THE ROLE OF AIRSTRIKES IN ATTAINING US OBJECTIVES IN NORTH VIETNAM

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP80T01629R000300080014-9
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 262
• Document Creation Date: December 21, 2016
• Document Release Date: October 16, 2008
• Sequence Number: 14
• Publication Date: March 1, 1966
• Content Type: REPORT

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I UP SECRET
Copy No. 33
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
The Role of Airstrikes
in Attaining US Objectives in North Vietnam
JCS Review Completed
ARMY and DIA review(s)
completed.
TOP SECRET
X
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FOREWORD
This report presents an analysis of the Rolling Thunder air offen-
sive against North Vietnam, estimates the physical damage and human
casualties resulting from the air campaign, and analyzes the US and
South Vietnamese air operations employed to obtain these effects.
Finally, the report evaluates the potential of air attacks as a weapon
to achieve the stated objectives of the Rolling Thunder program, and
considers alternative courses of action which are believed to be
more promising ways of achieving the Rolling Thunder objectives.
For purposes of comparison, some ca sule evaluations of US experi-
ence gained from the air war[]against North
Korea also are presented.
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CONTENTS
Page
Findings and Conclusions . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
. . .
1
I. Objectives of the Rolling Thunder Program . . . .
. . .
5
II. The Logistics Target System . . . . . . . . . .
. . .
5
III. The Rolling Thunder Attack . . . . . . . . . . .
? . .
6
A. Factors Conditioning the Nature and Scale of Attacks .
6
B. Analysis of Rolling Thunder Operations . . . .
. . .
7
IV. Effects of the Rolling Thunder Program . . . . . .
. . .
9
A. Physical Effects . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
. . .
9
B. Estimated Casualties . . . . . . . . . . . .
. . .
10
C. North Vietnamese Countermeasures . . . . .
. . .
11
D. Effect on North Vietnam's A.llies . . . . . . .
. . .
13
V. The Potential of Air Attacks Against North Vietnam
. . .
14
A.. Some Principles of Target Selection . . . . .
. . .
14
1. Use Pattern . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
. . .
15
2. Depth . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
. . .
15
3. Cushion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
. . .
15
4. Target Vulnerability . . . . . . . . . .
. . .
15
5. Recuperation . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
. . .
15
6. rFl~rr~t? azpsomcf Concentration . . . . .
. . .
16
B. Fragmentation of Attacks . . . . . . . . . .
. . .
16
C. The Military Significance of North Vietnam . .
. . .
16
1. The Logistic Funnel . . . . . . . . . .
. . .
16
2. Manpower . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
. . .
17
3. Control Center for Insurgency . . . . . .
. . .
17
D. The Logistics Target System . . . . . . . .
. . .
18
1. Results of the 1965 Campaign . . . . . .
. . .
18
2. A Preferred LOC Target System . . . . .
. . .
20
3. Some Limits to Resupply . . . . . . . .
. . .
27
E. The "Will of the Regime" as a Target System .
. . .
27
1. Military Supply Targets . . . . . . . . .
. . .
28
2. Military Economic Targets . . . . . . .
. . .
32
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3. Industrial Targets . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 34
4. The Command and Control, Agricultural,
and Manpower Targets . . . . . . . . . . . . 35
Summary Tables
1. Logistics Targets Attacked Under Assumed Intensified
Allied Air Offensive . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22
2. Military Supply Target System . . . . . . . . . . . . 29
3. Military/Economic Target System . . . . . . . . . . . 33
Appendixes
Appendix A. The Logistic Supply of Viet Cong and North
Vietnamese Forces in South Vietnam . . . . . A-1
I. Daily Supply Requirements . . . . . . . . . . . . A.-1
II. Effect of a Denial of Supplies from Sources Within
South Vietnam . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . A-7
III. Route Capacities . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . A.-9
IV. Options for Resupply . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . A-15
Appendix B. The Rolling Thunder Attack . . . . . . . . . . B-1
1. Factors Conditioning the Nature and Scale
of Attacks . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . B-1
II. Analysis of the Rolling Thunder Operation . . . . . B-7
Appendix C. An Appraisal of the Effects of the Bombing
of North Vietnam . . . . . . . . . . . . . . C-1
1. Physical Damage . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . C-1
II. Civilian and Military Casualties . . . . . . . . . . C-33
III. North Vietnamese Countermeasures . . . . . . . C-39
IV. Cost to Communist China and the USSR of Additional
Support to North Vietnam . . . . . . . . . . . . . C-53
V. Political Effects of the Bombing . . . . . . . . . . C-61
VI. Discussion of Sources and Methodology . . . . . . . C-63
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Appendix D. Potential of Air Attacks as a Weapon to Achieve
Rolling Thunder Objectives . . . . . . . . . . D-1
I. Military Significance of North Vietnam . . . . . . . D-1
II. The Logistics Target System . . . . . . . . . . . D-5
III. The "Will of the Regime as a Target System" . . . . D-15
Appendix E. The Effectiveness of Air Attacks in Other Wars . E-1
III. The Air War Against North Korea . . . . . . . . . E-14
Appendix Tables
A-1. Logistical Support for the Current Communist Main
Force in South Vietnam Under the Current Scale
of Combat . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . A-2
A-2. Logistical Support for the Current Communist Main
Force in South Vietnam Under an Escalated Scale
of Combat . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . A-3
A-3. Logistical Support for an Expanded Communist Main
Force in South Vietnam Under an Escalated Scale
of Combat . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . A-4
B-1. Equation of Rolling Thunder Number with Corresponding
Dates . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . B-4
B-2. Equation of Week Number with Corresponding Dates . B-5
B-3. Rolling Thunder: Total Sorties, by Week,
2 March 1965 - 19 February 1966 . . . . . . . . . . B-10
B-4. Attack on JCS Fixed Targets, 2 March 1965 -
19 February 1966 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . B-12
B-5. Rolling Thunder: Ordnance Expended, by Week and by
Service, 2 March 1965 - 19 February 1966 . . . . . . B-15
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B-6. Rolling Thunder: Ordnance Expended, by Week
and by Program, 2 March 1965 - 19 February 1966 . B-17
B-7. Rolling Thunder: Cancellations Because of Weather,
1 October - 24 December 1965 . . . . . . . . . . . B-20
B-8. Rolling Thunder: Total Sorties, by Month,
March-December 1965 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . B-21
B-9. Rolling Thunder: Ordnance Expended, by Month, by
Program, and by Service, March-December 1965 . . B-.22
B-10. Share of Services in Total Sorties and Total Ordnance
Delivered, 2 March 1965 - 19 February 1966 . . . . B-25
B-11. Rolling Thunder: Relationship Between Aircraft Losses
and Total Sorties Flown, 2 March 1965 -
19 February 1966 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . B-27
B-12. Estimated Costs of Rolling Thunder Related to Costs
of Damage to the Economy of North Vietnam,
2 March - 24 December 1965 . . . . . . . . . . . . B-29
B-13. Monthly Cost of Rolling Thunder Compared with Cost
of Damage to the Economy of North Vietnam,
2 March - 24 December 1965 . . . . . . . . . . . . B-30
B-14. Rolling Thunder: Statistical Summary of Attacks
on Railroad Yards and Shops, 2 March -
24 December 1965 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . B-33
C-1. Electric Powerplants Attacked Under the Rolling
Thunder Program . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . C-2
C-2. Petroleum Storage Facilities Attacked Under
the Rolling Thunder Program . . . . . . . . . . . . C-4
C- 3. Manufacturing Facilities Attacked Under the Rolling
Thunder Program . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . C-6
C-4. Railroad Yards Attacked Under the Rolling Thunder
Program . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . C-10
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C-5. Maritime Ports Attacked Under the Rolling Thunder
Program . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . C-1 Z
C-6. Airfields Attacked Under the Rolling Thunder Program. C-15
C-7. Naval Bases Attacked Under the Rolling Thunder
Program . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . C-17
C-8. Barracks. Attacked Under the Rolling Thunder
Program . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . C-18
C-9. Supply Depots Attacked Under the Rolling Thunder
Program . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . C-23
C-10. Ammunition Depots Attacked Under the Rolling Thunder
Program . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . C-25
C-11. Cost of Damage Inflicted by Armed Reconnaissance
Sorties . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . C-30
C-12. Inventory of Damage by Armed Reconnaissance
Sorties . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . C-31
U-13. Estimated North Vietnamese Imports by Land and the
Increase in Imports Resulting from the Rolling
Thunder Program, 1965 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . C-40
C-14. Estimated North Vietnamese Imports of Motor
Vehicles, 1965 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . C-46
C-15. Estimated Soviet and Chinese Deliveries of Military
Equipment to North Vietnam, 1965 . . . . . . . . . C-57
C-16. Communist Economic Aid Extended to North Vietnam,
1955-65 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . C-58
C-17. Estimated Communist Technical Assistance to North
Vietnam, 1965 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . C-59
D-1. Military Supply Target System. . . . . . . . . . . . D-16
D-2. Military/Economic Target System . . . . . . . . . . D-18
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D-3. Modern Industrial Target System . . . . . . . . . . D-22
D-5. Agricultural Target System . . . . . . . . . . . . . D-27
E-1. Distribution of Bomb Tonnages in the European
Theater During World War II . . . . . . . . . . . . E-3
E-2. Comparison of Air Operations in Korea and North
Vietnam . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . E-17
E-3. Strategic Targets Attacked in North Korea, 1950 . . . E-26
Illustrations
(Following Appendix A)
A-1. Vietnam, Laos, and Cambodia: Transportation (map)
(Following Appendix B)
B-1. Rolling Thunder: Armed Reconnaissance Boundaries (map)
B-2. Rolling Thunder: Statistical Summary, 2 March 1965 -
19 February 1966 (chart)
B-3. Rolling Thunder: Weekly Summary of Sorties, by Program,
2 March 1965 - 19 February 1966 (chart)
B-4. Rolling Thunder: Weekly Summary of Sorties, by Service,
2 March 1965 - 19 February 1966 (chart)
B-5. Rolling Thunder: Sorties Flown, 2 March 1965 -
19 February 1966 (chart)
B-6. Rolling Thunder: Sorties Flown, 2 March 1965 -
24 December 1965 (chart)
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B-7. Rolling Thunder: Statistical Summary, 31 January -
19 February 1966 (chart)
B-8. Rolling Thunder: Weekly Summary of Ordnance Expended,
by Service, 2 March 1965 - 19 February 1966 (chart)
B-9. Rolling Thunder: Weekly Summary of Ordnance Expended,
by Program, 2 March 1965 - 19 February 1966 (chart)
B-10. Rolling Thunder: Ordnance Expended, 2 March
24 December 1965 (chart)
B-11. Rolling Thunder: Monthly Summary of Sorties, by Service,
March-December 1965 (chart)
B-12. Rolling Thunder: Monthly Summary of Sorties, by Program,
March-December 1965 (chart)
B-13. Rolling Thunder: Monthly Summary of Ordnance Expended,
by Service, March-December 1965 (chart)
B-14. Rolling Thunder: Monthly Summary of Ordnance Expended,
by Program, March-December 1965 (chart)
B-15. Rolling Thunder: Indexes of Sorties Flown in Southeast Asia
and the Relative Amount in Each Area, March-December
1965 (chart)
B-16. Estimated Cost of Rolling Thunder Related to the Cost
of Damage to the Economy of North Vietnam, 2 March
24 December 1965 (chart)
B-17. [Monthly Cost Compared with Cost of Damage to the Economy
of North Vietnam]
B-18. Rolling Thunder: Statistical Summary of Attacks on Airfields,
2 March - 24 December 1965 (chart)
B-19. Rolling Thunder: Statistical Summary of Attacks on Bridges,
2 March - 24 December 1965 (chart)
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B-20. Rolling Thunder: Statistical Summary of Attacks on Locks,
2 March - 24 December 1965 (chart)
B-21. Rolling Thunder: Statistical Summary of Attacks on Ferries,
2 March - 24 December 1965 (chart)
B-22. Rolling Thunder: S atistical Summary of Attacks on Barracks,
2 March - 24 December 1965 (chart)
B-23. Rolling Thunder: Statistical Summary of Attacks on Combined
Barracks and Ammunition Depots, 2 March - 24 December 1965
(chart)
B-24. Rolling Thunder: Statistical Summary of Attacks on Ammunition
Depots, 2 March - 24 December 1965 (chart)
B-25. Rolling Thunder: Statistical Summary of Attacks on Supply
Depots, 2 March - 24 December 1965 (chart)
B-26. Rolling Thunder: Statistical Summary of Attacks on Combined
Barracks and Supply Depots, 2 March - 24 December 1965
(chart)
B-27. Rolling Thunder: Statistical Summary of Attacks on Bulk
Petroleum SLor'.age Facilities, 2 March - 24 December 1965
(chart)
B-28. Rolling Thunder: Statistical Summary of Attacks on Port
Facilities and Naval Bases, 2 March - 24 December 1965
(chart)
B-29. Rolling Thunder: Statistical Summary of Attacks on Radar
Installations, 2 March - 24 December 1965 (chart)
B-30. Rolling Thunder: Statistical Summary of Attacks on Communica-
tions Facilities, 2 March - 24 December 1965 (chart)
B-31. Rolling Thunder: Statistical Summary of Attacks on Electric
Powerplants, 2 March - 24 December 1965 (chart)
B-32. Rolling Thunder: Statistical Summary of Attacks on Explosives
Plants, 2 March - 24 December 1965 (chart)
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(Following Appendix C)
C-1. Value of Damage Inflicted on North Vietnam During the Rolling
Thunder Program (chart)
C-2. Value of Damage, by Sector, Inflicted on North Vietnam
During the Rolling Thunder Program (chart)
C-3. Total Cost of Damage Inflicted During the Rolling Thunder
Program (chart)
C-4. [Cost of Damage to Assigned JCS Targets]
C-5. [Cost of Damage by Armed Reconnaissance Missions]
C-6. Rolling Thunder: Indexes of Value of Damage, Sorties Flown,
and Bombs Expended (chart)
C-7. North Vietnam: Major JCS Targets Struck and Not Struck
During 1965 (map)
(Following Appendix D)
D-1. North Vietnam: JCS Transportation Targets Attacked and Not
Attacked (map)
(Following Appendix E)
E-1. Effect of Allied Bombing on German Munitions Production
(chart)
E-2. Effect of Allied Bombing on Japanese Munitions Production
and Maritime Shipping (chart)
E-3. Indexes of Bombs Expended and Value of Destruction in the
Korean War During Operation Strangle (chart)
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THE ROLE OF AIRSTRIKES
IN ATTAINING US OBJECTIVES IN NORTH VIETNAM
Findings and Conclusions
Findings
1. The bombing of North Vietnam under the ground rules
and at the force levels which applied in 1965 has obviously not
achieved its major objectives -- reduction of the flow of sup-
plies to the insurgent forces in the South and the forcing of
Hanoi to enter into negotiations. Although the movement of
men and supplies in North Vietnam has been hampered and
made somewhat more costly, the Communists have been able
to increase the flow of supplies and manpower to South Vietnam.
Hanoi's determination to continue its policy of supporting the
insurgency in the South appears as firm as ever. As a mani-
festation of US support and positive action in behalf of South
Vietnam, the Rolling Thunder program has been more suc-
cessful in attaining its third objective -- bolstering the confi-
dence and morale of the South Vietnamese.
2. Even if the weight of attack were to be substantially
increased, it is estimated that a continuation of the bombing
under the ground rules which applied in 1965, and which are
currently being followed, would not achieve the first two
objectives noted above.
3. Air attacks almost certainly cannot bring about a
meaningful reduction in the current level at which essential
supplies and men flow into South Vietnam. Air attacks can,
however, increase significantly the costs and difficulties
associated with North Vietnam's support of the Communist
forces in the South, complicate greatly the problem of main-
taining essential economic activity in the North, and thereby
bring meaningful pressures on the Hanoi regime. There-
fore, it is concluded that, under drastically revised ground
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rules, particularly through the removal of limitations on
geographic areas which can be taken under attack, and with
a significant revision of the target systems selected and the
manner in which they are attacked, airstrikes against North
Vietnam would be much more likely to contribute to the achiev-
ing of US objectives.
4. The effectiveness of air attacks in reducing the flow
of supplies to a critical point is in large measure dependent
on the course of ground combat in the South. Military action
in South Vietnam against the Viet Cong and the regular units
of the North Vietnamese army and their bases in South Viet-
nam on the one hand and the neutralization of their support
facilities in North Vietnam on the other are complementary
measures. Therefore, escalating the level of combat in
South Vietnam is of major importance. The result would be
substantially increased requirements for supplies from ex-
ternal sources to sustain the insurgency. These require-
ments could be increased to the point where the capacity
of Communist overland supply routes would be tested and
the costs of furnishing logistic support to the insurgent
forces could be sharply boosted, particularly if local
sources of supply in South Vietnam can be denied.
5. The choice of alternative target systems which
might be attacked is limited. Neutralization of many of
the target choices would have no direct impact on the
course of the war since few of North Vietnam's economic
resources are directly committed to the effort. An addi-
tional and fairly severe limitation on the choice of target
systems results from the early stage of escalation in the
present conflict. Without a declaration of war or a much
higher degree of escalation, resort to unrestricted aerial
warfare, including mass attacks on populated areas, does
not appear to be a possible course of action at this time.
Conclusions
1. The US ground rules under which the air campaign
against North Vietnam is waged should undergo drastic re-
vision in order to enable conventional airstrikes to make
a meaningful contribution to the achievement of the major
US objectives.
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2. More emphasis in air attacks should be placed on
military-related targets in the northern part of the country.
Sustained harassment of traffic movements in the southern
regions (and Laos) on a more limited scale would contribute
to the achievement of the overall objectives, but greater
effort in the northern area of North Vietnam should increase
the returns from air attacks.
3. A. program of air attacks designed to optimize the
furthering of these objectives at this stage of the war in
South Vietnam would include the following targets. In com-
bination, these attacks are clearly identified as against
military or militarily related targets. They are neither
directed at nor expected to bring about the collapse of the
regime.
a. First, the neutralization of petroleum
(POL) storage facilities and the Haiphong cement
plant. -11 This should be done as quickly as pos-
sible to maximize effectiveness and prevent the
North Vietnamese from taking countermeasures.
The result would be to present the Communists
with a major problem of military and economic
supply, to complicate essential reconstruction,
and to increase import requirements signifi-
cantly.
b. Following neutralization of these facili-
ties, the interdiction of the ports by mining, to
throw the burden of military and economic supply
primarily onto the rail lines, which probably
would not be able to handle all import require-
ments. Coastal and inland waterways and high-
ways would be used to an increased extent to
help cope with the supply problem and would
themselves begin to present more lucrative
traffic targets.
the Sao Vang rubber factory at
Hanoi is producing truck tires and therefore falls in the category of
war-supporting industry in the same manner as the cement plant.
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c. Following the mining of the ports, the
concentration of bombing attacks on the China-
North Vietnam lines of communication (LOC's),
particularly the key rail targets. This effort,
including 24-hour armed reconnaissance against
rail, highway, and coastal and inland water traffic,
should begin to bite into the essential traffic flows
needed to keep the economy functioning normally.
The cost of maintaining a flow of military-
economic supplies would be very greatly raised
over current levels.
d. The neutralization of selected military
barracks and supply facilities if reconnaissance
shows them to be in active use. A.gain, the attack
should be carried out as quickly as possible since
these facilities will probably be abandoned after
the first strike.
e. The pre-strike estimates (DIA./JCS)
of civilian casualties, assuming conditions of
daylight alert, for the attacks against these
fixed targets is less than 700. This is a minimum
figure and would increase if shelter measures
were ineffective or not taken, or if the assumed
accuracy of the airstrikes were reduced. On
the basis of 1965 experience the postulated armed
reconnaissance sorties could result in as many
as 1, 000 casualties a month. Most of these,
however, would be civilians directly engaged
in moving logistic supplies or in keeping the
lines of communication open.
f. It is recognized that strikes against
previous sanctuary areas, particularly Hanoi,
would probably lead to engagement of North
Vietnamese air forces. Therefore, in carrying
out the attacks outlined above, increased sorties
to neutralize the air force and air defense forces
would be necessary.
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I. Objectives of the Rolling Thunder Program
The Rolling Thunder program, a systematic but restrained air
offensive against selected economic and military targets in North Viet-
nam, was begun on 2 March 1965. The basic objectives of the air
attacks on North Vietnam have been made clear in public statements
by the President and other high officials of the US Government. These
objectives are (a) to reduce the ability of North Vietnam to support the
Communist insurgencies in South Vietnam and Laos; (b) to increase
progressively the pressure on North Vietnam to the point where the
regime would decide it was too costly to continue directing and support-
ing the insurgency in the South; and (c) to bolster the confidence and
morale of the South Vietnamese.
II. The Logistics Target System*
North Vietnam's major contributions to the war in the South are its
military manpower, its function as the control center for the insurgency,
and its function as the logistic funnel through which materiel, mostly
from the USSR and Communist China, is moved into South Vietnam.
Consequently the attainment of the first objective of Rolling Thunder
hinges almost exclusively on our ability to impede or to stop the flow
of men and supplies from North Vietnam to South Vietnam. The
logistics target system which must be attacked to meet this objective
is of such a rudimentary nature, and the volume of traffic so small,
that conventional air attack, particularly at the levels of 1965, is most
unlikely to be an adequate weapon.
Under present combat conditions the Viet Cong and North Vietnamese
forces are estimated to be dependent on external sources for less than
20 percent of their total daily logistic requirement. This movement
from North Vietnam requires the use of less than 5 percent of the
capacity of the supply corridor through Laos alone. Indeed, the capacity
of this single route can provide the tonnage required from external
sources even if the level of the Communist forces increases by nearly
40 percent and the intensity of combat reaches a scale more than 10
times its present level. * Although the capacity of the Communist
See Appendix A.
>k~< These figures pertain to illustrative projections which attribute to
the Viet Cong and North Vietnamese main forces a capability to build
up by the end of 1966 to a level of 155 battalion equivalents fighting
once in every 3 days.
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supply routes could be tested by heavy attacks with air weapons currently
available, *e believe that despite such attacks the land corridor could
supply all logistic requirements even if the expanded Viet Cong and
North Vietnamese forces were made completely dependent on external
sources. To do so, however, would require a heavy commitment of
manpower and materials to repair damage to lines of communication.
Even if the land route through Laos were successfully interdicted,
the North Vietnamese could fall back on alternative infiltration routes
to South Vietnam by sea or from Cambodia. These alternative routes
probably would be adequate to enable the Communists to maintain their
present level of activity, and to step up the firepower of their forces.
These routes would also support an increase of present forces by as
much as 40 percent, provided the level of fighting remained approxi-
mately at its present level.
III. The Rolling Thunder Attack=`
A. Factors Conditioning the Nature and Scale of Attacks
The US and South Vietnamese air campaign against North Viet-
nam has been one of the most restricted and voluntarily limited air
campaigns ever conducted by a major air power. It has been used as
a carefully controlled means of gradual escalation to achieve strictly
limited objectives. Consequently, the program has operated under a
set of rigorously defined ground rules.
Self-imposed restrictions have limited both the choice of targets
and the areas to be bombed. The existence of large restricted areas
has effectively insulated almost 80 percent of North Vietnam's limited
modern industrial economy from air attack; these areas contain 75
percent of the nation's population and the most lucrative military supply
and LOC targets. In addition to area restrictions which limit armed
reconnaissance attacks, there are specific sanctuary areas which are
exempt from air attack. These areas include a 30-nautical-mile (nm)
buffer zone along the Chinese border, a 30-nm radius around the city
of Hanoi, and a 10-nm radius around the city of Haiphong.
Attacks on specific fixed targets are now limited to those
approved in each Rolling Thunder program. These authorizations often
provide additional restrictions limiting the number of strikes against
approved targets and, in effect, exempt some types of targets from
See Appendix B.
25X1
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attack. There is, however, more flexibility in the type of targets for
armed reconnaissance. A major restriction is the policy decision to
avoid civilian casualties to the extent possible, which has resulted in
many targets outside of the sanctuary areas not being approved for
attack.
The overall effect of these area and operational restrictions
has been to grant a large measure of immunity to the military, political,
and economic assets used in Hanoi's support of the war in the South. The
restrictions also insure an ample flow of military supplies from North
Vietnam's allies. The preconditions established for the number of
strikes and sorties, the methods of attack, and the avoidance of civilian
casualties result in an operational disregard of basic principles of
target selection. Among North Vietnam's target systems, not one has
been attacked either intensively or extensively enough to provide a
critical reduction in national capacity. No target system can be reduced
to its critical point under existing rules.
Finally, the voluntary choice of such ground rules may well
give the Hanoi regime an impression of divided counsel within the US
Government. The limited nature of the US air attacks after the bomb-
ing pause may reinforce Hanoi's possible judgment that this restraint
reflects a divisiveness and US reluctance to escalate the war.
B. Analysis of Rolling Thunder Operations
The Rolling Thunder attack on North Vietnam from 2 March
1965 through 19 February 1966 delivered a total of 37, 000 tons of
ordnance on more than 140 fixed targets and numerous targets of
opportunity. A total of 42, 597 sorties were flown -- approximately
57 percent by the US Navy, 41 percent by the US Air Force, and 2
percent by the South Vietnamese Air Force. Attack sorties -- strike
and flak suppression -- accounted for over 60 percent of total sorties.
In terms of ordnance expended the Navy-Air Force relationship was
reversed, withthe Air Force accounting for 62 percent of the total.
This reflects the fact that the average ordnance load of sorties flown
by the Air Force is slightly more than twice the average load for
sorties flown by the Navy. Or stated differently, the Navy must fly
twice as many sorties to deliver a given weight of ordnance in the
target area.
A total of 181 aircraft and 154 men were lost. The estimated
cost of ordnance expended, aircraft lost, and sortie overhead comes
to a total of about $470 million. The assessable return in dollar terms
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from this attack is $63 million in damage to economic and military
facilities 'in North Vietnam.
Of the targets on the current JCS Target List that are outside
sanctuary areas, all but 30 have been struck. Thus the opportunities
within existing restrictions for striking new and important fixed targets
are extremely limited. As a result of the lack of fresh fixed targets,
armed reconnaissance is constituting an increasing share of the total
Rolling Thunder attack. Armed reconnaissance has accounted for over
72 percent of total sorties flown and has delivered 68 percent of the
ordnance expended by Rolling Thunder, but has accounted for only 21
percent of the estimated cost of damage to North Vietnam. The targets
struck on armed reconnaissance usually involve lower restoration
costs than do fixed targets, so the effectiveness of the program must
be measured primarily in military, political, and psychological terms
rather than economic.
The analysis of the air effort against North Vietnam in rela-
tion to total air activities in the Vietnamese war shows rather strong
fluctuations in the weekly level of activity. This analysis suggests that
these fluctuations may reflect a need to shift aircraft temporarily from
attack on North Vietnam to support ground operations in South Vietnam
or to attack targets in Laos.
There is a direct connection between losses and number of
sorties flown, but the ratio of loss to sorties is higher for fixed target
strike sorties than for armed reconnaissance strike sorties.
The air attack capability in the Southeast Asian area, includ-
ing the B-52's in Guam, as indicated by performance in December
1965, is of course much greater than the effort levied against North
Vietnam in 1965 and stands at about 630 sorties per day, or more than
26, 000 tons of ordnance per month. This capability is directed against
the three principal target areas -- South Vietnam, North Vietnam, and
Laos -- as military and political requirements dictate. During the
latter part of 1965, approximately 20 percent of the total air attack on
the three areas was directed against North Vietnam.
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I I
IV. Effects of the Rolling Thunder Program*
A. Physical Effects
The estimated dollar cost for the restoration of economic and
military targets attacked in the Rolling Thunder campaign is less than
10 percent of the value of the economic aid given to North Vietnam in
recent years by Communist countries.
Restoration Costs of Facilities
Attacked by the Rolling Thunder Program
Attacks on
fixed targets
Armed reconnais-
sance missions
Total
Economic
Military
Total
23.6
26.4
50
12.8
0.7
13
36
27
63
Each month there has been a decreasing return in terms of
bomb damage as fewer fixed targets outside the restricted area are
available for attack and armed reconnaissance accounts for a greater
share of the total air effort. The return has been particularly small
since the resumption of bombing as a result of confining most of the
effort to the low-value target system in the southernmost parts of
North Vietnam.
About 57 percent of the total damage -- $36 million -- is
attributable to the destruction of economic targets. This cost has
been broadly distributed throughout the economic sector, and no one
sector has been forced to bear unacceptably high levels of damage.
In terms of national capacity the greatest damage was inflicted on
electric power and petroleum storage facilities. These target systems
lost 27 and 17 percent, respectively, of their national capacity. In
each case, however, the target system had adequate cushion in the
form of excess capacity to absorb these attacks, and economic activity
could therefore be maintained at almost normal levels.
=ti See Appendix C.
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The damage to military facilities is just over $27 million.
Almost 60 percent of this damage was to military barracks, but the
effect has been negligible. The damage to military targets has shown
a definite downward trend since the peak month of July 1965.
The damage to military facilities not only has resulted in
losses of equipment but also has prompted the abandonment of instal-
lations such as airfields and the dispersal of equipment and supplies
normally stored in ammunition and supply depots.
B. Estimated Casualties
The United States has placed restrictions on the air offensive,
against North Vietnam in order to minimize civilian casualties. It has
been to North Vietnam's interest to assert otherwise, however, and
propaganda media attempt to give the impression that the air offensive
has been a vicious and unrestrained assault on the civilian population,
hospitals, schools, and other nonmilitary objectives. Nevertheless,
in only one instance have Hanoi officials presumed to provide a total
for the number of casual ies
Although the Rolling Thunder program has flown many thou-
sands of attack sorties against targets in North Vietnam, the toll in
human casualties has been light. Based on sample data, through the
end of 1965, North Vietnamese casualties -- both civilian and military --
are estimated to have ranged from 11, 700 to 14, 800, divided about
equally between killed and wounded.
Estimated Casualties Resulting from Rolling Thunder
Military
Civilian
Total
Attacks on
fixed targets
3,900 to 4,700
1,700 to 2,400
5,600 to
7,100
Armed reconnais-
sance missions
2,600 to 3,200
3,500 to 4,500
6,100 to
7,700
900
500 to 7
6
200 to 6,00
5
11,700 to 1
4,800
Total
,
,
,
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About 55 percent of these casualties were military personnel.
The strikes against JCS-designated fixed targets produced about two
military for each civilian casualty, whereas the armed reconnaissance
missions produced proportionately greater civilian casualties.
The civilians killed or injured by armed reconnaissance attacks
were for the most part truck drivers or transport and construction
workers rather directly engaged in maintaining the logistic pipeline
to South Vietnam.
Approximately 3, 000 civilian deaths (one-half of total civilian
casualties) as a result of military action against North Vietnam is a
small number. The impact of 3, 000 civilian casualties is slight in a
country where over 350, 000 persons died in 1965 from other causes
and where the accidental deaths alone produced casualties some three
to five times greater than those resulting from the Rolling Thunder
program.
C. North Vietnamese Countermeasures
The economic and military damage sustained has presented an
increasing but still moderate bill to Hanoi, which in large measure can
be (and has been) passed along to Moscow and Peiping.
The major effect of the attack on North Vietnam has been to
force Hanoi to cope with disruption to normal economic activity, par-
ticularly in transportation and distribution. Reconstruction efforts
have been hampered by difficulties in allocating manpower. The regime
has relocated large elements.of its urban population. Problems in the
distribution of food have appeared, although these problems are not yet
pressing. Where the bombing has hurt most has been in its disruption
of the road and rail nets and in the very considerable repair effort
which became necessary. On the other hand, the regime has been
singularly successful in overcoming US interdiction efforts.
Much of the damage has been to installations which the North
Vietnamese do not need to sustain the military effort. No attempt to
restore petroleum storage facilities has taken place and only recently
have there been indications of intent to repair some of the damaged
electric power stations. In both cases the failure to restore or repair
is explained by the existence of adequate excess capacity or the fact
that the facilities which have been attacked were not of vital importance.
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A similar phenomenon is noted in the absence of repair of
military facilities. The military have chosen not only the outright
abandonment of facilities such as barracks, but also the dispersal of
the material usually stored in ammunition and supply depots.
An examination of destroyed and damaged facilities shows that
only a small number were truly essential to the war effort. The major
essential restoration has consisted of measures to keep traffic moving,
to keep the railroad yards operating, to maintain communications, and
to replace transport equipment and equipment for radar and SAM sites.
These measures have probably been effected at a cost of between $4
million and $5 million, or between 5 and 10 percent of the.total economic
and military damage sustained in North Vietnam to date.
The increasing Soviet and Chinese commitments to sustain the
flow of military and economic aid to North Vietnam imply an obligation
to underwrite the economic restoration of the country on a grant basis
or on favorable terms. This assurance is almost certainly a controlling
determinant in Hanoi's attitude toward the loss of its economic facilities.
In the Korean War, more severe economic losses did not deter Pyongyang
during the conflict, and restoration assistance was provided by both China
and the USSR.
Support of the insurgency in the South has been only indirectly
affected by the bomb damage. North Vietnam's major inputs to the con-
flict in the South are its provision of military leadership and manpower
and its function as the control center and logistic base for the Viet Cong
and North Vietnamese force. North Vietnam serves essentially as the
logistic funnel through which the flow of military supplies, particularly
weapons and ammunition from the USSR and China, is maintained.
Despite the concentration of allied attacks in the South and in
Laos and the resumption of bombing in the North, the movement of
trucks during the current dry season along the infiltration routes
through Laos is twice the level of a year ago, and the North Vietnamese
are using larger trucks with heavier loads. The North Vietnamese
through intensive efforts have increased the capacity of the lines of
communication and made them less vulnerable to air attack. They have
built new bypasses and ferries to circumvent bombed bridges, improved
old roads and trails, and are constructing new roads. In several
instances, roads previously limited to dry-season operation now have
an all-weather capability. The current dry-season capacity of the
interdicted route through Laos is adequate to accommodate a buildup
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present leveo. percent
of the Viet Cong and moat more than 10 force of at least 4
and an intensity of co
estimate excludes any effect of attacks on truck traffic.
This ability to react and to offset the effects of the air attacks
has not been without its costs. It is estimated that the diversion of man-
power to tasks associated with dispersal programs and emergency repair
and maintenance of lines of communication throughout North Vietnam may
now require the full-time services of 200, 000 workers (equivalent to about
10 percent of the nonagricultural labor force) and the part-time impress-
ment of another 100, 000. An additional 150, 000 people are also obli-
gated, on a part-time basis, to serve in various aspects of civil defense
which take them away from their normal pursuits. Thus a significant
share of the labor force is diverted in varying degrees to supporting t the cu-
war in the South. The diversion of labor has been supplemented, p
larly in the northern provinces, by Chinese logistic support troops.
D. Effect on North Vietnam's Allies
In response to the intensified US and Vietnamese air offensive
in 1965, all countries of the Communist camp have extended economic
assistance as proof of their support. The response on the part of North
Vietnam's allies, however, has been more unstinting in political and
economic support and much more restrained in the military field. The
major economic and military aid programs have been undertaken by the
USSR and Communist China. The Eastern European Communist coun-
tries have generally extended only token amounts of assistance.
Total assistance extended by China and the USSR in 1965 is
on the order of $250 million to $400 million, of which military aid
accounted for $150 million to $200 million. * This aid is a relatively
insignificant drain on the capabilities of both countries. In 1965, for
example, the value of military equipment and of economic aid provided
to less developed countries of the Free World by the USSR was more
than twice that supplied to North Vietnam in the same period.
* These estimates are based on the same methodologies as those
used in national intelligence estimates. The costing of Soviet mili-
tary systems in this manner has been carried on over a period of
many years.
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The USSR is by far the major source of military equipment for
North Vietnam, supplying 70 to 95 percent, or $142 million, of the total
provided in 1965. The major components of Soviet military aid were
SAM sites (15 to 20), antiaircraft guns (1, 000 to 1, 200), planes (44),
motor vehicles (2, 600), radar, and jet fuel. China's identified mili-
tary aid, totaling only $11 million, consisted principally of planes
(8) and trucks (1, 400). In addition, large amounts of infantry weapons
and ammunition are provided by Communist China. The inclusion of the
cost of this equipment would probably raise the value of China's total
contribution by a few million dollars. Military aid from the Eastern
European Communist countries -- consisting principally of small arms
and ammunition, medicines and medical equipment, and some trucks --
is valued at only a few million dollars.
V. The Potential of Air Attacks Against North Vietnam-
The Rolling Thunder program has been handicapped, as would be
any air attack program against North Vietnam, by the absence of an
indigenous economic base heavily committed to the support of military
operations. Additionally, the ground rules under which the program
must operate are highly restrictive, and the air attack has been frag-
mented on a variety of military and economic target systems. The
greatest weight of bombing has been expended on a comparatively
invulnerable rudimentary transport network in the southern part of
North Vietnam.
If the effectiveness of the campaign is to be raised significantly,
two fundamental changes must be made. The first is a basic change
in ground rules to remove area and target limitations including mining
of the ports. The second is a more rational use of basic principles of
target selection.
A. Some Principles of Target Selection
The following principles of target selection apply to the analysis
of any industry or service that is being considered as a potential target
system because of its contribution to military output or to the sustaining
of military operations.
See Appendix D.
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This factor covers the extent to which a particular system
really contributes to military output or to military operations, to civilian
uses, to export, and so forth. Certain of these uses are essential and
others are nonessential. The more detail in which a use pattern can be
analyzed the more illuminating the process becomes.
2. Depth
This factor covers the travel time of a product from the
point of manufacture to the front-line strength of the enemy. The travel
time, or lead time, on the steel industry, for example, to the front line
is probably on the order of a year or more, whereas the aircraft assembly
can be measured in terms of a few months.
This factor includes a variety of considerations such as the
extent to which pre-attack consumption must be cut back before essential
requirements are affected, the extent to which the enemy can employ a
substitute, the size of stocks, goods in the pipeline, and the like. The
most important factor with respect to cushion is the determination of the
so-called "critical point, " which is the point to which the output of the
target industry or service may be reduced without serious effect. Below
the critical point the effects begin to be felt with increasing impact.
4. Target Vulnerability
This factor covers the appraisal of the physical vulner-
ability of a potential target system to attack by existing military means.
The size of weaponry available and needed, the level of bombing accuracy
which is achievable, the physical hardness of the target, and other per-
tinent considerations enter into this calculation.
5. Recuperation
This factor covers both the time and size of effort needed
to repair or replace the essential parts of a damaged target system.
For example, during the Rolling Thunder program the North Vietnamese,
with Chinese assistance, have been able to repair 60- to 90-foot rail-
road bridges in from 48 to 72 hours, to repair 20-foot spans on highway
bridges in from 20 to 24 hours, and to replace 100 feet of underwater
crossings in from 8 to 10 hours. This speed of recuperation was suf-
ficient to more than maintain the required logistic flows.
