
prevented them from continuing to move very large quantities of supplies
through the system.
7. What then is the logistic outlook? There is no reason to believe
that the Communists will not continue large-scale logistic activity
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throughout the system. They have the demonstrated capability, and, as the
Allied air interdiction effort declines, their chore becomes an easier one.
If they can attain a halt or even a slowdown in the bombing from negotiating
concessions or the withdrawal of the US effort, the Communists should
be able to sustain a high level of logistic activity with even fewer resources
than are now committed. In the future, then, both short-term and long-term,
the viability of the Communist logistic network would seem to provide
them with a strong logistics base from which to operate.
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Military Aid and
North Vietnamese Strategic Stockpiling
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Military Aid -- Past Patterns
1. A predominantly agricultural country with only a small industrial
sector, North Vietnam lacks the capacity to produce the sophisticated
weapons and war-supporting goods and equipment needed for its military
efforts throughout Indochina. The ordnance branch of North Vietnam's
industry produces only a small number of light infantry weapons, mortars,
grenades, and some ammunition but no other types of military hardware
and concentrates primarily on repair of equipment. North Vietnam is totally
dependent on the Communist aid donors for supplies of all its air defense
weapons and virtually all its ground forces equipment. North Vietnam also
lacks such domestic resources as petroleum and the industrial capability
to produce such essential war-supporting goods as trucks. In addition to
imports of weapons and war-supporting goods, Hanoi has been forced to
rely on the Communist aid donors for supplies of food and other consumer
necessities to offset shortfalls in domestic production.
2. Communist military aid deliveries to North Vietnam have declined
sharply in recent years from the wartime peak of $650 million in 1967
to less than $200 million per year in 1970 and 1971 (see Table XI-1).
The decline has resulted largely from reduced requirements for air defense
equipment, missiles, and antiaircraft artillery ammunition following the
bombing halt in 1968. As the USSR is the main supplier of air defense
materiel, the value of Soviet military aid has also dropped sharply during
this period. Meanwhile, Hanoi's need for ground force equipment and
ammunition, largely supplied by the People's Republic of China (PRC), has
remained fairly constant. The net result has been a decline in the Soviet
share of Communist military aid to North Vietnam from about
three-quarters in 1967 to one-half in 1970 and a corresponding rise in the
Chinese share. The increase in aid from $155 million in 1970 to
$180 million in 1971 was due largely to increased deliveries of SA-2
equipment to support the stepped-up resistance to the US air interdiction
campaign.
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N
1967
1968
1969
1970
1971
Type of Aid
Total
USSR
PRC
Total
USSR
PRC
Total
USSR
PRC
Total
USSR
PRC
Total
USSR
PRC
All types a/
650
505
145
390
290
100
225
120
205
155
70
85
180 b/
100
75
Air defense
equipment c/
115
95
20
88
81
7
77
60
17
9
5
4
49
46
3
Missiles
120
120
0
34
34
0
6
6
0
3
3
0
2
2
0
Ammunition
369
275
94
226
164
62
74
37
37
102
49
53
74 b/
34
37
Ground forces
equipment
36
11
25
34
4
30
57
9
48
28
4
24
40 b/
13
25
Naval craft
4
0
4
1
Negl.
1
Negl.
Negl.
0
0
0
0
8
0
8
Other
8
4
4
7
5
2
8
7
1
16
10
6
9
5
4
a. Totals are rounded to the nearest 5 million. Because of rounding, components may not add to the
totals shown.
b. Including about $5 million in military aid from Eastern Europe, consisting of about $3 million in
ammunition and $2 million in small arms.
c. Air defense equipment includes jet fighter aircraft, antiaircraft artillery, radar, and equipment for
SA-2 missile battalions (excluding missiles).
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L.,
3. The Communist donors have traditionally responded promptly to
North Vietnam's need for military aid. During the US bombing campaign,
the USSR provided sophisticated air defense equipment while the PRC
concentrated on providing equipment for North Vietnam's ground forces.
