THE VIETNAMESE COMMUNISTS WILL TO PERSIST

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP80T01719R000300020001-9
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 316
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: June 7, 2010
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: August 26, 1966
• Content Type: REPORT

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Y74--DIA review
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USAF review(s) impleted.
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An Analysis of the Vietnamese Communists'
Strengths, Capabilities, and Will to Persist in Their
Present Strategy in Vietnam.
26 AUGUST 1966
This memorandum has been produced by the Directorate of Intelligence of the Central
Intelligence Agency. It was jointly prepared by the Office of Current Intelligence, the
Office of Research and Reports, the Office of National Estimates, and the Special Assis-
tant for Vietnamese Affairs in the Office of the Director of Central Intelligence.
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SUMMARY DISCUSSION . . o . . ,
I. Introduction , o , o , , o ? , . r . . 1
II, The Vietnamese Communists' Investment in the
Struggle , ~ ~ , . . . _ . . ? , . . ~ . . . 1
III, Vietnamese Communist Capabilities for Persisting
in Their Present Strategy . . , . , , . 4
IV. The Vietnamese Communists' Probable Estimate
of the Current State of the Struggle . . . , v . . , . 6
V. Probable Communist Near-Term Military and Political
Strategy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
VL Key Trends and Factors . . . 17
VIL The Day of Decision . , , , . , , o . , 17
VIIL Alternate Communist Strategic Options . . . . . 18
PRINCIPAL FINDINGS . . . . . . . . . . . . .
THE ECONOMIC, MILITARY AND LOGISTIC RESOURCES
AND CAPABILITIES OF THE VIETNAMESE
COMMUNISTS
A. Manpower . . . . . . . . . I-1
B. Effects of the Rolling Thunder Program 1-6
C. The State of Civilian Morale . , . . , , 1-12
IL The Significance of Laos and Cambodia
A. Laos . . , . . . . . o . . . 1-17
B. Cambodia . . o o 1-22
Appendix A. Recuperability of the Transportation System
in North Vietnam . . . e . o . . . 1-25
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I-1. Estimated Manpower Available for Military Se:,-vice
in North Vietnam, 1 January 1966 . . . . . . . . . I-1
1-2. Civilian Labor Force of North Vietnam with Sex
Breakdown, 1 January 1966 following page . . . . . 1-3
1-3. Selected Recuperation Times on Repair Work in
Military Region IV following page . . . . . . . . . 1-33
1-4. North Vietnam: Transport Performance, 1964-1965,
and First Half 1966. . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . 1-35
Figure 1-1. Military and Economic Damage Resulting
from Air Attacks Against North Vietnam,
March 1965 - June 1966 and Projected
July 1966 - June 1967 ( chart) following page .
1-6
Figure 1-2. Supplies Trucked from North Vietnam into the
Laotian Panhandle During the 1965 and 1966
Dry Seasons (chart) following page . . . . .
1-17
Figure 1-3. Laos Panhandle Area: Communist Roadnet
Development (map) following page . . . . .
1-19
Figure 1-4. Laos Panhandle: Road Capacities and
Development (map) following page . . . . .
1-19
Figure 1-5. Schedule of Road Construction in Laos, August
1965 - April 1966 (chart) following page . . .
1-21
Figure 1-6. Northeast Cambodia: Road Improvements and
Communist Activity, 1965-66 (map) following
page . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1-22
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Figure 1-7. North Vietnam: Destruction of Bridges Versus
Repair, 1 November 1965 - 1 June 1966
(chart) following page . . . . . . . . . . . 1-29
Figure 1-8. North Vietnam: Status of Highway Bridges,
1 November 1965 - 1 June 1966 (chart)
following page . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1-29
THE EFFECTS OF SOVIET AND CHINESE INVOLVEMENT
IN THE WAR ON THE VIETNAMESE COMMUNISTS
I. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . II-1
II.. The Significance of Economic and Military Aid . . . . II- 1
A. General Level of Aid . . . . . . . . . . . . . II-1
B. Economic Aid . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11-2
C. Military Aid . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11-4
D. Bloc Aid as a Critical Factor in Continuing
the War . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11-6
III. The Rationale for Chinese Support . . . . . . . . . . 11-8
IV. Vietnamese View of Soviet Support . . . . . . . . . . 11-9
II-1. Communist Economic Aid Extended to North Vietnam,
1955-64 following page . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11-3
11-2. Estimated Soviet and Chinese Deliveries of Military
Equipment to North Vietnam, 1953 - June 1966
following page . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11-4
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THE COMMUNIST ORGANIZATION AND CAPABILITY FOR
POLITICAL SUBVERSION IN SOUTH VIETNAM
Page
I. Communist Concepts of Political Subversion , ? , . ? 1II-1
II. The Apparatus for Subversion ? . . ? . . . . . . . . III-1
A. Party Organization and Role . . . . . . 111-2
B.: Party Numerical Strength . . . . . . . 111-5
C. Numerical Strength of the Party Youth Group 111-8
D. Numerical and Other Limitations on Party
Effectiveness ~ I ~ ~ ` . . . . . 111-9
The National Liberation Front . . . . III-10
F. Numerica' Strength of the Front . . . i 2
III. Numerical Strength of the Communist Political
Apparatus in Urban Areas . . . 111-14
A. General Position . . o . . . . . . III-14
B. Numerical Strength in Saigon and Environs 111-15
IV, Strength of the Political Apparatus in Rural Areas-,
A Sample . . .. . . . . . . . .
Vn The Communist Propaganda Apparatus and Its
Influence . ? . ~ , . . _ . . . . . . ? . . . .
A. Propaganda Apparatus
111-19
Effectiveness of the Propaganda . . . 111-20
VL The Overall Effectiveness of the Political Subversive
Apparatus . . . . . .. .
A. With the Rural Vietnamese
B.; In the Cities: Saigon in Particular
III-22
111- 24
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Figure III-1. Communist Command Structure in South
Vietnam and Organization of the Viet Cong
Logistics System (chart) following page . .
111-3
Figure 111-2. South Vietnam: Population and Area Control
(chart) following page . . . . . . . . . .
111-24
ANNEX IV
THE GROUND WAR IN SOUTH VIETNAM
I.
The Build-Up of Forces . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
IV-1
II.
Casualties . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
IV-2
Appendix A. The Ground War in South Vietnam . . . . . .
IV-5
IV-1. South Vietnam: Actual and Projected Growth of
Total US/Third Nation Forces, December 1964 -
June 1967 following page . . . . . . . . . . .
IV-5
IV-2. South Vietnam: Comparative Actual and Projected
Regular Allied Troop Strength, December 1964 -
June 1967 following page . . . . . . . . . . .
IV-5
IV-3. Total South Vietnamese Armed Strength, December
1964 - June 1967 following page . . . . . . . .
IV-5
IV-4. Major South Vietnamese Ground Force Deployments
by Corps Area, Mid-1966 . . . . . . . . . . .
IV-6
IV-5. South Vietnam: Estimated NVA/VC Forces,
December 1964 - Mid-1967 . . . . . . . . . . .
IV-7
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IV-6,. South Vietnam: Estimated Strength, Composition
and Deployment of NVA/VC Main Force Elements
by Corps Area, Mid-1966 a , ? . . , , . ? d , ,
IV-7. South Vietnam: Actual and Projected Deployment
of US/Third Nation Forces, by Function,
July 1965 - June 1967 following page
IV-8
IV-10
IV-8~ South Vietnam: Actual and Projected Deployment
of US/Third Nation Maneuver Battalions, by
Service and Corps Area, February 1965 -
June 1967 following page . ? A m ,
IV-10
IV-9. South Vietnam: Actual and Projected Deployment
of ARVN Maneuver Battalions, by Corps Area,
February 1965 - June 1967 following page
IV-11
IV-10. South Vietnam: Ratio of Allied Maneuver Battalion
Strength to Estimated NVA/VC Main Force Troop
Strength, July 1965 - June 1967 following page , ?
IV-12
IV-11. South Vietnam: Ratio of Allied Maneuver Battalion
Strength to Estimated NVA/VC Main Force Troop
Strength, by Corps Area, Mid-1966 u , . ~ , a .
IV-13
IV-12, South Vietnam: Projected Critical Troop Ratios:
Allied Maneuver Battalion Strength to Estimated
NVA and VC Main Force Strengths . . . , ,
IV-14
IV-13a South Vietnam.- Absolute Indicators of Communist
Performance in Battle . . ~ , , o , . . , ,
IV-18
IV-14, Relative Indicators of Communist Motivations in
Battle, Expressed in Terms of the Scale of Combat,
1964-66 . , . . . o . . ? ,
IV-18
IV-15. South Vietnam: Estimate of Communist Losses,
1965 - June 1967 0 . ? < . , < . , ,
IV-16. Selected Wounded to Killed Ratios
IV-23
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Figure IV-l. South Vietnam: Major Allied Deployments
of Regular Troops, by Corps, Mid-1966
(chart) following page . . . . . . . . . . IV-5
Figure IV-2. South Vietnam: Actual and Projected Growth
in US/GVN/ Third Nation Forces and Com-
munist Forces, December 1964 - June 1967
(chart) following page . . . . . . . . . . IV-8
Figure IV-3. South Vietnam: Approximate Composition of
Actual and Projected Growth in Regular
Allied Forces (US, TN, and RVNAF),
December 1964 - June 1967 (chart) follow-
ing page . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . IV-8
Figure IV-4. South Vietnam: Approximate and Projected
Growth in Communist Forces, December
1964 - June 1967 (chart) following page . . IV-8
Figure IV-5. Composition of US Maneuver Battalion and
Artillery Battalion Strength to Total US
Army and USMC Troop Strength, July
1965 - June 1967 (chart) following page . . IV-10
Figure IV-6. Approximate Composition of ARVN Maneuver
Battalion Strength to Total ARVN Troop
Strength, 1964 - June 1967 (chart) following
page . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . IV-11
Figure IV-7. South Vietnam: Troop Disposition, by Corps
of Allied Maneuver Battalions and Estimated
VC/NVA Main Forces (MF), June 1966
(chart) following page . . . . . . . . . . IV-11
Figure IV-8. Comparative, Actual, and Projected Allied
and US/Third Nation Maneuver Battalion
Strength to VC/NVA Main Force Strength,
July 1965 - June 1966 and Projected for
December 1966 and June 1967 (chart)
following page . . . . . . . . . . . . . IV-14
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Figure IV- 9. Approximate Communist KIA, by Inflicting
Force, 1965 - May 1966 (chart), following
page . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . IV- 16
Figure IV-10. Relationship of Communist and US/Third
Nation KIA to Build-Up of US/Third Nation
Maneuver Battalion Strength, July 1965 -
May 1966 (chart) following page . . . . . IV-16
Figure IV-11. Composition of Reported VC/NVA KIA, by
Inflicting Force, July 1965 - May 1966
(chart) following page . . . . . . . . . . IV-16
Figure IV-12. Approximate Distribution of Reported VC/
NVA KIA, by Corps Area, July 1965 - May
1966 (chart) following page . . . . . . . IV-16
Figure IV-13. Relationship of Communist and GVN KIA,
to Build-Up of GVN Maneuver Battalions,
July 1965 - May 1966 (chart) following
page . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . IV- 17
THE RESOURCES AND LOGISTIC CAPABILITIES
OF THE COMMUNISTS IN SOUTH VIETNAM
I.
The Viet Cong Economy and Its Manpower
A. The
Viet Cong Economy . . . . . . . . . . .
.
V-1
B. The
Pre
Economic Impact of Increased Military
ssure . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
.
V-2
C. The
Manpower Situation . . . . . . . . . . .
.
V-4
II.
Communist Logistic Operations in South Vietnam . .
.
V-5
Appendix A.
The Communist Logistics System in South
Vietnam . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
.
V-8
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Figure V-1. South Vietnam: Communist Logistic Support,
June 1966 (map) following page . . . . . . . V-11
Figure V-2. South Vietnam: Daily VC/NVA Logistic
Requirements, as of Mid-Year 1966, by
Class and Source of Supply (chart) following
page . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . V- 13
Figure V-3. South Vietnam: Disposition of VC/NVA Regular
Forces, by Corps Area, Mid-1966 (map)
following page . . . . . . . . . . . . . . V-18
Figure V-4. South Vietnam: Daily VC/NVA Logistic
Requirements, as of Mid-Year 1966, by
Corps Area (chart) following page . .
Figure V-5. South Vietnam: Daily Logistic Requirements
of VC/NVA Forces at Varying Levels of
Combat, June 1966 and Projected June 1967
(chart) following page . . . . . . . . . . V-19
THE MORALE OF THE COMMUNIST FORCES
A. The Viet Cong View of Morale . . . . . . . . . .
VI-2
B. Morale of the Cadres . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
VI-4
C. Morale of the Soldiers . . . . . . . . . . . . .
VI-6
D. Gauges of Military Morale . . . . . . . . . . .
VI-13
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MORALE AMONG THE PEOPLE IN VIET CONG AREAS VII-1
VIETNAMESE COMMUNIST VIEWS ON THE LIKELY
LENGTH OF THE WAR
I. The Anticipated Timing of Victory in 1955 and 1956 . . VIII-1
II. Victory Timing in the Period 1956-1959 . . . . . . . VIII-2
III. The Time Frame and Goals in 1959 . . . . . . . . . VIII-3
IV. The Initial Deferral of Victory Anticipations . . . . . VIII-4
V. The Growth of Communist Optimism in 1964
and Early 1965 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . VIII-6
VI. The Communist Reassessment in Mid-1965 . . . . . . VIII-8
THE COMMUNIST VIEW AND APPLICATION OF LESSONS
LEARNED IN FIGHTING THE FRENCH
I. The Three Phased War . . . . . . . . . . . . . . IX-1
II. Tactical Military Lessons . . . . . . . . . . . . . IX-4
III. Political Lessons . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . IX-5
THE EFFECT OF THE INTERNATIONAL POLITICAL
CLIMATE ON VIETNAMESE COMMUNIST PLANS
AND CAPABILITIES
I. World Public Opinion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . X-1
II. Domestic Opposition in the United States . . . . . . . X-2
III. Cambodian Attitudes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . X-5
IV. The Effect of Links with Western Leaders . . . . . . X-6
V. The Public Posture of the National Liberation Front
(NFLSV) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . X-7
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THE PROBABLE NEAR TERM MILITARY AND POLITICAL
STRATEGY OF THE VIETNAMESE COMMUNISTS
I. General Concepts . . . < , , . s . T ? _
4
XI-1
II. Probable Areas of Communist Oper';.tions . .
.
.
XI-3
A~ The Highlands , . . . . . . . . , . . .
.
?
XI-3
B. Coastal Areas of II Corps . , . < . .
.
.
XI-4
C. I Corps . , . . ~ f . . . . .
,
.
XI-5
D. III Corps U . . . . , . a . . . .
.
.
XI-6
E. IV Corps . . . . . .
o
XI-7
III. Prospects and Problems e . A o . .
.
.
XI-?8
IV. The Near Term Political Strategy of the Vietnamese
Communists , . . . . . . . . .
.
.
XI-8
AN HISTORICAL ANALYSIS OF ASIAN COMMUNIST
EMPLOYMENT OF THE POLITICAL TACTIC
OF NEGOTIATIONS
Summary . . . . . . . ? . . .
.
A. The CCP-KMT Civil War (1937 to 1949) .
. . . .
XII-5
B. The Korean War (1950 to 1953) o
. . .
XII-13
C. Vietnam (1953 to 1954) . .
o .
XII-27
D. Implications for Vietnam Today . . . . .
. . . .
XII-49
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Ratchet
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lanh
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------ Province boundary
National capital
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C amrap
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1. Introduction
1. For thirty-six years the Vietnamese Communist
Party has struggled unrelentingly to acquire political
control of Vietnam. During this period the Vietnamese
Communists have often altered their strategy but never
their objective, which remains today what it was when
the Party was founded in 1930. Since 1959 their strat-
egy has focused on a "War of National Liberation"--a
blend of military and political action in South Vietnam
designed to erode non-Communist political authority, to
create an aura of Communist invincibility, and, even-
tually, destroy the South Vietnamese and U.S. will to
resist.
2. The Lao Dong (i.e., Vietnamese Communist) Party
now controls only the government of North Vietnam (the
DRV), but it is national in scope, even though, for
cover purposes, its members in the South operate under
the name of the "People's Revolutionary Party." It in-
stigated the present insurgency and has controlled it
from its inception. In every significant respect the
Communist movement throughout Vietnam is a single po-
litical entity whose strengths, capabilities and stra-
tegic intentions cannot be properly assessed unless it
is analyzed as such.*
II. The Vietnamese Communists' Investment in the Strug-
gle
3. During the early years of insurgency, the Vietnam-
ese Communists fought at negligible cost to the DRV it-
self. The Viet Cong's political apparatus and its mil-
itary forces were almost entirely composed of ethnic
southerners. Even cadre and technicians infiltrated
from North Vietnam were primarily Southerners who had
gone north in the post-1954 regroupment. The insurgents
*Additional details on Vietnamese Communist organi-
zation are given in Annex III.
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lived off the land and obtained a large proportion of
their supplies, including weapons and ammunition, from
pre-1954 caches or capture from GVN forces. While the
war ravaged the South, North Vietnam's own territory
and economy were untouched. All of this, of course,
has changed since 1961, and particularly since 1964.
Hanoi's continued expansion of the insurgent effort
has altered the complexion of the struggle and the
ground rules under which it is waged.
4. This has required a drastic increase in the
Communist investment. On a population base of around
18 million, North Vietnam now is supporting a military
establishment of at least 400,000 men. By mid-1966
Hanoi was maintaining a force of at least 38,000 North
Vietnamese troops to fight in the South. We estimate
that this figure will rise to 60,000 by the end of
1966 and to 75,000 by mid-1967. Furthermore, to sus-
tain its commitment in the struggle, North Vietnam has
undergone partial mobilization and has had'to divert
at least 350,000 laborers to military or war-related
tasks. North Vietnam's economy has been dislocated,
its transportation system disrupted and the personal
lives of its citizens adversely affected. To facili-
tate the dispatch of troops to South Vietnam and the
external supplies they now require, Hanoi has had to
develop and maintain an elaborate road and trail net-
work through Laos in the face of continued interdic-
tion and harassment.*
5. In South Vietnam, the Communists have devel-
oped an insurgent structure which includes an armed
force estimated to be around 232,000 in addition to
the 38,000 North Vietnamese troops already mentioned.
This figure includes Viet Cong Main and Local Force
troops, political cadre and combat support elements,and
Southern Communist irregulars. Recently acquired
documentary evidence, now being studied in detail,
*See Annex I for further details on North Vietnam-
ese resources and capabilities.
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suggests that our holdings on the numerical strength
of these irregulars (now carried at around 110,000) may
require drastic upward revision.* To direct the execu-
tion of their insurgent campaign, the Communists have
developed a party apparatus in the South estimated to
number around 100,000 members, supported by a somewhat
smaller youth auxiliary.** The Communists have also
probably enrolled around 700,000 people in some compo-
nent of their front organization, the "National Front
for the Liberation of South Vietnam." This total ap-
paratus must be controlled, funded and supplied, al-
though most of its requirements may be met from re-
sources within South Vietnam.
6. Casualties the Communists have incurred and are
incurring in ever increasing numbers represent another
major element of human cost. We estimate that total
Communist losses in South Vietnam alone--killed in ac-
tion, captured, seriously wounded and deserted--ranged
from 80,000 to 90,000 during 1965, counting both North
and South Vietnamese*** We estimate that during 1966
these losses may range from 105,000 to 120,000. We
further estimate that the Communists may incur an addi-
tional 65,000 to 75,000 losses during the first six
months of 1967, if current rates of combat are main-
tained and presently projected troop strengths are
achieved.
*Details on Communist military forces in South Viet-
nam are given in Annex IV.
**Around 25,000 party members and somewhere between
15,000 to 20,000 members of the youth auxiliary are
thought to be serving in the Communist armed forces.
They would be included in the military strength totals
already cited. If our estimate of the number of Commu-
nist irregulars proves to require upward revision, our
estimate of the size of the party apparatus in the
South and of its youth auxiliary will also require com-
pensating adjustments. Details on the Communist organ-
ization in South Vietnam are given in Annex III.
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III. Vietnamese Communist Capabilities for Persisting in
Their Present Strategy
7. The Northern Base: North Vietnam's role in the
presdnt insurgency is that of a command and control cen-
ter, a source of manpower and a channel of supplies. The
command and control function is something relatively in-
vulnerable to physical pressure or external assault.
Present Communist strategy is imposing some strains on
North Vietnam's manpower reserves, but the strains are
more qualitative than quantitative, and they are not
likely to become insurmountable. The major pressures
on manpower have resulted from the Hanoi regime's inabil-
ity to manage manpower effectively, a relative scarcity
of technicians and skilled laborers, and an excessive
drain on the agricultural labor force. Over the next 12
months North Vietnam should be able to meet the manpower
requirements generated by its internal needs, as well as
those generated by projected further deployments of
troops to the South, but these needs will be met at in-
creasing costs in the economic, educational and social
fields.
8. North Vietnam's own industrial plant makes only
the most marginal contribution to Vietnamese Communist
military strength. With minor exceptions (e.g., a modest
small arms ammunition manufacturing capability) the Viet-
namese Communists' military hardware is entirely sup-
plied from external sources. Thus Hanoi's ability to
provide continued materiel assistance to Communist forces
in South Vietnam is largely dependent on North Vietnam's
continued receipt of materiel support from China, the
Soviet Union and East European Communist countries.* So
far, the US aerial pressure program has not appreciably
impeded North Vietnam's receipt of materiel support from
abroad and its dispatch to South Vietnam. Despite the
disruptions inflicted, the North Vietnamese transport
and logistic system is now functioning more effectively
after almost 18 months of bombing than it did when the
*This aspect of Vietnamese Communist capability is
discussed in detail in Annex II.
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Rolling Thunder program started. Both internal trans-
portation and infiltration traffic in 1966 were carried
on at higher levels than in 1965. So long as the US
air offensive remains at present levels, it is unlikely
to diminish North Vietnam's continued ability to provide
materiel support to the war in the South.
9. The Logistic Supply Network: Communist forces
in South Vietnam are supplied with manpower and mate-
riel primarily over the Communist-developed and'-main-
tained network of about 650 miles of roads and trails
through southern Laos, and to a lesser extent by sea or
through Cambodia. Allied harassment and interdiction
certainly complicate the Communist supply system. The
volume of traffic now moving through Laos, however, is
so much below route capacity that it is unlikely that
conventional attack can ever reduce the capacity of the
Laos trail network below the level required to sustain
Communist efforts in South Vietnam. Communist forces
use Cambodia with almost complete immunity from allied
countermeasures and with minimal interference from the
Cambodian government. US and South Vietnamese naval
patrols have probably curtailed Communist sea infiltra-
tion, but given the extent and nature of South Vietnam's
coastline and the amount of small boat traffic in South
Vietnamese waters, even this channel can never be com-
pletely closed.
10. The Southern Apparatus: The buildup of both
VC/NVN and allied forces in South Vietnam and the rising
tempo of combat are placing appreciable strains on the
Viet Cong's ability to support the war. The distribu-
tion of needed supplies, particularly foodstuffs, within
South Vietnam has become extremely difficult. This
problem has been aggravated by the concentration of VC
forces in food-deficient areas.* Furthermore, the man-
power squeeze on Viet Cong resources is becoming seri-
ous. The Viet Cong have borne the brunt of Communist
personnel losses in South Vietnam and have also had to
compensate for losses of North Vietnamese personnel. We
believe that the Viet Cong capability to recruit and
train manpower is adequate to cover losses estimated
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for 1966 but will probably be inadequate to compensate
for casualties and losses in 1967. During 1967 the
North Vietnamese will have to assume most of the bur-
den of expanding force levels, and an increasing role
in replacing losses. These manpower requirements can
almost certainly be met from North Vietnamese re-
sources, but they will impose additional strains on
North Vietnam's limited supply of skilled personnel
and leadership cadre.
11. Apart from military manpower requirements, doc-
umentary evidence indicates that the Communist polit-
ical apparatus in South Vietnam is already stretched
thin and is not considered by the Communists themselves
as fully adequate to their needs, particularly in ur-
ban areas. Cadre and leadership shortages will almost
certainly increase in the months ahead. Although these
shortages can be ameliorated by additional personnel
dispatched from North Vietnam, the injection of an in-
creasing number of northerners into the Southern ap-
paratus will of itself produce some measure of discord
within the Communist movement. Although the Viet Cong
personnel needs are not likely to prevent the Viet-
namese Communists from persisting in their present
strategy, they almost certainly represent the weakest
link in the Communists' capability chain.
12. Net Capability Assessment: The Communists'
present strategy is costly in both human and economic
terms and is taxing Communist resources in some areas,
particularly within South Vietnam itself. Allied ac-
tions are complicating Communist efforts and raising
the costs of their execution. However, neither inter-
nal resource shortages nor allied actions within pres-
ent political parameters are likely to render the
Vietnamese Communists physically incapable of persist-
ing in their present strategy.
IV. The Vietnamese Communists' Probable Estimate of
The Current State of the Struggle
13. The Communists' evaluation of the war and es-
timate of its future course will involve interlocked
judgments on a variety of key factors, some of which
are discussed below.
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14. The Communists' "Time Table": The Communists al-
most certainly do not have any.'-fixed or rigid ' time table
for victory. Their consideration of where they stand
now, however, must in some measure be influenced by
earlier estimates of where they had expected to be in
mid-1966. Analysis of available documentary evidence
suggests that in the 1959-1960 era, Hanoi's rulers
thought it would take at least five years of all-out
military and political action to gain control over
South Vietnam. Until about 1962, the Communists appear
to have been reasonably satisfied with the progress of
their insurgent movement and to have felt that things
were going more or less as planned. The counterinsur-
gency efforts of the Diem regime after 1962, however,
and the expanded US advisory/support program confronted
the Communists with unwelcome obstacles and led them to
conclude that the conquest of South Vietnam would take
longer than they had originally estimated.*
15. During 1964, as the Communists watched the con-
tinuing political disarray in Saigon, and devised tac-
tics to cope with the increased U.S. assistance, Commu-
nist documents discussing the war grew progressively
more optimistic. Communist optimism apparently reached
its apex in the spring of 1965. They still carefully
refrained from tying "victory" to a definite calendar
date, but the Communists appear to have believed that
they were then perhaps within a year or two of achiev-
ing a major part of their objectives. They had every
reason to be optimistic in the spring of 1965; the
GVN's strategic reserve was stretched to the breaking
point, and the Communists were scoring tactical mili-
tary successes with considerable cumulative political
impact.
16. The massive infusion of US combat strength which
began in mid-1965 probably saved the GVN from defeat and
certainly disabused the Communists of any hopes of early
victory. Their propaganda began to shift away from
the theme of early victory to its present theme of in-
evitable victory. During 1966, Communist documents and
public pronouncements have indicated that the Communists
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expect a long war. The Communists must be disappointed
in comparing the present situation with that which ex-
isted in the spring of 1965. At least indirectly, they
have acknowledged that the infusion of US and Allied
combat forces has created new problems which must be
overcome before victory can be won. Yet Communist re-
alism is presently tinged more with defiance than pes-
simism; the Communists may be disappointed, but they do
not yet seem to be discouraged.
17. The Lessons of the Franco - Viet Minh War: Pres-
ent Vietnamese Communist strategy is appreciably influ-
enced by the 1946-1954 struggle in. which the Communist-
controlled Viet Minh forced the French to withdraw from
Vietnam. In Communist eyes, probably the most signifi-
cant feature of this earlier successful campaign was the
fact it was won without inflicting a strategic defeat
on the French Military Forces.* During their nine-year
struggle, the Communists successfully used military
pressure as a political abrasive. They worked more on
French will than on French strategic capabilities, and
eventually succeeded in making the struggle a politically
unsaleable commodity in metropolitan France. Communist
strategy, in short, succeeded in creating a climate in
which the government in Paris lost its will to fight even
though the French Expeditionary Corps remained effective
and largely intact as a military force. The Communists
suffered horrendous casualties and went through periods
of severe setback, but their persistence eventually paid
off.
*The battle of Dienbienphu was a major tactical--
rather than strategic--reverse for the French. It cer-
tainly did not destroy the French Expeditionary Corps
as an effective military entity.
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20. On the basis of Moscow's assistance so far, the
Vietnamese probably judge that the Soviet commitment
in the war is considerably more restrained than that
of the Chinese. Hanoi is fully aware that Moscow, like
Peking, is anxious to avoid steps which might lead to
a direct military confrontation with the U.S. It is
also doubtless clear to the Vietnamese that the Soviets
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would welcome an early end to the war. On balance, how-
ever, it is probable that Soviet backing has the effect
of buttressing the Vietnamese Communist will to persist
in the conflict. The Vietnamese probably judge that
they can continue to count indefinitely on Moscow's as-
sistance along present lines so long as the war con-
tinues in its present context. They probably believe,
in fact, that the Soviets now are locked into a strug-
gle in view of Moscow's desire to retain leadership of
the Communist camp.
21. The Course of the Military Struggle in the
South: Any objective assessment the Communists make of
the course of the military struggle in South Vietnam
will acknowledge that although they may not be losing
the war at the present time, they are certainly not'win-
ning it. They have gone for months without a major
tactical success. They are suffering severe and increas-
ing casualties. They no longer enjoy a virtual monop-
oly of the initiative. Their base areas are no longer
virtually sacrosanct; instead they are increasingly
subject not only to aerial harassment but also to pene-
tration by allied troops. Their plans are constantly
being disrupted by allied spoiling actions, to which
Communists must react either by fleeing or by fighting
an unplanned engagement. The absolute strength of the
forces with which the Communists must contend is
steadily increasing. The time-honored guerrilla prin-
ciple of ensuring numerical superiority at the point
of attack has been undercut by the mobility of allied
forces who cover ground by helicopter instead of by
road. The Communists are far from being defeated, but
they are faced with problems greater than any they have
had to contend with before in this struggle. Further-
more, for the time being at least, Communist forces
have lost the aura of invincibility which in days past
(and in the Franco - Viet Minh war) was one of the Com-
munists' most potent political assets.
22. The Price Being Paid in the North:* The air
strikes against North Vietnam have created problems for
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the Communists, but in both military and economic terms,
the damage inflicted so far has probably not exceeded
what the Communists regard as acceptable levels. In
most cases the reconstruction or repair of damaged fa-
cilities can be postponed or effectively achieved by
cheap and temporary expedients. In both financial and
material terms, the cost inflicted on North Vietnam by
allied aerial attack is more than covered by the mil-
itary and economic aid and technical assistance pro-
vided by other Communist countries. Although economic
growth has stagnated and will probably deteriorate
further in the coming year, air attacks conducted under
present rules of engagement almost certainly cannot stop
North Vietnamese activities essential to the support of
the Communist war effort. In short, North Vietnam is
taking punishment in its own territory, but a price it
can afford and one it probably considers acceptable in
light of the political objectives it hopes to achieve.
23. Communist Capabilities For Additional Force
Commitment: In absolute numerical terms the Communists
cannot hope to match present and projected allied force
commitments. However, it is extremely unlikely that
they feel any need to do so. An analysis of relative
force levels shows that the apparent present free world
superiority of six to one over VC/NVA Forces is largely
eliminated when one compares the relative ratios of
actual maneuver battalions--i.e., tactical combat
troops available for commitment to offensive ground op-
erations.* The present ratio of allied to Communist
maneuver battalions is nearly one to one. If present
estimates of allied and Communist force projections are
accurate, by mid-1967 the Communists will have a slight
advantage in this critical ratio. The Communists al-
most certainly feel that if they can maintain a maneuver
battalion ratio in this range, they will be able to
prolong the struggle indefinitely and wear down U.S.
will to persist.
24. The Calculation of International Attitudes:**
There is considerable evidence that the Vietnamese
Maneuver battalion ratios are analyzed in detail in
Annex IV.
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Communists believe popular opposition throughout the
Western world to U.S. policy in Vietnam can be an impor-
tant political factor in the ultimate outcome of the
struggle. Even though Hanoi appears to be concerned with
the Vietnamese Communists' relatively limited ability to
spur Western agitation against the allied policy by
dint of their own propqLganda apparatus, they obviously
welcome the widespread belief that the struggle in South
Vietnam has its roots in what is essentially a southern
civil war and not, as Washington claims, in North Viet-
namese aggression. Consideration of world popular op-
position to U.S. policy would certainly enter into any
eventual Vietnamese Communist decision on whether to
revise present strategy but would almost certainly not
be a decisive factor.
25. The Calculation of U.S. Domestic Attitudes: The
Vietnamese Communists pay close attention to evidence of
opposition to current U.S. policy arising within the
United States itself. Despite some occasional signs of
realism about the actual political force of such opposi-
tion, by and large the Vietnamese Communists almost cer-
tainly overestimate its present strength. Detailed
knowledge of the realities of U.S. domestic politics is
a fairly scarce commodity in Hanoi. Furthermore, not
only do the Communists want to believe that there is
strong American domestic opposition to current U.S.
policy, but the course and eventual outcome of their
previous struggle with the French almost certainly
predisposes them to draw invalid parallels to French
domestic opposition in the Indochina war and to look for
signs of American domestic political pressures capable
of forcing policy changes on Washington.
26. The Communists also appear to believe that the
U.S. cannot match the continued input of North Vietnam-
ese forces into the struggle (particularly in light of
the maneuver battalion comparison outlined above) with-
out going on a virtual wartime footing. They believe
this would involve at least partial mobilization and
create economic pressures which would drastically in-
crease American opposition to the war, particularly as
casualties continue. The Communists may hope that all
of these pressures would be sufficiently unpopular
within the U.S. to make the war politically unsaleable.
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27. Morale in North Vietnam:* The wearing effects of
the war are causing some decline of civilian morale in
North Vietnam, and there are indications the regime fears
there may be a further deterioration. The decline, how-
ever, has not had any meaningful impact upon the de-
termination of the regime to continue with the war or
the policy options it may elect to achieve its objec-
tives.
28. Communist Morale in South Vietnam:** Morale
within Communist military forces and the political ap-
paratus in South Vietnam has declined since mid-1965. It
is conceivable that at some future point, the prospect
of indefinite struggle if not defeat could break the
morale of key elements of the Communist southern ap-
paratus. Although Communist morale is obviously fray-
ing badly in some parts of the insurgent structure, no-
where has it yet deteriorated to the point where the
battle performance of Communist units is adversely af-
fected. It has certainly not declined to a point pres-
ently sufficient to force any major revision in the
basic Communist strategy.
29. Attitudes Among the People in Viet Cong Areas:***
There is a substantial body of evidence that morale and,
consequently, support for the Communist cause, is drop-
ping in Viet Cong - controlled areas of South Vietnam.
The flow of refugees from such areas has increased dras-
tically, and even if a desire for safety is the main
motive for this exodus, the exodus itself attests to
popular realization that no Viet Cong region is now im-
mune from attack. Furthermore, there are indications
that the refugee flow is caused not only by a quest for
safety but also by a desire to escape increasingly
onerous Communist levies of taxation, forced labor and
*See Annex I.
**The critical subject of morale in Communist Forces
is the'subject of Annex VI.
***This subject is examined in detail in Annex VII.
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conscription. Even though distaste for the Viet Cong
is not necessarily positive support for Saigon, this
shift in popular attitude could eventually cause the
Communists serious problems.
30. The Course of South Vietnamese Political De-
velopment: Communist prospects obviously brighten
perceptibly during periods of political turmoil within
South Vietnam. Conversely, the development of a popu-
larly rooted, viable non-Communist South Vietnamese
state is the thing which, over the longer term, the
Communists have the greatest reason to fear. Hanoi
cannot ignore the fact that although the present Sai-
gon regime is fragile, is far from effective or
genuinely popular, and is beset with internal stress,
it has nonetheless successfully weathered storms which
several of its predecessors were unable to survive.
The Communists must also recognize that the events of
last spring made painfully manifest how weak they
were in urban areas and how limited were their capa-
bilities for capitalizing on political strife among
contending non-Communist factions. While the present
Saigon government would probably stand no chance of
unaided survival in a contest with the Viet Cong, even
if all North Vietnamese troops were withdrawn from
South Vietnam, there are trends in South Vietnamese
political life which are probably a source of dis-
quiet to the Communists. Furthermore, they must
recognize that the type of political activity rep-
resented by the Rural Development program, even if
it is only moderately successful, strikes at the
roots, of their insurgency's indigenous strength and
alters one of the necessary conditions for a success-
ful "war of national liberation" strategy.
V. Probable Communist Near-Term Military and Polit-
ical Strategy*
31. If they are objective, the Communists must
acknowledge that during the past year their insurgent
campaign has lost momentum in both the military and
political fields. There are signs that the Communists
have indeed recognized that developments of the past
year have created problems which they must solve,
Discussed in further detail in Annex XI.
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along with a situation quite different from that which
they faced in fighting the French. Acknowledgment of
the existence of these problems does seem to have pro-
voked debates over strategy within the Communist hier-
archy, but there is no present sign of any Communist
intent to abandon or significantly alter the Communists'
present strategy.
32. This strategy in the near term will probably
revolve around two major efforts: (1) to keep intact,
as far as possible, main Force units in South Vietnam,
and (2) to build up the Main Force strength, both in
quantity and in quality, in order to be able to counter
allied power when US forces in Vietnam have built up
to the level of 400,000 expected by the Communists at
the end of 1966. The North Vietnamese leaders probably
believe that if they can go into 1967 with an ability
to field a Main Force strength of about 125,000, as
compared to a US strength of 400,000, they will be able
to continue the war. Hanoi probably estimates that a
four-to-one absolute military manpower advantage in
favor of the US will not be enough for the US to defeat
the insurgents; even under these conditions the Commu-
nists will be able to match allied forces in maneuver
battalions.
33. Analysis of Communist materials indicates that
the military strategy of the Communists during the com-
ing months will be largely a continuation of their op-
erational concepts of 1964 and 1965. They will concen-
trate mainly on opening simultaneous campaigns in the
highlands and the area northwest of Saigon, combined
with occasional other major actions in the northern
coastal provinces. The latter may accelerate as the
northeast monsoons begin. Their primary aim will be
to stretch the allied forces as thin as possible and
inflict as many casualties as possible on allied units.
The primary target of the Communists during the coming
months will probably be U.S. forces, rather than South
Vietnamese. The Communists will continue their attempts
to reduce American military mobility and striking
power by harassment and by concentration of Communist
forces around U.S. base areas to tie down as many Ameri-
cans as possible in static defense tasks.
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34. To keep U.S. and other allied forces from hit-
ting and hurting large Communist units, the insurgents
will probably stick primarily to ambushes, hit-and-run
strikes, and guerrilla harassment in situations where
they believe the odds of success are decidedly in
their favor. Should favorable conditions arise, how-
ever, they will almost certainly attempt to conduct op-
erations in regimental strength and greater. The Com-
munists will be working in the meantime on efforts at
better concealment of the locations of their main
force units in order to counter the improved allied
intelligence on the tactical disposition of Communist
elements. When large-scale battles occur, the Commu-
nists may attempt to devolve them into a series of
skirmishes in which Communist ambush and hit-and-run
tactics can be used more effectively against small-
sized elements of the allied attacking force.
35. On the political side, Communist strategy and
goals for the remainder of 1966 and early 1967 will
have to take account of recent insurgent setbacks.
Captured documents indicate that the Communists will
give priority to strengthening and improving their
political apparatus, notably by trying to improve the
quality of political cadres down to the village level,
and by continued emphasis on the recruitment of party
members and sympathizers in both rural and urban
areas. They will probably continue to concentrate
their subversive efforts on the South Vietnamese
army and civil service. Laboring class elements may
also attract increasing attention in the hope that
economic discontent with the inflation spiral in
South Vietnam can be exploited to the insurgents' ad-
vantage.
36. There is an increasing number of reports that
the Communists will make serious efforts to disrupt the
constitutional assembly election on 11 September. It
is doubtful at this time that the Communists them-
selves have any significant number of followers among
the candidates who have filed, though many of the
candidates are relative unknowns even to local govern-
ment officials. Communist propaganda statements have
vigorously denounced the coming election as a farce
and a trick. The Communists may feel impelled to
take an active role through covert campaigning against
candidates, or through terrorism and other direct sabo-
tage efforts.
