Assessment of Probable North Vietnamese Military Strategy over the Next Six Months

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP80T01719R000300090002-1
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
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• Document Creation Date: December 9, 2016
• Document Release Date: November 28, 2000
• Sequence Number: 2
• Publication Date: March 31, 1972
• Content Type: REPORT

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Assessment of Probable North Vietnamese Military Strategy
over the Next Six Months
This memorandum was drafted by the Central
Intelligence Agency and coordinated with the
NSC Indochina Ad Hoc Group, under whose
auspices it is being forwarded.'
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SECRET
SC--07036/72
31 March 1972
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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
31 March 1972
ASSESSMENT OF PROBABLE NORTH VIETNAMESE
MILITARY STRATEGY OVER THE NEXT SIX MONTHS
Overview
1. Hanoi probably intends to engage its main force units in heavy
offensive action in the next six months. Some of these units apparently
have already begun to launch major attacks. The focus of this effort is
likely to be in the rugged western parts of Military Regions (MRs) 1 and
2 in South Vietnam, where large numbers of well-equipped Communist
troops are already arrayed. In southern South Vietnam, an expansion of
terrorism and guerrilla activity is possible, but extensive Communist main
force action seems unlikely unless the Saigon government moves enough
of its troops north to MRs 1 and 2 to present Hanoi with an exploitable
opportunity.
2. The Communists are also likely to continue the current offensive
in northern Laos through the end of the dry season unless they secure
the Long Tieng area before then. Southern Laos, by contrast, will probably
see only limited activity designed to protect Hanoi's logistic network from
any possible ground threat. Extensive main force activity in Cambodia looks
unlikely, given the extent to which Communist forces have been retargeted
against South Vietnam. In Laos and particularly in Cambodia, however,
the Communists are almost certain to increase terrorist activities, especially
when they want to unsettle the local government or feel themselves in need
of headlines.
Timing
3. In the western highlands of MR 2, substantial evidence indicates
that the North Vietnamese Army (NVA) intended to launch major attacks
earlier than this in 1972. The Communist timetable has almost certainly
been upset by US air strikes and by ARVN's preemptive actions on the
ground, and such Allied counter-action may delay the enemy still further.
SECRET SPOKE
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Nonetheless, the present disposition of Communist forces in the western
highlands strongly suggests that they are now ready for action. They may
simply be holding off the initiation of major attacks until other enemy
main force units are also in position in MR 1 and elsewhere.
4. For maximum impact, it is likely that the Communists would
in fact like to attack more or less simultaneously in MRs 1 and 2. In MR 2
they still have time before the rains begin in May to mount a major attack
against Kontum or Pleiku cities; at the least they would hope to give ARVN
a highly visible bloodying. After the rainy season gets under way, they
might return the 320th Division to North Vietnam, but it seems just as
likely that they will keep their force structure in and near the highlands
at something like its present level.
5. Farther north the Communists opened heavy attacks just below
the DMZ on 30 March. It is as yet unclear whether this is the beginning
of a major offensive. The Communists now have new roads on the east
side of the mountains, and they will probably use them to keep on fighting
in MR 1 through the summer. In both MRs 1 and 2, they will be trying
to bring unprecedentedly heavy firepower to bear on their adversaries.
Elsewhere in South Vietnam, the goal of their main force units will be
to tie down as many South Vietnamese troops as possible and to test for
weaknesses, probably in a fairly cautious way.
A "Spontaneous Uprising?" 25X1 C
6. the North Vietnamese
and Viet Cong are also still talking to the political and paramilitary
components of their apparatus about a "spontaneous uprising" to disrupt
the pacification, sometime in the next few months. Our estimates of the
strength of these assets -- the local forces, civilian cadres, and
non-Communist sympathizers among the South Vietnamese people - are
much softer than those for the Communist main forces. Still, it seems likely
that Hanoi will be disappointed if it really is expecting much out of them
any time soon. Indeed, if Hanoi insists on fomenting a "spontaneous
uprising," it runs the risk of squandering many of these valuable assets
as it did in 1968. The Communists will, however, stay on the lookout for
favorable opportunities for "people's war" in South Vietnam, and Vietcong
local units will launch whatever actions they can to tie down South
Vietnamese forces.