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6. The Principle of Concentration
This factor is of overriding importance in attacks on
either tactical or strategic target systems. The principle of concen-
tration fixes attention on two primary factors:
a. The essentiality of taking all or the major part
of any target system under attack, in order to cut through the cushion.
b. The essentiality of concentrating the attack in
point of time to overwhelm the ability to reconstruct, repair, or
disperse.
B. Fragmentation of Attacks
The spreading of bomb tonnage over a great variety of mili-
tary and economic target systems but attacking no one of these in
depth has been characteristic of the Rolling Thunder program. The
unattacked targets represent, for any one system, more than adequate
capacity to meet all essential requirements. The attacks on major
targets in some cases have been phased over such long periods of
time that adequate readjustments to meet the disruption had been
effected.
C. The Military Significance of North Vietnam
The significance of North Vietnam to military activities in
South Vietnam is measurable in terms of three basic functions which
it assumes: (1) as a logistic funnel for the stockage and movement of
supplies into South Vietnam; (2) as a source of manpower; and (3) as
a control center for the direction of insurgency.
The Logistic Funnel
The North Vietnamese economy, which is basically one
of subsistence agriculture, has only a small modern industrial center
concentrated in a few urban centers, including Hanoi, Haiphong, Nam
Dinh, Viet Tri, and Thai Nguyen. The country imports little food even
in poor agricultural years and depends largely on domestic production
to feed its population. Agriculture in 1964 accounted for almost one-
half of the gross national product. North Vietnam produces only minor
items of military equipment -- grenades, mines, mortars, and ammuni-
tion for small arms -- and must import all of its heavy military equipment
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and most of its small arms, ammunition, and medical supplies from
Communist countries.
2. Manpower
A major aspect of North Vietnam's military significance
is its capacity both to train and to supply insurgent Viet Cong personnel
for later infiltration into South Vietnam and to provide substantial incre-
ments of its own population, to serve in South Vietnam or in indirect
support functions.
North Vietnam has a population of over 18 million. Since
80 percent of the labor force is engaged in agriculture and is greatly
underemployed, this primitive economy has basically large reserves.
A large-scale mobilization of manpower had reportedly been under way
in North Vietnam during 1965.
The country has about 4 million draft-age males, almost
all of whom have been put in the regular armed force, paramilitary
organizations, or labor repair and maintenance battalions. An esti-
mated 175, 000 males reach draft age each year, of which at least
100, 000 are physically fit for military duty.
It is estimated that North Vietnam has the capacity to
train and infiltrate the equivalent of nine North Vietnamese battalions
each month during 1966, or a total of approximately 54, 000 men for
the full year. The net additions to be made to the Communist forces
in South Vietnam will depend, in addition to decisions on the rate of
North Vietnamese infiltration, on the capability of the Viet Cong to
train new and replacement troops and the casualty rates inflicted on
Viet Cong and North Vietnamese forces during the year. North Viet-
nam has also demonstrated a capacity to mobilize large numbers of
personnel for activities involved in supporting the insurgency in the
South.
3. Control Center for Insurgency
The function of North Vietnam as the control center for
Viet Cong insurgency is well documented 25X1
The major instrument of political control and direction
of the Viet Cong insurgency is the Lao Dong Party, specifically the
Committee for the Supervision of the South, which is attached to the
Party's Central Committee. The North Vietnamese Communist Party
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and government linkage with the National Liberation Front (NLF) is
close and clear. Hanoi maintains control over the NLF through the
Communist leaders in South Vietnam to whom the North Vietnamese
issue overall guidance.
D. The Logistics Target System
1. Results of the 1965 Campaign
During 1965, more than 2,700 strike and flak suppression
sorties carrying more than 3, 400 tons of ordnance were flown against
fixed targets on LOC's in North Vietnam. Relatively few of these
targets were located on the railroads and roads north and east of
Hanoi. Armed reconnaissance played a very significant additional role
in the program to interdict LOC's, but again concentrated for the most
part in the southern parts of North Vietnam.
These attacks made it more difficult and expensive for
North Vietnam to maintain normal economic activity and to support
the war in the South. Nevertheless, overall performance by the modern
transport system was maintained at the levels of 1964, even though some
important export traffic movements -- for example, that of apatite -- were
halted completely. The transport system directly involved in the move-
ment of men and materials to Laos and South Vietnam was able to sus-
tain and to increase the flow of this traffic. At the same time, the
number of routes and bypasses was increased, thus making the network
less vulnerable to air attack. The results of the interdiction campaign
show clearly that the original expectation that it would reduce LOC
capacity in the southern part of the country by about two-thirds and even
more in the north could not be realized. The North Vietnamese had suf-
ficient recuperability resources so that atwo-thirds reduction in capacity
was imposed for only a very short period of time if at all. The most
successful interdiction -- the Hanoi-Lao Cai rail line -- apparently was
effective because of the relatively heavy level of traffic on this line and
the fact that it is one of the few major transport routes without alterna-
tive means of transportation.
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Photographic examination) of 26 inter- 25X1
dicted highway route segments shows that on 15 segments route
capacity had been restored to previous levels, on 2 segments capacity
had increased, and on 9 segments capacity had been reduced. Only
on two of these nine segments had capacity been reduced more than
25 percent. On one of these, restoration required only a matter of
hours; the other was not vital to maintaining traffic flows.
Traffic volume on the major infiltration routes is at
levels substantially below -- only rarely over 25 percent -- even
interdicted route capacities. Bomb damage on these routes is invar-
iably repaired quickly and inexpensively.
In summary, the rudimentary nature of the logistic tar-
gets in the southern part of North Vietnam, the small volume of traffic
moving over them in relation to route capacities, the relative ease and
speed with which they are repaired, and the extremely high frequency
with which they would have to be restruck -- once every three days --
all combine to make the logistics network in this region a relatively
unattractive target system, except as a supplement to a larger program.
A significant lesson from the Rolling Thunder program to
date is that the goal of sustained interdiction of the rudimentary road
and trail networks in southern North Vietnam and in Laos will be ex-
tremely difficult and probably impossible to obtain in 1966, given the
conventional ordnance and strike capabilities likely to exist. The ease
with which bypass roads, river crossings, and ferries can be constructed
? and the ability to resort to human transport when necessary make these
extremely unprofitable targets. This is borne out by experience in both
the Korean War and the present conflict. In Korea the interdiction pro-
gram flew sorties at three times the level of Rolling Thunder against
a logistics target system moving almost 250 times the amount of supplies
moving into South Vietnam. Yet the North Koreans and Chinese in a
defensive position were able to move in their daily logistic requirement
and make significant additions to stockpiles. They were, however,
unable to mount a sustained offensive due to the logistic supply ceiling
imposed by air attack.
The recent effort in Laos during the bombing pause also
points out the relative ineffectiveness of conventional interdiction pro-
grams against simple high-capacity logistic systems made up of high-
way targets. During the five-week period of the bombing lull in Decem-
ber 1965 - January 1966, 9, 000 sorties (8, 000 of which were over the
Panhandle) were flown to drop perhaps 18, 000 tons of ordnance on the
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supply routes to South Vietnam. Despite this effort, the level of truck
traffic moving south on these routes was twice the average of 15 trucks
per day moving south during the same period in 1965. For these
reasons the sortie and ordnance expenditure presently used against
supply routes in the southern region could probably be more effectively
used against the more lucrative LOC targets in the northern part of
North Vietnam.
2. A Preferred LOC Target System
The source of logistic supplies not obtainable in South
Vietnam for the Viet Cong and North Vietnamese forces and for North
Vietnam's defense forces is the military aid being provided by the
USSR and China. Although the flow of supplies from these sources
cannot be cut off, the movement could be made considerably more ex-
pensive and unreliable if authorization is granted to attack intensively
the rail connections to Communist China and if the three major ports
are effectively mined, thereby closing off the movement of oceangoing
ships. At the same time, the flow of imports needed to sustain eco-
nomic activity in North Vietnam could almost certainly be reduced.
About two-thirds of North Vietnam's imports are carried
by sea transport and the remainder move principally over the rail
connection with Communist China. Mining the entrances to the three
major ports would effectively transfer almost all imports to rail trans-
port. The rail connection to Communist China, which is currently
used at only about one-third of capacity, would then be forced to attempt
to operate at close to full capacity under interdiction conditions. If
production in facilities such as the cement plant, and probably the
rubber plant, were halted at the same time, an import requirement
would be generated which would be far in excess of rail capacity.
The logistics target system in the northern part of North Vietnam
would then be more like such a system in a developed economy at
war, which is required to maintain high levels of both economic and
military traffic. The disruptive effect of interdiction of this rail
system would then be more immediately felt. Sustained interdiction
of the line would force Hanoi to allocate considerable amounts of man-
power and materials to maintain the line and alternate highway routes.
The repair of major bridge structures would be measurably more com-
plex and expensive than the relatively simple expedients which keep
traffic moving in the southern provinces and in Laos. Sustained 24-hour
interdiction and destruction of locomotives and rolling stock by armed
reconnaissance would probably stop all daylight traffic and disrupt night-
time traffic, thus slowing down the movement of supplies and making
25X1
I
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the logistic resupply of Communist forces considerably less reliable
than at present. As a result, some economic requirements at least
would go unsatisfied.
The North Vietnamese would probably be forced to make
greater use of alternate means of transport such as highways and
coastal and inland waterways. Although it would be extremely diffi-
cult to interdict these systems, their greater use would increase the
opportunities for harassment of actual traffic movements.
The specific program considered would include attacks
on 29 major bridges and the four principal railroad yards and shops
(see Table 1). The probable increase in aircraft losses resulting
from a concentration of air efforts on the northern LOC's has not
been analyzed. The initial strikes against these targets would require
an estimated 1, 670 strike and support sorties and 1, 560 tons of
ordnance. The restrike effort required to keep these targets inter-
dicted has not been calculated, but it would involve armed reconnais-
sance on a 24-hour basis. An interdiction program only against the
two rail connections to China -- the Hanoi-Lao Cai and Hanoi-bong
Dang lines -- would require an estimated 750 strike and support
sorties monthly. Sustained interdiction and armed reconnaissance
of the land transport targets in the north would probably require over
3, 000 sorties monthly. This program would stop through traffic on
major rail routes, but more intensive attacks would probably be neces-
sary to deny the use of these routes for shuttle service. Successful
attacks on these 33 land transport targets, the major portion of which
are located on the more heavily used transport routes of the country,
would be much more effective than attacking minor bridges in the
south and other outlying areas, and from the standpoint of identifica-
tion would be more easily carried out than attacks on the more obscured,
smaller, and diverse transport targets in the south.
The interdiction of LOC's, to be effective, must be com-
bined with the mining of the three major ports. The mining program
would require initially 104 sorties and only 190 tons of ordnance. The
closing of the ports to oceangoing traffic would throw almost all of
North Vietnam's import traffic onto the rail connection to China. The
Hanoi-Doug Dang line would then be operating at or close to full capac-
ity. Further use would also be made of highway and coastal water
routes. If other essential import requirements were generated by
neutralization of industrial facilities, such as the Haiphong cement
plant, import requirements would then exceed the capacity of the rail
line. With only limited highway capacity available, interdiction of
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Logistics Targets Attacked Under Assumed Intensified Allied Air Offensive
T
t
Estimated Sorties
Ordnance
arge
Number
St
ik
Required
r
e
Support
Total
Tons
Location b
A
Railroad Bridges
y
rea
18.24 Cao Nung Railroad Bridge over the Song
Hoa
18.26 Lang Con Railroad Bridge NW
88
28
16
16
104
44
39.0
42.0
Northeast quadrant
rural area
Border buffer zone
r'O N
18.58 Lang Dang Railroad Bridge over the
Song Thuong
18.74 Vu Chua Railroad Bridge over the
Suoi Ngang
24
88
16
16
40
104
36.0
39.0
rural area
Border buffer zone
rural area
Northeast quadrant
rural area
Highway Bridges
17 Haiphong Highway Bridge over the Song
Da Bach
18.31 Kep Highway Bridge over the Song
Thuong
18.33 Thai Nguyen Highway Bridge over the
Song Cau
18.36 Ha Gia Highway Bridge over the Song
Cong
35
35
35
22
18
18
18
16
53
53
53
38
50.0
50.0
50.0
49.5
Haiphong restricted
zone rural area
(mud flats)
Northeast quadrant
near villages
Northeast quadrant
near villages
Hanoi restricted
zone near villages
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Table 1
(Continued)
Number Name
Highway Bridges (Continued)
Estimated Sorties Ordnance
Required
Strike Support Total (Tons) Location by Area
18.38
Dan Phuong Highway Causeway over the
Song Day
24
18.0
Hanoi restricted
zone near villages
18.42
Xuan Mai Highway Bridge North over the
Song Con
34
24
58
25.5
Hanoi restricted
zone near villages
18.59
Long Khap Highway Bridge
40
16
56
90.0
Border buffer zone
rural area
18.61
Bac Can Highway Bridge over the Song
Cau
35
i8
53
50.0
Northeast quadrant
near villages
18.62
Lang Luong Highway Bridge over the
Song Mo Ga
35
18
53
50.0
Northeast quadrant
rural area
18.65
On Highway Bridge over the Song Thuon
32
16
48
24.0
Border buffer zone
near villages
18.66
Me Xa Highway Bridge over the Song Ky
35
18
53
50.0
Northeast quadrant
near villages
18.67
Chieng Chang Highway Bridge
48
48.0
Northeast quadrant
rural area
18.71
Loc Binh Highway Bridge
34
16
50
76.5
Border buffer zone
rural area
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Table 1
(Continued)
Number Name
Highway Bridges (Continued)
18.72
Xuan Mai Highway Bridge SW over the
Song Day
50
16
66
112.5
Hanoi restricted
zone near villages
18.77
Ha Chanh Highway Bridge North
22
16
38
33.0
Border buffer zone
rural area
18.78
Lam Highway Bridge NE
56
16
72
42.0
Northeast quadrant
rural area
Combination Bridges
11
Hai Duong RR/Highway Bridge over the
Song Thai Binh
35
19
54
49.5
Hanoi restricted
zone near villages
12
Hanoi RR/Highway Bridge over the Red
River
34
24
58
76.5
Hanoi restricted
zone near villages
13
Hanoi RR/Highway Bridge over the Song
Duong (Canal Des Rapides)
28
20
48
63.0
Hanoi restricted
zone near villages
15
Viet Tri RR/Highway Bridge over the
Song Lo (Riviere Claire)
22
24
46
49.5
Hanoi restricted
zone near villages
16
Dap Cau RR/Highway Bridge over the
Song Cau
28
16
44
63.0
Hanoi restricted
zone near villages
18
Lang Son RR/Highway Bridge over the
Song Ky Cung
22
16
38
49.5
Border buffer zone
densely populated
Estimated Sorties Ordnance
Required
Strike Support Total (Tons) Location by Area
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Table 1
(Continued)
Combination Bridges (Continued)
Required
Number Name Strike Support Total (Tons) Location by Area 25X1
18.22
Co Trai RR/Highway Bridge over the
Song Thuong
32
16
48
48.0
Hanoi restricted
zone near villages
18.23
Bac Giang (Phu Lang Thuong) RR/Highway
Bridge over the Song Thuong
22
42
49.5
Hanoi restricted
zone near villages
18.25
Hai Duong RR/Highway Bridge East over
the Song Rang
35
19
54
49.5
Northeast quadrant
rural area
Railroad Yards and Shops
19
Yen Vien railroad classification yard
6
24
30
13.5
Hanoi restricted
zone near villages
20
Hanoi railroad car repair shops
at Gia Lam
30
13.5
Hanoi restricted
zone near villages
21
Hanoi railroad station and
classification yard
18
24
42
4
0.5
Hanoi restricted zone
,densely populated
21.11
Thai Nguyen railroad station yards
and shops
8
24
32
18.0
Northeast quadrant
near industrial
complex
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Table 1
(Continued)
Number
Name
Strike
Support
Total
Required
(Tons)
Location by Area
68
Cam Pha Mineable Area.
8
12
20
25
Northeast quadrant
rural area
69
Hon Gai Mineable Area
20
12
32
7L
Haiphong restricted
zone rural area,
70.1
Haiphong Mineable Area
36
16
52
91
Haiphong restricted
zone rural area
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I I
northern transport lines would then have a more immediate and direct
impact. The flow of military supplies into North Vietnam and onward
to South Vietnam would be slowed up and made more costly. Some eco-
nomic imports would probably have to be foregone. In summary, the
North Vietnamese regime would, by this program, be brought under far
stronger pressures from air attacks than resulted from the pattern of
airstrikes in 1965. At the same time, however, it is believed that
this program would place no real restraint on the level of Communist
activity in South Vietnam until requirements for resupply become
much higher than now estimated.
3. Some Limits to Resupply
The upper limits on the level and cost of logistic support
which the Hanoi regime would be willing to sustain cannot be quantified
at this time. Several factors are relevant to the determination of that
level. One factor is the limit to which local labor can be diverted
to maintain the supply lines and support the logistic effort without an
unfavorable impact on essential industrial and/or agricultural produc-
tion. Substantial additional diversion of labor could necessitate imports
of food to make up for production lost because of a shortage of farm
labor. This could aggravate existing internal distribution and import
programs, particularly if the major ports were closed and the rail and
highway connections to China were being subjected to heavy interdic-
tion.
A direct influence on logistic needs is the extent to
which allied offensive operations in South Vietnam can force the Com-
munists to use supplies at a higher rate or deny them access to exist-
ing stockpiles. If, for example, the buildup and level of combat pro-
jected for the end of 1966 also involved a total dependence on external
sources for supplies, the North Vietnamese would have to supply about
250 tons a day to the insurgent forces in South Vietnam.
E. The "Will of the Regime" as a Target System
In addition to Hanoi's estimate of the US will to continue the
war, three main factors appear to affect the determination of the
regime to continue to support the war in South Vietnam: (1) the course
of the war; (2) the degree of political and material support for the
policy rendered the regime by its two main allies, the USSR and Com-
munist China; and (3) the economic, social, and political consequences
of supporting the war in South Vietnam within North Vietnam itself.
The effort required in supporting the war in South Vietnam draws very
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little on the physical resources of North Vietnam. The neutralization
of given target systems within North Vietnam, however, would exact
an increasing cost as the price to be paid for supporting the insurgency.
If air attack is to be a significant factor in the attaining of
US objectives, a substantial revision must be made in the self-imposed
ground rules. Air attack can increase significantly the price which
North Vietnam pays to continue the war and reduce the ease with which
it carries on its support of the war in the South.
A preliminary ranking has been made of the various possible
target systems with the exception of lines of communication (which
is discussed elsewhere) in a rough order of their importance to the
military effort. This section presents a judgment on the feasibility
or desirability of subjecting them to air attack at the current stage
of the campaign and evaluates the probable impact of a postulated
attack. Estimates of the forces and ordnance required for attack are
presented only for those target systems which presently are in the
preferred systems for a revised Rolling Thunder (see Tables 2 and 3).
Six target systems have been considered: (1) the military supply sys-
tem, (2) the military/ economic system, (3) the modern industrial
system, (4) the command and control system, (5) an agricultural sys-
tem, and (6) the manpower system.
Extension of Rolling Thunder at this time is considered only
for the first two target systems, in addition to the LOC system dis-
cussed separately. The details of these attacks are shown in the
tables included.
1. Military Supply Targets
Twenty-six military barracks and/or supply targets re-
main unattacked although they are on the JCS target list (see Table 2).
Since almost all of these are in the "sanctuary" areas, the extent to
which they are occupied is not known. If reconnaissance were to
reveal a significant level of activity at these facilities, they would be
valid military targets whose neutralization would impede the flow of
military supplies and disrupt military training programs in North
Vietnam. The barracks on the list are those believed to be associated
with military training programs in support of the infiltration. Virtually
simultaneous attack would be needed for effectiveness, particularly the
barracks attacks. Based on previous experience we can assume that
these barracks will be abandoned after the first strike. The effect
would be increasingly disruptive if other attacks on military/ economic
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Military Supply Target System
Estimated Sorties
Ordnance
JCS Target Number
Name
Strike
Support
Total
Requirement
(Tons)
22
Xuan Mai SSW
1+1+
21+
68
99.0
24
63.0
31
Ha Dong Barracks/
Supply Depot
100
32
132
225.0
34
Vinh Yen North
1+6
20
66
103.5
Son Tay SW
34
20
54
76.5
39.29
Kep Ha NE
64
28
92
11+1+.0
39.33
Trai Thon
21+
16
1+0
51+.0
39.37
Vinh Yen NNE
26
20
1+6
58.5
39.38
Phu Tho NW
18
16
34
40.5
39.1+1
Ngoc Thai
18
16
31+
1+0.5
Remarks
Hanoi Circle
near villages
Hanoi Circle
rural area
Hanoi Circle
near villages
Hanoi Circle
near villages
Hanoi Circle
rural area
NE Quadrant
near villages
Hanoi Circle
near villages
Hanoi Circle
rural area
NW Quadrant
rural area
NW Quadrant
near villages
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Table 2
(Continued)
Estimated Sorties
Ordnance
JCS Target Number
Name
Strike
Support
Total
Requirement
(Tons)
Remarks
39.42
Son Dong SSE
54
16
70
121.5
Hanoi Circle
39.43
Kep South
20
16
36
45.0
rural area
NE Quadrant
rural area
39.44
Chi Ne
18
16
34
40.5
39.46
Bien Son NNE
132
20
152
297.0
39.51
Nom Son
8
8
16
18.0
Ammunition depots
45
Haiphong
76
28
104
114.0
47.14
Vinh Yen
32
20
52
48.0
47.16
Hon Gai Explosives
Storage
28
12
40
42.0
47.17
Cam Ly
24
20
44
36.0
47.21
Bac Giang
20
16
36
45.0
Southern
rural area
Southern
near villages
Southern
Haiphong Circle
near villages
Hanoi Circle
near villages
NE Quadrant
rural area
NE Quadrant
rural area
Hanoi Circle
rural area
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JCS Target Number Name
Supply/ordnance
depots
Table 2
(Continued)
Estimated Sorties Ordnance
Requirement
Strike Support Total (Tons) Remarks
58
52
21.0
Hanoi Circle
densely populated
30
50
22.5
Hanoi Circle
densely populated
Thai Nguyen North
14
34
10.5
Northeast quadrant
near villages
16
36
12.0
Hanoi Circle
near villages
63.11
Van Dien Vehicle
Depot
58
90
43.5
Hanoi Circle
near villages
63.14
Son Tay
34
24
58
25.5
Hanoi Circle
near villages
994+
528
1,522
1,846.5
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and LOC targets are carried out simultaneously, in order to obtain a
maximum disruption of the flow of essential military supplies into
North Vietnam and their eventual redistribution to military consumers.
2. Military/ Economic Targets
The economic targets in North Vietnam's modern indus-
trial base which have a direct bearing on the regime's ability to sup-
port the war in the South are the major bulk petroleum storage facilities
and the Haiphong cement plant (see Table 3). The petroleum storage
installations sustain the supply and distribution activities within North
Vietnam and through Laos, and are vital to the mobility of North Viet-
namese military forces and to distribution and transport services for
the civilian economy. The Haiphong cement plant as the sole producer
in North Vietnam provides a major input to both normal construction
activity and the reconstruction programs necessitated by Rolling Thunder
attacks. Intelligence may reveal other war-supporting facilities falling
in this category.
The extension of airstrikes against eight major POL
storage terminals would deprive the regime of all but some 10, 000
tons of storage dispersed in a variety of untargeted locations, includ-
ing some 2, 200 tons in small buried tanks at seven newly identified
dispersed storage facilities. In addition, about 4, 000 tons of residual
capacity would remain in sites previously struck. The planned attacks
would eliminate the principal bulk petroleum terminals in North Vietnam.
Remaining storage would be less than one month's supply at 1965 levels.
A. minimum of 440 sorties, comprising 280 strike aircraft
and 160 support, will probably be required to neutralize these facilities.
The ordnance requirement for these targets is estimated to be about
850 tons.
If the attack is to obtain optimum effect, it is imperative
that it be carried out almost simultaneously on all petroleum storage
targets. Simultaneous attack insures the most certain way of eliminat-
ing the cushion represented by excess storage capacity and stocks and
of preventing countermeasures such as dispersal and thus of reaching
the critical point in meeting essential requirements. The loss of petro-
leum storage facilities -- and their contents -- would have an immed-
iate effect on the economy. The effect on normal industrial production
activities would be slight because most of the industrial enterprises in
North Vietnam rely on coal or electricity for energy. The major effect
in the civilian economy would be in transportation and distribution.
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Table 3
Military/Economic Target System
Estimated Sorties Ordnance
Capacity Requirement
JCS Target Number Name (Metric Tons) Strike Support Total (Tons) Remarks
Petroleum storage
facilities a
72,000
58
24
82
196.0
Haiphong Circle
near villages
49
Hanoi (Thanh
Am)
34,000
36
24
60
121.5
Hanoi Circle
rural area
14,000
50
24
74
169.0
Hanoi Circle
rural area
Duong Nham
14,000
38
20
58
85.5
Hanoi Circle
near villages
20
60
135.0
Hanoi Circle
near villages
8,000
12
34
49.5
Haiphong Circle
near villages
51.11
Bac Giang (Phu
Lang Thuong)
6,000
16
36
45.0
Hanoi Circle
near villages
51.14
4,000
20
20
40
45.0
Hanoi Circle
near villages
165,000
284
160
444
846.5
700,000 to 800,000
4
16
20
13-5W
Haiphong Circle
densely populated
b. Computed on the basis of an attack on the electric powerplant. The ordnance requirement would be heavier
if the cement plant itself were attacked.
a. Previous strikes at four facilities have eliminated almost 37,000 tons of capacity.
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A sustained loss of petroleum storage facilities coupled
with an inability to import even minimum operating requirements
would have its greatest effect on military operations. North Vietnamese
military forces account for about 60 percent of total petroleum consump-
tion, or a monthly average of about 8, 500 tons. North Vietnam with
Chinese cooperation would probably be able after an initial period of
disruption to maintain petroleum imports at almost normal levels even
after the intensified attacks discussed in this report. Therefore, the
supply of essential imports of petroleum for military requirements
would appear to be almost certain.
Nevertheless, the attack would compound the difficulties
of maintaining the flow of imports and military aid on the land trans-
port connections to Communist China. The difficulties would be in-
creased as attacks on other target systems increased the traffic flows
in these land and coastal water transport routes.
An attack on the Haiphong cement plant would, by neutraliz-
ing North Vietnam's only producer of cement, create a major impediment
to reconstruction and repair programs, at least in the short run. Over
the longer term, cement could be imported from China. The import
requirement could be on the order of 700, 000 to 800, 000 tons a year
to meet all military and economic needs. If this volume were required,
it would mean a doubling of the present tonnage of all seaborne imports,
but it is probable that the total current requirements would not be con-
sidered essential under stringent transport conditions. If the cement
and all seaborne imports had to be carried on the rail line from China,
the total traffic volume would be in excess of the normal capacities of
the Hanoi-Dong Dang rail line and the highway connections to China, and
far in excess of their capacity under conditions of interdiction.
3. Industrial Targets
North Vietnam's small modern industrial sector contains
a few highly prized and nominally lucrative industrial targets. Prin-
cipal among these are the Hanoi machine building plant, the iron and
steel plant at Thai Nguyen, and the Viet Tri chemical combine.
These plants and an additional 11 smaller plants constitute
almost all of the modern industrial targets. They could be taken under
attack by airstrikes involving about 500 sorties and the expenditure of
slightly over 500 tons of ordnance. Alternatively a successful attack on
the main electric power facilities could effectively put almost all of
these plants out of operation.
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Such an attack is often postulated as one which by depriv-
ing Hanoi of almost all of its modern economy and the major hallmarks
of its economic progress will persuade the regime to enter into negotia-
tions to end the war. This outcome is uncertain and probably unlikely.
North Vietnam's modern industrial economy makes almost no direct or
significant contribution to the war effort, which is sustained materially
almost exclusively by supplies from other Communist countries. Since
North Vietnam is essentially a subsistence economy, the modern indus-
trial sector makes only a limited contribution to economic activity.
The loss of industrial production would have almost no impact on the
great mass of this agrarian society. The small element of the popula-
tion directly affected would hardly be sufficient, or disposed, to persuade
the regime to stop the war. For these reasons an attack on the modern
industrial base of itself would not be likely to attain US objectives.
The experience of the Korean War also supports this judg-
ment. Korea in 1950 was a country with a population considerably
smaller and an industrial base much larger than those of North Vietnam
in 1965. Most of Korea's modern industry was destroyed in the first
three months of the war. One year later, hydroelectric plants were
attacked to increase pressures on the regime. Attacks in the spring
of 1953 against irrigation dams brought further pressure on the Korean
leadership. This carefully phased program failed to force the enemy
to accept UN truce proposals. In both North Korea and North Vietnam
it is clear that the modern industrial base is too small to serve as a
testing ground for the "hostage" concept of industrial destruction as
a means of deterring aggression.
This potential target system does serve to provide a list
of optional targets for possible use when other air attacks or activities
in South Vietnam might produce indications of a weakening of Hanoi' s
determination to carry on with the war. At such a point, attacks on
industrial targets could provide additional psychological pressure on
the regime and the morale of its people.
4. The Command and Control, Agricultural, and Manpower
Targets
The attacks on these targets are not recommended at this
time. In each case the effects of the attacks are debatable and are
likely to provoke hostile reaction in world capitals.
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The breaching of the agricultural levees in the Red River
delta region would be extremely difficult to do successfully and, more-
over, would probably be rejected on humanitarian grounds. Even if
carried out, any resultant loss of food supplies would fall on the lowest
priority groups in the population.
The highest price to be imposed in North Vietnam would
be represented by large-scale attacks on cities in order to maximize
the number of casualties among skilled workers, thereby reducing
their contribution to mobilization potential and to the maintenance of
a viable economy. No calculations of the number of sorties, the
volume of ordnance, or the probable number of casualties to be
achieved by mass attacks on the eight urban cities have been made.
To the extent that the attacks produce mass casualties and have a
sufficiently harmful effect on civilian morale, the regime might
find it increasingly difficult to continue with the war and might be-
come more receptive to negotiations. However, attacks designed
solely to produce mass casualties among a civilian population would
be most difficult to support or justify at this stage of the war.
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THE LOGISTIC SUPPLY OF VIET CONG AND NORTH VIETNAMESE FORCES
IN SOUTH VIETNAM
I. Daily Supply Requirements
Viet Cong and North Vietnamese (VC/PAVN) regular combat forces in
South Vietnam were estimated on 24 February 1966 at approximately
72,500 men, including 12,500 PAVN, 43,000 Viet Cong in the main force,
and about 17,000 Viet Cong in separate companies and platoons in the
local forces. Only the 55,500 troops (111 battalion equivalents of
500 men each) of the main force are believed to receive significant
logistical support from external sources. Therefore, the logistic re-
quirements for both external and internal support discussed in this
Appendix pertain only to the 111 VC/PAVN main force battalions. The
logistic impact of the introduction of 120-mm mortars into main force
units and the use of PAVN antiaircraft artillery units in South Viet-
nam is not considered in detail in the following discussion. Taking
such factors into consideration would require field reporting on
ordnance expenditure which is not yet available.
The logistic requirements for three possible situations are con-
sidered: (1) the present level of the main force and the present
level of combat, in which each battalion is assumed to fight about once
in every 35 days; (2) the present level of the main force and escalated
combat in which each battalion is assumed to fight once in every 7
days; and (3) the main force increased to 155 battalions,each of which
is engaged in combat once in every 3 days. The level of combat under
the first situation is that prevailing during most of 1965. Under each
situation a battalion is assumed to expend one-third of its basic load
of ammunition during each day of combat. The estimated basic load of
ammunition of a Viet Cong infantry battalion is 7.9 tons.* The weapons
of the battalion include rifles, carbines, light machinegun/assault
guns, 12.7-mm machineguns, 57-mm recoilless rifles, 40-mm rocket
launchers, 60/61-mm mortars, and 81/82-mm mortars. Of the total basic
load of 7.9 tons of ammunition, more than 4.9 tons are required for
the 12.7-mm machineguns. The remaining 3 tons are fairly well dis-
tributed among the other weapons organic to the battalion. The num-
ber of rounds per weapon varies from 5 for each rocket launcher and 40
for each rifle and carbine to 1,760 for each 12.7-mm machinegun and
2,160 for each light machinegun. This does not seem to be a particu-
larly generous ammunition allowance.
Daily logistic requirements for the VC/PAVN main force battalions
under the various assumptions listed above are summarized in Tables A-1
through A-3.X'
Tonnages in this Appendix are given in short tons.
Text continued on p. A-5.
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Logistical Support for the Current Communist Main Force in South Vietnam
Under the Current Scale of Combat
Class of Supply
Short Tons per Day
Requirements Supplied Requirements Supplied
from Sources Within from Sources Outside Total
South Vietnam South Vietnam Requirements 25X1
Negl. 55.5
Class I (food)
Class II (quartermaster)
and Class IV (weapons)
Class III (POL)
Class V (ammunition)
Total
55.5 w
1.6 c/ 3.7
1.4 Negl.
Negl. 8.3
5.5 12.0
5.3
1.4
8.3
a. A total of 111 battalions Viet Cong, 25 PAVN of 500 men each. Each battalion is
engaged in combat once in every 35 days.
b. Calculated on the basis of two pounds of food per man per day, known from captured docu-
ments to be the VC/PAVN planning figure.
c. Quartermaster supplies only.
d. The 17,000 Viet Cong in the local forces require an additional 20.5 tons per day of
logistic support from sources within South Vietnam. These local forces are assumed to be self-
supporting and to obtain all their requirements for food, quartermaster supplies, weapons, and
ammunition from indigenous sources. Although most of these troops are not equipped with the
new family of 7.62-mm weapons, there have been indications that some units are beginning to be
so equipped. Ifthis is the case the requirement for these forces would be increased slightly
and they would have to depend to some extent on logistic support from external sources.
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Table k-2
of MCombat ain Force in South Vietnam
TTforMthe Current Communist
Logistical Support
Class of Supply
Requirements Supplied
from Sources Within
South Vietnam
Class I (food)
Class II (quartermaster)
and Class IV (weapons)
55.5 b
2.8 j
Class III (POL)
1.4
Class V (ammunition)
Negl.
Total 59.7
Requirements Supplied
Tot a1
from Sources Outside Requirements
South Vietnam ~----
Negl.
23.0
Negl.
x+1.7
64+.7
5 p A of 500 men each.
55.5
124.4
Each battalion is
y
engaged in combat once in every b. of food per man per day.
b? Calculated on the basis of two Pounds tons per day of logistic
c. quartermaster supplies only.
d. The 17,000 Viet Cong in the local forces require an additional 31.3
support from sources within South Vietnam.
a A total of 111 battalions Viet Cong,
s
da
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Table A-3
Logistical Support for an Expanded Communist Main Force
Under an Escalated Scale of Combat
Class of Siu-pply
Class I (food)
Class II (quartermaster)
and Class IV (weapons)
Class III (POL)
Class V (ammunition)
Total
Requirements Supplied
from Sources Within
South Vietnam
77.5 w
5.5 c/
1.9
Negl.
84.9J
a. A total of 155 battalions 11 Viet Co
engaged in combat o, 39 PAVN
n
Short Tons per Day
Total
Requirements 25X1
77.5
41.1
1.9
135.9
256.4
Each battalion is
n
d. The 17,000 Viet Cong in the local forces require an additional 48.$ tons
support from sources within South Vietnam. per day of logistic
ce in every three days.
b. Calculated on the basis of two pounds of food per
c. Quartermaster supplies o
l
in South Vietnam
Requirements Supplied
from Sources Outside
South Vietnam
Negl.
35.6
Negl.
135.9
171.5
Of 500 men each.
man per day.
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The total requirement for logistic support for the VC/PAVN main
force under the present level of fighting is estimated to be about
70 tons per day, with somewhat less than 60 tons required from sources
within South Vietnam and about 12 tons, or one-sixth, of the total re-
quired from external sources. The internal requirement is made up
primarily of food and the external requirement primarily of weapons
and ammunition. If the force level remains the same, but the level of
fighting escalates to once in seven days, the total logistic require-
ment increases to about 125 tons per day with about 60 tons required
from internal sources and nearly 65 tons or slightly more than one-
half of the total from external sources. A buildup of VC/PAVN forces
to 155 battalions and an increase in the level of fighting to once in
every three days would bring about a substantial increase in dependence
on external sources for logistic support. Under these circumstances
the total requirement would increase to more than 255 tons per day
with about 85 tons required from internal sources and more than 170
tons, or two-thirds of the total, from external sources. Even if the
present scale of fighting and the present force do not increase sig-
nificantly, there are indications that the requirement for external
logistic support will increase gradually during 1966 because of the
introduction of heavy mortars in main force units and the limited use
of PAVN antiaircraft artillery units. Under these circumstances the
logistic requirement from external sources for the present force might
increase to more than 12 tons per day. The 12 tons per day is based
essentially on the experience of 1965, but if the assumptions about
ammunition expenditure for heavy weapons change, this figure might
double. The following tabulation summarizes the total requirement
figures under the various assumptions discussed above:
Internal External
Requirement Requirement Re
Total
quirement a/
Tons per Per- Tons per Per-
Day _ cent Day cent
Tons per
Day
111 battalions
(current level
of combat) 58 83 12 17
70
111 battalions
(combat once
in seven days) 60 48 65 52
124
155 battalions
(combat once
in three days) 85 33 171 67
256
a. Because of rounding,components may not agree with the
totals shown.
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ii. Effect of a Denial of Supplies from Sources Within South Vietnam
A complete denial of supplies from sources within South Vietnam is
difficult to imagine, but if it were to occur the Communists would
essentially be required to ship into the country substantial tonnages
of food each day in addition to the large amounts of weapons and ammuni-
tion already required. Quartermaster supplies and POL would present
few problems because the amounts required would be relatively small.
On an annual basis the food required would range from about 20,000 to
28,000 tons, under the three cases considered above. These tonnages
are not large in comparison with the annual availability of rice in
North Vietnam, amounting to less than 1 percent of the total. Thus it
seems feasible to assume that the North Vietnamese Scould
Vi.a e a ailable
the additional food required. Moving the
sustained and predictable basis, however, might be another matter,
although the total logistic support required even under the most exten-
sive scale of combat presented above is still within the estimated
capacity of the overland supply route through
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III. Route Capacities*
A. Land
The overland movement of the required tonnages from North Viet-
nam to the border of South Vietnam is restricted by the capacity of the
routes in the Laotian Panhandle rather than by the capacity of the
routes in the southern part of North Vietnam. Even route 15, the key
route leading to Mu Gia Pass, has an estimated present dry season
capacity of 450 tons per day, reduced from 600 tons per day in April
1965 as a result of allied air attacks. The capacity of route 102
leading to the Laos border north of the Demarcation Line is currently
100 tons per day. Over these two roads alone at least 550 tons per
day can currently be delivered to the Laotian border.