Both the USSR and China provided additional confirmation of their support
for Hanoi on several occasions during 1971 and are continuing to reaffirm
their support for Hanoi in 1972. China signed a supplemental aid agreement
immediately after the start of Operation Lam Son 719 in February 1971
and subsequently signed a protocol on military aid in July 1971. (Both
these documents were apparently designed to provide for the replacement
of equipment lost during Lam Son 719.) The USSR also signed a
supplemental aid agreement in early summer. In early autumn 1971 both
China and the USSR sent high-level delegations to Hanoi to sign the annual
military and economic aid agreements for 1972.. Subsequently the USSR
announced a supplementary military aid agreement in December 1971 and
the Chinese announced a similar supplemental protocol on military and
economic aid in late January 1972. These latter agreements are apparently
intended to reassure Hanoi that there will be no slackening in the
Communist countries' support of its goals. Further evidence of this support
is provided by the March 1972 visit of Soviet Deputy Defense Minister
Batitskiy to Hanoi, which reemphasized Moscow's continuing high-level
interest in improving North Vietnam's air defense capability.
Increase in Aid
4. We believe that during the course of the war North Vietnam has
consistently received as much military aid as its war policy has required.
Nevertheless for illustrative purposes we have examined the possible impact
of an increased level of military assistance. A 25% ($45 million) increase
in military aid deliveries in 1972, for example, could provide significant
amounts of additional equipment including any one (or a combination) of
the following packages:
(a) Ten additional SA-2 battalions or about 5-6 new SA-3
battalions.
(b) About 40 additional MIG-21 s or more than 300 additional
MIG-17s.
(c) Almost 400 T-54 medium tanks or 800-900 PT-76 light
amphibious tanks.
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(d) About 40 more PGN-2 Shanghai-class motor gunboats.
(e) A 60% increase in ammunition and missile deliveries.
5. North Vietnam increased its SAM strength to 45-50 SA-2 missile
battalions by adding 10 battalions in 1971. A similar increase in 1972 would
add 15% to 20% to its air defense capability. A somewhat less likely prospect
would be the addition of SA-3 missile battalions to North Vietnam's arsenal.
SA-3 missiles would increase North Vietnam's ability to engage low-flying
aircraft at greater distances, but would require a substantial investment in
training personnel to operate and maintain the system. The use of two
SAM systems would also complicate logistics and support. The North
Vietnamese have already developed a high degree of skill and logistical
capability in site preparation and transportation of the SA-2 missile system.
The benefits from introduction of the SA-3 at this time probably would
not be worth the cost.
6. The addition of up to 40 MIG-21s to North Vietnam's current
inventory of 250 jet aircraft probably would not provide a significant
improvement in North Vietnam's jet fighter capability despite the qualitative
improvement offered by larger numbers of this advanced jet fighter. Hanoi's
inventory currently includes about 130 MIG-15/17s, 30 MIG-19s, and more
than 80 MIG-21s.
7. Hanoi's recent military efforts indicate that field artillery and
armored equipment would be included in any package of additional aid.
Hanoi's continuing emphasis on its air defense effort would probably also
require strengthening of its antiaircraft artillery along with possible increases
in its SA-2 capability. In addition to air and ground weapons, Hanoi has
also expanded its coastal patrol force by the addition of eight Shanghai-class
motor gunboats, and expansion here might be continued to a limited extent.
Decrease in Aid
8. Again for illustrative purposes, we have postulated a reduction
in military aid. A 50% reduction in military aid deliveries below the 1971
level would cut deliveries to about $90 million, and North Vietnam would
be unable to replace in full ammunition and equipment expended or lost
during 1972 even if the rate of expenditure equaled the relatively low 1971
rate. In 1971 the estimated value of ammunition and replacement missile
deliveries amounted to about $75 million. Deliveries of ground forces
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equipment amounted to about $40 million, including more than $10 million
to replace tanks lost during the year, nearly $25 million of infantry weapons,
and more than $5 million of field artillery.(1)
Capabilities of Enemy Stockpiles to Dampen
the Effects of Reduction in Aid
9. Throughout the war in Indochina, Communist forces have adhered
to a stockpiling concept that calls for supply reserves to exceed anticipated
requirements by several fold. Stores of food, weapons, and ammunition
are established at three distinct echelons of command. Field stockpiles --
also called combat stockpiles -- are maintained in all operational areas to
meet the specific firepower requirements of units that are to be committed
to combat, in addition to normal day-to-day requirements; campaign
stockpiles are stored in more secure areas, but at locations relatively close
to potential combat areas in anticipation of military actions; and. finally,
strategic stockpiles to meet various contingencies are established in base
areas having a high degree of security.