7. Broadly speaking the Communists probably have three interrelated
objectives in this period: to undermine ARVN's self-confidence and its
credibility with the populace, and thereby to reduce the effectiveness of
the pacification program; to influence US domestic politics, particularly the
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election campaign; and to stimulate pressure in both South Vietnam and
the United States for a negotiated settlement on something approaching
the Communists' terms. Hanoi may also be harboring grander hopes - for
a military victory so smashing as to undermine the Saigon regime, for
instance, or for a significant surge of popular unrest. The Communists
probably do not, however, consider such events particularly likely. They
almost certainly have ruled out an all-or-nothing operation in 1972 along
the lines of the 1968 offensives, and they probably are prepared to live
with the possibility that they will achieve no more than fairly modest gains
in the next six months.
Enemy Capabilities: Manpower and Disposition of Forces
8. Conscription in North Vietnam has been high over the past year,
with large numbers of young men being inducted into the NVA to replace
the troops sent to fight beyond the borders of North Vietnam. Thus far
this dry season, Hanoi has dispatched about 117,000 infiltrators to the
southern war zones. This compares with some 106,200 during the entire
dry season last year (1970/71). Since the infiltration flow in most dry
seasons has almost ceased by the end of March, we may have seen the
bulk of the infiltration this spring already. Infiltrators beginning the trek
from the north after March would generally arrive in the south at the end
of the campaigning season, and rain comes to the Laos Panhandle in May --
making travel more difficult. Furthermore, combat losses have not been
heavy during the dry season campaigning to date, and thus the need for
late-season infiltrators as replacements is not great. (This could change, of
course, if large-scale military action gets under way in coming weeks.)
9.
Dry-season infiltration starts, by destination, compare as follows:
1970/71
(Sep-Jun)
1971/72
(Sep-Mar)
DMZ-Tri Thien-Hue
6,000
12,000
MR 5
14,000
16,000
B-3 Front
14,500
40,000
GVN MRs 3 and
and Cambodia
4
COSVN
45,000
35,000
Southern Laos
26,500 a/
14,000
Total
106,200
117, 000
a, Includes some units deployed for Lam
Son 719.
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As the infiltration figures indicate, the NVA threat to MRs 1 and 2 has
developed more strongly than to MRs 3 and 4. The estimate for the B-3
Front includes the 320th Division. The figure for the DMZ and the Tri
Thien-Hue (TTH) Military Region includes the 324B Division. In addition,
the 304th Division is now deploying to western Quang Tri Province, and
the 308th Division is located north of the DMZ in a position to enter
TTH. These latter two divisions would represent about 15,000 to 20,000
additional combat troops.
10. We estimate that this year's infiltration has provided for an
expansion of the VC/NVA combat order of battle (OB) in South Vietnam
and Cambodia by about 27,000 men, increasing the combat OB from about
69,000 to~91,000 in South, Vietnam and providing for a 5,000-man increase
to COSVN's concentration of forces in Cambodia opposite GVN MR 3 (see
the ta ble). The remaining 90,000 infiltrators have been used to expand the
rear services system in southern Laos and Cambodia and to provide a stock
of fillers to offset combat casualties.
11. It seems clear from the manpower situation that Hanoi has
committed a large portion of its military assets this year to the various
military fronts outside North Vietnam. As a result of (a) this year's
infiltration, (b) the recent unit deployments into South Vietnam, and (c)
an earlier expansion of the force structure in northern Laos, there will
remain in North Vietnam only 17 regular infantry regiments.(') This is
the smallest reserve force kept at home by Hanoi during any dry season
since 1968 when the General Offensive was under way. In addition, there
is some question concerning the combat capability of some of these reserve
regiments.
12. This willingness of Hanoi to move an increasing proportion of
its troops to areas outside North Vietnam has led to some change in the
comparative enemy-versus-friendly combat strengths in South Vietnam. As
can be seen from the following tabulation, GVN Main Forces still enjoy
superiority in all Military Regions, but that superiority is significantly greater
in MRs 3 and 4 than in MRs 1 and 2.
1. This assumes that the 308th Division, which is still in North Vietnam, is committed
to redeploy to South Vietnam.
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Main Force Ratios (Allied to VCLNVA) a/
As of
31 March
MR 1
MR 2
MR 3
South
MR 4 Vietnam
1968
2.4
3.3
3.9
2.4 2.9
1970
2.5
7.0
4.5
8.3 4.2
1972
1.9
2.4
19.5
7.4 3.7
(3.3) b/
(4.6) b/ (2.8) b/
a. These figures, based on CIA analysis, are a
ratio of aggregate maneuver battalion strength.