Present road capacities within Laos are such that 450 tons
delivered to Mu Gia Pass can be moved over routes 12, 23, 911, and 9
to Ban Dong where route 92 joins route 9. An additional 100 tons can
be delivered to Ban Dong around the end of the Demilitarized Zone from
the end of route 102. Thus the Communists can at present deliver 550
tons daily to Ban Dong at the junction of routes 9 and 92. From this
point, 400 tons per day can be moved south on route 92 to the junction
with route 922, over which 200 tons per day can be moved toward the
South Vietnamese border. Before reaching this point, 50 tons per day
can be diverted over route 921, also toward the South Vietnamese
border. The remaining 150 tons can be moved further south on a segment
of route 92, which has a capacity of 150 tons per day, and then over
routes 923, 96, and 165 to the border of South Vietnam. Thus the
present throughput capacity of the routes in the Laotian Panhandle
appears to be about 400 tons per day
Z is qui e possib e hat more than 00 tons
per ay can e de ivered on a sustained basis to within a few miles
of the South Vietnamese border if the Communists make an all-out
effort.
It iW expected that new access routes from North Vietnam and
Laos into South Vietnam will be constructed in 1966. These routes
will enhance the infiltration throughput capability by providing a
more. diverse choice of routes. A new road was observed under con-
struction in late January in a northeasterly direction from route 911.
This road may eventually become another border crossing between North
Vietnam and Laos south of Mu Gia Pass. Further south, road construc-
tion has been under way between Chavane on route 165 and route 16 east
of Attopeu. Recent track activity indicates that the work may have
been completed, thus providing about 50 miles of motorable road
* For a map showing transportation routes in Cambodia, Laos, and
Vietnam, see the map, Figure A-l.
A-9
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further south on the supply route. Photography
also indicated that clearing operations were being
conducted at a rapid rate southeast of route 16. If this work con-
tinued at the same rate as in early February, a road would have been
open to the Cambodian border in the tri-border area (Cambodia, Laos,
and South Vietnam) by the last week in February. The improvement of
a route into this area is another indication of the increased activity
in the Laotian Panhandle in support of Communist supply movements to
South Vietnam.
Considering the present and projected level of construction
and interdiction in the Panhandle it is estimated that the practical
throughput capacity of the Laotian routes will be in the range of 400
to 700 tons at the end of 1966 and that the Communists will be able to
sustain a movement of at least 400 tons per day to the end of route 165
or further south to route 16 and beyond if they so desire. On an all-
weather basis the Communists are now able to move about 100 tons per
day toward the border of South Vietnam -- 50 tons at the end of
route 922 and 50 tons at the end of route 165. If it is assumed that
400 tons per day can be moved forward during the 180-day dry, season
and 100 tons per day during the rainy season, an average of about 250
tons per day can be moved forward on an annual basis.
It should be pointed out that these estimates of road capacity
are for sustained movements of at least 90 days duration and 'that they
make no provision for crash movements or various field expedients that
the Communists have often employed in the past. For example, when
short-term operational moves of 3 or 4 days are considered the road
capacity may be doubled or even tripled. In general, it should be
kept in mind that estimates of road capacity tend to err on the low
side and that all the capacity figures previously cited are at best
only very rough approximations of the use which the Communists can
make of the cited routes.
Inland waterways have been used to supplement some sections of
the road network both in North Vietnam and in Laos. Only one waterway
in Laos, the Se Kong River, is known to be used to any extent as part
of an infiltration route, although the alignment of other waterways,
the Se Bang Hieng, the Se Pone, and the Song Ben Hai, makes them sus-
pect infiltration routes. Aerial photography of the Se Kong between
the southern end of route 92 and the point where route 165 leaves the
river has revealed waterway improvements, native craft on the river,
and portages of difficult sections. This waterway is navigable by
canoes throughout the year, but its use during the dry season has prob-
ably been reduced since the completion of parallel route 96. The
Song Ben Hai/Rao Thanh waterway in the Demilitarized Zone forms the
border between North and South Vietnam. Although infiltration of per-
sonnel across this river has been reported, infiltration of sttpplies
has not been observed. Use by canoes of this waterway throughout
25X1
25X1
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the year for lateral movement within the Demilitarized Zone to interior
tracks, trails, and tributary streams that provide access to South
Vietnam is possible, however. Estimates of the capacity of these
various waterways are extremely tenuous, ranging generally from 25 to
50 tons per day during the dry season to 50 to 500 tons per day during
the rainy season. At best ri inlan waterways c be
cannot be used for through move-
portions of the road
ments.
ments.
In general, it may be concluded that the current and projected
capacity of the route system through Laos during the dry season is much
more than adequate to provide for the amount of tonnage required by
Communist main force units in South Vietnam, even if the level of these
forces increases by nearly 4+0 percent and the intensity of combat
reaches a scale of more than 10 times its present level.
B. Sea
The capacity of the sea infiltration route from North Vietnam
to South Vietnam cannot be quantified with even as much precision as
the land route through-Laos. Although sea infiltration has provided
an important means of supply to the Viet Cong in the past, the sporadic
nature of sea movements, the infrequency of detection, and the small
number of voyages by any given craft in the course of a year make it
very difficult to establish even a theoretical order of magnitude for
shipments by sea, let alone the amounts actually moving.
The level of sea infiltration between North and South Vietnam
is believed to have been drastically reduced since the inception of the
US Market Time operation in 1965. Since that time, no craft identified
as infiltrating supplies into South Vietnam by sea have been picked up.
Because of the magnitude of the US Market Time operation it is prob-
able that some infiltrating craft would have been intercepted if the
North Vietnamese were making a concerted effort to move supplies in
this manner. As of November 1965, it was estimated with 95 percent
confidence that under the current scope of the Market Time operation
14
only one infiltration craft could escape detection each day to get
ndthrough
craft each night. If 15 small craft were actually able
the blockade during each 24-hour period and each craft carried about
4 tons of supplies each trip, then 60 tons could be delivered on a
daily basis. With each craft making one trip:a month between North
Vietnam and South Vietnam, about 450 craft would be involved. Steel-
hulled ships or the larger junks used for infiltration could carry
50 to 100 tons per trip. Even an occasional successful delivery by a
ship of this type would add substantially to the amount of material
being infiltrated. If the Communists made a determined and concerted
effort to infiltrate supplies by sea, however, they would have to be
willing to run the risk of experiencing substantial losses.
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It can be concluded that the capacity of the sea route in the
short term is essentially whatever the Communists want to make it.
In the long run, however, this capacity is limited by the number of
craft and trained crews available and by the costs the Communists are
willing to pay in terms of craft sunk, crews captured or killed, and
supplies lost during infiltration attempts. The Market Time operation
has increased this potential cost immensely and probably will continue
to discourage the Communists from making any serious attempts at large-
scale sea infiltration as long as sufficient amounts of supplies can
be moved south on the land route through Laos and lesser amounts can
be moved along land or sea routes from Cambodia.
C. Cambodia
If the Cambodian government were to permit the use of its ter-
ritory to support Communist military activities in South Vietnam, the
Communists would be able to develop a major and secure supply system
into the delta area of South Vietnam. This supply system would have
the capacity to move the additional 1,200 tons of military supplies
which it is estimated could be handled Bail the ort of Sihanouk-
Ville.
In addition to the major port of Sihanoukville,Cambodia
has three minor ports which are used mostly for fishing and naval
activities. A small additional amount of tonnage could be delivered
at these ports, but only one of them can accommodate small oceangoing
ships. Clearance from Sihanoukville and the minor ports would be
mainly by road transport, although coastal water transport using small
craft would also be available. A railroad from Sihanoukville to Phnom
Penh has been under construction for about five years, but a number of
major bridges and most of the tracklaying on the 160-mile route remain
to be completed. Cambodia is estimated to have about 10,000 trucks,
and more could easily be imported.
The roads leading out of Sihanoukville have a greater capacity
than the port itself and could easily handle 1,200 tons per day of
military supplies for shipment to South Vietnam. Two roads could be
used to clear Sihanoukville: (1) the Sihanoukville-Phnom Penh American
Friendship highway and (2) the coastal route direct to South Vietnam.
The direct impact of the use of these routes would be almost wholly
in the southern part of South Vietnam, particularly in the Mekong
Delta region.
The 1)+5-mile Sihanoukville-Phnom Penh American Friendship high-
way, route 4, with a capacity of 7,000 tons per day in the dry season
and 6,300 tons per day in the rainy season, is the major route avail-
able to clear the port. From Phnom Penh, supplies could be moved by
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either highway or inland waterway to the South Vietnamese border. The
best route, however, is highway route 1, which leads to the area facing
Tay Ninh Province. Route 1 has a capacity of 3,600 tons per day in
the dry season and 1,550 tons per day in the rainy season. The move-
ment of 1,200 tons daily from Sihanoukville to the border on this
route would require about 3,000 trucks. There are also two routes that
extend north from the Phnom Penh area and connect with route 7, which
approaches the northern border of Tay Ninh Province. These routes
have lower capacities than route 1, especially in the rainy season,
and the distance to the border is greater. From Phnom Penh, two
slightly shorter routes extend to the border of Kien Giang and Chau
Doc Provinces. At least 1,200 tons per day could be moved over these
two routes throughout the year. The coastal road from Sihanoukville
has a dry-weather capacity of slightly less than 1,000 tons per day and
is the shortest route to the border, only 115 miles. In the rainy
season, however, its capacity drops to 130 tons per day.
The major inland waterway is the Mekong River system, which
has a capacity to move at least 6,000 tons per day south to the border
from Phnom Penh with craft readily available. This capacity could be
increased during the high-water season. Supplies could also be moved
north to Stung Treng on the Mekong or on parallel route 13 which now
is estimated to have a capacity of 3,650 tons per day in the dry season
and 1,570 tons per day in the rainy season. From Stung Treng, supplies
could be moved on route 19, on trails, or on minor waterways to VC/PAVN
forces in Kontum and Pleiku Provinces. At one time, it was believed
that this was a difficult route with less capacity than the Lao corri-
dor, but route 19 is now estimated to have a capacity of 700 tons per
day in the dry season and 250 tons per day in the rainy season.
The capacities of the various routes mentioned above are ex-
pected to remain at approximately the same level at the end of 1966.
Although goods could be moved to border crossing points on these
routes, the South Vietnamese government has checkpoints at the border
crossings of each of the major routes, with the exception of route 1,
so supplies would have to be dispersed at some point before the border
was reached and moved on local roads, trails, and waterways. The
border crossing point on route 1, however, is apparently under Viet
Cong control, with the nearest known South Vietnamese military units
located about 15 miles to the northeast.
It can be concluded that with sufficient trucks and drivers
available, and in the absence of air interdiction, the total volume of
supplies which could be cleared through the port of Sihanoukville could
be moved forward to the South Vietnamese border over the main routes.
In addition, supplies brought in through lesser ports along the Gulf
of Siam could be moved by coastal and inland water routes and over
trails to the border area.
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IV. Options for Resupply
If the land route through the Laotian Panhandle were successfully
interdicted, the Communists would be forced to fall back on the sea
route and the various routes through Cambodia in order to supply
their forces in South Vietnam. Some use. might be made of an airlift,
although resort to such a procedure would be highly unlikely, consider-
ing allied air superiority. However, if even two Ii-14's could get
through each night to airdrop supplies, they could deliver a total of
nearly five tons per day.
The present external logistic requirement of 12 tons per day prob-
ably could be satisfied by the use of the sea route, the various routes
through Cambodia, and an occasional airdrop. If only one or two small
junks per day were able to evade the Market Time blockade, about half
the requirement could be fulfilled. The remainder would have to come
from or through Cambodia or by air. Through a combined use of normal
commercial channels and clandestine means, the Communists could procure
and move moderate amounts of supplies through Cambodia. However, it is
doubtful that, through clandestine means alone, they could move, on a
sustained basis, the entire 12 tons of military supplies needed daily
by the VC PAVN forces in South Vietnam.
If the 12 tons could
actually be landed at Sihanoukville or other points along the coast,
however, the Communists could undoubtedly move them forward into South
Vietnam. At a minimum, the ability of the Communists to move goods
clandestinely through Cambodia would be sufficient to provide an impor-
tant adjunct to infiltration of supplies by sea.
The external logistic requirement of 65 tons per day for the
present force fighting once in every seven days would be almost impos-
sible to fulfill without use of the land route through Laos unless the
Cambodian government were openly to permit the use of its territory to
support Communist military activities in South Vietnam. This is even
more obvious in the case of the more than 170-ton logistic requirement
for an increased force fighting once in every three days. As pointed
out previously, the Communists would have to be prepared to face sub-
stantial losses if they attempted to bring in large tonnages by sea
on a regular basis. They might succeed in this endeavor for a few
weeks, but in the long run the attrition rate would be so high that the
costs would probably prove to be prohibitive. Although the capability
of the supply system through Cambodia is more than seven times the
maximum projection of more than 170 tons of daily external logistic
support, this capability could be used only if the Cambodians overtly
abandoned their neutralist policies in order to support the Communists.
Even if this happened, the capability of VC/PAVN forces to wage war
in the central highlands of South Vietnam might be affected measurably
by the cutting off of the Panhandle route because the central high-
lands area is more easily and directly supplied through Laos.
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On balance, it does not seem likely that Cambodia will come out
openly in support of the Viet Cong. Prince Sihanouk has been par-
ticularly sensitive to allegations that the Viet Cong are receiving
weapons from Cambodia. Late in 1965, for example, Sihanouk asked the
International Control Commission to institute control procedures in the
port of Sihanoukville because of press reports concerning possible use
of the port by the Communists. Other factors militating against a sig-
nificant expansion of Communist supply operations through Cambodia
include (1) the fact that the Communists would have to get Skihanouk's
support to open Cambodian ports, and it is extremely doubtful that he
would risk retaliation by such out-and-out cooperation, and (2) the
fact that the Communists themselves would hesitate to establish a
major supply route which would have to depend on Sihanouk, whom they
undoubtedly consider on the basis of past performance to be thoroughly
unreliable.
Recent information has indicated increased use of Cambodian ter-
ritory by the Communists, particularly in the extreme northeast salient
of the country. Large numbers of Viet Cong troops have been reported
in the Lomphat area, and aerial photographs have shown numerous trails
along the border area from the general vicinity of Camp Le Rolland
north to route 19, which are believed to indicate Viet Cong activity.
PAVN personnel have reportedly infiltrated through this area of Cam-
bodia and some supplies have reportedly been carried from a warehouse
on the Cambodian side of the border near route 19 to the Pleiku area
in South Vietnam. It has been reported that during a 15-day period
nearly 150 short tons were moved to the Viet Cong forces, or about
10 tons per day. This is the laxgest supply movement that has been
reported taking place recently from across the Cambodian border over
any sustained period of time, but is it considerably less than the 65
tons per day that would be needed by the present force under an escalated
level of combat.
The inescapable conclusion seems to be that the Communists in
South Vietnam would be cut off from external logistic support of more
than 12 to 20 tons per day if the route through the Laotian Panhandle
were blocked, unless Cambodia came out actively and openly in their
behalf. It is believed that the latter contingency is unlikely to
occur. It should be kept in mind, however, that with only 12,to 20
tons a day flowing in by the sea route and clandestinely through Cam-
bodia, the Communists could maintain their present level of activity,
could step up the firepower of their forces, and could even increase
their present force by as much as 40 percent, provided the level of
fighting remained approximately at its present intensity.
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Furthermore, it is highly improbable that complete interdiction of
the Panhandle road system could be achieved by air attack alone. Even
with so-called successful interdiction, road capacities are probably
reduced by no more than two-thirds for short periods of time, and a
reduction of one-third over a longer period is about all that can be
hoped for. Even where it is impossible to get through traffic moving
again in a short period of time, porters can be used to move supplies
around interdicted points and for longer hauls if necessary. Even if
all road traffic through Laos were brought to a halt, small amounts of
supplies could still be infiltrated by use of porters, bicycles, carts,
and pack animals, using trails largely invisible from the air.
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 Ken, Tun,
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region boundary
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Vietnam, Laos, and Cambodia: Transportation
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 Approved For Release 2008/10/16: CIA-RDP80TO1629R000300080014-9
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 Approved For Release 2008/10/16: CIA-RDP80TO1629R000300080014-9
APPENDIX B
THE ROLLING THUNDER ATTACK
I. Factors Conditioning the Nature and Scale of Attacks
The US and South Vietnamese air campaign against North Vietnam has
been the most restricted and voluntarily limited air war ever conducted
by a major air power. It has been used as a carefully controlled means
of gradual escalation to achieve strictly limited objectives. Con-
sequently, the program has operated under a set of rigorously defined
ground rules.
The Rolling Thunder program over time has extended both the area
and the frequency of air attacks in North Vietnam. But self-imposed
restrictions have limited both the choice of targets and the areas to be
bombed. The existence of large restricted areas has effectively in-
sulated almost 80 percent of North Vietnam's limited modern industrial
economy from air attack; these areas contain 75 percent of the nation's
population.
The area, limitations for armed reconnaissance were confined origi-
nally by Rolling Thunder (program number) 7* to an area south of latitude
18 30 N and gradually moved northward, the northernmost extension occur-
ring with Rolling Thunder 30/31 (3-17 September). (See the map, Figure
B-1). This line continued until the bombing pause on 24 December 1965.
Since the resumption of the attacks with Rolling Thunder 48, the line
was pulled back to include the area, south of a. line running west along
latitude 20 31 N to longitude 105 20 E then north to 21 00 N and con-
tinuing west to the Laotian border. This line effectively excludes
the entire northern part of North Vietnam from armed reconnaissance.
In addition to these area restrictions on armed reconnaissance,
attacks on fixed targets were generally held to the southern areas of
North Vietnam, moving northward at about the same rate as the armed
reconnaissance areas.
Within the general areas demarked by the limits of the armed recon-
naissance areas, there are specific sanctuary areas that are exempt from
air attacks. These area's include a 30-nautical mile (nm) buffer zone
along the Chinese border, a 30-nm radius around the city of Hanoi, and
a, 10-nm radius around the city of Haiphong.
* For a correlation of the number of a specific Rolling Thunder program
with the corresponding date, see Table B-l. For a correlation of the
number of a, specific week of the Rolling Thunder Program with the
corresponding date, see Table B-2.
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Attacks on specific fixed targets are limited to those approved in
each Rolling Thunder program. These authorizations often provide
additional restrictions which limit the number of strikes against
approved targets. There is, however, more flexibility in the type of
targets for armed reconnaissance. Initially, armed reconnaissance
strikes were directed along specific routes against military transport
facilities, ferries, radar sites, secondary bridges, and other targets
of a military character. Subsequently, the objective was expanded to
sustaining day and night interdiction of lines of communication (LOC)
for maximum feasible periods through surveillance.and destruction of
targets of a, military character that were encountered, including but not
limited to trucks, ferries, lighters, radar sites, secondary bridges,
road-repair equipment, and bivouac and staging areas- The objective
of the coastal armed reconnaissance strikes was to include destruction
of recognized North Vietnamese naval craft and other craft which fired
on our aircraft along the North Vietnamese coast, in estuaries and
mooring areas, and in the vicinity of coastal islands. For Rolling
Thunder 18 (11-17 June) it wqG stated that daylight armed reconnaissance
could include missions to obtain maximum surveillance of LOC's and
selected missions with the primary purpose of conducting small precise
attacks against pre-briefed military targets with secondary emphasis on
the conduct of armed route reconnaissance. Next, Rolling Thunder 22/23
(9-22 July) authorized armed reconnaissance against airfields and JCS-
numbered LOC targets which had been assigned in previous Rolling Thunder
strikes and which were observed to be under repair.
Other current restrictions in the Rolling Thunder program include
the mining of principal ports or attacks on major port facilities.
Similar restrictions apply to attacks on major airfields in the northern
areas of North Vietnam. There also are specific prohibitions against
combat air patrol and screening aircraft attacking these airfields in
hot pursuit. Since Rolling Thunder 28/29 (20 August-2 September),
strikes against SAM systems within the armed reconnaissance area, have
been authorized. Until 24 December, SAM's in the Northeast area, could
be attacked after photographic identification, unless they were in the
sanctuary areas. (An exception to the requirement of photographic
identification permitted suppression of actual SAM attacks encountered
in the course of authorized strikes on fixed targets in the Northeast
area,.) Since the resumption of bombing in January, strikes on SAM's in
the Northeast area, have not been authorized. Finally, a, policy decision
to avoid civilian casualties to the extent possible has resulted in many
targets not being attacked.
The overall effect of these area, and operational restrictions has
been to grant a critical measure of immunity to the military, political,
and economic assets used in Hanoi's support of the war in the South.
The restrictions also insure a virtually unimpeded flow of military
supplies from North Vietnam's allies. The preconditions established for
the number of strikes and sorties, the methods of attack, and the avoid-
ance of civilian casualties result in an operational disregard of basic
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principles of target selection. Among North Vietnam's target systems,
not one has been attacked either intensively or extensively enough to
produce a critical reduction in national capacity. No target system
can be reduced to its critical point under existing rules.
Finally, the voluntary choice of ground rules which result in an
ineffective air campaign may well give the Hanoi regime an unwarranted
impression of divided counsel within the US government. The even more
limited nature of the US air attacks after the bombing pause may rein-
force Hanoi's possible judgment that this restraint reflects a divisive-
ness and lack of US determination to get on with the war.
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Equation of Rolling Thunder Number
with Corresponding Dates
Rolling Thunder Number
Inclusive Dates
(Cancelled)
(Cancelled)
(Cancelled)
(Cancelled)
2 Mar - 10 Mar
11 Mar - 18 Mar
19 Mar - 25 Mar
26 Mar - 1 Apr
2 Apr 8 Apr
9 Apr 15 Apr
16 Apr - 22 Apr
23 Apr - 29 Apr
30 Apr - 6 May
7 May - 13 May
18 May - 24 May
25 May - 3 Jun
4 Jun - 10 Jun
11 Jun - 17 Jun
18 Jun - 24 Jun
25 Jun - 1 Jul
22/23
2 Jul - 8 Jul
24/25
9 Jul - 22 Jul
26/27
23 Jul
5 Aug
28/29
6 Aug - 19 Aug
30/31
20 Aug - 2 Sep
32/33
3 Sep
- 17 Sep
34/35
18 Sep
- 30 Sep
36/37
1 Oct
- 14 Oct
38/39
15 Oct
- 28 Oct
40/41
29 Oct
- 11 Nov
42/43
12 Nov
- 25 Nov
44/45
26 Nov
- 9 Dec
46/47
10 Dec
- 23 Dec
48
(Not Used)
31 Jan 66 -
28 Feb 66
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
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Equation of Week Number with Corresponding Dates
Inclusive Dates
1 Mar - 6 Mar
7 Mar - 13 Mar
14 Mar - 20 Mar
21 Mar - 27 Mar
28 Mar - 3 Apr
4Apr-10Apr
11 Apr - 17 Apr
18 Apr - 24 Apr
25 Apr - 1 May
2 May - 8 May
9 May - 15 May
16 May - 22 May
23 May - 29 May
30 May - 5 Jun
6 Jun - 12 Jun
13 Jun - 19 Jun
20 Jun - 26 Jun
27 Jun - 3 Jul
4 Jul - 10 Jul
11 Jul - 17 Jul
18 Jul - 24 Jul
25 Jul - 31 Jul
1 Aug - 7 Aug
8 Aug - 14 Aug
15 Aug - 21 Aug
22 Aug - 28 Aug
29 Aug - 4 Sep
5 Sep - 11 Sep
12 Sep - 18 Sep
19 Sep - 25 Sep
26 Sep - 2 Oct
3 Oct - 9 Oct
10 Oct - 16 Oct
17 Oct - 23 Oct
24 Oct - 30 Oct
31 Oct - 6 Nov
7 Nov - 13 Nov
14 Nov - 20 Nov
21 Nov - 27 Nov
28 Nov - 4 Dec
5 Dec - 11 Dec
12 Dec - 18 Dec
19 Dec - 25 Dec
26 Dec - 1 Jan 1966
2Jan- 8Jan
9Jan-15Jan
16 Jan - 22 Jan
23 Jan - 29 Jan
30 Jan - 5 Feb
6 Feb - 12 Feb
13 Feb - 19 Feb
20 Feb - 26 Feb
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II. Analysis of the Rolling Thunder Operation*
The Rolling Thunder attack reviewed in this Appendix covers two
periods. The first period of 43 weeks extended from 2 March through
24 December 1965 and included a 5-day pause (13-17 May) in bombing attacks
against North Vietnam. The second period consists of 3 weeks -- 31 Janu-
ary through 19 February 1966. Between them was a 5-week period in which
no bombing attacks were made on North Vietnam. An attempt has been made
to take note of activity since the resumption of bombing, but the material
in this Appendix is concentrated primarily on the 1965 period.**
A. Targets
In the initial weeks of the Rolling Thunder program, US attacks
were limited to a primary target or to one of two alternates. If
neither the primary target nor an alternate could be struck, ordnance
was dumped in the China Sea. Vietnamese Air Force participation prior
to or concurrent with US strikes was required, and armed reconnaissance
was not authorized. Targets were selected from a list approved by the
Joint Chiefs of Staff. This list grew out of a detailed study conducted
by the Joint Chiefs in the summer of 1964, when they selected 94 of the
most significant targets and routes for armed reconnaissance from among
the 470 then known targets in North Vietnam. The target lists were
grouped in 5 basic categories -- four fixed target systems plus routes
for armed reconnaissance -- and have been continually revised. The
tabulation (p. B-8) indicates the status of the fixed target lists as
of 8 February 1966. The opportunity for striking fresh fixed targets
of importance is extremely limited. Of 233 fixed targets on the current
list, 134 have been struck. An additional 8 targets that have been
dropped from the current list were also struck prior to being dropped.
Of the 99*** targets on the current list that remain unstruck, 69 are
inside sanctuary areas, and only 30 are outside. Of these thirty, 20
are in the key northeast area and hence are exempt from armed recon-
naissance strikes.
After the beginning of April the attack was expanded to include
armed reconnaissance sorties. The Rolling Thunder program defines
armed reconnaissance as an air mission flown with the primary purpose
of locating and attacking targets of opportunity -- that is, enemy
* Data in this Appendix were derived from individual strike reports
given in the Bomb Damage Assessment (BDA) and therefore may not agree
with data in other sections and Appendixes which have been derived
from other sources such as execute messages and preliminary strike re-
ports. The data, however, have been made as consistent as possible,
given problems associated with correction of preliminary data and varied
reporting systems.
X- For a glossary of terms used in this Appendix, see p. B-32.
*** If mineable approaches to certain ports and naval facilities are
considered separate targets, the total of unstruck targets may be re-
garded as 105, and the total of JCS targets as 239.
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Inside
Sstem Tar ets q+ k
r
uc
S
anctuar
Airfields (11)
(Lines of communication
Bridges
Railroad yards
Railroad shops
Locks
ies
11 4 5
61 44 J 17
4 1 2
1 0 1
8 1 1
Military installations (125)
Military barracks/headquarters 57 40 10
Ammunition depots 17 12
Petroleum storage 13 4 3
Supply and ordnance depots 18 6
Communication facilities 1L 5
Port facilities 5 2 3
Naval bases 6 2 2
(Mineable approaches to ports 3 2 1
and naval bases)
(6) / 0
N.A. j/
SAM support facilities 1 1 0 Radar sites
5 10 a/ 0
Industrial installations (23)
Electric power facilities 17 6 9 J
6
Other 1
Total Zia 142 a/ a
Outside Sanctuaries
Total
In Key NE Area
2
2
2
2
1
1
0
0
6
2
7
2
2
2
1
3
1
1
0
0
2
2
0
0
N.A.
N.A.
0
0
1
0
2
2
1
1
30
20
a. Including struck targets (2 bridges and 6 radar sites that have been dropped from
the current JCS Fixed Target List.
b. Not applicable. A number of mineable approaches carry the same JCS target numbers
as ports and naval facilities but should be regarded as separate targets.
c. Powerplants and 1 transformer substation.
material, personnel, and facilities in assigned areas or along assigned
ground communications routes, and not for the purpose of attacking
specific briefed targets. Gradually the authorization was expanded to
include:
(1) Attacks against small pre-briefed military
targets not on the JCS list, followed by armed route
reconnaissance.
(2) Restrikes against previously struck JCS-
designated fixed targets, excluding locks and dams,
located within the armed reconnaissance area, with
the objective of keeping them nonoperational.
(74)
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(3) Attacks against possible SAM systems lying
within Rolling Thunder armed reconnaissance areas.
B. Sorties
A total of 42,597 Rolling Thunder sorties were flown against
North Vietnam from 2 March 1965 through 19 February 1966 (see Fig-
ure B-2). Of this total, 11,064 -- or approximately 26 percent -- were
fixed target strike sorties, and 30,832 -- or 72 percent -- were armed
reconnaissance strike sorties. The remaining 701 sorties -- 2 percent --
were leaflet drops, photoreconnaissance sorties not accompanying a
strike mission, gift drops, and other miscellaneous sorties. The US
Navy flew 57 percent of the total sorties, the US Air Force 41 percent,
and the South Vietnamese Air Force 2 percent. The weekly distribution
of these sorties by type of strike and by service is shown in Table B-3
and in Figures B-3 and B-4.
Excluding the 701 sorties on miscellaneous missions, there were
41,896 combat sorties, which is equal to approximately 9 percent of
total combat sorties flown during the entire Korean War from June 1950
through July 1953, and to about 6 percent of total bomber sorties
flown by US Army Air Forces against Germany during World War II,
1942-45. Of the combat sorties flown against North Vietnam 26,044,
or 62 percent, were strike and flak suppression sorties, and 15,852,
or 38 percent, were support sorties. The division by service closely
approximated the division of total sorties flown. The US Navy flew
58 percent of the combat sorties, the US Air Force 41 percent, and the
South Vietnamese Air Force about 1 percent. Data on total sorties and
combat sorties flown from 2 March 1965 through 19 February 1966 are shown
by program and service in Figure B-5.
The 11,064 fixed target strike sorties did not represent the
total attack on JCS fixed targets. As indicated by Table B-4, 2,948
armed reconnaissance strike sorties participated in the attack on
fixed targets. This amounts to approximately 21 percent of a total
of 14,012 sorties flown against fixed targets between 2 March 1965 and
19 February 1966. (These armed reconnaissance sorties, however,
accounted for only about 8 percent of the total ordnance -- 12,960
tons -- delivered on fixed targets. This reflects, at least in part,
the fact that armed reconnaissance sorties attacking fixed targets are
on multiple missions and expend part of their ordnance elsewhere.)
During the 43-week period from 2 March through 24 December --
prior to the 5-week cessation of bombing -- a total of 39,641 sorties
were flown. Of these 27,932 -- or approximately 70 percent -- were
armed reconnaissance strike sorties, 11,064 -- or 28 percent -- were
fixed target strike sorties, and the remaining 645 -- or 2 percent --
were leaflet drops, photoreconnaissance missions, and goodwill gift*
* Text continued on p. B-13.
B-9
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Rolling Thunder: Total Sorties, by Week
2 March 1965 - 19 February 1966
Armed Us South
Leaflet Fixed Recon- Total Vietnamese
Week and Other Target naissance Sorties Navy Air Force Air Force
2 Mar - 24 Dec 65
1
0
128
o
128
0
108
20
2
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
3
0
342
0
342
195
123
24
4
0
157
0
157
70
47
40
5
0
393
0
393
219
135
39
6
0
471
224
695
456
219
20
7
0
296
150
446
231
200
15
8
0
362
451
813
4oo
379
34
9
0
165
385
550
305
211
34
=_0
0
438
262
700
378
292
30
-1
198
71
317
586
228
322
36
12
199
356
198
753
400
333
20
13
0
336
434
770
279
463
28
14
0
315
303
618
185
423
10
1-5
4
302
296
602
288
294
20
16
0
266
341
607
290
287
30
17
0
409
291
700
390
282
28
18
2
334
329
665
398
237
30
19
4
261
393
658
416
226
16
20
6
284
361
651
402
229
20
21
24
415
347
786
443
329
14
22
6
461
473
940
586
321
33
23
0
488
747
1,235
826
397
12
114
24
346
902
1,272
960
306
6
25
0
323
905
1,228
856
362
10
1:6
0
208
1,097
1,305
737
556
12
27
0
24
1,020
1,044
625
419
0
28
0
495
1,340
1,835
1,026
798
11
29
0
478
1,021
1,499
675
824
0
7;.0
13
346
1,118
1,477
735
732
10
31
15
122
1,063
1,200
782
418
0
32
16
263
1,684
1,963
1,276
679
8
33
17
0
992
1,009
718
291
0
34
20
150
1,079
1,249
732
517
0
35
20
78
1,138
1,236
795
441
0
36
5
129
1,317
1,451
997
454
0
37
10
107
1,276
1,393
885
508
0
38
10
214
1,127
1,351
935
409
7
39
6
161
1,061
1,228
572
656
0
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Rolling Thunder: Total Sorties, by Week
2 March 1965 - 19 February 1966
(Continued)
Armed
Us
South
Leaflet
d Othe
Fixed
et
Tar
Recon-
naissance
Total
Sorties
Navy Air
Vietnamese
Force Air Force
r
an
g
2Mar-24Dec65
40
22
194
1,044
1,260
643
606
11
41
14
0
917
931
477
445
9
42
8
63
817
888
410
478
0
43
2
313
712
1,027
464
554
9
Total:
2 Mar -
2,6L1
22 68 16
310
646
645
6
064
11
27,932
1
,
24 Dec
5
,
Cessation of Bomb-
ing, Weeks 44-48,
25 Dec 65 -
30 Jan 66
31 Jan - 19 -Feb 66
49
28
0
731
759
312
447
8
0
0
50
28
O
1,231
1,259
771
48
0
51
0
O
938
938
563
375
Total:
31 Jan -
2
56
646
1
310
66
56
0
2,900
,9
1,
,
19 Feb
Total Ro
Thunder
2 Mar 6
lling
5 -
646
64
8
)+2
597
331
4
2
17,620
19 Feb
66
701
11,0
,22
3?
,
,
_
25X1
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Sorties Flown
Ordnance Delivered
Percent Through
Percent Through
Strike and Flak
Suppression
Support
Number
24 Dec 65
19 Feb 66
Tons
24 Dec 65
19 Feb 66
Fixed target
2 Mar - 24 Dec 65
Armed reconnaissance a/
6,928
4,136
11,064
80
79
11,960
93
92
2 Max - 24 Dec 65
1,778
1,046
2,824
20
20
840
7
7
Total 2 Mar - 24 Dec 65 a
8,706
5,182
13,888
100
12,800
100
Armed reconnaissance a/
31 Jan - 19 Feb 66
l
-LOU
1
Total armed reconnaissance
through 19 Feb 66 a/
Total 2 Mar 65 -
19 Feb 66
8,819
5,193
14,012
100 ,
12,960
100
a. Including aircraft that were on multiple strike missions, in some cases striking more than one fixed target.
N
H c+
19 ra
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drops. Approximately 57 percent of the sorties were flown by the US
Navy, 41 percent by the US Air Force, and 2 percent by the South Viet-
namese Air Force. Data on sorties flown during the period 2 March -
24 December 1965 are summarized and distributed according to program,
strike mission, and service in Figure B-6.
In the three weeks from 31 January through 19 February 1966 --
the period after resumption of bombing North Vietnam -- no fixed
target strike sorties were flown. Out of a total of 2,956 sorties
flown during the period, 56 were leaflet drops and 2,900 were armed
reconnaissance sorties. Of the latter number, 124 were restrikes on
15 JCS fixed targets as follows:
Barracks
6
Bridges
3
Ammunition depots
2
Airfields
2
Port facilities
1
Railroad yards
1
Total
15
Sorties during this period are depicted graphically in Figure B-7.
C. Ordnance
During the period from 2 March 1965 to 19 February 1966, Roll-
ing Thunder sorties delivered a total of 37,000 tons of ordnance on
targets in North Vietnam.* This is equal to approximately 8 percent
of total ordnance expended in air operations in the Korean War and to
about 3 percent of the tons of bombs dropped by US Army Air Forces on
Germany in World War II. When total ordnance delivered is related to
total combat sorties, an average of nearly 0.9 ton per sortie is
* In this Appendix, ordnance is measured in short tons (2,000 pounds).
All estimates of "ordnance delivered" are based on launch weights. As
such, however, they must be regarded as minimum estimates, because of
the methodology used in their compilation. They were compiled from
data in BDA reports of individual strikes. Where type designations
were not specific, for example "2 Bullpups," the smallest applicable
type was consistently assumed. In this example the AGM-12 B, 250-
pound Bullpup (launch weight: 567 pounds) was assumed, rather than
the AGM-12 C, 1,000-pound Bullpup (launch weight: 1,778 pounds). Also,,
where types were indicated, but numbers were absent, for example
"Napalm" or "Zuni," only one bomb of the smallest applicable type
was assumed, although it is probable that more than one was dropped.
Also no weights were included for such reports as "Fammo."
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indicated. This is approximately the same average load per sortie as
that indicated by the data for total ordnance expended and total combat
sorties flown during the Korean War. The ratio of tons of bombs
dropped to total bomber and fighter sorties flown by US Air Forces
against Germany in World War II was more than 0.8 ton per sortie. When
ordnance delivered in North Vietnam is related. to total strike plus
flak suppression sorties an average load of 1.4 tons per sortie is
obtained, compared with an average load of 1.9 tons per bomber sortie
flown by US Air Forces against Germany in World War II.
Of the 37,000 tons of ordnance expended on North Vietnam, the
US Air Force delivered 62 percent, the US Navy 35 percent, and the
South Vietnamese Air Force 3 percent (see Table B-5 and Figure B-8).
Approximately 11,960 tons -- or 32 percent -- of the total were de-
livered on fixed target strikes, and more than 25,000 tons -- or 68 per-
cent -- were delivered on armed reconnaissance. The latter figure
includes about 1,000 tons (3 percent of the total) delivered on fixed
targets by armed reconnaissance sorties. The weekly expenditure of
ordnance is allocated to the fixed target and armed reconnaissance pro-
grams in Table B-6 and Figure B-9.
During the period 2 March-24 December a total of 34,300 tons
of ordnance were expended on targets in North Vietnam. Of this amount,
11,960 tons -- or 35 percent -- were delivered by fixed target strike
sorties and an additional 840 tons -- or 2 percent -- were delivered
on fixed targets by armed reconnaissance strike sorties. Thus 37 per-
cent of the total ordnance delivered during 1965 was on fixed targets.
(The allocation of ordnance delivered during this period is indicated,
by service and by attack program, in Figure B-10.)
In 1966, after the resumption of bombing, approximately 2,700
tons of ordnance were delivered during the period from 31 January
through 19 February. As in 1965 the US Air Force delivered about 62
percent of the total. The share of the US Navy, which was 35 percent
during 1965, increased to 38 percent during the 1966 period. The South
Vietnamese Air Force, which delivered 3 percent of the ordnance in 1965,
delivered none in the first three weeks after resumption of bombing in
1966. As indicated previously, there were no fixed target strike
sorties during this period, but armed reconnaissance sorties delivered
approximately 1,000 tons of ordnance on restrikes of JCS fixed targets.
