SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS TO THE HIGHLANDERS OF SOUTH VIETNAM (Attached)

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP80T01719R000300010002-9
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: C
• Document Page Count: 8
• Document Creation Date: November 9, 2016
• Document Release Date: July 24, 1998
• Sequence Number: 2
• Publication Date: June 24, 1966
• Content Type: REPORT

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24 June 1966
THE HIGHLANDERS OF SOUTH VIETNAM (Attached)
Approximately fifty percent of South Vietnam's territory
consists of mountains and forrested upland plateaus whose indigenous
inhabitants are 700, 000-odd nomadic and primitive people who, among
themselves, display considerable ethnic and cultural diversity but
who all share the common trait of being both ethnically and culturally
distinct from the lowland Vietnamese. Until 1954 French colonial
policy had enveloped these Highlanders in a protective mantle which
effectively limited Vietnamese settlement in their native habitat.
This mantle was torn away in 1954 when control of the Highlands passed
to the Vietnamese; soon thereafter Vietnamese refugees and settlers
began coming into the Highlands in large numbers. In the provinces
of Kontum, Pleiku, Phu Bon, Darlac and Quang Duc, where there had
been approximately 6, 000 Vietnamese in 1953, there were about 150, 000
ten years later. This influx of Vietnamese settlers and administrators,
who had no knowledge of the Highlanders and showed little to no regard
for Highlanders' customs or land rights, exacerbated the historic
animosity existing between Highlanders and ethnic Vietnamese.
Throughout history the Highlanders had resisted outside domination,
including French domination. In 1957, educated Highlanders began
organizing resistance to Vietnamese domination of the Highlands, making
an open though unsuccessful bid for autonomy a year later. Continued
unrequited sentiment for autonomy erupted into armed revolts in 1964
and 1965.
The Vietnamese Government's policy has consistently aimed at
the assimilation of the Highlanders into Vietnamese society and consistently
opposed the establishment of an autonomous region for them. The Saigon
Government's attention, when directed to the Highlands, has primarily
concentrated on the problem of Vietnamese settlement. Such attention,
however, has been sporadic (partly because of pressing political problems
elsewhere). Highland programs designed to encourage ethnic Vietnamese
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settlement and Highlander assimilation have often languished for want
of resources, ineffective administration or simple bureaucratic neglect.
Vietnamese officials have always been prone to ignore the Highlander
and often treated him as a savage without rights. The actions of such
officials have often done more to hinder than to advance the policy of
assimilation. Little effort has been made to understand the Highlanders
and attention has been given to improving their lot only when local
conditions -- e.g., incipient or current Highlander "revolts" -- have
made it impossible to ignore Highlander needs or aspirations.
The Viet Cong have long been active in Highland areas. Viet
Cong propaganda has exploited the ineptness of the Saigon Government
and the Communists have long encouraged the Highlanders to seek autonomy
from Saigon. In 1961, the Viet Cong launched a drive to control the
Highlands which resulted in over 100, 000 Highlanders fleeing Viet Cong
areas. With considerable assistance and encouragement from the U. S.
Government, the Vietnamese Government responded by arming the
Highlanders for village defense under the Civilian Irregular Defense
Group (CIDG) program. As security improved, however, the Vietnamese
began disarming the Highlanders, political and economic aspects of
the CIDG program became subordinated to more conventional military
activities, and programs for improving the lot of the Highlander lost
momentum. The Highlanders, not trusting Vietnamese promises which
had often been broken, developed a dissident group (FULRO) which has
demanded complete autonomy and has gained an increasing acceptance
among the Highlanders as the government has failed to implement
promised reforms and programs.
The deterioration of security in the Highlands has precluded
effective government administration outside of the chief towns which
are primarily populated by ethnic Vietnamese. By the spring of 1966
the Communists probably had some form of influence over fifty percent
of the Highlanders, while the government influenced about twenty-five
percent. The security situation would limit effective implementation of
economic programs for the Highlanders even if the government were
to initiate such programs. Negotiations with the dissident FULRO
organization, though showing some signs of progress, have run hot and
cold partly because of internal political stresses in the Saigon Government.
The outlook for significant improvement in Vietnamese-Highlander
relations in the foreseeable future is not encouraging.
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The existing attitude of Vietnamese administrators makes it
doubtful that any broad government program would meet with success,
even if the security and political situation were to improve. The
government would still be faced with the problem of educating the
Vietnamese administrators who are assigned to the Highlands and must
implement any program for the Highlanders, and the more basic problem
of the general attitude of the Vietnamese, both military and civilian, in
daily contact with the Highlanders. The Highlander is looked upon by
administrator, soldier, and settler as unworthy of decent treatment. In
most instances, the Highlander has not even achieved the position of
second-class citizen.
It is possible that the Vietnamese are willing to accept the
Highlander as a second-class citizen when the Highlander has earned
this privilege, but the Vietnamese see no reason for allocating their
resources to a program that will assist the Highlanders in obtaining
this position, especially when these resources are needed to raise the
living standards of the Vietnamese. The Vietnamese feel the Highlander
must gain their respect, but do not feel that they must gain the respect
of the Highlander. The Vietnamese will reluctantly provide limited
assistance in education, agriculture, medical services and public
administration to keep the Highlander from open rebellion, but it is
doubtful that a just land title program, protection from exploitation by
merchants, or recourse to a legal system keyed to Highlander problems
will be forthcoming in the near future. Autonomy is out of the question.