10. Strategic stockpiles have been established principally in North
Vietnam and Laos, although there are undoubtedly some in South Vietnam
and Cambodia in base areas deemed adequately secure. Campaign stockpiles
have been established widely throughout the Laotian and Cambodian base
areas and in the more secure areas within South Vietnam. Combat stockpiles
exist solely in South Vietnam unless they are designed to support specific
military operations outside of South Vietnam. The various types of
stockpiles are not necessarily maintained separately. For example, a single
supply depot may contain both strategic and campaign stockpiles. Thus
the chief distinction between the two would be one of warehouse accounting
and planning.
11. We do not have firm intelligence on the aggregate size of the
enemy's stockpiles in Indochina. From what we know of his logistic planning
doctrine, the enemy's strategic stockpiles should approximate 12 months'
resupply requirements; campaign stockpiles, 6 months' requirements; and
combat stockpiles, 3 months' requirements -- a total of 21 months of
resupply requirements. Current stocks probably do not equal 21 months,
because the dry season effort to move large quantities of supplies to both
South Vietnam and Cambodia is still under way. Communist stock levels
are increasing and probably represent at least a 12-month resupply
1. Other war-supporting goods and supplies such as petroleum are included in
economic aid.
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requirement. For example, COMINT intercepts of January 1972 revealed
that more than 4,500 tons of supplies were stored in eight storage areas
in the Laotian Panhandle. These storage areas are only a fraction of the
number currently being maintained in the Panhandle alone. COMINT also
indicates a similar picture in the North Vietnamese Panhandle -- largely
bomb-free since 1968. One late 1971 intercept revealed more than 5,000
tons of supplies stored in several areas in Quang Binh Province. More
recently, intercepts have indicated several thousand tons of ordnance stored
in the key Vinh area.
Petroleum and Trucks
12. To support its military activities throughout Indochina and sustain
its domestic economy, North Vietnam has imported between 360,000 and
390,000 tons of petroleum products per year since 1968. Most of the
imports -- 90% - are made up of gasoline and diesel fuel, of which 85%
is consumed by civil and military transport. Countrywide, North Vietnam
maintains an estimated 90-day stockpile of petroleum on the average.
However, stocks may be substantially higher than this in the North
Vietnamese Panhandle -- possibly as high as 45,000 tons -- in terms of
requirements there and in southern Laos. Petroleum requirements in
southern Laos are estimated at about 70 tons per day, or roughly 17,000
tons for the entire dry season. Therefore, even if petroleum imports were
halved through January 1973, sufficient stocks probably are on hand to
ensure continued support of the war in the south, although the out in
petroleum deliveries would adversely affect the transport sector of the
economy.
13. Currently, the North Vietnamese truck inventory is at the highest
level ever, and a record number of trucks are on order from the USSR
for delivery this year. It is unlikely that the USSR would default on this
order; thus in Janury 1973 the North Vietnamese should continue to have
excess stocks assuming no major increase in the current rate of enemy truck
losses in Laos.
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i~ww
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APPENDIX XII
Regional Assessment (Including Cambodia)(1
Military Region 1
Background
I. Military Region (MR) 1 encompasses five provinces representing
about 20% of the total population of South Vietnam. To protect this
population the United States had as many as four infantry divisions
deployed within MR 1 in addition to two ARVN infantry divisions.
Beginning in late 1969, the United States began a phased withdrawal of
troops from MR 1 so that by February 1972 all four infantry divisions
had been completely withdrawn, leaving three ARVN infantry divisions to
assume primary responsibility for protecting the population. Despite
substantial US troop withdrawals, the VSSG Control Indicator for GVN
control over the rural population increased from 53% to 73% between 1969
and 1971.
2. Friendly main forces were reduced by about one-third between
early 1970 and early 1972, reflecting the withdrawal of US forces. On the
other hand, enemy main forces were reduced by only 10%. Our Main Forces
Ratio indicates that in this period the ratio decreased from 2.5 to 1.9.(2)
However, the Total Force Ratio has increased from 2.5 to 2.8 during the
same time period. This is explained by the fact that enemy local forces
had been seriously eroded while GVN territorials had been expanded and
upgraded. Total enemy forces decreased by 33% while total friendly forces
decreased by 26% between the first quarter of 1970 and 1972.