During the week of 6-12 February (the 50th week of the Rolling Thunder
program) armed reconnaissance strike sorties delivered 120 tons of
ordnance on fixed targets, the largest amount delivered on fixed tar-
gets by armed reconnaissance sorties during any single week of the
Rolling Thunder program (see Table B-6 and Figure B-9).*
Text continued on p. B-19.
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Rolling Thunder: Ordnance Expended, by Week and by Service
2 March 1965 - 19 February 1966
a*
Tons
South
Vietnamese
Air Force Air Force Total
2 Mar - 24 Dec 65
1
0
16o
40
200
2
0
0
0
0
3
120
260
80
460
4
60
30
110
200
5
150
210
80
440
6
350
290
50
690
7
150
200
30
380
8
150
420
60
630
9
110
230
40
380
10
110
400
30
540
11
6o
9o
40
190
12
220
60
10
300
13
150
410
50
610
14
9o
440
20
550
15
290
380
40
710
16
190
660
50
goo
17
42o
520
50
990
18
270
380
50
700
19
380
360
30
770
20
340
310
10
660
21
400
430
20
850
22
370
430
50
840 J
23
46o
660
20
1,140
24
370
470
0
840
25
390
boo
20
1,010
26
400
880
20
1,300
27
340
320
0
660
28
4go
1,160
20
1,670
29
330
1,130
0
1,470 J
30
470
1,080
20
1,570
31
370
430
0
800
32
48o
1,000
10
1,490
33
280
500
0
780
34
340
860
0
1,200
35
280
840
0
1,120
36
46o
700
0
1,160
37
400
850
0
1,250
38
370
480
20
870
39
400
740
0
1,140
40
260
550
10
820
* Footnotes follow on p. B-16.
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Table B-5
Bolling Thunder: Ordnance Expended, by Week and by Service
2 March 1965 - 19 February 1966
(Continued)
Tons _a/
us South
Vietnamese
Navy Air Force Air Force Total
2 Max - 24 Dec 65
41 230 430 0 660
42 210 270 0 480
43 240 640 Negl. 880
Total: 2 Mar -
24 Dec 65 11,950 21,260 1,080 34,300 J
Cessation of Bomb-
ing, Weeks 44-48,
25 Dec 65 -
30 Jan 66
31 Jan - 19 Feb 66
49
260
510
0
770
50
400
700
0
1,100
51
360
480
0
840
19 Feb 66
1,020
1,690 0
710
2
Total Rolling
Thunder
,
2 Mar 65 -
19 Feb 66
12,970
22,950 1,080
000
a. Rounded to nearest 10 tons except for grand total and total for 1965, Which are to
the nearest 100 tons. Deliveries of less than 5 tons are indicated as Negligible
(Negl.).
b. Because of rounding, totals may not agree with the components shown.
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Table B-6
Rolling Thunder: Ordnance Expended, by Week and by Program
2 March 1965 - 19 February 1966
Tons =L
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Total Armed Total
On Fixed By Fixed By Armed Reconnaissance On Armed
Targets Target Reconnaissance Not On Reconnaissance Total
Week Col 2+3) Strikes Strikes Fixed Targets (Col 3+4) Col 1+4
2 Mar - 24 Dec 65
1
200
200
0
0
0
200
2
0
0
0
0
0
0
3
460
460
0
0
o
460
4
200
200
0
0
0
200
5
440
440
0
0
o
44o
6
630
630
0
60
60
690
7
350
310
40
30
70
380
8
450
360
90
180
270
630
9
220
140
80
160
240
380
10
460
460
0
90
90
54o
11
90
9o
0
9o
9o
190
12
240
240
0
60
60
300
13
470
470
0
14o
140
610
T4
410
410
0
140
140
550
15
410
410
0
300
300
710
16
420
420
0
480
480
goo
17
640
640
0
350
360
990
18
390
390
Negl.
310
300
700
19
200
200
0
570
570
770
20
360
280
80
300
380
660
21
380
380
Negl.
470
470
850
22
350
350
0
490
490
840
23
410
360
50
730
780
1,140
24
320
290
30
520
550
840
25
370
260
110
64o
750
1,010
26
320
320
0
980
980
1,300
27
50
50
0
610
610
660
28
550
550
0
1,120
1,120
1,670
29
630
630
0
840
840
1,470
30
440
440
Negl.
1,130
1,130
1,570
31
170
160
10
630
640
800
32
240
230
10
1,250
1,260
1,490
33
10
0
10
770
780
780
34
18o
150
30
1,020
1,050
1,200
35
220
170
50
goo
950
1,120
36
14o
70
70
1,020
1,090
1,160
37
150
14o
10
1,100
1,110
1,250
38
200
170
30
670
700
870
39
140
130
10
1,000
1,010
1,140
40
160
130
30
660
690
820
41
30
0
30
630
660
660
42
60
20
40
420
460
480
43
240
210
30
640
670
880
Total 2 Mar -
24 Dec
65
12,800
11,960
840
21,500
2
2,340
34,300
Cessation of Bombing,
Weeks 44-48,
25 Dec 65-30 Jan 66
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Rolling Thunder: Ordnance Expended, by Week and by Program
2 March 1965 - 19 February 1966
(Continued)
Tons J
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Total Armed Total
On Fixed By Fixed By Armed Reconnaissance On Armed
Targets Target Reconnaissance Not On Reconnaissance Total
Week (Col 2+3) Strikes Strikes Fixed Targets (col 3+4) Col 1+4)
31 Jan - 19 Feb 66
'E9 0 0 Negl. 770 770 770
1j0 120 0 120 980 1,100 1,100
j1 4o 0 40 800 840 84o
19 Feb 66 160 0 160 2,550 2,710 2,710
Total Rolling Thunder
2 Mar 65 - 19 Feb 66 12,960 11,960 12000 24,050 252~050
37,000
a. Rounded to nearest 10 tons except for grand total and total for 1965, which are to the nearest
100 tons. Because of rounding, totals may not agree with the components shown. Deliveries of less
than 5 tons are indicated as Negligible (Negl.).
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D. Consistent of Attack and Deliver Ca abilities
When either the data for sorties or ordnance are plotted by
week, considerable unevenness in there tack North Vietnaesestaries
gets becomes immediately apparent
and B-8 and B-9 for ordnance). A hypothesis that weather might be the
adding to
werefcaattack was nceled becausetested
o fweather.
cause the thei sorties intensity
"sortiees s f7-own n the period
Unfortunately, data on cancellations were available only for
n or the s from 1 October through 24 Deindicat(sethatbweathe).is not the cause of
inadequate sample, however, orties canceled
the apparent irregularity of attack. Adding the but did not tend to
merely moved the fluctuations to a higher
eliminate them (see Figure B-4).
When the data for sorties and tons of ordnance delivered were
grouped by months, the unevenness noted in the weekly da eahe disappeared
ac
(see Tables B-8 and B-9)' This becomes most app data in Figures B-11 through B-14. The
presentation of the monthly gradually (with the exception of
curves for dip emoothed, built
September and October, and there-
after slight dip in une ) to a peak in December. When
after fell off slightly in November and more sharply
monthly sorties flown in North Vietnam were compared
dewiah monthly sor-
ties flown in South Vietnam and Laos, sorties aeast North
found to increase at times when the number of sorties against Nor h
Vietnam declined (see Figure B-15). In June,
I October, offsetting
Viwas a etnam ea t
in North Vietnam and Laos declined, bntSouththere
num-
increase in sorties against targets
to an even greater degree in November, there was adeclinne ins tae more
ber of sorties against targets in North Vietnam, yet
than offsetting increase in the number of sorties against targets in
South Vietnam and Laos, so that the number of sorties for the combined
area of North Vietnam, South Vietnam, and Laos showed substantial in-
crease. In December, sorties against North Vietnam were flown only
through 32 weeks. Had sorties been flown n wt the last week soofieecfm ere
equal to the weekly average of the first 3-21
against North Vietnam would have
ineDecemberswas
against en
iahg the trend of
November. The number of sorties somewhat greater than in November but was in keeping with
previous months. The number of sorties flown ag
_* A decrease in ordnance delivered is evident in May (see Figures B-13
and 1-14), a month when the tobec useb strikeortsieagainsts
ures B-ll and B-12). This is purposes for a 5-day period
13-17e May, but 397e hotoreconnaissance missions pwere flown during the
same period. but The 397 p effect of these photoreconnaissance missions on total
se in Fig-
sorties flown evident in 11th
a1212 12th and even ven of the Rolling Thunder program in Figure B-3.
and n
-xx Text continued on p. .
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Table B-7
Rolling Thunder: Cancellations Because of Weather
1 October - 24 December 1965
Dates
October
Number
of Sorties
1 - 7
31/32
8 - 14
135
32/33
76
15 - 21
33/34
288
22 - 28
34/35
285
November
29-4
5 - 11
12 - 18
19-25
December
35/36
36/37
37/38
38/39
191
42
205
26-2
39/40
316
3-9
40/41
566
10 - L6
41/42
483
17-23
42/43
3,481
43
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Table B-8
Rolling Thunder: Total Sorties, by Month
March-December 1965
Armed
Leaflet Fixed Recon- Total
Month and Other Target naissance Sorties
Mar 0 850 0 850
Apr 0 1,464 1,200 2,664
May 397 1,301 1,237 2,935
Jun 4 1,361 1,386 2,751
Jul 42 1,586 1,732 3,360
Aug 24 1,389 4,221 5,634
Sep 28 1,441 4,594 6,063
Oct 73 570 5,458 6,101
Nov 47 574 5,108 5,729
Dec 30 528 2,996 3,554
Total 645 11,064 27,932 39,641
US
South
Navy
Air Force
Vietnamese
Air Force
382
345
123
1,484
1,077
103
1,295
1,516
124
1,378
1,265
108
2,020
1,257
83
3,743
1,851
40
3,202
2,840
21
3,943
2,150
8
3,582
2,140
7
1,656
1,869
29
22,685
16 10
646
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Table B-9
Rolling Thunder: Ordnance Expended, by Month, by Program, and by Service
March-December 1965
Program
Service
Armed
South
Month
Recon-
naissance a
Fixed
Target
Total
Nav
Air F
Vietnamese
y
orce
Air Force
Mar
0
1,130
1,130
280
540
310
Apr
640
1,620
2,260
800
1,280
180
May
380
1,420
1,8oo
540
1,100
160
Jun
1,430
1,900
3,330
1,150
1,990
190
w
N
Jul
2,060
1,410
3,470
1,590
1
780
100
N
Aug
3,390
1,280
4,670
1,830
,
2,780
60
Sep
3,74o
1,780
5,520
1,700
3,790
30
Oct
4,500
590
5,090
1,56o
3,520
10
Nov
4,040
480
4,520
1,690
2,810
20
Dec
2,160
350
2,510
810
1,680
20
Total
22,340
11,960
34,300
11
950
21
270
1
080
,
,
,
a. Including 8 0 tons of ordnance expended by armed reconnaissance strike sorties on
fixed targets.
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increased markedly -- to an even greater degree than sorties against
North Vietnam declined. Thus the data clearly reflect a decision to
use in Laos those aircraft not used against North Vietnam in the last
week of December. This analysis strongly suggests that the fluctua-
tions noted in the weekly data were occasioned by necessity for tem-
porarily shifting aircraft from attack on North Vietnam to support
ground operations in South Vietnam or to attack targets in Laos.*
Thus it becomes clear that the capability of the US and South
Vietnamese Air Forces for delivering ordnance on targets in North Viet-
nam cannot be defined in isolation. Forces available in Southeast Asia
can be used, as necessity or policy dictates, in varying combinations
and degree against the three principal target areas of South Vietnam,
North Vietnam, and Laos. Prior to the cessation of bombing in North
Vietnam in late December, the priority on sorties flown against targets
in the three areas was: 1st priority, South Vietnam; 2nd priority,
North Vietnam; and 3rd priority, Laos. The relative effort expended
in the three areas is reflected in the following percentages of cumu-
lative attack sorties flown against targets in South Vietnam, North
Vietnam, and Laos during July-December 1965:
Target Area
Percent
South Vietnam
72
North Vietnam
20
Laos
8
The current delivery capability of forces now available in South-
east Asia is reflected in the 18,335 attack sorties flown during the
* A desirable test of the hypothesis that decreases in the intensity
of attack on North Vietnam have coincided with increased air activity
in other areas would be comparison of weekly data for each of the
three areas concerned. Unfortunately, weekly data for sorties against
targets in Laos and South Vietnam were not readily available, and the
time available for preparation of this Appendix did not permit further
investigation of this topic.
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month of December 1965.* These attack sorties are allocated by ser-
vice in the following tabulation:
Air Force
8,436
Navy
5,207
Marines
2,103
Vietnamese Air
Force
2,589
Total 18,335
Allowing for the fact that the period covered by the 18,335 sorties
included a cessation of air operations in North Vietnam from 1800 hours
on 24 December through 31 December and in South Vietnam a 30-hour
cessation over Christmas, an approximate capability of 630 sorties per
day is indicated. A peak effort for a limited period of time could
substantially increase this daily sortie rate, but the above data are
indicative of a normal month-to-month capability. If the average load
of 1.4 tons of ordnance per sortie observed for strike plus flak sup-
pression sorties against North Vietnam is assumed for the 630 sorties
per day, there exists in the Southeast Asian area a current capability
for delivering more than 26,000 tons of ordnance per month. Alloca-
tion of 20 percent of this amount to attacks on targets in North Viet-
nam would result in delivery of slightly more than 5,000 tons per
* The attack sorties flown against targets in the three primary areas
during December 1965 were distributed according to service and type of
aircraft as follows:
Service
Total
Type of
Aircraft
Air Force
Navy
Marines
Vietnamese Num
Air Force So
ber of
rties Percent
B-52
316
316
1.7
B-57
521
521
2.8
A-1
1,560
475
2,589 4
,624
25.3
A-3
11
11
0.1
A-4
3,242
1,201
4
,443
24.3
A-6
120
120
0.7
F-4
1,377
931
836
3
,144
17.1
F-5
643
643
3.5
F-8
428
66
494
2.7
F-100
2,117
2
,117
11.5
F-102
76
76
o.4
F-105
1,781
1
,781
9.7
FC-47
45
45
0.2
Total
8,436
5,207
2,103
2,589 18
,335
100
B-24
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month -- an amount which approximates the average monthly delivery dur-
ing the four-month period August-November and is somewhat below the
amount delivered in the peak month of September (see Table B-9
and Figure B-13).
E. Increasi Share of Armed Reconnaissance in Total Effort
d
Next to the unevenness noted when weeklyedatatfor sorti s factanwas e
ordnance were plotted in Figures B-3 and B-9,
the steady increase in armed reconnaissance as a share of the totealBair s 11
attack on North Vietnam.
more clearly trelatipeoshaaesnoflthe var-
through B-14 reveal ious services and of the fixed target and armed reconnaissance programs
in the total effort. The dramatic increase inoteshare oreflef
reconnaissance (see Figures B-12 and B-14) undoubtedly
broadened
diminishing number of new fixed targets available for attack,
authorization for armed reconnaissance, and at least in part a change
in definitions used in bookkeeping. As the number of categories of
permissible armed reconnaissance targets hs creasedaand, ascrnnais-
strikes on fixed targets have come to be permitted connai sance missions, some sortis been fixed
sance that previously would
targets.
F. Relative Shares of Services in the Air Attack
The monthly data plotted for the period March-December 1965
clearly reveal that the US Navy has flown the largest number of sor-
ties (Figure B-11) and that the US Air Force has delivered the largest
share of the ordnance (Figure B-13). This fact is also evident from
the data pertaining to the entire period from 2 March 1965 through
19 February 1966 (see Table B-10).
Table B-10
Share of Services in Total Sorties and Total Ordnance Delivered
2 March 1965 - 19 February 1966
Percent of Percent of Total
Total Sorties Ordnance Delivered
Service
US Navy 5l 57
US Air Force 2
Vietnamese Air Force
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That the US Air Force delivered 62 percent of the ordnance but flew
only 41 percent of the sorties highlights the fact that the average
load of aircraft flown by the Air Force is greater than that of the
Navy aircraft. During 1965 the average load of strike plus flak sup-
pression sorties flown by the Air Force against targets in North Viet-
nam was slightly more than twice the average load of such sorties flown
by the Navy. Consequently, the Navy must fly more sorties to deliver
a given quantity of ordnance. This frequency of exposure was at firtt
regarded as a significant fact in considering losses of aircraft.
G. Losses
During the period from 2 March 1965 through February 1966 a
total of 181 aircraft and 154 men were lost on Rolling Thunder missions.
(An additional 65 men were lost but recovered.) Losses by service are
indicated in the following tabulation:
Personnel
Service Aircraft
Lost Recovered
US Navy 95 85
US Air Force 78 63 33
South Vietnamese Air 30
Force 8 6
2
Total. 181 154
65
The fact that the Navy suffered the largest number of losses seemed to
bear out the hypothesis that there is a close connection between losses
and frequency of exposure. Further investigation, however, revealed
that Navy losses represent a smaller percentage of sorties flown than
do Air Force losses (see Table B-11). It was concluded that differences
in the types of missions flown were offsetting the influence of fre-
quency of risk. During the period 2 March - 24 December 1965,
the same number of sorties against fixed targets were flown by bouhhly
services -- 5,554 by the Navy Y both
however, flew about 1.6 times the number boftarmedrrecconnaissanceavY,
sorties flown by the Air Force -- by the Air Force. 16 932 by the Navy and 10,831
b
so by yrthes flown thApproximately 75 percent of the total number of
66 percent of total sorties were
flown by the AirnForce awere onearmedore-
connaissance.* This difference becomes significant when aircraft
losses are examined by type of mission.
* Details concerning armed reconnaissance and fixed strike sorties
are available in the files of this Office.
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Table B-11
Rolling Thunder: Relationship Between Aircraft Losses
and Total Sorties Flown
2 March 1965 - 19 February 1966
Service
Total Sorties
Flown
Aircraft
Losses
Losses as a Percent
of Sorties Flown
24
331
95
0.39
US Navy
,
78
0.44
US Air Force
South Vietnamese Air
17,620
646
Force
42,597
181
0.4
Of the total number of aircraft lost from 2 March 1965 through
19 February 1966, 106 were on armed reconnaissance missions, 74 were
on sorties against fixed targets, and 1 was on a photoreconnaissance
mission. However, an average of 7 aircraft were lost per 1,000 sorties
against fixed targets, not including SAM sites, but c mparaoleies.
figure for armed reconnaissance was only 3 aircraft per
(This lower loss ratio for armed reconnaissance sorties, coupled with
the high percentage of total Navy sorties that are on armed reconnais-
sance, tends to explain why Navy losses amount to a smaller percentage
of sorties flown than do Air Force losses.) From 2 March 1965 through
19 February 1966, losses of aircraft by type of task were 131 on strike
missions, 11 on flak suppression missions, and 39 on other missions.
This is a loss-to-sortie ratio of 0.5 percent for strike plus flak sup-
pression sorties and of 0.2 percent for support sorties. Ground ff ire es
is the most frequently reported cause of aircraft loss. Only 12 were reported as being caused by SAM'S.
During the period from 2 March 1965 through 19 February 1966
losses per 100 sorties against various target systems were as indicated
by the following tabulation:
Target System
Losses per
100 Sorties
Losses per
Target System 100 Sorties
SAM sites
2.03
Powerplants o.81
46
Railroad yards
1.80
Ports o.
41
0
Radar sites
1.59
.
Petroleum storage
40
losives plants
Ex
1.28
Supply depots 0.
0
p
Naval bases
1.14
Ammunition depots 0.3
21
0
Bridges
0.89
.
Barracks
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With the exception of the categories "Railroad Yards" and "Explosives
Plants" -- which probably are not representative samples, because
only one target of each category was struck -- the above tabulation
probably is indicative of the relative intensity of defenses at the
various types of targets.
Losses by type of aircraft are indicated in the following tab-
ulation of data for the 1965 period. Losses ranged from 0.3 to 0.7
percent of sorties flown by the types of aircraft that flew the lar-
gest shares of total sorties. Several types of aircraft that flew fewer
missions incurred higher proportional losses. For example, the data on
the A-lF undoubtedly reflect both the small number of sorties flown and
unfortunate chance circumstances.
Sorties Flown by This
Type of
Aircraft Lost Ai
Type of Aircraft as Los
a Percent of Total of
Number of Sorties Flown by All
rcraft Lost Types of Aircraft Ty
ses as a Percent
Total Sorties
Flown by This
pe of Aircraft
F-105
A
1H
54 23
0
6
-
A
4
24 8.8
.
0
7
-
E
A
4
15 12.2
.
3
0
-
C
F
4C
14 7.1
.
0
5
-
10
.
F-4B
9.3
0.3
F-8D
9
8 5.7
0.4
F-8E
1.8
7
1.1
RF-101
6 5.9
0.3
RF-8A
0.7
6
2.1
F-100
0.9
5
1.7
1.0
1
RA-5C
A-6A
3 0.3
3
.2
2.3
A-lE
1.2
2
0.6
EA-1F
0.01
1
50
1.8
0
1
B-57
H
1 0.4
.
0
elicopters
3 Not included
.7
N.A.
The total cost of the Rolling Thunder attack on targets in
North Vietnam during the period from 2 March 1965 through 19 February
1966 is estimated at about $470 million. As indicated in Figure B-2,
this figure represents approximately $330 million in aircraft losses,
$80 million in the operational cost of sorties flown, and $60 million
in the cost of ordnance expended.
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During the period 2 March-24 December 1965 the program cost
approximately $440 million. The cost of damage to the economy of
North Vietnam during the same period has been estimated at about $63
million (see Table B-12 and Figure B-16). The value of the attack on
targets in North Vietnam obviously must be measured in military,
political, and psychological terms rather than economic. It must be
noted, moreover, that a large share of the cost of the Rolling Thunder
program is incurred in connection with armed reconnaissance strikes
that frequently result in damage to targets having a lower restora-
tion cost than that of most fixed targets. The cost of the armed
reconnaissance program during 2 March - 24 December 1965 is estimated
at approximately 63 percent of the total $440 million cost of Rolling
Thunder. In contrast, only 21 percent of the estimated cost of damage
to the economy of North Vietnam is attributed to the armed reconnais-
sance program.
Estimated Costs of Rolling Thunder
Related to Costs of Damage to the Economy of North Vietnam
2 March-24 December 1965
Million US $
Month
Sortie
Overhead J
Aircraft
Losses
Ordnance
Total
Cost to
North Vietnam
March
1.5
18.8
1.7
22.0
1.3
April
4.8
23.3
3.6
31.7
3.2
May
4.6
14.6
3.9
23.1
4.4
June
4.8
18.8
5.7
29.3
8.9
July
5.9
45.0
5.1
56.0
10.0
August
10.1
34.5
8.6
53.2
10.0
September
11.0
39.0
10.6
60.6
8.0
October
11.4
39.4
5.8
56.6
5.3
November
11.8
27.2
7.4
46.4
5.3
December
7.5
45.2
3.8
56.5
6.9
Total
73.4
305.8
56.2
435.4
63.3
a. Based on average operating costs per sortie for different types of
aircraft as indicated by data contained in US Army, STAG, Assessment
of the Air Effort in Vietnam and Laos, Annex A, Appendix II, Tab B,
Appendix III, Tab B, and Appendix IV, Tab B, TOP SECRET. These data
on average cost per sortie were applied to the sum of data on sorties
contained in the BDA.
b. Average costs of production models of various types of aircraft
taken from US Army, STAG, were applied to da.ta,on aircraft losses
contained in the BDA.
c. Average costs of various types of ordnance taken from US Army,
STAG, were applied to data, on ordnance expended contained in the BDA.
d. Including restoration costs for damage in installations and equip-
ment and losses incurred in agriculture and export.
B-29
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Estimated total monthly costs of the Rolling Thunder program
during March-December 1965 are compared with the estimated monthly cost
of damage to the economy of North Vietnam in Figure B-17 and Table B-13.
The pattern of the two monthly series is roughly similar; however,
there is a wide gap between the two. The costs of the program exceed
the value of damage to the North Vietnamese economy by $20 million to
$50 million per month. It is evident that there is a direct relationship
between damage caused and the scale of effort, but the cost is high.
Monthly Cost of Rolling Thunder
Compared with Cost of Damage to Economy of North Vietnam
2 March-24 December 1965
Million US $
Cost of Cost to
Month Rolling Thunder North Vietnam Difference
March 22.0 1.3 20.7
April 31.7 3.2 28.5
May 23.1 4.4 18.7
June 29.3 8.9 20.4
July 56.0 10.0 46.o
August 53.2 10.0 43.2
September 60.6 8.0 52.6
October 56.6 5.3 51.3
November 46.4 5.3 41.1
December 56.5 6.9 49.6
Total 435.4 63- 73 2.1
I. The Attack on Fixed Target System
During the period from 2 March 1965 through 19 February 1966
a total of 14,012 sorties delivered 12,960 tons of ordnance on JCS fixed
targets, as indicated by the following tabulation:
Sorties Ordnance Delivered
Type of Sortie Number Percent Tons Percent
Fixed target strike 11,064 79 11,960 92
Armed reconnaissance 2,948 21 1,000 8
14,012 100 12,96o 100
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The attack on fixed targets accounted for approximately 33 percent of
all Rolling Thunder sorties flown and 35 percent of all ordnance de-
livered on North Vietnam. Strikes were made on 142 fixed targets.
During the last three months of 1965, the number of fixed target
strike sorties and the amount of ordnance delivered by them declined
absolutely in comparison with previous levels and also declined relatively
as a. share of the total Rolling Thunder attack (see Figures B-12 and
B-14). In the period from 31 January through 19 February, no fixed target
strike sorties were flown, but 124 armed reconnaissance sorties restruck
JCS targets that had been attacked previously. The increasingly important
role of armed reconnaissance strike sorties in the total effort against
JCS fixed targets in the last few weeks of 1965, and in the period after
resumption of bombing in 1966, is evident in Figure B-9.
Significant data pertaining to the attack on individual JCS
fixed target systems during the period 2 March-24 December 1965 are
summarized graphically in Figures B-18 through B-32 and in Table B-14.*
These figures present, for each of the major target systems, aggregate
data, concerning system capacity, number of targets struck, number of
sorties flown, tons of ordnance delivered, losses of aircraft and per-
sonnel, and -- where possible -- the cost of the attacks and the esti-
mated cost for restoration of the damaged installation. When possible,
similar data were also presented for individual JCS targets within the
target systems. Data, pertaining to military complexes such as combina-
tion barracks and supply depots or barracks and ammunition depots have
been summarized separately to provide alternatives for combination with
data,perta,ining to other targets that fit properly into a. single category.
J. Glossary**
Rolling Thunder - An unclassified codename applied to the
entire airstrike program against North Vietnam.
Strike - An attack conducted by one or more aircraft.
Sortie - One operational flight by a single aircraft.
Combat Sortie - One aircraft airborne on a mission against the
enemy.
* The data concerning attacks on ferries also were summarized,
although these targets have been dropped from JCS Fixed Target List.
** Definitions are in accordance with those contained in the Joint
Chiefs of Staff Armed Reconnaissance Study Group Report, An Analysis
of the Armed Reconnaissance Program in North Vietnam, Appendix 3,
Annex A,
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Included are the following, defined as applicable within the Rolling
Thunder program:
a. Fixed Target Strike Sortie - One aircraft airborne
on a primary mission against a pre-briefed JCS
numbered target.
b. Armed Reconnaissance Strike Sortie - One aircraft
airborne with the primary mission of locating and
attacking targets of opportunity -- that is, enemy
material, personnel, and facilities in assigned
general areas or along assigned lines of communica-
tion; or for attacks on pre-briefed small military
targets, followed by armed route reconnaissance; or
for restrikes on JCS numbered fixed targets.
c. Flak Suppression Sortie - One aircraft airborne with
a primary mission against enemy surface antiaircraft
defenses.
d. Other Combat Sorties - One aircraft airborne with a
primary mission of air interdiction, close air sup-
port, or combat air patrol.
Combat Support Sortie - One aircraft airborne with the primary
mission of providing operational assistance to combat elements.
Included in the category are: escort, flare, refueling, bomb
damage assessment, reconnaissance, air reconnaissance, photo!-
reconnaissance, pre-strike reconnaissance, search and rescue,
weather reconnaissance, ELINT, COMINT, ECM, and ECCM.
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Table B-l4
Rolling Thunder: Statistical Summary of Attacks
on Railroad Yards and Shops
2 March-24 December 1965
Number of targets 4 yards; 1 shop
Targets struck 2 yards (1 on JCS list;
1 not on JCS list)
Strikes 5
Attacking service US Navy
Sorties
Strike and flak suppression 75
Support 36
Total ill
Ordnance delivered 66 tons
Aircraft lost 2
Personnel lost 1
Personnel recovered 1
Cost to US Million US $
Aircraft lost 2.40
Operational cost of
sorties flown 0.13
Ordnance expended 0.04
Total 2.57
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CHINA
?.,..f
CHINA
..,.? ?..~
.f j
j
ROLLINN THUNDER 30
'L 18 June 1 65
ROLL
THUN ER 2~
~
9 July 1965
.. ,r
ROLLING
THUNDER 21
2 July 1965
HANOI
ROLLING THUNDER 20
, ?
25 June 1965
ep
?>
LAOS
Haiphong
ROLLING THUNDER 19
ROLLING THUNDER 48
18 June 1965
31 January 1966
ROLLING THUNDER 9
A JI
a
April 196S
A` ^~
t
,s G UL F
OF
ROLLING THUNDER 7
TONKIN
March 1965
THAILAND ~.~
e..
DEMARCATION LINE
Armed Reconnaissance
Boundaries; 1965-66
SOUTH
~
\?
` VIETNAM
LAOS
25 50 75 mil-
?
0 25 50 75 Kilometers
\...
61385 B-1 Rolling Thunder: Armed Reconnaissance Boundaries
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ROLLING THUNDER
Statistical Summary, 2 March 1965-19 February 1966
ORDNANCE DELIVERED
TOTAL: 37,000 (TONS)
12,970
ORDNANCE DELIVERED
TOTAL: 37,000=100%
SOUTH VIETNAMESE
AIR FORCE
US AIR f
ARMED RECONNAISSANCE PROGRAM
68%
AIR FORCE
SOUTH VIETNAMESE
AIR FORCE
STRIKE & FLAK
SUPPRESSION SORTIES
TOTAL: 26,044
SOUTH VIETNAMESE
AIR FORCE
SUPPORT SORTIES
TOTAL: 15,852
-? US NAVY
10,370
FIXED TARGET PROGRAM
32%
1US AIR FORC
SOUTH VIETNAMESE
MISCELLANEOUS OTHER
SORTIES
TOTAL: 701
US NAVY
=199
SOUTH VIETNAMESE
AIR FORCE
AIRCRAFT LOST
TOTAL: 181
:S-NA Y
t7
AIRFORCE
SOUTH VIETNAMESE
AIR FORCE
PERSONNEL LOST
TOTAL: 154
ESTIMATED COST
OF PROGRAM
(MILLION US $)
TOTAL: 470
AIRCRAFT LOSSES
330
80
B-2 Rolling Thunder: Statistical Summary, 2 March 1985-19 February 1966
OPERATIONAL COST ORDNANCE
OF SORTIES FLOWN ~ EXPENDED
81353
25X1
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Sorties
2,100
Armed Reconnaissance Program
Wook I 3 5 7 9 11* 13 15 17 19 21 23 25 27 29 31 33 35 37 39 41 43 49 51
Month MAR APR MAY JUNE JULY AUG SEPT OCT NOV DEC JAN FEB
R/T# 5 6 7 8 9 1011 12 1314 15 16 171819 2021 22/ 24/ 26/ 281 30/ 32/ 34/ 36/ 381, 40/ 42/ 44/ 48
23 25 27 29 31 33 35 37 39 41 43 45
B-3 Rolling Thunder: Weekly Summary of Sorties, by Program
81354 2 March 1965-19 February 1966
*Five day suspension of bombing
Sorties
2,100
Weekly Sorties, by Program
2 March 1965-19 February 1966
Photo Reconnaissance,
Leaflet Drops, Gift Drops, etc.
Weekly Sorties, by Service
2 March 1965.19 February 1966
R/T# 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 171819 20 21 22/ 24/ 261 281 30/ 32/ 34/ 36/ 381 40/ 42/ 44/
23 25 27 29 31 33 35 37 39 41 43 45
B-4 Rolling Thunder: Weekly Summary of Sorties, by Service
61355 2 March 1965-19 February 1966
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ROLLING THUNDER
Sorties Flown, 2 March 1965.19 February 1966
SERVICE
NUMBER
OF SORTIES
US NAVY
24,331-57%
us
US AIR. FORCE
17,620-41 %
AIR FORCE
SOUTH VIETNAMESE
646- 2%
AIR FORCE
TOTAL
42,597
COMBAT SORTIES
STRIKE & FLAK SUPPRESSION SORTIES:
US NAVY
13,762-33%
US AIR FORCE
11,720-28%
SOUTH VIETNAMESE
AIR FORCE
562- 1 %a
26,044- 62%
SUPPORT SORTIES:
15,852-
38%
US NAVY
10,370-25%
US AIR FORCE
5,415-13%
SOUTH VIETNAMESE
67-NEGL.
AIR FORCE
TOTAL
41,896-100%
PROGRAM
FIXED TARGET SORTIES
11,064- 26%
ARMED RECONNAISSANCE SORTIES
30,832- 72%
LEAFLET DROPS, PHOTO RECON-
701- 2%
NAISSANCE, GIFT DROPS, ETC.
_____
TOTAL
42,597-100%
B-5 Rolling Thunder: Sorties Flown, 2 March 1965-19 February 1966
SOUTH VIETNAMESE
2%! AIR FORCE
US NAVY
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ROLLING THUNDER
Sorties Flown, 2 March 1965-24 December 1965
SERVICE NUMBER OF SORTIES
US NAVY 22,685
U S AIR FORCE 16,310
SOUTH VIETNAMESE 646
AIR FORCE
TOTAL 39,641
PROGRAM 11
FIXED TARGET SORTIES 11,064
ARMED RECONNAISSANCE
SORTIES
27,932
LEAFLET DROPS, PHOTO RECON- 645 1 1 2'%?
NAISSANCE, GIFT DROPS, ETC.
TOTAL 39,641
COMBAT SORTIES
ST IIKESAND FLAK SUP - 24,057-62%
USN
USAF
VNAF
12,728-33%
10,767-28%
562- 1%
SUPPORT SORTIES
14,939-38%
USN
9,758-25%
USAF
5,114-13%
VNAF
67-NEGL.
TOTAL
38,996-100%
B-6 Rolling Thunder: Sorties Flown, 2 March-24 December 1965
61357 25X1
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ROLLING THUNDER
Statistical Summary,31 January-19 February 1966
ARMED ARMED
RECONNAISSANCE RECONNAISSANCE
NOT. ON FIXED ON FIXED TARGET
TARGET
TOTAL SORTIES
BY PROGRAM 2,956
BY SERVICE
STRIKE & FLAK
SUPPORT
ORDNANCE
NOT ON FIXED
TARGET
ON FIXED
TARGETS
2,956
2,550
PERSONNEL LOST 10 40,
1TV11111111
PERSONNEL RECOVERED 3 I
COST OF PROGRAM
(MILLION US $) 33
AIRCRAFT LOSSES
24
SORTIE OVERHEAD
B-7 Rolling Thunder: Statistical Summary, 31 January-19 February 1966
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Tons
1600
Tons
1600
Ordnance Expended, by Service
2 March 1965-19 February 1966
1 3 5 7 9 11 13 15 17 19 21 23 25 27 29 31 33 35 37 39 41 43 49 51
Week
B-8 Rolling Thunder: Weekly Summary of Ordnance Expended, by Service
, 1
7
u
1966
2 M
965
Febr
ary
Ordnance Expended, by Program
2 March 1965-19 February 1966
_ ' on Fixed Targets A&
B-9 Rolling Thunder: Weekly Summary of Ordnance Expended, by Program
2 March 1965-19 February 1966
3 5 7 9 11 13 15 17 19 21 23 25 27 29 31 33 35 37 39 41
Week
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ROLLING THUNDER
Ordnance Expended, 2 March -24 December 1965
US AIR FORCE
U S NAVY
SOUTH VIETNAMESE
AIR FORCE
TONS
21,300
11,900
1,100
TOTAL 34,300
FIXED TARGET STRIKES 11,960
ARMED RECONNAISSANCE
ON FIXED TARGETS
840 %%%
(TOTAL ON FIXED TARGETS 12,800)
ARMED RECONNAISSANCE
NOT ON FIXED TARGETS 21,500
TOTAL ARMED RECONNAISSANCE 22,340
TOTAL TONS DELIVERED 34,300
B-10 Rolling Thunder: Ordnance Expended, 2 March-24 December 1965
61361 25X1
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Sorties, by Service
South Vietnamese Air Force
Mar. Apr. May June July Aug. Sept. Oct. Nov. Dec.
B-11 Rolling Thunder: Monthly Summary of Sorties, by Service, March-December 1965
61361 3-66 CIA
Sorties, by Program
- Leaflet and Other
Mar. Apr. May June July Aug. Sept. Oct. Nov. Dec.
B-12 Rolling Thunder: Monthly Summary of Sorties, by Program, March-December 1965
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Ordnance Expended, by Service
6,000
5,000
4,000
3,000
2,000
1,000
/South Vietnamese Air Force
Mar. Apr. May June July Aug. Sept. Oct. Nov. Dec.
B-13 Rolling Thunder: Monthly Summary of Ordnance Expended, by Service, March-December 1965
Ordnance Expended, by Program
Tons
6,000 -
Mar. Apr. May June July Aug. Sept. Oct. Nov.
B-14 Rolling Thunder: Monthly Summary of Ordnance Expended, by Program, March-December 1965
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Indexes of Sorties Flown in Southeast Asia
MAR APR MAY JUNE JULY AUG SEPT OCT NOV DEC
B-15 Indexes of Sorties Flown in Southeast Asia and the Relative Amount in Each Area
March-December 1965
*Correction assuming sorties against N. Viet-
nam had continued through last week of
December at some level as average of first
35 weeks and that aircraft not used in N.
Vietnam actually were used In Laos.