The government in Saigon recognizes the need for improving the
lot of the Highlander and winning him to the side of the government.
But only after Highlander revolts and in reaction to pressure from the
United States Government and the Viet Gong has the Vietnamese Government
given serious attention to the problem. The Government of Vietnam has
never implemented a program for the Highlanders that it has not later
discontinued or allowed to deteriorate from neglect. Much of this is
due to the lack of initiative and understanding by local administrators
and the lack of direction by the central government. Government programs
in areas other than the Highlands met the same fate. It would be unfair
to imply that the government had done substantially better in solving
its problems in other areas outside the Highlands.
The policy of the Vietnamese Government to assimilate the
Highlanders into Vietnamese society has not changed since its formulation
in 1955. Follow-up action to develop and carry out programs designed
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to achieve this policy has been extremely spotty. Since 1956 repeated
recommendations have been made for the establishment of a special
agency charged with formulating and managing programs for the
Highlanders, but this has not been accomplished. The former Directorate,
now Commission, for Highlander Affairs has not been given either the
authority or the influence necessary to undertake management responsibility.
The Highlanders' semi-nomadic life, resistance to cultural
change, historic distrust of the Vietnamese, and strong aversion to
control has further complicated Vietnamese efforts of assimilation.
The protection afforded the Highlander during French colonial days
(when the Vietnamese were excluded from the area) posed a severe
handicap on the ability of the Vietnamese to undertake the administration
of an area they knew little about. With the influx of American personnel
into the Highlands who demonstrated a greater sympathy toward the
Highlanders than was possible for the Vietnamese, the Highlanders
sought the protection of the Americans and gave their loyalty to the
Americans instead of the Vietnamese. This in turn caused the Vietnamese,
who remembered French protective activities, to distrust American
intentions. With some success, the Highlanders also attempted to use
Americans as a buffer between themselves and the Vietnamese. They
not only sought assistance and advice from Americans in their efforts
to gain autonomy, but also attempted to negotiate with the Vietnamese
through the Americans. The Highlander believed local American
sympathies and programs indicated that the U.S. Government was
willing to support Highlander aspirations for autonomy. When they
were informed that the U. S. Government would only assist the Highlanders
through the Vietnamese Government and would not support their aspirations
for autonomy, Highlanders found this hard to believe and were slow to
accept it as the truth.
It is not possible to pick out any one cause of the Vietnamese
Government's lack of successin the Highlands. The principal factors
were deteriorating security, the attitude of the Vietnamese, poor government
management, with each aggravating the others. It is possible to speculate
that had the Vietnamese had a more sympathetic attitude toward the
Highlanders, the Viet Cong would have been less successful, but the
Highlanders do not appear to have accepted the Viet Cong any more
willingly than the Vietnamese in the lowlands accepted the Viet Cong.
It is likely that had there been better administration of Vietnamese programs
the Highlanders would have been less inclined to believe the Vietnamese
had no interest in them, but this would still not have overcome the Highlanders'
resentment and fear of being Vietnamized.
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In the final analysis American supported programs in the
Highlands have been directed toward improving the security situation,
not toward improving Highlander-Vietnamese relations. (Though the
intention in 1961 was to improve relations, improve the welfare of the
Highlanders, and improve security.) These programs provided no
training of Vietnamese so that they could better understand and administer
the Highlanders. The Vietnamese feared the programs would provide a
Highlander force that would be hostile to the government.
Attempts to move rapidly ahead with American sponsored programs
in the Highlands were frustrated by Vietnamese officials who, for a
number of reasons, were not interested or convinced in the merits of
the programs. There were also only a limited number of Vietnamese
qualified to administer the programs and thus unqualified and poorly
motivated officials were assigned in a number of areas. As American
frustrations mounted, the Americans assumed an increasing degree of
direct control and command. Vietnamese officials became figureheads
and lost face in the eyes of the Highlanders. Many Americans observing
the attitude of the Vietnamese and the childlike nature of the Highlanders
sided with the latter, The Americans had a much better understanding
of the Highlanders than did the Vietnamese and were extremely sympathetic
to Highlander needs, but at least at the local level, the Americans were
not in sympathy with the Vietnamese policy of assimilation (if in fact
they were informed of this policy) as it was being carried out. Instead
of attempting to understand the Vietnamese position, they ignored it.
Much of this was due to lack of effective coordination between U. S. agencies
at the national level and lack of adequate direction and guidance by the
U.S. agencies to their officers working in the provinces who in turn had
to interpret policy and programs. At one point there were four U. S. agencies
advising Vietnamese officials at the local and national level on how to
deal with the Highlanders. This lack of coordination and direction applied
also to the Vietnamese at the national and local level.
