THE HIGHLANDERS OF SOUTH VIETNAM: A Review of Political Developments and Forces

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP80T01719R000300010003-8
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: C
• Document Page Count: 109
• Document Creation Date: November 9, 2016
• Document Release Date: July 24, 1998
• Sequence Number: 3
• Publication Date: June 1, 1966
• Content Type: REPORT

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THE HIGHLANDERS OF SOUTH VIETNAM
A Review of Political Developments and Forces
This document has been produced by
the Vietnamese Affairs Staff of the
Office of the Director of Central Intelligence.
June 1966
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dadassifical
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GROUP I
Excluded from oulomolic
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ion
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This Document contains information affecting the National Defense
of the United States, within the meaning of Title 18, Sections
793 and 794, of the U. S. Code, as amended. Its transmission or
revelation of its contents to or receipt by an unauthorized person is
prohibited by law. The reproduction of this form is prohibited.
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CONTENTS
Introduction (Tnclassified)
Maps: A. South Vietnam Ethnic Groups (Unclassified)
B. Population and Administrative Divisions
(Unclassified)
I.
The Historical Background Until 1955 (Unclassified)
3
II.
Vietnamese Government Policies in the Highlands
1954-1958 (Unclassified)
10
III.
U.S. Government Proposals, 1956-1958
16
IV.
(Official Use Only)
The Bajaraka Autonomy Movement, 1957'-1958
(Official Use Only)
19
V.
The Highlander Resettlement Program, 1957-1960
(Official Use Only)
27
VI.
The Viet Cong Offensive and Government Reaction,
1960-1961 (Official Use Only)
31
VII.
Vietnamese Pacification Proposals, 1961
(CONFIDENTIAL)
34
VIII.
U.S. Support in Arming the Highlanders, 1961-1962
(CONFIDENTIAL)
39
IX.
Disarming the Highlanders, 1962-1963
(CONFIDENTIAL)
46
X.
The Resurgence of Bajaraka, 1962-1963
(CONFIDENTIAL)
53
XI.
Steady Deterioration in the Highlands, 1963-1964
(CONFIDENTIAL)
59
?
XII.
The Highlander Revolt of September 1964
(CONFIDENTIAL)
66
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XIII.
Government Efforts to Appease the Highlanders,
1964-1965 (CONFIDENTIAL)
71
XIV.
FULRO and Viet Cong Activities, 1964-1965
(CONFIDENTIAL)
76
XV.
Negotiations and FULRO Activities, 1965
(CONFIDENTIAL)
79
XVI.
FULRO Uprising of December 1965
(CONFIDENTIAL)
89
XVII.
Constructive Moves by the Commission for
Highlander Affairs (CONFIDENTIAL)
98
Biographies (CONFIDENTIAL)
102
Bibliography (CONFIDENTIAL)
124
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" T o seize and control the Highlands is to solve
the whole problem of South Vietnam."
General Vo Nguyen Giap
The strategic importance of the Highlands of South Vietnam
is recognized by military and political authorities on both sides of
the current Viet Cong conflict. But what are the political and
economic forces, either native or alien, that influence any effort
to control this., sparcely populated area that encompasses half of
South Vietnam? How have the primitive Highlanders who have
been propelled into this political struggle at the same time that
they are experiencing drastic cultural changes been effected?
It is the intention of this study to bring together a history
of the political, economic and social developments in the Highlands,
especially since 1954 when the area came under Vietnamese
Government direction, so that the area and its problems can be
better understood and, in part, answers to the questions raised
above suggested. It is also intended to review briefly the numer-
ous Vietnamese and American programs initiated at various times
in the Highlands and outline the results. Except as necessary
background information so that the reader may better understand
how the Highlander lives as opposed to the Vietnamese, a dis-
cussion of the culture of the Highlander has been avoided since
several recent studies exist on this subject.
There are few Western authorities or scholars who are
knowledgeable in any great depth on the Highlands minorities.
Such as exist are primarily French administrators and mission-
aries who lived in the region, antropologists who have conducted
cultural studies, a few American missionaries who have dedicated
their lives to working with these primitive peoples, and Dr.
Gerald C. Hickey, currently with The RAND Corporation but who
has spent the last ten years studying these people. There are no
Vietnamese authorities who have come to public attention. Though
little is known of some of the tribal groups and further studies
are desirable, there exists today sufficient cultural information
on the Highlanders to provide adequate background knowledge to
civilian and military officials, both Vietnamese and American,
involved in this region. There is no known recent publication of
any detail on the political history of the Highlanders and the effects
Vietnamese, American and Communist programs in the area have
had on these people. It is hoped that this study will help fill that gap.
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This study has made use of both unclassified and classified
reports prepared by various U. S. Government agencies and
independent scholars. The most useful information was contained
in State Department reporting, U. S. AID memoranda, and CIA
information reports. Press reporting on the area is limited and
was found to be often inaccurate. The publications of research
and educational institutions provided valuable background informa-
tion. More than one thousand individual reports were consulted
of which approximately one-fourth were germane to this study.
Significant gaps in the information available are to be noted.
There are no accurate population figures for the area, with esti-
mates of Highlanders ranging from 500, 000 to 1, 000, 000. The
population figures cited in this study are therefore the best judg-
ment of the author, derived from the numerous and conflicting
data available, and are used to show magnitude rather than a
precise knowledge. Information on Highlander leaders is also
sketchy and confusing. Biographic resumes included in the body
of this study and found also in the appendix leave much to be
desired and are subject to correction and expansion by more
knowledgeable persons than the author. In most instances, infor-
mation available- reflects the views expressed by Vietnamese
officials to American officials and does not reflect views expressed
by Vietnamese among themselves. This leaves a gap in our under-
standing of Vietnamese intentions in the Highlands which can be
filled in part by relating announced programs to the expressed
attitudes of the officials-charged with conducting the programs and
the support provided by the Central Government. There are also
gaps in our knowledge of events that occurred and the incidents
that led up to these events. In some instances the author, who
lived in the Highlands in 1964 and 1965, has attempted to bring the
forces at work into cleared focus from his personal observations
and conversations with Highlanders and Vietnamese officials.
If this study provides the reader with a better understanding
of the political and economic forces at work, the frictions between
the Highlander and Vietnamese, the Vietnamese and American
programs that have been attempted in the Highlands, and the
aspirations of the Highlanders, then it will have served its purpose.
Washington, D.C.
15 June 1966
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LAOS
THAILAND N O 1 /_F OF
p g H.' Approximate boundary between
VI9TNA1-0.V K I N highlands and lowlands
SOUTH VIETNAM
DEMARCATION LINE
ETHNIC GROUPS
He Su
I