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VI. Key Trends and Factors
37. In addition to their own logistic, manpower
and morale problems, future Communist strategic deci-
sions will probably be primarily influenced by develop-
ments in three areas: the course of South Vietnam's
political evolution, the course of the military strug-
gle in South Vietnam, and the attitude of the United
States--or, more accurately, their estimate of Ameri-
can will and the US Government's political ability
to persevere. The Communists, for example, will be
paying particular attention to the outcome of the
September elections in Vietnam and their resultant
effect on South Vietnamese political stability and
strength; Communist success or failure in matching al-
lied maneuver battalion strength and achieving at
least some tactical successes; and the outcome and im-
port--or what the Communists believe to be the import
--of next November's elections in the United States.
VII. The Day of Decision
38. The timing of any Vietnamese Communist deci-
sion on altering basic strategy--and the nature of
such a decision--will be greatly affected by a va-
riety of considerations including those outlined in
the preceding paragraph. We estimate that none of
the pressures upon the Communists which we can now
identify is severe enough to force a major change
in Communist strategy over the next eight to nine
months. The Communists would be even less inclined
to alter their strategy if they should find polit-
ical and military developments during this period
running in their favor--for example, serious polit-
ical deterioration in South Vietnam, a series of ma-
jor Viet Cong military successes, or what they con-
strue as a significant rise of anti-war sentiment in
the United States. If on the other hand pressures
on them are maintained, and the course of events
gives them no grounds for encouragement, they will
probably feel compelled by late spring of 1967 to
take stock and consider a change in their basic
strategy.
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VIII. Alternate Communist Strategic Options
39. Should the Vietnamese Communists decide at
this point that continuation of their insurgency
along current lines would not be profitable, they
would have three basic policy options. They could:
(1) convert the struggle into a major war by invit-
ing massive Chinese Communist military intervention;
(2) relax Communist pressure and withdraw some North
Vietnamese troops, in the hope that the appearance
of tranquility would eventually impel the US to
disengage the better part of its forces without any
formal commitments from the Communists in return;
or (3) enter into some form of negotiations.
40. We believe Option (1) is the option the
Vietnamese Communists would consider least in their
long-term interests. Option (2), despite some ad-
vantages, would entail major problems for the Com-
munists. It carries no guarantee that the U.S. would
in fact disengage, and puts the Communists in a po-
sition of bidding by successive increments to bring
this about. It would engender serious morale prob-
lems for the Communists during a protracted stand-
down without simultaneous U.S. response. It would
be hard to explain as anything but acknowledgement
of a serious reverse for long-range Communist objec-
tives.
41. In our view, the Vietnamese Communists would
be most likely to try some variant of Option (3)--
negotiation. They would hope initially to achieve
a reduction of allied offensive pressure, including
a suspension of bombing in the North.* They would
probably work to keep the talks going in order to
prolong such a respite. During the course of the
negotiations, they would probably determine whether
they would seriously explore the possibilities of an
acceptable political solution, or examine the alter-
native courses still open to them.
*Communist behavior in periods of negotiation is
examined in Annex XII.
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1. So long as the U.S. air offensive remains at pres-
ent levels, it is unlikely to diminish North Vietnam's
continued ability to provide materiel support to the war
in the South. North Vietnam is taking punishment on its
own territory, but at a price it can afford and one it
probably considers acceptable in light of the political
objectives it hopes to achieve.
2. The Viet Cong have borne the brunt of Communist
personnel losses in South Vietnam and have also had to
compensate for losses of North Vietnamese personnel. We
believe that the Viet Cong capability to recruit and train
manpower is adequate to cover losses estimated for 1966
but will probably be inadequate to compensate for casual-
ties and losses in 1967. During 1967 the North Vietnamese
will have to assume most of the burden of expanding force
levels, and an increasing role in replacing losses. These
manpower requirements can almost certainly be met from
North Vietnamese resources, but they will impose addi-
tional strains on North Vietnam's limited supply of skilled
personnel and leadership cadre.
3. The Communists' present strategy is costly in both
human and economic terms and is taxing Communist resources
in some areas, particularly within South Vietnam itself.
Allied actions are complicating Communist efforts and
raising the costs of their execution. However, neither
internal resource shortages nor allied actions within
present political parameters are likely to render the
Vietnamese Communists physically incapable of persisting
in their present strategy.
4. In absolute numerical terms the Communists cannot
hope to match present and projected Allied force commit-
ments. However, if present estimates of Allied and Com-
munist force projections are accurate, by mid-1967 the
Communists will have a slight advantage in maneuver bat-
talions--i.e., tactical combat troops available for com-
mitment to offensive ground operations.
5. Nevertheless, if they are objective, the Commu-
nists must acknowledge that during the past year their
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insurgent campaign has lost momentum in both the military
and political fields. Although they may not be losing
the war at the present time, they are certainly not win-
ning it. The Communists are far from being defeated; but
they are faced with problems greater than any they have
had to contend with before in this struggle. Further-
more, Communist forces have at least temporarily lost the
aura of invincibility which was one of their most potent
political assets.
6. Morale within Communist military forces and the
political apparatus in South Vietnam has declined since
mid-1965 but not to a point presently sufficient to
force any major revision in basic Communist strategy.
7. The Communists must be disappointed in comparing
the present situation with that which existed in the
spring of 1965. At least indirectly, they have acknowl-
edged that the infusion of U.S. and Allied combat forces
has created new problems which must be overcome before
victory can be won. Yet Communist realism is presently
tinged more with defiance than pessimism; the Communists
may be disappointed, but they do not yet seem to be dis-
couraged.
8. Consideration of world popular opposition to U.S.
policy would certainly enter into any eventual Vietnamese
Communist decision on whether to revise present strategy
but would most certainly not be a decisive factor.
9. The Vietnamese Communists pay close attention to
evidence of opposition to current U.S. policy arising
within the United States itself. The outcome of their
previous struggle with the French almost certainly pre-
disposes them to draw invalid parallels to French domestic
opposition in the Indochina war and to look for signs of
American domestic political pressures capable of forcing
policy changes on Washington.
10. The timing of any Vietnamese Communist decision
on altering basic strategy--and the nature of such a de-
cision--will be greatly affected by a variety of consid-
erations, including those outlined in this paper. We es-
timate that none of the pressures upon the Communists
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which we can now identify is severe enough to force a ma-
jor change in Communist strategy over the next eight to
nine months. The Communists would be even less inclined
to alter their strategy if they should find political and
military developments during this period running in their
favor--for example, serious political deterioration in
South Vietnam, a series of major Viet Cong military suc-
cesses, or what they construe as a significant rise of
anti-war sentiment in the United States. If on the other
hand pressures on them are maintained and the course of
events gives them no grounds for encouragement, by late
spring of 1967 they will probably feel compelled to take
stock and consider a change in their basic strategy.
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ANNEX I
THE ECONOMIC, MILITARY AND LOGISTIC RESOURCES
AND CAPABILITIES OF THE VIETNAMESE COMMUNISTS
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ANNEX I
THE ECONOMIC, MILITARY AND LOGISTIC
RESOURCES AND CAPABILITIES OF
THE VIETNAMESE COMMUNISTS
I. North Vietnam
A. Manpower
1. The Population Base
The manpower problem in North Vietnam, viewed
solely in terms of numbers, is not yet acute, although in
a qualitative sense it is becoming more severe. In spite
of substantial manpower levies the country still has a wide
range of unused opportunities to replace men with women, to
withdraw males from sectors where labor is underemployed,
and to transfer labor from nonessential or postponable
tasks. North Vietnam has not yet had to resort to full mo-
bilization.
The population of North Vietnam as of 1 January
1966 is estimated at between 17.9 and 19.2 million persons.
(See Table I-1) North Vietnam's manpower resources for
military service consist of 4.1-4.5 million males in the
15-49 age group of which 2.1-2.3 are physically fit for
military duty. Over 110,000 physically fit males reach
draft age each year.
Estimated Manpower Available for
Military Service in North Vietnam
1 January 1966
Total
Males
Females
Low
High
Low High
Low High
Total population
17,895
19,210
8,730
9,374
9,165
9,836
Persons
age 15-49
8,561
9,182
4,146
4,457
4,415
4,725
Those
fit
physically
for military
service
--
--
2,110
2,267
--
--
Persons of draft age
(18)
--
--
175
188
--
--
Those
for
physically fit
military
service
--
--
107
115
--
--
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2. The Manpower Drain
The major drains on manpower resources in
North Vietnam have resulted from the build-up of the armed
forces, the reallocation of labor to military support ac-
tivities and the repair or reconstruction of bomb damaged
facilities, particularly the lines of communication in
North Vietnam and Laos.
We are not able to give precise estimates
of the extent to which mobilization has taken place in North
Vietnam. It is apparent that mobilization of manpower for
military duty or military support activities has not reached
a point of exhausting North Vietnam's manpower resources,
although it has placed an increasing drain on administrative
and management skills. Unless the US greatly stepped up
its bombing, North Vietnam could make substantial increases
in its armed forces and make additional manpower inputs
into military support activities without placing an in-
ordinately severe strain on its manpower resources.
Current estimates of the build-up of
NVA forces in the past year indicate that a minimum of
125,000 persons were called for military duty. To this
total should be added those numbers of NVA personnel in-
filtrating into South Vietnam, not as part of the build-up
of NVA forces there, but as replacements and fillers for
killed or seriously wounded NVA troops. 8,000 infiltrators
can be placed in this category for 1965 and 10-30,000
for 1966 according to current estimates of the rates of
infiltration and build-up of NVA forces in South Vietnam.
On this basis we can estimate that certainly over 150,000
persons have already been called into military service. This
total is about 70 percent of the number of physically fit
males reaching draft age during 1965 and 1966. Even if
the North Vietnamese armed forces should expand by 25 per-
cent--to 500,000 persons--the drain on manpower resources
for military service in numerical terms would not approach
burdensome proportions.
In addition to the manpower drain for mil-
itary service,; the North Vietnamese have had to reallocate
labor to repair or reconstruction activities and to tasks
associated with dispersal programs and emergency activities.
These programs require the full-time services of 200,000
workers and the part-time utilization of another 100,000.
An additional diversion of the labor force results from
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the obligation of some 150,000 persons to fulfill civil
defense obligations on a part-time basis.
Excluding the part-time diversions of
labor, the measurable mobilization of manpower to date
for military duty or war-associated tasks would seem to
involve a minimum of 350,000 persons. This commitment
could be at least 450,000 persons if the armed forces were
to expand to 500,000 persons. The commitment would be
even greater if air strikes against the logistics target
system increased and could amount to an additional 40,000-
50,000 persons. The additions to the labor force probably
need not be greater because of the large amount of work
already done in expanding the road system and building by-
passes and other temporary crossings. The main thrust of
future labor efforts will be in maintenance and repair of
this expanded road system. However, the requirement for
an additional 40,000-50,000 persons could create additional
strains on North Vietnam's limited resources of skilled
manpower.
3. Alternative Sources of Manpower
North Vietnam has several alternatives to
be used in drawing upon its labor force of over 9.5 million
people to replace the manpower mobilized for military and
war-related activities. A primary source for the replace-
ment of manpower diverted to mobilization programs is the
large number of women in the labor force. Over 1.7 million
women are reported by Hanoi to be ready to replace men in
the labor force. We have little evidence, however, to sup-
port a judgment that the number of females in the labor
force has increased significantly since mobilization
measures began in April 1965. As late as October 1965 the
regime still claimed that women accounted for 60 percent
of the agricultural labor force, the same percentage
claimed before mobilization. (See Table 1-2)
In addition to the possibilities of women
replacing men in the labor force, Hanoi has several alterna-
tive resources for manpower. The natural annual increment
to the total labor force is in the order of 350,000 persons
a year. We also estimate that from 300,000-350,000 males
could be released from trade and services enterprises, in-
stitutions and educational establishments without disrupt-
ing essential economic activity. Finally there are
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Civilian Labor Force of North Vietnam with Sex Breakdown a/
1 January 1966
Total Male Female
Total 9,522 4,482 5,040
Production and Distribution 8,700 N. A. N. A.
Agriculture 7,000 2,800 4,200
Industry 806 494 312
State-owned
(206)
(146)
(60)
Handicrafts
(600)
(348)
(252)
Construction
200
.138
62
Transport and Communications
328
N.A.
N.A.
State-owned
(106)
N. A.
N. A.
Non-State
(222)
N. A.
N. A.
282
171
111
State-owned
(75)
(51)
(24)
Non-State
(207)
(120)
(87)
84
N. A.
N. A.
Administration
74
70
4
Banking
8
7
1
Consumer Services
402
233
169
Culture, education, science
187
130
57
Medicine and social services
83
49
34
Civil Defense
1
N. A.
N. A.
Other
67
N.A.
N.A.
a. Employment data refer to full-time labor force in various
branches. Unless otherwise indicated, figures on total work force
in various branches are taken from North Vietnamese official data
for 1963. Increases in employment in these branches that may have
occurred during 1964 are assumed to be counterbalanced in 1965 by
diversion of workers from their normal occupations to the regular
armed forces, and to employment in construction and transportation.
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substantial numbers--35,000-65,000--of draft-age male stu-
dents at the college and high school level that would be
available if full mobilization were undertaken.,
4. Pressures on Manpower
Mobilization in North Vietnam has not dried up
the pool of excess labor. Although the manpower situation
is tight the regime for the most part still avoids coercive
programs in channeling workers into essential jobs. The
withdrawal of manpower from production has not resulted in
many of the austerity measures which would be associated
with full mobilization. Rationing of food has been within
moderate limits, agricultural taxes have not increased nor
have food and cloth imports increased significantly.
School enrollments in 1966, of the 14-21 age group, are
reported by the regime to be double the level of last
year. With the exception of some disruption to normal
routine and some minor deprivations, there are few indi-
cations that the population has been asked to make extreme
sacrifices in support of the war effort.
The major pressures on manpower result from
the regime's inability to manage manpower effectively, a
relative scarcity of skilled manpower, and an excessive
drain on the agricultural labor force.
The management problems reflect the diffi-
culties associated with a rapid transfer of masses of
low-level workers to essential wartime tasks. The transfers
effected to date were disorderly and poorly planned and re-
sulted in uneven and unproductive allocations of the labor
force. The drain of manpower from agriculture was, for example,
an important factor in the disappointing fifth-month harvest.
At the same time the regime found that the~lnocatnexfes-
workers to construction work camps was apparently so
or irrational that some of these workers could be re-
turned to the agricultural labor force or to other production
tasks.
Skilled manpower resources in North Vietnam
total about 300,000 workers or only 3 percent of the civilian
labor force. This total is inadequate to meet all the require-
ments of mobilization and normal economic activity. The
strain on these resources has been reduced somewhat by the
presence of an estimated 25,000-45,000 men in Chinese Com-
munist engineer units engaged in railroad and airfield -
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construction work in the northern part of North Vietnam. De-
spite this Chinese technical assistance the supply of skilled
manpower remains tight. Water conservancy which is vital
to agriculture is one area where the shortage of skilled
manpower seems to be particularly acute. In the spring of
1966 the regime noted that it had become difficult to man
water conservancy brigades because of the loss of cadres
to wartime tasks.
5. Prospects
If the commitment of manpower to regular
military forces over the next twelve months does not exceed
currently estimated levels, North Vietnam should be able to
meet its manpower requirements but at an increasing cost to
other economic, educational and social programs.
Although in terms of numbers the North Viet-
namese have adquate manpower to replace losses and to build-
up forces in South Vietnam, there are factors that may re-
duce their enthusiasm for sustaining this drain. The man-
power being sent to South Vietnam is in qualitative terms
probably the best the country can muster. Its loss over
the long term is not one to be borne lightly by any power.
Moreover, even though North Vietnam probably can meet its
basic manpower commitment in South Vietnam, there is con-
siderable drain on manpower within North Vietnam and the
prospects are good that this drain will increase as the
air war requires greater reconstruction efforts and as a
lagging agriculture requires additional inputs of manpower.
Finally an increasing scarcity of skilled manpower and quali-
fied leaders--both military and economic--should make the
drain of North Vietnam's manpower an increasingly difficult
burden.
If the manpower drain does become acute,
it will probably be in the area of agricultural manpower.
In February 1966 the regime felt that the agricultural labor
force could remain stable at about 7 million persons, that
annual withdrawals would be almost exactly balanced by the
normal annual addition to the work force. By April 1966 the
regime had apparently concluded that this balance was too
low and that a reallocation of labor back into agriculture
was necessary. We do not know if this reallocation has been
made. However, the disappointing fifth-month harvest makes
it likely that the regime will be compelled to provide more
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agricultural manpower in order to achieve a successful 10th
month harvest. If the regime is unsuccessful in this effort,
strong pressures will develop in early 1967 for an even
greater commitment of manpower to agriculture. This prob-
ably could not be accomplished without disrupting the op-
erations of other sectors of the economy, particularly if
the reallocation of manpower to agriculture involves large
numbers of skilled workers.
B. Effects of the Rolling Thunder Program
1. Economic and Military Target System
Damage caused by air strikes against eco-
nomic and military facilities and equipment in North Vietnam
through June 1966 amounted to $86 million of which $52
million were sustained by the economy and $34 million by
the military.* (See Figure I-1)
If the bombing of North Vietnam persists during
the 12-months to mid-1967 along the same scale and character
(exclusive of the strikes against petroleum storage) as
during the first five months of 1966** an additional $38
million of damage to the economy may be expected. The
cost of replacing the destroyed bulk petroleum facilities
will total an additional $4 million. The total cumulative
measurable damage to the economy of North Vietnam by mid-
1967 will then total $94 million.
Damage inflicted to military facilities and
equipment during the first five months of bombing during
1966 (February through June) amounted to only $7 million
and was exceedingly low when compared with 1965. The bulk
of this loss consisted of the destruction of aircraft and
*These dollar costs assigned to bomb damage are values
indicating a general measure of the effectiveness of the
bombing program. They are not intended to indicate im-
mediate outlays which have to be undertaken by the Hanoi
regime.
**There was a pause in the bombing of North Vietnam
from 24 December 1965 through 30 January.".1966.
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Figure 1.1
MILITARY AND ECONOMIC DAMAGE
RESULTING FROM AIR ATTACKS AGAINST NORTH VIETNAM
March 1965 - June 1966 and Projected July 1966 - June 1967
Military Damage
Economic Damage
(Million Dollars)
52
58*
16
50
Mar 1965-Jun 1966 Jul 1966-Jun 1967 Mar 1965-Jun 1967
*Projection based on scale and character of air strikes during first five months of 1966
~is ou?u,1k
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naval craft. No important military barracks and supply de-
pots were attacked because of their location in sanctuary
areas. The average monthly damage to military facilities
and equipment amounted to about $1.3 million. On the as-
sumption that the air war will continue against military
targets at about this scale during the forthcoming twelve
months, the total loss sustained by military targets will
amount to only $16 million. The total cumulative damage
to military facilities and equipment as of mid-1967 will
then be about $50 million.
Using the same assumptions, we estimate that
the cumulative economic and military damage as a conse-
quence of the Rolling Thunder program will total $144
million by mid-1967. In addition, there are and will be
other losses and indirect costs to the economy and the
military establishment to which values cannot be assigned.
Losses at this level will not present a sig-
nificant drain on North Vietnam's resources. Much of the
cost represents damages to facilities such as military
barracks which are not in active use, or to facilities
such as bridges which do not require permanent repair.
The North Vietnamese have chosen so far not to repair the
damaged petroleum storage facilities. The only known re-
construction of the damaged electric power stations has
been Uong Bi station and this presumably has been
done by or with the help of Russian technicians.
The damage sustained by air attacks against
North Vietnam is in large measure a bill that can be
passed to the USSR and Communist China. The increasing
aid commitments of these countries far overshadow the small
dollar value of the damage caused by air attack. These com-
mitments imply an obligation on the part of the USSR and Com-
munist China to underwrite the economic restoration of the
country on favorable terms and explain in large measure
Hanoi's attitude toward the loss of its modern economic fa-
cilities.
2. Effects of the Air Attacks at Present Levels
The bulk petroleum storage facilities in
North Vietnam represent the first important military/eco-
nomic target system attacked in depth by the Rolling Thunder
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program apart from the sporadic strikes against transporta-
tion in the northern part of the country. The neutraliza-
tion of the petroleum storage system will present Hanoi and
its allies with an immediate problem in improvising an ade-
quate flow of petroleum products.. Hanoi has already gone
to considerable lengths to reduce the vulnerability of its
bulk petroleum storage centers by dispersal and other pas-
sive defense measures, including burying tanks, so that an
emergency plan for an alternative system of supply undoubt-
edly exists. To the extent that off-loading and improvised
storage cannot be fully realized at Haiphong, the logical
alternative system would be based on China's Fort Bayard
and port facilities and its connecting rail links.
The immediate impact in North Vietnam will
be felt, therefore, in the need to convert to a new system of
supply and distribution. This conversion will necessitate
costly measures and create significant problems in adapting
to a new situation. If a petroleum shortage develops its
burden will fall on less essential or nonessential and
civilian uses, which may comprise as much as one-third of
normal consumption.
We estimate, nevertheless, that the supply
of petroleum for the essential military and economic func-
tions will continue, and that the flow of supplies to the
insurgent forces in South Vietnam can be sustained if not
increased.
Even before the attacks on the bulk pe-
troleum storage facilities the bombings were causing in-
creasing disruption of economic activity. After adjust-
ments have been made to operate a makeshift supply and
distribution system for petroleum the continuation of at-
tacks on transportation will cause further disruption.
Hanoi will have to reallocate capital and additional labor
for repair and construction within the transport sector
at the expense of industry and agriculture.
The cumulative debilitating effects of the
bombing had already slowed down growth in industry and
agriculture during 1965. There will probably be no growth
in industry and agriculture during 1966 and the first 6
months of 1967, and some plans for economic development in-
cluding new industrial construction projects will probably
have to be abandoned. The stagnation of industrial growth
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will have no overriding effect on the waging of a war which,
for other than manpower, is essentially sustained by material
inputs from outside North Vietnam. North Vietnam's modern
industrial economy makes almost no direct or significant
contribution to the war effort. The stagnation of agri-
cultural growth may, however, create problems particularly
if the 10th month harvest is poor. Even so the primarily
agrarian nature of this subsistence economy means that there
will be no sustained or critical hardship among the bulk
of the population as a consequence of the effect of the
air war at its present levels.
b. Military
Air attacks on military targets in North
Vietnam to mid-1967 if maintained at the scale and of the
same nature as that of the first part of 1966 will not im-
pair the military capability of North Vietnam. The military
targets being attacked in the present air war are not those
that would have a highly disruptive effect on the military
establishment or significantly impair its training, and de-
fense capabilities or its capability to support the insur-
gency in South Vietnam.
3. Effects of an Expanded Air Offensive
The effectiveness of air attacks in creating
burdensome pressures and strains on North Vietnam would be
greatly enhanced by an expanded bombing program that in-
cluded intensive 24-hour interdiction against the road
and rail connections to Communist China and neutralization
of the many significant military/economic targets such as
the remaining petroleum storage facilities and the Haiphong
cement plant.
Such a program could cause an overloading of
the main transport connections to China and create severe
internal distribution problems.* Although expanded air at-
tacks would not stop activities essential to support of the
war, they could cause a drastic decline in the level and
efficiency with which the economic and military sectors
function.
*See Appendix A for a more detailed discussion of the
transportation problems resulting from this postulated at-
tack.
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4. The Logistics Target System
The Rolling Thunder attack against lines of com-
munication, bridges and transportation equipment targets has
resulted in losses to North Vietnam of over $30 million or
over three-fourths of the estimated direct damage inflicted
on all economic targets. Forty six bridges or 20 percent of
the bridges on the rail lines subjected to air attacks have
been damaged or destroyed, and 212 highway bridges have been
destroyed or damaged. In spite of the continued and increas-
ing armed reconnaissance attacks on the five major railroad
lines, on only two--Hanoi to Vinh and Hanoi to Lao Cai--has
through rail service been effectively interdicted for most
of the time since the bombings began. The Hanoi - Dong Dang
line has been interdicted for through service several times
but for a total of only a few months. The Hanoi-Haiphong
line has been interdicted for a total of only a few weeks.
The Hanoi - Thai Nguyen line has been able to maintain
through traffic almost constantly.
Losses of transporation equipment, particularly
motor trucks, have increased sharply in recent months. Ac-
cording to pilot reports over 2,000 trucks have been damaged
or destroyed. These pilot reports undoubtedly overstate ac-
tual results but even without adjustment, reports indicat-
ing this level of destruction would amount to only two-thirds
of the trucks known to have been imported by North Vietnam in
1965.
The North Vietnamese responded to these attacks
with a crash construction effort to implement a pre-strike
planning program designed to keep lines of communication open
to develop more sophisticated methods of concealment for
roads, bridges and ferries, and to complete an impressive
proliferation of bridge bypasses and alternate routes. By
the end of 1965 an estimated 70-100,000 workers had been
added to the labor force of construction work-camps engaged
in rail and road repairs.
The success of these countermeasures is seen in
statistics on the number of bridges destroyed or damaged and
the repair measures adopted by North Vietnam to keep traffic
moving. Of the total of 258 bridges damaged--46 rail or
rail/highway bridges and 212 highway bridges--North Vietnam
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has found it necessary to repair only 67 bridges--22 rail
or rail/highway and 45 highway bridges. The major emphasis
has been to construct temporary crossings or by-passes, over
173 of these having been constructed to replace damaged high-
way bridges. The savings resulting from these expedients
are impressive. North Vietnam has had to expend only $3
million on temporary repairs compared to a cost of over
$12 million if all the damaged or destroyed bridges were
permanently repaired or reconstructed.
Although the air strikes have patently made it
more difficult and costly to maintain traffic movement, the
countermeasures adopted have proved extremely effective.
Overall transport performance has been maintained at pre-
bombing levels. The known movement of supplies into Laos
and South Vietnam during the 1965-66 dry season was double
that of the previous year.
After an initial shaky response to Allied bomb-
ings, the North Vietnamese were able to consolidate their
position and are now able to maintain and improve their trans-
portation system even though the bombings have increased.
The ease with which they converted to a wartime construction
base during 1965 indicates that further increases in air
attacks would undoubtedly be countered by an expansion of
existing capabilities to keep open all important routes to
South Vietnam.
The level of interdiction carried on through
June 1966 has been insufficient to create any major strains
in the North Vietnamese transport system. If interdiction
continues at current levels through mid-1967, the North Viet-
namese should have no difficulty in maintaining current levels
of traffic, including imports and exports by land.
Meaningful pressures on North Vietnamese trans-
port capabilities would require an air attack program that
denies the country its ability to maintain seaborne imports
and exports, increases import requirements, and concentrates
transport on the land connections to Communist China. Such
an air attack program would have to include measures to
close North Vietnam's major seaports, the neutralization
of remaining petroleum storage facilities and vital economic
targets such as the Haiphong cement plant, and a highly in-
tensified program of armed reconnaissance against surface
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transport and lines of communication linking North Vietnam
and Communist China.
The two rail connections to China are currently
used at only about one-third of their normal capacity. If
measures against the major seaports could stop as much as
50 percent of normal import trade, these rail lines would
be forced to operate at approximately full capacity under
interdicted conditions. If more seaborne traffic had to be
diverted to overland movement and additional import require-
ments were generated, by neutralization of the cement plant
for example, the rail traffic requirement would increase
even beyond the uninterdicted capacity of the rail lines.
Sustained interdiction of the lines would force
the Communists to allocate considerable amounts of manpower
and materials to maintain the railroad lines and alternate
highway routes. Virtually all daylight traffic would stop
and night traffic would be disrupted thus slowing down move-
ment and making the logistic resupply of Communist forces con-
siderably less reliable than at present.
Some economic requirements would have to go unsatis-
fied and many of the Bloc aid projects and domestic construc-
tion programs would have to be postponed. Modern industrial
production would be slowed down and there would be increasing
though not critical problems in food and distribution prob-
lems.
There would, of course, be adequate transport
capacity to support the military establishment and to con-
tinue the present level of aggression in South Vietnam and
Laos. But the support of these activities would be a much
more costly and difficult burden. The population of North
Vietnam would also be more keenly aware of the deprivations
and costs associated with the war.
C. The State of Civilian Morale
1. General Review
The initial response of North Vietnam's civilian
population to the US/GVN air attacks was characterized by
a high degree of patriotic enthusiasm. The air attacks in
large measure have been a strong force for unifying the pop-
ulation in its resistance to the "US aggressors." As the
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air attacks have continued and intensified, there has been
a waning of popular enthusiasm. This has not, however,
reached the point that it has any meaningful impact upon
the determination of the regime to continue with the war or
the policy options it may elect to achieve its objectives.
Almost every segment of the civilian population
of North Vietnam has been forced to make some sacrifice in
its standard of living as the result of the bombing. How-
ever, civilians living in the southern part of the country--
about 15 percent of the population--have suffered far
greater hardships in the form of personal and property losses,
shortages of consumer goods, and sharp declines in income
resulting from interruption of normal economic activity.
Letters from residents of the southern part of the country
to relatives in Thailand cite personal hardships and
anxieties resulting from air strikes more frequently than
in the past and more often than letters from residents of
other parts of the country.
25X1
Data released by the Ministry of Labor in the
spring of 1966 on the excessive rates of absenteeism among
construction workers in the southern provinces may reflect
the poor state of morale there. Absenteeism due to illness
among construction workers largely engaged in repair work
on the transportation system in the southern part of the
country averaged 16.3 days per worker in 1965 or 5 percent
of total working days scheduled.
(morale and
iscip i.ne problems resulting from shortages of food con-
tinue to hamper operations at both civilian work camps
and at military units in the southern provinces.
Elsewhere, the hardships caused by evacuation
from urban centers, splitting of families, reductions in
quality of consumer goods and services, increases in work
hours largely without additional compensation, and losses
of income resulting from transfers from normal jobs to
lower paying defense-related tasks are less severe but
apparently have depressed civilian morale to some extent.
There is little explicit evidence available on the morale
of civilians living outside of target areas. A March 1966
Hanoi press report stated that a decline in the health and
morale of workers at the country's second largest machinery
plant--the Tran Hung Dao Machinery and Tool Plant in Hanoi,
which produces items for military as well as civilian use--
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had occurred due to the increase in regular working time
and in outside duties.
Nevertheless, recent public discussion of the
need to tighten control over both party members and the
general population implies that the regime fears there may
be some deterioration of public morale. An article in the
March 1966 issue of the party journal Hoc Tap, detailed
weaknesses in the party's techniques for disciplining
erring members, and in April 1966, Ho Chi Minh called for
"harsh disciplinary measures" against a number of party
members and cadres in party cells who failed to carry out
party policies correctly. Less than two weeks later the
chairman of the Supreme Peoples Organ of Control in the
government called for a revision of the sections of the
legal code dealing with counterrevolutionary activities,
protection of state property, and the rights and duties of
citizens "in order to satisfy the demands of wartime."
This recent emphasis upon breakdowns of disci-
pline implies that patriotic appeals alone are no longer
sufficient to maintain civilian enthusiasm for the war.
The original strength of appeals to the patriots was evi-
dent from the response of over 3 million youths (ages 16-30)
and 1.7 million women, or about 50 percent of the working
age population, to give active support for the war effort
by performing various essential economic and paramilitary
tasks under the "three readies"* and "three responsibilities"**
movements. the participants
in the movements were highly motivated to contribute to the
war effort.
The continuation of bombing appears, however,
to be gradually intensifying economic and political problems
to the point that the patriotic fervor with which the popu-
lation initially greeted the air strikes is being diminished.
*The "three readies" for youth are: (1) ready to fight;
(2) ready to join the army; (3) ready to go wherever the
country requires them.
**The "three responsibilities" for women are: (1) respon-
sibility to produce and do other tasks to free the men to
fight; (2) responsibility to take over family affairs and to
encourage their husbands and sons to serve in combat; (3) re-
sponsibility to serve in battle if necessary.
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Discussions of civilian mobilization in North
Vietnamese publications during 1966 indicate that the re-
gime is encountering difficulties in effectively employing
those already mobilized. These difficulties are largely
blamed on the lower level cadres in both the government and
the party, who are said to discriminate against young
people in general and women in particular in the assess-
ment of responsibilities. The morale-depressing effects of
prejudice and discrimination in the mobilization effort is
compounded by the sheer inability of North Vietnam's cadre
force to manage the task. Managerial inefficiencies have
proliferated since air strikes began in February 1965, and
have prevented an orderly reallocation of the labor force.
Cadres have been criticized in the North Vietnamese press
for mobilizing construction workers and starting protects
without plan.
1,600 workers were sent to a highway construction
reports indicate that civilians in North Vietnam do in fact
see the bombing as a direct consequence of the support
furnished by North Vietnam to the Viet Cong. They, more-
over, take great pride in their country's achievements in
downing American aircraft and often mention the well pub-
licized achievements of Communist forces in South Vietnam.
and the bombing of North Vietnam.
In an effort to stimulate patriotic fervor
the regime's propaganda makes clear the direct connection 25X1
between North Vietnamese support for the war in the South
Despite the regime's propaganda on the success
of the "liberation forces" in the south, the population in
North Vietnam is probably increasingly aware that the war
is not going well and that heavy casualties are being
suffered by North Vietnamese troops who have been sent
south. North Vietnamese soldiers who have been captured
or who have defected in South Vietnam reveal that some in-
dication of the hardships, sickness, and injuries suffered
by infiltrated troops is provided the people at home
through letters and by eyewitness reports from wounded
veterans who have returned home. If these casualties
mount and the morale of the North Vietnamese troops in
South Vietnam drops seriously, there is likely to be a
comparable drop in the morale of the civilian popula-
tion. Knowledge of military reverses in the field rather
than the effect of bombing at home was a major factor in
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the decline of popular morale in Japan and Germany in
World War II.
2. Prospects
Civilian morale is likely to continue to de-
cline in North Vietnam over the next 12 months because of
the probability of further declines in civilian living
standards. Agricultural difficulties--resulting at least
in part from the mobilization effort--have already affected
the current harvest, intensifying the already tight food
situation in North Vietnam. Pham Hung, a member of the
party politburo and director of the Financial and Trade
Bureau of the Premier's Office stated in May 1966 that
prices of food on the free market have already started
to rise because of setbacks in the spring harvest and that
"some...comrades...doubt it will be possible to stabilize
the situation in the forthcoming period." In addition to
the pressure on food supplies, other strains on civilian
living standards will probably increase. Despite the pos-
sibility of a further decline in civilian morale during
the next year, such an eventuality is not likely in the
foreseeable future to deprive the leadership of freedom
to pursue the conflict in whatever manner it chooses.
II. The Significance of Laos and Cambodia
The ability of the Communists to launch and to sustain
the insurgency movement in North Vietnam has been greatly
facilitated by the essentially free access they have had
to those areas in Laos and Cambodia which border South
Vietnam. Laos has developed as the major route for the
infiltration of men and supplies into South Vietnam. Cam-
bodia, which has been used to a limited extent as a source
of supplies and has served principally as a safe-haven
for Communist forces, is becoming increasingly important
as an integral part of the logistics system. The unique
value to the Communists of both countries lies in their
neutral status. The logistic resupply activities in Laos
are hindered only by aerial interdiction and such ground
activities as have been conducted to date. Both of these
measures have had only a limited effectiveness. Cambodia,
on the other hand, provides the Communists an almost
complete immunity from US/GVN and allied military reaction.
The opportunities to apply political or economic pressures
to induce a Cambodia reaction against Communist use of its
territory are also extremely limited.
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1. Supply Requirements and'Road Capacity
The Communists have been able to use three
routes to supply their forces in South Vietnam--the sea
route from North Vietnam (or China), the Laotian land route,
and the Cambodian route.* Although the use of any particu-
lar route has varied over time, the overwelming share of
supplies needed to meet the external logistic requirements
of the Communist forces in South Vietnam are being moved
by truck from North Vietnam through the Laotian Panhandle.
The increasing use of the Laotian supply route
is shown graphically in Figure 1-2 which compares the move-
ment of supplies by truck into the southern panhandle during
the 1965 and 1966 dry season. During the 1965 dry season
trucks carried an average of some 34 short tons of supplies
a day into the infiltration corridor of Laos for a total
resupply of over 6,000 tons. During the 1966 dry season,
however, the daily movement of supplies into Southern Laos
was about 84 tons or almost 17,000 tons during the
season of which 15,100 were delivered to the infiltration
corridor. In both years the flow of supplies was also
supplemented by a small--2 tons a day--movement around the
DMZ. Figure 1-2 also shows the dramatic increase in the
through movement of supplies to the borders of South Viet-
nam. Although the. Communists had to increase the flow of
supplies for their forces in the Panhandle they were at
the same time able to increase the flow of supplies by
truck to South Vietnam from at least 900 tons in 1965 to
7,350 tons thus far in 1966.
a. The Logistic Requirement
The estimated VC/NVA military strength in
South Vietnam in mid-1966 was between 260,000 and 280,000
which includes an estimated 118,000 regular troops. These
troops require approximately 150 tons of supplies daily
*The reference here is to supplies moved into South
Vietnam from any point in Cambodia, and is not intended
to refer to supplies that move on the Laotian route and
merely cross northeast Cambodia before entering South
Vietnam.
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Figure 1-2
SUPPLIES TRUCKED FROM NORTH VIETNAM
INTO THE LAOTIAN PANHANDLE
DURING THE 1965 AND 1966 DRY SEASONS
Tons*
8,000
7,350
5,220
6,760
Panhandle
South
Vietnam
1965
Dec 1964-May 1965
* Short tons
1966
**Deliveries into the Laotian infiltration corridor shown here reflect 20% less in transit
due to pilferage, spoilage, and aerial interdiction. In addition to these deliveries, both
Laos and South Vietnam received some supplies from Cambodia.
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at present levels of combat. Only a small part of this
daily requirement--some 20 tons of Class II (weapons),
Class IV (quartermaster, engineer, and medical) and Class
V (ammunition) supplies--must be obtained from out of coun-
try. We have noted in recent months, however, that be-
cause of internal distribution problems within South Viet-
nam the Communist forces stationed in the food-deficit
central highlands are obtaining rice supplies from Cambodia.
The present estimates of the probable build-up of Communist
forces and rates of combat by mid-1967 would, of course,
increase these requirements substantially. The total daily
requirement by mid-1967 could be in the order of 210 tons a
day. The external requirement would then be 35 tons a day
at present levels of combat or some 55 tons a day if the
level of combat should double. These external supply re-
quirements are small and their fulfillment requires the
use of only a small percentage of the capacity of the
supply routes through Laos.
b. Logistic Capacity
The capability to move supplies overland
through North Vietnam and Laos to South Vietnam is re-
stricted by the capacity of the roads in Laos. The cur-
rent uninterdicted capacity of the infiltration network
in the Laotian Panhandle for truck movement to points
within a few miles of South Vietnam is about 400 tons a
day in the dry season and 100 tons a day in the rainy
season. Come rain or come shine this capacity ranges
from 5-20 times the current external logistic requirement
of the Communist forces in South Vietnam and from 2-7
times the probable external requirements under current
estimates of the probable build-up of Communist forces
by mid-1967.
The prospects are dim that conventional
air interdiction can reduce the capacity of this network
to a level that would represent an effective ceiling on
the volume of supplies that can be moved through Laos.
During the 30-day bombing pause from December 1965-
January 1966 some 8,000 sorties dropped 16,000 tons of
ordnance on the main supply routes in the Panhandle. In
spite of this attack the level of truck traffic moving
south during the same period--29 trucks per day--was twice
the level of truck traffic in the same period one year
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In addition to these losses, damage and dis-
ruption to the transport system has resulted from interdic-
tion strikes against road systems and from attacks on rail-
road yards at Vinh, Yen Bai, Thai Nguyen, and Nam Dinh. Both
the amount of time and cost of repairing the damage result-
ing from these strikes has been negligible.
The air strikes to date have concentrated primarily on
transportation targets in the southern part of North Vietnam.
The most significant strikes, however, have been against
transport routes in the northern and central parts of North
Vietnam. The interdiction program has produced relatively
uneven results in attaining its objective of halting rail
traffic.
Only one rail line--Hanoi to Thai Nguyen--has been
open for through traffic almost continuously since the air
strikes began. The Hanoi to Vinh line has been effectively
interdicted for through rail service for most of the period.