They include US forces for 1968 and 1970 only, and
in 1972 they include the GVN's Regional Force bat-
talions. The ratios also reflect a maximum first
quarter NVA buildup concept, including in _1972_,the
308th Division. The ARVN side of the ratio for
MRs 1 and 2 also includes the planned deployment
of the remaining Marine and Airborne units out of
the reserves.
b. The figures in parentheses result from the
inclusion of COSVN's 5th, 7th, and 9th Divisions,
which are targeted against South Vietnam but are
presently in Cambodia near the GVN MR 3 border,
and the 1st Division which has moved opposite
GVN MR 4.
13. To the extent that Hanoi's strategy considerations are based on
its manpower commitments (and its judgments regarding Allied strengths),
MRs 1 and 2 continue to seem the most likely candidates for
enemy-initiated sustained offensive action. Given the existing force ratio
situation, if the NVA should launch such an offensive, fighting would be
heavy and casualties high. Casualties would be particularly high for the NVA,
however, which is the offensive force and which is highly vulnerable - when
its units are concentrated - to Allied firepower. Although local situations
might develop that appear desperate, the South Vietnamese forces in MRs 1
and 2 should be capable of protecting themselves and the populated areas
of the region and of retaking any key objectives lost in the opening round
of NVA attacks. (This assessment is consistent with the views held by most
senior South Vietnamese commanders.)
14. Hanoi's military strategy in Cambodia is closely related to its
strategy in the southern half of South Vietnam. The North Vietnamese
in Cambodia have attempted to create a situation in which Khmer
Communist units, along with certain newly developed light territorial-type
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Estimated Strength of Communist Regular
Combat Forces in Indochina
Thousand
December
December
December
March
1969
1970
1971
1972
VC/NVA
130-150
105-120
105-120
140-155
South
Viet-
nam a/
130-150
85-95
80-90
110-120
Cambodia
--
20-25
25-30
30-35
Khmer Com-
munist
N.A.
10-20
15-30
15-30
PL/NVA b/
55-65
60-70
70-85
70-85
Northern
Laos
35-40
30-35
40-45
40-45
Southern
Laos
20-25
30-35
30-40
30-40
a. Figures for South Vietnam include those NVA
forces located in southern North Vietnam between
Dong Hoi and the DMZ which are considered to be a
threat to South Vietnam. These forces numbered
13,000 in December 1969, 10,000 in December 1970,
12,000 in December 1971, and 20,000 in March 1972.
The figure for South Vietnam for 1969 includes
some forces actuaZZy stationed in Cambodia but
targeted against South Vietnam.
b. Includes troops engaged in antiaircraft sup-
port activities.
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NVA regiments, are strong enough on their own to hamstring the Cambodian
army. If successful, this would free regular North Vietnamese and Viet Cong
main force units to put pressure on GVN MRs 3 and 4. Hanoi's objective
is to tie down as many GVN forces in MRs 3 and 4 as possible. Hanoi
will doubtless also seek to expand terrorist and sapper activity to the extent
possible in both Cambodia and South Vietnam in furtherance of this
objective. Given the ratio of opposing main forces, however, it is unlikely
that the VC/NVA can bring off any striking successes in southern South
Vietnam in the next six months.
15. Hanoi also sharply increased its commitment of forces to the war
in northern Laos this season. Heavy deployment toward the end of 1971
included the introduction of three infantry regiments, improvements in the
air defense system, and increases in heavy artillery. By the end of 1971,
the NVA enjoyed a combat force superiority of about 2.5 to 1 over the
Laos irregulars and Thai and Laos regular army personnel in the Plaine
des Jarres area. Since then, the combat force ratio has been improved by
the movement of additional irregulars and Thais into the area.
16. Hanoi's intention this season was to secure the Plaine des Jarres
area by taking friendly strong points to the southwest, including Long Tieng,
and to destroy the remaining effectiveness of Vang Pao's army. However,
Vang Pao's efforts, with heavy air and artillery support, have delayed the
North Vietnamese attack. The growing participation of Thai troops was
probably one factor in Hanoi's decision to try for a major breakthrough
in northern Laos this year. At this point, it is not clear whether NVA
forces have steam enough to complete the job of taking Long Tieng and
associated areas. Because it is now late in the dry season, the fall of Long
Tieng would not, in the absence of other military or political events, spark
a major political crisis within the Royal Lao government.