Laos
Total ti
South Vietnam
Vietnam
w_ -
- -----------
- arc toia or ort retnam, oust iefnam, and Laos - 100 }
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Cost Related to the Cost of Damage
Rolling Thunder Program
90
80
70,
Rolling Thunder Program
440
i
MAR APR MAY JUNE JULY AUG SEPT OCT NOV DEC
B-16, B-17 Estimated Cost of Rolling Thunder Related to the Cost of Damage to the Economy of North Vietnam
2 March-24 December 1965
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 Approved For Release 2008/10/16: CIA-RDP80TO1629R000300080014-9
ROLLING THUNDER:
Attacks on Airfields, 2 March ?24 December 1965
US AIR FORCE US NAVY
TARGETS ATTACKED: 4
KNOWN AIRFIELDS: 22
AIRFIELDS TARGETED: 11
% CAPACITY OF TARGETED
AIRFIELDS DESTROYED: 19
ORDNANCE (TONS)
PROGRAMED -0 380
DELIVERED:
STRIKES: 12
SORTIES PROGRAMED
IN TIS a
STRIKE SORTIES (INCLUDING 421
FLAK SUPPRESSION)
SUPPORT SORTIES 134
ESTIMATED COST OF
ATTACKS ON AIRFIELDS
ESTIMATED COST OF
TARGET REPLACEMENT
SOUTH VIETNAMESE PROGRAMED IN TIS
1.3
-313 32
2 $880 THOUSAND
$400 THOUS ORDNAN E $480 THOUSAND-SORTIE OVERHEAD
$380 THOUSAND
a) Upper limits of the ranges of ordnance and sorties given in the
Target Information Summary (TIS) of the Joint Chiefs of Staff as
the operational requirements far 70% destruction of the target.
B-18 a Rolling Thunder: Statistical Summary of Attacks on Airfields, 2 March-24 December 1965
25X1
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ROLLING THUNDER
Attacks on Airfields, 2 March-24 December 1965
CAPACITY
CAPACITY
ORDNANCE-TIS &
AIRFIELD
%
% DESTROYED
ACTUAL WEIGHT IN TONS;
SORTIES
TARGETED
OR INACTIVE
COST OF BOMBS EXPENDED
STRIKE AND FLAK
B-18 b Rolling Thunder: Statistical Summary of Attacks on Airfields, 2 March-24 December 1965
10
75 1251 1 110
SOUTH VIETNAMESE
AID FfRCF
it,
180 STRIKE AND FLAK 12
32 1 136
,,2 6
I 75 1' 83 SUPPORT
STRIKE AND FLAK
1~7
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ROLunv MURMUR
Attacks on Bridges, 2 March-24 December 1965
% NORTH VIETNAMESE BRIDGES
TARGETED
% TARGETED CAPACITY
STRUCK*
* REPRESENTS 44 BRIDGES ACTUALLY
STRUCK OF THE 63` ORIGINALLY
TARGETED. THESE 44 BRIDGES
COMPRISED APPROX. 58.0% OF
TARGETED CAPACITY
US AIR FORCE
STRIKE SORTIES (INCLUDING
1400
FLAK SUPPRESSION SORTIES)
ACTUAL
58%
PROGRAMED
ORDNANCE (TONS)
PROGRAMED
' TWO BRIDGES HAVE BEEN DROPPED SUBSEQUENTLY FROM THE TARGET LIST.
b UPPER LIMIT OF THE RANGE OF ORDNANCE AND SORTIES GIVEN IN THE TARGET INFORMATION
SUMMARY (TIS) OF THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF AS THE OPERATIONAL REQUIREMENTS FOR 70%
DESTRUCTION OF THE TARGET
B-19a Rolling Thunder: Statistical Summary of Attacks on Bridges, 2 March-24 December 1965
837
48%
1293
400/-
0 ?%%
SOUTH VIETNAMESE
AIR FORCE
REPRESENTS
REPRESENTS 61 BRIDGES
TARGETED FROM A TOTAL OF
519 IN NORTH VIETNAM
% TARGETED CAPACITY
DESTROYED
"'!5X1
PROGRAMED "
TOTAL 2425
TOTAL 2308
TOTAL 1713
5% TOTAL 3198
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ROLLING THUNDER
Attacks on Bridges, 2 March -24 December 1965
PERSONNEL
LOST
iiifftiitttiii
US NAVY 17 [46%]
US AIR FORCE 17 [46%]
SOUTH VIETNAMESE
AIR FORCE 3 [8%]
TOTAL 37
US NAVY 18 [51%]
US AIR FORCE 14 [40%]
SOUTH VIETNAMESE
AIR FOR
CE
3 [9%]
T
OTA
L 3
5
RECOVERED - US NAVY
5
IM US AIR FO
RC
E
4
SOUTH VIETNAMESE
AIR FORCE 0
TOTAL 9
COMPARATIVE COST
MILLION US $
ESTIMATED COST OF
EXPENDED ORDNANCE
OPERATIONAL COST
OF SORTIES FLOWN
NORTH VIETNAMESE
ESTIMATED COST
OF RESTORATION
86.5
*INCLUDING COST OF RESTORATION OF
BRIDGES NOT ON JCS-TARGET LIST.
B-19b Rolling Thunder: Statistical Summary of Attacks on Bridges; 2 March-24 December 1965
61387 25X1
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ROLLING THUNDER
Attacks on Locks, 2 March 1965-24 December 1965
NUMBER OF LOCKS TARGETED: 8
% TARGET CAPACITY DESTROYED: 5.3
ORDNANCE: (TONS)
PROGRAMED ON TIS?
STRIKE SORTIES: (INCLUDES
FLAK SUPPRESSION)
PROGRAMED IN TIS ? 51
ACTUAL:
SUPPORT SORTIES:
AIRCRAFT LOST:
30 THOUSAND
SORTIE OVERHEAD ORDNANCE
a) Upper limits of the ranges of ordnance and sorties given in the
Target Information Summary (TIS) of the Joint Chiefs of Staff as
the operational requirements for 70% destruction of the target.
?
ESTIMATED COST OF $100 THOUSAND $70 THOUSAND
ATTACKS ON LOCKS
B-20 Rolling Thunder: Statistical Summary of Attacks on Locks, 2 March-24 December 1965
F -1 6137125X1
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ROLLING THUNDER
Attacks on ferries; 2 March -24 December 1965
US NAVY US AIR FORCE
SOUTH VIETNAMESE
AIR FORCE
ORDNANCE DROPPED
(TONS):
100
STRIKE SORTIES:
(INCLUDING FLAK
211
SUPPRESSION)
SUPPORT SORTIES:
118
AIRCRAFT LOST:
0
ESTIMATED COST OF
ATTACKS ON FERRIES
($0.8 MILLION)
0.2 0.6
*FERRIES ARE NO LONGER JCS TARGETS
B-21 Rolling Thunder: Statistical Summary of Attacks on Ferries, 2 March-24 December 1965
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 Approved For Release 2008/10/16: CIA-RDP80TO1629R000300080014-9
Attacks on Barracks, 2 March 1965.24 December 1965
U S AIR FORCE SOUTH VIETNAMESE PROGRAMED IN TIS
AIR FORCE
TOTAL NATIONAL BARRACKS
CAPACITY 443,000 TROOPS
TARGETED 180,000 TROOPS
NATIONAL CAPACITY
STRUCK
ORDNANCE (TONS) 3300
DELIVERED
SORTIES:
STRIKE & FLAK
SUPPORT
LOSSES:
AIRCRAFT: 7
PROGRAMED NATIONAL ACTUAL NATIONAL CAPACITY
CAPACITY DESTROYED DESTROYED OR INACTIVE
PERSONNEL: 3 LOST, 4 RECOVERED j
` UPPER LIMIT OF THE RANGE OF ORDNANCE AND SORTIES GIVEN IN THE TARGET INFORMATION
SUMMARY (TIS) OF THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF AS THE OPERATIONAL REQUIREMENTS FOR 70%
DESTRUCTION OF THE TARGET
ESTIMATED
COST TO US $18.6 MILLION LOST AIRCRAFT
SORTIE OVERHEAD
ORDNANCE
$3.8 $5.2 MILLION
MILLION
ESTIMATED
COST OF TARGET DAMAGE TO BARRACKS
REPLACEMENT TOTAL $16 MILLION
B-22 Rolling Thunder: Statistical Summary of Attacks on Barracks
2 March-24 December 1965
61373
25X1
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Attacks on Combined Barracks and Ammunition Depots
ROLLING THUNDER
SOUTH VIETNAMESE AIR FORCE PROGRAMED IN TIS
NATIONAL BARRACKS
CAPACITY DESTROYED
STRIKE & FLAK SORTIES 413
PROGRAMED
STRIKE & FLAK SORTIES 141
SUPPORT SORTIES: 107
ORDNANCE
PROGRAMED (TONS)
ORDNANCE
DELIVERED (TONS)
AIRCRAFT LOSSES: 0
COST OF ORDNANCE DROPPED: $0.5 MILLION
OPERATIONAL COST OF SORTIES FLOWN: $ 0.7 MILLION
a) Upper limits of the ranges of ordnance and sorties given in the
Target Information Summary (TIS) of the Joint Chiefs of Staff as
the operational requirements for 70% destruction of the target.
Note: Also see Fig. B-22 & Fig. B-24
B-23 Rolling Thunder: Statistical Summary of Attacks on Combined Barracks and
Ammunition Depots 2 March-24 December 1965
0.7
6137425X1
NATIONAL AMMUNITION DEPOT
CAPACITY DESTROYED
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Attacks on Ammunition Depots; 2 March-24 December 1965
ROLLING THUNDER
PERCENT OF
NATIONAL
CAPACITY
STRIKES:
46
SORTIES:
1711
STRIKE & FLAK :
1110
ORDNANCE/(TONS)
DELIVERED 1979
ESTIMATED COST OF
ATTACKS ON AMMO
DEPOTS: $7.1 MILLION
LOSSES:
AIRCRAFT
5
PERSONNEL
RECOVERED:
3
SOUTH VIETNAMESE
AIR FORCE
PERCENT OF
NATIONAL CAPACITY
DESTROYED
*EXCLUDING COMBINED BARRACKS AND AMMUNITION DEPOTS Note: Also see Fig, B-23
a) Upper limits of the ranges of ordnance and sorties given in the Target Information Summary (TIS) of the Joint Chiefs of Staff as
the operational requirements for 70% destruction of the target.
B-24 Rolling Thunder: Statistical Summary of Attacks on Ammunition Depots*
2 March-24 December 1965
61375
25X1
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Attacks on Supply Depots, *2 March .24 December 1965
US NAVY US AIR FORCE SOUTH VIETNAMESE PROGRAMED IN TIS
AIR FORCE
7 (1 (Q Aft Aft
% NATIONAL CAPACITY: 7
% NATIONAL CAPACITY
DESTROYED: 5
ORDNANCE (TONS)
PROGRAMED a 1180
STRIKE SORTIES
PROGRAMED a 714
FLOWN: 414
(INCLUDES FLAK
SUPPRESSION SORTIES)
1 62 `-23
SUPPORT SORTIES:
85
PERSONNEL LOST:
0
MILLION US $
T1.9
ESTIMATED COST TO
NORTH VIETNAM OF
RESTORATION
*EXCLUDING COMBINED BARRACKS
AND SUPPLY DEPOTS
a Upper limits of the ranges of ordnance and sorties given In the Target Information Summary (TIS) of the Joint Chiefs
of Staff as the operational requirements for 70% destruction of the target.
B-25 Rolling Thunder: Statistical Summary of Attacks on Supply Depots
2 March-24 December 1965
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 Approved For Release 2008/10/16: CIA-RDP80TO1629R000300080014-9
ROLLING THUNDER
Attacks on Combined Barracks and Supply Depots 2 March .24 December 1965
NATIONAL BARRACKS
CAPACITY DESTROYED
2.4%
STRIKE SORTIES
(INCLUDING FLAK) 762
STRIKE SORTIES
PROGRAMED IN TIS 2063
ORDNANCE
ACTUAL
1310
PROGRAMED
IN TIS
3949
LOSSES:
AIRCRAFT:
COST OF ORDNANCE DROPPED: $1.5 MILLION
COST OF AIRCRAFT LOST: $2.1 MILLION
OPERATIONAL COST OF SORTIES FLOWN: $1.1 MILLION
NATIONAL STORAGE
CAPACITY DESTROYED
6%
0
B-26 Rolling Thunder: Statistical Summary of Attacks on Combined Barracks and Supply Depots
2 March-24 December 1965
SOUTH VIETNAMESE
AIR FORCE
61377
25X1
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ROLLING THUNDER
Attacks on Bulk Petroleum Storage Facilities,2 March-24 December 1965
US NAVY
TARGETS ATTACKED: 4
TOTAL NATIONAL CAPACITY:
216,000 METRIC TONS
% NATIONAL CAPACITY DESTROYED:
17
ORDNANCE (TONS)
PROGRAMED IN TIS 280
ACTUAL ORDNANCE
EXPENDED 120
STRIKES: 9
STRIKE SORTIES (INCLUDING
FLAK SUPPRESSION SORTIES)
PROGRAMED IN TIS 115
AIRCRAFT LOST: 1
PERSONNEL LOST: 1
ESTIMATED COST OF
ATTACKS ON PETROLEUM
STORAGE FACILITIES
ESTIMATED COST OF
TARGET RESTORATION
$1.8
$0.2 $0.3 MILLION
SORTIE OVERHEAD
a) Upper limits of the ranges of ordnance and sorties given in the Target Information Summary (TIS) of the
Joint Chiefs of Staff as the operational requirements for 70% destruction of the target.
b) Includes $210 thousand worth of damage inflicted in August, 1964.
BULK
CAPACITY
SITE
(MT) % NAT CAP
PHU VAN
1
NEGL.
VINH
18
8
NAM DINH
12
6
PHU QUI
10
5
WEIGHT IN TONS STRIKE & FLAK
B-27 Rolling Thunder: Statistical Summary of Attacks on Bulk Petroleum Storage Facilities
2 March-24 December 1965
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 Approved For Release 2008/10/16: CIA-RDP80TO1629R000300080014-9
Attacks on Port Facilities and Naval Bases, 2 March ?24 December 1965
ROLLING THUNDER
US AIR FORCE US NAVY SOUTH VIETNAMESE
AIR FORCE
}
TARGETS ATTACKED: 4
% NATIONAL CARGO HANDLING
CAPACITY
PROGRAMED ACTUALLY b
FOR DESTRUCTION DESTROYED
ORDNANCE (TONS)
PROGRAMED IN TIS
STRIKES: 23
SORTIES
PROGRAMED IN TIS ? 868
STRIKE & FLAK
SUPPORT SORTIES
AIRCRAFT LOST
PERSONNEL LOST
87 1
PROGRAMED
IN TIS
15
320 I 55
1j 4 .6
1 t
UPPER LIMIT OF THE RANGE OF ORDNANCE AND SORTIES GIVEN IN THE TARGET INFORMATION
SUMMARY (TIS) OF THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF AS THE OPERATIONAL REQUIREMENTS FOR 70%
DESTRUCTION OF THE TARGET
? 15 PERCENT OF NORTH VIETNAMESE NAVAL BASE SUPPORT CAPACITY WAS DESTROYED AT THE TWO
NAVAL BASES.
B-28 a Rolling Thunder: Statistical Summary of Attacks on Port Facilities and Naval Bases
61379
2 March-24 December 1965
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 Approved For Release 2008/10/16: CIA-RDP80TO1629R000300080014-9
ROLLING THUNDER
Attacks on Port Facilities and Naval Bases, 2 March-24 December 1965
ESTIMATED COST OF
ATTACKS ON PORTS
AND NAVAL BASES.
ESTIMATED COST OF
TARGET REPLACEMENT
(CIVILIAN FACILITIES
ONLY)
% NAT. CAP.
CARGO NAVAL
HANDLING SUPPORT
PHUC LOI
NAVAL BASE
QUANG KHE
NAVAL BASE
SOUTH VIETNAMESE
AIR FORCE
PROGRAMED
AIRCRAFT ORDNANCE
5.3 .1.4'1 j;1 $6.3 MILLION
SORTIE OVERHEAD
$660 THOUSAND
ORDNANCE SORTIES
(TIS RECOMMENDED
AND EXPENDED (TIS RECOMMENDED
WEIGHT IN TONS AND AND ACTUAL) b
COST IN DOLLARS) b
137 STRIKE & FLAK
109 STRIKE & FLAK.
34 SUPPORT
1'0
3.5 10.0 110
1.06
86
I j$80 THOUSAND 1:5
I24 ,F20
55 Ii 5 10 80 281 72
24
2211 2
'UPPER LIMIT OF THE RANGE OF ORDNANCE AND SORTIES GIVEN IN THE TARGET INFORMATION
SUMMARY (TIS) OF THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF AS THE OPERATIONAL REQUIREMENTS FOR 70%
DESTRUCTION OF THE TARGET
b 15 PERCENT OF NORTH VIETNAMESE NAVAL BASE SUPPORT CAPACITY WAS DESTROYED AT THE TWO
NAVAL BASES.
Figure B-28b Rolling Thunder: Statistical Summary of Attacks on Port Facilities and Naval Bases,
2 March-24 December 1965
61f
25X1
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Attacks on Radar Installations, 2 March 1965.24 December 1965
ROLLING THUNDER
US NAVY US AIR FORCE SOUTH VIETNAMESE PROGRAMED IN TIS
AIR FORCE
PERCENT OF TARGETED CAPACITY DESTROYED HON MATT
KNOWN RADAR SITES: 29
TARGETED RADAR SITES: 5
RADAR SITES STRUCK: 10
ORDNANCE (TONS)
DELIVERED
680
SORTIES
PROGRAMED:
61
ACTUAL:
STRIKE AND FLAK:
620
STRIKES:
LOSSES:
AIRCRAFT:
11
3
a) Upper limits of the ranges of ordnance and sorties given In the Target Information Summary
(TIS) of the Joint Chiefs of Staff as the operational requirements for 70% destruction of
the target.
B-29 Rolling Thunder: Statistical Summary of Attacks on Radar Installations
2 March-24 December 1965
61380 25X1
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IIVLLIIWV ^REW--
Attacks on Communications Facilities, 2 March-24 December 1965
US NAVY
10 TARGETS STRUCK: 2
KNOWN COMMUNICATIONS 22
SITES:
NUMBER TARGETED: 5
% TARGETED CAPACITY 20
DESTROYED:
ORDNANCE (TONS)
PROGRAMED a
DELIVERED:
STRIKES:
US AIR FORCE PROGRAMED IN TIS
G
STRIKE SORTIES
PROGRAMED'
26
STRIKE SORTIES:
15
SUPPORT SORTIES:
2
AIRCRAFT LOST:
0
ESTIMATED COST OF
EXPENDED ORDNANCE:
$40 THOUSAND
'UPPER LIMIT OF THE RANGE OF ORDNANCE AND SORTIES GIVEN IN THE TARGET INFORMATION
SUMMARY (TIS) OF THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF AS THE OPERATIONAL REQUIREMENTS FOR 70%
DESTRUCTION OF THE TARGET
B-30 Rolling Thunder: Statistical Summary of Attacks on Communications Facilities
2 March-24 December 1965
aiaar
25X1
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Attacks on Electric Powerplants, 2 March 1965-24 December 1965
ROLLING THUNDER
TARGETS .
ATTACKED: 6
TOTAL NATIONAL CAPACITY:
175,000 KILOWATTS
e 0
5 THERMAL 1 HYDRO
PERCENT NATIONAL CAPACITY
DESTROYED: 27
ORDNANCE: (TONS)
PROGRAMED
DELIVERED
STRIKES: 21
STRIKE SORTIES (INCLUDING
FLAK SUPPRESSION SORTIES)
PROGRAMED
ACTUAL: 229 a
SUPPORT SORTIES: 264
STRIKE AIRCRAFT LOST: 4
PERSONNEL LOST: 3
PERSONNEL RECOVERED: 1
ORDNANCE AIRCRAFT SORTIE OVERHEAD
ESTIMATED COST OF ATTACKS ON
ELECTRIC POWER PLANTS (MILLION US$): 6.0 10.71 4.4 0.9
ESTIMATED COST OF TARGET RESTORATION
(MILLION US$): 7.8
a INCLUDES 19 AIRCRAFT THAT ALSO ATTACKED FIXED TARGETS OF OTHER TYPES ON MISSION.
B-31a Rolling Thunder: Statistical Summary of Attacks on Electric Powerplants
2 March-24 December 1965
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 Approved For Release 2008/10/16: CIA-RDP80TO1629R000300080014-9
ROLLING THUNDER
Attacks on Electric Powerplants, 2 March 1965.24 December 1965
CAPACITY ORDNANCE (TONS)
POWERPLANT (KILOWATTS) % NAIL .
15 PROGRAMED IN TIS
BAN THACH 1,000 0.5
(HYDRO.)
80
DELIVERED
THAN HOA 5,000 3
55
18
NAM DINH 7,500
20
BEN THUY 8,000
UONG BI 24,000 14
TOTAL 47,000 27
5 PROGRAMED
IN TIS
? STRIKE SORTIES
0 SUPPORT SORTIES
4 PROGRAMED
28 ! STRIKE*
42 .78
.a) Upper limits of the ranges of ordnance and sorties given in the
Target Information Summary (TIS) of the Joint Chiefs of Staff as
the operational requirements for 70% destruction of the target.
*ASTERISKS INDICATE NUMBER OF AIRCRAFT LOST.
B-31b Rolling Thunder: Statistical Summary of Attacks on Electric Powerplants
2 March-24 December 1965
25X1
61390
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Attacks on Explosives Plants, 2 March 1965.24 December 1965
ROLLING THUNDER
TARGETS ATTACKED: 1
% NATIONAL CAPACITY: 100
% NATIONAL CAPACITY DESTROYED: 71
ORDNANCE (TONS)
PROGRAMED: a
640
DELIVERED:
90
STRIKES:
3
FLOWN:
(INCLUDES FLAK
SUPPRESSION)
SUPPORT SORTIES:
50
STRIKE AIRCRAFT LOST:
1
PERSONNEL LOST:
0
ESTIMATED COST OF
ATTACKS ON
EXPLOSIVE PLANT
ESTIMATED COST OF
TARGET REPLACEMENT
$370,000
a) Upper limits of the ranges of ordnance and sorties given in the
Target Information Summary (TIS) . of the Joint Chiefs of Staff as
the operational requirements for 70% destruction of the target.
B-32 Rolling Thunder: Statistical Summary of Attacks on Explosives Plants,
2 March-24 December 1965
$120,000 T $210,000 x$330,000
ORDNANCE SORTIE OVERHEAD
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 Approved For Release 2008/10/16: CIA-RDP80TO1629R000300080014-9
AN APPRAISAL OF THE EFFECTS OF THE BOMBING OF NORTH VIETNAM
I. Physical Damage
The cost of reconstruction or repair of the economic and military
facilities in North Vietnam which were attacked under the Rolling
Thunder program is estimated at about US $63 million. About 57 percent
of the damage was inflicted on targets of an economic nature and
roughly 43 percent against military targets. Strikes against assigned
JCS targets (both military and economic) accounted for about 79 per-
cent of the damage and armed reconnaissance missions for about 21 per-
cent. Generally, most of the targets struck are located in southern
North Vietnam and consequently are not of major importance either
economically or militarily. The bulk of North Vietnam's important and
as yet unstruck targets are located in the Hanoi-Haiphong complex.
For a graphic presentation of the costs of reconstruction or repair of
these economic and military facilities, see Figures C-1 through C-6.
For locations of JCS targets, see the map, Figure C-7.
A. Economic
1. Powerplants
North Vietnam's pre-strike electrical generating capacity
is estimated at 175,000 kilowatts. About 75 percent of this total was
generated by the main electric power grid which is made up of eight
large interconnected powerplants serving about 90 percent of North
Vietnam's industry. Attacks on North Vietnam's electric power-producing
facilities started in April 1965 and extended through 22 December. In
all, six powerplants were struck, only two of which -- Ben Thach and
Uong Bi -- are in the main power grid. The number of attacks against
the powerplants ranged from two each against the Ben Thuy and Co Dinh
powerplants to six against the plant at Thanh Hoa. The final power-
plant to be struck was the one at Uong Bi, which was attacked four times
in December (see Table C-l).
The six power facilities struck under the Rolling Thunder
program effectively lost all their capacity to generate electric power,
although the physical plants sustained varying degrees of destruction.
Total power-generating capacity in North Vietnam has been reduced by
about 27 percent while that of the main grid has been reduced by nearly
25 percent.
In general, the damage to the powerplants is so severe that
none can be repaired quickly. In most cases, repair will necessitate
dismantling and reconstruction of portions of the facilities, a process
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 Approved For Release 2008/10/16: CIA-RDP80TO1629R000300080014-9
Table C-1
Electric Powerplants Attacked Under the Rolling Thunder Programs
Target
Percent of Target
Percent of National
Target
as a Percent
Dates
Capacity
Powerplant Capacity Cost of
Target
Capacity
of National
of Attack
Currently out of
Currently out of Restoration
Number
Name
(Kilowatts)
Capacity
(1965)
Operation
Operation (Thousand US $)
4 Apr
27 Jul
29 Jul
30 Jul
31 Jul
4 Aug
100
3
82.11
Ben Thuy
8,000
4 Jun
4 Jun
100
5
82.18
Co Dinh
1,500
8 Jun
10 Jun
100
1
82.15
Nam Dinh
7,500
28 Jul
29 Jul
2 Aug
3 Aug
82.21
Ben Thach
1,000
0.5
21 Aug
22 Aug
23 Aug
15 Dec
20 Dec
22 Dec
22 Dec
14
27 a1
a. Representing a net loss in national generating capacity of approximately 147,000 kilowatts. Total national electric power-generating
capacity is 175,000 kilowatts.
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 Approved For Release 2008/10/16: CIA-RDP80TO1629R000300080014-9
almost as time consuming and costly as the original construction, and
will require considerable foreign technical assistance as well as the
importing of major components. At least six months will he required
to restore three of the six plants to even partial operation (includ-
ing the important Uong Bi facility) and from one to one and one-half
years for the remaining three. Full restoration will require from
one to two years and even longer for the Nam Dinh plant. Total cost
of restoration is estimated to be $7.8 million.
The financial burden, however, is only partly indicative
of the effect of the attacks. In order to reconstruct the facilities
destroyed, large inputs of highly skilled personnel and materials
embodying advanced technology will be required, forcing North Vietnam
to make substantial diversions of resources from other priority needs
as well as to require still more foreign assistance.
While destruction of the power facilities thus represents
a distinct economic loss to North Vietnam, it is by no means of crip-
pling proportions. Loss of capacity at those stations outside of the
principal power network has resulted in local power shortages (in some
cases stoppages) in the southern part of the country and in a reduction
of the power available for agricultural irrigation. On the other hand,
it is likely that the destruction of the capacity at the two network
stations -- Nam Dinh and Uong Bi -- has been offset by an increased
utilization of existing generating capacity in other powerplants joined
to the network. Thus most of the major industrial requirements for
power in the Haiphong-Hanoi area are probably being met.
2. Petroleum Storage
The allied strike on the major petroleum storage depot at
Vinh in August 1964, in retaliation for the Tonkin Bay incidents, was
the first attack on a North Vietnamese economic target. Since then,
three other petroleum storage facilities have been bombed and the Vinh
facility has been restruck (see Table C-2).
Pre-strike, major bulk petroleum storage capacity is esti-
mated at about 190,000 tons,* located at 11 principal installations
and a number of small, untargeted, local-issue storage points. Addi-
tional storage installations which were under construction at the time
of the initial Vinh attack have been completed, and small, dispersed
installations composed of semisurface, small, horizontal tanks have
also been developed. The total oil storage capacity, therefore, is
estimated to have been 216,000 tons, located in 12 principal installa-
tions and at small and untargeted sites.
Damage to the four storage installations which have been
bombed represents a loss of 37,000 tons, or about 17 percent of the
* Tonnages are given in metric tons.
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Table C-2
Petroleum Storage Facilities Attacked Under the Rolling Thunder Program
Target
Target
as a Percent
Dates
Cost of
Target
Capacity
of National
of Attack
Percent of Target
Percent of National
Restoration
Number
Name
(Metric Tons)
Capacity
(1965)
Capacity Destroyed
Storage Destroyed
(Thousand US $)
42.0
Phu Van
1,000
Negl.
6 May
51.16
Phu Qui
10,000
5
18 May
50.0
Vinh
18,000
9
24 May
26 May
11 Sep
15 Sep
6 Oct
2 Jul
4 Jul
a. The facility at Vinh was atta.ckedlin August 1964, prior to the Rolling Thunder program.
b. Representing a loss in national storage capacity of approximately 37,000 metric tons. Total national storage capacity is 216,000
metric tons.
25X1
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total capacity known to have existed in North Vietnam.' Individually,
complete destruction of capacity at Nam Dinh
the strikes yielded c tons), 80 percent at Phu Qui (origi-
89 (1,000
(12,000 tons) and Phu Van
percent tonsat Vinh (originally 18,000 tons).
nally 10,000 tons), and
Total usable oil storage capacity in North Vietnam is esti-
mated to have been 179,000 tons as of January 1966. This total in-
tons ateight principal and unattacked installatioand
eludes 165,000 in two of the four bombed sites,
1+,000 tons of residual capacity small storage sites. Total
10,000 tons in untargeted, dispersed,
supply of petroleum to North Vietnam in 1965 is estimated to have been
about 175,000 tons.
To restore the tankage damaged and destroyed at these four
facilities would take from two atoecthree months and would cost onstruction would probably have to
$700,000. Materials for such the USSR.
come from outside sources, pre
e facilities at Nam Dinh, Vinh, and
While loss of the storag south of Haiphong, the economic
Phu Qui has eliminated all bulk storage s nor agriculture in
effect has not been significant. Neither industry negri could in
ndregnorI fact, it
North Vietnam is a large user of petroleum, a
met by makeshift storage and distribution procedures.
appears that North Vietnam has not chosen thus ff ax to srestore thethe
bombed facilities but rather is dispersing petrs
development of small storage depots elsewhere.
Manufacturing
Two manufacturing facilities have been bombed attacked
der the
Thunder program. The Lang Chi Explosives Plant, thhree e times during July
teng and August, is an assigned JCS target.
r
Nam Dinh Textile Mill which is not an assigned target, was uninten-
a strike in late July against the Nam Dinh Thermal
tionally damaged by
Powerplant, which lies adjacent to the mill (see Table C-3).
The damage sustained by both facilities is of little conse-
quence to the economy or to North Vietnam's capacity to wage war.
Although the Lang Chi plant is the only known Nornh imports se ex-
plosives producer, North Vietnam relies heavily po n years from that Com-
munist Communist countries. There is evidence in by
munist China has furnished virtually all the explosivean quired b y
North Vietnam. Damage to the Nam Dinh Textile Mill --
producer of cotton textiles -- was not extensive.
T The dam -age assessment includes the initial attack of the petroleum
rior to the Rolling Thunder pro-
at Vinh, which took place p
gram.
gram.
C-5
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 25X1 Target
Number
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Table C-3
Manufacturing Facilities Attacked Under the Rolling Thunder Program
47.2 Lang Chi
Explosives Plant
Nam Dinh Textile
Mill
Target
as a Percent
of National
Cap_
Dates
of Attack Percent of Target
L Capacity Destroyed
100 24 Jul
7 Aug
8 Aug
70 to 75
cotton
spinning,
50 cotton
weaving
Percent of National
Capacity Destroyed
or Inactive
Cost of
Restoration
Thousand US $)
3 800
1,170
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 25X1
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against the Lang Chi facility have reduced its
The attacks and the cost of restoration is esti-
capacity b Y nearly three-fourths,
Restoration storation of the buildings damaged and
mated to be about $37010 l and replacement of machinery
though some of it might have to be im-
destroyed could be done le aalsho
would be relatively situp ,
ate
h Textile Mill is estim
a
odu
-
Physical damage to the Nam Din
loss of about 5 percent of the mill's p
to amount to a temporary 0 to 75 percent of
The Nam Dinh milcaacacity and for
for at least 50 percent
North apacity.
NortVietnam's cotton-spinning capacity complete shut-
of the cotton produced to meet its textile needs.
severe damage result
n of the plant for a period of several months the longer
i t
in considerable shortages of textiles. Although shutdown
the n Nam Dinh Thermal Po werplant may have caused a temporary
likely that alternatO sources of power
at the textile mill,.it is very repair to the mill., including
were soon made available. The cost of
is eestimated at $800,000. Re-
the replacement of damaged equip
placement machinery can be imported from Communist China.
ported.
4 Brid es
Tar ets
a. JCS Desi nated Highway _f' s
nated highway bridges were destroyed or
Thirty JCS-desig through January
damaged by 59 attacks during the Rolling Thunder program routes
of these bridges are located on main highway located
1966. The majority Vietnam. With few exceptions,
in souther hig cafe
tackedsduring thehighway
in n North Vietnam. of the in the Haiphong the area have nsucbessfullyattacked.
bridges targeted by the JCS were - few bridges were destroyed
early phases of the Rolling Thunder program -
during the latter phases of the air war.
The highway bridges destroyed or damaged range in
length from 100 to 500 feet and constitute most of the large b ridgeset-
located outside of the Hanoi-Haiphong area. Generally, the North ear to have made a major reconstruction effort on-, tee do not app ferries, and pontoon bridges are usually pressed
these e Fords, bridge has been destroyed. Major recon-
into service after a highway when the rivers are too deep to
struction efforts are undertaken only
ford or when traffic bottlenecks occur bb ecause, of the limitations en-
countered in using ferries and p
b. JCS-Designated Railroad Tar ets
Six railroad bridges on the JCS target list -have been
destroyed or damaged in 20 attacks on the Hanoi-Vinh,
and Hanoi-Dong Dang rail lines. The rate of repair on rail bridges
has been considerably more rapid than in the case of highway bridges.
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Temporary bridge restoration on the
lines has, in certain instances, beenmadeL in less and
a
than two Hanoi-Dweekung bang
*
Restoration on the Hanoi-Vinh line has usually taken loner, s'
g though actual work time is about the sconsiderably
The economic and military importance of the
Dang and the Eanoi-Lao Cai lines Hanoi-bong
restoration off' these rail bridges~doubtedly account for the rapid'
, partly by struction units. Restoration of the bridges on1thee railroad con
has been slower, probably reflecti .Hanoi-Vinh line
and military importance of the rail gliinehsouthe thmof e anoi. tcohouldi
noted, however, that through rail service appears Hanoi. Ie srld'..,ae
lished
lished between Hanoi and Vinh.
to have been reestab-
JCS-Designated Combination Railroad Highway Targets
Six combination bridges have been destroyed or damaged
in 19 attacks On the above-mentioned rail lines,
bridges have received the s These combination
to rail bridges, ame priority for restoration as that
given
d. Armed Reconnaissance Bridge Targets
Some 660 bridges have been reported as being destroyed
or damaged by pilots on armed reconnaissance missions during
This figure undoubtedly contains considerable double counting
19d5,
inaccurate assessments of the actual damage incurred, and
Estim
destruction and damage on the basis of photographic eviden eashowof
less than 30 percent of the damage claimed by pilot reports, as shown
in the following tabulation:
Destro ed or Dama ed
Photographic Evidence Pil
ot Reports
Railroad and combinations
30
64
Highway-bridges
145
593
Total
175
657
designated bridgTsearoststof repairing
mated damage inflicted on 42 JCS-e for the 175 bridges struck b $4 million and at $6,5 million
y armed reconnaissance. Although the
* This restoration time represents reconstruction observed in pho-
tography; restoration could have been achi
of time, eved in a shorter period
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armed reconnaissance effort has destroyed or damaged far more bridges
than the strikes against JCS-designated targets, the JCS-targeted
bridges are the major bridge installations.
Both money and inputs of skilled labor and material
required ultimately for the complete restoration of the destroyed and
damaged bridges will be considerable. Even with necessary substantial
foreign assistance it appears that it will take the North Vietnamese
at least five years after the present conflict is over to restore
the existing damage.
5. Railroad Yards
Three railroad yards were struck under the. Rolling Thunder
program. Of the three, only the Vinh classification yard is on the JCS
target list. Neither the Yen Bai yard (on the Hanoi-Lao Cai line serv-
ing northwest North Vietnam and Yunnan Province, China) nor the Nam Dinh
yard (on the Hanoi-Vinh line serving southern North Vietnam) were
assigned targets. They were attacked in conjunction with strikes against
targeted facilities in the surrounding areas. These three yards repre-
sent about 10 percent of the total national railroad cargo-handling
capacity. Both the amount of time and the cost involved in repairing
the bomb damage to the rail yards are considered to be negligible (see
Table c-4).
Although the damage inflicted on the rail yards succeeded
in limiting and in certain instances in stopping temporarily the
through movement of traffic along the lines, the bombings have not
significantly hampered the operations of the major segments of North
Vietnam's rail system.
The attacks on the Nam Dinh and Vinh yards added incre-
mental damage to the operation of the interdicted Hanoi-Vinh line.
However, the level of traffic normally moving on this line is rela-
tively small. The damage inflicted on the Yen Bai yard, coupled with
bridge interdictions along the line, limited through rail service
between Hanoi and Lao Cai and since July has effectively halted exports
of apatite, a principal North Vietnamese export.
Most North Vietnamese rail activity is centered on the
Hanoi-bong Dang (China) and Hanoi-Haiphong rail lines. Two large
railroad yards are located in the Hanoi area (Yen Vien and Hanoi) and
constitute approximately 60 percent of North Vietnamese railroad cargo-
handling capacity. The heart of North Vietnam's rail system lies
within the sanctuary area. Most.of the locomotives, rolling stock,
repair shops, and rail yards are within the Hanoi-Haiphong complex.
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Railroad Yards Attached Under the Rolling Thunder Program
Dates Cost of
Target of Attack Restoration
Number Name (1965) Damage ( hou.s and US $ )
21.1 Vinh Classifica- 26 May Main line interdicted
tion Yard N.W. 27 May in four places; four
1 Jun sidings interdicted
Nam Dinh Yard 2 Aug Damage to switching
!I- Aug wye, rail sidings,
tracks, and build-
ings
a. Hit in conjunction with strike against JCS Target No. 44, Yen Bai Ordnance Depot.
Yen Bai Yard a/ 11 Jul Damage to rolling
13 Jul stock; lines inter-
l4 Jul dicted in numerous
places
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6. Maritime Ports
Six North Vietnamese ports representing 88 percent of the
country's total maritime cargo-handling capacity have been selected
as JCS targets. Under the Rolling Thunder program the ports of
Ben Thuy and Ham Rong, serving Vinh and Thanh Hoa, respectively, have
been struck. Approximately 60 percent of the cargo-handling capacity
at Ben Thuy was destroyed and approximately 15 percent at Ham Rong.
It is estimated that damage to the port facilities will cost about
$660,000 to restore (see Table C-5)-
The impact of this damage on North Vietnam's economy is
of minor proportions. Ben Thuy and Ham Rong constitute only 5 percent
of the nation's, maritime cargo-handling capacity. Both ports serve
southern provinces that are largely rural. Consequently, neither of
the damaged ports plays an important role in the economy of North
Vietnam. With the exception of machinery, most repair materials can be
obtained locally. Reconstruction operations are not considered to be
complex and probably could be completed in a fairly short period of time.