Through rail service on the Hanoi - Lao Cai line, which
carried an estimated 30 percent of total rail traffic in
1964, has been halted during most of the period since mid-
July 1965. Interdiction of this line disrupted the export
of apatite and stopped the movement of Chinese transit traf-
fic to and from Yunnan Province.
The important Hanoi - Dong Dang and Hanoi-Haiphong
lines which carry the bulk of North Vietnam's imports have
been subjected to the least amount of bombing. They are also
the two lines transiting territory which provides more alter-
natives for bypasses and other expedients to maintain traffic
movement. The Hanoi - Dong Dang line has been interdicted for
through service for a total of only a few months. The Hanoi-
Haiphong has been interdicted for a total of only a few
weeks. Successful interdiction of the Hanoi - Dong Dang
line would have particularly important and measurable ef-
fects. When the line came under heavy attack in late 1965
the import of Chinese coal was shifted from rail to sea
transport. The coal movement was shifted back to rail
transportation in March 1966 but was noted to be again mov-
ing by sea in may when the rail line was again interdicted
for through traffic.
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B. Damage to Bridges
The status of the bridges damaged or destroyed by
air attack is shown in the following tabulation:
Rail and
Rail/Highway Bridges
Highway
Bridges
Total
Damaged or
Destroyed
46
212
258
Repaired
22
45
67
To Be Repaired
24
167
191
The North Vietnamese have found it necessary to repair
slightly over 25 percent of the bridges damaged or destroyed.
Rather than effect costly and probably short lived repairs
they have chosen to concentrate on the construction of al-
ternate bypasses such as fords, ferries and temporary
bridges. A total of 173 alternate crossings have been con-
firmed by aerial photography. These alternate crossings
have been used particularly to sustain highway transport.
The net effect is that North Vietnam now has more highway
crossings than it had before the start of the bombings.
The use of temporary expedients to ensure continuous
transport is particularly attractive to the North Vietnamese
not only because the expedients are generally less vulner-
able to air attack but also because they can be implemented
at far less cost. The permanent repair or reconstruction
of the bridges attacked to date would cost North Vietnam an
estimated $12.2 million. The cost of temporary repairs and
other expedients to maintain traffic, however, has been only
$2.9 million.
II. Countermeasures to Air Attack
A. Repair of Bridges
As indicated above, one of the major responses of the
North Vietnamese to the air attack on their transportation
has been to use temporary expedients to keep traffic moving.
The following survey of the damage or destruction of bridges
on the principal rail lines illustrates this point in detail.
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This line is approximately 170 nautical miles (nm)
in length and includes 26 major bridges (over 90 feet in
length) and 48 minor bridges (less than 90 feet long).
Eleven of the 26 major bridges have been damaged by air
strikes. Seven of these have an operational bypass bridge
or one under construction. Four have no bridge bypass, but
in all cases there is evidence of some means of crossing
such as foot bridges, pontoon bridges, or ferry crossing.
Although 15 bridges have not been damaged, three of
them have bypass bridges already under construction; a re-
flection of North Vietnam's widespread pre-strike planning.
On this stretch of line, which is approximately
52 nm long, 6 major and 4 minor bridges have been damaged
or destroyed. Fifty percent have evidence of bypass efforts
in addition to attempts at repair of the original bridge.
The North Vietnamese have demonstrated considerable
ingenuity and expertise in keeping traffic moving on this
line and there is little or no indication that these capa-
bilities have diminished appreciably.
Hanoi to Dong Dang
The line from Hanoi to the Chinese border is approxi-
mately 86 nautical miles in length. There are 25 bridges 50
feet and over in length. Ten of these bridges may be con-
sidered as major structures.
Photographic coverage is available on seven bridges,
of which all but two have railroad bypasses either operable
or under construction. At least three major bridges on this
line have been damaged by U. S. air strikes. Repairs to
these bridges are being carried out with modern equipment;
the new substructures are massive and the repairs appear to
be of a permanent nature. The nature of these repairs and
the installation of dual gauge track in certain locations
give every indication that the North Vietnamese hope to keep
this line open under all conditions.
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Hanoi to Haiphong
This line, the most important for the movement of
imported economic goods, is approximately 52 miles in length.
Two bridges have been damaged by air attack.
Bypass activity includes a new temporary bridge
which is assumed to be operational, as well as an existing
ferry crossing in the immediate vicinity. Repairs to the
damaged original bridges are in evidence, though lack of
photography precludes a determination of the pace of repair.
Hanoi to Lao Cai
The line from Hanoi to the Chinese border is approxi-
m4tely 156 nautical miles in length and has 45 major and 29
minor bridges. Photographic coverage shows the damage or
destruction of 4 major and 9 minor bridges above Yen Bai and
in rough terrain along the Red River. The Viet Tri bridge,
located south of Yen Bai, was destroyed late in June of this
year. The rugged nature of the terrain and the constrictive
nature of the road bed has forced the North Vietnamese to
repair the damaged structures rather than resort to bypasses.
Only two bypasses are discernible in available photography.
Highway Bridges
Damage or destruction of a highway bridge in North
Vietnam does not present the complications associated with
such an act in more industrialized countries. This is borne
out by a graphic review of the status of damaged highway
bridges since November 1965.
Figure 1-7 shows the cumulative totals of bridges of
all types which have been destroyed or damaged plotted
against the total number of bridges in need of repair at any
given time. The difference between the two lines is the to-
tal number of bridges repaired. During the bombing pause
from 24 December 1965 to 30 January 1966 the number of
bridges repaired is seen to be appreciable. The difference
since that period generally remains the same. The costs to
repair or reconstruct the damaged bridges is shown in two
categories--the cost of permanent repair and cost of tempo-
rary repairs that were made to keep traffic moving around
all damaged structures. The decreasing trend shown for the
cost of temporary repairs reflects the increased use of al-
ternate methods of bypassing a given vulnerable crossing.
This is more clearly shown in Figure 1-8.
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Bridges
320-
280
NORTH VIETNAM
DESTRUCTION OF BRIDGES VERSUS REPAIR
I November 1965 - I June 1966
Cost of Permanent Repair
Bridges Destroyed
0
1 Nov 1 Dec 1 Jan
1965 1966
1 Feb
Bridges Not Repaired
Cost to / -ake Temporarj Repairs Only
11,000,000
10,000,000
1,100,000
1,000,000
900,000
800,000
0
1 Apr 1 May 1 Jun
Figure 1-7
US Dollars
13,000,000
12,000,000
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Bridges
20 -
2201-
Bridges Dcnaged/Destro
L
Figure 1-8
Total Alternate Crossings
Total ;Bridge Repairs`
0L 4
1 Nov 1 Dec 1 Jan
1965 1966
1 Apr 1 May
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0000
WOW woo
NORTH VIETNAM: STATUS OF HIGHWAY BRIDGES
NORTH
I November 1965 - I June 1966
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earlier. Similarly, a photographic analysis of 26 route
segments interdicted during 1965 in MR IV in North Vietnam
showed that route capacity was reduced on only nine seg-
ments. On only two of these segments was capacity reduced
more than 25 percent.
In view of these assessments and the fact
that the level of traffic moving on these routes is a small
volume of military traffic using, on the average, only
slightly over 20 percent of road capacity, the Laotian
supply network must be regarded as relatively invulnerable
to conventional air interdiction.
2. Maintenance and Improvement of the Route
Through Laos
The difficulty in interdicting the supply net-
work through Laos is compounded by the intensive efforts
which the North Vietnamese have expended in camouflaging
roads, in effecting rapid repairs, in resorting to night
travel, and other innovations to keep traffic moving, and
at the same time to improve and expand the original net-
work. As shown in the map (Figure 1-3) the infiltration
network through Laos now consists of some 650 miles of
roads compared with about 150 miles at the end of the
1964 dry season.
a. Road Construction
At the end of 1964 the truckable road net-
work in Laos extended only as far south as Muong Nong. By
the end of 1965 the network had advanced another 100 miles
farther south. During the 1966 dry season a more inten-
sive effort was put forth. The southward route was ex-
tended another 60 miles to the tri-border area and more
than 100 miles of new roads were built in Laos and Cam-
bodia to connect the infiltration network with the Cam-
bodian road system. In addition, 130 miles of new alternate
roads, including the alternates to Mu Gia Pass, were built
in the northern part of the country. The details of the
1965-66 construction are shown in Figure 1-4. The net
effect of the expansion in 1966 has been to provide an al-
ternate route for every road that existed prior to the
end of 1964. Furthermore the main north-south network has
improved to the extent that some through truck traffic
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DEMARCATION
LINE
Figure 1-3
I JANUARY 1964
L A
rUbon
\\ hafhani ` ,qPakse
gc ~ 2 M\
VIE TNA
~
M
o
Nong
o s
b, I
, Attopeu
Ban Sac
ci ~1 l Attopeu
?~--~' ~~ J f 'Siem Pang
SQ SpM1 ,-,,.,~ y
o: r
Stun Stun
g Trang
C A W; ,B 0 D I A
I AUGUST 1966
Se Bang F.ien9
911
poneepone)
Muong
Nong
165
Chavane
CAM\ 30DIA
LAOS PANHANDLE AREA
COMMUNIST ROADNET DEVELOPMENT
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I SEPTEMBER 1965
THAILANDi
Ubon f \\\
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Figure 1-4
LAOS PANHANDLE
ROAD CAPACITIES
AND DEVELOPMENT
Kham Nape
Communist roadnet developed
since mid-1965 (Laos only,
except for 137 and 97)
Other road
Communist controlled area
Road capacity in tons per day
Dry season 1600/125 Rainy season
ssE INd2T
12
0 25 50 75 Miles
0 25 50 75 Kilometers
uong Hot
J ?, 137/
101
500/100
1A
4501100
91
23 912
00/100 n an 'DEMARCATION
500/100 102 LINE
Muong San 911 600/125
9 ueng Tri
pone
Muong an S O U T nakhet Phalane Ban Phone 9' Jr ^ Hue
Mouang 1200/50 914 400/100 1
l~~x~ xo x[oi%g~~iGq~xxx xxixc
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by them during the 11 month period, 26 percent were ac-
counted for by US Marines in I Corps, 51 percent by US
Army/Third Nation forces in III Corps. (See Figure IV-12).
As a general rule US/Third Nation maneuver battalion kill
ratios have been highest in I and II Corps areas and lowest
in III Corps.
During the July 1965 - May 1966 period the
South Vietnamese Army participation in ground operations
decreased. From July-December 1965, GVN forces accounted
for 7 percent of the 23,600 enemy troops reported killed in
action, or approximately 3,000 enemy killed per month.
(See Figure IV-13). High desertion rates, heavy casualties,
and political instability have adversely affected the bat-
tlefield contributions of South Vietnamese military units.
South Vietnamese forces achieved a 2.7 to 1
kill ratio over Communist forces during the July 1965 -
May 1966 period. Approximately 35 percent of these kills
were recorded in I and II Corps, 25 percent in III Corps
and 40 percent in IV Corps.
C. Communist Performance in Battle
The question of Communist troop morale is discussed
in detail in Annex VII. Communist troop performance indi-
cates that the enemy troops are not yet experiencing morale
problems that adversely affect their behavior on the battle-
field. However, the number of captured Communist weapons,
personnel, and desertions have increased considerably since
1964. (See Table IV-13). These losses can be explained by
the increasing scale of combat and do not necessarily re-
flect a decline in Communist battlefield performance.
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ILIA
4,000
RELATIONSHIP OF COMMUNIST AND GVN KIA
TO BUILD-UP OF GVN MANEUVER BATTALIONS
July 1965-May 1966
Of _ i
Jul 1965 Aug Sep
ARVN Maneuver Battalion Strength
Approximately 45,100
Figure IV-13
Jan 1966 Feb Mar Apr May
~~ARVN Maneuver Battalion Strength
Approximately 51,000
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South Vietnam: Absolute Indicators of Communist
Performance in Battle
1964
1965
1966*
Communist "Chieu Hoi"
Military Desertions**
1,900
9,500
12,000
Captured
4,200
6,300
7,000
Communist Weapons Captured
5,900
11,800
N. A.
*Estimate for entire year.
**GVN amnesty program for Communist deserters.
By relating the selected indicators to the scale of
combat (the number of enemy reported KIA and captured) it
is possible to illustrate that in a relative sense Commu-
nist forces are essentially performing as well as in battle
today as they were in 1964 and 1965.
Relative Indicators of Communist Motivations in Battle
Expressed in Terms of the Scale of Combat, 1964-66
Captured - as a Percent of KIA
.24
.19
.14
1
1
1
Weapons Loss - as a Percent of
KIA and Captured**
.29
.30
.32
1
1
1
"Chieu Hoi" Desertions - as a
Percent of KIA
.11
.27
.26
1
1
1
*Ratios calculated on January-June data.
**Also includes weapons captured on junks and other infil-
tration craft, consequently this ratio overstates the
true battlefield weapons loss.
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It is observed that Communist battlefield performance has
not changed in spite of the growing scale of combat and in-
creased US/Third Nation participation. At present, the
magnitude of Communist morale problems in terms of influenc-
ing battlefield performance, seems to be a minor hindrance
to enemy operations in South Vietnam.
D. An Approximate Allocation of NVA/VC Battle Fatali-
ties January-May 1966
1. Methodology
One of the most difficult intelligence problems
faced in South Vietnam is that of allocating enemy casual-
ties to their respective fighting units. The characteristics
of guerrilla warfare make it impossible to distinguish be-
tween civilians, irregulars, VC main force and PAVN troops
killed in action. Lack of uniforms and unit insignias are
some of the basic problems encountered. The time alloted to
body identification of the battlefield is influenced by the
pressures of combat and undoubtedly is far too short to
allow for accurate body counts, let alone extensive investi-
gations of enemy unit identification. The importance of
allocating enemy casualties to their respective units is
crucial in assessing the present and probable course of the
war in South Vietnam. The extent to which the Communists
must rely on internal recruitment and North Vietnamese
regulars can best be determined by arriving at an approxi-
mate allocation of enemy casualties.
It was initially assumed that all enemy reported
killed in action were members of the Communist military
establishment. Such an assumption obviously overstates
enemy losses since it includes civilians inadvertently
killed in and around the battlefields and counted as enemy
dead. The inclusion of considerable numbers of South Viet-
namese Communist irregulars and combat support troops helps
to relax this assumption to a certain degree. However,
the lack of any definitive study on such civilian casual-
ties makes it impossible to adjust enemy casualties with
any degree of precision. Consequently the killed in ac-
tion figures are taken as given.
In order to allocate enemy battlefield fatali-
ties to NVA/VC units, it was assumed that enemy casualties
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were sustained in proportion to their respective troop
strength in the various Corps areas as of mid-1966. In
the case of irregular and combat support troops it was as-
sumed that these forces were half as likely to engage in
major combat operations as were the NVA and VC regular forces.
Reported enemy battlefield fatalities were allocated on a
corps basis during the January-May 1966 period. Enemy
losses and respective strength by corps area were then
compared. Since there were no known NVA troops stationed
in IV Corps during January-May 1966 it was concluded that
all of the reported battle fatalities were sustained by
local Communists. NVA strength in III Corps during the
relevant period accounted for a small portion of the
enemy main force strength - 15 percent in III Corps by
mid-1966. The preponderance of enemy casualties in III
Corps during the relevant period were assumed, therefore,
to be sustained by local Communists. The bulk of the NVA
strength in South Vietnam is stationed in II and I Corps
respectively. Communist losses during the January-May 1966
period in the two upper Corps were allocated to NVA/VC
on the basis of regular enemy troop strength as of mid-
1966. By employing this methodology it was deduced that
at a maximum 25-30 percent of Communist battlefield fatali-
ties were inflicted on NVA troops during January-May 1966.
Projected enemy troop strengths indicate that about 40
percent of the enemy battlefield fatalities during the
next year will be sustained by NVA forces.*
The use of Communist regular troop strength
as of mid-1966 weights the casualties heavily toward NVA
forces during the January-May 1966 period. NVA troop
strength has rapidly increased in recent months, thus over-
stating probable NVA losses during the early months of 1966.
Such a bias should counter arguments that NVA forces are
employed more intensively in combat than are local Commu-
nist forces. The use of total South Vietnamese Communist
It is not possible at this time to refine the alloca-
tion of fatalities by considering the actual frequency
with which VC NVA units engage in combat.
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troop strength may also overstate local enemy casualties
since it implicitly assumes that local forces have and will
be engaged as often as North Vietnamese troops.
2. Analysis
This distribution provides some insights into
probable future trends in the growth and composition of
enemy forces in South Vietnam. It is estimated that Com-
munist battlefield fatalities averaged approximately 4,000
a month during January-May 1966. Average monthly North
Vietnamese and VC battlefield fatalities were 1,600 and
2,400 respectively. Accepted aaverage monthly Communist
infiltration during the same period was 4,200. Combined
accepted and reported NVA infiltration averaged 7,000 a
month.
It is obvious that during January-May 1966
North Vietnamese troop strength grew at a more rapid rate
than did direct sustained battlefield fatalities. Consider-
able increases in estimated North Vietnamese Army strength
in South Vietnam during the same period confirm this trend.
The relatively stable size of the VC main force during
the period probably indicates that the local Communists
have been able to offset battlefield deaths by recruit-
ments from the irregular forces and the populace.
IV. Communist Losses
A. Total Communist Losses
During 1965, it is estimated that some 79,300 to
90,300 Communists (See Table IV-15) were effectively put out
of action. Projections indicate that from 105,000-120,000
enemy forces will be effectively lost in 1966 and from
65,000-75,000 will be lost during the first half of 1967.
Battle fatalities account for approximately 40 percent of
the losses, seriously wounded, estimated on the basis of
captured documents, account for 32 percent, and captured
and deserters the remaining 28 percent.
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South Vietnam: Estimate of Communist Losses
1965 - June 1967
Jan-June
1967
KIA
35,000 48,000
30,000
Captured
6,300 7,000
4,300
("Chieu Hoi" Returnees) 9,500 13,000
8,000
SUB TOT
AL 50,800 68,000
42,300
Seriously Wounded 19,000-30,000 24,000-39,000 15,000-24,000
Deserters 9,500 13,000 8,000
TOTAL 79,300-90,300 105,000-120,000 65,300-74,300
1. Killed in Action
Average monthly reported Communist battle fatali-
ties increased from less than 2,000 during the first 6 months
of 1965 to approximately 3,900 each month in the second
half of the year. During January-May 1966, Communist battle
fatalities averaged 4,000 per month. Some 35,000 Communist
troops were killed in action in 1965. Approximately 20,000
enemy troops were reported killed in action during January-
May of this year, and current estimates indicate that approxi-
mately 48,.000 Communists will probably be killed in action
by the end of 1966.
a. Methodology
Few if any official figures are released
that give an indication of the total number of Communist sol-
diers wounded in action. The primary reason for the lack of
such information is that the enemy remove a considerable num-
ber of their dead and wounded from the battlefield in an ef-
fort to conceal their losses and prevent the capture of addi-
tional personnel.
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Three basic components went into derivation
of an estimate of NVA/VC wounded in action. Consideration
was given to historical factors such as: (1) US, ANZAC,
and Japanese experience in Burma, Malaya, and the Pacific
Islands in World War II; (2) the experience of South Viet-
namese, and US/TN forces in Vietnam; and (3) Communist
prisoner interrogation reports mentioning casualties and
captured enemy documents such as medical reports and unit
combat records. The observed ratios of wounded to killed
during World War II and in Vietnam are summarized in
Table IV-16 below.
Selected Wounded to Killed Ratios
Papuan Campaign (Australian)
Papuan Campaign (US)
Philippines (US)
Okinawa (US)
Burma 1949 (Japan)
Burma 1943 (Japan)
Vietnam
South Vietnam, 1963-65, (GVN)
US/Third Nation, 1965
2.04
1
2.79
1
3.52
1
2.47
1
3.23
1
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Prisoner interrogation reports and captured
enemy documents provided 15 quantifiable observations on the
relationship between Communist troops killed and wounded in
action. Enemy casualties ranged from some 700 in large unit
actions to 20 casualties or less in small group actions. All
of these losses were sustained while fighting against South
Vietnamese forces during 1964 and 1965. The observed ra-
tios of wounded to killed in action ranged from 1.07:1 to
2.4:1, with a weighted average ratio of 1.62:1. Since
these figures are not biased by enemy removal of dead
troops from the battlefield they may better reflect the
distribution of enemy killed to wounded than those ratios
which employ Allied body counts as a base figure.
An enemy document captured by the 1st Cav-
alry Division on 17 March 1966, in central Binh Dinh Prov-
ince, revealed regimental data on Communist troops wounded
in action during 9 April 1965 - 1 March 1966. The 2nd VC,
18th NVA, and Quyet Ram regiments which were estimated to
be the major enemy elements stationed in Binh Dinh were
listed in the document. The security of Binh Dinh is pre-
dominantly maintained by US and ROK forces. Consequently,
a comparison between Communist troops killed in action (US/
ROK body count) and enemy accounts of those wounded in ac-
tion in Binh Dinh during the relevant period provides some
indication of an enemy (WIA) relationship between US/Third
(KIA)
nation forces and the enemy.
US/ROK forces killed 628 Communists in Binh
Dinh during the relevant period according to body counts.
Enemy documents indicate that 1,135 troops were wounded.
Some 85 Communists wounded in action were captured by US/
ROK forces. It is assumed that: (1) US/ROK forces did
most of the fighting in Binh Dinh Province; and (2) that
the above mentioned Communist regiments comprise most of
the enemy strength in Binh Dinh. The resulting ratio is
WIA = 1,135 + 85 = 1.94 for Communist forces engaging US/
KIA 628
Third Nation forces in South Vietnam. The US/ROK body
count probably understates the number of enemy killed and
consequently results in higher wounded to killed ratio than
was probably experienced.
A general relationship between the number
of troops killed in action and those wounded in action was
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observed in the samples examined. Troops with high kill
ratios (Enemy killed) also experienced high wounded to
(Friendly killed)
killed ratios (Friendly wounded). Conversely, troops with
(Friendly killed)
relatively low kill ratios tended to have low wounded to
killed ratios. Troops (such as NVA/VC) with low kill ratios
probably sustain a large number killed and a relatively
smaller number wounded, while troops (such as US/Third Na-
tion forces). with high kill ratios sustain a smaller number
killed and a relatively larger number wounded. This rela-
tionship can be rationalized by the fact that better trained
and organized troops with superior support fire from artil-
lery and aircraft sustain fewer fatalities in obtaining or
defending an objective than do forces that lack such support
fire.
Captured enemy documents further indicate
that approximately 50 percent of the wounded received seri-
ous injuries--broken bones and damage to internal organs
that required immediate surgery. About 30 percent of the
wounds were classified as light, and most of these cases
were immediately returned to the battlefield. The remaining
20 percent suffered slight wounds that required little med-
ical attention and were also immediately returned to the
field.
It is difficult to estimate the number of
seriously wounded Communist troops who die or cease to be
effective fighting men. However, most of the seriously
wounded are moved considerable distances by primitive means
of transportation to surgical centers where, undoubtedly,
the facilities and the quality of the medical personnel are
far below Western standards. These factors coupled with the
consideration that many Communist troops are already af-
fected by debilitating tropical diseases suggest that the
majority of the seriously wounded troops are out of action
for considerable lengths of time or indefinitely.
b. Estimate
Some 19,000 to 30,000 Communist troops were
seriously wounded in 1965. End of year estimates indicate
that from 24,000-39,000 enemy troops will be seriously
wounded in 1966.
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3. Captured
Some 6,300 Communist military personnel
were captured in action during 1965. Given the current scale
of operations it is estimated that approximately 7,000
enemy troops will be captured in 1966.
4. "Chieu Hoi" Returnees and Deserters
Some 9,500 Communist soldiers defected un-
der the GVN "Chien Hoi" program during 1965. Current esti-
mates indicate that about. 13,000 enemy military personnel are
expected to defect under the "Chieu Hoi" program this year.
No information exists on the number of enemy personnel who
simply desert and return to their villages. We estimate
that unrecorded enemy desertions are at least equal to the
number of defectors under the "Chieu Hoi" program. This is
admittedly a conservative approach and the actual numbers
of deserters could be significantly higher than the esti-
mates used in this annex:
B. Allocations of Present and Future Communist Military
Losses in South Vietnam
It is estimated that a maximum of some 25,000 to
30,000 North Vietnamese troops will. be effectively put out of
action in South Vietnam during 1966. An additional 25,000
to 30,000 will be lost in the first half of 1967 if current
rates of combat are maintained and projected troop strengths
are realized. The bulk of the North Vietnamese losses will
result from troops killed and seriously wounded in action.
Relatively few North Vietnamese losses will be accounted for
by captures, desertions, or defections,
Local Communists (including main forces, irregulars
and combat support troops) will. at a maximum sustain some
80,000 to 90,000 effective losses in action during 1966. An
additional 40,000 to 45,000 will. be lost in the first half
of 1967. Approximately two-thirds of the local Communist
losses will result from battle deaths and serious wounds.
The remainder will be accounted for by captures and deser-
tions. The relative shift in casualties from local to North
Vietnamese Communist forces in 1967 reflects the expected
increase in the role of PAVN troops in the South Vietnamese
war. In terms of comparative battlefield losses the Allied
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forces have a distinct advantage over the Communists. It
is estimated that some 16,000 Free World soldiers will be
killed in action during 1966, (6,000 US/TN, 10,000 GVN),
compared to 48,000 Communists. An additional 9,000 Allied
soldiers will probably be killed by mid-1967, reflecting the
same loss composition, compared to some 30,000 Communists.
In a country with an abundant population, where some
270,000 natural deaths and 20,000 accidents occur each
year, the loss of some 40,000-60,000 youths annually for the
sake of "National Liberation" does not, in an oriental
sense, seem too high, The increased North Vietnamese
commitment in South Vietnam is not, however, entirely based
on patriotism. VC units have borne the brunt of enemy cas-
ualties to date and appear pressed to maintain their current
strength in face of growing Allied strength. The squeeze
on VC manpower is becoming more apparent, and the necessity
of outside help more acute if the war is to be waged at the
present level. North Vietnam appears both willing and able
to take on this task in the hope that a protracted struggle
will give them ultimate victory. It may, however, find this
commitment to be increasingly burdensome particularly as it
required increasing numbers of the country's limited re-
sources of skilled manpower and leadership cadres.
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THE RESOURCES AND LOGISTIC CAPABILITIES
OF THE COMMUNISTS IN SOUTH VIETNAM
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THE RESOURCES AND LOGISTIC
CAPABILITIES OF THE
COMMUNISTS IN SOUTH VIETNAM
I. The Viet Cong Economy and Its Manpower
A. The Viet Cong Economy
The Viet Cong have successfully organized and
expanded an economic organization to meet the basic task
of funding VC revolutionary activity. The basic economic
organization, operating through the Finance and Economic
Section of the People's Revolutionary (Communist) Party
is assisted by the National Liberation Front and Communist
military components in acquiring, transporting, and stor-
ing within South Vietnam almost all the non-military
supplies required by the Viet Cong. During the past five
years, the VC economic organization has expanded with the
development of VC forces. Starting as a local self-
production unit, the economic structure progressed, first,
into a voluntary fund drive, then, into an organized taxa-
tion and finance mechanism and, finally into an organiza-
tion activity supporting enlarged base and battlefield re-
quirements.
Taxation appears to be the principal means used by
the Viet Cong to acquire financial and material resources
within South Vietnam. Agricultural taxation remains the
most important source of VC tax receipts and is clearly
dependent on continuing Viet Cong access to or some meas-
ure of control over the rural population. The Viet Cong
currently exercise predominant political influence over 25
to 30 percent of the rice-cultivated area of South Vietnam
which produces between 750,000 and 900,000 metric tons of
rice per year. Annual consumption of rice by Communist
regular forces could be obtained by an average tax of
about 3 percent of total production in VC areas alone. The
Viet Cong usually tax at a substantially higher level (12
to 15 percent). There is no indication that resentment by
the rural population against taxes of this magnitude has
reached levels adequate to stop rice collections. Planta-
tion taxes--either in money or in kind--continue to be
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collected and are an important source of supply for Viet
Cong forces in the northern III Corps. Internal trans-
portation, business establishments, and commercial activ-
ities are also widely taxed.
VC-initiated economic activities, seizures, and
clandestine operations supplement VC tax receipts. Bond
drives, food production, and simple manufacturing units
have been initiated by the VC to support military person-
nel. Significant supplies of war booty continue to be ac-
cumulated by the Viet Cong. Clandestine front business
operations and discreet purchases by civilians acting for
the Viet Cong, provide access to resources from GVN-con-
trolled areas, including imported manufactured goods.
For specific goods in certain areas of South
Vietnam, the Viet Cong have utilized traditional smuggl-
ing along the South Vietnam - Cambodia border. During
recent months, however, Viet Cong use of Cambodia as a
source of non-military supplies has increased and been
organized in a systematic fashion. Although this logis-
tic support is more costly than domestic acquisition and
evidently requires external financial arrangements with
banks in Hong Kong, the immunity and proximity of such
logistic support to large VC/NVA forces along the Cam-
bodian border apparently has made this source of supplies
increasingly valuable. On an annual basis, it is esti-
mated that at least 5,000 and probably as much as 10,000
metric tons of rice are being acquired from Cambodia and
a frequently reported figure of 20,000 metric tons ap-
pears to be possible. Some of this rice is also ac-
quired to support Communist forces in Laos. In addition,
the VC are acquiring in Cambodia substantial quantities
of cloth, pharmaceuticals, salt, fish and fish sauce,
gasoline, communications equipment, explosive chemicals,
and other supplies.
B. The Economic Impact of Increased Military Pres-
sure
The build-up in VC/NVA forces in South Vietnam
during the last year has placed a heavy strain on VC
logistic operations. Confirmed VC/NVA main force
strength has approximately doubled during the last year.
Whereas guerrilla personnel, like the civilian popula-
tion, are expected to be self-sufficient in basic sup-
plies, main force units require extensive logistic
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support. Food supplies, especially rice, remain the prin-
cipal bulk commodities required by these forces. The en-
tire increase in main force strength has been recorded in
rice-deficit areas--I and II Corps and northern III Corps.
There has been no increase in VC main force strength in
the rice-surplus IV Corps where logistic requirements for
food supplies are relatively small.
With the concentration of VC/NVA main force
strength in I and II Corps and in northern III Corps an-
nual rice requirements clearly exceed the total rice pro-
duction under VC control in the provinces of Pleiku, Kon-
tun, Phu Bon, the western districts of the coastal prov-
inces of central Vietnam, and the rice-deficit areas of VC
military region 7. In all of these areas, there is evi-
dence that the VC are experiencing food supply problems.
For example, a recently captured document cited the lo-
gistical difficulties experienced by the VC during an
early 1966 campaign in rice-deficit Quang Duc Province
that did not have sufficient rice for its own provincial
force; region forces assigned to the campaign were re-
quired to arrange their own rice supply "through the bor-
der," presumably the Cambodian border. During the course
of the campaign, one-third of VC combat strength was di-
verted to the transportation of rice.
The increase in allied military action has contin-
ued to hamper the logistic system of the Viet Cong. Al-
lied military actions have had an adverse effect on ag-
ricultural production in VC controlled areas and on the
percentage of the harvest that the VC can acquire and
transport to their base areas. The area covered and per-
centage of crop harvested in these rice-harvesting opera-
tions is not reported, and no aggregative estimate of
their impact is possible. Even with continued VC access
to rice-producing areas, the Viet Cong face a second ma-
jor difficulty in transporting this commodity. The major
portion of this movement has been carried out by civilian
laborers, but the danger of involvement in military ac-
tion has caused serious disaffection among the VC-con-
trolled population as the tempo of military activity has
increased. A third major difficulty caused by allied
military activity has been the disruption caused by al-
lied destruction of VC supply caches.
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C. The Manpower Situation
The South Vietnamese population in VC controlled
areas is at least 3.5 million people and could be as
much as five million people depending on the extent to
which the VC have access to contested areas. Most of
the VC controlled population live in the delta region.
This controlled population probably contains some 500,000
physically fit young males. An additional 30,000-
35,000 youths annually become old enough to fight. In
addition to this controlled population the VC also draw
on the population of military age in contested areas, on
GVN deserters and on recruits from urban areas.
An increasing requirement for manpower during
1965 forced the VC to resort to monetary inducements and
to forced conscription and returnee programs to obtain
local personnel. With these new methods VC have been
able to attain a significantly higher level of local re-
cruitment--over 80,000 in 1965 compared to 30,000-
40,000 annually during 1961-64. We estimate that the VC
have a capability in 1966 to recruit and train some 7,000
to 10,000 personnel a month.
Recruitment at this scale must be regarded as
close to the maximum capabilities of the VC, particularly
if these recruits are to receive adequate training. There
have been increasing signs of a growing squeeze on VC
manpower during 1966. This is reflected in the growing
dominance of North Vietnamese troops as the NVA/VC force
expands. There are also frequent prisoner reports of
manpower shortages and the poor quality and training of
new recruits.
In addition to making up for their own losses of
an estimated 80,000-90,000 in 1966, we estimate that VC
forces will increase by about 5,000 troops in 1966. The
VC are also required, however, to provide replacements
for a growing number of NVA losses. During 1966 we esti-
mate that the NVA will infiltrate from 55,000-75,000
troops at the same time that they are expanding the NVA
troop level by an estimated 49,000 troops. NVA losses
during the year, however, will range from 25,000-30,000.
Thus the VC could have to make up for 5,000-20,000 NVA
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losses, depending on the rate of infiltration and expan-
sion of NVA forces. This indicates a total VC military
manpower requirement in 1966 of from 90,000-115,000. This
requirement is within the higher end of the range of cur-
rent estimates of VC recruitment capabilities.
If the casualty rate increases as expected during
1967 to an annual rate of 130,000-150,000 Communist
losses will be beyond the estimated recruitment and
training capabilities of the VC. More of the manpower
burder will then be placed on North Vietnam creating ad-
ditional pressures on its manpower resources.
II. Communist Logistic Operations in South Vietnam (See
Appendix A)
The Communist forces in South Vietnam have created a
highly centralized system of Supply Councils to meet the
logistics requirements of the VC/NVA forces. This organ-
ization operates at each administrative level in South
Vietnam working closely with counterpart economic and
service organizations of the Central Office for South
Vietnam (COSVN) and the Rear Services Staffs of the mil-
itary command. This elaborate system controls from
40,000-50,000 personnel engaged full-time in logistic
support activities. Additional thousands of personnel
are conscripted on a part-time basis to assist in trans-
porting supplies, the construction of logistics bases,
and the maintenance of supply routes. The VC use an
elaborate system of land routes, trails, and inland water-
ways connecting the infiltration routes from Laos and Cam-
bodia with the major COSVN base areas.
The VC storage system is greatly decentralized work-
ing from a large number of small depots, storing gener-
ally only 5-10 tons of supplies each. This dispersed sys-
tem provides maximum protection against large scale de-
struction or capture of supplies but also serves as a ma-
jor constraint to the initiation of large sustained enemy
actions.
The logistics system used by the Communist forces in
South Vietnam has been able to satisfy adequately the
minimum requirement for movement and storage of supplies.
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This capability has been weakened and made more difficult
as the scale of combat has increased and Allied ground
operations have disrupted normal logistic movements and
overrun storage areas. Difficulty in effectively main-
taining the internal distribution of supplies has also
been compounded by the manner in which VC/NVA forces are
dispersed throughout South Vietnam.
In mid-1966 one-third of the enemy combat and combat
support troops was located in the II Corps Area, one
third in the III Corps, and the remainder about equally
between the I and IV Corps. The IV Corps area with only
15 percent of total VC/NVA regular forces, is the area in
which the VC have the greatest self-sufficiency in logis-
tic supplies, particularly foodstuffs. The predominant
share of VC/NVA forces is concentrated in food-deficit
areas. Thus the II and III Corps areas which are the
predominant rice-deficit areas account for almost two-
thirds of the total daily logistic requirement.
The inability to transport food from rice surplus to
deficit areas has become more severe as Allied ground
actions intensify. The Communists have been compelled
to turn to Cambodian sources in order to provide rice to
the forces in the central highlands. Use of this source
of supply has increased in the last half year and may
now be as much as 15 tons a day. The need to turn to
sources outside the country for rice indicates that in-
ternal distribution is one of the most pressing problems
faced by the Communists and is probably the most vulner-
able aspect of their entire logistics operation.
If the disposition of Communist forces in South Viet-
nam remains unchanged during the build-up projected
through mid-1967 and internal distribution of food is im-
possible, their dependence on external sources for sup-
plies could double. Our present estimates indicate a
maximum external requirement of about 55 tons a day. But
if internal distribution of food to the food-deficit
areas cannot be effectively accomplished, this require-
ment could be increased to at least 100 tons a day.
This added logistic requirement would not be criti-
cal, particularly if it were met from Cambodian sources.
It would not even tax the Laotian infiltration route
very severely but would aid substantially in reducing
the excess of road capacity over logistic requirements.
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The present disposition of Communist forces is much
more favorable for the internal distribution of supplies
infiltrated into South Vietnam. Over 85 percent of the
NVA forces and 35 percent of the VC forces are in the I
and II Corps areas in close proximity to the Laotian in-
filtration corridor and the northern infiltration routes
from Cambodia. These forces account for almost three-
fourths of the supplies which must be infiltrated from
external sources.
The data available on the destruction and capture of
supplies by Allied forces during the past year are quite
incomplete. Food supplies amounting to at least 10,000-
12,000 tons and over 21,000 weapons and 180,000 rounds
of ammunition are the major amounts known to have been
captured or destroyed. We lack almost completely any
meaningful data on Communist stock-piles and are there-
fore unable to assess the impact of these losses. But as
minimum losses, the food stocks may be relatively sig-
nificant, particularly as Allied operations uncover more
storage areas and interfere more with the internal dis-
tribution of supplies.
The substantial increase in incidents of Communist
terrorism and harassment of local population may indicate
that the enemy is finding it increasingly difficult to
obtain local support in terms of food and/or labor for
its war effort.
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THE COMMUNIST LOGISTICS SYSTEM
IN SOUTH VIETNAM
I. Organization
VC/NVA* logistic operations are under the control
and supervision of Supply Councils found at every eche-
lon of command from the Central Office for South Vietnam
(COSVN) to the village level. (See Figure III-1)**
Village Forward Supply Councils are responsible for pro-
curement and for the distribution of supplies to troops
in the field. The province level controls the planning
and regulatory agencies which furnish logistic data to
the military Rear Service Staffs at the various levels
of command. Communications and liaison sections, under
the Supply Councils, exercise an important role in safe-
guarding all types of logistic operations. Party cadre
associated with the communication and liaison sections
serve as guides, security personnel, station attendants,
and supervisory personnel.
Supply Councils also supervise the work of two basic
transportation organizations--the People's Revolutionary
Party (PRP) Finance and Economic Section transport ele-
ments and the military Rear Service Section transport
elements.
Transport and supporting elements under the jurisdic-
tion of military Rear Services Sections are organized
*The organization structure outlined in this section
is estimated to apply generally to both VC and NVA forces.
Some of the material appearing in this section is based
on an analysis of a captured document discussing the VC
Sao Vang Division, a division containing both VC and NVA
elements.
**Figure III-1 follows page 111-5 in Annex III.
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into (1) transport elements of the Rear Services Sections
which are organic to the various echelons of the VC/NVA
regular military forces, (2) separate military transport
units (not found below military region level) responsible
for the receipt and redistribution of supplies, and (3)
ordnance sections and armament sections. The Rear Serv-
ice Staff organic to the VC/NVA Division is organized into
four functional sections: a quartermaster section for
procurement, storage, and distribution of food and cloth-
ing; an ordnance section for procurement, storage, main-
tenance and distribution of weapons and ammunition; a med-
ical section for medical support and evacuation; and a
finance section for financial support.