The Air Threat
17. North Vietnam has only a limited offensive air capability, given
a continuation of US air presence in Indochina. Nevertheless, its air force
could present an increasing threat to Allied forces over the next six months
and in some circumstances could become a significant element in the
military balance of power. North Vietnam has about 250 MIG-15, MIG-17,
MIG-19, and MIG-21 jet fighters. Although these aircraft have been used
exclusively in a defensive role against US aircraft, they could be converted
and used in a tactical support role with little trouble.
18. The current level of North Vietnamese air activity, coupled with
the construction of two new airfields in the far southern Panhandle, strongly
suggests that Hanoi plans to utilize its air force in the war more fully in
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the future than it has in the past. For the near term, Hanoi has three
options which it can exercise while US air power remains in Southeast Asia:
(1) increase MIG response to Allied aircraft interdicting the enemy supply
effort in both northern and southern Laos, (2) provide ground support to
enemy forces in Laos and northern South Vietnam, and (3) use its aircraft
in an interception role against Allied aircraft providing ground support to
ARVN.
19. The commitment of multiple fighter sorties against Allied aircraft
in Laos, staging from five bases south of the 19th parallel and Bai Thuong
at the 20th parallel, would increase the threat to Allied air operations. SAM
and AAA units now in place are available to provide cover for enemy aircraft
operations. By concentrating, training efforts on ground attack during the
next several months, the North Vietnamese could balance out their air threat
to include tactical support to their ground forces. Using the southern bases,
this threat would be positioned within striking range of targets in Laos,
and, equally important, in South Vietnam.
20. North Vietnamese MIGs do not necessarily have to engage US
aircraft to have a significant impact on our ability effectively to support
friendly forces. The MIG intrusions into Laos have frequently caused us
to divert bombers and gunships away from primary targets. Hence, the use
of MIGs over northern South Vietnam could, depending on the US response,
cause a drop in our effectiveness in helping the South Vietnamese ward
off Communist ground attacks. North Vietnamese MIGs were used in this
way over northern Laos during the heavy fighting that took place there
last winter, and the penetration of northern South Vietnam by a MIG-21
on 30 March suggests that MIGs may be used in a similar role in this area.
21. One factor which would initially limit the size of operations by
Hanoi is its tactical doctrine calling for positive ground radar control of
all fighter activities, and the apparent inability of North Vietnam's GCI
controllers to direct more than one to two flights simultaneously. The
principle deterrent to large-scale North Vietnamese air operations in 1972,
however, remains the threat of US retaliation.
Enemy Logisistics
22. The overall picture of the Communists' logistical activity during
the past several months matches that of their military manpower
commitment. Unusually heavy levels of resupply have been detected in
southern Laos and along the Cambodian and South Vietnam frontiers --
particularly the borders of MRs 1 and 2. In northern Laos the enemy's
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offensive, now several months along, continues to receive substantial logistics
support.
23. Currently, supply stockpiles in North Vietnam are extensive.
Petroleum stocks in southern North Vietnam may be as high as 45,000
short tons, substantially higher than the enemy's entire dry season petroleum
requirement in southern Laos. The current inventory of trucks is the_highest
ever. Logistics-related construction continues to complement the buildup
in stocks in North Vietnam. For example, new construction is under way
extending the railroad south of Vinh to within a few miles of Mu Gia
Pass, and on a new pipeline to connect Hanoi with the pipeline systems
in the North Vietnamese and Laotian Panhandles.
Supply Movements This Dry Season
24. The Communist's annual dry season General Transportation
Offensive in southern Laos got into high gear in early January and has
continued unabated to the present.(2) Facilitated by a considerable road
construction effort and restructured logistic apparatus, large quantities of
supplies have been moved from North Vietnam through the Laos Panhandle
into Cambodia and South Vietnam. A new road system has been built
through the central Laos Panhandle; more than 100 miles of new roads
are being constructed in northeastern Cambodia; new roads are under
construction through the DMZ into South Vietnam; and a series of new
roads is being built south of the tri-border area, presumably to support
troop deployments in the Central Highlands of South Vietnam.
25. The level of logistic activity noted in the southernmost part of
the Laos Panhandle has been particularly impressive this dry season. For
example, as the General Transportation Offensive began in January, Binh
Tram 35 in the Ban Bac area reportedly delivered some 3,500 tons (an
average of 113 short tons per day - STPD) of supplies during the month --
probably the largest monthly total ever detected moving that far south.(3)
Besides these heavy southward deliveries, large quantities of supplies also
have been detected moving eastward toward South Vietnam. Binh Tram 42
reported the delivery of 102 STPD to GVN MR 1 on seven days in late
2. The area has now entered the transitional weather phase preceding the rainy
southwest monsoon season which starts usually in May. Thus far, however, weather
has not yet affected the road system which remains in generally excellent condition.