I . The situation as of 3 April. See Appendix IV for a definition of the force structure.
2. This ratio does not include all the force changes which are the consequence of
the current enemy offensive, for example, the recent ARVN redeployments and enemy
and friendly casualties. It does include the recent enemy redeployment from North
Vietnam.
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The 1971/72 Dry Season (3)
3. The enemy main force buildup this dry season is concentrated
in Quang Tri and Thua Thien Provinces and has reached a magnitude greater
than any year during the war. Four new roads have been constructed
through the DMZ facilitating the rapid movement of men and materiel into
northern MR 1. In recent weeks, heavy artillery such as 130-mm field guns
and 152-mm howitzers have been deployed to Quang Tri Province,
complementing the deployment of several air defense weapons already in
Quang Tri and western Thua Thien Provinces. The deployment of heavy
combat support weapons to northern MR 1 enhances the combat
effectiveness of enemy ground forces and presents a significant threat to
Allied tactical air (tacair) and helicopter support operations.
4. To counter the enemy threat in Quang Tri and Thua Thien
Provinces, friendly forces are relying heavily on concentrated B-52 bombing
support missions and tacair. The main force shield around the coastal
lowlands, which depended on long- and medium-range artillery (175-mm,
155-mm, and 105-mm), armor/infantry reaction forces, and Allied tacair
has been broken. The shield, which was comprised of several fire support
bases forward of the urban population had, for the past two years, been
successful in preventing enemy main forces from infiltrating the lowlands.
It is now an open question as to when this shield will be reestablished.
The Battle Zone
5. Because much of the enemy's current dry season augmentation
is concentrated in the two northern provinces of MR 1, we have expected
to see much of the main force combat action occur in these provinces -
as has thus far been the case. As of 31 March there were 32 GVN maneuver
battalions available for combat operations in Quang Tri and Thua Thien
Provinces, or roughly 50% of the total number of GVN maneuver battalions
available within MR 1 -- 26, or 81%, were deployed in the highlands west
of Quang Tri City and Hue City on or near key fire support bases. Opposing
the GVN maneuver battalions are 48 enemy maneuver battalions, providing
enemy main forces with a 1.5 maneuver battalion advantage over friendly
main forces in Quang Tri and Thua Thien Provinces. (The maneuver
battalion strength ratio is about 1.0.) From the manpower point of view
this does not necessarily give the NVA a decisive edge, because usually
3. The dry season in MR 1 usually begins in January and continues through August.
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two or three Communist maneuver battalions are employed against one
friendly maneuver battalion. The augmentation in enemy main forces in
Quang Tri and Thua Thien Provinces this dry season suggested that the
enemy would change his strategy this year from protracted to main force
warfare. In fact, the enemy has committed a large main force supported
by heavy artillery and air defense weapons against GVN main forces in
Quang Tri and Thua Thien Provinces.
Military Region 2
Background
6. GVN MR 2 has been a chronic security problem for the South
Vietnamese government for many years. Two main reasons for this are the
historical presence of a well-organized enemy political and military
infrastructure and the nonavailability of Allied military assets to initiate
an aggressive pacification campaign in the military region. However, since
late 1970 the population security apparatus has shown some significant
improvements. Reporting since 1969 has shown that the VSSG Control
Indicator for GVN control over the rural population has increased from
45% to 56% between 1969 and 1971.
7. Except for US forces, Allied combat forces in the region have
not been characterized by aggressive combat operations. While US forces
had primary responsibility for containing enemy main forces in the
highlands, the remaining two ARVN infantry divisions and two South
Korean infantry divisions were assigned to population control. As US forces
were routing the enemy's main forces in the highlands, only marginal gains
were made in pacification and population control between 1968 and 1970.
In early 1970, US forces began withdrawing which caused GVN forces to
assume primary responsibility for combat operations.
8. Between the first quarter of 1970 and 1972, friendly main forces
were reduced by 6% by the withdrawal of two US infantry divisions. Enemy
main forces have more than tripled during the same time period while total
enemy forces declined by 3%. The increase in enemy main forces reflects
the dramatic buildup of main forces during the 1972 dry season. The decline
in total forces has been caused by the severe erosion of enemy local forces
and guerrillas in the coastal lowlands of the military region.