A. Personnel
Enemy forces in South Vietnam in mid-1966 amounted
to 260,000-280,000 including from 40,000-50,000 personnel
engaged in logistic support. The composition of important
VC supply elements is shown in the following tabulation:
Combat Support
Separate Military Transport Units
5,800
Region/Province/District Ordnance
and Ammunition Sections
3,000
Other Combat Support Troops
8,800
Total
17,600
Other Forces
Finance and Economic Transport
Units
2,000
Infiltration Corridor Personnel
3,000
Communications and Liaison Units
2,000
Organic Military Transport Ele-
ments
7,400
VC/NVA Crewmen on Water Craft
12,000
Total
26,400
TOTAL
44,000
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In addition to these regular employees the VC have
conscripted thousands of temporary, civilian workers to
assist in logistic activities. Recruiting is carried out
among men between the ages of 18 and 50 and women between
the ages of 20 and 41, with the annual period of service
usually being from 1 to 3 months. This conscripted labor
is given both political and security training. It is then
organized into platoons and companies, and assigned by
village and district forward supply councils to the combat
units or to a rear services staff. Front line or Class A
laborers are used by combat units to transport ammunition
and food supplies; to evacuate battle casualties; to re-
move captured supplies to collection points, and to con-
struct supply depots and defensive positions, as well as
in other miscellaneous tasks. Local inhabitants have been
conscripted to carry weapons and ammunition inland from
coastal areas and to transport food to the mountainous
regions. Special groups are assigned to carry supplies
and ammunition from the Cambodian border area to enemy
base areas.
II. Storage and Distribution
The VC supply system is designed to satisfy both nor-
mal, continuous troop requirements and those requirements
imposed by rapidly changing battlefield conditions. The
VC have established an area supply system which incorpo-
rates alarge number of small depots--each generally having
a capacity of five-ten tons--dispersed throughout areas
in which VC units operate. Although classes of supplies
in depots are usually mixed, some depots store food ex-
clusively and others contain only weapons and ammunition.
Even in the larger war zones, supplies are dispersed
throughout the area. Villages that are located close to
combat units may also act as supply points. In certain
areas, only one-third of the prescribed stock is allo-
cated to depots, with the remaining two-thirds dispersed
among civilians for custody. This system limits the dam-
age that can be caused by the destruction of one large
depot or supply cache, but it also acts as a major con-
straint to the initiation of large, sustained enemy ac-
tions when large amounts of supplies need to be concen-
trated in relatively small areas.
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A. Distribution of Food
Regiments are given an initial issue of rice cor-
responding to a 30 day supply, which is to be replen-
ished when half of the supply is consumed. Rear service
staffs are charged with maintaining a stock equivalent
to one month's supply for all forces operating in their
area of jurisdiction. When a regiment leaves the area
the remaining rice must be returned to these staffs.
Troops usually have a seven-day supply of rice in their
individual packs as a reserve for emergencies; the unit
draws rice from supply points located along the line of
movement. This method reduces the supply train and the
requirement for porters. Each regiment is assigned an
area from which food is purchased. A rear supply element
of the regiment normally sends out purchasing teams to
the area to contact local VC authorities and to arrange
for purchase in the prescribed quantities.
III. Transportation Routes
The enemy in South Vietnam makes use of a very large
number and variety of lines of communication. These in-
clude major South Vietnamese highways, secondary roads,
waterways, trails and innumerable footpaths. (See Fig-
ure V-1). Many of the land routes, especially in the
north, are narrow, unimproved trails, negotiable only by
foot, animal, or small two or three-wheeled vehicles,
but trucks are sometimes used on segments of the major
routes when they are under Communist control, and some-
times on routes nominally under GVN control. Extensive
use is made of water craft in the Delta area.
The most frequently used land routes for the
movement of personnel are probably the two in a north-
south orientation connecting the Laotian and Cambodian
infiltration corridor with the large established enemy
base areas in Tay Ninh Province northwest of Saigon. The
first route, which runs just inside South Vietnam along
the Cambodian border, consists for the most part of a
connecting group of trails although it follows or paral-
lels existing roads in its southern segments. The second
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1 ~~, ! tsuan rslec
11 Details of s
BATTAMBANG T nJ 1 (~ Io istic support routes from Cam odia a X09 oa Y Hoa
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QUO CA HO Binh Minh ego
10 HOHO RACH GIA 9- ? COMMUNIST LOGISTIC SUPPORT
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g /Kle inh $ry Phu Vinh P , JUNE b AA
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Viet Cong/North Vietnamese Army (VC/NVA)
communication-liaison route
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0 Border crossing point frequently used by VC/NVA
Sea debarkation point (reported or suspect)
Base area
ON SON .i--i--+. Railroad ---- Trail
~~ otp5'on
Road 13 Route number
0 25 50 75 100 125
Statute Miles
0 25 50 75 100 125
Kilometers
HON KHOAIA
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oGAO~PU o 25X1
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Figure V-1
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registration of civilian boats, so that Communist boats
are difficult to identify. Curfew restrictions cannot
be imposed or enforced except on some major waterways
because of the lack of adequate communications and pa-
trol craft. Moreover, security is maintained by moving
primarily at night, by taking advantage of foliage near
river banks, by maintaining advance and rear units to
warn of nearby flight activity and by sinking boats for
later recovery when detection seems imminent.
War Zones usually consist of a group of dispersed
and relatively primitive supply caches, command posts,
arms workshops, training facilities, and troop bivouacs
linked by a network of unpaved roads, trails, and paths.
They generally are located on major transport routes
used by the enemy in areas which are sparsely populated
and/or populated by ethnic or religious minorities hos-
tile to the South Vietnamese government. The war zones
located near planned Communist areas of combat probably
serve as staging areas, while those located well away
from friendly forces most likely contain facilities for
weapons repair and manufacture, trains g, and rest.
Areas, such as War Zone C, adjacent to the Cambodian
border also serve as access to sanctuary and as transit
points for movement of supplies and troops. Until late
1962, the enemy operated in these zones with relative
impunity, but the areas have been coming under increas-
ingly heavy ground and air attack in recent months.
V. Logistic Resupply Requirement for Communist Forces in
South Vietnam
The VC/NVA forces in South Vietnam have a daily to-
tal logistic requirement of 150 tons. This. logistic re-
quirement is divided into 5 classes: Class I (food),
Class II (weapons), Class III (petroleum), Class IV (quar-
termaster, engineer and medical) and Class V (ammunition).
Figure V-2 shows the daily volume of each class of sup-
ply and the amounts supplied from internal and external
sources.
A. Class I (Food Supplies)
The Communist forces in South Vietnam obtain most
of their food supplies within the country. Although
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Figure V-2
SOUTH VIETNAM
DAILY VC/NVA LOGISTIC REQUIREMENTS AS OF MID-YEAR 1966
BY CLASS AND SOURCE OF SUPPLY*
(Short Tons)
Internal Supplies
External Supplies
GRDiPiii
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these forces control sufficient rice production to sat-
isfy all VC/NVA food requirements, large quantities of
rice apparently are being transported from Cambodia to
enemy controlled rice-deficit areas in South Vietnam.
This is because of the difficulty in sustaining internal
distribution of large amounts of bulk commodities.
The principal rice-deficit areas with large
troop concentrations include the provinces of Kontum,
Pleiku, Darlac, Phu Bon, and Quang Duc, all in the II
Corps area, and Phuoc Long, Binh Long and the northern
part of Tay Ninh in the III Corps. If the main and lo-
cal force VC and NVA troops in these areas were made com-
pletely dependent on Cambodian sources for food, Cambodia
would be providing about 25 percent of the total daily
food requirement for all Communist forces in South Viet-
nam.
Enemy incidents of terrorism and harassment have
risen from a monthly average of 1,629 in 1964 to 2,233
during the first four months of 1966. Although these in-
creases are attributable to various factors they may
indicate that the enemy is finding it increasingly dif-
ficult to obtain local support in terms of food, and/or
labor, for the war effort.
B. Class II and Class IV Supplies
1. Weapons
The enemy stock of weapons has been accumu-
lated from several sources. These include weapons which
have been captured, locally-produced, buried or left be-
hind in South Vietnam from the Indochina War, and in-
filtrated from North Vietnam. Local manufacture of mil-
itary supplies, however, presently emphasizes ammunition,
hand grenades, and mines rather than the fabrication of
individual weapons.
Significant quantities of Soviet and East
European weapons and Chinese Communist copies of these
weapons have been infiltrated into South Vietnam from
North Vietnam. About 30 percent of the VC main force is
estimated to have been at least partially equipped with
the new family of Chinese 7.62 mm weapons by January 1966.
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With respect to heavy weapons, the crew-served
60/61 mm and 81/82 mm mortars are now found in most main
force battalions. The recent introduction of 120 mm mor-
tars also has added to the firepower of Communist forces
in the south. Other heavy weapons known to have been used
by Communist forces include the 75 mm recoilless rifle,
the 70 mm pack howitzer, and possibly the 105 mm howitzer,
the latter having been captured from friendly forces or
dating from the war with the French.
The flow of weapons from outside South Vietnam
has enabled the VC to achieve some progress in weapons
standardization within main force units. However, non-
standard weapons are used by a large number of VC local
forces and guerrilla forces. Data on weapons captured in
1963, 1964, and 1965 show that the use of Chinese-manu-
factured arms is increasing as seen in the following tab-
ulation:
(Percentages based on captured. items)
Home made and
Chinese
U. S.
French
other
1963
8.4
27.7
49.8
14.1
1964
22.7
29.1
32.6
15.6
1965
27.0
50.0
8.0
15.0
1966
(estimate)
35.0
30.0
15.0
20.0*
*Includes 5 percent from USSR.
Of the nearly 1,000 weapons captured by Allied
troops in clashes with the NVA near Plei Me last November,
86 percent were of Chinese Communist manufacture, 11 per-
cent of North Korean manufacture, and 3 percent of Soviet
manufacture. These arms represent the most modern weapons
used by Chinese and North Korean forces, suggesting that
NVA units are well equipped.
25X1
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2. Clothing
Enemy requirements for clothing and other
textile products are not extensive, and most of it is
obtained locally by a special VC clothing unit. How-
ever, a number of clothing items such as khaki uniforms,
underwear, and winter clothing for the mountainous re-
gions have been produced in North Vietnam and are is-
sued to infiltrators. Some clothing is also required
in Cambodia.
3. Medical Supplies
Medical supplies are obtained both locally
and from various Communist and Free World countries
through Cambodia and North Vietnam. Antibiotics, plasma,
and quinine are the principal items acquired from ex-
ternal sources. Medical supplies are in fairly tight
supply so that their external procurement has a high
priority.
4. Transportation Equipment
Trucks, water craft, and other transporta-
tion equipment used by enemy forces in South Vietnam
usually are acquired in the country, sometimes"by con-
fiscation, but also by purchase or borrowing.
5. Signal Supplies
Most VC communications equipment has been
supplied by East European Communist countries or Commu-
nist China or is of US, Japanese, or French manufacture
and has been captured on the battlefield. NVA equipment
is infiltrated with military personnel.
6. Engineer and Chemical Supplies
Most VC/NVA chemical and engineer supplies
are estimated to be obtained from within the country,
although some chemicals are also smuggled in from Cam-
bodia. A large share of the chemicals is used for the
production of filler for locally-produced ammunition.
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C. Class III (Petroleum)
The total requirement for petroleum products for
VC/NVA forces in South Vietnam is small, being needed
primarily for confiscated vehicles, motorized junks in
the Delta region, generator equipment at command posts,
and in some crude arms factories. The VC obtain sup-
plies from taxation of the content of petroleum tank
trucks in VC/NVA-controlled areas of South Vietnam, sei-
zure of petroleum supplies, and purchase from local
gasoline stations or in Cambodia.
D. Class V (Ammunition)
In the present situation of relative independence
from external sources for most supplies, ammunition is
the principal determinant of the volume of supplies which
must be infiltrated from North Vietnam. The supply of
ammunition is particularly important to the major combat
elements equipped with the new family of weapons who
are completely dependent on outside sources for their
ammunition. Due to the extensive use of a variety of
weapons, however, the enemy utilizes both internal and
external sources for the supply of ammunition. Standard
ammunition is generally manufactured in the Communist
countries. The remainder of the supply is from captured
stock or is manufactured locally in VC engineer work-
shops. Viet Cong munition factories are not estimated
to have a present capability to manufacture 7.62 mm ammu-
nition. There is no evidence that expended shells are
reloaded, and captured U.S. 7.62 mm ammunition is not
compatible with Communist weapons.
The heavier ammunition employed by the enemy in-
cludes 40 mm antitank grenades, 57 mm and 75 mm recoil-
less rifle rounds, 60 mm, 82 mm, and 120 mm mortar
rounds, and 70 mm, 75 mm and 105 mm howitzer ammunition.
All heavier ammunition is either captured or obtained
from external sources.
VI. Geographic Distribution of Logistic Requirements for
VC/NVA Forces in South Vietnam
As of mid-year 1966 the strength of VC/NVA regular
forces in South Vietnam stood at 118,000 personnel. The
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disposition of these forces by Corps area is shown in
Figure V-3 which also shows the major areas of rice cul-
tivation. The predominant share of these forces is lo-
cated in rice-deficit areas.
In Figure V-4 we show by Corps area the current allo-
cation of total logistic requirements--150 tons a day--
and that portion--some 20 tons a day--which must be sup-
plied from external sources. The distribution of Com-
munist forces reflects an unevenness in daily logistic
requirements by Corps area and leads to internal dis-
tribution problems.
Thus the forces in the I and IV Corps areas require
only 19 and 15 percent respectively of total daily re-
quirements. The IV Corps, with the smallest concentra-
tion of forces, is also the area in which the Communists
have the greatest self-sufficiency in food. The II and
III Corps areas, in which most of the Communist forces
are concentrated, account for almost two-thirds of the
total daily requirement. These areas are also the pre-
dominant rice-deficit areas.
The inability to transport food from rice surplus
to deficit areas is apparently becoming more severe. The
Communists consequently have had to turn to Cambodian
sources as a logistic expedient to provide rice to some
of the forces in the central highlands. This movement
has increased in the last half year and has reached an
estimated 15 tons a day. The need to turn to Cambodian
sources for rice indicates that internal distribution is
one of the most pressing problems faced by the Communists
and is probably the most vulnerable aspect of their en-
tire logistics operation. As US/GVN and allied forces
have increasing success in capturing or destroying Commu-
nist stockpiles and in disrupting Communist control of
transport routes this problem would be even more ag-
gravated. It would not, however, be critical, particu-
larly as long as food supplies could be obtained and in-
filtrated from Cambodia. Even if they had to be pro-
vided by North Vietnam through Laos the volumes which we
estimate would be required could be accommodated on the
Laotian infiltration network.
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Figure V-3
e
T H iA I L A N D
i
DAO
PHU QUDC
NORTH`
YIETNAM
Z~} DEMARCATION LINE
QUANG
TRI
rHUA
THIEN
10,000 NVA
11;400 VC
II COPS
23,500 NVA
I6 700 vC
SOUTH VIETNAM
DISPOSITION OF VC/NVA
REGULAR FORCES
BY CORPS AREA, MID-1966
25 50 75 100 Miles
0 25 50 75 100 Kilometers
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SOUTH VIETNAM
Figure V-4
DAILY VC/NVA LOGISTIC REQUIREMENTS AS OF MID-YEAR 1966, BY CORPS AREA
NVA
VC
(Short Tons)
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The current estimates of the build-up of Communist
forces and the highest probable levels of combat through
mid-1967 yield an external logistic requirement for
Class II and IV and Class V supplies of 55 tons a day.
If the disposition of Communist forces remains the same
and internal distribution of food is impossible, an addi-
tional 45 tons of food could be required daily in the
food-deficit areas (See Figure V-5). This added logistic
requirement would not tax the infiltration route through
Laos very severely, but it would aid substantially in
reducing the excess of road capacity over logistic re-
quirements. But as the Communist build-up continues and
the level of combat increases the excess of road capacity
in Laos over logistic requirements could be diminished
substantially.
The present disposition of Communist forces in South
Vietnam is much more favorable for resupply from external
sources. Over 85 percent of the NVA forces and 35 per-
cent of the VC forces are in the I and II Corps areas in
close proximity to both the Laotian infiltration corridor
and the infiltration routes from Cambodia. These forces
account for almost three-fourths of the supplies which
must be infiltrated from external sources.
VII. Effect of Destruction and Capture of Supplies
The destruction and capture of Communist supplies by
US and Allied forces during the past year as compiled
from available data for selected categories of supplies
are shown below. The data for food, ammunition, and POL
basically represent losses incurred in the provinces of
Binh Duong, Bien Hoa and Tay Ninh in III Corps area, and
Quang Duc, Binh Dinh, Phu Yen, and Pleiku in II Corps--
areas where US forces engaged in large search and destroy
operations. Weapons losses include those inflicted by
South Vietnamese troops as well as US and Allied forces.
Food (tons)
10-12,000
Ammunition
Small arms and 12.7 mm
machine gun (rounds)
180,000
POL (gallons)
7,700
Weapons
21,284
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SOUTH VIETNAM Figure V-5
DAILY LOGISTIC REQUIREMENTS OF VC/NVA FORCES
AT VARYING LEVELS OF COMBAT
June 1966 and Projected June 1967
(Short Tons)
.I4
External Requirement
for
Class II and Class IV
Supplies and
Class V Ammunition
Potential External
Requirement for
Class I, Food Supplies
Internal Requirement
Jun 1967
(Each enemy battalion engaged
in combat 1 day in 15)
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The quantity of food known to have been captured or
destroyed represents an amount sufficient to feed the
current Communist main and local forces in South Vietnam
for a period of about three months. This quantity be-
comes relatively significant when considered as the min-
imum loss of food to the enemy. Moreover, recent allied
operations have not only destroyed enemy food crops and
uncovered VC food storage points, but protected rice
harvests from enemy acquisition and interdicted the move-
ment of some food to VC distribution points.
Known losses of small arms and heavy machine gun am-
munition, however, represent only about three days' sup-
ply for the current order of battle of VC/NVA troops at
present levels of combat. Although the magnitude of
losses sustained in engagements with ARVN forces or as
a result of air strikes cannot be determined at the pres-
ent time, such losses to date have had little discernible
effect on the enemy's ability to initiate attacks or on
the rate with which he expends his ammunition.
Known losses of POL in South Vietnam represent less
than a two week supply for VC/NVA forces. Losses in-
flicted against POL stocks by ARVN forces and air strikes
probably have added to the quantity of such supplies de-
nied the enemy, but due to the small requirement esti-
mated for VC/NVA forces operating in South Vietnam these
losses probably have no effect on enemy capabilities.
The known number of weapons captured or destroyed by
friendly forces through June 1966 was sufficient to
equip some 40 battalions. Losses incurred as a result
of air strikes have raised the total weapons loss, but
again, if such losses are examined in the context of the
number of VC-initiated attacks over recent months, it
becomes clear that total weapons losses have not been
prohibitive.
The quantities of destroyed and captured Communist
supplies undoubtedly have added to the logistic problems
faced by VC/NVA forces in South Vietnam but the extent
of these adverse effects cannot be estimated since we
are almost totally lacking in knowledge of Communist
stockpiles in South Vietnam. The data presently avail-
able do not include losses inflicted by South Vietnamese
forces (with the exception of losses of weapons); sup-
plies lost as a result of B-52 strikes; or supplies de-
stroyed as a result of numerous strikes by U.S. tactical
aircraft.
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THE MORALE OF THE COMMUNIST FORCES
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THE MORALE OF THE COMMUNIST FORCES
The morale of the Viet Cong has declined gradually as
the impact of the US force build-up has been felt. It
has not yet, however, deteriorated to the point where the
battle performance of Communist units is adversely affected,
and certainly not to a degree sufficient to force any major
adjustment in basic Communist strategy.
To all appearances, the Viet Cong organization is still
basically intact, and its cadres* appear resolute. This
is particularly true of the middle and upper echelons.
Lower level cadres continue to accomplish everyday tasks,
but their quality has declined considerably.
The battlefield capability of the southern Viet Cong--
both regulars and irregulars--remains high. The rate of
battlefield surrender** has actually gone down. There is
evidence, however, of erosion in the ranks which has not
yet been reflected in the overall combat performance. The
best southern troops are apparently being killed or maimed,
and the recruits who replace them are often inferior both
in quality and in motivation. The lowering enthusiasm of
southern Viet Cong troops shows up in increasing defection
rates, particularly among regulars, and in a rate of deser-
tion by Viet Cong regulars which is probably at least as
high as the rate for the South Vietnamese Army. Documen-
tary evidence suggests that as many as 25% of all Viet
Cong regulars deserted last year (compared to an ARVN de-
sertion rate in 1965 of 14.2 per thousand per month, or
about 17%.)*** In 1965 this included an estimated 1,400
defecting Viet Cong'regulars--about three percent of the
mean regular strength--and several hundred battlefield
surrenders. About 7,000 irregulars also defected last
*The word "cadre" in this discussion is defined as one
who has the rank of assistant squad leader or above in the
Communist Army, or his civilian equivalent.
**In this discussion distinction is made between battle-
field surrender, desertion from the Communists, and defec-
tion to Allied control.
***Neither rate takes into account the number of desert-
ers who later returned to military control.
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year. There is little hard evidence on the extent of
simple desertion or "resignation" from irregular ranks.
Southbound NVA units apparently lose a few desert-
ers in North Vietnam and Laos, and some also in South
Vietnam. By mid-1966, there had been about 100 defec-
tions and 500 surrenders from NVA units.
The continued resolution of the NVA is in sharp con-
trast to the decline in morale of the southern Viet Cong
Army in part because its cadres are good, but also be-
cause NVA soldiers who want to quit believe they have
no place to go.
Barring a marked improvement in Viet Cong military
fortunes or another round of political instability in
Saigon, Southern Viet Cong morale seems likely to con-
tinue its downhill course. The deterioration in morale
seems likely to accelerate as the quality of low level
cadres continues to decline and as the proportion of
poorly motivated draftees in army ranks increases. The
erosion of morale will probably be reflected by rising
rates of defection and desertion. Desertion rates could
begin to hurt the Viet Cong seriously in the not too
distant future.
The NVA troops in South Vietnam are likely to re-
main resolute, in large part because they see no al-
ternative to fighting. If the resolution and quality
of the southern Viet Cong continue to deteriorate,
the NVA units will probably assume an even greater
share of the fighting.
A. The Viet Cong View of Morale
The Viet Cong, like Napoleon, consider morale
far
more important than materiel. According to
a Viet
Cong
document written in 1965, apparently by an
offi-
cial
on the COSVN staff, "the Americans fail to
realize
that
neither the size of an expeditionary force
nor
the
quantity of modern weapons can be a decisive
factor
in any liberation war. They (the Americans) are
not
aware or not willing to admit the fact that the
key
factor that leads to victory in any war is the
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determination of the people to fight and win."* The
Communists do not leave the maintenance of morale to
chance.
A Viet Cong document which discussed several
missions of training italicized only one: that of
heightening "the will to fight and morale of our or-
ganization." It prescribed "reindoctrination" courses,
60-70 days long for Viet Cong regulars, and 20-30 days
long for village guerrillas. Such courses are supple-'
mented by frequent spot lectures, several drafts of
which have been captured, and by attempts by the Viet
Cong to exclude government propaganda from their ter-
ritory..**
The Viet Cong constantly assess the state of
their own morale. For example, a captured memorandum,
dated 14 April 1965, concerning the censoring of per-
sonal letters stated "the purpose of censorship is to
detect anti-revolutionary thoughts or loss of morale...."
A more recent memorandum, dated 27 February 1966, asked
subordinate units to report on the "status of political
ideology" together with "the number of North Vietnamese,
and South Vietnamese (Viet Cong) deserters, stragglers,
ralliers and missing."
While determined to preserve their own morale,
the Viet Cong are equally resolved to undermine their
enemy's. Government officials are assassinated not
simply. to eliminate specific officeholders, but to sow
panic and confusion. Attacks are often launched for
psychological effect rather. than for purely military
reasons. Viet Cong psychological warfare efforts are
massive, much larger in proportion to resources avail-
able than those of the allies. All PRP Committees, from
'Nortetnamese Minister of Defense Giap reiterated
the theme in the January issue of Hoc Tom, the party's
theoretical journal in North Vietnam.
**One Viet Cong document even suggested that people
in the "liberated zone" be forbidden from listening to
"plays and soap operas" broadcast by government radio.
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COSVN down to village levels, have Military Proselyting
Sections to induce GVN defections.*
The Viet Cong hierarchy is aware that the morale
of its rank and file has been gradually eroding, but it
apparently believes that allied--particularly South Viet-
namese--morale is deteriorating even more rapidly. Be-
cause the Viet Cong view the war primarily as a contest
of wills, evidence of crumbling or lowered morale on the
part of their adversaries takes on particular signifi-
cance. Tales of South Vietnamese ineptitude and lack of
motivation are frequent and often well-grounded. ARVN
desertion rates may give the Viet Cong considerable
grounds for hope.** The recent Buddhist upheavals may
have reinforced the Viet Cong's opinion that the fabric
of the South Vietnamese government is weak, and that its
will to continue over the long run is questionable.
The Viet Cong's greatest strength lies in the
organization and in the cadres who keep it going. As
long as the cadre structure remains intact and cadres
are determined and willing to impose discipline, the
rank and file, who may become individually disheartened,
are unlikely to give up in large groups.
The level of cadre spirit, although generally
high, varies from echelon to echelon. Among the lead-
ers of the party, there is little evidence of a slack-
ening of resolve, and mid-level cadres also appear res-
olute. Low-level cadres, although they continue to get
the jobs done, are often less sanguine than their supe-
riors, however, and there is considerable evidence that
many are discouraged, A moderate but increasing number
of assistant platoon leaders, squad leaders, assistant
*The proselyters aim at US as well as Vietnamese
soldiers. A study of US troops, written late last year
by COSVN's Military Proselyting Section, asserted that
while US officers were well-indoctrinated, most US en-
listed men in South Vietnam "dread a large-scale and
protracted war, and favor negotiations." Thus far, no
American soldiers have defected.
**ARVN desertion rates per thousand:
Monthly average, 1964: 8.3
Monthly average, 1965: 14.2
Monthly average, 1966: 20.1 (1st quarter)
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squad leaders, and hamlet village officials, have appeared
at government Chieu Hoi centers,* and many others have de-
serted or "resigned."**
ous, however. Interrogations, captured 25X1
diaries, and letters indicate t a mos A cadres, despite
hardships, are resolute. A recent MACV study on the NVA
states that "the quality of its cadre is one of the NVA's
strongest assets."
North Vietnamese formations apparently are not im-
mune from cadre desertions. Captives from an antiaircraft
unit established in North Vietnam in April 1965 said that
the unit had had "many sudden changes in command" because
cadre deserted before arriving in the south. Cadre deser-
tions from North Vietnamese units are probably not numer-
The lowering quality of Southern Viet Cong cadres
probably accounts to a large degree for recent increases
in cadre desertion. A captured party directive from the
Viet Cong province of Can Tho, dated 30 April 1966, com-
plained of the party cadres' "inability to cope with
hardship," and ascribed "the drop in quality.. [to] recent
heavy recruiting, which resulted in members' putting too
much stress on quantity..." The directive stated that
"at present we have a number of comrades who have not
has noted that out of 1,274 ralliers
who defected in the last six months of 1965, 164 (13%)
claimed to be cadres. Surprisingly, a larger percentage
of regulars (26%) than irregulars (9%) said they were
cadres. said in June 1966 that the
overall ratio of cadres to total defectors is rising.
Exact figures are unavailable.
**Captured documents indicate that on some occasions
cadres have been about as prone to desert as the rank
and file. For example, a Viet Cong report dated 3 April
1966, stated that an ARVN operation in the delta had in-
duced "32 cadres and 42 troops" to "resign."
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yet been able to eradicate their bourgeois mentality...
When the going gets rough, they drag their feet.*
The shortage of experienced cadre has become
an increasingly common theme in Viet Cong documents.
The shortage--particularly in the delta where many
have been withdrawn to reinforce units outside the
area--has forced the Viet Cong to employ what may turn
out to be unpopular expedients. in
Dinh Tuong Province in the delta has reported that in
a number of cases, women &re now being employed as
party officials. Despite the Communist doctrine of
the equality of sexes, this is probably deeply re-
sented by Vietnamese men. states
that in some instances, "outsiders" are being put in
charge of local units in Dinh Tuong. Although many
reports have been received about "dissension" arising
from the use of outsiders, there are no hard indica-
tions as yet that the disagreements have reached seri-
ous proportions.
C. Morale of the Soldiers
1. The North Vietnamese Army (NVA)
By most objective measures, the fighting
spirit of the North Vietnamese soldier is good. As of
1 July 1966, only about 100 NVA soldiers had defected,
and allied soldiers had captured only about 500, despite
frequent engagements and heavy fighting. No NVA infantry
unit as large as a squad, has surrendered en masse. Al-
lied field officers report that with few exceptions, North
Vietnamese soldiers fight tenaciously and are well disci-
plined in battle. On the basis of interviews of 39 North 25X1
Vietnamese soldiers, has concluded
that "most NVA soldiers see no option but to go on fight-
ing."
*Other captured documents make reference to the poor
quality of new cadre. For example, a 1965 "Top Secret"
document from Phu Yen Province complained that the "new
cadres used for replenishment of our VC units cause seri-
ous security problems due to their low political experi-
ence." A later document from the same province contrasted
the "old time cadre," who were "experienced but somewhat
tired," with the "new cadre" who were "ardent but inex-
perienced." The document added, however, that "poor cadre
are better than none."
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Available evidence, however, indicates that many
of the rank and file, and some cadres, are in low spirits.
The level of an NVA soldier's morale, of course, depends on
where he is and what he has experienced. Before starting
the trip south, most North Vietnamese are in good spirits.
Interrogations of prisoners and ralliers, and captured NVA
diaries, of which there are at least 30 examples, indicate
that most feel their cause is just, and that their mission
is to rid South Vietnam of American "imperialists" and "pup-
pets."
With some exceptions, the NVA soldiers retain
their spirit as they march through the southern part of
North Vietnam toward the Laotian corridor. After they cross
into Laos, however, their mood begins to shift. Steep hills,
tight marching schedules, bombing raids, mosquitoes and
leeches help induce the change. Diarists frequently become
eloquent about their troubles during the march through the
corridor, which takes from one to three months. An NVA ser-
geant wrote in his diary, after three weeks in Laos, that
"twelve days had passed with innumerable hardships. Marches
and marches. Rains and rains." Another diarist wrote,
after a month on the trail, that he was going through "the
deepest sorrow and utmost hardship" he had ever experienced.
A third diarist, also on the trail for a month, wrote on 25
January 1966 that he was "lying on the ground, suffering
from the stings of Laotian flies and bleeding...." A fourth
declared that "no word is enough to depict the rigor and
hardship we have been experiencing."
Once he reaches South Vietnam, an NVA soldier's
morale often rises, particularly if his unit is allowed to
recuperate. One infiltrator, on reaching the South, wrote
a friend that although "the infiltration trip to South Viet-
nam was filled with rigors and hardships," he was now "eager
to do his duties." Not all of them can rest, however. Many
NVA soldiers who fought at Plei Me last November or at A
Shau this March were relatively fresh from the trail.
Once in South Vietnam and committed to campaign-
ing, the average NVA soldier lives a life of hardship and
danger. Frequently, he is sick. A 23 January 1966 entry
in a medical record picked up by the Air Cavalry in Binh
Dinh Province noted that in a 519-man NVA battalion, "sick
personnel accounted for 45% of the assigned strength." The
sick included 133 men who had malaria, 10 suffering from
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"debility," and two who contracted beri-beri. More recent
documents indicate that the NVA sick rates continue high.*
Hardships, fighting, and air and artillery har-
assment sometimes combine to dishearten individual NVA
soldiers, even units. A diary captured in February 1966,
kept by a soldier in an antiaircraft detachment infiltrated
into South Vietnam late last summer, indicated that the
"morale of cadres and soldiers" in his unit "continued to
be unstable." Another diarist wrote on 2 January 1966 that
"I have been 5 months in the battlefield... I began to wilt
under the strain of privations, hardships, and loneliness
in the heart of the jungle... I have seen nothing but...
jungle, stream water, and bombs and bullets. What a bitter
truth! Now I am hoodwinked at the point of no return... I
have a deep distaste for the war and I am really fed up with
the liberation undertaking, which has been heralded as a
'turning point of history' and a 'golden opportunity'...
Instead there exists only illusion, a political trick to ap-
pease those who are engaged in the fight." Not all diarists,
of course, react to their hardships the same way. One had
written earlier, "Damn the Americans: They force us to
sleep in forests and eat nothing but rice and salt. I am
determined to fight and serve my people until my last breath."
Although NVA units continue to perform well,
there is considerable evidence that their composition has
been changing, probably for the worse from their point of
view. The ratio of recruits to veterans is rising.** More-
over, as NVA units suffer heavy casualties, they are taking
* The 324B Division, which infiltrated in May directly through
the DMZ, has had a much lower malaria rate than other NVA
units. A POW said that only about 10% of the division suf-
fered from malaria. The trip across the DMZ, of course, is
far shorter than that through Laos.
** A document captured late last year indicated that 59% of the
soldiers in one NVA battalion had been conscripted in 1965. NVA
units infiltrated earlier in the year had a much higher proportion
of veterans.
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in southerners as replacements. As a general rule, South
Vietnamese fillers are less eager than their northern coun-
terparts.*
On balance, however, neither the rising percentage
of draftees nor the inclusion in NVA units of poorly moti-
vated southerners seems likely in the near future to affect
seriously NVA combat performance. The quality of NVA cadres
is still too high, and the base rates of defection, deser-
tion, and surrender are still too low to indicate a sudden
or rapid deterioration in the NVA?s ability to fight. it
seems likely that for the foreseeable future the North Viet-
namese soldier will continue to follow the path of least
resistance--that of obeying orders of his cadre, and of
staying with his unit.
2. Viet Cong Regulars**
Like NVA formations, indigenous Southern Viet
Cong regular units have good combat morale. Almost in-
'variably, they fight well, and under skilled leadership.
So far, no regular unit has given up en masse. Few Viet
Cong officers have surrendered. Whatever the rank and file
may feel off the battlefield, they are tightly disciplined
in combat.
Yet the morale problems of Viet Cong regular
units are more numerous and more concrete than those of NVA
battalions. Exact statistics are unavailable, but it is
estimated that approximately 1,400 regulars defected to the
government last year. (That is, about 3% of the total mean
regular strength.) Several hundred additional regulars sur-
rendered last year. The overall yearly desertion rate of
regulars, including defectors and those who go home, prob-
ably runs around 25%, somewhat higher than ARVN rates. The
high desertion rate is a relatively recent development.
* An NVA document captured in Binh Dinh complained of the
"relatively low political awareness of the newly-recruited
southerners."
There are two types of regulars:
1) Main Force units, directly subordinate to COSVN,
or to a military region headquarters.
2) Local Force units, directly subordinate to a provin-
cial or district headquarters.
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The decline in off-battlefield morale has come
about principally for two reasons. The first is the con-
stant harassment and heavy losses inflicted on regular
units by the Allies. Captured documents attest to the ef-
fect of the pounding. A report captured in Hau Nghia Prov-
ince, issued in November 1965 by the "Unified Command Com-
mittee" (apparently a regional party organization) outlines
some of the problems that Viet Cong regulars face:
To cope with our mobility on the battlefield,
the enemy increases his air and artillery
activities day and night or conducts continuous
sweep operations to wear down our armed forces
or foil our plan of attack if he foresees our in-
tentions... (Our) movements frequently take
place at night. Troops must carry heavy loads
and move great distances... (They) must fre-
quently bivouac in the field, lie on the ground,
endure bad weather, and are kept awake by enemy
aircraft and arillery; therefore, their health
is highly affected... (Consequently) the troops'
morale and nerves are permanently high strung
and many complications arise in case of alarm.*
The second reason for the decline in off-battle-
field morale among regulars is the changing composition of
the Viet Cong army. In 1964, regular units consisted largely
of well-motivated volunteers. Since then, the Viet Cong have
had to rely increasingly on unwilling conscripts. A study
of Chieu Hoi records shows that recently-recruited conscripts
make up a large portion of those who defect. They are also
far more prone than volunteers to desert. As the proportion
of poorly-motivated draftees among Viet Cong regulars increases,
desertion and defection rates should rise.
It would be a mistake, however, to picture the
morale of Viet Cong regular forces as completely gloomy.
Neither the low-level cadre nor the rank and file are as
*Documents and prisoners captured in other parts of the
country attest that such problems are widespread.
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staunch as they used to be, but many noncoms and appar-
ently most officers appear as determined as ever. Yet
the trend in the quality of regular personnel seems in-
exorably downward. Eventually, the erosion in quality
of regulars, accompanied by an increasingly high deser-
tion rate, may limit the Viet Cong's ability to carry out
their present strategy.
3. Viet Cong Irregulars*
Viet Cong irregular forces continue in large
part to perform their tasks. In fact, the incidence of
terrorism and sabotage--usually carried out by guerrillas
--rose substantially in the last quarter of 1965, and ex-
cept for a seasonal drop around Tet, has stayed at high
levels ever since.
A considerable body of evidence suggests,
however, that the morale of the irregulars has been drop-
ping over the past year. Last year, about 7,000 defected
to the government. Approximately 5,000 more surrendered.
In 1964, about 1,500 defected and 3,500 surrendered. The
overall frequency of defection and surrender has continued
to increase this year. Desertions among guerrillas appear
to be increasing, although hamlet militiamen who serve at
home, apparently seldom desert.
When Allied activity is intense, irregulars
in some areas have surrendered and defected in large num-
bers. Early this year in Binh Dinh Province, for example,
while the six-week-long Operation WHITE WING was in prog-
ress, some 650 irregulars gave up and about 250 rallied.
According to a US official involved in the Chieu Hoi pro-
gram, "several 10-15-man groups" were among those who de-
fected in Binh Dinh.
*Viet Cong irregular forces are those subordinate to
the village and hamlet. They include:
1) Guerrillas, consisting of full-time squads and
platoons, not always based in their village or
hamlets.
2) People's Self-Defense Force (often called the
militia), consisting of part-time paramilitary
forces assigned to defend hamlets and villages.
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The rise in defections among irregulars probably
has occurred for the same reasons that an increase took
place among the regulars. Allied operations have resulted
in an increasing decline in guerrilla morale, and the quality
of personnel has declined.* As Viet Cong casualties mount,
both trends seem likely to continue.
4. Recruitment Problems
Until the middle of last year, the Viet Cong ap-
peared to be able to fill its ranks with relative ease.
Volunteers were still fairly plentiful, and draftees usually
went willingly. Somewhere around mid-1965, however, the
situation apparently began to sour. As Viet Cong demands
for manpower soared, volunteers became scarcer, and con-
scripts joined the Viet Cong more reluctantly. The trend
is illustrated by an undated document captured in late Novem-
ber 1965 in Long Khanh Province. The document stated that
"the Youth's enlistment... in January, February and March
1965 increased over that in the last six months in 1964...
However, the result of enlistment obtained in the first
six months of 1965 failed to meet the requirements of the
armed forces... The draft movement in May, June and July
declined."** Some Viet Cong draftees interviewed by RAND
have stated that "they wanted to avoid military service with
either side, but that if they had to serve, they preferred
to do so with ARVN, where they were paid and their families
received death benefits."
The Viet Cong are using several expedients to
relieve their manpower demands. They have resorted to kid-
napings, are employing large numbers of women as irregulars,***
* A substantial number of documents indicate that one of
the main reasons for the decline has been the Viet Cong policy
of sending guerrillas and militiamen who show promise to
serve with regular units. The "upgrading" process has been
particularly intense in IV Corps, where Viet Cong fortunes
are gradually deteriorating.
** Other documents and POW interrogations indicate that the
problem is widespread.
*** A Viet Cong directive written in August 1965 stated that
one-third of all "guerrillas" should be women.
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and are increasing the use of ARVN defectors and POW's
to fill regular ranks.*
Such measures probably provide some temporary
alleviation of Viet Cong recruitment problems. They do not
solve the problems however. In addition, as casualties
mount, it is possible that the Communists will eventually
be unable by any device to replace their losses from within
South Vietnam, thereby placing an even greater demand on
North Vietnam for troops.
D. Gauges of Military Morale
Since early 1963, according to the Chieu Hoi
office in Saigon, about 20,000 Viet Cong regular and ir-
regular soldiers have rallied to the government. Of
these, about 2,900 defected in 1963. The number dropped
to 1,900 in 1964. In 1965, largely as a result of the
American intervention, Communist military defections in-
creased to about 8,500. In the first half of this year,
approximately 6,500 soldiers rallied.
Generally speaking, the low-level, poorly
motivated Viet Cong soldier defects at a far higher rate
than does the cadre.** Nonetheless, defectors tond to
share certain characteristics. They are usually of short
service, and they tend to rally near their homes.