The most important ports, located in northeastern North
Vietnam, have not been subjected to attack. The Haiphong port complex
represents about 50 percent of the nation's maritime cargo-handling
capacity and is by far the most active port in the country, handling
most import and export trade. Cam Pha and Hon Gai, which handle
primarily coal exports, make up an additional 32 percent of national
cargo-handling capacity. These ports, representing 82 percent of the
nation's cargo-handling capacity, are the only significant deepwater
ports in North Vietnam.
7. Locks
Of the 91 locks and dams known to be in North Vietnam,
8 locks have been targeted because of their significance to inland
waterways, flood control, and irrigation. Only one lock -- Bich
Phuong Lock No. 3 -- located in Thanh Hoa Province,was struck under
the Rolling Thunder program. This lock was attacked twice in August
and was heavily damaged. The water level in the Song Chu canal
undoubtedly dropped as a result of the attacks, and inland water
traffic in the area was probably disrupted. Repair of the damage
to the lock would take about 30 days, provided that the necessary
manpower and material were readily available. ?
Simultaneous damage to the remaining seven locks would
significantly hamper North Vietnam's inland water transport system.
The destruction of the Ben Thon, Van Cau, and Lu Yen Locks in the
Haiphong-Hanoi area would seriously lower the water level in the
canals linking Hanoi and Thai Nguyen with the seaport at Haiphong.
Since a significant portion of the goods transported in the Delta
region move by inland water, the disruption of this bulk-carrier
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Table C-5
Maritime Ports Attacked Under the Rolling Thunder Program
Target
as a Percent
Target Capacity of National
(Short Tons of Maritime Dates
Target Cargo Handled Cargo-Handling of Attack
Number Name per Day) Capacity (1965)
71.13 Ham Rong 782.5
Total
H
5 Jun
6 Jun
8 Jun
9 Jul
10 Jul
11 Jul
17 Jul
19 Jul
21 Jul
14 Jul
16 Jul
18 Jul
Percent of National Cost of
Percent of Target Cargo-Handling Restoration
Capacity Destroyed Capacity Destroyed (Thousand US $)
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660
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route would present the North Vietnamese with considerable transpor-
tation problems. The destruction of the other four locks in Thanh Hoa
and Nghe An Provinces would also present problems to canal traffic
operating in the area.
8. Agriculture
Allied attacks on electric powerplants may have indirectly
caused some agricultural losses in North Vietnam during 1965. The
relatively good fall rice crop may have been reduced by some 30,000
tons as a result of the lack of electric power needed to operate the
irrigation pumps in the southern provinces. The imputed loss is
estimated to be $3.5 million.
Attacks on the electric power network in Thanh Hoa and
Nghe An Provinces in mid-1965 probably, interrupted irrigation services
to nearly 100,000 acres of rice land.
A shortfall of 30,000 tons of rice would have little
appreciable effect on the total rice production in North Vietnam,
which averages about 4.5 million tons annually. Good weather conditions
in 1965 probably more than offset the potential losses of rice attributed
to irrigation difficulties -- the fall rice crop in Nghe An and Thanh Hoa
Provinces was apparently above normal.
9. Export Loss
The allied air effort has resulted in a decline in North
Vietnam's export of apatite and cement and possibly in the export of
other commodities as well. Apatite exports during the second half of
1965 ceased as a result of the continual interdiction (July through
December) of the Hanoi-Lao Cai rail line, although by mid-December
the North Vietnamese had succeeded in restoring through rail service
on the line. The decline in cement exports during 1965 probably
reflects the increased internal consumption of cement in repairing
damage inflicted by allied air attacks and in the subsequent recon-
struction efforts. Export losses for cement and apatite are presented
in the following tabulation:
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Thousand US $
Cement a
3,140
2nd
quarter
630
3rd
quarter
1,050
4th
quarter
1,460
Apatite
2,560
2nd
quarter
1,030
3rd
4th
quarter
quarter
1,530
Total
5,700
a. Some double counting in terms
of restoration cost and export
loss may be included.
The fluctuations in other North Vietnamese exports present contradic-
tory patterns that cannot be related unequivocally to the conduct of
the air war.
B. Military
1.. Airfields
Only 11 of North Vietnam's 22 airfields are targeted and
considered to have economic and military significance. Between March
and October, airfields at Vinh and Dong Hoi in the south and at Dien
Bien Phu and Na San in the northwest were attacked numerous times.
Dong Hoi and Vinh have limited jet capability and the other two air-
fields are able to handle only reciprocating engine aircraft. These
four airfields represent about one-fifth of North Vietnam's targeted
airfield capacity. Although each of the bombed airfields has facili-
ties left standing, the runways are heavily cratered and the fields
are unable to receive air traffic. Total restoration of these air-
f'ields will probably cost about $380,000 (see Table C-6).
The damage inflicted on the airfields has had limited
secondary military and economic effects. Air transport and passenger
service is virtually nonexistent in North Vietnam, and the fear of US
airpower has generally kept North Vietnamese aircraft within the con-
fines of the sanctuary area surrounding Hanoi. It appears likely that
even if the airfields had not been damaged, their vulnerable locations
would have limited their usefulness as operating airbases.
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Table C-6
Airfields Attacked Under the Rolling Thunder Program
Target
25X1 Number
Target Dates Cost of
as a Percent Percent of National of Attack a Restoration
Percent of Target of National 7~argeted Capacity (X965) J (Thousand US $)
Utility Destroyed Capacity Destroyed or Inactive
6 6 30 Max 50
4.0 Dong Hoi 53.0 (inactive) 6 Jun
10.0 (inactive)
45.0 (inactive)
2.0 Dien Bien Phu 94.0 (inactive)
1 Jul
17 Sep
22 Sep
23 Sep
6 6 8 May 43
30 Jun
1 Jul
4 4 25 Jun 144
3 3
23 Sep
24 Oct
2 Jul 143
8 Jul
380
a. Dates of attack indicate only assigned strikes; in certain instances more attacks have been launched against a specific target than
is indicated above.
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The most important airfields in North Vietnam are located
in the Hanoi-Haiphong area. The Phuc Yen and Kep airfields, near Hanoi,
and the Haiphong airfield all have full jet-handling capability. These
three fields represent about 50 percent of the targeted airfield capacity
in the country. Airfields at Hanoi/Gia Lam and Haiphong/Kien An have
limited jet-handling capacity and constitute an additional 25 percent
of North Vietnam's targeted airfield capacity.
2. Naval Bases
From early March to late September the naval bases at Phuc
Loi and Quang Khe were attacked periodically under the Rolling Thunder
program.. Of the five naval bases considered to be of targeting signifi-
cance, the bombed facilities represent a relatively small share -- 25
percent -- of the total support capability available to the North Viet-
namese Navy. The damaged facilities normally provide berthing,
logistical support, and repair facilities for coastal patrol craft
operating in the waters off central and southern North Vietnam.
Bombing succeeded in reducing the utility of Phuc Loi by
nearly one-half and. the operational usefulness of Quang Khe by nearly
four-fifths. This damage hypothetically represents a l5-percent re-
duction in North Vietnam's total support capability to its naval
forces. Restoration costs are estimated to be $790,000 (see Table C-7).
The impact of the damage on the North Vietnamese Navy and
economy is of limited significance. With the possible exception of
replacing or repairing destroyed or damaged machinery, most of the
repair materials can be obtained locally. Repair operations are not
considered to be complex and could be completed in a fairly short
period of time. It is doubtful that the damage to the bases has
seriously affected the operations of North Vietnam's small navy, which
during the air war has generally operated in areas not subject to air
attack. The major naval bases located at Haiphong, Port Walnut, and
Ilon Gai represent 75 percent of the naval support capacity and cur-
rently serve as the base of North Vietnamese naval operations.
3. Barracks
At least 45 and possibly as many as 50 of the 63 targeted
barracks in North Vietnam have been attacked under the Rolling Thunder
program. Two-thirds of the barracks attacked are located in the
southern provinces, one-fifth in the south-central region, and the
remainder in the northwestern provinces. Damage to the barracks
represents a reduction of one-fifth in national housing capacity in
barracks. If restoration were attempted, the total cost would be
about $16 million (see Table C-8).*
* Text continued on p. C-22.
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Naval Bases Attacked Under the Rolling Thunder Program
Target
as a Percent -
of National
Support Percent of Percent of National Dates Cost of
Target Capacity of Base Capacity Support Capacity of of Attack Restoration
Number Name Naval Bases Destroyed Naval Bases Destroyed (1965) (Thousand US $)
74.1 Quang Khe Naval Base 15.0 47.0 7 2 Mar
28 May
21 Sep
24 Sep
27 Sep
28 Sep
20 May 660
12 Sep
a. Dates of attack indicate only assigned strikes; in certain instances more attacks have been launched against a specific target than
is indicated above.
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Barracks Attacked Jnder the Rolling Thunder Program
Target Capacity
Dates
Percent of National
Cost of
Target
(Number of Men
Percent of Targeted
of Attack /
Percent of Targeted
Targeted Capacity
Restoration
Number
Name
Accommodated)
National Capacity
(1965)
Capacity Destroyed
Destroyed or Inactive
(Thousand US $)
33.0
Dong Hoi Barracks NW
2,500
0.6
7 Feb
24 Jul
27 Jul
82
0.5
550
39.0
Chop Le Barracks NW
1,200
0.3
8 Feb
11 Feb
7 Jun
9 Jun
10 Jun
36 (inactive)
0.3
110
39.16
Hon Gio Military
Barracks
N.A.
14 Mar
N.A.
N.A.
20
32.0
Vu Con Barracks
500
0.1
21 Mar
71 (inactive)
0.1
90
Supply
23 May
39.2
Vinh Linh Barracks
1,500
0.3
4 May
39 (inactive)
0.3
40
Cent. NE
5 July
22 Sep
24 Sep
27 Sep
39-8
Vinh Linh Barracks
1,200
0.3
4 May
87 (inactive)
0.3
260
NW, Xom Cho
5 Jul
39.5
Xam Trang Hoa
Barracks and
Supply Depot
39.7
Vinh Linh Barracks
East, Line Cong.
1,000
0.2
9 May
90 (inactive)
0.2
225
39.11
Roan Lao Barracks
2,500
0.6
19 May
22 Sep
25 Sep
80 (inactive)
0.6
550
39.13
Phu Le Barracks/
Supply Depot
1,200
0.3
21 May
48 (inactive)
0.3
200
29.0
Quang Suoi Barracks
2,500
0.6
22 May
32 (inactive)
0.6
200
NE
23 Jul
26 Jul
29 Jul
56.0
Phu Qui Barracks/
3,000
0.7
23 May
55
0.4
700
Supply Depot
19 Jun
20 Jun
21 Jun
22 Jun
39.3
Mu Gia Pass Barracks
600
0.1
25 May
74 (inactive)
0.1
150
39.1
Ben Quang Barracks SW
2,100
0.5
27 May
3 Jun
28 Jun
66 (inactive)
0.5
350
a. Dates of attack indicate only assigned strikes; in certain instances more attacks have been launched against a specific target than is indicated above.
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 Number Name Accommodated) National Capacity
52.0 Vinh, Hqs. Military 5,000
Region IV, Barracks/
Supply Depot
Dates
of Attack a/
(1965)
Percent of National Cost of
Percent of Targeted Targeted Capacity Restoration
Capacity Destroyed Destroyed or Inactive (Thousand US $)
4 Jun 43
6 Jun
7 Jun
8 Jun
10 Jun
7 Aug
8 Aug
9 Aug
14 Aug
16 Aug
17 Aug
7 Jun
9 Jun
10 Jun
30 Jul
31 Jul
1 Aug
2 Aug
5 Aug
11 Sep
12 Sep
38.0 Vinh Barracks 9,000 2,0
12 Jun 57 (inactive)
14 Jun
16 Jun
10 Jul
14 Jul
18 Jul
19 Jul
20 Jul
21 Jul
5 Nov
12 Jun 51 (inactive)
13 Jun
14 Jun
15 Jun
7 Sep
14 Jun 30 (inactive)
17 Jun
39.24 Sam Son Barracks West 1,200
25.0 Son La Army Barracks; 9,000
Hq. Military Region NW
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Barracks Attacked Under the Rolling Thunder Program
(Continued)
Target Capacity
(Number of Men Percent of Targeted
400
4,000
18 Jun 52
20 Jun
23 Jun
24 Jun
29 Jun
30 Jun
1 Jul
13 Jul
14 Jul
15 Jul
10 Aug
11 Aug
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70
510
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Table c-8
Barracks Attacked Under the Rolling Thunder Program
(Continued)
Target Capacity
Dates
Percent of National
Cost of
Target
(Number of Men
Percent of Targeted
of Attack a
Percent of Targeted
Targeted Capacity
Restoration
Number
Name
Accommodated)
National Capacity
(1965)
Ca
acit
D
t
d
D
t
p
y
es
roye
es
royed or Inactive
(Thousand US $)
37.0
Moe Chau Barracks
1,000
0.2
21 Jun
23 Jun
24 Jun
65 (inactive)
0.2
160
39.12
Dong Hoi Barracks
3,000
0.7
21 Jun
7 Aug
9 Aug
77 (inactive)
63.0
Thuan Chau Barracks/
Supply Depot
1,000
0.2
29 Jun
30 Jun
10 Aug
15 Aug
16 Aug
52
39.17
Don Bai Dinh Military
Camp
26.0
Dien Bien Phu
Barracks
2 Jul
11 Jul
15 Jul
26 Jul
28 Jul
29 Jul
8 Aug
10 Aug
11 Aug
12 Aug
13 Aug
16 Aug
17 Aug
18 Aug
39.22
Thanh Hoa Barracks
South
8 Jul
21 Aug
36 (inactive)
0.3
140
39.25
Vinh Son Barracks
South
3,500
0.8
14 Jul
18 Jul
19 Jul
52 (inactive)
39.26
Dong Can Thon
5,500
1.2
21 Jul
88 (inactive)
1.2
1
210
Barracks
22 Jul
,
39.28
Bai Thuong Barracks
NE
2,300
o.6
28 Jul
31 Jul
2 Aug
5 Aug
22 Aug
56 (inactive)
39.27
Vinh Barracks NNE
2,300
0.6
Aug
2
43
0
2
0
2
Aug
5 Aug
.
5
39.31
Xom Trung Hoa
Barracks
25 Aug
28 Aug
29 Aug
31
39.34
Ha Tinh Barracks/
Supply Depot
900
0.2
5
6 Sep
6 Sep
35 (inactive)
0.2
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Barracks Attacked Under the Rolling Thunder Program
(Continued)
Target
Number
Name
Target Capacity
(Number of Men
Accommodated)
Percent of Targeted
National Capacity
Dates
of Attack J
(1965)
Percent of Targeted
Capacity Destroyed
Percent of National
Targeted Capacity
Destroyed or Inactive
Cost of
Restoration
(Thousand US $)
39.36
Vinh Barracks NW
4,000
1.0
7 Sep
8 Sep
9 Sep
10 Sep
14 Sep
15 Sep
53
0.5
550
39.32
Xom Bang Barracks
850
0.2
6 Sep
97 (inactive)
0.2
200
East
12 Sep
13 Sep
7 Sep
9 Sep
10 Sep
12 Sep
14 Sep
15 Sep
16 Sep
100 (inactive)
0.2
250
47.1
Yen Khaai Barracks/
Ammunition Storage
9 Sep
10 Sep
11 Sep
12 Sep
14 Sep
15 Sep
50 (inactive)
0.6
450
9 Sep
10 Sep
94 (inactive)
0.1
100
61.0
Xom Chang Barracks
South
24 Sep
30 Sep
31 (inactive)
0.1
165
63.13
Chuc A Barracks/
Support Area
24 Oct
25 Oct
26 Oct
88
0.5
440
0.2
23 Dec
N.A.
N.A.
Negl.
18
16,000
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Total estimated barracks capacity in North Vietnam (443,000
men) exceeds the standing requirements of the PAVN. The order-of-battle
strength of the PAVN is currently estimated to be below 300,000. A
distinct possibility exists, therefore, that many of the barracks,
especially those in the southern provinces, were either inactive or
operating at a low level of capacity at the time they were attacked.
At present it appears that the North Vietnamese have not made a sig-
nificant attempt to repair the damage inflicted on the barracks.
Although the long-run economic and military implications of
the damage to barracks may be significant, the short-run effects seem
to be considerably less formidable. If, as seems likely, strikes against
many barracks succeeded only in destroying excess or unused capacity,
there would appear to be little need for the North Vietnamese Army to
restore these facilities in the immediate future. The destruction of
numerous barracks has undoubtedly caused the PAVN inconvenience.
in most instances barracks, if
occupied, were abandoned after the initial strike. Troops from the
damaged barracks apparently are being quartered with civilians in
nearby towns, in tents, and in other makeshift shelters in surrounding
areas.
Most of North Vietnam's more important barracks are located
in the Hanoi-Haiphong complex and have yet to be attacked. The military
strength in this area far exceeds that in the outlying areas already
struck by US aircraft.
4. Supply Depots
Eighteen of North Vietnam's supply and ordnance depots are
targeted under the Rolling Thunder program; these facilities represent
one-third of the known national storage capacity. The depots struck
constitute about 5 percent of national capacity, and the actual
storage area destroyed is even less. Except for the Vinh Supply Depot
(serving Military Region IV) and the Yen Bai Ordnance Depot (serving
the Hanoi area), the depots struck are of relatively minor importance
to the PAVN and are located in the southern provinces of North Viet-
nam (see Table C-9).
The cost of restoring these facilities is estimated to be
about $3 million. These depots could be put back into limited opera-
tion within a few days by utilizing local materials and labor and
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Table C-9
Supply Depots Attacked Under the Rolling Thunder Program
~fV
Target
Dates
Percent of National
Cost of
Target
Capacity
Percent of
of Attack
Percent of Target
Capacity Destroyed
Restoration
Number
Name
(Square Feet)
National Capacity
(1965)
Capacity Destroyed
or Inactive
(Thousand US $)
53.0
Phu Van SE
55,440
0.5
19 Mar
26 May
86 (inactive)
0.5
372
55
Vinh Son
84,480
0.8
19 Mar
20 Jun
22 Jun
24 Jun
47
0.4
144
54
Thien Linh Dong
124,080
1.2
30 Apr
58 (inactive)
1.2
495
South
13 Aug
63.2
Dong Thanh Ware-
68,640
0.6
8 May
71 (inactive)
0.6
492
house Area South
22 Jun
63.1
Vinh Loc
50,000
0.5
20 Aug
79 (inactive)
0.5
236
63.21
Dong Thanh Ware-
54,000
0.5
17 Aug
38
0.2
386
house West
18 Aug
18 Nov
63.12
Phu Due
0.3
Total
4
25
Son La Army Barracks
52
Vinh, Headquarters Military Region IV,
32
Vu Con Army Barracks
Army Barracks
39.13
Phu Le Army Barracks
56
Phu Qui Army Barracks
39.34
Ha Tinh Army Barracks
63
Thuan Chau Barracks
39.5
Xom Trung Hoa Army Barracks
63.13
Chuc A Army Barracks
JCS Target No. 44, Yen Bai Ordnance Depot, listed in Table C-10, also has some supply/storage capacity.
b. Dates of attack indicate only assigned strikes; in certain instances more attacks have been launched against a specific target than is indicated above.
c. Including an estimated cost of $874,500 for restoration of the supply/storage depots within barracks. See footnote a.
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into full operation within weeks if replacement supplies were forth-
coming. In most cases, adjacent civilian buildings in the depot areas
can be used for emergency storage. The largest supply depots have
yet to be attacked. These include the Hanoi Supply Depot South at
Quin Loi, the Hanoi Supply Depot North at Tay He, the Thai Nguyen
Supply Depot (believed to be the largest supply depot in North Viet-
nam), and the Thuan Chau Barracks and Supply Depot.
5. Ammunition Depots
Thirteen ammunition depots have been struck during the
Rolling Thunder program. Almost two-thirds of North Vietnam's ammuni-
tion storage capacity is estimated to have been destroyed, damaged,
or deactivated as a result of allied airstrikes. The cost of restor-
ing these facilities is estimated to be $4.5 million (see Table C-10).
These figures, however, must be qualified. Most of the destroyed
capacity has been located in the southern, central, and western areas
of North Vietnam. It is also difficult to tell at what level of
capacity these depots were being utilized before the airstrikes began.
Although there is no indication that any ammunition depot resumed
activity after being hit, it is estimated that a limited reactivation
of the depots, using tents, could be accomplished in 10 days.
Of the ammunition depots attacked, Bac Can, Tai Xouan,
Lang Het, Yen Son, and Yen Bai probably play a role in the ammunition
supply arrangements between China and North Vietnam. The other depots
are important for regional support of North Vietnamese troops and for
supplying the Viet Cong and PAVN units in Laos and South Vietnam.
The destruction of these depots probably has caused temporary delays
but has not caused a cessation in the movement of ammunition.
Several ammunition depots not yet struck by allied forces
seem to be fundamental to the overall supply network between China and
North Vietnam. Their loss in the short run would be significant in
hampering North Vietnam's military efforts in the south. For example,
the destruction of the Hon Gai depot which serves the 320th Division
in the Haiphong area would reduce ammunition supplies to Haiphong but
might also eliminate secure storage for new stocks coming in from
China. The Cam By depot, which supports the Hanoi-Haiphong complex,
also serves depots to the south. Its destruction would delay the
movement of supplies going south and would also deny additional
storage for ammunition imported from China. The Haiphong depot is
known to serve as a major ammunition storage area for ground forces
in the Haiphong area and may also be used to store ammunition headed
south. The Phu Lang Thuong depot mainly provides storage space for
ammunition imported from China. The destruction of the above-mentioned
facilities would initially limit the movement of ammunition from China
to North Vietnam and would hinder the internal distribution of ammuni-
tion supplies.
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Ammunition Depots Attacked Under the Rolling Thunder Program J*
64.0
40.0
47.18
Target
Capacity
Percent of
Dates
of Attack /
6
)
Percent of Targeted
Destroyed
acit
C
Percent of
National Capacity
Destroyed or Inactive
Cost of
Restoration
(Thousand US $)
National Capacity
(19
5
y
ap
Xom Bang
5,000
4
2 Mar
75.0 (inactive)
4
260
Phu Qui
9,000
8
15 Mar
30 Apr
22 May
4 Jun
19 Max
5 May
6 May
62.0 (inactive)
71 (inactive)
8
300
Xom Rung
4,120
4
4 May
31 Jul
13 (inactive)
8,236
7
30 May
31 May
1 Jun
20 Jun
22 Jun
24 Jun
48 (inactive)
6 Jul
23 Jul
6 Aug
8 Aug
11 Aug
18 Sep
25 Jun 32 (inactive)
26 Jun
27 Jun
3 Jul
4 Jul
8 Jul
25 Jun 50 (inactive)
30 Jun
9 Jul 58 (inactive) 9 960
10 Jul
11 Jul
12 Jul
20 Jul
25 Sep
26 Sep
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Ammunition Depots Attacked Under the Rolling Thunder Program J
(Continued)
Target Dates Percent of Cost of
Target Capacity Percent of of Attack j/ Percent of Targeted National Capacity
Restoration
Number Name (Metric Tons) National Cacit a
(1
6
p y
9
5) Capacity Destroyed Destroyed or Inactive (Thousand US $)
9 Jul
10 Jul
11 Jul
12 Jul
13 Jul
14 Jul
17 Jul
32 2 330
75 (inactive) 2 200
4 0.2 20
7 24 Jul
18 Sep
21 Sep
23 Sep
26 Sep
47.22 Bac Can 2,000 2 5 Sep
8 Sep
10 Sep
12 Sep
14 Sep
15 Sep
63 4,500
b. Dates o' attack indicate only assigned strikes; in certain instar_ces^oreVattacks have beena aunchednagainst eacspecific target than is indicated above.
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8. Radar
There were three radars destroyed and six damaged in Roll-
ing Thunder operations through 24+ December. One radar was struck as
a target of opportunity under the armed reconnaissance program; all
the rest were associated with the JCS target program either as primary
targets or as a part of a SAM site. The estimated value of the radars
destroyed is as 'ollows :
Number Type
Thousand US $
2 SCR-270 early warning 150
1 TRACKDISH fire control 24+5
395
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The radars damaged are believed to be of the types listed below:
Number
Thousand US
1
KNIFEREST B early warning
i
75
150
2
ng
CROSS SLOT early warn
ning
75
1
SCR-270 early war
75
1
SPOONREST A early warning
t
1
FLAT FACE early warning/targe
260
acquisition
635
The bombing of radar installations in thus Norfar.ietnam has
not been of crucial significance to the country
C. Armed Reconnaissance
During 1965 the armed reconnaissance phase of the Rolling
primarily directed against transport vehicles,
Thunder program was ferry facilities,
small bridges, occasional assigned fixed targets,
and small pre-briefed targets in selected regions of North$13.4 Vietnam-
Some 28,000 armed reconnaissance sorties inflicted about
lion worth of damage (see Table C-11).
Beginning in late March, allied aircraft were authorized, on
a limited basis, to attack locomotives, railroad rolling stock,
vehicles, and hostile North Vietnamese craft on selece are d routes below
the 20th parallel. As the program expanded, greater
Vietnam were opened for attack and more sorties and targets were air
authorized for armed reconnaissance missions. At the peak
oo f-Haiphong
war, roughly two-thirds of North Vietnam (excluding the area, the northeastern provinces, and a 30-mile buffer zone along the
North Vietnam-China border) was open to armed reconnaissance attack.
s
Damage to transport equipment accounted for $6 million, bridg
miscellaneous buildings $280,000, and military-assoi
$6.5 million, esd
targets about $670,000 (see Table C-12). Most of the damage was in-
flicted in the southern provinces.
* For a further discussion of bridges destroyed or damaged by armed
reconnaissance, see section A, 4, above.
C-29
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Table C-11
Cost of Damage Inflicted by Armed Reconnaissance Sorties W
w
0
1965
April
May
June
July
August
September
October
November
December
Total
Total Cost
of Damage
Thousand US
Number of
Armed
Reconnaissance
Sorties
Cost of Damage
per Sortie
(US $)
555
1
200
,
462
565
1,237
457
1
002
,
1
386
,
723
900
1,732
520
620
4
221
,
147
642
4,594
140
763
5,458
140
1
285
,
5,108
625
2,996
209
6 57
27,932
Excluding damage to bridges of
19,000 on armed reconnaissance sorties.
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Inventory of Damage by Armed Reconnaissance Sorties
Destroyed
Damaged
Transport equipment
1,176
1,916
Locomotives
6
6
Rail cars
227
592
Trucks
318
487
Vehicles
165
78
Ferry boats
53
56
Barges
263
487
Lighters and junks
144
210
Bridges/ferry landings
Road bridges
161
432
Railroad and combination bridges
14
50
Ferry facilities
0
75
Small pre-briefed targets
1,911
2,625
Barracks
93
137
Supply warehouses
71
105
Miscellaneous buildings
1,673
2,024
Radar and communications sites
9
133
Truck parks
3
138
Antiaircraft sites
62
88
a. The total estimated cost of damage is $13,450,000.
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II. Civilian and Military Casualties
A. General Considerations
25X1
L In general the estimates of civilian casualties are based on
methodologies previously adopted by CIA. The estimates of military
casualties have been provided by the Defense Intelligence Agency and
have been accepted as presented subject to an adjustment of plus or
minus 10 percent to allow for the probable bias inherent in pilot
strike reports.
From early spring of 1965, when the governments of the United
States and South Vietnam launched the Rolling Thunder program,* through
24+ December, when a temporary halt in the bombing was ordered, North
Vietnamese casualties -- both civilian and military -- are estimated to
have reached a total of 11,700 to 14,800 killed and wounded. This esti-
Tate contrasts with a claim reportedly made last fall by Hanoi officials
that total casualties had reached the 75 000 mark
The Rolling Thunder program has been specifically carried out
with the view of avoiding civilian casualties where at all possible.
It is estimated that roughly an equal number of civilian and military
personnel have been killed or wounded during the course of the program,
although military casualties slightly predominate in the ratio.** Strikes
against the JCS-designated fixed targets, which are predominantly mili-
tary, did not produce as high a ratio of civilian casualties as did the
armed reconnaissance program. Bombardment of fixed targets resulted in
a ratio of about two-thirds military to one-third civilian casualties.
The armed reconnaissance missions, however, which were primarily directed
against targets of opportunity -- both economic and military within cer-
tain prescribed areas -- and which comprised a larger share of the total
Rolling Thunder sorties flown, resulted in a preponderance of civilian
casualties -- estimated to be about 58 percent of the total casualties
from armed reconnaissance. The civilians subjected to armed reconnais-
sance attacks are for the most part directly engaged in transport, con-
struction, and repair activities directly related to the North Vietnamese
war effort.
Casualty estimates in this report reflect intelligence information
available on all Rolling Thunder missions as well as the three missions
of 7, 8, and 11 February which took place just prior to the inception
of the Rolling Thunder program.
** Numerical data on casualties are presented in the following sections.
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To illustrate further, bombing activities against fixed targets
had tapered off considerably in the final two months covered by this'
report -- November and December 1965 -- and were in all but six cases
directed toward the restriking of targets that had been covered by
earlier missions. Furthermore, there were no-targets struck in major
urban areas. Under these conditions, bombing of fixed targets in
November and December added only about 1 percent or less to the total
of civilian casualties under the Rolling Thunder program. In other
words, virtually all civilian casualties from strikes on fixed targets
occurred in the first four-fifths of the timespan covered by the program.
By way of contrast, armed reconnaissance during November and December
added about 36 percent to total civilian casualties for this type of
target. In other words, approximately one-fourth of all civilian
casualties resulting from armed reconnaissance occurred in the final
one-fifth of the period being studied.
Similar comparisons made for military casualties during November
and December bear out these same general tendencies. Strikes on fixed
targets during the two-month period added only a little over 1 percent
to the total military casualties for this type of mission -- reflecting
the fact that fewer targets were bombed and that they were often in an
abandoned state, having been struck before. The increase in military casual-
ties from armed reconnaissance for the final two-month period was also
significant, amounting to about 4+5 percent.
B. Intelligence Sources for Estimating Casualties
The number of casualties from allied airstrikes in North Vietnam
cannot be estimated with any precision.
Although the United States adopted self-imposed restrictions
on its air offensive against North Vietnam in order to minimize civilian
casualties, it is to North Vietnam's interest to assert otherwise. Thus
its propaganda media give the impression that the air offensive is a
vicious and unrestrained assault on the civilian population, hospitals,
schools, and other nonmilitary objectives. While there have been few
North Vietnamese official statements giving precise casualty figures
for specific incidents, the North Vietnamese press and radiobroadcasts
and formal protests by the North Vietnamese Army to the International
Control Commission im 1 that casualties are inordinately high.
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Finally, documented German experience with Allied bombing during
World War II (covering the year 1943) averaging one wounded for each
eight buildings severely damaged or destroyed and one killed for each
25 buildings severely damaged or destroyed. has provided a useful assess-
ment guideline. These data show the effectiveness of even improvised
shelters.
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D. Estimates of Casualties from Attacks on Fixed Targets
It is estimated that strikes against fixed targets, including
armed reconnaissance strikes against JCS targets, resulted in 1,700 to
2,400 civilian casualties during the period 7 February to 24 December
1965. Of these, approximately 5 to 10 percent resulted from strikes
against targets located in urban areas. For the same period, it is
estimated that military casualties have been within the range of 3,800
to 4,700. Probably not more than 55 military casualties and 30 civilian
casualties occurred in the last two months of the program prior to the
Christmas cessation, reflecting the shift in emphasis to armed recon-
naissance and the fact that many fixed targets struck during that period
were abandoned. Furthermore, none of the targets struck during November-
December was near heavily populated areas (see the tabulation in E, below)
About 470 strikes were made against 157 fixed targets in a little
more than 100 localities. Approximately three-quarters of the strikes
were made against targets in 55 urban areas, which ranged in size from
Nam Dinh with a population of 90,000 to Ha Tinh, 5,000. The remaining
strikes were made against nearly 65 targets in about 45 rural areas.
About 10 targets were located in uninhabited areas for which no civilian
casualties could be expected. Of the total, about one-fourth were eco-
nomic targets located in urban areas.
During the last two months covered by this report, all targets
struck -- 16 in number -- were considered to be located in rural areas,
although two, the Uong Bi thermal powerplant and the Hanoi SAM support
facility, are associated with urban areas -- though not geographically
within the boundaries of the cities.
E. Estimates of Casualties from Armed Reconnaissance Missions
Since the inception of the armed reconnaissance strikes through
24 December, approximately 17,000 sorties were flown against trucks,
boats, barracks, and lines-of-communication targets such as bridges,
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I I
railroads, and. ferry facilities. Civilian casualties from this activity
are estimated to range between 3,500 and 4,500 killed or wounded, whereas
military casualties are numbered at 2,600 to 3,200. It is of interest
that, although civilian casualties resulting from strikes on fixed tar-
gets have been a negligible factor in the total during the last two
months, as shown in the tabulation below,* the number of killed or
wounded from armed reconnaissance is relatively high, reflecting the
increase in this type of activity. There was an estimated monthly
total of 325 to 410 civilian casualties from armed reconnaissance
through 28 October and some 450 to 600 casualties per month during
the final two months covered by this report. Similarly there were
225 to 275 military casualties through October and 400 to 500 per month
in the November-December period.
Type of Casualty February-October November-December
Fixed. targets
Military 3,800 to 4,600 55
Civilian 1,700 to 2,400 30
Armed reconnaissance
Military
1,800 to 2,200
800 to 1,000
Civilian
2,600 to 3,300
900 to 1,200
F. Estimated Total Casualties
The estimated total casualties resulting both from airstrikes
against fixed targets and from armed reconnaissance missions is in the
range of 11,700 to 14,800 persons, probably divided about equally be-
tween killed. and. wounded. Of these, between 5,200 and.6,900 represent
civilian casualties. This estimate cannot be endorsed as one of pre-
cision or finality, however, even though it seems reasonably consistent
with the information available.
The impact of some 3,000 civilian deaths out of the total number
of civilian casualties cannot be great in the total picture of life in
North Vietnam, where some 350,000 persons probably died in 1965 alone.
Even the accidental death rate in North Vietnam overshadows the civilian
casualty losses. At the rate of 3 to 5 percent of all deaths, accidents
probably accounted for from 10,500 to 17,500 deaths in 1965. Relating
these casualties to those inflicted by the Viet Cong on the civilian
population of South Vietnam, it is observed that 1,870 South Vietnamese
* Because of rounding, the data shown in the tabulation do not neces-
sarily agree with data given elsewhere in this report.
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civilians were killed during 1965 and some additional 12,700 were kid-
napped with unknown fate. The importance of the military casualties
is likewise difficult to measure except in relative terms. The approxi-
mately 6,500 to 7,900 casualties represent only a small percentage of
the estimated total North Vietnamese armed force of 265,000 troops and
of the military casualties of the South Vietnamese armed forces during d
1965 of approximately 34,000 killed and wounded.
C-38
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III. North Vietnamese Countermeasures
A. Reconstruction and Repair
From the beginning of bombing attacks in February 1965, the North
Vietnamese have demonstrated a. remarkable
ability to restore and rebuild damaged or destroyed bridges, to improvise
substitute stream crossings, and otherwise to maintain the transportation
routes (see Table C-13). Despite shortages of technical and engineering
manpower, administrative inefficiencies, and shortages of some types of
construction materials and equipment, they have been able both to restore
most of the damaged transportation routes and to improve and extend
their supply net. Their pattern of engineering operations and techniques
closely parallels that used by the Communist forces during the Korean War
and demonstrates a, phenomenal speed in replacing or repairing destroyed
and damaged bridges, as shown in the following tabulation:
Type of Reconstruction
Average Work Time
Length (Hours)
Railroad bridges
60 to 90 feet 48
to
72
Highway bridges
20-foot spans 20
to
24
Approaches
(earth)
50 to 100 feet 4
to
6
Bypasses
per mile 20
to
30
Underwater
crossings (ford)
per 100 feet 8
to
10
Simplicity of construction, improvisation, and mass use of labor make it
possible to surmount quickly the inconveniences created by the bombing.
Available intelligence data indicate that bomb damage to supply routes
has neither stopped nor curtailed the flow of military supplies, in part
because current military logistics needs are not taxing the existing
system. Moreover, Communist potential for recuperability, in terms of
the means for restoration and repair, maintenance, and construction of
new supply routes could be at least doubled and probably tripled.
On the other hand, recuperability from damage suffered by elec-
tric powerplants has been quite slow because of the shortage of tech-
nicians and the nonava,ilability of spare parts. Some machinery could
be put back into operation by cannibalizing other damaged equipment for
needed replacement parts. In most cases, however, it will be necessary
to import both parts and new replacement equipment. Shortages of elec-
tric power probably have been partly compensated for by strict rationing
regulations and the introduction of small portable generating units, by
the spreading out of work shifts, and by.more intensive utilization of
existing generating capacity. It is believed that none of the power-
plants damaged by airstrikes has yet been put back into service. Petro-
leum (POL) bulk storage installations which have been damaged have been
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Table C-13
Estimated North Vietnamese Imports by Land and the Increase in Imports
Resulting from the Rolling Thunder Program
1965
Total Imports Volume
(Metric Tons) (Metric Tons) Number and Type Source
Total 13 0,000 110,000
Military 100,000 90,000 Including (other than that noted below)
large shipments of various types of
artillery, tanks, mortars, small arms,
other weapons, and ammunition.
SAM equipment 9,600 to 9,600 to 15 to 20 active USSR Including fire battalions and support
14,600 14,600 sites battalions.
AAA equipment 4,600 to 4,600 to 1,000 to 1,200 USSR and China
5,600 5,600 weapons
Aircraft 420 420 8 I1-28 USSR
11 MIG-21 USSR
24 to 25 MIG- USSR
15/17
44 MIG-15/17 China
Radar 420 420 67 a/ 70 percent Probably as important as the increased
from China quantity of radars is the shift to
30 percent more sophisticated equipment. Some
from the USSR older types of radars have actually
been retired.
Economic 210,000 20,000 Including (other than that noted below)
increased shipments primarily of con-
struction supplies such as bridge
steel, rails, and asphalt; boats and
barges; bicycles and parts; truck
parts; medical supplies; and probably
some increased shipments of food,
textiles, and radio equipment.
Coke and coking coal 160,000 0
China Although coal imports increased in 1965,
the increase resulted from the opening
of the second blast furnace at the
Thai Nguyen Iron and Steel Complex, not
from the bombing.
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Table C-13
(Continued)
Total Imports Volume
(Metric Tons) (Metric Tons) Number and Type Source
Economic (Continued)
Petroleum products 6,800 / 1,700 Jet fuel and some USSR Jets were first brought in after the
aviation gas Gulf of Tonkin incident. Imports of
aviation gas probably also increased.
Trucks 5,500 J 5,400 1,330 cargo trucks; China Probably almost all trucks imported
8 crane trucks China from China were a result of the bomb-
ing.
