Order of Battle Concept for Vietnam

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP80T01719R000300070002-3
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 5
• Document Creation Date: November 9, 2016
• Document Release Date: July 21, 1998
• Sequence Number: 2
• Publication Date: April 28, 1967
• Content Type: MEMO

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M EMORANDUM
SUB-
3 April 1967
ECT: Order of Battle Concept for Vietnam
1. The prime responsibility for military order of battle in Vietnam
lies with MACV and the Defense Intelligence apparatus. At an interagency
conference on the subject held recently in Honolulu, which included repre-
sentatives of CIA, MACV's order of battle definitions, criteria and method-
ology were reviewed. Some changes were made in certain procedures,
accounting and reporting, but the conference generally endorsed MACV's
current approach. Further refinements are desirable and some are likely,
but military order of battle, per se is a function of military command, with
CIA's role being essentially one of advice and coordination. Because the
Viet Cong order of battle problem extends beyond the purely military aspect
into the realm of political and civil intelligence, however, we have more
than a passing concern with the problem. It is within the framework of our
role in political and civil intelligence activities in Vietnam that we offer the
conceptual thoughts outlined below.
2. Our first thought with respect to the Viet Gong order of battle
problem is that it should be broken out more precisely in terms of the military
and non-military components. The current practice of adding together the
strengths of the military and political elements tends to becloud the enemy's
potential in both spheres, and creates real problems in terms of calculating
net gains and losses. Although the dividing line between political and military
components is a fine one, it can be drawn in a fashion which would more
meaningfully portray the nature and scope of the threat posed by each element
and facilitate development of more effective plans and programs for coping
with each threat.
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3. Secondly, we should portray the enemy's organization as he
envisages it, rather than arbitrarily (and artificially) slicing it up to suit
our own parochial American viewpoint of how things should be. Since the
enemy talks in terms of "three categories of forces, "and organizes and
directs their activities accordingly, our problems in analyzing and keeping
book on these forces would be simplified and clarified if we looked at them
in the same way. This would also facilitate a more widespread and realistic
understanding of their roles and missions and, thus, tend to clarify our
thinking regarding the roles and missions of our own forces.
4. A third point is the need for flexibility and dynamism in our
approach to the order of battle problem. An over-fixation on the accounting
and bookkeeping, combined with overly rigid criteria and definitions, precludes
the development of a realistic "estimate" of the enemy's strength and, hence,
of his capabilities. For example, if units are listed at their last "confirmed"
strength, without any allowance for undetected replacements, strength figures
tend to become inherently low "assessments" (in the taxation sense) rather
than realistic estimates (in the real estate sales sense) of potential. Similarly,
if the data shows that the enemy has adopted a widespread policy of creating
certain types of units at a specific level (say anti-aircraft battalions for each
division) and this policy has been confirmed, but we don't permit listing any
unit as even "possible" until we have had at least one specific reference to
it by a document or a prisoner, we are not presenting the planner with a
realistic "estimate" of the enemy's anti-aircraft potential in a given situation.
e A fourth point involves the need to fix a realistic estimate of the
enemy'smanpower potential within South Vietnam. No estimate of his
recruitment replacement capability c4n approach validity without a more
realistic estimate than that now used. The current estimate and methodology
is so restrictive that it barely allows enough manpower to staff out the probable
Viet Cong apparatus, let alone provide a pool for additional recruitment. It
allows the Viet Cons access to only 90 percent of the manpower in areas
under their control, 30 percent in area* "undergoing clearing, " 30 percent
in areas undergoing securing, and 10 percent in secured areas. Because
their recruiting is accomplished largely through their "infrastructure,"
which operates clandestinely in areas not wider VC control, their access to
manpower is certainly greater than that established by these arbitrary
assessments. Moreover, the increasing reliance on females for use even
In provincial battitlione and district companies, as well as in guerrilla units,
terrorist cells, and non-military organizations, should be reflected in assessing
the availability of people to fill out the enemy's military, paramilitary and
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political ranks. Recent documents have directed that guerrilla and assault
youth units recruit up to one-third of their strength from among females.