* A directive issued by the Central Trung Bo Liberation
Army, Unit 2B, dated 26 October 1965, stated that units
were required "to select 50% of -surrendered RVNAF soldiers
to fill vacancies in our units." A number of documents
indicate that the Viet Cong are wary of ex-government troops.
** The percentage of regular defectors appears to be
rising, however. Monthly percentage of regulars to total
military defectors: July 1965 - 15%; August - 13%; Sep-
tember - 18%; October - 17%; December - 19%; January 1966 -
23%; February - 26%;March - 23%; April - 23%. Although
there have been 6,500 military defectors in the first half
of this year (compared to about 8,500 all last year), regu-
lar defectors this year (about 1,450) already outnumber
regular defectors last year (about 1,400).
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a. Southern Viet Cong
Desertion is an extremely serious problem
for the Viet Cong. Available evidence, direct and indirect,
indicates that deserters who do not defect are far e
numerous than those who do. docu-
ment, probably genuine, issued by the Central Office for
South Vietnam (COSVN) late last year stated that "...deser-
tion for the specific purpose of defecting to the enemy (is)
rare in comparison with desertion from other motives..."
COSVN undoubtedly is aware of how many of its soldiers de-
sert, and also knows how many of these defect.
COSVN's assertion about the ratio of de-
serters to defectors is supported by other documents. A
Viet Cong "Top Secret" Directive dated 20 October 1965,
captured by the 173rd Airborne Brigade in early January
1966, stated that in one area "desertion is prevailing in
various armed and paramilitary forces. According to in-
complete statistics, there were 138 deserters from January
to August 1965...five defected to the ARVN government."
Another Viet Cong document mentioned that "during a one-
month period in one unit, 47 men deserted to go home and
two defected to the enemy." A check of 20 deserters listed
in a Viet Cong roster captured in late December, 1965,
against records of arrivals in local Chieu Hoi centers in-
dicated that none of the deserters defected.
Although desertion is frequently mentioned
in captured Viet Cong documents, only seven so far have in-
cluded all the ingredients necessary for establishing rates:
the size of the unit, the number of deserters who left it,
and a time frame. If all seven units are added together,
and their respective time frames stretched to a year, their
overall projected annual desertion rate would be 32%. How-
ever, two of the seven documents imply that the units men-
tioned had unusually high rates. If these units are ex-
cluded from the total, the overall average annual rate of
the sample drops to 27%. The seven-unit sample includes
two battalions and five companies. The five-unit sample
includes two battalions and three companies.
Twenty-seven percent--or rounded off, 25%--
seems plausible as an overall desertion rate for 1965 from
regular Viet Cong units. A reading of most POW and rallier
interrogations would suggest that the rate is substantially
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higher than 25%, but prisoners and defectors may be inclined
to exaggerate. The interrogations appear to indicate that
desertion is more common in local force units than in main
force units, and likewise more common in main force units re-
cruited locally than in like units serving away from home.
If the mean size of the regular Viet Cong
army (excluding NVA soldiers) was 45,000 last year, and 25%
is accepted as the regular desertion rate, then some 11,250
Viet Cong regulars deserted last year.* Since approximately
1,400 regulars defected last year, the ratio of deserters
who go home to defectors among regular units would appear to
be about seven to one. It should be noted that available
documentary evidence suggests the ratio is a good deal higher.
In the first six months of 1966, an estimated
1,450 southern Viet Cong regulars defected (See Defection).'
If the ratio of deserter to defector is 7-1, and if defection/
desertion rates continue at current rates during the rest of
the year, then there will be a total of 23,200 defectors and
deserters during 1966 from southern Viet Cong regular forces.
(2,900x7?20,300 deserters + 2.900 defectors = 23,200). As-
suming the mean size of the southern regular force will be
about 60,000 for 1966, then the Viet Cong regular force de-
sertion rate would be 38%. Many of these, of course, would
be retrieved.
Little is known about desertion among Viet
Cong irregular units. The rate of desertion, however,
varies considerably by type with the highest rate found
among the village guerrillas--the highest category of irreg-
ulars. Hamlet militia and guerrillas apparently do not de-
sert in large numbers, but, since they never leave home, they
may just refuse to fight.** Within each category of irregular
* What is not known is how many Viet Cong deserters re-
turn to the ranks, either voluntarily, or through being
caught. US advisers estimate that from 15 to 20% of men
listed as deserters by the RVNAF return to their own or some
other unit. The rate of return among Viet Cong deserters
may be comparable.
** Captured documents indicate that hamlet militiamen in
several areas have refused to fight, or, as one report put
it, "quit rank to live as civilians."
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forces the highest desertion rate is probably among the
fresh recruits.*
So far, the southern Viet Cong have been
able to live with their desertion problem, probably because
their manpower pool has been adequate to fill the gaps. If
the pool begins to dry up, or if desertion rates increase,
the desertion of southerners could become a crucial problem
for the Viet Cong. Among the consequences of a higher de-
sertion rate would be an increased reliance on fillers from
North Vietnam.
So far, NVA desertion rates have been rela-
tively low. Captured documents, including diaries, indicate
that NVA units moving south lose a few men to desertion in
North Vietnam and more along the corridor.** Once in South
Vietnam, the average NVA soldier seldom deserts, probably
because he has no place to go. Captured documents indicate
there are some exceptions. For example, a notebook containing
strength figures of a 488-man North Vietnamese outfit shows
that 9 were deserters and that 17 men were "lost." Some of
the errant may have been South Vietnamese attached ,to the
unit, however. On balance, desertion is not now a serious
problem for the NVA, and seems unlikely to become one in
the foreseeable future.
3. Surrender
While desertion and defection have been increas-
ing, the rate of battlefield surrender has gone down. In
1963, according to MACV J-2 statistics, 4,771 Viet Cong
surrendered. The number dropped to 4,187 in 1964, and rose
* A considerable body of evidence points to a high de-
sertion rate among recruits. For example, in one group of
152 recruits being sent from the delta to a training depot
in III Corps, 33 deserted enroute. Documents captured at
the depot indicate that it had a special "stragglers' and
deserters' barracks."
** Where deserters in Laos go is unclear. A diary of an
NVA battalion commander suggests that at least some are
eaten by tigers.
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to 5,982 last year--an increase of 43%. The rise in cap-
tives failed to keep pace with the expansion of the Viet
Cong, however, whose numbers increased by at least 50% dur-
ing the year. Furthermore, since 1964, while the number
of Viet Cong killed has been growing substantially, the
number of captives has increased only slightly.* As one
might expect, Viet Cong irregulars are far more prone to
surrender than Viet Cong regulars.**
Why Viet Cong surrenders have failed to keep
pace with burgeoning defection and desertion rates is dif-
ficult to determine. One explanation lies in the Viet
Cong's excellent battlefield discipline. Another may lie
in the increasing use of air power by the allies. Many
who might otherwise surrender are struck down by bombs be-
fore they can reach allied lines.
*
Ratios of estimated killed to captured:
1964
1965
First 5 months 1966
16,785
36,900
21,245
4,187
5,982
2,837
(or approximately)
** In operation WHITE WING, conducted in Binh Dinh Prov-
ince early this year, 718 Viet Cong reportedly surrendered.
According to II Corps estimates, only about 60 of these
were regulars.
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.ANNEX VII
MORALE AMONG THE PEOPLE IN VIET CONG AREAS
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MORALE AMONG THE PEOPLE IN VIET CONG AREAS
The morale and support of the populace in the areas under
Viet Cong control, (the "sea" in which the Communist "fish"
must swim) are matters of prime long range importance to the
Communists. There is a substantial body of evidence that
morale, and therefore, support for the Communists, is drop-
ping in the Viet Cong areas. The flow of refugees has in-
creased dramatically. The desire for safety, of course, is
the main motive for this exodus; increasing numbers of people
now realize that no Viet Cong region is. immune from attack.
Among other reasons given by the refugees are high Viet Cong
taxes, forced labor, and conscription.
Popular support for the Viet Cong probably will continue
to dwindle as insurgent taxes rise and forced labor demands
increase. Should the populace begin to think the Viet Cong
are definitely losing, movement away from the Communists--
if not always towards the government--will probably increase,
and the Viet Cong will be faced with an eroding popular base.
Refugees
The principal evidence that the Viet Cong have lost the
active support of many people in areas they control is the
flow of refugees toward regions dominated by the govern-
ment. Although there were some refugees during and before
1964, most have fled since the beginning of 1965. The rate
of flow appears to have increased particularly since the
summer of 1965, coincidental with the build-up of US forces
in Vietnam and the large-scale increase in the number of
airstrikes. Statistics compiled by the South Vietnamese
government* illustrate the upward trend:
* These statistics must, of course, be taken with some re-
serve. There are omissions, duplications, and delays in re-
porting by provincial officials. Although required to report
to Saigon on a weekly basis, some provinces are said to have
a statistical backlog of from one to three months. To add
to the confusion, many refugees register more than once, in
order to pick up extra benefits.
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27 Jun 65
31 Jan 66
30 Jun 66
Refugees in Temporary Shelters
144,717
442,522
500,732
Resettled Refugees
106,435
269,794
360,574
Refugees Returning to
Native Villages
72,035
140,502
251,152
784,351
1,001,808
Moreover, many more flee the Viet Cong than are reflected
in government statistics. The government records only those
who register. Large numbers of refugees do not, many in order
to circumvent local government policies which exclude them
from certain areas. The largest number of such unregistered
refugees is in Saigon, which has a law on the books forbidding
refugees from settling in the city. Estimates of the number
of refugees in one of Saigon's nine precincts run as high as
30,000 to 40,000, although the government lists only 1,518
in the entire city.
The principal reason for fleeing given by most refugees
is a desire for safety, but a large proportion add that they
are weary of Viet Cong taxes, conscription, and demands for
forced labor. Whatever the motive, once the refugee has en-
tered a government camp active support for the Communists
generally stops. Most refugees cooperate to some extent
with the South Vietnamese government.
At present, the Viet Cong do not appear to have a clear,
overall policy on what to do about the exodus.* Their course
seems to vary by time and place. In some areas, they have
merely tried to make the refugees' lot unpleasant. Elsewhere,
the Viet Cong have made direct attacks on refugee camps, for
instance in Quang Tin Province where 30 refugees were killed
and 60 wounded in an attack on a refugee center last January.
The refugee flow continues despite such tactics, indicating
the inability of the Viet Cong to stop it.
* It is abundantly clear from captured documents that the
Viet Cong do not want refugees to leave Communist-controlled
territory. There is no documentary evidence to support a
:frequently made assertion that the Viet Cong encourage the
flow of refugees to overburden the South Vietnamese govern-
ment's administrative apparatus.
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Those Who Stay
For those who remain in Viet Cong territory, life is be-
coming increasingly unpleasant. As refugees flee, the pres-
sure on those who remain grows more intense. Taxes are
higher, demands for labor have increased, and controls are
tighter. Although the Viet Cong have been losing favor in
many of their areas in the last twelve months, they still
maintain firm control in most of them and still are able to
carry out their tasks adequately. By and large, the Saigon
government has not been able to translate distaste for the
Viet Cong into support for itself by the people in contested
and VC-controlled areas, although there have been a few
dividends for the government in the form of information pro-
vided about the Viet Cong.
The Viet Cong tax burden--collected in money and
goods--falls most heavily on the South Vietnamese peasant,
and the Viet Cong effort is costly. According to the cap-
tured minutes of a COSVN-level conference held on 15 Feb-
ruary 1966, the chief of the COSVN Rear Service Department
disclosed that supply requirements for 1966 would be "three
times higher" than those of 1965. The Viet Cong frequently
set goals considerably in excess of what they expect to
achieve, but the COSVN supply officer's disclosure still
suggests that tax pressures on the inhabitants of Viet Cong
areas will be much heavier this year than last.*
* The plight of the taxpayer in Viet Cong areas is illus-
trated by a document, captured in October in Binh Duong Prov-
ince, outlining the Viet Cong plans for taxation in the prov-
ince for the last six months of 1965. The document reviewed
earlier tax revenues and estimates:
Estimated Revenue for 1964 16,920,000
Actual Revenue for 1964 20,531,612
Estimated Revenue for 1965 31,130,000
Actual Revenue for Six Months of 1965: 8,951,084
A comparison of the estimated revenues of 1964 and 1965 makes
it apparent that the Viet Cong almost doubled tax goals in
Binh Duong in 1965. Yet a comparison of actual revenues shows
that the Viet Cong were having greater difficulties in col-
lecting the 1965 taxes. Documents captured later in the prov-
ince indicate that many Binh Duong taxpayers did "not enthu-
siastically contribute to the resistance," and that "generally
speaking, residents in the liberated areas lived a destitute
and miserable life."
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Although complaints about Viet Cong taxes are amply
documented, one must be careful to avoid reading too much
into them. A "1965 Tax Collection Report," issued by COSVN's
Financial and Economic Section, indicated that complaining
was by no means universal in Viet Cong territory, and that
in some areas taxes were collected without too much trouble.
Yet Viet Cong taxes are much higher than those of the South
Vietnamese government, as many refugees have pointedly re-
marked. High taxes probably will not by themselves cause
people in Viet Cong areas to shift their allegiances. If
combined with other burdens, however, the taxes may induce
additional inhabitants of Viet Cong territory to flee, or,
ultimately, to curtail their support of the Viet Cong.
2. Labor
The Viet Cong need large numbers of people to grow
food, haul supplies, and move earth. The number of volunteers
is inadequate. Forced labor has become increasingly prevalent
as Viet Cong operations have expanded, and as the labor pool
has shrunk--partly because of the draft, and partly because
of the flight of refugees. Although the Viet Cong try to
persuade laborers to work willingly, the number of volunteers
is inadequate and often the Viet Cong must use harsh methods.
A document, dated 20 September 1965, illustrated
some of the labor problems the Viet Cong face. The author,
apparently a high-ranking provincial labor official, stated
that "the people in areas where mobilization is still possible
are not fully aware of our policies. Therefore, they do not
work enthusiastically, lack a sense of responsibility, and
waste manpower as well as equipment. Village and hamlet
cadres, instead of persuading, tend to order the people to
work. Front line Supply Commands in villages and hamlets
do not have sufficient personnel for operations... The mission
is burdensome and there are not enough laborers to move rice
available from production."*
* The shortage of labor is a recurrent theme in Viet Cong
documents. Furthermore, recruited laborers frequently desert.
One document stated that of 600 short-term civilian laborers
needed for evacuating casualties from a battle which had
taken place a few days earlier, only 54 were gathered; these
all went home after completing their first evacuation trip.
The removal of wounded from the battlefield was thereafter
improvised.
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It would be a mistake to exaggerate Viet Cong labor
problems, or the extent to which the enemy's forced labor
policy alienates the people. Viet Cong performance in most
areas still shows their ability to get things done; and the
South Vietnamese peasant is used to being put upon. Yet if
labor shortages increase--as seems likely--the Viet Cong
will probably have to resort to still more draconian methods
to make sure that work is accomplished. An increasingly
severe labor policy would probably estrange still more Viet-
namese peasants.
3. Willingness of-the People to Provide Information
on the Viet Cong
In the past year, the amount of information volun-
teered about the Viet Cong has increased greatly. Some of
the increase is due to more efficient collection techniques,
higher agent pay, and the presence in the field of large num-
bers of intelligence officers. However, most Allied intel-
ligence officials--military and civilian--state that much
of the increase has resulted from a greater willingness on
the part of the populace to inform on the Viet Cong.
Some of the voluntary informants became available
because they thought the Allies were beginning to win, some
because they harbored grudges against the Viet Cong. Some
had other reasons. A report, dated 7 March, written by the
US G-2 adviser to the ARVN lst Division, stated, for example,
that "it is believed that the local population in the lst
Division area does not feel an identity with Viet Cong Main
Force... probably because [Main Force units in the region]
are composed primarily of North Vietnamese draftees and some
regroupees." The people apparently were more willing to
inform on northerners than on the local boys in the militia
and guerrillas. The prevalence of such a reaction is not
known. If it is generally true throughout Vietnam, the
intelligence picture may improve still further as the pro-
portion of North Vietnamese in Main Force units continues
to rise.
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ANNEX VIII
VIETNAMESE COMMUNIST VIEWS ON THE
LIKELY LENGTH OF THE WAR
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ANNEX VIII
VIETNAMESE COMMUNIST VIEWS ON THE
LIKELY LENGTH OF THE WAR
I. The Anticipated Timing of Victory in 1955 and 1956
During the first two years following the Geneva Confer-
ence, the Communists believed that they could attain a
position of dominance in South Vietnam mainly through the
medium of political, rather than military action.
From mid-1955 to mid-1956 the Communists gradually grew
more pessimistic about their chances of a takeover under the
terms of the Geneva Agreement, as the Diem government re-
peatedly refused to agree to an election which it realized
the Communists would inevitably wino The Communists were
never again so optimistic about their chances
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II. Victory Timing in the Period 1956-1959
Captured documents reveal that the failure to hold the
elections agreed on at Geneva resulted in deep and wide-
spread disillusionment in Communist ranks in the South.
For the next few years, party leaders in the North and the
South cast about for a new strategy to accomplish their ob-
jectives. Difficulties were increased by the success of
Ngo Dinh Diem's regime in repressing the low-level terrorism
which had been mounted by the Communists in the hope of
weakening and undercutting the Saigon government's position
before and during the elections. Communist documents speak
of great damage inflicted on the underground cadre organiza-
tion by Diem's operations.
This combination of difficulties, particularly the Diem
government's military pressure, led many of the southern
Communists to believe that only a turn from reliance primarily
on political action to reliance primarily on military opera-
tions against the government would bring about a Communist
victory in the South. Communist documents indicate that
there were various strategies put forth by the cadres in the
South for insuring the success of military action. One
called for concentration on the construction of a large Com-
munist base in the highlands from which the lowlands and the
population centers could be threatened. Those who advocated
this policy, according to the documents, suggested that the
Communists focus almost all their assets on the highlands
and delay the solidification and enlargement of their posi-
tion in the delta until the highlands effort was completed.
Others argued for a concentration of effort in the delta to
the exclusion of the highlands,
It can readily be seen that debates over strategy as
basic as this would have a strong influence on Communist
estimates of the time needed to accomplish their goals,
and that such estimates would thus be cast in only the
haziest and most indefinite of terms.
Documents indicate that the Communists eventually de-
cided on a country-wide effort which theoretically would
put equal emphasis on military and political "struggle."
The documents give much of the credit for the adoption of
this strategy to Le Duan, the present first secretary of
the Communist Party in Hanoi. Le Duan went to the North
in 1956, apparently from the top leadership position in
the South. He appears to have convinced the Communist
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hierarchy in the North that an all-out military effort
should be started in the South. Communist records gen-
erally date the decision to mount an all-out struggle in
the South as having been made in late 1958 or early 1959.
It was clear by 1959 that the Communists were already
organizing for a full-scale military effort in the South.
One captured document stated that "instructions from the
political department of the party in about May of 1959"
reminded the cadres in the South of the "necessity of
making full use of the armed forces," and that the cadres
then started to "lay out" the "necessary policies." Since
"October of 1959," the document asserted, "the armed forces
have been fighting powerfully."
III. The Time Frame and Goals in 1959
There are no specific references in any available Com-
munist materials as to what amount of time the Communists
believed in 1959 would be necessary to accomplish a take-
over of South Vietnam, or even to achieve any significant
proportion of their objectives. Language on the antici-
pation of victory in Communist materials of this period
was cast in very general terms. A broadcast by the Com-
munists in late 1959, for example, said that the "day
of victory" would "depend mainly on the changing aspects
of the struggle." Such statements suggest a desire to
avoid raising false hopes among the cadre or to make pre-
dictions which might later prove wrongo
Analysis of Communist materials, however, does point
rather firmly to a Communist belief in 1959 and 1960 that
it would take at least five years of all-out military and
political action to bring about Communist domination of
the South. It does not appear that they expected at this
time to be in power before 1966 at the earliest. This
can be inferred from indications as to what the Communists
believed they had to accomplish in order to achieve vic-
tory. They fully recognized that they were still a negli-
gible factor in the urban areas, and that in the rural areas
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their position was still weak.* That the Communists planned
to take their time and build carefully was reflected in a
basic order on the insurgency sent south from Hanoi in Au-
gust of 1960. According to this order, the revolutionary
movement was recognized as "still weak this year," but
"we have the time to prepare any aspect where we are weak."
IV. The Initial Deferral of Victory Anticipations
Until early 1962 the Communists appear to have believed
that they were making satisfactory progress in the develop-
ment of the insurgent movement as originally envisioned.**
By the spring of 1962, however, the step-up in American
military assistance to the Diem regime and the counterinsur-
gency programs put into effect by the governmment had begun
One example of their appraisal of their situation was
apparent in the interrogation of a VC battalion commander
captured in 1960. He stated that the Communists were at
the time devoting nearly all their efforts to the rural area.
He implied that the establishment of a significant urban
apparatus to take advantage of the "urban uprising" which
the Communists expected would take several more years.
Another 1960 captive, the chairman of a VC district
committee in Kien Giang province, indicated that the Com-
munists would be satisfied if they could make significant
strides in 1960 in the elimination of government influ-
ence in the southwestern part of South Vietnam.
**In at least one instance, Communist cadres were told
that the situation was moving as had been forecast by top
Communist authorities in 19610
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to cause increasing difficulties for the Communists, and
enemy materials indicate that their estimates of the time
needed for achieving a victory were stretched out.*
It was at this point, Communist documents suggest, that
the insurgents began to put more emphasis on the so-called
"urban uprising," a key element in Communist guidelines
for success in South Vietnam, but one that did not receive
very heavy emphasis in their writings during the first few
years of the insurgency. In the Communist view, victory
could be anticipated as near at hand when the expansion
of the Communist base among the rural populace was combined
with a general uprising of the city populace against the
government. This has gradually received more stress in
Communist instructions to cadre in recent years.**
Communist documents indicated that, by early 1963, the
Viet Cong felt they were successfully countering Diem's
military push and the American effort. However, they also
indicated a Viet Cong expectation that the fighting in South
Vietnam still would last longer than the Communists had
originally thought. One of the best summaries of Communist
views on the war in early 1963 was contained in an article
*One document commenting on the period discloses that
"at first we did not realize the harm and danger of the
strategic hamlets," and "consequently the question of
countering and destroying them was not properly examined."
The same document notes that the "increase in direct aggres-
sion against us" resulted in "making the revolutionary war
last longer and become more difficult." The revolution could
no longer "go smoothly ahead," but would be ."a long and
fierce tug of war."
**An instruction document written in early 1963, for ex-
ample, says that the Communists expected the "cities in the
South, chiefly Saigon and Cholon, to stir up the revolution
and cooperate with the rural zones when opportunity was
available." According to the document, the revolution
would succeed through a "combination of city and rural up-
rising." The Communists would be "unable to overthrow the
enemy through a general offensive" by itself, if mounted
mainly from the rural areas.
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by the North Vietnamese historian Minh Thuan who had often
sized up the progress of the revolution since the era of
the war against the French.
Thuan took the position that the insurgency had suffered
"many ups and downs and many failures." The initiation of
a large US advisory/support effort meant that the rebels
"had to face the enemy under new circumstances" and could
no longer "expect a rapid and easy victory." Thuan stressed
the importance of the appearance of a "general uprising" as
an omen that success was around the corner. According to
Thuan, the Communists should "keep in mind the appearance
of a pre-revolutionary situation" which would come about
"only when the broad masses" are ready to "rise up and
fight" against the regime. "Decisive victory," he declared,
can be achieved "only when this pre-revolutionary situation
appears."
Another Communist document of this period indicated that
the Communists realized they could do little to hasten the
fulfillment of their objectives. In "time to come," it
said, help from the "North" and from the rest of the bloc
would give the Communist armed forces the "capability to
grow relatively fast." But "that is a question of time
and we just cannot do it in a hurry. All our efforts up
to now are just the first steps." Such statements imply
that the Communists probably believed they were still at
least five years away from victory.*
V. The Growth of Communist Optimism in 1964 and Early 1965
Enemy materials discussing the war situation grew pro-
gressively more optimistic during 1964, as the Communists
assessed the political disarray in Saigon and the provinces
following Diem's overthrow and the success of their efforts
They were also, however, still very flexible and oppor-
tunistic, perhaps even more so than in 1959. One document,
in discussing the future, said it would be necessary "to
play seesaw with the enemy for a certain period." If, how-
ever, "enemy strength begins to sag significantly in the
process, we will fight against the clock to overcome our
weaknesses and rapidly develop our power, especially our
military power, hoping to win victories of a decisive na-
ture."
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to counter the increases in US aid to the Saigon govern-
ment's anti-insurgency programs. A February 1964 article
in the North Vietnamese party journal, for example, de-
clared that the fighting, "although protracted, will not
last forever," and "final victory" could be achieved "in
the near future."* There were a number of Communist moves
which suggested that they were trying to get in a position
to take maximum and rapid advantage of the government dis-
integration which they expected. One such move was an ef-
fort to speedily build up Communist main force strength
in the area of the III Corps north of Saigon by levying
very heavy manpower quotas on the guerrilla units in the
delta.
Communist optimism appeared to reach its height in
early 1965. Although they still carefully refrained from
fixing a definite timetable, they do appear to have be-
lieved at the time that they were possibly within a year
or two of victory. This, for example, was the implication
of an important article by the chairman of Hanoi's "Re-
unification" committees, Nguyen Van Vinh. Vinh's views
have long appeared to reflect some of the inner thoughts
of the top Communist leadership. Writing in the January
1965 issue of the-party journal, he argued that the Re-
public of Vietnam forces had been forced to disperse
widely and to use about half of their strength to protect
the capital region. The government reserves, according
to Vinh, were only about one third as great as the French
reserves had been, and thus Saigon would "soon" have to
abandon large areas of the countryside to the Viet Cong.
Vinh pointed to the period in 1953 and early 1954 in
the war against the French as a similar one, a time in
which the Viet Minh inflicted the most "decisive" defeats
on the French. Vinh seemed to be implying that a similar
development might take place in this war, a development
which could mean a Communist military victory in 1965
At the June 1964 congress of the National Liberation
Front, the Front's president claimed a "new" period of the
insurgency had arrived and the "situation has never been
so bright." In July 1964, North Vietnamese Defense Minis-
ter Vo Nguyen Giap also saw the war as "entering a new
phase," with the Communist forces in "an offensive position."
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or 1966. The insurgents, according to Vinh, were "advanc-
ing to the fulfillment" of their mission "in the coming year."
Among the lower-level Viet Cong leaders, it appears that
the idea was being promoted at this time that the "general
uprising" was near. A defector from a district Communist com-
mittee in Kien Hoa Province, for example, claimed that Commu-
nist plans called for the "general uprising and complete over-
throw of the government in 1966." It does not appear that
the initiation of sustained US air attacks against the DRV
in February 1965 or the landing of US Marine combat units in
northern South Vietnam in March served initially to dampen
Communist optimism.
VI. The Communist Reassessment in Mid-1965
By mid-summer 1965, the weight of the direct US combat
effort in South Vietnam had thoroughly disabused the Commu-
nists of any hopes of an early victory. Both in public and
in private, the probability of a protracted conflict again
became a major theme in Communist statements. Nguyen Van
Vinh, for example, who had spoken so optimistically in Jan-
uary, talked in July only of "eventual" victory. General
Giap was also more sober in his assessment of the situation
in July 1965 than he had been in July 1964, The entry of
the US, Giap said, had created a "serious situation" through-
out Vietnam.** Giap spoke only about "ultimate victory" over
the US,
**Giap no longer focused his main attention on the pros-
pects for the Viet Cong, as he had in his previous assess-
ments, but now stressed the necessity of defending the DRV
against US "aggression." This in itself seemed an implicit
admission of the major setback dealt to Communist hopes in
Vietnam by the direct US involvement.
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In May of 1965, the top leaders of the military affairs
committee of the Communist party in the South met to "as-
sess the enemy and friendly situation." A report of that
conference has been captured. It indicates that the meeting
was dominated by discussions of the growing American involve-
ment in the war. Analysis of the nature of the Communist
military and political weaknesses set against those of the
allies, as discussed at the session, suggests that the party
hierarchy must have believed at the time that the Communist
position was such that the war could easily last another
three and possibly five more years.
During 1966, Communist materials have continued to re-
flect an expectation that the war will be indefinitely long
and protracted. A January 1966 editorial in the North Viet-
namese party paper, for example, claimed that the Communists
still had confidence in their "final" victory, but admitted
that the "enemy has not budged as yet" and his "intention"
to crush the "insurgency" "had not weakened." In March, a
DRV diplomat in Laos who had just returned from briefings
in Hanoi said that the Communists now realized that the US
war potential meant "there would be no quick and easy vic-
tory" in South Vietnam. Ho Chi Minh reaffirmed this as
late as mid-July when he promised that the Vietnamese peo-
ple would fight until final victory if it took "five, ten,
twenty-five years, or even longer."
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ANNEX IX
THE COMMUNIST VIEW AND APPLICATION
OF LESSONS-'LEARNED IN
FIGHTING THE FRENCH.
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THE COMMUNIST VIEW AND APPLICATION
OF LESSONS LEARNED IN
FIGHTING THE FRENCH
The attitude of the North Vietnamese leadership toward
the current military situation in South Vietnam is shaped
to a considerable extent both strategically and tactically
by their experience in fighting the French. Drawing heav-
ily upon this experience, they have carefully plotted their
actions in the current war to duplicate as far as possible
their successes against the French and to avoid mistakes
committed in the earlier war.
I. The Three Phased War
Their experiences in the Franco-Viet Minh war doubt-
less convinced the Communists that the predictions on the
course of this conflict made in 1947 by the then Party Sec-
retary General Truong Chinh had proved valid, and could
probably be applied in the planned takeover of South Viet-
nam. In essence, Truong Chinh's blueprint for victory
called for a protracted struggle through three stages which
would enable the small and weak forces of the Viet Minh to
defeat the more numerous and better-equipped French forces.
According to Truong Chinh, the first phase of the war
would see the French in control of the cities using primarily
"conventional" tactics. In this period the French would be
on the "offensive." The Viet Minh, on the other hand, were
small, poorly armed forces and therefore had to fight a
"defensive" type of war. The chief strategy for the Viet
Minh during this period, argued Truong Chinh, should be
to attack the enemy using guerrilla tactics, i.e., ambushes,
sabotage, and small-scale attacks on French units of smaller
size than the local Viet Minh unit. The Viet Minh during
this period, he said must avoid pitched battles with the
enemy and must build its strength.
Truong Chinh took the position that, although the Viet
Minh would be strategically on the defensive, tactically
they should always be on the offensive. Since the French
would be strategically on the offensive, they would over-
extend themselves, thus giving the Viet Minh opportunities
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for attacking isolated and small units. During this first
stage of the "people's war," he said, the Viet Minh must
also concentrate on gaining the support of the peasants.
Political efforts, Chinh held, were in some respects even
more important than military efforts, because without the
support of the people there could be no military effort.
At some point, Truong Chinh asserted, the enemy would
extend his position as far as he could. At that time, the
harassing action of the guerrillas would combine with the
enemy's inherent weaknesses to create an equilibrium.
During this stage of the war, the enemy would. concentrate
on consolidating his overextended positions with particular
emphasis on his lines of communications and supply. He
would continue to launch attacks on the Viet Minh strong-
holds. In the political sphere, the enemy would concentrate
on setting up "puppet" local adminstrations, infiltrating
the Communist zones with spies, and repressing the Viet
Minh political movement.
The Viet Minh, during this period, should employ to
the maximum the tactic of guerrilla warfare to harass the
enemy day and night. This would be designed to force the
enemy to disperse his forces, to overextend his area of
operations further, and to use up his manpower and resources.
The key tactic during this period would be a combination
of guerrilla and mobile warfare, with the guerrilla taking
the lead at first, followed by later and stronger efforts
at mobile warfare. The tactic of positional war was given
only a limited role at this stage, since the enemy would
still be able to bring superior force to bear on static
defensive positions.
During the second phase of the struggle, the Viet Minh
forces would swing from a defensive strategy to an offensive
one. This stage should see not only military defeat of
the enemy but also a collapse of morale on his home
front, i.e., in metropolitan France. Economic and morale
problems at home would have a decisive effect on France's
will to fight. On the battle front, the French would be
forced to withdraw from their advanced positions in order
to defend their major bases. The Viet Minh would depend
primarily on mobile warfare tactics supported by guerrilla
activities. Finally, in the third phase near the end,
mobile warfare would often be transformed into positional
warfare for the decisive battles.
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Truong Chinh's analysis proved an amazingly accurate
prediction of the actual course of the war with the French.
Chinh's assessment of the weaknesses of the French was unerr-
ing and his program for the development of both tactics and
strategy for the Viet Minh proved effective. His views per-
meated the outlook of the Viet Minh leadership and particularly
that of General Vo Nguyen Giap. It was largely Giap's
responsibility as commander of the Viet Minh army to put
into practice Truong Chinh's military concepts. He did
just that and led the Viet Minh to final victory at the
famous battle of Dien Bien Phu.
The extent to which the Vietnamese Communists still
rely on this basic design for victory is evidenced in the
writings of their leaders. On several occasions in the
last two years Giap, in his articles, has applied Truong
Chinh's concepts of military analysis to the situation
in the South. In remarkably similar terms, Giap has stressed
the need for a prolonged war, emphasized that the US would
become overextended in its ability to supply its troops in
the field, and predicted that popular dissatisfaction with
the war in the United States would undermine the determina-
tion of the administration to continue the war. Giap has
claimed that the tendency of both French and US strategists
to fix short deadlines for accomplishing major goals is
proof of their inability to outlast the Communists.
According to Truong Chinh's criteria, the Viet Cong
presumably would have reached the point of equilibrium with
the ARVN in 1964 or early 1965 and would have gone over
to the offensive relying more and more on mobile rather
than guerrilla tactics. However, the use of US forces in
a combat role has since then probably removed any notion
from the Communists' minds that they have managed to move
into an advanced part of Truong Chinh's second phase, one
in which the opponent is forced to withdraw from his ad-
vanced positions to defend his bases. This is evidenced
in their discussions of the large and successful US/ARVN
offensive raids into Viet Cong base areas this year.
Apparently the Hanoi high command believes that its
forces in the South, at least in the northern half of
South Vietnam, are in the first part of Truong Chinh's
phase two, that is to say, that the US and ARVN are now
overextended and are concentrating on keeping open lines
of communication to their exposed outer posts. To some
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extent, of course, this is true. What is new in the sit-
uation, however, is the fact that with its improved intel-
ligence, extreme mobility, heavy firepower, and tremendous
air-support capability, the US can also attack Viet Cong
strongholds and thus by spoiling actions throw Communist
tactical planning and movements off balance.
Moreover, there has now developed a serious challenge
to what the Communists regard as one of the keys to their
ultimate victory, their own rear base. In the war with
France, this safe rear was first in China, then in the
highlands of North Vietnam. In the current war, the Com-
munists have made it clear that they regard North Vietnam
as the rear area for the war. Since February 1965, however,
this base for the movement of men and supplies to the Viet
Cong has come under heavy aerial attack by the US. While
these air strikes have as yet not prevented North Vietnam
from continuing to send men and material to the South, they
have made the process much more costly and time consuming.
II. Tactical Military Lessons
The lessons learned in fighting the French are being
applied in a myriad of practical steps by the Vietnamese
Communists in the current war. The reliance on the tactic
of ambush, for example, results in large measure from the
successful development of this technique against the French.
The Viet Cong have frequently set up ambushes against the
South Vietnamese and US forces on almost exactly the same
spots where French elements were ambushed nearly twenty
years ago.
Another lesson, learned the hard way against the French,
is the need to avoid precipitous military action against
superior forces. In 1951 and 1952, Vo Nguyen Giap launched
several major attacks on French forces only to have his
units shattered by superior French firepower. Giap drew
back, reformed, re-equipped, and retrained his units, and
from then on faithfully followed the advice of Truong Chinh
who urged that such actions be undertaken only when the
Communists positively enjoyed the superior position. Giap's
dedication to this formula led ultimately to Dien Bien Phu,
where his forces had the superior position. That the Viet-
namese Communist High Command learned its lesson is evident
in Communist tactics in the present war. The Viet Cong/
PAVN forces rarely venture out on an attack now unless they
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are virtually certain that they will have the advantage.
The Communists instead, attempt to draw friendly forces
into remote areas where terrain, transportation, and
weather tend to neutralize the superior firepower and
mobility of the allied side.
The success of the North Vietnamese in keeping their
transportation routes open is also due in some measure to
their experience in the Franco Viet Minh war. In addi-
tion, they appear to have drawn heavily upon Chinese and
North Korean experiences in the Korean War. The extensive
use of coolie labor for bomb-damage repair is not something
uniquely Vietnamese, but the Hanoi leadership has had great
experience, due to the war with France, in forming and op-
erating coolie labor units. The mobilization of rudimentary
forms of transportation is also a technique learned well in
the war against France.
III. Political Lessons
Experiences gained in the political sphere in the war
against the French are also being used by the Communists
in the present conflict. They continue to put heavy em-
phasis on the "political struggle" and to express confi-
dence that enemy military superiority cannot in the long
run prevail in a "people's war." To the extent that it
is more than propaganda, this line partly reflects adher-
ence to Marxist dialectic principles that "contradictions"
in the opposing forces (referring here to "contradictions"
between the Americans and their "puppets" as well as to
conflicts among the South Vietnamese themselves as evidenced
by the recent succession of internal coups) will inevitably
work in the Communists' favor.r_The Communists are mindful of
the fact that in the `earlier war the lack of positive sup-
port by the majority of non-Communist Vietnamese for the
French was a major factor contributing to the ultimate de-
feat of France.
On the practical level, the Communists have in their
current "struggle" sought to apply their political view
of the war through methods which parallel those used ear-
lier by the Viet Minh. In addition to propaganda which
seeks to foster South Vietnamese hatred for the Americans
as the true "aggressors," the Communists set out to repeat
the combined tactics of terror and benevolence used success-
fully by the Viet Minh. Thus they have revived the terror-
ist bombings in Saigon and conducted terrorist reprisals
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against supporters of the Saigon government at all levels
throughout the countryside, while at the same time they
have tried to ingratiate themselves with the general popu-
lace by various good works--helping with the harvest, im-
proving sanitation, conducting educational programs, etc.
Land reform, a technique used with some success by the
Viet Minh through simply granting ownership outside the
colonial administration, became a platform of Viet Cong's
Liberation Front.
The Hanoi leadership also learned in part from the
Franco-Viet Minh war to proceed cautiously on the matter
of negotiations, even while not rejecting the idea of
talks at an appropriate point. Premier Pham Van Dong was
the primary agent for the Vietnamese Communists in the series
of negotiations with the French between 1945 and 1954. He
stated in 1965 that the Vietnamese Communists had learned
from their negotiations with the French that the "imperial-
ists" merely use discussions as a technique to gain a pause
in the shooting so that they can prepare for further fight-
ing. Dong went on to state that they do not intend to make
the same mistake with the Americans. Instead, they intend
to wear. the US down to the point of accepting the bulk of
their terms for a settlement through the tactic of pro-
tracted war.
The Vietnamese Communists do have some reason to feel
that the various negotiated agreements reached with the
French were used to the disadvantage of the Viet Minh.
The French moved against Ho's self-proclaimed Democratic
Republic of Vietnam in 1946 despite an agreement signed
with representatives of his government recognizing its
autonomy. The aftermath of the Fountainbleau conference
in 1946 at which a cease-fire agreement was reached, showed
the French moving to escalate the war. The final proof
of Western perfidy, in the eyes of the Vietnamese Commu-
nists, was the failure of the Western powers to implement
the 1954 Geneva Agreements on Indochina, agreements which
the Hanoi leaders felt would assure their peaceful take-
over of all Vietnam.
Although chary of actually entering into negotiations
with the.US from a position of relative weakness, the
Vietnamese Communists also realize that the tactic of "talk,
fight, talk," was in some respects used effectively by both
sides in the Franco - Viet Minh war. Thus they have been
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reluctant to close the door completely to possible nego-
tiations with the US; a talk stage in the "struggle"
could prove attractive to Hanoi itself at some point to
gain a respite from allied military pressure.
