AN APPRAISAL OF THE BOMBING OF NORTH VIETNAM

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP80T01629R000300080016-7
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 13
• Document Creation Date: December 21, 2016
• Document Release Date: October 23, 2007
• Sequence Number: 16
• Publication Date: December 22, 1965
• Content Type: IM

INTELLIGENCE MEMORANDUM
DIA
review(s)
corn
pleted.
OGC Has
Reviewed
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C40 jl~
22 December 1965
No. 3182/65
Copy No.
AN APPRAISAL O7 THE BOMBING OF NORTH VIETNAM
DIRECTORATE OF INTELLIGENCE
Llu
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SECRET
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No. 3182/65
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
Directorate of Intelligence
22 December 1965
INTELLIGENCE MEMORANDUM
An Appraisal of the Bombing
of North V am*
US air strikes against North Vietnam have been
going on for almost 11 months, but are just
n is the cr DRVea'ts ing prima-
Attripi in
to put a noticeable
rily agrarian economy.
significant problems in production and distribution,
and in the allocation of manpower and management
resources. There continues to be no indication of
any significant decline in
or of any softening in Hanoi's
negotiations as a result of the bombings. Disdisrup-
up,
tive effects on the DRV s economy nd have noted,
in regime propaganda, et aie stde-
pendence on outside aid is growing.
continue place primary emphasis on interdiction
of
of lines of of communication in North Vietnam but have
not significantly reduced DRV capabilities for
logistic support of the war in South Vietnam.
Effects on the DRV Economy
1. The US/GVN air strikes to date fall far
short of crippling the North Vietnamese economy.
But the sustained and increasing rate of attrition
the economy to develop a noticeable limp.
s i cawthg assistance from other Communist
Ev ven with increasing
*This mem orandum is CIA's issuance of a joint CIA-
DIA study prepared periodically to assess the effects
of US bombing of North Vietnam.
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NEW, A rd (. hC V I Mr
countries, the adverse impact is now becoming more
apparent in the economically important areas of the
country. The extension of interdiction measures to
lines of communication joining important industrial
centers is compounding already aggravated distribu-
tion problems. The regime is apparently making in-
creased use of ocean transport to provide relief to
overland distribution channels. Hanoi now admits
publicly to a substantial upheaval of production
plans in many industrial plants. Import and export
programs are in disarray. The planned program under
the First Five-Year Plan (1961-1965) has undergone
substantial rearrangement. A recent report indicates,
moreover, that implementation of the Second Five-
Year Plan scheduled to begin in January 1966 has been
postponed. The increasing rate of deterioration of
some important sectors of the economy still has not
greatly reduced total economic activity. The primary
strains continue to be in distribution, allocation
of manpower, and management resources. In the face
of great difficulties, however, priority traffic con-
tinues to move. The air strikes have not yet halted,
or even reduced, priority short-term support by the
economy to North Vietnam's military efforts, but this
support has been maintained only by transferring men
and materials away from long-term activities and
projects.
2. The air strikes against overland transport
facilities and routes in North Vietnam have hampered
the movement of personnel, equipment, and supplies
but have not significantly reduced the North Vietnam-
ese capability to provide and increase their logistic
support for the Communist forces in Laos and South
Vietnam. The capacity of specific transport routes
has been reduced by the bombings, but on most routes
it is still in excess of the present level of logistic
movements. The North Vietnamese have demonstrated a
remarkable capability to keep supplies moving in
spite of the air attacks. The various improvements
and improvisations instituted by the Communists have
increased their capability to move men and supplies
into Laos and South Vietnam during the present dry
season. Even with an intensification of air attacks
it is doubtful that the capacity of the overland trans-
port system can be reduced below the level required to
provide logistic support at the existing scale of com-
bat in South Vietnam.
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3. The ability of the North Vietnamese to keep
the industrial economy moving on a makeshift basis,
to maintain priority transportation movements, and
to provide the support necessary for military opera-
tions, is in large part a result of increasing as-
sistance from other Communist countries. This
assistance has taken several forms: the assignment
of elements of two Chinese railroad engineer diva-
sions to help keep transportation lines open; large
increases in shipments of motor trucks; the provi-
sion of structural steels and prefabricated shapes
for bridge repair and reconstruction; and the assign-
ment of technical and industrial advisers from the
USSR and European Satellite countries. The amount
and scope of this support continued to grow in re-
cent weeks.