3. Previous record levels of supply deliveries in the southern Panhandle were reached
during February and March of 1970 when Binh Tram 35 reported receiving an average
of 107 STPD of supplies. Comparing the two, the 113 STPD figure for January 1972
represents Binh Tram 35's deliveries farther south (not receipts from the north) well
before the normal peak levels of activity in February-March.
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January. Similarly, Binh Tram 37 revealed an average supply flow of some
64 STPD to the B-3 Front in early February, while at the same time
maintaining a significant flow of supplies south to Binh Trams in
northeastern Cambodia. A northward flow of supplies - chiefly rice - has
also been maintained in the tri-border area. The rice is delivered through
the northern Cambodia logistical network to Binh Tram 37, which
distributes it among units in the southern part of the Panhandle and also
moves it to the east along supply routes to South Vietnam.
26. Massive quantities of arms and ammunition have been included
in the detected supply deliveries. For example, Binh Tram 45 shipped some
2,800 tons of ordnance to Binh Tram 46 along the new central road system
during February. The shipments included virtually every category of weapon
and ammunition known to be in the North Vietnamese inventory and
represent the largest monthly shipment of munitions ever noted in COMINT
in southern aos. This i eve of activity along the centra corn or as
continued into March. A summary report for the period 1-12 March
indicated that 1,650 tons of supplies - roughly half arms and ammunition --
were moved between Binh Trams 45 and 46.
27. This heavy supply activity in the southern Panhandle has had a
dual impact. First, activity on the exit corridors has resulted in supply
throughput to South Vietnam and Cambodia this season being considerably
higher than that of last year at this time. Second, this performance has
allowed the Communists to augment their stockpiles of supplies, particularly
of arms and ammunition.( 4
4. While throughput has been at high levels, one anomoly exists in the intelligence
available for evaluating the dry season effort. The level of supply input into southern
Laos as detected by sensors is running well below that recorded last year. Several factors
could explain this:
? Resupply requirements may be considerably smaller this year than
last when the enemy was building very large supply stockpiles in
anticipation of and defense against the ARVN operations.
? Required inputs from North Vietnam may be lower this year because
of concentrated efforts by the Communists to achieve greater
self-sufficiency in rice in southern Laos and northern South Vietnam.
Supplementing this is a probable increased flow of rice from
Cambodia to southern Laos and South Vietnam, a flow which should
conceptually be considered "input".
? The extensive expansion of the southern Laos and Cambodian logistic
system probably required levels of supply input which are currently
unnecessary. With that system now operating more efficiently it
presumably requires less input from the north for its own
consumption. (Footnote continued on p. I 1)
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Northeast Cambodia
28. Resupply activity in northeast Cambodia this dry season has
tracked closely with that in southern Laos. Traffic levels on the overland
corridor (Route 110/97) increased markedly in January and by
mid-February had surged to moderate rates between the border and Stung
Treng. South of Stung Treng, sizable volumes of supplies have continued
to be shipped southward via the Mekong and Route 13 to Kratie, thence
to enemy strongholds on either side of the Mekong. At the same time,
the Communists have sustained a flow of rice and gasoline north for
consumption by enemy forces in northeast Cambodia, the southern part
of the Laos Panhandle, and the B-3 Front area of South Vietnam.
Concurrent with the large troop buildup in the B-3 Front area, enemy
engineers have constructed a series of new motorable roads and related
facilities in the area. The latest reports from aerial observers reveal that
the roadnet will apparently link Base Areas 609 and 702 and also will
provide a direct link to the Stung Treng military complex.
29. This dry season the VC/NVA have also reoccupied, rebuilt, and
restocked their former base areas along the Cambodian border opposite GVN
MRs 3 and 4. recent prisoner-of-war interrogations
reveal that large quantities of munitions and other supplies have been moved
into these areas from Kratie, Chup, Dambe, and 0 Reang Au. Reports of
enemy supply shipments along established LOCs leading across the border
into the Saigon area also have become more frequent.