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The 1971 /72 Dry Season(4)
9. Since January 1972 the enemy has dramatically increased his main
force structure in MR 2, primarily within Pleiku and Kontum Provinces.
Estimated infiltration to the B-3 Front currently is approximately 42,000
men, with an additional 16,000 destined for VC MR 5 along the coastal
lowlands of MR 2 and southern MR 1. Infiltration to MR 2 is the highest
recorded at any time during the war. Included in the infiltration is the
deployment of one full division, the 320th, in addition to filler and
replacement personnel. Moreover, two regiments of the 2nd NVA Division
have been deployed into Kontum Province from southern Laos. Rounding
out the enemy manpower buildup has been the unprecedented flow of war
materiel to the western highlands. Although 130-mm field guns have not
been detected in the area, heavy mortars and medium-range artillery
(160-mm mortars and 122-mm field guns) have been deployed to support
enemy ground forces. In addition, it is believed that a substantial increase
in antiaircraft artillery has taken place, representing a threat to Allied tacair
and helicopter support operations. Finally, reports have suggested that the
enemy plans to employ a significant armor force, possibly two armor
battalions, during offensive operations this dry season. COMINT and forward
air controller reports have indicated that NVA tanks were deploying in the
direction of the western highlands from southern Laos.
10. Facing the enemy threat in Kontum and Pleiku Provinces are two
ARVN infantry divisions. Both divisions are considered marginal at best
when compared with other GVN infantry divisions, but they have been
augmented with elements of a third division and a Ranger Group. For
analytical purposes and because the JGS has deployed two airborne brigades
from the General Reserve with one more scheduled to be deployed, we
have assumed that the entire airborne division is in Kontum Province. In
addition, we have not included South Korean forces or GVN maneuver
battalions assigned to pacification missions as part of friendly main forces.
11. The MR 2 Main Force Ratio declined from 7.0 to 2.1 between
the first quarter of 1970 and 1972, primarily because of the withdrawal
of US troops, the significant increase in enemy main forces, and the omission
of GVN and Free World maneuver battalions on pacification status from
the main force structure. Because the enemy main force buildup has been
confined to a small geographic area and friendly main forces have about
a two to one advantage over enemy main forces for the military region
as a whole, the GVN has been able to meet the enemy threat by
4. The dry season in the highlands of MR 2 usually begins in November and continues
through April.
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concentrating its main forces in the same area without major risk to the
rest of the military region. Assuming the arrival of the entire airborne
division, there will be 42 GVN maneuver battalions deployed within Kontum
and Pleiku Provinces, representing about 60% of the total number of GVN
maneuver battalions available within the military region. Opposing the GVN
maneuver battalions are 35 enemy maneuver battalions which could be
increased by approximately 12 maneuver battalions from forces in southern
Laos and the lowlands of Binh Dinh Province. However, this is unlikely
because the forces in southern Laos are currently located near Pakse and
those in Binh Dinh will probably be targeting GVN maneuver battalions
in the lowlands. Assuming no further enemy main force reinforcement
capability from outside the military region, the maneuver battalion strength
ratio is roughly 1.4 in favor of friendly forces.
12. Tactically, friendly main forces have assumed a defensive posture
centered around key fire support bases forming a main force shield
supported by B-52 bombing missions, Allied tacair, medium-range artillery
(155-mm and 105-mm), and armor/infantry reaction forces designed to
protect the province capitals of Kontum and Pleiku Cities and key lines
of communication. As in MR 1, friendly main forces in MR 2 have been
fighting two types of warfare since 1969, protracted warfare in the lowlands
and main force warfare in the highlands. During the last two years, enemy
total forces were severely eroded by adopting this strategy. A gradual erosion
occurred in the lowlands, while limited enemy main forces attacked Allied
fire support bases in the highlands, resulting in heavy casualties with no
strategic military successes achieved by either side.
13. This dry season the enemy's main targets probably are Kontum
City and Pleiku City. The enemy probably hopes that even a short
occupation of either of these cities would discredit the Vietnamization
Program and quite possibly have some influence upon the outcome of US
elections in November.