4. Direct losses caused by damage to economic
facilities and equipment are now estimated at almost
$23 million and measurable indirect losses amount to
almost $9 million. The cost of permanent reconstruc-
tion of rail/highway bridges would be more than $10
million, and the replacement or repair of destroyed
or damaged transport equipment would cost an addi-
tional $5.4 million. The cost of temporary repairs
to bridges would be more than $1 million. Recon-
struction of the damaged electric power plants, the
petroleum storage facilities, and the Nam Dinh tex-
tile mill would cost about $6 million. The loss of
foreign exchange earnings totals at least $5.2 mi],-
lion. The growing losses from lower production
throughout the economy can be quantified only in
agriculture where losses in the fall rice crop may
have amounted to about $3.5 million. The measurable
costs of reconstruction, replacement, and repair of
damaged facilities, if attempted, would represent
more than 20 percent of total gross annual invest-
ment in industry. The additional costs which North
Vietnam is incurring for temporary expedients to
compensate in part for the damaged facilities cannot
be quantified at this time.
5. The most severe disruptions of economic
activity in North Vietnam have been in the southern
part of the country where the transportation system
has been heavily bombed and electric power tstations
have been destroyed. Industry in this pe
SE CR
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country normally accounts for only about 20 percent
of total gross industrial output, however, and con-
sists mainly of textile production, food processing,
lumber and paper production, chromite mining, and
processing of crude phosphate fertilizers. Con-
tinued shortages of manpower and equipment in the
areas directly affected by bombing have hampered
reconstruction efforts and created severe hardships
for local populations, but the primarily rural na-
ture of these regions has permitted continued func-
tioning of the subsistance economy.
6. The disruptions caused by bombing are now
being felt in the more economically important areas
of the country. The difficulties in maintaining
production in the face of insoluble management prob-
lems and shortages of skilled manpower have been com-
pounded by the disruption of the distribution system.
In November, for the first time, the transportation
system connecting North Vietnam's major industrial
areas was attacked. Through rail service between
Hanoi and Nam Dinh was interdicted by the destruction
of the Phu Ly railroad bridge on the Hanoi-Vinh line.
However, rail traffic is apparently still moving on
stretches of this rail line between interdicted points,
A combination railroad and highway bridge serving the
Hanoi-Haiphong railroad line and Route 5 was also
attacked. The damage to this bridge was light and by
undertaking priority repair measures rail service on
the line was quickly restored. Nevertheless, these
air strikes undoubtedly further disrupted the flow
of exports, imports, and goods for domestic use. Ac-
cording to the regional press, distribution problems
resulting from damage to the transportation system
have "turned upside down" production plans in many
enterprises in Haiphong, where some plants have been
substituting inferior materials for unavailable
regular supplies. Essential materials and equipment
can still be delivered to Haiphong by sea, however,
and until 1 December other industrial centers could
still receive supplies from China via the Hanoi -
Dong Dang rail line where previous bomb damage was
quickly repaired. On 1 December, however, the Cao
Nung railroad bridge on the Hanoi - Dong Dang line
was again attacked and several spans were dropped.
Several weeks will be required to make temporary re-
pairs to the bridge. In the meantime some cargo
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probably will be moved across the river by fording,
and some can be moved by road on alternate routes
such as 13B, which has not been attacked, and IA
and 18, where enough time has probably elapsed for
bomb damage to have been repaired. Some freight
normally shipped by rail between China and North
Vietnam probably was already being transferred to
sea transportation before the 1 December strike.
This action was taken so that high priority items
such as military supplies could be handled more
easily by rail. Despite the increasing disruptions,
work on major economic development projects of the
First Five-Year Plan (1961-1965) is continuing and
several new projects have been undertaken in the
past few months.
7. The Hanoi - Lao Cai railroad line reportedly
was opened for through traffic early in December
even though there were a series of strikes against
this line at the end of November. Although photog-
raphy is not available to assess the results of
these strikes, damage must have been slight or
negligible for the line to be opened so quickly. If
the line remains open we would expect to see a re-
sumption of apatite shipments moving to Haiphong
for export. Practically no Chinese transit traffic
to and from Yunnan has moved through North Vietnam
since July. There have been no indications, however,
that either Yunnan or the rest of China has suffered
serious shortages because of the loss of transit
service through North Vietnam. Truck transport within
China apparently is being used to replace this transit
service. Transportation in the southern part of North
Vietnam continues to be complicated by air attacks.