Railroad rolling 1,000 / 900 4 locomotives; China Including 2 locomotives sent from
stock 64 freight cars Rumania by sea.
a. Excluding radars included as part of the SAM equipment.
b. Reported shipments. The actual total probably is larger.
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neither repaired nor replaced. It is possible that the Communists have
no intention of restoring the damaged POL storage facilities and have
chosen to protect their oil supplies and provide for more flexible dis-
tribution through dispersion and concealment. They have developed new
bulk storage capacity by the installation of small tanks at various
locations and probably have established stockpiles of POL in drums and
cans. It is estimated that the capacity represented by these expedients
is small compared with the capacity lost by bombing.
B. Development of Alternative Transportation Routes
In many areas which have been bombed intensely during the Rolling
Thunder operations the North Vietnamese are developing alternative trans-
portation routes and other transportation means which are providing
greater flexibility and capacity for movement of military supplies south-
ward from North Vietnam to South Vietnam. Initial destruction of the
land routes in the early part of 1965 forced the North Vietnamese to
rely, to a, greater extent, on coastal shipping and the use of inland
waterways. In many places, inland waterways parallel existing roads and
serve as alternate transportation routes. The most far-reaching effort,
however, in terms of inputs, has been the construction of over 300 kilo-
meters of roads and several bypasses around traffic chokepoints. In so
doing, there has been an intense effort to take advantage of natural
cover and to conceal these new routes and bypasses by camouflage. In
addition to the use of waterways and new roads, the transportation system
includes a restored portion of rail line parallel with route 15 south of
Vinh. Bombing has also resulted in a more intensive use of the many foot
trails, particularly in the area around the Demilitarized Zone. Fre-
quently a. new road is simply a foot trail which has been expanded to
carry truck traffic. In addition, the Communists have expanded and im-
proved the road net comprising that part of the supply route which
passes through Laos to South Vietnam.
The principal effort to construct and maintain alternate routes
in North Vietnam has been in the area, southward from Thanh Hoa. The
North Vietnamese are developing these inland north-south roads to provide
a, choice of routes south through Mu Gia Pass, where route 15 crosses the
Laotian border and continues as route 12. At Mu Gia Pass there are now
two bypass roads around the chokepoint and a ,third under construction to
insure the uninterrupted movement of supplies. A new road under con-
struction from route 911 will provide a ,new transport connection between
North Vietnam and Laos. The North Vietnamese are continuing to improve
route 12 in Laos and to develop bypass roads at chokepoints in their
determination to keep this major border crossing open to provide another
supply route to South Vietnam. The following roads and a, segment of
railroad were constructed or improved during 1965 in Military Region IV
(south of Thanh Hoa) in North Vietnam:
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Length Possible Alternate
(Kilometer) for Sections of Route
101 west from Dong Hoi
(17 29 N 106 36 E) 35 1A
701, 704, and 116 between
Thanh Hoa, and Vinh (improvement) 82 1A
15 northwest from Vinh
(improvement) 60 lA
74 (improvement) 84 15 and 1A
83, 831, 832 81 15 and 1A
Railroad segment south from Vinh 70 15
Total length of alternate routes 412
The continued expansion of this road net in southern North Vietnam would
further increase its capacity to keep military supplies moving south. In
addition, the construction of routes 911, 922, 96, 165 and improvements
to route 16 in Laos during 1965 offer a, choice of routes to South Vietnam
on the southernmost segment of the supply line from Hanoi. The effort to
build additional routes in Laos has been equally as intense as the effort
in southern North Vietnam.
The manpower and materials committed to restoring roads and stream
crossings destroyed by bombings has been sufficient to provide the neces-
sary resources for development of alternative routes. An estimated
70,000 to 100,000 workers have been organized into work camps and smaller
elements such as mechanized units or bridge units. Despite these large
numbers, shortages of technically experienced road and bridge builders
exist. To alleviate this shortage, groups of 200 workers have been sent
to Hanoi and possibly China, for training in the operation and maintenance
of construction equipment. About 60,000 youths from the Hanoi-Haiphong
area, were drafted for construction in southern North Vietnam during 1965
to meet the needs for construction labor, and a, new, broader program is
currently under way throughout the country to draft even more young
people into the program. They have caused complaints because of their
inexperience, but they have effectively filled the need for mass labor
to repair bomb damage. Although the greater share of this labor is em-
ployed in restoration of existing roads and the building of bypasses,
about 21,000 workers are involved in the construction of new roads.
Although there are shortages of construction equipment, recent
information indicates some additions to existing inventories through
imports from the USSR. The North Vietnamese method of construction
using mass labor, however, tends to offset the shortage of equipment.
It is estimated that 3,000 North Vietnamese are responsible for each
25-kilometer segment of new road construction, or about 120 workers per
kilometer. They have completed 116 kilometers of new roads and 226
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kilometers of improvements to existing roads in approximately 7 months
for an overall average completion of 1.6 kilometers per day. The rate
of road construction on individual projects varies according to the
priority placed upon it.
C. Increased Flow of Supplies from other Communist Countries
In 1965, primarily as a reaction to allied bombing, North
Vietnamese imports of military and military-related economic goods
from other Communist countries increased 170,000 tons over the 1964
level.* Military equipment and supplies, mainly for defense purposes,,
made up more than half of this increase, as shown in the following tabu-
lation:
Increase Above 1964
Increase in total imports 170,000 Metric tons
Military
90,000
SAM sites 15 to 20
Antiaircraft artillery 1,000 to
1,200
8
11
Equipment for sites
Units
I1-28 bombers
MIG-21 jet fighters
68 to 69**
MIG-15 17 jet
Radar (not included with
fighters
SAM equipment)
67
Units
80,000
Metric tons
Petroleum 26,300
Metric tons
Motor vehicles 3,890
Units
Rails and rail joints 6,980
Metric tons
Suction dredges 58
Units
Pontoon bridges 200
Metric tons
For an appraisal of the dollar cost of the increased military and
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goods resulting from the bombing,
imports of economic as April from
The increase in related, began as e occurred
almost all which was err oods from the USSR, however, other curred mainly
China. Iomports of similar g Imports of cargo trucks, trans-
over the 1964 level. In
during the latter half of 1965.
and petroleum rose sharply 6e aleve 13, In to
port equipment,
spite o~ air attacks, North Vietnam's truck inventory
15,000 military and civilian trucks by the end of 1965, an increase of
e imports of construction equip-
rails, and
about 3,000 trucks during the year. Large
ment and supplies, including bridge steel, pontoon bridges, ma'inta'ining but
small dredges, aided the North Vatosthensouthernypart of North Vietnam
a1so increasing the flow of supplies
as the year progressed.
1. Increased Imports by Land Transport
Allied air attacks were indirectly responsible for an esti-1 mated 110,000 tons out of the total,o 1965 ne(see(Tab1e CE~3j00 tons)
North in
Vietnam
North Vietnamese imports by land i
importing by land transportation an esti
countered the air attacks by n -
d supplies, which apparently
equipment an
eco-
nomic moved ,ted 90 goo o,000 tons of military aud 20,000 an tons of military-related eco
aboverland, 20,000 of the 90,000 tons of military goods
almost entirely
goods. . Only about 20, to 20 active SAM sites
can be quantified by type. Equipment for the 15
toed in North Vietnam made up the largest volume of identi-
currently dep y ods An estimated 1,000 to 1,200 antiaircraft
f about 2 240
?
also were imported because e ui vent
artillery weapons out of a. as were almost 7 0
of the bombing,
fied imports of military g
current total in North Vietnam ?O the 160
radars not included with
tely 70 000 tons of mili-
canno e quern
ary goo s a small arms, and ammunition.
artillery, tanks, mortars,
Increased imports of economic goods resulting from air attacks
included at least 1,330 cargo trucks from China transported overland out
o inc 10 cargo trucks* imported from all Communied
co a ries by an and e,3 see Table C-14),. China also supplied
by land and sea in 1965 dump trucks and other construction
tot, al
8 crane trucks out of a total of 510 rails,
North Vietnamese. Increai~ders)shipments
vehicles imported in 1965 Y e.steel (including g
of construction supplies such as bridgs' bicycles and parts; and
and asphalt; boats and barges; truck part
d' al supplies were noted but cannot be area itified. I China. probably
The approxima, ' imports of
ified by type included large
least 4 loc to
meic locomotives and 64 freight cars also has allowed the North Vietnamese use sinorderaue
rolling stock normally used stock.
counter the destruction of North Vietnamese rolling
* Excluding dump trucks and other specialized cargo trucks.
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Table C-14
Estimated North Vietnamese Imports of Motor Vehicles
1965
Tyne
By Land
By Se
--._
a
____ Total
General cargo trucks
Dump trucks 1,3
3
8
-
Oth
12
1 !
312
er construction vehicles
31
1
Z,
2 92
1
3 J
21
Bulldozers
Scrapers
4
-
3 43
Graders
4
4 44
Excavators
6 6
Automotive crane
s
6
Truck workshops
8
6
6
14
8
8
Other vehicles
30
165
195
Tank trucks
Ambulances
2
2
Refrigerator truc
ks
38
8
Truck tractors
Jeeps
8
3
30
Buses
103
8
1
Automobiles
5
9
03
5
9
1,36 2 , 651
0
a?. Reported shipme
---- - --------
nts either received or en route. The actual totals
probably are larger,
b. From the USSR and Eastern Europe.
C. Although most of these trucks are related to economic aid
Projects
they could be used for construction projects resulting from the bombing.
2. Increased Imports by Sea, Transport
Much of the 13-percent increase in North Vietnamese seaborne
imports from communist countries in 1965 over the 1964 level can be
attributed to allied bombing. All of the 1
of petroleum from Communist countries and muchheofethell4rpercent increase
in general cargoes can be attributed to the bombing.
The most striking increase in the category of general cargo
is that for motor vehicles. Communist ships carried 2,650 motor vehicles
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of all types to North Vietnam in 1965, compared with about 100 in 1964.
All of these vehicles originated in Communist countries, and most were
suitable for military or construction use. Another significant in-
crease occurred in Soviet shipments of railroad rails and rail joints,
presumably for rebuilding bomb-damaged rail lines. In 1964, only 52
tons of rails were shipped to North Vietnam from Communist countries.
The following tabulation shows the increases described above:
Commodity
Unit
Increase in 1965
Above 1964
Percent Increase
in 1965
Above 1964
Increase in total
seaborne imports
Metric tons
59,600
Petroleum
Metric tons
24,300
17
Motor vehicles
Units
2,550
2,550
Railroad rails
and rail joints
Metric tons
6,732
12,900
Pontoon bridges
Metric tons
200
J
Suction dredges
Units
58
J
a. Few or no imports in 19
D. Adjustments in Civilian Living Standards
Civilian living standards in North Vietnam, which are barely
above subsistence even in normal times, have generally declined as a
result of allied airstrikes, but the impact of bombing has varied widely
despite some sacrifice in the standard of living by almost every segment
of the civilian population. The regime has demanded extra work, largely
without compensation, of almost every able-bodied person and has post-
poned some benefits, such as vacations at "health camps," which were
previously awarded to a, small number of outstanding workers. Moreover,
higher rice procurement quotas in 1965 have probably reduced food avail-
abilities in rural areas, while urban residents have had to bear the
disruptions caused by evacuation and by reduction of some urban services.
Families living in target areas and those with a high ratio of dependents
to wage-earning members have suffered far greater hardships than other
civilians, and the regime has apparently made little effort to provide
assistance to those civilians feeling the greatest effects of the bomb-
ing. For the most part, however, adequate levels of consumption have
been maintained, largely because of the relatively unimpaired functioning
of the subsistence sector of the economy, which supports about 85 percent
of North Vietnam's population.
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The greatest decline in living standards has been in the southern
part of the country, where extensive bombing has severely disrupted the
distribution system and economic activity in the urban areas as well as
destroying some civilian property and where the influx of large numbers
of workers to repair bomb damage has strained local supplies of food and
The primarily rural nature of the
southern provinces has permitted continued functioning of the subsistence
sector, but rural families in the southern provinces have probably suffered
some decline in living standards as they have had to provide assistance
to urban relatives and have probably had some soldiers and repair workers
billeted in their homes.
Inhabitants of other parts of the country have been most affected
by strains on incomes, by physical dislocations, and by the reduced
quality of many consumer goods and services, although distribution and
production difficulties as well as stockpile requirements have probably
intensified normally tight supplies of consumer goods. Incomes of many
urban and rural families have undoubtedly fallen because of a diversion
of working members to low-paying or uncompensated defense and reconstruc-
tion tasks and as a result of the elimination of pay for overtime work in
industry. Moreover, evacuation of dependents from urban areas has involved
a, sharp reduction in living standards for city dwellers forced to live
under more primitive conditions in the countryside. The maintenance of
separate households has imposed considerable financial burdens on some
families. Little information is available on the extent of evacuation,
and apparently many of those who left subsequently returned to the cities.
However, several hundred thousand urban residents may have moved to rural
areas. Those remaining in the urban areas have been forced to accept a,
less desirable diet -- part of the rice previously included in food
rations has been replaced by less popular secondary foods, such as manioc
and sweet potatoes -- and they have probably been deprived of at least
some electricity for home use because of the destruction of two large
powerplants that were included in the power grid linking North Vietnam's
major cities. In addition, dispersal of some schools, hospitals, and
industrial facilities from urban areas has probably resulted in reduc-
tions in the quality of health and educational services and in the quality
of many consumer goods.
E. Other Actions to Minimize the Effects of Air Attack
The North Vietnamese authorities have taken steps to reduce
casualties and damage in North Vietnam. North Vietnamese civil defense
has probably supplemented US restraint in target selection to hold
civilian casualties at a. relatively low level.
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Measures taken to reduce casualties in North Vietnam include the
thinning out (or strategic evacuation) of cities and some supplementary
population dispersal during daylight hours, when air attack is considered
more likely. In addition, the North Vietnamese rely for defense on the
extensive preparation and use of foxholes, trenches, and air raid shelters.
In some cases the hours of school, work, and marketing have been adjusted
to avoid large concentrations of people during the day.
1. Civil Defense
Civil defense is controlled nationally by a ,Directorate of
Peoples Antiaircraft Defense in the Ministry of Defense and at the prov-
ince and town level by local civil defense committees. The latter coordi-
nate the militia,, fire departments, and the civilian "self-defense" units
which are organized and trained for medical aid, firefighting, shelter
supervision, and rescue and repair activities. The organization of mobile
medical units and stationary first aid points has been reported.
The organization of civil defense at important factories and
transportation worksites includes a ,combat group armed with machineguns
and rifles to fire at atta,cking planes as well as the conventional first
aid, firefighting, and rescue units. Shelters for workers have been 25X1
Areas
of dispersed storage have been seen in recent weeks along North Vietnamese
transportation routes.
2. Resettlement Evacuation
Since early 1965, some North Vietnamese civilians have been
evacuated to northern areas from Hanoi, Haiphong, and the southern coastal
towns. Others have been evacuated on a resettlement basis to areas not
fax from their home city. Old people, women, children, and the unemployed
are the most frequently identified evacuees. Nearly all schools and
university faculties have left the central Hanoi area,, and similar pre-
cautions have been taken for schools in other urban centers. Elements of
the central government have left Hanoi to set up at points not more than
50 miles distant. Local government offices in other cities or towns have
apparently relocated to nearby rural areas or are prepared to move quickly
when necessary.
The government has assisted evacuees in the organization of
movement and by reducing transportation fares, but the principal costs
are borne by individuals or families. The exact extent of resettle-
ment remains unknown.
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3. Changes in Work Hours and Dispersal
Frequent air alerts during daylight hours have apparently
altered the routine of North Vietnamese cities. In and around Hanoi,
government offices, schools, and some ships have shifted their work
to the early morning and the evening hours. Thus work and school go on
from about 0400 to 0900 and from about 1700 to 2100 hours. Similarly,
schools in a. number of other localities have shifted to morning or
evening sessions, or both. Market places have been reported a,s being
open only at night in several cities south of Hanoi.
the population of some cities is partially dispersed, the people
retreating to the countryside during the day and returning at night.
A Prague news-
paper carried an article stating that practically the entire population
of Nam Dinh leaves home for nearby villages during the day.
It is unlikely that the entire population of larger urban
area's is dispersed during daylight. There is sufficient evidence to
support a. belief that a dispersal program exists for substantial groups
of the population, particularly children, older people, and those
engaged in the services sector of the economy such as transportation
and the wholesale and retail trades. The nature of the dispersal
program for workers in industry is less well defined. In some indus-
tries the nature of the production process would preclude midday shut-
downs. In sanctuary areas, such as Hanoi and Haiphong, there is no
need to shut down. It seems probable, however, that factory operations
are halted for long periods in target cities such as Vinh and Nam Dinh.
It is equally probable that, although the entire labor force is not sent
to the country during daylight hours, the regime does attempt to avoid
the daytime concentration of workers in facilities that are likely to
be the target of air attack and, in addition, to provide nearby shelters
for the work force.
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4. Shelter
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and trench shelters is apparent in photography of such target areas as
The existence of foxholes
Hanoi, some trench shelters have been lined with brick and roofed with
masonry. More elaborate concrete shelters have been seen at government
Vinh, Nam Dinh, and Dong Hoi. It appears that every family must have
its own foxholes or trench shelters; others are dug at frequent inter-
vals along city streets. During 1965, many trenches have been roofed
with timber or other available materials and covered with earth. In 25X1
buildings and hotels.
pipes are now being used in improving simple excavated trenches in
Hanoi and Haiphong.
5. Industry Relocation
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The amount of industry moved from North Vietnamese cities
is unknown. What has been accomplished is probably limited to small
factories and cooperatives with easily moved machines and relatively
few employees.
6. Transport Movement
The North Vietnamese have used camouflage, movement by night
with reduced lighting, and dispersal to reduce transport vulnerability.
Camouflage efforts have included painting vehicles and railroad cars in
dull colors and with irregular patterns. In addition, camouflage nets
and foliage are used to break the outlines of motor vehicles, trailers,
and boats. Reporting during the past year indicates that a great deal
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of road movement, including both civilian vehicles and military convoys,
has taken place during the hours of darkness.
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IV. Costs to Communist China and the USSR of Additional Support to
North Vietnam
In 1965 the levels of military and economic assistance provided to
North Vietnam by Communist China and the USSR increased. sharply and. are
believed to have totaled somewhere in the range of $250 million to $400
million. After a two-year lull, economic aid, believed to be on the
order of $100 million to $150 million, was extended to North Vietnam
in 1965. Military aid, which previously had been supplied on a very
small scale, reached an estimated level of $150 million to $200 million
in 1965. Technical aid grew to a value estimated at $10 million to
$25 million.
This increased assistance to North Vietnam appears to be largely
in response to the intensified allied air offensive. By far the largest
part of the military equipment (by value) delivered in 1965 represented
SAM sites, antiaircraft artillery, and related air defense equipment,
most of which was supplied by the USSR. Communist economic and tech-
nical assistance to North Vietnam in 1965 consisted in large part of
equipment and personnel needed to restore and maintain power, transport,
and. communications.
In spite of the increased costs to Communist China and the USSR of
assisting North Vietnam, these costs in 1965 -- both direct and indirect --
were small in terms of Chinese and Soviet capabilities to extend military
and economic aid. In 1965, for example, the USSR supplied the less de-
veloped countries of the Free World with more than twice as much military
equipment (by value) as it supplied to North Vietnam in the same period.
Similarly, Soviet economic aid extended to the less developed countries
in 1965 was about twice the amount that the USSR is believed to have
extended to North Vietnam. China, which supplied some 4+0 MIG-1517
fighters to North Vietnam following the Tonkin Gulf incident in 1964,
is believed to have provided only small quantities of military aid in
1965. China's economic aid also seems to have been on a relatively
modest scale in 1965; indeed, its most significant contribution appears
to have been the thousands of Chinese support personnel assigned to
duty in North Vietnam. Assistance from the Eastern European Communist
countries has been limited thus far to token supplies of small arms,
medicines, and a few industrial specialists.
A. Costs of Soviet and Chinese Military Aid
In 1965 the USSR became by far the major source of weapons to
North Vietnam, supplying somewhere between 70 and 95 percent (by value)
of the total estimated military equipment received (see Table C-15)-
More than four-fifths of the Soviet deliveries consisted of air defense
equipment, including operational SAM sites, antiaircraft artillery, and
radar, which together reached an estimated value of roughly $115 million.
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Other large deliveries of military goods in 1965 included some
50-odd jet aircraft, of which more than 40 were supplied by the USSR
and the remainder by Communist China. The USSR and China together are
estimated to have delivered more than 4,000 trucks to North Vietnam in
1965, most of which are believed to have been used in military or defense-
related transport (for example, hauling construction crews and supplies
for repair of bridges and highways).
In addition, China and the Communist countries of Eastern Europe
supplied North Vietnam with machineguns, small arms, and ammunition
probably valued at around a few million dollars in 1965. The chief con-
tribution of the Eastern European countries in 1965 was the sharply in-
creased supply of medicines and medical equipment, estimated to have
been on the order of a couple of million dollars. China also engaged
in repairing North Vietnamese gunboats and in naval patrol activity in
North Vietnamese waters during 1965, but the costs of these activities,
although believed to be only a few million dollars, cannot be reliably
estimated.
An additional aspect of the costs of 1965 military aid is the
terms under which it was extended. The Chinese have specified that
some of their military assistance is in the form of grants; it seems
likely that this also is true of some Soviet deliveries. The value
of Chinese and Soviet military aid together is twice the value of
North Vietnam's exports to the entire Communist world in any recent
year. It therefore would. be unrealistic, to say the least, to expect
North Vietnam to be economically capable of repaying so large a debt.
B. Costs of Communist Economic Aid
New extensions of economic aid to North Vietnam increased
rapidly in 1965, following a virtual cessation in new economic aid
agreements during 1962-64. The economic aid extended in 1965, thought
to have been somewhere on the order of $100 million to $150 million,
was nevertheless well below that extended in several of the years
prior to 1962 (see Table C-l6). This total was also well below --
less than one-fifth -- the value of Communist economic aid to the
less developed countries of the Free World in 1965.
The 1965 aid, unlike that of any previous year, involved com-
mitments not only by China and the USSR but also by all the other
Communist countries. This broader participation of the Communist camp
in economic aid to North Vietnam reflects the growing pressure on these
countries to give tangible proof of their support to North Vietnam's
military effort against the United States. The token character of
their response, however, is suggested by Communist propaganda concern-
ing the 1965 aid agreements. In no single case was the value of the
aid extended made public.
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Although relatively little information is available on the
composition of the 1965 aid, the evidence at hand suggests that it
may have consisted. in large part of supplies of materials and equip-
ment made necessary by the war, such as medical supplies and equipment
to restore transport, power, and other economic capacity. The North
Vietnamese, after successfully concluding a series of economic aid
agreements with almost every Communist country in mid-1965, were com-
pelled to send out another aid-seeking mission at the end of the year.
In addition to extending material aid, most of which was in
the form of grants, several additional categories of economic aid
costs were sustained by Communist China, the USSR, and the Eastern
European Communist countries in their 1965 aid to North Vietnam. The
most important was the dispatch of technical, advisory, and other
special personnel to North Vietnam (see C, below). Additional costs
were incurred by a number of Communist countries in the form of public
donations to North Vietnam, amounting to no more than several million
dollars in 1965, and in the postponement of certain North Vietnamese
debt obligations.
Between February 1965 and January 1966, three Communist
countries -- the USSR, Hungary, and Rumania -- agreed. to a deferment
of debt repayments by North Vietnam. Although details are lacking,
it is likely that the agreements cover the 1966 installments on North
Vietnam's long-term debts to these three countries. It is difficult
to assess, however, the extent to which this should be counted a real
loss, in terms of imports foregone in 1966, for despite North Vietnam's
indebtedness to the Communist countries (estimated to be around $500
million at the beginning of 1966), North Vietnam has consistently run
an import surplus in its trade with these countries. In view of North
Vietnam's chronic difficulty in repaying earlier debts, its creditors
would have been optimistic, indeed, to expect repayments to be made
under the conditions likely to exist in 1966.
C. Costs to the Communist Countries of Technical Assistance*
In 1965 the number of personnel from the USSR, Eastern Europe,
and Communist China, particularly the latter, in North Vietnam in-
creased rapidly over previous levels. It is estimated that some 30,000
Chinese special troops were sent into the northern regions of North
* Technical assistance is used here to cover only the personnel sent
to North Vietnam or the North Vietnamese personnel trained in Communist
countries. Other technical services are not included.
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Vietnam where they were associated mainly with maintaining and repairing
North Vietnamese transport and communications to the north. A rapid
influx of Soviet technicians accompanied the introduction of the SAM
sites in mid-1965, although some of the Soviet technicians in North
Vietnam were engaged in jet aircraft training and maintenance. The
Eastern European Communist countries furnished a much smaller number
of personnel, most of whom apparently were medical or industrial special-
ists. The total value of technical assistance to North Vietnam in 1065,
as shown in Table C-17, is estimated to have been roughly between $10 mil-
lion and $25 million.
D. Costs to North Vietnam Associated with Trade and Aid
In addition to the costs of Communist aid to North Vietnam, the
country itself bore certain costs associated with its foreign trade and
its aid receipts in 1965. Export earnings, particularly those from the
Free World, appear to have declined in 1965, probably reflecting in
large part the disruption of normal economic activity brought about by
the allied air offensive. Although data on North Vietnam's 1965 trade
are fragmentary, it seems likely that total exports may have declined
by as much as 10 percent -- that is, by around $10 million -- in 1965.
Identified seaborne exports to the Free World alone of coal, cement,
and apatite -- three of North Vietnam's leading exchange earners --
declined sharply in 1965, representing a loss of some $5 million to
$6 million.
North Vietnam also bore additional costs associated with the
more than 30,000 military personnel believed to have served in the
country in 1965. Assuming that food represented virtually all of such
costs to North Vietnam, it is estimated that these costs amounted to
slightly more than $1 million.
C-56
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Table C-15
Estimated Soviet and Chinese Deliveries of Military Equipment
to North Vietnam
1965
25X1
Value
Quantity (Million US
SAM sites (operational) 15 to 20 80.0
Antiaircraft guns 1,000 to 1,200 30.0
44 15.0
Aircraft
8 2.8
I1-28 bombers 25 2V 2
MIG-15/17's 11 a 8.8
MIG-21's
10.0 b/
Trucks and other vehicles 2,650 b/
5.0
Radar
2.0 b/
Medicines
1,531 metric 0.1
Jet fuel tons
Communist China
Value
Value
Quantity (Million US $) Quantity (Mill US
)
15 to 20 80.0
N.A N.A. 1,000 to 1,200 30.0
N.A.
8 1.0 52
16.0
8 2.8
8 1.0 33 4.2 11 8.8
1,370 5.0 1+,020 15.0
10.0
5.0
2.0
Negl. Negl.
1,531 metric 0.1
tons
150 to 200 J
or 25 aircraft. China and Eastern
a. Base don reported delivery of 2 e together*
b. Import Europe, so includes small as provided by Communist ed from the USSR and Eastern Eur deliveries c. The estimated total value of military
Europe e. Although the value of these deliveries cannot be reliably
and medical supplies provided by Eastern ~'?p to only a few million dollars.
estimated, it is known to be small, probably amounting
Minimum estimated total
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Table C-16
Communist Economic Aid Extended to North Vietnam a/
1955-65
1955 1956 1957 1958 19- 59 1960 1961
Communist China 20
1962 1963-64
0.0 b/ b/ b/ 100.0 b/ 157.0 b
USSR 100.0 7 5 1 N. A. C/
1
8
Million
L9-55-65
x+57.0
368.9
130.5
?0 223?4 N.A. b/ 100 to 150 f/ 1 056.4 to
a? In addition, insignificant amounts of aid have been extended b 1,10 .1F f/
ania
b. No extensions are known to exist, although some may have takenyplacAlbe.
c. New aid includes a grant in July and a credit in December; values are n Mavgolia, and North Korea.
d. New aid includes a are not available. grant
in February, a credit in Jul of available.
Y, and a grant and credit in December; values
e. All Eastern European Communist countries made available new assistance'
available, the amounts are believed to be small.
f. Total extensions for 1965 have been estimated; however, a regional breakdown is not ova-i-2-able.
.
20.7 25.0 200.0 3.9 N.A. b
N. A. d/
2.5 Negl. 62.
5 b /
Total
~ N. A. e/
350.2 15.8 18.8 20.7 127.5 200
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1965
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Estimated Communist Technical Assistance to North Vietnam
1965
Military
Economic
Cost
Cost
Number
(Million US $)
Number
(Million US $)
Communist technicians
in North Vietnam
Communist China
30,000
2.0
200 to 500
2.0 to )+.0
USSR
1,000 to 1,500
5.0
500 to 1,000
1.0 to 8.0
Eastern Europe
100 to 200
0.5
50 to 100
0.5
North Vietnamese pilot
trainees in the USSR
50
0.5
North Vietnamese trainees
in Communist China
N. A.
N. A.
N. A.
N. A.
Estimated total
5.0 to 10.0
5.0 to 15.0
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V. Political Effects of the Bombing
The bombing has not had. a major effect in shaping Hanoi's decision
on whether or not to continue the war in Vietnam. There is evidence
that some of the policymakers in Hanoi are concerned over the long-
range effect of the bombings on the North Vietnamese economy. Con-
tinuation of the air attacks would probably sharpen the apprehensions
of this group and. might also cut into the morale and staying power of
the more hard.-line elements in the North Vietnamese leadership. Never-
theless, the regime probably continues to base such decisions mainly on
the course of the fighting in the South and is willing to suffer even
stepped-up bombing so long as prospects of winning in the South appear
to be reasonably good. If the Viet Cong began to show significant
weakness in the South, however, the effect of the bombing would play
a larger part in Hanoi's decisions on how to handle the conflict. 25X1
Evidence on the effect of the bombing on the morale of the people
suggests that the results have been mixed.
Because the airstrikes have been directed away from urban areas, mora e
has probably been damaged less by direct bombing than by the indirect
effects of evacuation of urban population, splitting of families, and.
the inconveniences of air raid. drills.
If bombing were directed at urban centers, there would. be a sharper
drop in morale. But even in this event, popular morale would not be
expected to collapse or the regime to respond to morale problems by
making major shifts in its policies.
Hanoi's political relations with its allies have in some respects
been strengthened. by the bombing. The attacks have had. the effect of
encouraging greater material and political support from the Soviet
Union than might otherwise have been the case. While this Soviet aid.
has complicated. Hanoi's relationship with Peking, it has reduced. North
Vietnam's dependence on China and. thereby has given Hanoi more room
for maneuver in its own behalf.
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VI. Discussion of Sources and Methodology
A. Economic Targets
The inventory of physical. damage in the North Vietnamese eco-
nomic sector was assessed in several ways, depending on the availability
of pre-strike and post-strike information on the specific target systems.
In the case of powerplants, petroleum storage facilities, manufacturing
plants, and JCS bri es assessments of damage were made by industry
specialists
The damage inflicted on facilities was recorded in two ways:
(1) the cost in US dollars of restoration of the damaged facility and
(2) the damage to the facility expressed in terms of a reduction in
national capacity. Such factors as the actual utilization of capacity
and its meaning to the economy must be viewed when using the latter
measure as a bomb damage indicator. Target descriptions in the 94 Target
List, reductions in national capacity found in the DRV Target Study
Analysis, and the Bomb Damage Assessment Book (BDA) recording damage
inflicted on all tar ets during the air war, as well as aerial photog-
raphy used in the evaluation.
Damage and loss to rail yards, maritime ports, locks, agricul-
ture, and exports were handled in a somewhat different manner. In
addition to the above-mentioned sources, the assessment of damage to
rail yards was based on pilot reports recorded in the BDA and yard
descriptions in the North Vietnam Rail NIS. Ports were evaluated by
combining CIA/DIA cost of damage estimates, BDA information, and
descriptions in the 94 Target List. Damage to the single lock attacked
was assessed by evaluating the pre-strike descriptions found in the
94 Target List with the BDA description of damage. Agricultural loss 25X1
was estimated on the basis of a projected crop loss due to irrigation
difficulties. Export losses were calculated for apatite and cement.
By comparing figures of known North Vietnamese exports
and BDA information, it was possible to attribute
e oss in export exchange to the air war. Costs were calculated by
multiplying going world prices of cement and apatite by the net reduc-
tion in the 1965 exports of these two commodities.
B. Military Targets
By using CIA and DIA construction cost data, the 94 Target List,
the DRV Target Study Analysis, and the BDA, it was possible to elaborate
on the statistical information used by DIA to represent the damage in-
flicted on military targets in North Vietnam. Destroyed and remaining
capacities were evaluated with respect to known operational needs of
the North Vietnamese military. Costs of reconstruction, priorities,
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logistics, and the locations of struck targets were given consideration.
Particular emphasis was given to the importance and location of targets
not yet struck.
C. Armed Reconnaissance
Armed reconnaissance damage was based primarily on pilot reports
entered in the BDA, CIA/ORR weekly indications, reports, and the DIA con-
tribution to this report. Rough cost estimates were made for each of
the items reported destroyed or damaged.
in the localities with
less population there has been relatively more damage to civilian-
associated housing and activities. In addition, the smaller localities
are believed to have received less perfect warning of airstrikes and
have less well-established civilian defense measures than a locality of
the size of Nam Dinh. Furthermore, in the smaller localities civilian
housing is less well constructed.
To take these considerations into account, the populations of
Urban Area X as well as all other urban areas subjected to attack have
been divided into the population of Nam Dinh to obtain the necessary
weight:
Population of Nam Dinh: 90,000 divided by population
of X (10,000) equals 9.
The calculations have then been completed as follows:
3 times 9 equals 27 minimum casualties.
5 times 9 equals 45 probable casualties.
L. Civilian Casualties in Urban Areas
The city of Nam Dinh was used as a case study for the pur-
poses of constructing a methodology for calculating casualties in urban
areas. As a consequence of six airstrikes, the casualties estimated
for this city are a minimum of 30 and probably 4+5. The population of
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Nam Dinh is 90,000. Therfore, the estimates of casualties ranged from
1 per 18,000 in population to 1 per 12,000 in population. In applying
these findings to other urban areas, only two variables have been used.
The first is the number of strikes and the second is the population of
the various localities. Thus:
Urban area - X
Number of strikes - 6
Population - 10,000
6 times 10,000 equals 60,000
60,000 divided by 18,000 equals 3 casualties
60,000 divided.by 12,000 equals 5 casualties
2. Civilian Casualties in Rural Areas
Most of the civilian casualties inflicted on North Vietnam
by assigned strikes in rural areas appear to have been caused by collateral
bombing -- bombs falling off'target and hitting adjacent villages. In
an effort to quantify the number of casualties under these conditions,
sample villages in rural areas adjacent to JCS targets were studied..
The number of buildings in each village was determined by a visual obser-
vation from photoanalysis. In turn, the amount of physical damage to
each village was observed following attack. To derive casualty estimates
from the physical damage in the villages, three variables were considered:
(1) JCS pre-strike estimates of casualties against a specific target,
The final average figure
arrived at was one casualty for every four buildings destroyed. or damaged
in rural areas. In this report this ratio was applied to each JCS target
area after a visual check of photography to determine the number and size
of villages in the immediate vicinity (within 0.3 mile) of the target.
(2) German experience with Allied bombing in 19+3
3. Civilian Casualties from Armed Reconnaissance 25X1
density in the areas under attack to weapons effectiveness.
Two methods were used for determining casualties from armed.
reconnaissance. The first relates the average civilian population
Analysis of armed reconnaissance casualties using both methods
gave a considerable range with the first method yielding the "low
estimate and the second the "high" estimate.
C-65
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4. Military Casualties
In estimating military casualties resulting from strikes
against fixed targets the following factors were assumed: personnel
are in a warned condition; barracks areas are occupied only on the
date of the first strike; personnel are considered to be under hazard'
within the targeted. area and. an adjacent area defined as encompassing
three CEP's (for purposes of this study, 600 feet in all directions
from the outside perimeter of the target). Total casualties are esti-
mated on the basis of pre-attack demographic studies of the target and
the damage probability of the tonnage of ordnance actually dropped at
the target adjusted by a standard formula to determine probable on-
target hits. In this report the figures on total casualties derived.
by this methodology have been rounded and given as a range of plus or
minus 10 percent.
Estimates of military casualties resulting from the armed
reconnaissance program are achieved by applying uniform factors to
the number of targets reported by pilots to have been damaged and
destroyed. Thus for each truck or boat reported damaged or destroyed
one casualty was assigned; for each locomotive or railroad car damaged
or destroyed, 0.01 casualty was assigned; for each barracks, supply
warehouse, or other building, 0.1 casualty was assigned; and for each
antiaircraft, 0.3 casualty was assigned. While the casualty factors
appear to be based on reasonable assumptions the armed reconnaissance
estimates will be overstated to the extent that pilot reports often
are exaggerated and overlapping. Since no alternative source of infor-
mation is presently available for measuring the effectiveness of armed
reconnaissance, an attempt was made to accommodate the bias by rounding
total casualty figures derived by this methodology and applying a range
of plus or minus 10 percent.
25X1
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ROLLING THUNDER
Value of Damage
MILITARY
ECONOMIC
TOTAL
On armed
reconnaissance missions
On fixed target
missions
C-I Value of Damage Inflicted on North Vietnam During the Rolling Thunder Program
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Value of Damage, by Sector
(MILLIONS OF US DOLLARS)
SAM Sites
(0.63)
Utner
(0
Naval Bases
Radar and Communications
(1.1)
C-2 Value of Damage, by Sector, Inflicted on North Vietnam During the Rolling Thunder Program
61344
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ROLLING THUNDER
Cost of Damage Inflicted
ECONOMIC DAMAGE (Including agricultural and export losses)
7000
5000
O
a
4000
Z w
0 2000
I-
AUG MAR APR MAY JUNE JULY AUG SEPT OCT NOV DEC
1964 1965
MILITARY DAMAGE
7000
Total fixed target 23,600
Q TOTAL Total armed reconnaissance 12,780
0 TOTAL
Total fixed target 26,400
Total armed reconnaissance 670
C-3, C-4, C-5 Total Cost to North Vietnam of Damage Inflicted During the Rolling Thunder Program
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Index
350-
Indexes
MAR APR MAY JUNE JULY AUG SEPT OCT NOV DEC
1965
C-6 Rolling Thunder: Indexes of Value of Damage, Sorties Flown, and Bombs Expended
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Iq
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POTENTIAL OF AIR ATTACKS AS A WEAPON
TO ACHIEVE ROLLING THUNDER OBJECTIVES
I. Military Significance of North Vietnam
The military significance of North Vietnam is measurable in terms
of three basic functions which it performs in support of the military
activities in South Vietnam. It serves (1) as a logistic base for the
stockage and movement of supplies into South Vietnam, (2) as a source
of manpower,and (3)'as a control center for the direction of insurgency.