6. The above constitute the basic principles of our conceptual
approach to the Viet Cong order of battle. We would suggest applying these
principles as follows:
a. In dividing e order of battle into military and non-
military components, the "three categories" of forces outlined
in the enemy's doctrine -- main forces, regional (or local)
orces, and guerrilla-militia forces -- should be listed with
he military components One might also include certain para-
military formations which are partially armed, such as the /tumult
yoeth, public security. etc. The combined strength of these
forces would constitute the enemy's military potential. Political
cadre, including members of terrorist cells and other non-
military components either serving as Party committee members
at various echelons or as agent*, commo-liaison agents, front
cadres, etc., whether armed or not, should be 'lined separately
and considered as constituting the enemy's political-subversive
potential. While the two might be added to provide a sum total
of enemy personnel (political and military) this should be avoided
so as not to mix apples and peanuts. This separation between
military potential and political-subversive potential should be
maintained in computing gains and losses. In the same way, we
would not expect the Viet Cong to group GVN Public Works
officials at province level with ARVN, RF and PF strength in
calculating our probable gains and losses.
b. With respect to categorising breakdowns within the two
broad groupings listed above, we would divide the various forces
in the same general fashion as they are organised by the enemy.
The current groupings used by MACV are: combat strength,
administrative service strength, irregular strength, and political
strength. We would propose a different grouping, as follows:
main force, local force, and guerrilla-militia. Sub-categories
for combat, combat support, and administrative service could
be established within the main force and local force categories
to preserve the computations for those components. Guerrilla-
militia strength should be sub-categroited between the guerrilla
and self-defense militia components in order to reflect the distinc-
tion between their roles and missions and, hence, their combat
potential.
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c. In applying the third principle, we would recommend a
review of MACIT's definitions and criteria both to clarify their
meaning and bring them into consistency with Viet Cong termin-
ology, and also to permit greater flexibility in developing realistic
strength estimates. Although we respect the need for effective
bookkeeping devices, we also see a need for injecting dynamism
into the bookkeeping process so that planners have an appreciation
of the enemy's potential strength in a given situation, rather than
a statistical listing of "confirmed"" but very likely outdated --
data. The entire glossary of order of battle term* and definitions
currently used by MACY might be reviewed and refined in this
light.
d. In developing a manpower base for the Viet Cons any o
several methodological approaches might achieve realistic results
One approach iirould be to take the population data derived from
the new hamlet evaluation system, assessing full VC access to
all eeople living in VC-controlled and unevaluated hamlets, and
a successively diminishing degree of access to those people living
in those hamlets wherein the VC infrastructure has not been fully
eliminated (I. e.. E through B). The percentages might range from
75 percent for E hamlets down to 10 percent fox. B hounlets, although
careful consideration by experienced field personnel would be
required before establishing these percentages. The use of females
should also be considered in computing the manpower base, perhaps
calculating that up to one-third would be availisble for recruiting
for local force, paramilitary formations and political components.
7. There are tither factors which might be considered in connection with
the Wet Cong order of battle problem. These include the need for adequate (if
not equal) emphasis on every component -- military, paramilitary, and
political-subversive -- in order to insure equal aeliability of the basic data
and ultimate strength estimates. In this connection, we would hope that our
military colleagues would rely on and make use of the efforts of those agencies
with whom we work on the field of Viet Cong political order of battle. The
Nat Jona' Police in particular are focussing on this subject, and the analytical
sections of their Provincial Interrogation Centers are collating a substantial
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amount of information on the VC orgardration at hamlet, village, district
and provincial level. We would hope that all Vietnamese agencies ? civil
and military -- could focus their efforts more effectively on the guerrilla-
militia and other paramilitary components of the Viet Cong. Unfortunately,
the composition and roles of these forces are not widely understood, and
there is considerable confusion on both the Vietnamese and American sides
from the Saigon level on down, The collection of reliable data on these
forces is contingent on an educational program which would eliminate this
confusion.
3. The related problems of infiltration andieternal recruitment are
not so amendble to resolution. While one might prefer some minor refinements
in the existing methodology and criteria for infiltration, the current system
does fill the bill in most respects, and the data are presented in such a form as
to permit meaningful analysis. The major problem is really one of the time-
liness of data, and there is little one can do to improve that other than to urge
the ITC to defect sooner after their arrival, or to urge MACV to capture
prisoners sooner.
9. With respect to internal recruitment, not niuch can be done until
a realistic manpower base is established and more effective exploitation of
prisoners and documents permits the development of adequate experience
factors. We would hope, of course, that the ultimate methodology takes into
account the differing requirements of the various military, paramilitary, and
political components of the Viet Cons, rather than assessing all losses and
all gains to the sum total of those forces.
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