In spite of heavy damage to bridges, substantial
amounts of both economic and military traffic continue
to be hauled by motor truck and on a makeshift rail
line south of Vinh. The movement of all types of
traffic on the waterways also appears heavy. Supplies
are again being moved from North Vietnam on Route 15
to Routes 12 and 23 in Laos through Mu Gia Pass and
on a newly reported truckable by-pass around the Pass.
The transport system of North Vietnam appears to be
carrying as much tonnage during 1965 as it did during
1964. The interruptions on certain rail lines, how-
ever, will result in a considerably lower performance
in terms of ton-kilometers.
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8. There have been no recent strikes or re-
strikes against bulk oil storage facilities or
electric power plants in North Vietnam.* There
are localized problems in petroleum distribution
and storage, but there is no over-all petroleum
shortage in the country. Bulk petroleum storage
facilities have been reduced in capacity by about
17 percent. No action has been taken to rehabili-
tate any of these bombed POL storage facilities.
However, recent photography discloses the exist-
ence of seven additional petroleum storage sites
distributed in an arc at distances of about 30
miles north of Hanoi. These sites include a total
of about 300 semi-buried tanks (each about the
size of an airport refueling tank truck), but rep-
resent total storage of only 2,200 tons. The size
of the tanks and the number of sites suggest that
this storage is intended to disperse petroleum
supplies rather than provide for significant re-
serves. The reduction of total generating capacity
by about 14 percent continues to cause relatively
minor curtailment of mining and industrial opera-
tions and loss of power for irrigation systems. A
continuing study of all available source material
has disclosed no recent information concerning
bomb damage to machine building plants or to non-
food light industrial plants Priorities and
alternate means of communication have been estab-
lished in the telecommunications industry.
9. There is no evidence that the air strikes
have further aggravated the tight food situation in
North Vietnam. The harvest promises at best to be
mediocre, and in light of increased distribution
problems because of the war the tight food situa-
tion will continue. Labor shortages in the agri-
cultural cooperatives continue to be aggravated
because of the air strikes.
*This assessment does not take into account the
15 and 20 December air strike against the Uong
Bi Thermal Power Plant. Preliminary assessment
however, indicates that
these strikes apparen y inflicted no significant
damage to the plant.
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North Vietnamese Political and Public Reactions
10. There continues to be no indication of any
significant decline in North Vietnamese morale. Re-
gime propaganda continued to stress the resolve and
ability of the Vietnamese to ultimately defeat the
"US aggressors." Hanoi paid particular attention to
the Vietnam protest movements in the US and cited
them as an indication that the cost of the war in
men and materiel could ultimately undermine Ameri-
can morale and force a change in the US policy to-
ward the war. This theme was generally coupled in
DRV propaganda with claims of world-wide support
for the Vietnamese Communists and references to the
recent Viet Cong "victories" over US and GVN forces.
Although both these themes were designed to sustain
the fighting will of the insurgents as well as the
DRV populace, they probably accurately reflect cur-
rent Hanoi estimates of the situation.
11. The disruptive effect of the air strikes
on the DRV's economy was reflected in the regime's
propaganda. This recently took the form of efforts
to spur the populace on to greater patriotic en-
deavors in order to meet and overcome the difficul-
ties caused by the strikes. A party daily editorial
on 18 November in taking note of the disruption in
transportation and communications called upon persons
to pay more attention to these two areas and to be
"determined, urgent and flexible in meeting war
circumstances." In addition, other articles stress-
ing the necessity of increasing food production and
distribution as well as improving public order "for
the sake of the anti-US and national salvation
cause" were highlighted in DRV propaganda.
12. The growing disruption caused by the bomb-
ings also appeared to be the motive behind Hanoi's
dispatching its high-ranking economic expert, polit-
buro member Le Thanh Nghi, to Moscow, Peking and
Pyongyang in late November. Nghi's trip--his second
in less than six months--is probably an indication
that the bombings have affected the DRV economy to
such an extent that consultations on additional
economic aid from the Bloc are now needed. Through
Nghi's trip Hanoi may be seeking additional supplies
of capital equipment for bomb damage repair and
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perhaps even food, clothing and other necessities.