14. The position in the highlands, however, still appears to be
favorable to friendly forces. By concentrating their efforts in a small
geographic area and lacking the capability to bring additional main force
pressure upon friendly forces elsewhere in the military region, the GVN
has been able to meet the threat thus far by redeploying additional main
forces to the battle zone.
15. We anticipate further heavy fighting within the next few weeks
in the highlands, together with a continuation of the heavy fighting in
MR 1, resulting in a great loss of life to both sides. Given the current
friendly main force shield supported by effective Allied firepower and
armor/infantry reaction forces, we feel the GVN should be able to parry
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enemy main forces this dry season, but it will be faced with the strongest
enemy total force structure in MR 2 since early 1968.
Military Region 3
16. Enemy strategy and assets directed against GVN MR 3 - or, more
specifically, directed against Saigon -- have been concentrated largely in the
border areas of the region and on adjacent enemy bases in Cambodia. During
the past few months there has been some attempt by the enemy to reinforce
his former internal base areas and their populated fringes. Although security
deteriorated some on the fringes of these bases during this time, vigorous
GVN countermeasures early this year did much to counter these enemy
gains. In the region as a whole, the present GVN posture is firm, but, in
the northwestern border areas, it has been seriously challenged by main
forces deploying from Cambodia.
17. In recent years, the enemy has faced difficult situations in
conducting protracted warfare in MR 3. He has been seriously hurt by a
severe deterioration of his assets in the villages. Last year the enemy resorted
to widespread assignment of North Vietnamese to village guerrilla units.
While the enemy has tried since 1970 to counter his weakness and the
GVN presence at the village level by expanding the clandestine side of his
infrastructure, he has not been able to do so. Rather, his existing assets
at the village echelon have been further eroded.
18. While enemy assets (including a large share of his weak and
dispersed main and local forces) were important in bringing about
deterioration in the security of the fringes of War Zones C and D, the
root cause was poor local GVN leadership. In early 1972, however, extensive
sweeps by all three ARVN divisions assigned to MR 3 may have delayed
enemy preparations for future activity in these areas.
19. Current evidence suggests that the enemy is shifting to main force
warfare supported from Cambodia. In early April a number of main force
units returned to MR 3 from Cambodia, reducing the MR 3 Main Force
Ratio. The extremely dense GVN local forces provide sufficient rear area
security to free the entire main forces in the military region to concern
themselves with the COSVN main force threat from Cambodia. The final
outcome of this year's dry season operations in MR 3 obviously will be
largely dependent on the extent of the enemy's commitment of main forces
currently located in Cambodia. As of 3 April, at least three infantry
regiments had deployed from Cambodia into the border provinces of MR 3,
and indications are that several more will follow. Three VC/NVA main force
divisions have been located in Cambodia adjacent to the MR 3 border, and
very recent information suggests that elements of all three have moved into
MR 3.
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Military Region 4
20. Enemy forces in the Delta continued to erode during the last
dry season and probably will repeat their performance during the present
dry season. Last year the enemy's dry season campaign of protracted warfare
was muted and the coordination of his occasional highpoints was impaired
by aggressive friendly combat operations. Behind the favorable GVN
developments in the Delta last year was a gradual improvement in all phases
of its military operations.
21. For most of the war, Delta warfare was unique in that it was
mainly between indigenous forces on both sides. Small US combat forces
(two brigades at the peak) operated there during 1967 to mid-1969. On
the enemy's side, however, the war has been increasingly fought by North
Vietnamese since early 1969. NVA personnel now predominate in the main
forces and are assigned to some local force units as is the case in the other
military regions.
22. The strongest enemy resistance in the Delta during 1971 centered
in the U Minh Forest, traditionally his largest and most important base
in the Delta -- one which was essentially inviolate as late as the fall of
1970. However, the GVN made reduction of the U Minh base a high priority
goal, and the enemy's attempt to counter GVN moves with his largest
concentration of military forces in the Delta faltered badly. Presently, only
one large insecure area remains. The U Minh is one of five principal bases,
together with numerous small enemy mini-bases in the Delta, in which the
GVN has conducted extensive operations and which have been partly
occupied during the past year. A longstanding and continuing trend of
declining guerrilla forces also has seriously affected the enemy's protracted
warfare in the Delta. What once was a platoon of full-time guerrillas in
enemy villages in the mid-1960s had become a weak squad by 1969 and
then a cell of several men in far fewer villages by last year.