This is probably in part-why the North Vietnamese have
continued to receive a fairly steady flow of visitors from
Western and nonaligned countries with various ideas for
getting talks started between Hanoi and Washington. North
Vietnam probably has at least two aims in accepting these
visitors. One aim is to encourage the notion that the Com-
munists are reasonable, although firm, in their attitude
toward what it would take to reach a settlement of the war.
The second, and probably more important purpose, has been
to put increased pressure on the US to cease its bombings
of the North. A number of foreign visitors have come away
from Hanoi believing that they had received intimations
that if the bombings ceased, talks could begin.
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THE EFFECT OF THE INTERNATIONAL POLITICAL CLIMATE ON
VIETNAMESE COMMUNIST PLANS AND CAPABILITIES
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THE EFFECT OF THE INTERNATIONAL POLITICAL CLIMATE ON
VIETNAMESE COMMUNIST PLANS AND CAPABILITIES
I. World Public Opinion
The evidence shows that the Vietnamese Communists be-
lieve popular opposition throughout the Western world to
US policy in Vietnam can be an important factor in restrain-
ing the allied hand against the insurgents. Virtually
every significant Vietnamese Communist statement on war
strategy has stressed the necessity of mustering the maxi-
mum amount of world opposition against allied---principally
US--action in. the conflict.*
Also significant in the eyes of the Vietnamese Commu-
nists are the "liberation movements" and other outbreaks of
civil unrest and rebellion which occur elsewhere in the world
against Western authorities. Hanoi and the Viet Cong see
these, in part, as developments which hopefully will draw
a direct American military or economic reaction which will
distract and weaken the US war effort in Vietnam.** Such
"people's action" is also regarded as encouraging the morale
*In an important speech setting forth the DRV's terms for
settling the war in April 1965, for example, Premier Pham Van
Dong devoted nearly a quarter of his address to this theme.
"Strong and unrelenting opposition" from the "world's people,"
Dong said, "has the effect of checking and repelling" the
"aggressive and warmongering plots" of the enemy. In the
face of this opposition, he claimed, "the rear" of the enemy
is "disintegrating" and "contradictions" in his ranks are in-
creasing.
**According to the DRV chief of staff, Van Tien Dung, the
US cannot put "all its economic and military potential" into
action in Vietnam if it has to "cope with the situation.in
many other countries and in many fields...to repress other
peoples."
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of the Communist rank and file in Vietnam by demonstrating
that they are not alone in their opposition to Western
"imperialism and colonialism." Largely for these reasons,
Hanoi has frequently urged greater cooperation and unified
action by the Soviet Union and China during the: last two
years in support of the world "liberation movements." The
North Vietnamese apparently consider such action a matter
of great significance to Vietnamese Communist interests,
since North Vietnamese usually refrain from offering advice
to the rest of the bloc.
If the situation in Vietnam develops to the point where
the Vietnamese Communists are forced to make a decision on
whether to continue to support large-scale insurgency in
the South, it is probable that their estimate on the extent
of world popular opposition to allied policy in Vietnam and
of the strength of the various "liberation movements" would
be a significant factor in influencing their decision. It
would, however, almost certainly not be a critical factor.
II. Domestic Opposition in the United States
A more important issue in any Vietnamese decision on
continuing the war would be the extent and effect of opposi-
tion to American policy from within the United States.
It is clear that the Vietnamese realize general Western agi-
tation against the allies will never be particularly effec-
tive unless accompanied by important opposition in the US.*
The Vietnamese Communists do not view this opposition
as simply a manifestation of moral reticence among American
intellectuals and leftists over Washington's war policy,
but also believe that important opposition may develop as
a result of the economic pinch of the war on the American
public and business, and that such opposition may be fur-
ther fanned by the continuing American casualties in Viet
nam. It is clear that the Vietnamese believe the US will
*This has repeatedly been a theme of Vietnamese propaganda
in such assertions as "the struggle of the American people
plays an important role in the common struggle of the peoples
to check the acts of the US Government in Vietnam."
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be forced to go on an extensive wartime footing eventually
and that this will greatly increase domestic opposition.*
There have been other indications in private that the
Vietnamese believe domestic opposition in the US, if de-
veloped strongly, would seriously inhibit US war options.
Vietnamese Communist cadres have been told by their leaders
that the "increase in anger in world opinion over US ac-
tivities in Vietnam" could be "among the more important
factors," in addition to "casualties and economic costs,"
which would cause the ".American government to desist and
decide to give up and get out."**
It is hard, however, to assess just how far the Viet-
namese Communist inner councils really believe domestic
opposition to US war policy has developed to date. In their
view of the American. situation, the Vietnamese are doubt-
less influenced to some extent by their overall lack of
sophistication on American politics and by their earlier
successful experience in bringing significant pressure from
French public opinion to bear on French war policy in 1953-
1954. In private conversations with visitors to Hanoi,
the North Vietnamese have sometimes compared the present
war with their own experiences against the French.
Their lack of sophistication and eagerness to seize on
evidence of mounting US domestic opposition can perhaps
*We have the word of North Vietnamese part first secre-
tary, Le Duan, on this. Late last year,.
he was sure the U would nave to mn-
i ize a reserve force of 1,200,000 men in order to support
a force of 400,000 men in Vietnam. The US, he said, could
not maintain that kind of war effort without being forced
eventually by opinion in the US to re-examine and change its
policy.
**Western statesmen have been told by Vietnamese Communist
spokesmen that they believed the opposition to US policy
shown by some congressional leaders and by well-known Ameri-
can journalists indicated a basic "lack of confidence" in
the administration's policy. According to the Vietnamese,
the "US is suffering from a lack of a clear objective which
would unify American public opinion" behind the American policy
on Vietnam.
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best be seen in their reaction to the American student pro-
tests over Vietnam policy which reached at least an initial
peak in the fall of 1965. There was an increasing air of
optimism over the strength of the student agitation in
Vietnamese Communist propaganda at that time, capped by an
announcement from Hanoi on 24 October that a "united front
of the Vietnamese and American people has de facto taken
shape." The propaganda strongly suggested that the Viet-
namese were overreading the extent and depth of the pro-
tests in the US.* It is possible that the optimistic tone
of the propaganda was intended in part to give a boost to
the Vietnamese rank and file by demonstrating the sympathy
which allegedly exists for their position in the enemy's
own camp.
There has been some evidence in Vietnamese Communist
materials during 1966 of substantial realism regarding the
potential for domestic opposition in the US. This could
be seen, for example, in General Vo Nguyen Giap's assess-
ment of the war situation in the DRV party journal in Jan-
uary 1966. Giap placed US domestic opposition last when
reviewing American weaknesses in the war. He indicated
that the opposition would exercise a restraining effect on
American options in Vietnam, but implied that it would not
de decisive in determining US staying power in the conflict.
Giap placed more emphasis on US limitations in maintaining
strong economic and military positions throughout the world
while pursuing a large-scale commitment in Vietnam. He
did not, however, assess even this latter problem as critical
in determining the outcome of the conflict.**
*Communist misjudgment of American opinion was also evi-
dent in Hanoi's threats recently to take punitive action
against US flyers, and in its public abuse of the pilots.
When Hanoi realized the depth of feeling in the US over the
issue, it hastily stopped its propaganda regarding trials.
Its willingness to do so is indicative of the importance
it assigns to influencing US opinion.
**In private, visiting Western officials in Hanoi have been
given much the same line during the past few months. One
official was told that the DRV was "not counting" on US
opinion to win the war. The same theme has been reflected
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It would appear that the Vietnamese Communist leader-
ship does not expect any important difficulties for Washing-
ton in the near future, at least, as a result of popular
opposition to the war or because of economic/military stresses
caused by the conflict in the United States. Thus, in any
basic decision taken on the war by the Vietnamese Communists
over the next few months, the status of domestic American
opposition would probably not be regarded as critical. If
over the longer pull, however, the US was not forced into
extensive wartime mobilization measures and strong domestic
opposition was not triggered as Hanoi appears to expect, the
situation could possibly become a very important factor in
any basic Vietnamese Communist decision on prolonging the
fighting.
Phnom Penh's attitude toward the Vietnam war is of
importance to Hanoi's own plans chiefly on two counts: (1)
Cambodia's ties to the 1954 Geneva agreements and, (2) its
contiguity with Viet Cong operational bases in South Vietnam.
By appealing to the nationalistic proclivities of Cambodia's
leader, Prince Sihanouk, the Asian Communists have been
able to gain a substantial amount of political support for
the Vietnamese insurgents during the past several years.
This has included Cambodian condemnation of the US role in
South Vietnam as well as accusations that the US presence
there is, as Hanoi claims, in violation of the Geneve agree-
ments. Both of these themes are regarded by the Vietnamese
as important foundation stones in their own political policy
on the war.
On the physical side, Cambodia has served as a source
and a transit channel for limited amounts of both food and
other supplies for the Viet Cong. The Cambodians have also
taken a primarily neutral stance in permitting limited use
of their territory as a refuge and a secure base for the
Vietnamese Communist forces.
in the remarks of DRV diplomats abroad. In May, a French
newsman was told by the DRV representative in Paris that
Hanoi was greatly interested in encouraging the efforts of
students and intellectuals in the US in their opposition to
US policy, but realized that they represented only a minority.
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The Communists, nevertheless, do not have an ally or
even a constant sideline supporter in the Cambodians. Cam-
bodia's ambivalent foreign policy has frequently been at
odds with Hanoi's stand on such issues as Indo-Chinese
neutrality and the exact terms for settlement of the Viet-
nam war. The Communists have thus had to adopt a basically
cautious policy in exploiting Cambodia for their war effort.
They are probably reluctant to make any really large scale
or far reaching plans for the use of Cambodian territory by
the Viet Cong, and they cannot automatically count on re-
ceiving consistent and favorable political support from
Phnom Penh.
On balance, the situation probably tends to exert a
restraining influence on Vietnamese Communist policy options
in the sense that it forces the Vietnamese to focus pri-
marily on better strategic use of South Vietnamese and Lao-
tian territory in their efforts to cope with the growing
allied military pressure on their operational bases.
IV. The Effect of Links With Western Leaders
The Vietnamese Communists also regard the establish-
ment and preservation of adequate links to leaders and key
officials of Western countries as an important element in
their war strategy. There are a number of reasons for this
apart from a natural inclination to enhance Vietnamese Com-
munist prestige at the international level. Such contacts,
for one thing, offer the Vietnamese an opening to promote
opposition to allied policy on Vietnam among influential
individuals in the free world.
This can be seen in Hanoi's treatment of the Indian
Government. Although Indian proposals for settling the war
have consistently been rejected by the Vietnamese as un-
acceptably generous to the allies, Hanoi has been very care-
ful to avoid direct attacks on the Indian Leaders in its
propaganda. It has assiduously cultivated its diplomatic
relations with New Dehli and treated Indian representatives
visiting North Vietnam with considerable courtesy and
friendship. The Vietnamese doubtless believe the Indian
outlook has an important influence on over-all Afro-Asian
opinion about the war. Hanoi apparently also regards some
Indian leaders as potential channels for floating Vietnamese
views about the war to the allies.
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During 1966, the Vietnamese seem to have given special 25X1
attention to the use of Western statesmen as third art
channels to the allied leadershin- F_
From what has been learned of third party contacts
with the North Vietnamese, it does not appear that the
greater Hanoi interest in talking to prominent Westerners
during 1966 represents any softening as yet in Vietnamese
resolve to continue the war. It probably does mean, how-
ever, that the Communist leaders realize it might become
necessary at some point to change their tactics and actively
consider a political settlement of the conflict. At such
a time, third party contacts could prove especially valuable,
in part because they would provide a channel to the allies
that did not first filter through the bloc. At such a criti-
cal point, the Vietnamese might not see eye to eye on strategy
with bloc leaders.
V. The Public Posture of the National Liberation Front (NFLSV)
Since the creation of the NFLSV in 1960, the Vietnamese
have made a continuous effort to demonstrate that the Front
enjoys broad political support and control throughout South
Vietnam and that its "growing strength" is supplemented by
mounting recognition of Front claims and position in inter-
national circles. The results of this have been disappoint-
ing at best for the Communists. Front influence in South
Vietnam is limited chiefly to the rural areas under Commu-
nist control; even in those areas, the Front is widely re-
garded as a facade to cover the operations of the hard core
Viet Cong (see ANNEX III for a discussion of the numerical
strength and influence of the Front in South Vietnam).
On the international side, although there is a substan-
tial body of opinion in the free world which holds that the
insurgency in the South is an indigenous, patriotic and
legitimate revolutionary movement, the Front's own activities
have contributed relatively little to the spread of this belief.
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The Front is widely regarded in the West as more or less
a voice for the Communist view on Vietnam. Efforts to
achieve quasi-diplomatic status for the Front have not been
very successful. Even some of the bloc countries where
the Front has opened "permanent representations," have
made it clear that the NFLSV is accredited only to local
national front organizations and not to the bloc govern-
ment itself.
The best evidence, perhaps, of the weak position of the
Front lies in its failure to establish a provisional na-
tional government in South Vietnam. While both North Viet-
namese and Front officials have hinted on several occasions
in the past year that such a move was in process, it will
probably not take place in the predictable future. Such an
action would pose formidable problems for the Communists and
actually further expose the lack of public support for the
Front. It would almost certainly alienate politically ac-
tive groups in the South, such as the Buddhists, who do not
entirely support the Saigon government and have political
ambitions themselves. The Front would also find it diffi-
cult to establish a satisfactory seat of government in
South Vietnam.*
Despite the weaknesses of the Front, however,there are
compelling reasons for the Vietnamese Communists to con-
tinue to operate under its banner. It provides, for example,
a formal medium under which all facets of the insurgent
political and military activity in South Vietnam can be
organized. Although it does not yet pretend to formal
government on a national scale, it does establish for the
Communists a needed organizational alternative to the Saigon
regime. It is also useful as a platform for advertising
the broad program of political and economic objectives
which the Communists have set forth as their alleged goals
in South Vietnam.
*The leadership of any provisional NFLSV government would
have little attraction among politically conscious elements
of the population in South Vietnam not allied with the Commu-
nists. Movement toward the opening of negotiations on the
war, should the Vietnamese Communists decide to do so, might
also be complicated by the establishment of a Front government.
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 25X
Qr. +i- -A /'--.. A---A Fr.r DrJ-r.')hill/l Irl7 ? (`IA DfDQl1Tl1171ODlVV12r)r)r)7rVVll 0
ANNEX XI
THE PROBABLE NEAR TERM MILITARY AND POLITICAL
STRATEGY OF THE VIETNAMESE COMMUNISTS
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THE PROBABLE NEAR TERM MILITARY AND POLITICAL
STRATEGY OF THE VIETNAMESE COMMUNISTS
I. General Concepts
The near-term military strategy of the Communists will
probably revolve around two major efforts: (1) to keep
intact, as far as possible, their main force units in the
South, and (2) to build up this main force strength, both
in quantity and quality, so as to be able to counter the
allied power when US forces in Vietnam have built up to the
level of 400,000 expected by the Communists at the end of
1966. The North Vietnamese leaders probably hope that if
they can go into 1967 with an ability to field a main force
strength of what we estimate to be about 125,000 as compared
to a US strength of 400,000, they will be able to continue
the war. Hanoi probably estimates that a four-to-one man-
power advantage in favor of the US will not be enough for
the US to decisively defeat the Communists. Of particular
importance to the Communists is the fielding of sufficient
combat units to counter the expected US strength in combat
maneuver battalions. (See ANNEX IV for a discussion of
ratios in US and Communist combat strength)
One of the best recent Communist assessments of the
military situation was contained in a lengthy article car-
ried in the June issue of the North Vietnamese army jour-
nal. This article, as well as a discussion of tactics in
a document captured in Binh Dinh Province in June 1966,
indicate that the Communist plan for the rest of this year
is largely a continuation of their 1964-1965 concept. Ac-
cording to the article, by mid-1965, Communists attacks in
the highlands were coordinated with those in the "delta"--
a clear reference to what in fact was an almost simultaneous
launching of operations in the Kontum-Pleiku-Phu Bon pro-
vincial area of the highlands together with large operations
nearer the central coast in Quang Ngai Province and in the
provinces around Saigon. The result was, as the article
declared, a spreading of ARVN's forces, particularly its
reserves, so thin that the South Vietnamese army's ability
to keep going was in question.
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The article indicated that the Communists will concen-
trate again this year on opening simultaneous campaigns
in the highlands and in the area northeast and northwest of
Saigon. The frequency of other actions in the northern
coastal provinces may accelerate toward the end of the year
as the northeast monsoons begin there.* The primary aim
will again be to stretch the enemy's forces "thin," and to
inflict as many casualties as possible. This time, however,
the primary opponent will be US rather than South Vietnamese
units. Although the latter continue to be struck as attrac-
tive targets of opportunity, captured documents and recent
Communist propaganda identify US troops as the principal
threat and dismiss the South Vietnamese "puppet army" as
"no longer a force which can deal on equal terms with us."
The article also covered specific military concepts which
appear to constitute advice from the High Command on how to
battle the US in South Vietnam during the rest of 1966. It
suggested that the Communists believe they can be relatively
effective in limiting the mobility of US forces. It referred,
for example, to the creation of what it termed an "extermina-
tion belt" around Da Nang. This belt was not explained in
detail, but the positioning and activity of Communist forces
in the Da Nang area suggest that the Communists believe they
can create a type of flexible cordon around Da Nang and other
US base regions which can restrict many US forces largely to
their general base and confine them primarily to static de-
fense tasks.
One major tactical adjustment the Communists will have
to undertake is better concealment of the locations of their
The document captured in Binh Dinh stressed that the
enemy must be attacked on successive days both in the high-
lands and in the lowlands. It declared, however, that our
capabilities for this area are still low and far from being
able to completely annihilate an enemy unit." Thus, "it
will be difficult to attack the enemy continuously," and "if
the enemy reacts with great strength, with high mobility,
we can hardly avoid being pushed into a negative situation
and suffering losses." To cope with this problem, it stresses
the need for superior morale and discipline to offset the
superior US firepower, for a continued build-up of forces,
and for the devising of new plans to "keep up with the situa-
tion and mission."
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main force units. US forces are now gathering more and better
intelligence on the tactical disposition of Communist forces
than was ever available to the ARVN alone. The ability of
the US to conduct "spoiling operations" on the basis of this
intelligence appears to be keeping the Communists off balance
and inflicting heavy losses which require two to three months
for a unit's recovery. These "spoiling operations," moreover,
are playing havoc with the practical application of one of
North Vietnam's cardinal military tenets--that main force
units must avoid pitched battles during the period in which
they are still building up.
As a result, it seems likely that during the rest of 1966,
the Communists will stick primarily to ambushes, hit-and-run
strikes at isolated posts, terrorist bombings, and guerrilla
harassment, although they will almost certainly attempt to
conduct operations in regimental strength and greater should
favorable conditions arise. Their recent military conduct
suggests that they may frequently try to devolve large-scale
battles into a series of'skirmishes in which Communist units hit
piecemeal at smaller US or allied units.
II. Probable Areas of Communist Operations
Although it is difficult to predict precisely what the
Communist forces will attempt to do during the next six
months to one year, there is considerable intelligence athered
from captured documents,prisoner interrogations,__________ , re-
ports, ahd derived from known deployments of Communist main
force units and from their operations this year, to indicate
certain priority areas and targets. The totality of this
information reinforces the belief that the Communists hope
to repeat their operational patterns of 1965.
A. The ,Highlands
The continued reinforcement this year of the central
highlands area bordering Laos and Cambodia with regular PAVN
regiments suggests that this area is envisaged as a major
base and staging area, first for operations to lure and at-
tack US units under favorable conditions, and secondly
for gradual encroachment on the "delta" or lowland areas.
There have b umerous indications--in prisoner statements,
the
increased guerrilla harassment--that the
r-y4yy1+
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Communists hoped this year to renew their 1965 monsoon ef-
fort in the highlands.*
These Communist plans apparently have been disrupted
by the series of US "spoiling" operations conducted, some
in conjunction with ARVN troops, in the highlands areas
since early 1966. The Communists may nevertheless continue
their efforts to apply "mobile warfare" principles in the
highlands, although these may be preceded or accompanied by
smaller action designed to disperse friendly forces and to
permit the Viet Cong to regain the initiative. One document
captured in the spring of 1966 contained battle plans for an
attack against the US 1st Cavalry Division (Airmobile) base
at An Khe.** Attacks on such US strong points, however, will
probably be limited to mortar attacks or attempted sabotage
and be designed largely to tie down US troops and achieve
a psychological impact.
B. Coastal Areas of II Corps
Elsewhere in the II Corps area, the principal Com-
munist interest continues to focus on Binh Dinh Province
on the coast. There is some recent evidence, however, that
at least one PAVN Regiment--the 18B--has moved eastward from
the Cambodian border area of the highlands, possibly to fill
out a divisional structure under the Communist Southern Front
*Reportedly singled out for attack were Special Forces
camps such as those at Duc Co, Plei Me, Plei Mrong, and Plei
Djereng in Pleiku Province, and other targets extending as
far as Toumorong district in Kontum Province to-the north
and into Darlac Province to the south. Coupled with road
interdiction efforts, these attacks presumably would have
the dual purpose of providing traps for the ambush of re-
inforcing units, and of eliminating some allied outposts
in strategic territory.
**The Communists could find this a tempting target for
many reasons--the frequent fog there which limits air re-
sponse, the vulnerability of Route 19 to interdiction or
ambush, and the previous Viet Minh success in trapping the
French in this area. The Communists' recognition of their
own vulnerability in positional warfare, however, makes it
unlikely that they will attempt a major assault on An Khe.
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headquarters in the Phu Yen-Khanh Hoa Province area on the
coast. Long-term allied military operations to protect rice-
harvesting activities in this area appear to be successfully
denying the Communists access to their primary targets in
this part of II Corps--food and manpower.
The heavy Communist troop concentrations in the Phu
Yen-Khanh Hoa area and in the Binh Dinh-Quang Ngai area,
where another division operates on both sides of the provin-
cial border across ARVN corps boundaries, may foreshadow
renewed attacks toward the coast. The latter months of 1966
and the early months of 1967 would appear to be the most
favorable period for larger scale Communist operations in
this area, although hit-and-run raids coordinated with actions
in the highlands could occur here at any time.
C. L _C_
One of the provinces consistently suffering the
greatest number of Communist-initiated actions has been Quang
Ngai, in the southern part of I Corps. Extensive operational
plans for extending the already considerable Communist control
over this province have been captured this year, but the Com-
munist main force units have not yet proved sufficiently strong
to carry out such plans in full or to threaten the province
capital itself. At present the Communists in this area also
appear to be seeking to avoid sustained, large-scale engage-
ments in favor of rapid hit-and-run attacks and continued
erosive tactics. They may, however, resume efforts to grab
off isolated district towns as weather conditions become more
favorable.
There'is little hard evidence available on Communist
intentions in the northern Quang Ngai-Quang Tin-Quang Nam part
of I Corps. The presence of sizeable forces in this area
appears primarily designed to protect their Military Region 5
headquarters area from US operations and to tie down substan-
tial US forces in the vicinity of the US bases at Chu Lai
and Da Nang. More immediately significant may be the presence
of two Communist divisional structures in northernmost i Corps
--the Northern Front headquarters area in Thua Thien Province
and the recently infiltrated PAVN 324B division near the De-
militarized Zone (DMZ) in Quang Tri Province. One mission
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of these forces probably is to draw US units into the area
and spread them "thin."*
COMUSMACV has for some time anticipated an increased
Communist thrust in the Quang Tri-Thua Thien area. This
would not only divert attention from Communist efforts to
develop a base in the highlands and permit some respite there,
but would facilitate support from or sanctuary in the Commu-
nist "rear base" in North Vietnam. The presence of the
324th, which infiltrated across the DMZ, may portend increased
use of this shorter, more direct route in addition to routes
via the Laotian corridor. The Communists may also hope to
exploit the inactivity and possible lowered effectiveness of
South Vietnam's 1st Division in this area. The immediate of-
fensive plans of the 324th Division now appear to have been
disrupted or delayed by early US detection and counteropera-
tions, but increased Communist activity in this northernmost
part of South Vietnam remains probable.**
Cong forces, prisoner statements,
t at the Communists intended
D. III Corps
There is strong evidence from the deployment of Viet
*One recently captured PAVN prisoner claims that there
are two other PAVN divisions--one just above the DMZ in
North Vietnam and one near Route 9 opposite western Quang
Tri in Laos--prepared to cooperate in just this effort.
The presence of additional PAVN divisions around Quang Tri
could also reflect further infiltration in process, or pos-
sibly plans to seize territory in Quang Tri. Such plans
have been reported by some 324th Divison prisoners.
**An entrenched Communist position in northernmost I
Corps could provide them an alternate, although less effec-
tive, base area for ultimately moving against the lowlands.
The Communists appear to have been trying for some time to
forge a secure area stretching from their zone C stronghold
in Tay Ninh Province northwest of Saigon across the highlands
to North Vietnam at the 17th parallel. This appears to have
been one aim of the coordinated drives in mid-1965 in the
central highlands and in the Phuoc Long-Binh Duong area near
Saigon.
25X1
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to resume an effort to link up the southern portions of their
base complex in III Corps during the 1966 summer monsoon
period. The primary targets appear to have been a district
town and a Special Forces camp in Binh Long Province which
separates Zone C and Zone D, northwest and northeast of Sai-
gon, respectively. Possibly related efforts to improve their
position in III Corps include the presence of an understrength
division or Front headquarters southeast of Saigon in coastal
Phuoc Tuy Province, and efforts to build up main force units
in previously neglected areas east of Saigon, presaged in
part by intensified guerrilla harassment throughout early 1966.
US operations targeted against both the Viet Cong
Central Office for South Vietnam (COSVN), headquartered in
Zone C, and against Communist regiments in the Binh Long-Binh
Duong area appear to have thwarted or delayed Communist plans
in the III Crops area.* Nevertheless, the heavy concentration
of both main force units and guerrillas in much of the III
Corps area gives the Communists the capability to place a
variety of military, economic, and psychological pressures
on the area around Saigon. This pressure is reinforced through
road interdiction, shipping harassment, and terrorism within
the capital itself.
E. IV Corps
In the delta areas south and west of Saigon the num-
ber of large-scale Viet Cong operations have been dropping
for some time. This probably reflects some reduction in
capability because of both heavy casualties and heavy troop
levies for other areas especially III Corps. Sporadic at-
tacks against ARVN and paramilitary outposts and Special Forces
camps have occurred in recent months, however, and probably
will continue. The delta area is of vital importance to the
Communists as a source of rice and manpower, and in substan-
tial portions they remain solidly entrenched. Except when
*US operations in this northern part of the III Corps area
are being sustained on a long-term basis to drive a secure
wedge between Zones C and D, apply increasing pressure on the
Communist military and political headquarters in the area--
COSVN, Military Region 7 (now known as MR1), and Saigon/Gia
Dinh--and gradually weaken the Viet Cong hold on their tra-
ditional base areas.
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engaged in strength by ARVN operations, the Communists in
IV Corps will probably continue to give primary emphasis
to maintaining their lines of communication between the
delta and Zone C--as stressed in captured documents--and
to retaining base areas and secure zones for training and
for the smuggling of supplies. They will probably also at-
tempt to harass road and water communications between Sai-
gon and the delta in order to put an economic squeeze on
Saigon and on the provinces served by the capital.*
III. Prospects and Problems
Although there is as yet no hard evidence available on
Communist planning beyond 1966, we anticipate no signifi-
cant change in present Communist military strategy through
at least the spring of 1967. The primary objective of the
Communists, if they can succeed in maintaining their main
force basically intact through this year, will probably
be to inflict enough heavy casualties on the US forces--
particularly in the highlands--to cause the US to pull in
its horns and stop its "spoiling" operations.
The Communists, however, will be under severe pressure
to come up with some new ideas or modifications of their
present tactics. Although they will almost certainly main-
tain their reliance on the ambush, recent failures in this
tactic, resulting from US anticipatory moves and rapid
counteraction, have caused them setbacks. They will prob-
ably also work to improve their "close-in" battle tactic
which is designed to inhibit US use of artillery and air
support. The increasing emphasis noted in captured Commu-
nist documents on the need for a superior human element--
improved cadres and improved troop discipline and morale--
points up the Communists' awareness that, under continued
pressure from US troops and air bombardment, the coming
year will be a highly signficant one for them.
IV. The Near Term Political Strategy of the Vietnamese Communists
Within South Vietnam, Communist political goals for the
remainder of 1966 and early 1967 will have to take account
*Harassment of district towns, outposts, and US and ARVN
airfields, primarily by mortar fire, will probably continue,
along with small-scale actions to disrupt and undermine the
government's Revolutionary Development (pacification) program.
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of recent Communist setbacks. Captured documents indicate
that the Communists will 'give priority to strengthening
and improving their political apparatus, notably by trying
to improve the quality of political cadres down to the vil-
lage level, and by continued emphasis on the recruitment of
party members and sympathizers in both rural and urban areas.
With regard to particular target groups for penetration,
concentration will probably continue to be on the South Viet-
namese army and civil service. Laboring class elements may
attract increasing attention, not only in the hope of foster-
ing new wage-price spirals and further economic discontent,
but because of the access of construction workers to US base
facilities and of porters and other supporting workers to
US logistical supply lines. The Communists will probably
continue their efforts to exploit communal tensions--between
the Buddhists and Catholics, between the Chinese and ethnic
Vietnamese, between the Vietnamese and the ethnic tribes,
and among other rival political factions. The failure of
the Buddhists in confronting the military in Saigon may well
give the Communists second thoughts about expending too many
assets on trying to gain a handle on the Buddhist organiza-
tion. There is little question that the Communists will con-
tinue to focus their proselyting efforts bnthe ARVN
in an attempt to encourage desertions and defections. They
will also try to sow distrust and dissension among the Viet-
namese over the US presence, role, and intentions.
The Communist policy with regard to South Vietnam's coming
constitutional assembly election in September is still un-
clear. It seems doubtful at this time that the Communists
have any significant number of followers among the candidates
who have filed, though many of the candidates are relative
unknowns even to local government officials. There are
scattered reports that the Communists will make serious ef-
forts to disrupt the election. Similar such reports preceded
past elections, but Communist interference turned out to be
relatively ineffective. Communist propaganda statements
have, however, vigorously denounced the coming election as
a farce and a trick. They may thus feel impelled to try to
take a more active position through covert campaigning against
candidates, or through terrorism and other direct sabotage
efforts.
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In areas under their control, the Communists are likely
to continue their efforts to consolidate their hold. There
has been evidenceeover the past year of some quasi-govern-
mental reorganization at the local level through the estab-
lishment of village "Liberation Committees." Documents in-
dicate that these committees are Party-controlled administra-
tive bodies rather than a part of the Liberation Front struc-
ture. This local government endeavor may receive increased
emphasis, possibly in concert with local plebiscites with
which the Communists might hope to challenge and undercut
the impact of elected institutions created by Saigon.
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ANNEX XII
AN HISTORICAL ANALYSIS OF ASIAN COMMUNIST
EMPLOYMENT OF THE POLITICAL TACTIC OF NEGQ IATIONS
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AN HISTORICAL ANALYSIS
OF ASIAN COMMUNIST EMPLOYMENT
OF THE POLITICAL TACTIC OF NEGOTIATIONS
Summary
This Annex discusses the Asian (particularly Chinese)
Communist practice of negotiating, focusing on the motives
which, in the past, have impelled Asian Communists to nego-
tiate and the signs they have given when they were prepared
to talk. It includes an analysis of the fight-talk tactic
used in the Chinese civil war in the 1930s and 1940s as well
as a detailed examination of the Korean experience of 1950-
53 and the Vietnamese experience of 1953-54. Finally, there
is a short discussion of implications for Vietnam today.
a. General Findings
On the two occasions when the Chinese Communists have
initiated negotiations during military conflicts, their
forces were either
(a) weak and in danger of annihilation, as in the Chi-
nese civil war, or
(b) badly hurt in the field, as in the Korean war.
As they negotiated, they continued to fight. This fight-
and-talk tactic was formulated by Mao Tse-tung in 1940 as
a means to preserve his weak forces from being destroyed by
Chiang Kai-shek's militarily superior armies. Subsequently,
it was used in Korea by the Chinese and North Koreans, at
first as a expedient to shield their badly hurt armies in
1951, and then, from 1951 to 1953, as a holding tactic un-
til they could extract terms enabling them to disengage
from a costly limited war.
In Indochina, however, the decision to begin negotia-
tions was imposed by the Soviet and Chinese leaders on Ho
Chi Minh when they feared American involvement and escala-
tion of the war more than he did in 1953. They urged Ho to
close out the war, which he was by no means losing in the
field, and persuaded him to make concessions to the French
after talks started and to try to seize Vietnam by a process
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of low-risk political subversion. Even after Ho had been
induced to begin negotiations, his desire to use Mao's
original fight-and-talk tactic for a protracted period was
subordinated to the larger interests of Soviet policy (to
split the Western alliance in Europe) and Chinese policy
(to prevent the US from establishing alliances in Asia).
The Soviets and Chinese viewed these interests as being best
served by a "peace" offensive and hindered by continuation
of the Indochina war. Ho made concessions, particularly on
the matter of partition, which were later viewed by him and
his lieutenants as a mistake not to be repeated.
b. The CCP-KMT Civil War (1937 to 1949)
Constantly maneuvering to preserve the badly depleted
ranks of his Red Army from complete destruction by Chiang
Kai-shek's militarily superior forces, Mao in September 1937
finally induced Chiang to establish, on paper, a CCP-KMT
united front against Japan. But within the context of this
paper alliance, Mao expanded his military and political
forces in the northwest and even directed quick-decision
thrusts to be made against isolated KMT units. As a pattern
of limited armed conflict and political struggle emerged in
1940, Mao avoided major military operations which would pro-
voke a major counterattack and developed a tactic of limited-
fight, limited talk: "After we have repulsed the attack of
the [KMT forces] and before they launch a new one, we should
stop at the proper moment and bring that particular fight to
a close. In the period that follows, we should make a truce
with them." (Mao's statement of 11 March 1940). In this
way, Mao gained a series of small victories without running
the risk of a general civil war, while expanding his terri-
torial holdings behind the Japanese lines.
While fighting continued on the local level, CCP-KMT
negotiations went forward on the national level intermit-
tently from 1940 to 1946. Represented in Chungking by his
brillant negotiator, Chou En-lai, Mao used various lulls in
the civil war to increase his regular forces, and in 1944,
he permitted the American Army Observer Mission to operate
in Yenan because its very presence had a political restrain-
ing effect on Chiang. Recognizing the strengthened military
and political position of Chiang after the surrender of Japan
in August 1945, Mao tried to settle for a half-way station--
legalization of the CCP--on the road to an eventual seizure
of national power. Chiang refused to facilitate this even-
tual takeover. On 19 August 1946, shortly after KMT planes
bombed Yenan, Mao dropped the talking half of his dual tactic
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and began to fight the all-out civil war, which his forces
decisively won in mid-1949.
c. The Korean War (1950 to 1953)
Initial Chinese Communist military successes from No-
vember through December 1950 increased Mao's confidence that
the UN forces could be driven from Korea if military pressure
was sustained, and Chou En-lai rejected a cease-fire as "a
breathing spell" for the UN. But a series of manpower-killing
advances by UN and ROK units in March and early April 1951
followed by the blunting of the Communists' big April and
May offensives, which cost them an estimated 221,000 men,
left the ranks of Mao's best armies decimated by 1 June 1951.
Of the 21 Chinese Communist divisions which had initiated the
April and May offensives, 16 had suffered about 50 percent
casualties.
These disastrous defeats impelled Mao to begin negotia-
tions, but there were no prior indications that he was pre-
pared to drop his previous political conditions for a cease-
fire. When, on 23 June 1951, Soviet UN delegate Malik for
the first time called for talks for a cease-fire, he merely
avoided raising the preconditions that the US must withdraw
from Taiwan and that Peking should be admitted to the UN.
Mao seized upon the military breathing-spell to improve the
badly impaired combat capabilities of his forces in the
field.
Mao's strategy at the armistice negotiations (July 1951
to July 1953) was to wage a "protracted struggle," combining
tactics of political attrition with limited military pressure.
But this strategy did not break the determination of the US
negotiators to defend the principle of voluntary repatriation
of war prisoners. The death of Stalin (5 March 1953) per-
mitted the development of a new Soviet attitude toward East-
West tensions in general and concluding an armistice in par-
ticular. Their pressure on Mao and his own recognition that
further resistance was purposeless, and even harmful to his
economic program,inpelled him to retreat and accept voluntary
repatriation--a move which opened the way for the armistice
agreement of 27 July 1953.
d. Vietnam (1953 to 1954)
The same considerations that led the Soviets and the
Chinese to negotiate an end to the Korean war in mid-1953
made them look with favor upon a negotiated settlement of
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the Indochina war. At the time, however, the fortunes of
the Vietnamese Communists in their eight-year fight with the
French were steadily improving and Ho Chi Minh gave no in-
dication that he would be willing to accept less in a nego-
tiated settlement than his forces could seize on the battle-
field.
The first indication that the Communists might consider
negotiations came from the Soviets, who began in August 1953
to quote with approval demands in the French press for a
"Panmunjom" in Indochina. By September, the Chinese had
also indicated a willingness to discuss Indochina at the
conference table. But Vietnamese Communist propaganda made
it clear that these Soviet and Chinese initiatives were being
made at a time when Ho was still resisting the concept of ne-
gotiations. The attitude of the Viet Minh leaders at this
time is illustrative of the generalization that Asian Commu-
nists have been unwilling to begin negotiations when they
have been in an advantageous position militarily, or have not
been badly hurt in the field.
As the French Government was being subjected to increa-
sing pressure from many members of the National Assembly and
from the French public for an end to the costly war, Moscow
and Peking acted to convince Ho that he could make major gains
through negotiations. On 29 November 1953, he finally took
the initiative in proposing negotiations, but it was a hedged
proposal that, in effect, demanded a complete French surrender.
Premier Laniel was able to resist the strong domestic
pressure for immediate bilateral negotiations with the Viet
Minh by agreeing to discuss Indochina at the Geneva confer-
ence in May 1954. Although Ho clearly preferred bilaterals,
(in which he would have been in a much stronger position vis-
a-vis the French than he was at Geneva), he was again pres-
sured by the Soviets to agree to international negotiations.
At Geneva, Molotov and Chou En-lai moved adroitly to
avoid any impasse that could be used by the US as an excuse
for intervention in the fighting. Ho, whose delegate, Pham
Van Dong, started with maximum demands after the fall of
Dien Bien Phu (7 May 1954), apparently calculated that nego-
tiations could continue for some time without leading to
American involvement. His tactics of protracted negotiations,
which would afford him more time to solidify his military
position, were similar to those of Mao in Korea. But again
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and again, the Soviets and Chinese acted to undercut his dele-
gate's maximum demands at Geneva for French political con-
cessions in exchange for a ceasefire.
The Viet Minh certainly had not expected to have to make
as many political concessions as they finally agreed to at
Geneva. Ho was in a position to negotiate from strength and
to do so for a long time, but he found himself caught in a
Sino-Soviet political web and was persuaded not to use his
growing military capability to force major concessions. It
was clear at the time that the North Vietnamese were far from
completely satisfied with the Geneva compromises. As time
has gone on, they have probably become even more convinced
that the political concessions they made there were a mistake.
The clear awareness that they were impelled, primarily by
Moscow and Peking, to stop at a half-way station on the road
to total military victory has made them all the more deter-
mined to fight on in the present situation.
e. Implications for Vietnam Today
North Vietnamese and Chinese Communist officials have
indicated privately that the compromises made in 1954, pro-
viding the Viet Minh with something less than a total takeover
of Vietnam, were a mistake. Ho's determination not to stop
half-way again, even in the face of increased US airstrikes,
is bolstered by Mao's special need to keep him fighting.
Mao's special need, which stems largely from an image of him-
self as "leader" of the international Communist movement, is
to prove Soviet and other doubters wrong regarding the abil-
ity of revolutionaries to defeat the US in a protracted small
war.