The North Vietnamese may also believe it essential
to get some long range commitment on future Bloc
assistance in the event that US bombings destroy
most of North Vietnam's industry and transportation
system.
Effects on Military Targets
13. There has been no recent, appreciable
change in the intensity of air operations against
North Vietnam. The air effort continued to place
emphasis on the armed reconnaissance program, aimed
at inhibiting movement over the lines of communica-
tion and restriking and neutralizing previously at-
tacked targets. The JCS-designated targets recently
attacked have been predominantly rail and highway
bridges north of 20 degrees As the air strikes
concentrated on targets north and east of Hanoi, the
requiren}ent to neutralize SA-2 sites accelerated.
Armed reconnaissance aircraft have continued to at-
tack SA-2 sites. These attacks produced few dramatic
results, but possibly caused a more frequent displace-
ment of SA-2 firing elements which could result in
reduced operating efficiency. Since no major effort
has been expended against barracks, supply and am-
munition depots and POL storage areas, related na-
tional capacities have not been appreciably altered.
The North Vietnamese are continuing their efforts to
disperse such vulnerable elements of their infrastruc-
ture as barracks, supply and ammunition depots. Re-
cent evidence points to a new program of dispersing
POL stocks to locales north of Hanoi within the SAM
protected area.
14. While there are periodic indications of
specific, tactical, reactions to the air offensive,
the most overriding reaction is the emergence of
strategic indicators which suggest Hanoi's willing-
ness to persevere indefinitely. These latter in-
dicators include dispersal of industry, partial
mobilization, intensified coordination with other
Communist countries to obtain increased military aid,
and long range construction programs aimed at improv-
ing military air facilities. In a tactical sense,
the North Vietnamese have recognized the effective-
ness of US measures to counter the SA-2 threat. In
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this regard, they have taken action to degrade our
capability to detect and counter FAN SONG (SA-2
guidance radar) operations by compressing the op-
erating time of the vital guidance system.
15. While the air strikes against logistics
facilities and sensitive lines of communications
are causing major distribution problems, these
operations have not significantly reduced the DRV
capability to continue to support the Communist
forces in Laos and South Vietnam. (Chart)
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17D IleliL'f.1 Vlrl-'
RESULTS OF STRIKES ON DRV TARGETS a./
THROUGH TUESDAY, 14 DECEMBER 1965
FIXED TARGETS
TARGETS
STRUCK
c/
AT
NO
STRIKE
NO.
-
.
% b/ TACKS
SORTIES
BARRACKS
41
24.38
171
2516
AMMO DEPOTS
13
84.31
51
1108
POL STORAGE
4
19.0
7
90
SUPPLY DEPOTS
18
18.3
43
528
POWER PLANTS
5
13.5
15
133
MARITIME PORTS
4
12.0
9
157
RR YARDS
1
7.0
5
75
EXPLOSIVE PLANT
1
100
3
28
AIRFIELDS
4
9
268
NAVAL BASES
2
10
136
'RIDGES
40
d/
85!
1828
OMMO INSTALL
2
15
RADAR SITES
13
d/
48
348
SAM SITES
22
211
LOCKS
1
1
2
(Dropped from
Tgt list)
d/
FERRIES
11
7
44
TOTAL SORTIES
AGAINST FIXED TARGETS: 7487
ARMED RECCE SORTIES: 15948
TOTAL OF ALL SORTIES EXCEPT SUPPORT: 23435
% OF NAT'L CAPACITY
DESTROYED - INACTIVE
14.70
3.81
34.41
34.53
16.7
.50
10.18
.70
13.5
5.7
5.2
57
Runways cratered, 25%
buildings destroyed at
airfields attacked.
45% buildings destroy-
ed at bases attacked.
37 not usable.
2 destroyed.
3 destroyed, 6 damaged
4 redeployed prior to
attack.
11 possibly damaged, 3
not observed, 1 destroy.
1 destroyed.
RESULTS e/
De-
stroyed
Dam-
aged
Vessels
462
Vehicles
483
563
RR Stock
236
604
a/ Assessments are based on best information received, will be refined
as more accurate information becomes available.
b/ Percentages of national capacity where appropriate.
Strike plus flak suppression sorties.
Also numerous attacks during armed recce and other missions.
Also numerous installations, AA sites, bridges, etc, attacked and
`r'
25X1
road and rail cuts made.
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