23. Once dominant throughout much of the Delta, the enemy's
eroded and weak posture at the end of 1971 stemmed from his disastrous
military losses during the 1968 Tet Offensive, the subsequent movement
of the GVN into his villages and, more recently, improved ARVN
aggressiveness. Since early 1970, the GVN's regular troops in the Delta have
shifted from static to aggressive operations owing to direction from Saigon,
improved competence in the higher echelons as a result of personnel shifts,
and a growing sense of will and confidence among these higher echelons
within the past year. Among three ARVN divisions in the Delta, the 9th
has performed a Delta-wide mobile role for two years now and has, with
other Delta regulars, conducted shallow operations into Cambodia as well
as providing security along the Mekong River in Cambodia since early 1970.
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In the past year the increasing assumption by the GVN territorial forces --
Regional and Popular Forces -- of the entire security burden in half of
the provinces of the military region has been especially important. Formerly
characterized as static defense forces, the territorials were utilized in
extended Delta-wide sweeps on a regular basis beginning last year.
Additionally, their mobile capabilities were increased by the formation of
20 Regional Force battalions and the assignment of these battalions to a
mobile reaction role.
24. Faced with a weak position in MR 4 and desiring to strengthen
his forces in preparation for offensive action this dry season, the enemy
infiltrated at least one new NVA regiment into the Delta early this year.
More recently, he shifted at least two and possibly three regiments from
the Phuoc Long Front in Cambodia to the GVN Chau Doc Province border.
Also in late 1971 the enemy activated a division command echelon from
assets already within the Delta. Even with these forces, enemy capabilities
in the Delta probably still are not sufficient to seriously challenge GVN
military dominance, although there has been a recent upsurge of enemy
harassing actions. Currently, enemy forces probably are insufficient to tie
down all GVN regulars there in any offensive. However, if an ARVN division
is redeployed to MR 1, the friendly main force advantage in MR 4 will
be significantly reduced.
Enemy Combat Forces in Cambodia
25. Communist combat forces in Cambodia fall into two main
groupings: (a) the VC/NVA mobile strike forces and (b) the VC/NVA and
Khmer Communist (KC) regional forces. The mobile strike force is
composed of the 5th, 7th, and 9th Divisions plus the 69th Artillery
Command and the Phuoc Long Front, and its strength is estimated to be
at least 27,000 men. Most of these forces at present are targeted against
South Vietnam. The regional force structure is composed of at least eight
regiments plus a large number of local district-level company units. Its
strength is estimated at between 23,000 and 38,000 men.
26. The mobile strike forces are currently deployed in two major
formations. As of March, the first formation, composed of the 5th, 7th,
and 9th Divisions plus the 69th Artillery Command, was located in
Kompong Cham Province, Cambodia (opposite Tay Ninh Province in South
Vietnam), and had an estimated combat strength of about 20,000 men.
In early April, however, elements of all three Divisions had moved into
GVNN MR 3, together with two independent regiments. The second
formation, the Phuoc Long Front, has been deployed in an area west and
south of Phnom Penh, but a division-sized element has recently moved near
the Chau Doc Province border of MR 4 (see discussions on MRs 3 and 4,
above).
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27. The mobile strike forces in Cambodia are similar in strength and
character to the VC/NVA main force units operating in northern South
Vietnam. The strike force battalions average about 300 men each and are
well-equipped with modern small arms and crew-served weapons. At the
regimental and division level, additional combat support units are available,
which increases the firepower of the mobile strike force battalions when
operating as a part of these larger formations. The mobile strike force units
are the only units capable of posing a significant threat to ARVN units
inside South Vietnam.
28. The VC/NVA and KC regional forces (about 8,000 VC/NVA and
15,000 to 30,000 KC) are much less capable than their strike force
counterparts. Even the VC/NVA regional units contain substantial numbers
of locally recruited ethnic Khmer, who are much less motivated than recruits
from North Vietnam. In addition, these units lack much of the combat
support that the mobile strike forces enjoy. The regional forces have the
primarily defensive missions of population control and the protection of
Communist lines of communication running through their areas of
responsibility. The regional forces in Cambodia with their large number of
KC personnel and reduced firepower are not deemed a serious threat to
South Vietnam at the present time.
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Top Secret
Top Secret
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