Discussion
A. The CCP-KMT Civil War (1937 to 1949)
The badly depleted ranks of Mao's Red Army, which strag-
gled into the sanctuary of northwest China in November 1935
after the punishing attacks of Chiang Kai-shek's forces during
the Long March, were incapable of resisting an all-out KMT
offensive. Aware of this basic fact, Mao repeatedly appealed
to Chiang to end the civil war and establish a CCP-KMT united
front to expel Japanese forces from north China. Chiang was
unwilling to comply primarily because Mao insisted on pre-
serving his military units for use in the revolution: "It
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goes without saying that we shall never allow Chiang to lay
a finger on the Red Army." (Mao's statement of 14 March
1936). But Japan's large-scale attack on China in July 1937
provided Mao with a new opportunity to move Chiang into a
united front against Japan. Mao took the first formal step;
on 22 September 1937 the CCP declared that its armed forces
would be under the "direct control" of Chiang. Actually,
three days after this paper statement, Mao made it clear that
"direct control" was only an anti-Japanese political facade
and that units and their weapons would remain under Commu-
nist control:
It is necessary to maintain the CCP's absolutely inde-
pendent leadership in what originally was the Red Army
as well as in all guerrila units. Communists are not
permitted to vacillate on this principle. (CCP resolu-
tion of 25 September 1937)
Mao used the mythical anti-Japanese united front to deter
the KMT forces from attacking his new sanctuary in the north-
west and to expand his military, territorial, and political
holdings. Most of the CCP effort was directed toward extend-
ing its assets, some was directed toward guarding against a
KMT attack, and o y a little was directed toward engaging
Japanese armed forces Negotiations for the reorganization
of the former "Red Army" units moved very slowly in 1937 and
1938, and clashes continued on the local level between some
Nationalist and Communist forces. As friction increased, Mao
began to formulate his political-military tactic. On 6 No-
vember 1938, he directed that the CCP's main field work should
be in the relatively secure rear areas of the Japanese forces,
calculating that the political-military vacuum behind the
Japanese lines would shield the CCP from superior KMT forces
until the foothold in the northwest could be expanded. Mao
enlarged his armed forces as quickly and efficiently as pos-
sible. but he always stopped just short of provoking an open
break with Chiang and the retribution of a major KMT offen-
sive.
Calculated restraint, intended to provide Chiang with no
pretext for an offensive, was designed by Mao to be a tempor-
ary tactic to gain vitally needed breathing spells prior to
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the opening of a revolutionary advance in the future. Mao
indicated the "positive" role of reduced military aggressive-
ness as a tactic in advancing the revolution:
Our concession, withdrawal, turning to the defensive or
suspending action, whether in dealing with allies or
enemies, should always be regarded as part of the en-
tire revolutionary policy, as an indispensable link in
the general revolutionary line, as a segment in the
curvilinear movement. In short they are positive.
(Mao's statement of 5 November 1938)
That is, defensive or suspended action was part of Mao's
policy to expand his armies and the CCP membership behind
Japanese lines with the aim of seizing more territory at the
expense of the KMT. But quick-decision thrusts were never
abandoned. For example, in the spring of 1939, Communist
forces moved quickly into Shantung Province, and in the
winter of 1939-1940, they decimated KMT forces in Hopei Prov-
ince. These clashes were fully concordant with Mao's policy
of expanding holdings by armed struggle within the context
of the CCP-KMT paper united front.
A pattern of limited armed conflict and political strug-
gle emerged in CCP-KMT relations in the spring of 1940. Mao
began to refine his fighting-and-talking tactic. Militarily,
he limited the offensive operations of the Communist armies,
which were still considerably inferior to KMT armies; po-
litically, he worked vigorously to indoctrinate workers,
peasants, and intellectuals. In this fashion, he groped
his way, seeking out and exploiting the soft spots in Chiang's
military and political armor.
Mao systematized his tactic. On 11 March 1940, he set
forth the unique position that there was no incongruity be-
tween waging a political-military struggle against Chiang
while maintaining a united front with him. The struggle half
of this dialectical policy was intended to demonstrate to
Chiang that Mao's forces could not be destroyed--that they
would fight back against any KMT offensives. The unity half
was intended to deter KMT attacks and to "avert the outbreak
of large-scale civil war." Mao depicted the partial struggle
against Chiang as "the most important means for strengthening
KMT-CCP cooperation," his calculation having been, as he
pointed out on 4 May 1940 in a directive to Communist field
commanders operating in east China, that clashes with the
KMT forces were necessary -._.
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so as to make the KMT afraid to oppress us...and compel
them to recognize our legal status, and make them hesi-
tate to engineer a split.
That is, Mao, on occasion, used military action in certain
areas rather than direct political concessions to sustain the
united front on paper.
He correctly estimated that small CCP military thrusts
would not provoke Chiang to move beyond limited counter-
attacks because Chiang did not have the military capability
in 1940 to open a nation-wide offensive against CCP forces
so long as the war against Japan was being waged. Mao's
estimate of 4 May 1940 was that
The present military conflicts are local and not
nation-wide. They are merely acts of strategic re-
connaissance on the part of our opponents and are
as yet not large-scale actions intended to annihi-
late the Communists.
In this way, he defended the general plan for limited civil
war which he had enunciated on 11 March 1940 as a limited-
fight, limited-talk tactic. Mao had set forth the important
tactic in considerable detail:
First, we will never [sic] attack unless attacked;
if attacked, we will certainly counterattack....
Second, we do not fight unless we are sure of vic-
tory; we must on no account fight without prepara-
tion and without certainty of the outcome.... Third,
the principle of truce. After we have repulsed
the attack of the die-hards [i.e., the KMT forces]
and before they launch a new one, we should stop at
the proper moment and bring that particular fight
to a close. In the period that follows, we should
make a truce with them. We must on no account
fight on daily and hourly without stopping, nor
become dizzy with success. Herein lies the tempo-
rary nature of every particular struggle. Only
when the die-hards launch a new offensive should
we retaliate with a new struggle.
This became the basic tactical principle of Mao. His practice
indicated that his forces were directed to fight, close off
the particular battle with a defeat of KMT forces, and then
seek a truce and be prepared to negotiate in the hope that
Chiang would not take a local and limited defeat as the
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reason for a large-scale offensive against all Communist
armies. This is the tactical principle designed to advance
Mao's protracted war waged with initially weak forces, limit-
ing their actions to safe proportions.
In this way, Mao gained a series of local victories with-
out running a great risk of general civil war. At the same
time, he seized territory by expanding the base areas behind
the Japanese lines and by controlling the actions of his
field commanders, whose forces sporadically chopped away at
small KMT units. For example, the First Contingent of the
Communist New Fourth Army commanded by General Chen Yi deci-
mated KMT forces in northern Kiangsu in July 1940 and, in the
second half of 1940, several Communist victories were won
in the lower Yangtze valley. Mao had directed that the New
Fourth must be expanded to 100,000 men; by the end of 1940,
his generals were successful in expanding this army to ap-
proximately that number of combat regulars.
While fighting continued on the local level, CCP-KMT
negotiations took place on the national level in the second
half of 1940 as Mao implemented his fighting-and-talking
tactic. Even when vastly superior KMT forces unexpectedly
surrounded and destroyed 9,000 men attached to the New Fourth's
headquarters as they were withdrawing to the north of the
Yangtze River, Mao refused to consider this setback as in-
validating his principle of waging a limited war. In June
1943, the intermittent negotiations between the KMT and CCP
reached another major impasse in Chungking, just as they had
in late 1939 and in January 1941. Chiang asked Mao to give
a conclusive reply to his demands to relinquish the independent
CCP government and to incorporate CCP forces into Nationalist
armies. Chou En-lai, the brillant Communist representative
in Chungking, deflected these demands and charged the KMT
with increasing their forces along the northwest border base
areas. Chou attained some success in his political effort to
depict Chiang as the obdurate element in the united front.
The failure of Chiang to launch large-scale attacks
against Communist forces in 1943 was attributed by Mao at
the time to the political success in arousing domestic and
international opinion against Chiang's policies. (Liberation
DalV, 5 October 1943). Two additional factors were Japan's
east China offensive against KMT forces and US efforts to stop
Chiang's attempts to suppress the Communists. That is, Mao
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adroitly used political pressures to compensate for military
weakness: "The Communists are not capable of much, if any,
offensive action." (Report of Colonel Depass, 16 November
1943)
Expediently, from 1943 to 1945, Mao used the lull in
the CCP-KMT protracted war to further expand his armed forces,
which increased to 475,000 regulars by October 1944. The
Wallace mission to China in June 1944 resulted in the dispatch
of the American Army Observer Mission to Yenan, which Mao
favored because of "its political effect upon the KMT":
Any contact you Americans may have with us Communists
is gold. Of course, we are glad to have the Observer
Mission here because it will help to beat Japan. But
there is no use in pretending that--up to now at least
--the chief importance of your coming is not its po-
litical effect on the KMT. (Mao's remarks to John S.
Service, interview of 27 August 1944)
That is, Mao exploited the US desire to end the civil war
and get on with the war against Japan, adroitly using it
as a political shield against the potential offensive-power
of Chiang's superior military forces. He was capable then
of considerably more tactical flexibility than he has been
in recent years.
By insisting on policies which made the KMT appear unrea-
sonable, Mao deflected Chiang's demand that, to become a legal
party, the CCP should disband its armed forces. In a care-
fully worded proposal, which Mao maneuvered Ambassador Hurley
to sign with him in Yenan on 10 November 1944, Mao agreed only
"to work for" the unification of all military forces while
insisting on the formation of a "coalition national govern-
ment and a united national military council." His intention
was to exploit the generally held view that the CCP was just-
ified in refusing to disband its armies before the formation
of a coalition government. However, in order to keep the ne-
gotiations alive, he directed Chou En-lai in Chungking to join
Ambassador Hurley in pressing Chiang to accept the proposal.
Chiang insisted on disbanding the Communist armies, and Mao
was then able to "expose" Chiang as recalcitrant in rejecting
a "reasonable" negotiations compromise--i.e., a coalition.
The widespread domestic and international appeal of the Maoist
program for a settlement, the rapidly expanding military-
political power of the CCP, and US anxiety to bring about
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unity put Chiang at a considerable disadvantage in the talks.
Mao's success with dilatory tactics--that is, his substitu-
ting of talks about "working for" unified armed forces in the
place of a tc ion taken to disband CCP armies--further isolated
Chiang in(Min a and internationally.
All along, Mao had continued to expand his forces, and
by 24 April 1945, he claimed that they totalled 910,000
regulars and more than 2,200,000 militia. Mao made a major
move shortly before Japan's surrender, ordering CCP troops
to link up with Soviet troops driving southward in Manchuria
(10 August 1945). As CCP and KMT armies raced for control of
various Japanese-vacated areas and as Chiang prepared to
strike at Mao's forces, the Communist leader accepted Chiang's
invitation to accompany Ambassador Hurley to Chungking,
arriving on 28 August 1945. Mao was still anxious to gain a
series of breathing spells. Two days before flying to Chung-
king, Mao drafted an inner-party policy line on negotiations,
in which he indicated that the CCP should be prepared to make
some concessions--namely, some reduction in the size of those
base areas which were indefensible and in the strength of CCP
armed forces:
Without such concessions, we cannot explode the
KMT's civil war plot, cannot gain the political
initiative, cannot win the sympathy of world
public opinion and the middle-of-the-roaders in
China and cannot gain in exchange legal status
for our party and a state of peace.
But there are limits to such concessions: the
principle is that they must not damage the fun-
damental interests of the people [i.e., CCP con-
trol of the base areas and the armed forces].
(Mao's statement of 26 August 1945)
Mao in Chungking recognized the strengthened military and
diplomatic position of Chiang after the surrender of Japan
and the signing in Moscow of the Sino-Soviet treaty. In
private talks, he dropped his demand (to which he later re-
turned) for a coalition government and high command, but in-
sisted on retaining not less than 20 divisions as well as
exclusive control of the base areas in north China. He
wanted to obtain a settlement, a half-way station of legali-
zation on the road to an eventual seizure of national power,
inasmuch as his armies were still smaller and more badly-
equipped than Chiang's. "The Communist armies do not possess
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sufficient strength to directly oppose the KMT armies in
positional warfare; but over a long period of time as an
occupying force, the KMT cannot hold out even with US help."
(August 1945 report of Colonel Yeaton from Yenan) Chiang
accurately summarized Mao's position as equivalent to allow-
ing the CCP to carry on its political revolution without
opposition or hindrance while professing to end the KMT-CCP
military clashes by negotiating. Actually, while Mao was
talking, CCP forces were consolidating their control over
newly taken territory in the north, and when Mao returned
on 11 October 1945, after refusing to disband his forces,
he justified in the context of protracted revolution, his
willingness to negotiate.
Mao made it clear to cadres in Yenan on 17 October that
reducing CCP forces to 20 divisions would not mean handing
over weapons. "The arms of the people, every gun and every
bullet, must all be kept, must not be handed over." He then
reminded cadres that his strategy was to wage a long revo-
lutionary war:
Was our party right or wrong in deciding at its
7th Congress [in April 1945] that we were willing
to negotiate with the KMT provided that they
changed their policy? It was absolutely right.
The Chinese revolution is a long one and victory
can only be won step by step.
As both sides raced to seize Japanese arms and fill the
territorial vacuum, Mao directed the Northeast Bureau of
the CCP to expand its holdings and use the newly-arrived
100,000 Communist troops to hold the rural areas remote
from the existing centers of KMT control. Between the truce
of January and June 1946, both sides took territory in Man-
churia. During the whole period of the Marshall mission in
late 1945 and 1946, Mao tried to disgrace Chiang politically
by advocating a moderate program of "peace, democracy, and
unity" while his armed forces expanded. He relied heavily
on their ability to avoid decisive engagements, to prolong
the stop-start fighting, and to counter-attack against
small KMT units.
In the final series of negotiations of Mao's long revo-
lutionary war, he gave priority to the goal of attaining a
ceasefire and an extension of the Manchurian truce. He
was also concerned in June 1946 about US aid to Chiang's
forces. On the one hand, he relied on General Marshall's
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mediation to gain an immediate cease-fire, to ameliorate
Chiang's demands, and to state his own settlement terms.
Chou En-lai, urbane and persuasive, ably discharged his task
by appearing conciliatory, moderate, and reasonable. On
the other hand, Mao's press and radio in Yenan criticized
US policy with increasing vehemency in an effort to deter
Washington from giving further aid to the KMT. By 26 June
1946, Mao demanded that the US stop all military assistance
to Chiang and withdraw all US troops from the mainland; his
concern with the modern equipment sent to KMT forces had
been deepened. "Let them know that whatever happens, if
we are faced with mechanized war, we shall fight on if
necessary with our hands and feet." (Mao's statement to
Robert Payne in June 1946)
Although his armies were still numerically inferior to
Chiang's Mao issued an inner-party directive on 20 July
warning his forces to prepare to smash Chiang's offensive
by an all-out "war of self-defense," which required the
temporary abandonment of indefensible cities and the opening
of mobile warfare. Mao had no alternative but to fight
against superior forces and on 19 August 1946, shortly after
KMT planes bombed Yenan, Mao was impelled to drop the talking
half of his dual tactic and prepare for all-out civil war,
which his forces won in the straight: forward contest of mili-
tary strength waged between late 1946 and mid-1949.
In drawing an analogy between the Chinese civil war and
the Vietnam war today, CCP propagandists emphasize the pro-
tracted nature of both conflicts and the evolution of weak
into strong Communist forces. But they deliberately de-
emphasize, or avoid any reference to, the talking-half of Mao's
tactic and the temporary half-way station he tried to obtain.
Unlike the Soviet propagandists, they insist that talking
should take place only after the US withdraws its forces from
South Vietnam.
B. The Korean War (1950 to 1953)
Military developments in Korea in the spring of
1951 provide a clear-cut example of the Asian Communists having
been impelled to switch to the talking phase after they had
been hurt in the field. That is, they viewed the large losses
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of Chinese Communist Forces (CCF) combat regulars as the
sufficient cause for drastically reducing the fighting phase.
The military struggle was subordinated to a political "pro-
tracted struggle," the intention being to wear down Western
negotiators.
When, in late November 1950, the CCF entered the war
in force, North Korean Peoples Army (NKPA) combat casualties
were already very high, estimated by the United Nations
Command (UNC) at 200,000 in addition to 135,000 prisoners.
The NKPA had been virtually destroyed and never fought again
above corps strength in the Korean war. The initial CCF
successes against UNC forces from November through December
1950 increased the confidence of the Chinese Communist lead-
ers that they could drive UNC forces from Korea if CCF pres-
sure was sustained. On 22 December 1950 and again on 19
January 1951, Chou En-lai rejected a cease-fire, describing
it as a means to gain "a breathing spell" for UNC forces,
and demanded that prior to any halt in the fighting all
foreign troops must be withdrawn from Korea, US armed forces
must be withdrawn from Taiwan, and Peking's representatives
must be admitted to the United Nations. As UNC forces re-
treated from the Yalu River, however, they took a heavy toll
of CCF combat units. For example, between 27 November and 11
December, the 60,000 men of the eight divisions committed
by the 9th Army Group, Third CCF Field Army, were estimated
by the Marine Corps to have suffered 37,500 combat casualties,
a little over half of them inflicted by ground forces and the
rest by air attack. The 9th Army Group was so damaged by fire-
power that it disappeared from the Korean battlefield for
three months. By mid-January 1951, UNC forces had stopped
the CCF all along the front.
General Ridgway directed UNC forces to comply with his
dictum of "inflicting maximum casualties on the enemy"
rather than gaining ground. The dictum was put into practice
in the months following the UNC offensive which started in
late January 1951. By 9 February, OPERATION PUNCH had an-
nihilated at least 4,200 CCF (body count) and when, on 14
February, CCF infantry for the first time in Korea attacked
in mass waves, UNC forces killed thousands of Chinese at
Chipyong-ni. CCF mass infantry assaults resulted in further
heavy Chinese casualties on the 20th and again on the 21st
with the start of OPERATION KILLER. By 1 March, the entire
Chinese front south of the Han River had collapsed and UNC
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units moved to within 30 miles of the 38th parallel. CCF man-
power and equipment losses continued to be "heavy" after the
start of OPERATION RIPPER on 7 March, and on 14 March, Seoul
was retaken as CCF and small NKPA forces fell back. A series
of manpower-killing advances launched by UNC and ROK units
in late March and early April moved the allied forces across
the 38th parallel. The ranks of the best armies--Lin Piao's
4th Field Army and Chen Yi's 3rd Field Army--which the Chi-
nese leaders used in the first massive assault against the
UNC forces had been seriously depleted. "Now the best troops
are annihilated; this forced the CCF to send replacements
from the 1st and 2nd field armies.... The CCF suffered high
casualties and its faith in victory had been reduced."
(From interrogation report of Assistant Battalion Commander,
40th Army, 4th CCF Field Army)*
General Van Fleet met the first Communist spring offensive,
launched on 22 April 1951, with the manpower-killing tactics
of General Ridgway, and directed his corps commanders on
30 April
Expend steel and fire, not men.... I want so many
artillery holes that a man can step from one to
the other.
Because they used massed infantry assaults against concentra-
ted US artillery, automatic-weapons, and air firepower, units
of six CCF armies suffered a total of 70,000 casualties be-
tween 21 and 29 April and were forced to end their first
spring offensive. Their second spring offensive was even
more destructive to CCF men and materiel.
On 16 May, 21 CCF divisions, flanked by a total of 9
NKPA divisions, opened the second spring offensive along a
105-mile front using human wave tactics against strongly
fortified UNC positions. Although gains of 10 to 15 miles
were made along most of the front, the Communist offensive
was completely spent by 21 May, and UNC forces, which had
recoiled only slightly, lashed back in a major counter-
offensive, depriving the Communists of the opportunity to
place screening forces between their main armies and the
*The prisoner reports that are referred to in this
Annex are, in almost every case, the reports of prisoners
captured and interrogated in March and April 1951--that
is, after the collapse of the January 1951 CCF offensive
and before the even more costly defeats of the spring
of 1951.
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UNC units. UNC counterattacks quickly carried into CCF and
NKPA former assembly areas, where large quantities of sup-
plies were captured as many dumps were overrun. By 1 June,
the CCF and NKPA lost more than 102,000 men, and of the 21
CCF divisions which had initiated the offensive, 16 had
suffered about 50 percent casualties. The following table,
which is based on US Far East Command estimates, indicates
the magnitude of the Communist losses:
East Central Front
Strength Strength Strength % Losses
16 May 22 May 1 June
(Main attack)
12th CCF Army
30,000
17,000
1
0,000
67%
27th CCF Army
31,000
25,000
2
1,000
32%
39th CCF Army
20,000
20,000
1
9,000
5%
40th CCF Army
17,000
(?)
27,000
(?) 2
7,000
(?)
0
II NK Corps
18,000
18,000
1
7,000
5%
V NK Corps
19,000
18,000
1
6,000
16%
10th CCF Army
24,000
24,000
2
3,000
4%
15th CCF Army
32,000
23,000
1
4,000
56%
20th CCF Army
32,000
32,000
3
1,000
3%
26th CCF Army
21,000
17,000
1
9,000
9%
60th CCF Army
31,000
27,000
1
4,000
55%
63rd CCF Army
29,000
22,000
1
5,000
48%
64th CCF Army
28,000
22,000
2
0,000
29%
65th CCF Army
29,000
22,000
1
8,000
38%
I NK Corps
17,000
11,000
1
2,000
29%
VI NK Corps
28,000
28,000
2
8,000
0
406,000
353,000
30
4,000
25%
The table indicates that as of 1 June 1951, the Commu-
nists had sustained a loss of 25 percent of their total 16
May strength in Korea. From 1 to 14 June, they suffered an
additional 49,000 casualties (not included in the table above).
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Most of the CCF prisoners were taken during the last
week of May in frantic efforts to escape, indicating that the
political-control fabric of many CCF units had been shattered,
primarily because large numbers of political officers and non-
coms had been killed. UNC ground pursuit ended on 2 June after
all of South Korea except for a small part on the Western flank
had been cleared of Communist forces, enabling fortification
of the UNC line in depth to begin in the vicinity of the 38th
parallel.
The combined heavy losses to the first wave field
armies--i.e., the CCF 3rd and 4th--and the second wave
armies--i.e., the CCF 1st and 2nd--had significantly re-
duced the quality of the forces which the Chinese leaders
could put in the field in June 1951. Many of their best
combat officers and political cadres had been killed or
captured, partly because of the Maoist practice which re-
quired that they take front-line positions to lead their
troops. Many political officers were killed in combat "be-
cause they spent much of their time with the men in the
front line to lead the battle themselves" (from interroga-
tion report of a private in the 125th Division, 4th CCF
Field Army), and in some companies all officers including
the company commander had been ordered to the front line to
raise the men's "fighting spirit" (from interrogation re-
port of the Company Political officer in the 118th Division,
4th CCF Field Army). "The casualties among the commanders
were high...because they took the lead at the front" (from
interrogation report of Battalion Commander, 64th Army, 1st
CCF Field Army). The massed infantry attacks--used for the
first time by the CCF in Korea in mid-February 1951--facil-
itated the destruction: "We fought only with human wave
tactics; great numbers of men have been sacrificed; it was
indescribably miserable" (from interrogation report of
Private, 42nd Army, 4th CCF Field Army). The Maoist doctrine
of "defeating the enemy's firepower with a superiority in
manpower...is a military idea which is no good.... These
views of mine were shared by most lower-level leaders and
the men in the CCF, though they could not dare to make
them public" (from interrogation of Assistant Battalion
Political Officer, 40th Army, 4th CCF Field Army).
"'Human wave' tactics are supposed to overwhelm the enemy's
firepower with predominance of manpower and thus win the
victory. From my first experience in this war, I found
that this tactic had no sense and no value.... In actual
combat, it was nothing but a mass loss of lives and defeat"
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(from interrogation report of Squad Leader and CCP member,
40th Army, 4th CCF Field Army). The quality and number of
CCF cadres who were lost to the four CCF field armies prob-
ably was the sufficient cause for the Chinese Communist lead-
ers, whose forces comprised about 95 percent of the Communist
combat units in Korea, to switch to the talking phase.
In the disastrous offensives of spring 1951, the CCF
and NKPA sustained an estimated 221,000 casualties from 21
April to 16 June. By 16 June, the Chinese casualties since
the CCF entered the Korean war were approximately 577,000,
including roughly 73,000 non-battle casualties--mostly due
to various epidemics--and 16,500 prisoners. (NKPA casualties
as early as November 1950 had already been very high, estimated
at 200,000 in addition to 135,000 prisoners. No data is re-
ported here on NKPA total casualties since November 1950.)
The first step toward ending the commitment in Korea
was to begin negotiations for a cease-fire, the calculation
apparently having been that political concessions could be
gained by combining protracted talks with propaganda accusa-
tions, while the fighting was kept limited.
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Vice Foreign Minister Chan Han-fu 7ga-
tive and
insis e war must be settled only "in a military
way.") Unexpectedly, in his radio speech, Malik indicated
a change in the Communist position when he avoided linking
the Communists' proposal for a cease-fire to their earlier
demands that the US must withdraw from Taiwan and that Peking
must be admitted to the United Nations. "The Soviet peoples
believe that as a first step, discussions should be started
between the belligerents for a cease-fire and an armistice
providing for the mutual withdrawal of forces from the 38th
parallel."
to attack--that is, "to brand" the US and its allies as "war-
mongers" and to create dissension in the Western camp, their
strategy having been to wage a low-risk, high-volume propa-
ganda war in order to gain concessions at the truce talks.
The Chinese later formulated their switch to the talking
phase as follows:
that they had moved into the war's political phase in order
The Chinese, too, were careful not to admit they had
dropped preconditions. On 25 June, the Peking People's
Daily frontpaged Malik's proposal without acceding to truce
talks. The Chinese did not accede to truce talks publicly
until 1 July, and on 2 July they rationalized the change in
their basic position without acknowledging explicitly that
it had changed. That the Chinese were anxious to deny that 25X1
they were operating from a position of weakness is suggested
by their statements
shortly after Malik speecn. They insisted that "China 25X1
and the USSR are confident of their joint strength, as none
After the five great campaigns [i.e., offensives from
November 1950 to May 1951], the Volunteers switched
over in good time to the strategic line of "engaging
in protracted warfare while conducting positive de-
fense" and strictly subordinated the military struggle
to the political struggle. (NCNA commentary of 28 No-
vember 1958)
The Chinese used the military breathing-spell to improve
their impaired over-all combat capabilities. By the time the
armistice negotiations started on 8 July 1951, the Chinese had
improved their artillery and small-arm stores and had replaced
their manpower losses while the NKPA divisions were rebuilt.
Politically, they had already exploited the theme of seeking
peace and of opposing American "warmongering" with considerable
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success, gaining face internationally and placing themselves
in a favorable propaganda position as the initiators of the
truce talks. They were unwilling to move the talks along
to a mutually acceptable conclusion within any short period.
On the contrary, they used Mao's tactic of wearing down UNC
negotiators in a "protracted struggle" (Peking's phrase of
3 September 1951) in order to extract major concessions.
This tactic of political attrition succeded in frustra-
ting UNC negotiators, but it did not gain the Communists
major concessions. Small-scale but sustained UNC military
pressure on Communist forces in Korea in October 1951 was
reflected in the talks. On 26 October, the Communists in
effect dropped their demand that the demarcation line be
moved down to correspond with the 38th parallel. On the other
hand, they gained a 30-day de facto cease-fire from 27 No-
vember to 27 December, enabling them to further strengthen
front-line defenses and to augment unit strength.
The Chinese desired a political victory together with a
military truce, and as the talks centered on the prisoner
issue, they adamantly refused to accept a political setback.
The major deadlock on the matter of voluntary repatriation of
prisoners prolonged the talks from April 1952 to July 1953, inas-
much as the Chinese insisted on the forcible return of all
CCF (and NKPA) prisoners in order to avoid a major propaganda
defeat if large numbers were to opt for the West. The Commu-
nists would not recognize the UNC stand on voluntary repatri-
ation as a valid principle and argued that it was in conflict
with the Geneva Convention which required a compulsory, all-
for-all exchange. As an alternative, they calculated that
if a relatively small number would resist repatriation--
that is, about 16,000 of a total of 132,000 CCF and NKPA
prisoners--they could tacitly agree to the UNC screening
process.
Both the Communists and the UNC were shocked by the re-
sults of the screening process after about only half had been
questioned. Over 40,000 of about 65,000 prisoners screened
indicated that they would resist repatriation to China and
North Korea, but the UNC had given the Communist negotiators
an estimate of 116,000 willing to return of the total 132,000
prisoners. When, on 19 April, the Communists were informed
that only 70,000 would return without the use of force, the
CCF Colonel Tsai was speechless, asked for a recess, and on
the following day--apparently on instructions from Peking--
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said that the UNC's earlier estimate of 116,000 was a far
cry from 70,000. It was "completely impossible for us to
consider" and "you flagrantly repudiated what you said be-
fore." Because the Communists had been stung once by the
screening procedure, they indicated they would have nothing
more to do with it.
Small, division-scale battles continued in the field,
but the Communists were still unwilling to change the nature
of the war into that of major offensive actions. They tried
to deflect politically damaging charges of inhumanity on the
prisoner issue by launching a concerted propaganda campaign,
accusing the US--starting in late February 1952--of waging
"bacteriological warfare" in North Korea and Manchuria.
More importantly, Communist-instigated riots in the POW
camps were intended to undercut the UNC position on voluntary
repatriation by discrediting the entire screening process.
In the POW camps, the Communist soldiers shifted their re-
sponsibilities from military to political goals. Close
coordination was established between the POW camps and the
Panmunjom truce talks. On 20 May 1952, after forcing a con-
trived confession of "compulsory screening" from General
Dodd, who had been held prisoner by the prisoners of the
Koje-do camp, chief negotiator Nam Il charged that
The commandant of your prisoner-of-war camp could
not but confess before the whole world your inhuman
treatment and murderous violence against our cap-
tured personnel, and the criminal and unlawful acts
committed by your side in screening and re-arming
war prisoners by force. (emphasis supplied)
The Communist negotiators adroitly used the Koje-do
incident to discredit the UNC figures and insisted that they
obtain 132,000 prisoners in exchange for 12,000 prisoners
held by them on the principle of an all-for-all exchange and
forcible repatriation. Neither side conceded, and at the
recess of talks on 26 July 1952, a year of negotiation had
produced an estimated 2,000,000 words of discussion and
nearly 800 hours of formal meetings. The prisoner issue
was the only remaining agenda item.
On the battlefield, a military stalemate continued.
Mao had confronted the US with his limited-risk protracted
war. He apparently believed that Washington would continue
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On the battlefield, small-unit actions continued in
localized struggles for hill positions and, although the
Communists had taken losses in October 1952 that had cut
their estimated total strength from 1,008,900 to 972,000
at the end of the month, their total began to climb slowly
again in November as fighting tapered off. Both sides made
the same calculation, namely, that a major offensive would
lead to a very high casualty rate but not a military break-
through.
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The death of Stalin (5 March 1953) permitted the de-
velopment of an entirely new attitude among the Soviet lead-
ers toward East-West tensions in general and toward concluding
an armistice in particular.* Moscow now appeared to be more
anxious to negotiate a quick end to the war than did Peking.
Soviet statements in March following Stalin's death were more
conciliatory toward the West than those of the Chinese. Chair-
man of the Council of Ministers Malenkov stated on 15 March
that "there is no disputed or unresolved question that cannot
be settled peacefully by mutual agreement of the interested
countries." For the first time since the end of World War II,
Moscow Radio on 21 March admitted that the US and Britain had
played a role in winning a "common victory" over the Axis
powers. This followed Foreign Minister Molotov's unexpected
agreement on 18 March to intercede with the North Korean lead-
ers to obtain the release of 10 British diplomats and mission-
aries interned in North Korea since the start of the war. A
further indication of the change in the Soviet attitude was
Malenkov's depiction of the Korean war as a "defensive" op-
eration in his 17 March message to Kim Il-sung on the an-
niversary of a Soviet-Korean agreement. Significantly, it
differed from a similar message to Kim in 1951, when Stalin
had described the war as a "struggle for liberation of the
fatherland," in which any cease-fire would be conditioned
on the withdrawal of US forces from Korea.
Three days after Chou's return from talks with the
post-Stalin leadership in Moscow, the Communists unexpectedly
agreed to a routine UNC offer for an exchange of sick and
wounded prisoners which General Clark had reiterated in his
letter of 26 February. In suggesting that the exchange of
the sick and wounded might be the first step leading to the
"smooth settlement of the entire question of prisoners of
war, thereby achieving an armistice in Korea for which people
throughout the world are longing," the Communists indicated
'The death of Stalin provided the Soviet leaders with the
opportunity to jettison Stalin's more senseless and unproduc-
tive positions and to use methods of flexibility in diplomacy
--such as a variety of goodwill gestures and a diminution of
doctrinal hostility to Western governments. Stalin was con-
cerned about the international situation leading to a general
war, but for reasons of doctrinal obsessions and personal
prestige, he refused to moderate the Soviet attitude toward
the West and toward neutrals, and refused to make concessions
on important international issues dividing the West and the
Communist bloc.
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on 28 March a new and real interest in solving the last
crucial problem blocking a cease-fire agreement. This
was the first indication that the Chinese might be willing
to make a concession on repatriation.
But Mao waged a protracted political struggle as he
prepared to make his retreat on forcible repatriation as
small as possible. The Chinese used ambiguous and face-saving
language in an effort to hold a series of fallback positions,
which they surrendered only after it was clear the UNC would
insist on the voluntary principle. An ambiguous proposal
by Chou En-lai on 30 March--that both sides
should undertake to repatriate immediately after the
cessation of hostilities all those prisoners of war
in their custody who insist upon repatriation and
hand over the remaining prisoners of war to a neutral,
state so as to ensure a just solution to the question
of their repatriation (emphasis supplied)--
left unclear the matter of final disposition of prisoners
who were unwilling to return to China and North Korea. The
Chinese propagandists described Chou's proposal as a "pro-
cedural concession," which it was, as the point that pris-
oners who were unwilling to be repatriated should be handed
over to a neutral country represented a Chinese retreat. Chou
had been deliberately vague in not stating Chinese demands
for forcible repatriation, but Chinese propaganda returned
to the demands by insisting on the principle of total re-
patriation by way of a neutral state. That the Chinese
had made a concession in fact while insisting on the prin-
ciple to cover their retreat is indicated by the statement
of the senior Soviet member of the UN Secretariat, Kas-
saniev, who told a member of the Norwegian delegation on
30 March that Chou's declaration on prisoners was "the
real thing" and that only "technicalities" remain to be
worked out.
The UNC appraised this concession as indicating no
change on the substantive matter of voluntary repatriation,
and they pressed the Communists to clarify their position
on where screening would take place, on its duration, and
on whether the voluntary principle would be part of a cease-
fire agreement. After manipulating the language of their
counter-proposals throughout April, on 7 May the Communists
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made two more key concessions. They dropped the require-
ment that no repatriates should be sent physically to a neu-
tral state and reduced the explaining period from six to
four months. Finally, on 4 June, the Communists' chief ne-
gotiator, Nam Il, using language designed to conceal the Chi-
nese capitulation on forcible repatriation, stated that "ac-
cording to the application of each individual, those who elect
to go to the neutral nations shall be assisted by the Neu-
tral Nations Repatriation Commission and the Red Cross Society
of India." That is, men who refused to return to the Commu-
nist countries could reach non-Communist countries through
the channel of a neutral-nations commission stationed in
Korea, if explanations failed to persuade them to return
home. In this way, Mao accepted voluntary repatriation in a
disguised form. His propagandists stated that ex-prisoners
may go to "neutral states," without making it clear that they
were in fact free to go wherever they chose.
Mao was anxious to still extract a degree of political
prestige before the cease-fire agreement was signed. Face-
saving offensives were launched in June and July by the Commu-
nists to achieve several objectives: (a) to move the line
farther south, (b) to give ROK forces a bloody-nose in order
to convince Rhee that his forces could not "March North,"
and (c) to convince international opinion that the CCF and
NKPA were not weaker than UNC forces and that the Commu-
nist motive in seeking an armistice was not that of avoiding
military defeat. Although suffering heavy losses between
April and July 1953--an estimated total of 134,412--there
were over one million CCF and NKPA forces in Korea, well-fed
adequately clothed, and effectively supported by massed artil-
lery by the time of the signing of the armistice on 27 July.
Mao's capitulation on the principle of forcible repat,ria-
tion--a capitulation which provided the West with a major
propaganda victory--apparently stemmed from several major
considerations.
1. One was pressure from the post-Stalin leadership.
The Soviet leaders were clearly anxious to consolidate their
internal position and to relax international tension. They
were alert to the harder policy taken toward the China
mainland by the new administration of President Eisenhower.
Neither the Soviet nor the Chinese leaders could be certain
that the new administration would keep the war limited in
the event that truce talks remained deadlocked. Chinese ap-
prehension over the possibility of an attack, or at least
a series of substantial raids, from Taiwan was reflected in
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the resumption of recruiting in Shanghai in February and
March 1953 and in defense activity along the south China
coast. Implicit warnings from U.S. officials that Washing-
ton would not accept an indefinite deadlock and Secretary
of State Dulles' explicit statement to Nehru on 22 May--
viz., if a truce could not be arranged, the U.S. could not
be expected to continue to refrain from using atomic weap-
ons--further increased Communist apprehensions.
The post-Stalin leadership
sire move a greater distance from the brink of involve-
ment in the Korean war than Stalin had believed necessary;
they were unwilling to risk an escalation on the battle-
field which might well have provoked extension of U.S. air-
strikes to the China mainland.
2. Mao could perceive no further advantage in continu-
ing the limited war. He was aware that the talking phase--
i.e., the war of political attrition, intended to reduce the
staying power of the UNC on the voluntary repatriation issue--
had failed. The blackmail accusations--that is, American
"warmongering" and "bacteriological warfare," which were
components of the talking phase--had not forced a UNC
concession. His plan of attrition, requiring policy
critics in non-Communist countries to soften up the lead-
ers of enemy governments (while policy critics in the Com-
munist countries were effectively eliminated), did not
provide him with the advantage he calculated would be de-
cisive in inducing a major retreat. Despite his efforts
during the talking phase, the UNC prevailed on the issue of
repatriation, announcing on 21 July that 69,000 Koreans
and 5,000 Chinese would return to Communist control, but
7,800 Koreans and 14,500 Chinese would be non-repatriates.
(Earlier, on 18 June, Rhee had released 25,000 Korean pris-
oners.) Obviously, these figures represented a political
embarrassment to his regime which the new Soviet leaders
had to convince him to accept.
3. Mao wanted to get on with the job of industraliza-
tion. Although political and economic conditions in China
and North Korea probably were not exerting compelling pres-
sure on the Communists to conclude an armistice in the sum-
mer of 1953, the war was probably viewed as injurious to
long-term economic development programs. Political con-
trols had been increased in China during the war and the
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economic strains on the Chinese were probably less severe
in the spring of 1953 than they had been in 1950 and 1951.
But Mao was anxious to begin China's First Five-Year Plan
of economic development, and the North Koreans were aware
that they would have to start virtually from scratch to re-
build.
To sum up, Mao moved into the talking phase in Korea
because his best field armies had suffered very heavy losses
and were retreating under UNC military pressure. He appar-
ently viewed the enormous loss of human lives with revolu-
tionary callousness, but was forced to draw back because
the military capability of his armies had been greatly re-
duced. When confronted with the UNC's demand that no pris-
oners should be forced to return to Communist control, he
engaged in a "protracted struggle" in the hope of forcing
a major concession from the Western powers by combining
division-level battlefield pressure with political wear-
ing-down tactics. But he decided to end the Chinese commit-
ment when UNC presistence and Soviet pressure convinced
him that further intransigence was purposeless and even
harmful to the mainland's economic construction.
C. Vietnam (1953 to 1954)
Near the end of the Korean war, Viet Minh prestige
was steadily increasing, and its military successes and or-
ganizational effectiveness bolstered Ho Chi Minh's confidence
that he could attain a decisive military victory. He was
determined therefore, to prosecute the revolutionary guer-
rilla war more actively and felt under no real compulsion
to move toward the talking phase of his long-term effort
against the French. On the other hand, lack of French mil-
itary success and increasing domestic political pressure to
reduce or close out the commitment in Indochina made a suc-
cession of French premiers and cabinets pessimistic about
ever attaining a military decision over Ho's forces.