Northern Laos
30. The Communist dry season supply effort in northern Laos got
into full swing well ahead of that in the Laos Panhandle. By September,
extensive road work was under way and some resupply activity apparent,
and by early November very large quantities of supplies - particularly arms
and ammunition -- were on their way to Communist forces who would
launch the Communist dry season offensive in the Plaine des Jarres area.
The results of this effort have been impressive: an evaluation of intercepted
enemy communications suggests that the North Vietnamese have delivered
more supplies this dry season than ever before during a comparable period.
Although the pace of supply activity has now slowed from its peak period
? The Communists may be moving large quantities of supplies
stockpiled in the northern and central Panhandle last year forward
toward South Vietnam and Cambodia this year.
? Finally, our sensor data on input may understate the actual level
of vehicle activity.
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of November through January, there is evidence that significant deliveries --
possibly including 40 to 50 STPD of ammunition - have continued over
the past two months.
31. While continuing a high level of supply deliveries, the Communists
also have greatly upgraded their logistical and tactical capability in northern
Laos by constructing a major new supply route west of the Plaine des Jarres.
Now motorable to within a few miles of the Long Tieng Valley, this road
gives the Communists for the first time a motorable supply route by which
to supply forces west of the Plaine. Through its use the Communist posture
for pressing the assault on the Long Tieng complex is greatly enhanced.
Outlook for the Wet Season
32. Overall, the Communists' current logistical posture appears to be
in its best shape of the past two years: their stockpiles - especially of
arms and ammunition - appear sizable; their route structure has gained
further redundancy and capability; and they are capable of supporting a
record level of rainy season activity, both across the DMZ and in the
Laos/Cambodia border area. Finally, these developments will give them a
stronger logistics posture in the early stages of the 1972/73 dry season
than they had this dry season.
33. All signs indicate that the Communists will sustain a relatively
high level of logistic activity over the next two months. By June, however,
the seasonal monsoons will affect the road network in southern Laos and
Cambodia and the level of activity will be sharply curtailed. During the
summer, when rains are heaviest, the focus of activity throughout most
of the Panhandle will be on local logistical activity.
34. Some resupply into South Vietnam and Cambodia will occur,
however. Mid-March photography has shown that the new Route 103/6086
structure through the DMZ can support vehicle traffic as far south as Khe
Sanh. During the rainy season in Laos this route, as well as two others
extending into the DMZ, is shielded by the mountains along the western
DMZ boundary, which effectively block most of the rain. Thus these roads
give the Communists the ability to move supplies directly into MR 1 from
North Vietnam. In the Laos/Cambodia border area the Communists' rainy
season effort is facilitated by their use of waterways. During last year's
rainy season, the Communists relied heavily on these to deliver substantial
quantities of arms and ammunition south into Cambodia and equally large
quantities of rice (and some petroleum) north into the Laos Panhandle for
consumption there or eastward delivery to South Vietnam.
35. In sum, from the viewpoint of logistics, the Communists are now
in a fairly favorable position in most parts of Indochina - in GVN MRs 1
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and 2, in Laos, and in Cambodia. Assuming other factors provide no
hindrance, they have the supplies to sustain extensive combat activities in
each of these areas.
36. In MR 3 and MR 4 of South Vietnam, the logistics situation
of the Communists is less rosy. The enemy's problems in MR 3 are
substantial, but perhaps less troublesome to him than a year ago. Despite
ARVN pre-emptive operations in Cambodian areas adjacent to GVN MR 3,
the Communists have had some success in sustaining small but steady supply
flows into Tay Ninh Province and points farther south. Several large caches,
principally foodstuffs, were seized in northwest MR 3 early this year. These
seizures provided limited evidence of enemy intentions to stockpile for
future operations. More recent intelligence has indicated Communist
intentions to strengthen their logistics position in the subregions around
Saigon in anticipation of heightened military activity, possibly during the
third and fourth quarters this year. The enemy will face many difficulties
in implementing these measures, but some supply flows continue to be
detected moving across the border, and the enemy's efforts to strengthen
his supply lines clearly continue.
37. The Communists face their most difficult problems, in terms of
supplies, in MR 4. The recent surge in enemy sea infiltration attempts (15
this dry season, eight since January) attests to Communist resupply
difficulties. Enemy forces in the Delta do have an overland supply link
to Cambodia, but deliveries over this route must be considerably less than
desired, given the magnitude of the sea infiltration effort. Judging by the
Communists' logistics problems, we do not foresee any significant threat
from enemy main forces in this area over the next six months, although
attention-getting terrorist and sapper activities are always possible.
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