In spite of the difficulties and the resulting frustrations temporary
success was achieved. It is likely that had the Americans not initiated
the programs they did in 1961 that most of the Highlands would have
fallen to the Viet Gong in 1962. It is also likely that the American
organizational activities among the Highlanders and the training of
military groups contributed substantially to the strength of the Highlander
autonomy movement.
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A balance was not achieved between crash programs to obtain
immediate improvement in the security situation and programs designed
to assimilate the Highlanders over the long term. Though the American
Government made repeated recommendations on programs of a long-term
nature, both the Vietnamese and Americans were preoccupied with problems
of the moment. Techniques applied to solving the immediate problems
ran counter to the techniques required for solving the long-term problems.
The arming of the Highlanders without equal emphasis on political and
economic factors strengthened the Highlander as a force but did not
initiate the development of political and economic institutions that would
provide the Highlander a place in the national society. The movement
of Highlanders to resettlement centers and the implementation of the
Strategic Hamlet Program were primarily for the purpose of improving
security and did not provide adequate long-term assistance in agriculture,
education, or administration.
Monday morning quarterbacking is, of course, always easier than
identifying problems while deep in the process of developing programs
designed to meet an emergency situation. Nor is it easy to predict the
longer term effects of urgently needed crash programs when these are
first initiated. In looking back at Vietnamese and American efforts in
the Highlands, however, there are lessons to be learned regarding future
approaches to the problem on the American side:
1. In a minority area, all American officials are inevitably
involved, directly or indirectly, with the minority problem. These
officials need a complete understanding of policy and objectives which
must be partially provided by conversations with superiors in Saigon.
Written background material, guidance, and direct supervision of these
officials is also necessary. Thus an executive authority at the U. S,
Mission level would appear to be required to recommend policy, program,
indoctrinate, inform, and monitor, as well as represent the U. S. Mission
in conversations and negotiations with host government authorities,
Early consideration should be given to the idea of appointing, at the U. S.
Mission level, a senior, well informed officer who will devote full time
and attention to the Highlander problem.
2. In dealing with the Vietnamese Government, emphasis
should be given to special preparation of Vietnamese and Highlanders
for government assignment in the Highlands and to encourage the govern-
ment to indoctrinate its officials on policy as well as monitor and
supervise these officials and the programs. It is not expected that
historic animosities will change rapidly, but through education of both
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Vietnamese and Highlander better understanding can be achieved. The
establishment of a career service for Vietnamese assigned to ethnic
minority problems and programs instead of the constant rotation of
civil servants would provide better qualified cadre.
3. The Vietnamese policy is to assimilate the Highlander,
exercise political and military control in the Highlands, and not grant
autonomy to the Highlanders. If the U.S. Government supports the
Vietnamese policy, then its actions at the local level should reflect
this support. If there is exception to aspects of the policy or the manner
in which it is being carried out then these exceptions should be aired
with the Vietnamese at an appropriate administrative level and if
necessary support of programs or the Vietnamese policy withdrawn.
But public airing of differences vi th the Highlander s should be carefully
considered before being approved and undertaken. American personnel
should work through Vietnamese officials and keep their direct work
with the Highlander to a minimum. The Highlander should see the
Vietnamese and not the American as the person who is attempting to
help him. This will be extremely difficult, for the Vietnamese first
need to be trained and indoctrinated, but they in the end must live with
the problem and the effects of action taken.
4. Programs should be expanded as Vietnamese and High-
lander administrative, political and economic capacity increase. Even
short-term programs should be geared to assist in accomplishing long-
term objectives. Though it may be desirable it is not necessary to
commence programs for the entire Highlands. Success, carefully
evaluated in local programs, should dictate expansion.
5. A thorough understanding of Vietnamese policy and
objectives is necessary prior to recommending programs or actions.
The Vietnamese attitude toward Highlander land rights, administration
of justice, education and agriculture will have a significant effect, and
it may be better to initially work within the accepted attitude while
assisting the Vietnamese to become better informed rather than attempt
to force programs on the Vietnamese. The Vietnamese have become
frustrated because assimilation was not accomplished in a short period.
The Americans have recognized that assimilation is a long-term objective.
The Vietnamese can be brought to recognize this basic difference in
approach and experience to date may convince them that assimilation
is a long-term objective.
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The Highlander situation in Vietnam neither developed nor
will be solved overnight. The recurring political unrest among the
Highlanders is primarily due to the pressure of the more advanced
Vietnamese culture on the primitive Highlander culture. The Vietnamese
are still searching for a solution within their policy of assimilation.
The Highlanders will continue to press for autonomy. It would appear
from past events that further efforts by the U. S. Government to
encourage and assist the Vietnamese Government to constructively
assimilate the Highlanders will be both frustrating and for nought.
But there are some possible signals of an encouraging nature. The
Vietnamese Government, shocked by the strength of FULRO and
recognizing the need for Highlander support which cannot be obtained
without accepting and acting upon at least several of the Highlanders'
demands, has assigned more and more responsibility to Paul Nur,
Commissioner for Highlander Affairs. Paul Nur is still lacking the
necessary authority. The Vietnamese Government and its officials
appear to be awakening to the problem. Whether this is a temporary
phenomenon as it has been in the past is a matter of conjecture.
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