Even after General Navarre assumed command in Indochina
on 8 May 1953, the French were unable to revise their losing
strategy in the field despite a much touted (but never imple-
mented) plan for mobile warfare drawn on paper. The force
of 150,000 Vietnamese regulars, 50,000 Vietnamese auxiliaries,
15,000 Laotians, and 10,000 Cambodians that Navarre com-
manded proved unable to take over effectively the job of
static defense, so Navarre was impelled to fall back on the
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old losing policy of tying down and dispersing French and
French Union regulars to defend a series of key strongpoints.
Out of a total of 175,000 regulars and about 55,000 auxiliaries,
there were only seven mobile groups and eight parachute bat-
talions--the equivalent of three divisions--that were not as-
signed to immobile, defensive duties.
In contrast, the Viet Minh was not tied down to static
defense and with about 125,000 regulars, 75,000 full-time
regional and provincial troops, about 150,000 part-time
guerrillas--in short, the operating equivalent of nine regu-
lar divisions--moved freely through the countryside and
chose the place to attack the enemy forces. For example,
strong Viet Minh guerrilla elements together with two Viet
Minh divisions sufficed to contain the 114,000 regular
French Union forces in the Tonkin Delta. The Viet Minh
skill in guerrilla warfare and in infiltrating into areas
under French control seriously reduced Navarre's ability
to take the offensive.
While the French were cursed with the necessity of de-
fending a number of politically important but militarily un-
important points, Navarre was also under political restraint
from Paris. Because of domestic criticism of the war in
Indochina, the French government had directed its commander
in the field to incur the fewest possible number of French
casualties. The Viet Minh, on the other hand, was receiving
strong support, both military and political, from its allies.
The armistice in Korea had enabled Mao to increase signifi-
cantly his aid across the southern China border to Ho's
forces, strengthening their unit firepower and overall mil-
itary capability. All along, Viet Minh regular forces in
northern Indochina continued their gradual evolution from
lightly armed guerrilla bands to a regularly organized mili-
tary force with Chinese and Soviet equipment.
For all these reasons, Ho clearly preferred a complete
military victory and gave no indication that he would be will-
ing to attain less in a negotiated settlement than his forces
could seize on the battlefield.
The post-Stalin Soviet leadership, however, viewed a
softer policy toward East-West military conflicts as a
necessary element in their long-range effort to dissolve
the Western alliance in Europe. They tried to temporize
on every major East-West difference in order to increase
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pressure against the US by its allies for a relaxation of
trade controls, for great power negotiations, and for delays
in rearmament and in European integration. The Soviet lead-
ers calculated that such pressures and frictions would prog-
ressively reduce the West's capability for united action,
as witness Malenkov's statement of the Soviet strategy in
his speech of 8 August 1953:
If today, in conditions of tension in international
relations, the North Atlantic bloc is rent by inter-
nal strife and contradictions, the lessening of this
tension may lead to its disintegration.
This strategy formed the basis of the Soviet campaign of ne-
gotiations,, the pivotal slogan of which had been set forth
by Malenkov in his statement that "there is not a single
controversial or unsettled question which could not be
solved by peaceful means on the basis of mutual agreement of
the interested countries." (Speech of 15 March 1953) But
Ho apparently was unwilling to end the war for Soviet politi-
cal interests, and Moscow was impelled to make a distinction
between the need to settle the Korean war and the need to con-
tinue the Indochina war.
Shortly after Stalin's death (5 March 1953), the Soviet
leaders had made a distinction between the Korean war, which
should be settled, and the Indochinese fight for "national in-
dependence," which should continue. (Pravda article of 11
April 1953) They insisted that the Soviet Union cannot be ex-
pected to "retard the Liberation movement" of colonial peoples.
(Pravda editorial of 25 April 1953) But the Soviet leaders
also tried desperately to deny that their position on Indo-
china cut across their "peace policy and seized upon and
quoted with approval Churchill's remark that the Viet Minh
offensive into Laos was not necessarily a Soviet-inspired
move "inconsistent" with the attitude of the Soviet gov-
ernment," and suggested that the chances for mutual under-
standing between East and West would be improved if other
Western leaders would recognize the real causes of the "lib-
eration movements." (Pravda editorial of 24 May 1953)
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Ho was also aware of the demoralizing effect that
French political disputes were having on French troops in
Indochina and almost certainly viewed this development as
improving Viet Minh chances in the field. The French mil-
itary initiative in Indochina was constantly being tempered
by political considerations in Paris, and on 9 June 1953, a
senior French official in Soigon stated privately that the
confused state of French politics and the political issues in-
volved in handling the Indochina war were complicating Gen-
eral Navarre's task of restoring morale and confidence
in the French officer corps. The Viet Minh continued to
insist inflexibly on their hard-line demand that the basic
condition for negotiations was the complete withdrawal of
French troops. By late July 1953, they had gained effective
control over more than half of the Tonkin population and
were believed to have the military capability of occupying
the entire delta.
The signing of the Korean armistice in late July 1953
provided the Soviet leaders with the opportunity to maneuver
actively for a negotiated settlement of the Indochina war.
During the first two weeks after the armistice, Moscow's
statements directed in large part to the French, established
the line that the Korean truce demonstrated the "victory of
negotiations over force" and that this has given a "new
stimulus" to the struggle for a peaceful solution to the
"dirty war" in Indochina. Whereas prior to the truce, Mos-
cow had attacked suggestions for East-West negotiations
concerning Indochina, by mid-August 1953 it was quoting
with approval demands in the French press for a "Panmunjom"
in Indochina. By contrast, Viet Minh broadcasts in mid-
August 1953 warned that the armistice must not affect the
continuation of the war against the French, who will not
seek an armistice "in a short time," and that "we must
wage a protracted struggle... intensify our fighting so as
to annihilate more enemy troops; this is the only way to
compel the enemy to accept peace in Vietnam."
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As the Soviet leaders began to maneuver for a nego-
tiated settlement, they acted to impress the Chinese leaders
with the political benefits which would accrue to China
in the event of high-level talks. They gave increasing promi-
nence to the big-power status of the Peking regime and de-
clared that "serious current problems" in Asia could not be
resolved without Chinese Communist participation. (Soviet
note to the Western powers of 4 August 1953)
The Chinese, who had been working for several years to
gain wider recognition as the only legitimate government of
China, welcomed this Soviet line. Indicating that Chinese
Communist position was closer to the Soviet position, their
delegate to the World Peace Council called for "step by step
negotiations" of East-West issues. (Speech of 15 June 1953
by Kuo Mo-jo) On 2 September, Peking specifically cited the
Indochina issue as one which could be solved "only by apply-
ing the principle of negotiated settlement," and Chou En-lai
in mid-September privately informed the Swedish ambassador in
Peking that a big-power conference on Korea could also dis-
cuss Indochina--a significant change in Chou's previous posi-
tion that Indochina could not be discussed at such a confer-
ence.
were made at a time when o was still resisting e concept
of negotiations: the "French...and American propaganda cam-
paign, which has the "semblance of peace," is advanced in
the "vain hope of weakening the will of our people, who ask
only to fight... however painful and long." (Ho Chi Minh
speech on 2 September 1953) Ho continued to insist on a
"protracted struggle," inasmuch as his forces had not been
hurt in the field. On the contrary, in the fall of 1953,
Viet Minh military capabilities were at a new high point
as a result of the marked increase in Chinese aid, the rela-
tively light casualties suffered during the previous cam-
paign season, and the excellent state of its intelligence re-
garding French troops dispositions and tactical plans.
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The attitude of the Viet Minh leaders at the time is
further confirmation of the generalization that the Asian
Communists have been unwilling to begin the talking-phase
of their dual tactics at a time when they are militarily in
an advantageous position and have not suffered high casual-
ties in the field.
French operations to counter expanded Viet Minh guer-
rilla warfare in the southern Tonkin Delta area had met with
very limited success in October 1953 and at the cost of heavy
casualties. After an area was "cleared" by the French,
the Viet Minh reappeared quickly and Navarre's men, like
those of Stalin, his defensive-minded predecessor, were
tied down and dispersed in a static defense of provincial
crossroads waiting for the Viet Minh to come at them again
As certain French cabinet officials and many members
of the National Assembly increased their demands that Prem-
ier Laniel and Foreign Minister Bidault move to end the
costly war by negotiations, Ho apparently was brought un-
der increasing pressure from Moscow and Peking to agree to
enter the talking-phase of the Viet Minh effort in
Indochina. Quoting Izvestiya in its Vietnamese-language
broadcast of 24 September, Moscow Radio declared that there
exists no international misunderstanding which could not
be settled peaceably.
In April 1953, a senior French official had indicated
to American State and Defense Department officers that the
French were fighting in Indochina to maintain a position of
strength from which they could negotiate an "honorable"
settlement and that the French government was convinced
that France could not win the war in Indochina any more
than the US could win the Korean war. In early October
1953, this theme was taken up again by a French Foreign
Ministry spokesman who indicated to American officials that
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the only way France saw of ending the war lay through a ne-
gotiated settlement with the Viet Minh.
lai accepted the US proposals for a meeting to discuss the
time and place for the Korean political conference, and
Peking's propaganda continued to point to the need to set-
tle international problems through peaceful means.
Ho was clearly reluctant to switch to the talking-
phase, but because of Soviet and Chinese pressure as well
as domestic pressure on the French government to agree to
bilaterals, he apparently believed that even a hedged offer
to talk would improve his international prestige without
hindering Viet Minh military initiatives. In their note of
26 November to the Western powers, the Soviet leaders had
indicated their desire to prepare the way for a five-power
East-West foreign ministers' conference at which Communist
China would be present, and they apparently insisted that
Ho should at least appear to be less adamantly against talks
with the French than he had been. (Politburo member Truong
Chinh had declared on 25 September 1951 that peace negotia-
tions would be "illusory" and that the French would have to
be expelled as a necessary condition of peace, and Ho per-
sonally stated on 2 September 1953 that "We know that only
the resistance, however painful and long it may be, can give
us victory and restore peace to us.")
When, in late October 1953, Ho began to bring his posi-
tion a step closer to that of Peking and Moscow, he accepted
the principle of negotiations but insisted on the practice
of continuing military methods to gain a settlement satis-
factory to the Viet Minh. He conceded through his spokesmen
that "every international problem can be settled by negotia-
tions" (28 October) and that "to stop the Vietnam war through
negotiations is completely necessary and also possible" (23
November). But in his reply to questions posed by the Stock-
holm paper, Expressen, Ho on 29 November in effect demanded
a complete French surrender. He asked the French to begin
bilateral negotiations by making a peace proposal--which Ho
was only prepared to discuss--to stop fighting, to recognize
On 10 October, Chou En-
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the Viet Minh regime, and, by implication, to withdraw from
Vietnam. Ho implied that, in return, he might not continue
his war until the Viet Minh gained a complete military vic-?
tory.* Actually, he continued to fight, and despite some
displays of French aggressiveness, the military initiative
was with the Viet Minh, whose forces in late November 1953
included divisions in Tonkin so disposed as to permit at-
tacks against northwest Tonkin, against the northwest corner
of the delta, or against Laos.
Ho's hedged proposal of 29 November was a three-pronged
exercise of considerable political skill. It (1) advanced
the Soviet and Chinese "peace offensive, (2) further iso-
lated the Laniel government from the National Assembly and
the French press, and (3) revived and deepened Vietnamese
distrust of the French, who were viewed as being at the
brink of a "pacifist trap" and who might decide against a
greater military effort in the field. At the same time,
Ho had his own paramount interest to protect, namely, win-
ning a complete military victory, and in the first Viet
Minh comment on his proposal, it was made clear to Moscow
and Peking that peace could be attained only through "pro-
longed" military struggle and that the Viet Minh had no
illusion that peace could be easily won. (Viet Minh news
agency broadcast of 7 December 1953)
In France, Premier Laniel, supported by Foreign Minister
Bidault, rejected immediate negotiations with the Viet Minh
in the illusory hope that future negotiations could be at-
tained on more favorable terms after military successes in
the field.
Ho's generals continued their highly successful strategy
of dispersing French forces in static defense positions while
moving into areas of their own choosing. When, in early De-
cember 1953, General Navarre made the'recently captured Dien
Bien Phu a strongpoint to prevent moves into northern Laos,
some Viet Minh forces began to move artillery into the sur-
rounding area and, in late December, other Viet Minh forces
swept southward into central Laos.
*Ho stated that "if the French government wishes to.have
an armistice and settle the question through negotiations.,
we will be ready to meet the French proposal."
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This invasion of Laos by the Viet Minh was treated cau-
tiously by Moscow and Peking, who muted reports of the new
development in their commentaries and stressed the demand for
an end to the war. The Soviet leaders, who were searching
desperately for "proof" that Ho really intended to negotiate,
centered their commentaries on this proposal of 29 November.
"The recent statement by President Ho Chi Minh on his pre-
paredness to examine a French proposal on an armistice,
should such a proposal be made, constituted striking proof
of the peaceful intentions of the Democratic Republic of
Vietnam." (Moscow Radio commentary of 10 January 1954)
While initiating little independent comment, Peking con-
tinued to rebroadcast foreign statements alleging that only
US pressure prevented Paris from seeking an end to the Indo-
china war.
By contrast, the Viet Minh generally avoided the matter
of a negotiated settlement and reminded its forces that
real peace could be won "only by pushing forward the armed
struggle and by dealing deadly blows at the enemy until he
is compelled to demand negotiations." (Viet Minh radio
broadcast of 24 December 1953) By mid-January 1954, when
at least six battalions of Viet Minh were maintaining pres-
sure on French forces in central Laos and more than 18 bat-
talions were blocking all avenues of exit from Dien Bien
Phu and bringing in artillery for the siege, the divergence
between Ho, on the one hand, and the Soviet and Chinese
leaders, on the other, remained clear-cut and reflected his
reluctance to enter the talking-phase when his forces were
consolidating portions of northwest Tonkin. By insisting
that Paris submit a formal proposal for talks to the Viet
Minh, Ho had placed the onus for avoiding negotiations on
the French government, which continued to equivocate on the
issue.
His forces held the initiative throughout Indochina as
the result of widespread simultaneous offensive actions by
the time the four-power Berlin conference convened on 25
January 1954. The drive into northern Laos of an estimated
12,000 Viet Minh troops, continued encirclement of Dien Bien
Phu, the capture of small French posts in southern and cen-
tral Laos, and extensive harassing operations in the Tonkin
delta forced a further overall dispersal of French regular
forces. On 3 February, the American army attache in Saigon
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reported that staff thinking and procedures at French head-
quarters were of the "1935-39 vintage" and that Navarre's
strategy was identical to that of the defense-minded Salan.
Navarre tied up 12 battalions of regular troops at Dien Bien
Phu, only to be by-passed by the Viet Minh, who had moved
into portions of Laos but had not been engaged even where the
French had a three-to-one advantage. French patrolling from
strongpoints was "the exception rather than the rule," re-
flecting apparent instructions from Paris to Navarre that
he must conduct a "minimum-casualty holding action" with
a view to eventual big-power negotiations.
As domestic pressure to end the war increased on the
French government in the absence of victories in the field,
two alternatives to bilateral negotiations with the Viet
Minh were considered: (1) an international negotiated set-
tlement or (2) "internationalization" of the war through
UN--i.e., American--involvement.
Regarding (1), Foreign Minister Bidault reported from
the Berlin conference on 31 January his intention to work
for "joint discussion of the Indochina question by those
principally concerned," and suggested an approach to For-
eign Minister Molotov to try to end the war. Bidault ex-
pressed the hope that he had convinced Secretary Dulles
earlier that the reasoning behind American acceptance of
an armistice in Korea was even more valid for Indochina.
Military prospects were dismal. A French officer in Sai-
gon, responsible for estimates of the over-all situation
in Indochina, told the American military attache on 8 Feb-
ruary that the situation in the Tonkin delta was "rotten,"
that a French military victory there was impossible, and
that the population was turning increasingly to the Viet
Minh. According to Ambassador Heath, who spoke with Gen-
eral Navarre on the same day, the General's main concern
was the effect any losses he might incur would have in
Paris, and when the visiting French air force chief of
staff said that France could take its officer losses for
only one year more, Navarre replied that if that was the
spirit in France, it had better pull out now. General Le
Blanc, chief of staff of the French army, also stated in
Saigon that France should use its officers and troops for
NATO and appeared to catalogue the reasons why the war could
never be won.
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Regarding (2), almost all French spokesmen had vig-
orously opposed internationalization of the conflict.
Speaking for himself, Pierre de Chevigne, French secre-
tary of state for the army, told the American consul in
Hanoi on 18 February that he would not be averse to "in-
ternationalization." He said that American equipment
alone could not alter the situation, implicitly rejected
the build-up of the Vietnamese army as a substitute for
American participation, and said that nothing was to be
gained by seeking a political arrangement with the Viet
Minh. His opinion, however, was atypical..,. By contrast,
French officials in Paris, largely for fear of giving a
pretext for Chinese intervention, continued to rebuff
firmly any suggestion that American troops would be
necessary.
The Communists hit hard at the possibility of Ameri-
can involvement in responding to speculation in the West-
ern press, reflecting their own calculation that the in-
creasing Viet Minh initiatives in the field might impel
"direct intervention" by Washington. One of Molotov's
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chief aims at the Berlin meeting in agreeing to the Geneva
conference was to block any possible increase in American
military assistance to the French. The Chinese Communists,
satisfied with the Berlin agreement as a first step in
gaining general acceptance by the international community,
warned that increased American involvement in Indochina
was making the issue of Geneva more complicated. Ho Chi
Minh expressed his concern when, on 3 March, he accused
the US of "another step" toward direct intervention in
"allowing the American air force to participate" in the
Indochina war.
minister Bidault's public statement that it was not neces-
sary to invite Ho's representative to Geneva and insisted
that "it is impossible to solve the Indochina problem with-
out considering the lawful right of her people." As Soviet.
propaganda continued to press for Viet Minh participation at
Geneva, Ho was provided a clear insight into his prospective
political gains: unprecedented international prestige, inten-
sification of French-Vietnamese frictions, demoralization of
French forces in the field, and reduction of the risk of
direct American involvement in the war. Nevertheless, he
clearly preferred bilaterals with the French (in order to
prevent US pressure on Laniel to remain intransigent) and
considered the attendance at a multilateral conference
would reduce his position of strength. He finally agreed,
however, to multilaterals.
Moscow and Paris began to set forth their positions
before the Geneva conference was convened. On 4 March,
a Soviet embassy official in London told American officials
that if the US and France object to an amalgamation of the
Vietnam and Viet Minh administrations, "they can agree to
a division along the 16th parallel." This first Soviet
comment on Geneva suggested that Moscow was the most active
advocate of partition which would deprive the French of the
heavily populated, strategic Tonkin Delta and open the way
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for Viet Minh control of the whole country. Premier Laniel
set forth the French position publicly on 5 March by calling
for the complete withdrawal of all rebel troops from Laos
and Cambodia, establishment of a neutral zone around the
Red River delta, and withdrawal of all Viet Minh troops from
that area. He was aware that these terms would be unaccept-
able to Ho, as was later conceded by the Foreign Ministry
official who formulated them in order to forestall any Viet
Minh offers for bilateral negotiations before Geneva. Rumors
in Paris of direct French-Viet Minh contacts were not con-
firmed, and on 9 March, the Geneva alternative enabled Laniel
to resist pressure for immediate bilateral talks with the
Viet Minh.
All the while, Viet Minh tactical capabilities were
continuing to improve, particularly with respect to anti-
aircraft artillery and heavier infantry weapons acquired from
China. Each succeeding campaigning season left the French
occupying fewer outposts and the Viet Minh spread over larger
areas of the intervening countryside.
Before entering the talking-phase of the Indochina ef-
fort, Ho apparently decided to demonstrate Viet Minh strength
in the field. He made a major military move for political
reasons; on 12 March, Viet Minh battalions hit strongpoints
at Dien Bien Phu. He was willing to accept high losses--
from 4,000 to 5,000 killed and wounded out of a total of
In early April during the siege, Ho indicated to Com-
munist newsman Wilfred Burchett that the French situation
at Dien Bien Phu was hopeless. Ho placed a helmet upside
down on a table, and compared the helmet's rim to the
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hills around Dien Bien Phu, saying: "They shoot up and we
shoot in." He apparently calculated that loss of Dien
Bien Phu would reduce Vietnamese army morale, already
lowered by talk of an imminent truce; seriously discredit
the "new" strategy of Navarre; give the Viet Minh a tre-
mendous boost in prestige immediately prior to the Geneva
conference, thus increasing the incentive for defection by
Vietnamese nationalists; and increase French domestic pres-
As Laniel and Bidault parried domestic demands for di-
rect French - Viet Minh negotiations, they were also sub-
jected to increasing Soviet pressure before the Geneva con-
ference began. Soviet officials in Washington insisted to
French officials on 30 March that direct talks between
French and Viet Minh representatives should be held "in
order to achieve a cease-fire prior to Geneva." The So-
viets returned to the matter of bilaterals even after the
conference began, and on 5 May, Molotov told Foreign Sec-
retary Eden that the French and "Indochinese" should work
out an armistice "themselves."
Moscow and Peking were anxious to disparage American
foot-dragging and used Secretary Dulles' speech on 29 March,
in which he suggested that the West should take "united ac-
tion" to prevent a Communist seizure of Indochina, to spur
Paris into bilaterals. They were particularly fearful that
the American preference for the French to fight would stiffen
Bidault further at Geneva and make French concessions more
difficult to extract from him there, flanked by Secretary
Dulles. They were also concerned about American statements
regarding eventual if not immediate involvement: Pravda
on 11 April claimed that the real target of US threats was
China, and the Peking People's Daily declared on 21 April
that "faced with armed aggression, the Chinese people will
certainly not refrain from doing something about it." On
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28 April, Chou En-lai made another noncommittal deterrent
statement: the Chinese "most emphatically will not tolerate
aggression against us by any country" and the US is looking
toward a "new world war." At the same time, the Chinese
stepped up their already large military and medical aid
shipments to the Viet Minh for the Dien Bien Phu siege.
The series of assaults on Dien Bien Phu throughout
April indicated that Ho intended to take the strongpoint
even at a very high cost. Despite murderous losses, which
in late April and early May were variously estimated at
about two divisions (about 18,000 men), Ho's forces con-
tinued to attack in intermittent phases. Their estimated
strength was about 20,000 infantry plus some 9,000 support-
ing troops, as compared with less than 10,000 French Union
Troops. There were 134,000 French and Vietnamese regulars
in the Tonkin Delta, but the greater part of this number
was still tied down in static defense, leaving the rela-
tively few mobile units to counter the increased Viet Minh
activity.
By the start of the Geneva conference on 27 April 1954,
the overall military situation in Indochina and the par-
ticularly serious situation at Dien Bien Phu had provided
Ho, and his Soviet and Chinese partners, with a position of
considerable strength to use to offset American warnings
about possible internationalization of the war. of-- 25X6
ficials privately made various suggestions for a sett ement
--such as partition, nation-wide elections, and an immediate
cease-fire. Calculating that the French would be more amen-
able to some sort of partition than to a coalition govern-
ment, Soviet diplomats on the opening day of the conference
privately suggested to American officials that the idea of
partition would meet China's requirement that its southern
border should be buffered by a Communist regime.
The Soviet-Chinese effort to soften up the French on
the issue of partition was made in the face of the opposi-
tion of Ho, who like Bao Dai, claimed sovereignty over all
Vietnam. As early as 4 March 1954, a Soviet official had
suggested privately to American officials that partition
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At the Geneva conference, the Viet Minh delegate, Pham
Van Dong, tried to use military developments in Indochina
as a backdrop in demanding major French concessions. Dien
Bien Phu fell on 7 May, with Viet Minh losses estimated at
about 21,000, of which about one-half were killed and
French Union losses of about 18,000 men. On 10 May, Pham
Van Dong set for maximum conditions in the form of an
eight-point resolution, the main points of which were
political which were linked with military provisions for
a cease-fire: French recognition of the independence of
the three Indochinese communist-sponsored states, withdrawal
of "foreign troops," elections in each state, and a total
cease-fire involving occupation by each side of unspecified
areas, no reinforcements, and a mixed control commission.
Partition was not mentioned. By tying the French-desired
cease-fire to political concessions, the Viet Minh put them-
selves in the position of using the military weapon to ex-
tract a French political retreat.
When a conference deadlock was threatened by French
determination to deal with military matters first (i.e.
to effect a cease-fire) and Viet Minh insistence that po-
litical and military questions be dealt with together, Chou
En-lai and Molotov, playing major negotiating roles, moved
adroitly to avoid any impasse that could be used by the US
as an excuse for intervention in the fighting. In his major
speech of 14 May, Molotov had explicitly rejected the French
terms for an armistice because Bidault's formula did not deal
with political questions. However, at the secret session
on the 17th, he conceded that military questions could
discussed first. Chou En-lai also retreated;
Ho calculated that negotiations could continue together
with the fighting for some time without leading to American
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involvement. A Viet Minh commentary of mid-May seemed to
be directed at reminding the Chinese and Soviets that there
was no pressing need to end the war:
We still remember the Korean lesson which taught us
that one could negotiate and fight at the same time
...for two years.
Ho was clearly determined to protract the talking-phase
to gain as much territory of Vietnam, Laos, and Cambodia
as the French were willing to concede. As the Viet Minh
augmented its forces in the Tonkin Delta with units from
the Dien Bien Phu operations, helping to compress French-
controlled areas there, Ho's delegate at Geneva apparently
was instructed to insist again on political concessions
in exchange for a cease-fire. He hardened the Communist
position, which Molotov and Chou En-lai had been making
increasingly more flexible.
Pham Van Dong on 25 May insisted on French political
concessions before agreeing to end the fighting. He linked
any cease-fire prospect with arrangements for "Khmer Is-
serak and Pathet Lao," the Communist-contrived regimes in
Cambodia and Laos, and in effect denied that military and
political questions could be separated. Dong also took a
hard line on the Soviet-Chinese concept of partition, pro-
posing the "readjusting of areas under control of each
state...taking into account the actual areas controlled,
including population, and strategic interests." Inasmuch
as Chinese Communist maps showed the Viet Minh as holding
most of Vietnam, about half of Laos, and parts of Cambodia,
the Viet Minh proposal was a demand for considerable ter-
ritory--more than its units held on the ground.
On 29 May, however, an agreement was reached to have
representatives of both commands meet at Geneva to study
the disposition of forces prior to a cease-fire. Molotov
and Chou apparently were the prime movers on the Communist
side in making this concession. Moscow and Peking, whose
policy was centered on splitting the Americans from the
French and preventing a system of alliances from forming in
Asia, were apprehensive regarding the demands of most
French military leaders and some Laniel cabinet members that
the US enter the war. Accordingly, Molotov and Chou worked
hard to attain some kind of agreement at Geneva and to pre-
vent an abortive conference from leading to internationaliza-
tion of the war. Militarily, Ho was keeping up the pressure:
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a captured Viet Minh document of late May 1954 directed Viet
Minh commanders in the Tonkin Delta area to continue their
harassing and guerrilla activities for an unspecified period
"pending commitment of the battle corps."
Opposition of the French to the idea of partition be-
gan to weaken as they pressed for a cease-fire with controls,
and on 5 June, the French minister for the Associated States
told Ambassador Heath in Geneva that he favored partition as
a solution at about the 16th parallel--i.e., at about the
line suggested by the Soviets earlier.
The negotiations took a new turn as the Laniel govern-
ment tried to survive the National Assembly debate on Indo-
china which began on 9 June. On the preceding day, the Com-
munists indicated that they would use the weakened govern-
ment position to gain their maximum demands; Molotov re-
turned to a hard line, similar to that of Pham Van Dong as
set forth on 10 May. Molotov demanded independence for
Vietnam, Laos, and Cambodia, free elections in these states,
and withdrawal of all foreign troops. He seemed to believe
that the Laniel government would either move toward the
maximum Communist position or be replaced by a government
pledged to negotiate an immediate end to the war, and on
9 June, a Soviet Pravda writer told an American journalist
in Geneva that no progress on Indochina was possible until
after the French government crisis was resolved. On 11
June, a French official in Saigon told the American charge
there that all members of the endangered Laniel cabinet ex-
cept the Premier, Bidault, and Schumann had "written off
the war" and were anxious to end it. On 12 June, the Laniel
government fell, losing the vote of confidence in the Na-
tional Assembly after the debate on the war; on 18 June,
Pierre Mendes-France took over as the new Premier, and
he promised to close out the fighting by 20 July.
In the military conversations between the French and
the Viet Minh in Geneva, the latter asked for direct control
of about three-fourths of Vietnam, half of Laos, and much
of Cambodia. In the field, General Ely stated privately on
15 June that the military situation in the Tonkin Delta was
precarious and that French and Vietnamese troops were "very,
very tired." The Viet Minh maintained a capability for a
full-scale attack on the delta.
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The ever-present prospect of American involvement again
impelled Molotov and Chou to keep the conference alive with
small concessions. On 16 June, Molotov tried to break the
deadlock over the composition of the international truce
supervisory commission, and on the same day, Chou made a
settlement proposal which implied withdrawal of Viet Minh
forces from Laos and Cambodia. Under pressure, Pham Van
Dong also suggested postponement of a political settlement
for those two states. Thus by the time the Geneva confer-
ence terminated its Korea phase and temporarily adjourned,
the Soviets and Chinese seemed to have moved back in effect
to a position envisaging a partition of Vietnam and a neu-
tral Laos and Cambodia. When Pierre Mendes-France took
over as the new Premier pledged to seek an end to the war be-
fore 20 July, the road was opened to a final settlement.
Chou then moved to apply pressure on Ho to drop his
demands for retaining troops in Laos and Cambodia and for
a partition line as far south as the 14th parallel. He met
with Ho at Nanning on the China-Vietnam border in earl
July, on his return from India and Burma
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The final settlement on 20 July indicated that the Viet
Minh had retreated on three points. They accepted the parti-
tion of Vietnam (they had insisted on "unity" of Vietnam) and
with the line at the 17th parallel (they had wanted the 14th);
they agreed to withdraw from areas south of that line in
Vietnam and from all of Laos and Cambodia; and they accepted
July 1956 as the date for national elections--a two-year de-
lay contrasting with their demand for only a six-month delay.
Pham Van Dong had come to Geneva with the apparent ex-
pectation that the Viet Minh's increasingly strong military
position in the field would enable him to extract consider-
able concessions from the French to open the way for Commu-
nist forces to further penetrate Laos and Cambodia and con-
solidate everything above the 14th parallel in Vietnam.
But Soviet and Chinese pressures, stemming from larger policy
considerations and fear of American intervention, frustrated
this hope for maximum French concessions. Although Ho per-
ceived certain advantages in ending the military phase--that
is, his forces could take territory by political subversion
and, therefore, his effort would be less costly in terms of
manpower and safer in terms of non-involvement by the US--
he had not expected to have to make so many political con-
cessions. These concessions were later viewed by him and
his lieutenants as a major mistake. His forces had not been
decimated in the field, as the Chinese armies had been in
Korea in the spring of 1951 when Mao moved to the talking-
phase of the Korean war. He probably was concerned about
the prospect of US intervention, but Moscow and Peking
were clearly more concerned about the consequences to their
policy of internationalization of the war. He was in a posi-
tion to negotiate from strength and to do so for a long
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time--"two years" as his radio declared in mid-May 1954--but
he found himself caught in a Sino-Soviet political web and
was persuaded not to use his growing military capability to
force major concessions.
Viet Minh forces in the delta following the fall of Dien
Bien Phu were capable of launching a damaging full-scale
offensive, but it never took place. In mid-July, one Com-
munist journalist stated that he assumed Chou had pressed
Ho to keep the fighting at a low boil when the Geneva con-
ference was in its last phase. The Chinese indicated their
national interest in settling the fighting-phase when, on
23 July, one of their journalists at Geneva declared pri-
vately: "We have won the first campaign for the neutraliza-
tion of all Southeast Asia," the implication being that only
Thailand was a probable area for the establishment of an
American base. Chou in late July, after the Geneva agree-
ments were concluded, stated on two occasions that Asian
states must work out their "own" security arrangements,
and Pravda on 22 July emphasized that the area will not be
permitted to join any "aggressive groupings."
By contrast, the North Vietnamese leaders were far
less categorical in priasing the Geneva conference agree-
ments. Pham Van Dong declared at the closing session on
21 July that the problem of Vietnamese unification remained:
"We shall achieve this unity, and we shall achieve it just as
we have won the war." This contradicted the Pravda statement
of 22 July that Vietnamese independence had been won." On
22 July, Ho renewed his exhortations for a "long and arduous
struggle" and declared that the division of Vietnam was only
a temporary and transitional arrangement: "Central, South
and North Vietnam are all our land, and our country undoubt-
edly will be unified, the compatriots throughout our country
will certainly be liberated." The Viet Minh ambassador in
Peking, Hoang Van Hoan acknowledged to Indian correspondents
on 22 July that despite the strong military position of the
Viet Minh, it had to compromise on several vital points,
notably the timing of elections (put off for two years),
the question of French troop withdrawal, and the location
of the temporary demarcation line at the 17th parallel, in
order to secure peace in Vietnam. The leaders of the "Re-
sistance Government Khmer and Pathet Lao,".repeated Ho's
view that the agreements are but a "first step" and called
for a long, hard struggle.
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Neither Moscow nor Peking revived propaganda support
for these resistance phantom-governments. Moscow made little
effort to describe the agreement on Vietnam as "temporary"
or to stress that portion of the conference declaration dis-
claiming any intent to permanently partition Vietnam; that
is, the Soviet leaders were satisfied with partition.
Peking stressed its own new international prestige and the
boost to the cause of "collective peace in Asia" provided by
the agreements, which were a manifestation of Chou's five
principles as declared jointly with Nehru, U Nu, and Ho.
To sum up, the Soviet and Chinese leaders induced Ho
to enter the talking-phase of the Indochina war because:
1. It was a major problem which stimulated Western
defense efforts and threatened to make a mockery of the
"peace offensive" designed to impede these efforts. Soviet
policy in Europe, devised to produce schisms and paralysis
in France and to split Britain from the US, required that
an end be brought to this war, just as the Korean war had
been removed as a defense-stimulating conflict.
2. Peking as well as Moscow feared that any further
military advances in Indochina by the Viet Minh might have
led to the formation of a strong anti-Communist alliance in-
cluding some of the previously uncommitted Asian states.
Chou En-lai informed Indian, Pakistani, Indonesian, and
Burmese leaders in his talks with them that their security
could be guaranteed by his "five principles." At the
same time, Peking insisted that the Geneva agreements
barred all three Indochina states from any military al-
liance.
3. With the example of Korea before them, the Chinese and
Soviet leaders could not ignore the possibility that a con-
tinued offensive in Indochina would greatly increase the
risk of American intervention and a global war. They pre-
ferred a far lower level of risk, namely, political subver-
sion carried out by the Viet Minh. They "paid off" Ho by
continuing (in violation of the Geneva agreements) to sup-
ply military equipment to make his army a modernized fight-
ing force.
The developments in 1953 and 1954 have influenced the
attitude of Ho and his lieutenants toward the current war.
The clear awareness that they had been impelled, primarily
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by Moscow and Peking, to stop at a half-way station on the
road to total military victory in Vietnam, apparently has
made them very reluctant to stop half way again.
D. Implications for Vietnam Today
It is impossible to exaggerate the importance of
this historical lesson for Ho. It sustains his hostility
toward any suggestion that he again stop at a half-way sta-
tion on the road to control of all Vietnam. An official
of the DRV embassy in Havana told a leftist journalist on
3 May 1966 that
We thought we had achieved something with the French
by compromising (in 1954) and it turned out to be
shaky. Only through full and unconditional indepen-
dence can we achieve stability....We are determined
to continue to fight until we achieve total victory,
that is, military and political, and the Americans
leave and accept our four points. (emphasis supplied)
The Chinese leaders, too, apparently believe that they had
made a mistake in pressuring Ho to stop at a half-way sta-
tion in 1954. Chou En-lai told a visiting youth delegation
on 1 January 1966 that
China will continue her absolute support of Vietnam.
To tell the truth, I personally signed the Geneva
agreement and I regret that my having done so is caus-
ing trouble for our comrades in Vietnam. I am not
going to be deceived by the American peace campaign
this time.
Actually, it was the Soviet-Chinese (not the "American")
peace offensive that required an end to the war, and Molo-
tov was Chou's partner in persuading Ho to make concessions
to the French.
Ho is now in a stronger position to reject any Soviet
suggestions that he should close out the fighting, and So-
viet influence on him is as strong or as weak as Moscow's
positive support for the war. That is, when Moscow avoided
involvement (i.e., when Khrushchev decided to stand clear
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of providing important political and military aid to Hanoi),
Soviet influence was at an all-time low. On the other hand,
when Moscow incurred a degree of commitment (i.e., when the
post-Khrushchev leadership decided to supply Hanoi with mil-
itary aid and political support against the US), Soviet in-
fluence increased. However, it will never be as great as
it had been in 1954.
The Chinese leaders have helped to make this impossi-
ble. In contrast to 1954, they are now the opponents, not
the partners, of the Soviets. Ho's militancy is bolstered
by Mao's support, which itself stems from special personal
requirements. That is, Mao is personally far more preten-
tious than Ho--as witness the current irrationalities of the
Mao cult in China--and with increasing neuroticism insists
that his unique doctrine of "people's war" should legitimatize
his claim to be the successor of Lenin and Stalin as the
"leader of the international Communist movement." Unlike
Ho, whose sights are centered on his own national war, Mao
has a larger anti-Soviet doctrinal point to make: pro-
tracted small wars are effective in all under-developed areas
and must be the main strategy against the US.
Mao has a considerable personal stake in proving to ac-
tive doubters--namely, the Soviets, the East Europeans,
the neutrals, and even men in his own party and military
establishment--that his principle of protracted small war
will work against the superior American military capability
that if the Vietnamese Communists
military operations
they will make the Americans admit their defeat
and drive them out....The most important thing
...is to prove this by actual deed. Unless we
defeat the enemy, we will not be believed. (em-
phasis supplied)
Any sign, therefore, from Hanoi that Ho is willing even to
consider the matter of negotiating a cease-fire or a cessa-
tion of US air strikes against the North before a total
withdrawal of American troops occurs is critic by Peking.
For example, using a double-edged statement, intended for
neutrals and for the North Vietnamese, Chou En-lai on 2 Sep-
tember 1965 warned that: "As long as the US does not with-
draw its troops, it can carry on endless talks with you so
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that it may hang on there indefinitely." (emphasis supplied)
That this was a clear warning to Hanoi is suggested by the
fact that Chou made the statement to the DRV ambassador at
the North Vietnamese embassy in Peking.
Despite the constant concern of the Chinese leaders
that Ho might agree to negotiations before US troops are
withdrawn from the South, Ho continues to assign a high
priority to prolonging his reactivated war. He and his
lieutenants have absorbed Mao's own view on protracted civil
war. When, in December 1936, Mao said that "to wage a rev-
olutionary war for ten years, as we have done, might be sur-
prising in other countries," he was rejecting modern Western
and Soviet military doctrine on quick-decision ("impatient")
war. He made his point emphatic in June 1946, noting that
the Spanish civil war was "fought for three years, but we
have fought for twenty years." Ho declared on 17 July 1966
that
The war may still last 10, 20 years, or longer.
Hanoi, Haiphong, and other cities and enterprises
may be destroyed, but the Vietnamese people will
not be intimidated.
A similar statement of North Vietnamese determination to per-
severe in the event of air strikes against cities in the
North was made by a DRV embassy official in Havana on 3
May 1966: "The imperialists may well do so (i.e., bomb
Hanoi and Haiphong), but we are ready to accept this sacri-
fice as we have accepted the others and it will not change
our position or determination one iota."
Ho apparently believes that he can continue the war
primarily because, despite losses in the North and South,
he is still able to put forces into the South and to supply
them for operations. On the other hand, the Maoist doctrine
he has absorbed has a strong ingredient of opportunism. That
is, there is no fixed principle that determines when and in
what situation negotiations or a cease-fire should be accepted.
The deciding factor is a very practical consideration--namely,
inability to keep fighting. In the event that US air strikes
were to continue to increase his problems, his willingness
to negotiate a cessation of the strikes would not be blocked
by any doctrinal consideration. The Chinese leaders appar-
ently are aware of the ever-present prospect that Ho might
view negotiations as a means to gain a breathing-spell from
US pressure and are attacking not only the matter of talks
before a total American withdrawal but also the matter of
talks to attain a suspension of air strikes against the
North.
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/06/07: CIA-RDP80T01719R000300020001-9
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