A. The Logistic Base
The North Vietnamese economy, which is basically one of sub-
sistence agriculture, has only a small modern industrial sector con-
centrated in a few urban centers, including Hanoi, Haiphong, Nam Dinh,
Viet Tri, and Thai Nguyen. The country imports little food even in
poor agricultural years and depends largely on domestic production to
feed its population of about 18 million persons. More than 80 percent
of the labor force is engaged in agriculture, which in 1964 accounted
for almost one-half of the gross national product (GNP). North Vietnam
produces only minor items of military equipment -- grenades, mines,
mortars, and ammunition for small arms -- and must import all of its
heavy military equipment and most of its small arms, ammunition, and
medical supplies from'Communist countries.
The capabilities of North Vietnam's armed forces have not been
affected significantly by attacks on economic and military facilities
in North Vietnam. Although the movement of personnel, equipment, and
supplies has been hampered by damaged transportation facilities, the
Viet Cong and North Vietnamese forces place little direct reliance on
the North Vietnamese economy for material. Within South Vietnam the
Viet Cong have developed an effective logistic system which is able
to procure from internal sources almost all of their requirements for
supplies. The major items of critical material supply -- arms and
ammunition, technical equipment, medical supplies -- are all items which
North Vietnam itself does not produce. The main role of North Vietnam
in obtaining these supplies is as an importer from third countries,
usually Communist, and as a, forwarder to South Vietnam through a well-
developed supply system. North Vietnam has established and controls
the following principal supply routes: (1) a, land corridor through
Laos; (2) a sea, route from points in North Vietnam to points in the
southern and coastal parts of South Vietnam; and (3) a route from
Cambodia, using both land and inland water routes to South Vietnam or
on occasion resorting to sea infiltration. The_overwhelming share of
these supplies is funneled through North Vietnam or transported along
the roads and trails in Laos.
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B. Manpower
A major aspect of North Vietnam's military significance to the
fighting in the south is its capacity both to train and to supply
insurgent Viet Cong personnel for later infiltration into South Vietnam
and to provide substantial increments of its own population to serve in
South Vietnam or in indirect support functions.
North Vietnam has a, population of over 18 million. Most of the
labor force is engaged in agriculture and is seasonally underemployed,
but because of the difficulty in shifting manpower to meet the require-
ments for the large number of new tasks resulting from bombing, labor
supplies are tight. The regime views the manpower situation as
"critical," and a, large-scale mobilization of manpower has reportedly
been under way in North Vietnam during 1965.
The country has about 4 million males of draft age, almost all
of whom have been put in the regular armed forces, paramilitary organi-
zations, or labor repair and maintenance battalions. In addition to
these manpower resources, about 175,000 males reach draft age each year,
of which at least 100,000 will be physically fit for military duty.
With these resources the North Vietnamese should be able to sustain and
probably increase the approximately 20,000-man rate of infiltration into
South Vietnam maintained during 1965.
It is estimated that as many as 23, but probably only 12, of the
38 army infantry regiments in North Vietnam would be used to train in-
filtrees. These 12 units, operating on a four-month training cycle,
could train and infiltrate the equivalent of nine North Vietnamese bat-
talions each month during 1966, or a, total of approximately 5+,000 men
for the year. This estimate of North Vietnamese capability to infiltrate
forces into South Vietnam is a gross rate only. The net additions to
be made to the Communist forces in South Vietnam will depend, in addi-
tion to decisions on the rate of infiltration, on the capability of the
Viet Cong to train new and replacement troops and the casualty rates
inflicted on Viet Cong and North Vietnamese forces during the year. On
the basis of present projections, North Vietnam would account for more
than 56 percent of the forces to be added to combined Viet Cong and
North Vietnamese strength in 1966.
In addition to its ability to train and infiltrate significant
numbers of North Vietnamese forces for service in South Vietnam, North
Vietnam has also demonstrated a capacity to mobilize large numbers of
personnel for activities involved in supporting the insurgency in the
South. The diversion of manpower to tasks associated with dispersal
programs, emergency repair, and construction and maintenance of lines of
communication throughout North Vietnam may require the full-time services
of 200,000 workers (equivalent to about 10 percent of the nonagricultural
labor force) and the part-time impressment of another 100,000. An addi-
tional 150,000 persons are also obligated, on a part-time basis, to serve
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in various aspects of civil defense which take them away from their
normal pursuits. These levies represent a, significant share of the
labor force and an admitted cost to North Vietnam in supporting the
war in the South. This problem does not yet seem to have reached a,
critical point.
C. Control Center for Insurgency
The function of North Vietnam as the control center for Viet
Cong insurgency is well documented in intelligence materials. These
materials confirm that North Vietnam is playing a vital role as a. center
from which the Viet Cong obtains vital support in the form of manpower,
training, organization, and supplies. The Party and government leaders
of North Vietnam also function as the source of political direction
and, indeed, inspiration for the Viet Cong leaders.
The major instrument of political control and direction of the
Viet Cong insurgency is the Lao Dong Party, specifically the Committee
for the Supervision of the South which is attached to the Party's
Central Committee. The Communist Party of North Vietnam has in effect
as its southern branch, the People's Revolutionary Party of South
Vietnam. This organization is responsible for providing funds for the
Viet Cong war effort and of providing most of the -essential nonmilitary
goods for the Viet Cong organization. It also controls a, wide array
of Party, front, and military elements which implement the principal
tasks of supporting the insurgency.
Although the North Vietnamese Communist Party and government
have avoided any direct and overt ties with the National Liberation
Front (NLF), the linkage is close and clear. Hanoi maintains control
over the NLF through the Communist leaders in South Vietnam to whom
North Vietnam issues overall guidance. This control channel runs from
both the Reunification Department of the Central Committee and the
Reunification Commission of the North Vietnamese Council. of Ministers,
both of which are headed by Nguyen Van Vinh. The North Vietnamese
military command is also highly integrated into the hierarchy which
directs the insurgency in the South.
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II. The Logistics Target System
A. Interdiction Efforts During 1965
About 2,700 strike and flak suppression sorties carrying approx-
imately 3,400 tons of ordnance were flown against JCS-designated fixed
targets on LOC's in North Vietnam during 1965. All but about 5 percent
of the total sorties and tonnage on the logistic target system were
directed against 44 railroad, highway, and combination railroad and high-
way bridge targets selected from among the 63 JCS-targeted bridges.*
The remaining JCS targets attacked on the LOC's included one railroad
yard of the five targeted and two ports and one waterway lock of the
total of 16 waterways targets as follows: 6 ports, 8 locks, and 2 mine-
able areas. The accompanying map showing JCS targets, divided by those
attacked and not attacked, indicates that most of the JCS targets
attacked on the LOC's were located south of Ninh Binh. Relatively few
were located on the railroads and roads north and east of Hanoi.
In addition to scheduled strikes against JCS-designated targets,
armed reconnaissance was planned to be a very significant part of the
program for interdicting the LOC's. Within the areas of North Vietnam
that are authorized for aimed reconnaissance, not only JCS targets
but also all other transport facilities, including roads and rail
lines, ferries, fords, port facilities, transport equipment, and land-
ing beaches, are targets. Coastal and inland water craft are considered
to be targets only if they can be identified as possibly carrying mili-
tary cargo.
In general terms, it can be concluded that these interdiction
efforts made it more difficult and expensive for North Vietnam to con-
tinue operating at somewhere near its normal economic level and to
support the war in South Vietnam and Laos. Performance by the modern
transport system during 1965 probably was not reduced below the level
achieved in 1964. Performance would have considerably exceeded the
1964 level had it not been for the comparative success of attacks
on the railroad line to Lao Cai. On the other railroad lines and roads
the amount of interdiction, in terms of number and type of target and
frequency of attack, was not enough to reduce the capacity of the
routes below the level of traffic normally moved. It was believed
during the planning stages for Rolling Thunder that destruction of
bridges would reduce the capacity of the LOC's in the southern part
of the country by about two-thirds and by even more in the north.
Experience now indicates that the North Vietnamese have sufficient
* Two bridges have been deleted from the 63 targeted and 44 attacked,
but all the data a,va,ilable for the bridges are analyzed in this
Appendix.
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recuperability that the reduction of route capacity by two-thirds As
sustained only for a, very short period of time if at all. The North
Vietnamese are using a sufficient number of engineers and laborers to
maintain routes in the southern part of the country at roughly two-
thirds of their original capacity and at the same time to increase the
number of routes and bypasses, thus making the network less vulnerable
to attacks. Furthermore, the reduction actually achieved has not lowered
the capacity to anywhere near the low level of traffic that normally
moves on these routes. These conclusions are borne out by an analysis
of specific routes and areas.*
The relative success in interdicting the Hanoi - Lao Cai rail
line is explained by several factors. The Hanoi - Lao eai Line is used
normally at two-thirds of capacity, a moderately heavy rate of utiliza-
tion. At this rate of utilization this line becomes a rather attractive
interdiction target, particularly in the absence of alternative means
of transportation. There was no road paralleling the interdicted
portions of the railroad, and the Red River which parallels the line
at a distance of several miles has only limited navigability. Thus
alternative modes of transport were not available over which the normal
rail traffic could be moved and over which supplies to repair the rail'
bridges could be moved. Interdiction of through traffic was maintained
by making fairly frequent attacks on a number of small bridges and one
major JCS-designated bridge. The interdiction would have been even
more successful in stopping all traffic were it not for the rapidity
with which bridges were repaired, even though the line was being re-
struck. The Lang Bun bridge, a two-span 150-foot steel bridge, was
restored in late September or early October in 20 days or less, and
after the second strike in October it was rebuilt in less than 11 days.
In some instances the minor bridges on this line, ranging in length
from 30 to 90 feet, were restored to service in less than eight days.
The JCS estimate of the effort required to sustain interdiction of
this rail line was placed at six strikes per month, each with 25 strike
and 25 support sorties, or a total of 300 sorties. Data are not avail-
able at present to determine how many sorties were flown over this
line, but it was apparently considerably less than the recommended
number. Even if strikes had occurred once every five days, it is
believed that bridges could have been returned to service, based on
the demonstrated ability of the Communists to repair or replace
damaged railroad bridges of up to 90 feet in length in 48 to 72 hours.
In the area south of Thanh Hoa the North Vietnamese have put
forth great effort to maintain their existing routes. A comparison
of the estimated capacities based on photography of 26 segments of
route in January 1966 with capacities as of April 1965 indicates
that on 15 segments the route capacity was maintained at the same
level, on nine segments the capacity was reduced, and on two segments
the capacity had actually increased. Two of the segments for which
capacity is believed to have remained the same were sections of route
1A just north and south of Vinh, routes that have been heavily bombed.
* For transportation routes in Vietnam and Laos, see the map in
Appendix A.
D-6
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On most of the nine segments with reductions in ca a,cit
amounted to 25 percent or p
than 2 less. Segments that had a reduction reduction
5 percent in capacity were routes IA
of more
(reduced from 3,800 tons to 1100 just south of Thanh Hoa
of route 8 (reduced from 1,3tonsoto each way per days) and a portion
these instances it is quite obvious that the North tons each way to Y per day). In
use the road at even these reduced capacities. Incre did int eases capacity occurred on route lA from Zone (from Ha Tinh south to the D mil Demilitarized
75r tons to 8
Zon Demilitarized 50 tons each way per day) and on route 10
the though both of thesenro~tes hav0etbeenOheatons vileach
bowa 3 near
used as routes for men and su per day), even
pplies moving to thebtd because w they are
infiltration around the Demilitarized trail network for
Zone.
The North Vietnamese construction of new
and improvement of
alternate routes has also been significant in maintains
ward flow of supplies in spite of route interdiction.
more than 400 kilometers of alternate land routes and basses the south-
Militar During 1965,
Y Region IV were constructed. Improvement of the inland in the area has also increased the
increased capacity through flex. . oriexam oe the network and
of routecertain areasFor example th
74 to serve as
area will make Vinh an alternate to route IA ' e improvement
and to bypass the Vinh
even less of a chokepoint,
interdiction-Of rail and waterlroutesoin the cat
which
south was not so
ustained.
Only dry season capacities are used in this section.
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target l~+ the
The prime examples of this situation are JCSh e 'ng p, the
bridge, and target 18.8, t T _
Thank Hoa railroad/highway e both located in the Thanh Hoa area was
Thuong railroads first struck ay bridg ,
get 14 was first struck on 3 April with the recommended dtonnage a e twice
Comparatively light restrikes were made twice inafi-
severely damaged. and twice in September with no sig
serviceable
once each month in June and July, A ea also.
cant new damage. At the end of September et 18.8 was the de bridge destroyed was on 3 and June;
for rail and truck traffic. Te adropped on the target in May stream
causing Small amounts of e. ceAnew bypass bridge under construction up
further damage. The old bridge was res'truck was noted in Photography in early e. Sep By early November the new bridge
in September but not the new brie demonstrated speed with which the
was completed and operational. destroyed or damaged bridges
every
North Vietnamese can replace h repair uently
ntl very
requires that restrikes be scheduled fr gor against , as as often as alternate once ce e facili ties
con-
revent the nig
three days, against bridg repair
under construction. Even this action will not p site.
AC and ferries at the bridge
siruction and use of for ort of Ben Thuy was i
The initial strike in June 1965 on the p
destroyed 50 percent of the maritime trffdayapa A li y
reported to have 00 tons per day.
ad-
d to have been more than 7
esulti
timate
of the port, es r
l June and Jul
"'i ea
out
erere c-
ter of restrikes w ses and iers.
to
war-
o ditional dam, e
Capacity of the LOC's
ther Reduce the
t Re uired to Fur
Effor
C.
s
ountries indicates
t ms
ther c
The experience of US bombing in o
Th ected from interdiction of transport s
probable success to be expected the effort required. The lessons learned
ofd North Koreao during Of
and the World War II a
Germany and Japan during
Korean War are summarized below.
D-8
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The war in Vietnam is teaching the same lessons learned
during the Korean War. One of these lessons is that it is very
difficult to prevent by aerial bombing the movement of military supplies.
In North Korea, it appeared that the movement of large amounts of sup-
plies required by the Chinese Communist and North Korean troops --
estimated at from 2,400 to 3,000 tons a day -- could be prevented by
aerial bombing. However, the enemy not only continued to move the
minimum amount required for his daily resupply but in addition moved
in another 800 tons a day to build up stockpiles. The daily supplies
estimated to be needed by the Viet Cong and North Vietnamese now
fighting in South Vietnam are less than one-half of one percent of
those required by the Chinese Communists and North Koreans during the
Korean War -- about 12 tons a day moving to South Vietnam, compared
with about 2,400 to 3,000 tons required in the earlier war. It appears
that a much greater aerial bombing effort would be required to stop the
present movement of supplies, a trickle compared with the large flow
that moved during the Korean War. Yet the number of sorties flown
over North Vietnam in the Vietnamese War through December 1965 was less
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than one-third of the number flown during a comparable period in the
Korean War. The total ordnance dropped on North Vietnam in 1965 was
also only one-third that dropped on interdiction targets in Korea
during Operation Strangle alone. In both wars the Communists have
shown a remarkable ability to improvise repairs, build bypass lines,
mass workers to maintain and repair essential supply lines, and move
supplies in the dark.
D. Recent Experience in Laos
Even more applicable to the present problem is the experience
gained from recent bombing over Laos. During the period of the bombing
lull in North Vietnam, attacks on targets and routes in Laos were
increased over earlier levels, amounting to about 9,000 sorties, some
8,000 of which were flown over the Panhandle area south of Nape Pass.
These sorties each dropped an average of two tons of ordnance. The
majority of the sorties over the Panhandle were directed over the main
supply routes to South Vietnam, route 12 and its bypass from Mu Gia,
Pass and connecting routes to the south -- 23, 911, 92, 922, 96, and 165.
Nevertheless, the level of truck traffic moving south on routes 23 and
911 averaged 29 trucks per day -- twice the average of 15 trucks per
day moving south in this area during the same period one year earlier.
On 28 December 1965, as many as 115 trucks moved south on route 911 in
one day, indicating that the average level of truck traffic probably
could have been much higher if the Communists had wanted to move more
supplies south.
The trucks generally travel at night to avoid detection. The
aircraft have revealed comparatively few trucks on the road by dropping
flares.
It is quite possible that the bombs have
been expendeic on suspec e argets rather than identified targets.
The improved earth surfaces of the roads are easily repaired if cra-
tered, and during the dry season truck traffic can ford most streams
when the bridges are destroyed. Construction material is readily avail-
able from the forest beside the road to make whatever repairs are
necessary. During the rainy season, flying conditions are poor, and
traffic can move in the daytime under cloud cover. Some of the traffic
is moved by inland waterway rather than by truck in the rainy season.
During the coming rainy season, road conditions will undoubtedly be
poor, but it is probable that sufficient improvements in the routes
have been made to provide an all-season route through the Panhandle.
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The Laotian experience resembles that in the southern part of
North Vietnam in that the volume of traffic needed to be moved is only
a small volume of military traffic. If the routes in these areas had
to support a civilian economy as the German transport system did, they
could be carrying traffic of sufficient volume to show some interdiction
results from airstrikes. Only when the routes are being used at near-
capacity levels can attacks that damage bridges, crater roadbeds, and
force traffic to move at night be effective. It is hardly conceivable
that conventional air interdiction of the land routes in North Vietnam
and Laos could be so numerous, widespread, and repeated that the North
Vietnamese would decide that the effort required to move supplies by
land to South Vietnam was not possible.
E. The Requirement for Successful Interdiction
Analysts who have examined this problem say that it is impossible
to decide what might be required to interdict given transport routes to
produce a specific reduction in capacity. The experience of 1965 in
attempting to sustain interdiction against a rudimentary transport
system moving only small amounts of supplies would indicate that the
extreme difficulty in obtaining reductions in capacity to desired levels
would require an inordinately high level of sorties and ordnance expendi-
ture. Although continued attacks against traffic moving in-the southern
areas of North Vietnam and Laos would be justified, the optimum return
would probably be realized by concentrating, in combination with attacks
on other target systems, the interdiction program on the logistic target
systems in the northern part of the country.
A logistic target system that is proposed in an intensified
allied air offensive to interdict land transport in northern North
Vietnam includes attacks on 29 major bridges and the four principal
railroad yards and shops. The initial strikes against these targets
would require an estimated 1,760 strike and support sorties and 1,500
tons of ordnance. A precise restrike effort required to keep these
targets interdicted has not been calculated, but it would include armed
reconnaissance on a 24-hour basis and a combined, sustained effort of
over 3,000 sorties a month against land transport targets. An inter-
diction program only against the two rail connections to China -- the
Hanoi-Lao Cai and Hanoi-Dong Dang lines -- would require an estimated
750 strike and support sorties monthly. This
program,
inplemented, should stop through traffic on major routes. effectively inten-
sive attacks would be necessary to halt the use of these routes for
shuttle service, and this objective may not be completely feasible.
Attacks on these 33 land transport targets, the major portion of which
are located on the more heavily used transport routes of the country,
would be much more effective in reducing the flow of supplies than
attacking minor bridges in the south and in other outlying areas.
From the standpoint of target identification, this program would be
more easily carried out than attacks on the more obscure, smaller, and
diverse transport targets in the south.
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A major interdiction attack against logistic targets would
achieve optimum results if it were combined with the mining of the three
major ports. The mining program would require initially 104 sorties and
190 tons of ordnance. The closing of the ports to oceangoing traffic
would throw almost all of North Vietnam's import traffic onto the rail
connections to China. The Hanoi-Dong Dang line would then be operating'
at or close to full capacity. If other essential import requirements
were generated by attacks on industrial facilities, such as the
Haiphong cement plant, import traffic requirements would then exceed
the capacity of the rail line. With only limited highway capacity
available, interdiction of northern transport lines would then have
a more immediate and direct impact. The flow of military supplies
into North Vietnam and onward to South Vietnam would be slowed up and
made more costly. Some economic imports would probably have to be fore-
gone. In summary, the North Vietnamese regime would by this program be
brought under far stronger pressure from air attacks than that obtained
by the pattern of airstrikes in 1965.
It appears that air interdiction with the weapons available and
at the level of sorties i'lown in 1965 will place no real restraint on
the level of Communist activity in South Vietnam until their requirements
for resupply are much higher than now estimated. It is concluded that
to stop the flow of supplies by land from North Vietnam to South Vietnam,
allied forces must physically occupy the Panhandle of Laos and completely
control a belt across the northern part of South Vietnam. Even then the
andiccould
North Vietnamese would not be at the ends oftheir options
undertake alternative means of resupply such sea
increased use of routes through Cambodia.
F. Some Probable Limits to Resupply
There should be some multiple of the level of air attacks, how-
ever, that would increase the cost to the regime and place an upper
limit on the level of support that it would be willing to maintain. In
order to maintain the supply lines and support the logistic effort in
1965, it is estimated that at least 200,000 full-time laborers and
100,000 part-time workers were required. This number is equivalent to
about 20 percent of the industrial labor force. Most of these workers
probably come from the agricultural sector, but even their diversion
could have an unfavorable impact on agricultural production, particu-
larly in a country where food is in short supply. If this diversion
of labor has to increase substantially additional quantities of food
would have to be imported to make up for production foregone. This not
only would cause increased internal distribution problems but also
would aggravate the entire import program, particularly if the major
ports were closed by mining and the rail connections to China were sub-
jected to heavy interdiction.
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One of the key determinants in the effectiveness of the inter-
diction effort is the level of supplies required by the Communist forces
in South Vietnam. As these requirements increase, the interdiction
efforts have a greater chance of success. As allied offensive operations
increase in South Vietnam, the Communists will be forced to fight more
and will thus use supplies at a higher rate. This will also be true if
they on their own initiative try to step up the pace of the fighting.
At the same time, if sweep operations uncover and destroy stockpiles of
weapons and ammunition the Communist forces will be forced to depend
to a larger extent on the flow of supplies from external sources. If
the operations in South Vietnam could impose a total dependence on
external sources for supply, the daily external logistic requirement
would be six times the present level. This requirement could be satis-
fied through the existing supply network. If, however, the Communist
forces build up to the force levels projected for the end of 1966,
fight at intensive levels of combat, and are completely dependent on
external sources, the North Vietnamese would be hard pressed to meet
total requirements through land routes alone.
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III. The "Will of the Regime as a Target System"
In North Vietnam, three main factors appear to affect the determina-
tion of the regime to continue to support the war in South Vietnam:
(1) the course of the war itself in the South; (2) the degree of political
and material support rendered the regime by its two main allies, the
USSR and Communist China; and (3) the economic, social, and political
consequences within North Vietnam itself of supporting the war in South
Vietnam. The effort required in supporting the war in South Vietnam
draws very little on the physical resources of North Vietnam. The
neutralization of given target systems within North Vietnam does, how-
ever, exact an increasing cost as the price to be paid for supporting
the insurgency. This Appendix examines the various target systems
within North Vietnam, with the exception of lines of communication,
ranks them in a rough order of their importance to the military effort,
presents a judgment on the feasibility or desirability of subjecting
them to air attack, and evaluates the probable impact of recommended
attacks. Estimates of the forces and ordnance required are presented
only for those target systems which it is believed currently offer
defensible and fruitful choices in attaining the objectives of the Rolling
Thunder program.
A. The Military Supply Target System
Even assuming that the field commanders will have the authority
to neutralize all military target systems which prevent control of
North Vietnam's airspace, there remain valid military supply and
military/economic target systems. The destruction of these targets
would compound the adjustment problems which the North Vietnamese have
had to face in countering the attacks from the 1965 Rolling Thunder
program.
In the North Vietnamese military supply system there are 15
troop barracks, 5 ammunition depots, and 6 supply and ordnance depots
designated as fixed targets by the JCS which have not been attacked
(see Table D-1). These facilities primarily support North Vietnamese
military activity in the North; nevertheless, a number of these facili-
ties also serve as training areas for Viet Cong forces and are supply
points for North Vietnamese and Viet Cong forces operating in South
Vietnam.
The effectiveness of the postulated attack on these facilities
will depend on the extent to which they are in fact in active use.
The Hanoi regime appears to have abandoned or dispersed some facilities
of this type into the countryside where they will be less vulnerable
to air attacks. The dispersion of troops and the abandonment of bar-
racks has been quite widespread. Because construction of temporary
storage facilities for ammunition and ordnance may be more difficult
in North Vietnam's tropical climate, the extent of their dispersion is
less certain and probably less widespread.
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Military Supply Target System
Estimated Sorties
Ordnance
Name Strike
Support
Total
Requirement
Tons
JCS Target Number
22
Xuan Mai SSW
44
24
68
99.0
6
23
Xuan Mai NNW
28
24
52
3.0
31
Ha Dong Barracks/Supply Depot
100
32
132
225.0
34
Vinh Yen North
46
20
66
103.5
35
Son Tay SW
34
20
54
76.5
44
39.29
Kep Ha NE
64
28
92
.0
1
4
39.33
Trai Thon
24
16
40
5
.0
8
39.37
Vinh Yen NNE
26
20
46
.5
5
4
39.38
Phu Tho NW
18
16
34
0.5
4
39.41
Ngoc Thai
18
16
34
0.5
39.42
Son Dong SSE
54
16
70
121.5
4
39.43
Kep South
20
16
36
5.0
39.44
Chi Ne
18
16
34
40.5
39.46
Bien Son NNE
132
20
152
297.0
0
8
39.51
Nom Son
8
8
16
1
.
Ammunition depots
45
Haiphong 76
28
104
114.0
47.14
Vinh Yen 32
20
52
48.0
16
47
Hon Gai Explosives Storage 28
12
40
42.0
.
17
47
Cam Ly 24
20
44
36.0
.
47.21
Bac Giang 20
16
36
45.0
Supply/ordnance depots
58
Hanoi South 28
24
52
21.0
Hanoi North 30
20
50
22.5
60
Thai Nguyen North 14
20
34
10.5
62
Van Dien 16
20
36
12.0
63.11
Van Dien Vehicle Depot 58
32
9o
4+3.5
63.14
Son Tay 34
24
58
25.5
9944
5 88
1,522
1,846.5
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On balance, destruction of these targets would impede teafy w
of material in the military supply system and would disrupt
training programs in North Vietnam, but it does not appear likely to
decisively cripple the military effort of the regime. The effects
would be even more disruptive if other recommended attacks against
military/economic targets and lines of communication were carried out.
These added attacks would greatly complicate but still not eliminate
the flow of essential military supplies into North Vietnam and their
eventual distribution to military consumers.
B. The Military/Economic Target System
The economic targets in North Vietnam's modern industrial base
which have a direct bearing on the regime's ability to support the
war in the South are the major bulk petroleum hstoragelfaciltes and
Haiphong cement plant (see Table D-2). The pesroleumisi iaagevi-
stallations are vital to maintaining supply
ties within North Vietnam and through Laos, to the mobility of North
Vietnamese military forces, and to distribution and transport services
for the civilian economy. The Haiphong cement plant as the sole pro-
ducer in North Vietnam provides a major input to both normal construc-
tion activity and the intensive reconstruction and repair programs
necessitated by Rolling Thunder attacks.
1. Petroleum Storage Facilities
Previous airstrikes against bulk petroleum facilities de-
stroyed or rendered useless four storage facilities which represented
about 37,000 tons of bulk storage capacity. The estimated expansion of
airstrikes against eight major storage terminals would would eethenre-
only
gime of an additional 165,000 tons of capacity. There
4,000 tons of residual capacity in two of the four bombed sites and some
10,000 tons of storage dispersed in a variety of untargeted locations,
identi-
including some 2,200 tons in small buried tanks at seven newly
fied dispersed storage facilities. Thus the planned attacks would elimi-
nate the principal bulk petroleum terminals in North Vietnam and would
cby tankers. . About
preclude the delivery of petroleum supplies n bulk
90 percent of North Vietnam's imports of petroleum de-
livered by tanker.
A minimum of 440 sorties, comprising 280 strike and 160
support aircraft, will probably be required to destroy the
facilities. Losses resulting from ~centlrordefenses
aircpa,ft. The ordnance
targets are estimated at about 3 pe
requirement for these targets is estimated to be about 850 tons.
In 1965 the total supply of petroleum, all imported, was
about 175,000 tons. Although coal is the principal source of primary
energy, this amount of petroleum probably represents North Vietnam's
minimum essential needs. In relation to normal monthly rates of con-
sumption, North Vietnam's storage capacity represents almost a year's
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Military/Economic Target System
JCS T
t
Capacity
Estimated Sorties
Ordnance
arge
Number
Petroleum storage
Name
Metric Tons)
Strike
fa port
Total
Requirement
Tons 25X1
facilities a/
48
Haiphong
49
Hanoi (Thanh Am)
72,000
34
0
58
24
82
196.0
51.1
Phuc Yen
,
00
4
36
24
60
121.5
51.17
Duong Nham
1
,000
4
50
24
8
1o
51
Nguyen Khe
1
,000
000
13
38
20
5
58
85.5
51.13
Do Son
,
8
000
40
20
60
135.0
51.11
Bac Giang
,
22
12
34
49.5
51.14
(Phu Lang Thuong)
Viet T
i
6,000
20
16
36
4
r
4,000
20
20
40
5.0
45.0
Total
165,000
284
160
444
846.5
Cement plant
Haiphong
700,000 to
4
16
800,000
20
13.5
a. Previous strikes at four facilities have eliminated almost 37,000 tons of capacity.
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supply. Therefore, if the attack is to obtain optimum effect, it is
imperative that it be carried out almost simultaneously on all petro-
leum storage targets. Simultaneous attack insures the most certain
way of eliminating the cushion represented by excess storage capacity
and stocks and thus creating a critical shortage of supplies to meet
essential requirements. The loss of petroleum storage facilities --
and their contents -- would have an immediate effect on the economy.
The effect on normal industrial production activities would be slight
because most of the industrial enterprises in North Vietnam rely on
coal or electricity for energy. Consumption of petroleum by individual
civil consumers is negligible. The major effect in the civilian
economy would be in transportation. Civilian motorized transporta-
tion would come to a quick halt if imports of petroleum were interdicted
continuously. The transport of food, raw materials, and finished goods
would be curtailed drastically. Relief would be found only to the ex-
tent that priority transport and distribution problems could be handled
by primitive means of transport or through use of existing stockpiles.
A sustained loss of petroleum storage facilities coupled
with an inability to import even minimum operating requirements would
have its greatest effect on military operations. North Vietnamese
military forces account for about 60 percent of total petroleum consump-
tion, or a monthly average of about 8,500 tons. North Vietnam with
Chinese cooperation would probably be able to maintain petroleum im-
ports at almost normal levels even after the intensified attacks dis-
cussed in this Appendix. Therefore, the supply of essential imports
of petroleum for military requirements would appear to be almost certain.
Nevertheless, the attack would compound the difficulties
of maintaining the flow of civilian and military imports on the land
transport connections with Communist China. The difficulties would be
increased as attacks on other target systems increased the traffic
flows in these land and coastal water transport routes.
2. Haiphong Cement Plant
An attack on the Haiphong cement plant would neutralize
North Vietnam's only producer of cement and create a major impediment
to reconstruction and repair programs at least in the short run. Over
the longer term, cement could be imported from Communist China. The
import requirement could be in the order of 700,000 to 800,000 tons a
year and would require a doubling of the present volume of all seaborne
imports. If the cement and all seaborne imports had to be carried on
the rail line from China, the total traffic volume would be in excess
of the normal capacities of the Hanoi-Dong Dang rail line and the high-
way connections to China and would be far in excess of their capacity
under conditions of interdiction.
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C. The Modern Industrial Target System
The modern industrial target system of North Vietnam consists
of those major facilities which cumulatively represent Hanoi's hopes
for economic development and growth. However, excluding those military
and military-related industrial facilities and the fertilizer plants
which contribute directly and solely to agricultural output, the bulk
of the modern industrial facilities contribute in only a minor way to
the maintenance of the war effort.
Hence, modern industry has been called a "hostage target system"
in the sense that, while its destruction could well have a considerable
psychological impact on the Hanoi leadership, its output is not essen-
tial for the continuation of the insurgency in the South and is only
indirectly related to the maintenance of military defense in the North.
Such an attack is often postulated on the ground that by de-
priving Hanoi of almost all of its modern economy and the major hall-
marks of its economic progress the regime will be persuaded to enter
into negotiations to end the war. This outcome is uncertain and prob-
ably unlikely. North Vietnam's modern industrial economy makes almost
no direct or significant contribution to the war effort which is sus-
tained materially almost exclusively by supplies from other Communist
countries. Since North Vietnam is essentially a subsistence economy,
the industrial sector also makes only a limited contribution to economic
activity. The loss of industrial production would have almost no impact
on the great mass of this agrarian society. The small element of the
population directly affected would hardly be sufficient, or disposed,
to persuade the regime to stop the war. For these reasons an attack on
the modern industrial base of itself would not be likely to attain US
objectives.
The experience of the Korean War also supports this judgment.
Korea in 1950 was a country with a population considerably smaller and
an industrial base much larger than that of North Vietnam in 1965.
Most of Korea's modern industry was destroyed in the first three
months of the war. One year later, hydroelectric plants were attacked
to increase pressures on the regime. Attacks in the spring of 1953
against irrigation dams brought further pressure on the Korean economy.
This carefully phased program failed to force the enemy to accept UN
truce proposals. In both North Korea and North Vietnam it is clear
that the modern industrial base is too small to serve as a testing ground
for the "hostage" concept of industrial destruction as a means of deter-
ring aggression.
Attacks on modern industrial facilities, however, would become
potentially more promising when and as the effect of other actions --
the war in the South and the results of other Rolling Thunder programs --
gave a cumulative indication of effective pressure upon the regime.
At this time an extension of the Rolling Thunder program to attacks on
these facilities could add significantly to the psychological pressures
influencing the regime's attitude toward negotiations.
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I I
There are three categories of plants which fall within the
general classification of modern industrial facilities. These are the
electric powerplants, the newly constructed heavy industry facilities,
and a variety of factories which produce civilian-type goods for the
most part. Because these plants are only indirectly related to the
military effort, none of them is recommended for priority consideration
as targets at this time. They are discussed briefly below.
1. Electric Power
The electric power facilities which would be the object of
the postulated attacks are the thermal powerplants at Hanoi, Thai
Nguyen, and Hon Gai, and the Dong Anh transformer substation which
feeds power from three sources to the city of Hanoi. In addition, the
thermal powerplants at Viet Tri, Haiphong city, the Haiphong cement
plant, and Lao Cai would also become inoperable (see Table D-3).
Destruction of these facilities, including those destroyed so far, would
raise the total loss of power-generating capacity to 160,000 kilowatts,
or 91 percent of national capacity. These strikes would bring modern
industry in the affected areas to a virtual halt and would severely
disrupt the highly electrified operations at the port of Cam Pha.
Among the major industrial installations that would prob-
ably be shut down are the Hanoi machine building plant; the Hanoi
rubber products plant; the Nam Dinh textile plant; the March 8 textile
plant; the Thai Nguyen iron and steel plant and iron ore mines; the
Hon Gai coal mines; the paper mill, chemical combine, and sugar re-
finery at Viet Tri; the Haiphong cement plant and phosphate plant;
and the Lao Cai apatite mines.
If the attacks on the electric power facilities were effec-
tively executed, the North Vietnamese would be hard pressed to restore
power to the degree necessary to resume industrial production. Destruc-
tion of the targeted power facilities would also deny to agriculture
an estimated 30 to 40 percent of the power supply now used in agricul-
ture. The country lacks both the capability to manufacture the required
equipment and the technical skills necessary to reconstruct the power-
plants.
2. Heavy Industry
As noted earlier, successful air attacks on the 8 remaining
electric power facilities in North Vietnam would eliminate the power
sources for 13 major industrial facilities and, as a result, would
bring most modern industrial activity in North Vietnam to a halt.
Nevertheless, physical destruction of heavy industrial plant facili-
ties could have considerable psychological impact on the regime.
Both the time and resources required for reconstruction of these
facilities -- in addition to the requirements for replacing damaged
electric power facilities -- would further set back North Vietnamese
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Modern Industrial Target System
JCS Target Number Name
Capacity
(Kilowatts)
Electric power
facilities a/
81
Hanoi Thermal Powerplant
32,500
82.16
Thai Nguyen Thermal Powerplant
24,000
82.13
Hon Gai Thermal Powerplant
15,000
82.24
Dong Anh Transformer Substation
82.17
Viet Tri Thermal Powerplant
16,000
82.12
Haiphong Cement Plant Thermal Power
plant
12,000
80
Haiphong Thermal Powerplant
6,000
82.14
Lao Cai Thermal Powerplant
8,000
Total
113,500
Heavy industry
77 Hanoi Machine Building Plant
76 Thai Nguyen Iron and Steel Plant jJ
75 Viet Tri Chemical Combine 12
Tran Hung Dao Machinery Plant J
Light industry
Nam Dinh Textile Plant W
Viet Tri Paper Mill b
March 8 Textile Mill jJ
Sao Vang Rubber Products Plant in Hanoi
a. Previous strikes at 6 plants have eliminated more than 5,000 kilo-
watts of capacity.
b. This target would cease operations as the result of destruction of
electric power facilities.
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plans for eventual industrialization. In this case, the following in-
dustrial targets would be subject to attack.
a. Hanoi Machine Building Plant
This modern plant, which was a key Soviet aid project,
is highly prized by the North Vietnamese as a symbol of advanced tech-
nology.
b. Thai Nguyen Iron and Steel Plant
This 100,000-ton steel mill, which is being built with
Chinese aid, is the most expensive foreign aid project to be built in
North Vietnam. The plant is already producing pig iron and was ex-
pected to be producing crude steel and some rolled products by the end
of 1965.
c. Viet Tri Chemical Combine
This new plant, built by the Chinese and East Germans,
is the center of the industrial chemicals industry in North Vietnam.
d. Tran Hung Dao Machinery Plant
This plant is the second largest machinery and equip-
ment producer in North Vietnam.
3. Light Industry
The following are the major light industry targets of
North Vietnam:
a. March 8 Textile Mill
This plant, which has the capacity to produce 30 mil-
lion meters of cotton fabric annually, was built with Chinese aid and
began operation in 1964.
b. Sao Vang Rubber Products Plant in Hanoi
This Chinese-built plant is the sole producer of rubber
products. Output includes "large" automobile tires (1965 plan: 23,000
units) of 8 types, including truck tires. It also produces some 30
products for the communications industry as well as bicycle tires,
inner tubes, recap tires, and shoe products.
This plant -- the largest producer of cotton fabric in
North Vietnam -- was reconstructed in 1956 and subsequently expanded
with Chinese Communist aid.
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d. Viet Tri Paper Mill
This plant was built with Chinese aid and has a capacity
of 20,000 metric tons. The plant began initial operation in 1961.
D-24
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E. The Agricultural Target bystem
The agricultural target system that has been considered falls
into two categories (see Table D-5). The first is the industrial
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facilities which directly support agricultural output and which consist
primarily of fertilizer plants and one sugar refinery. The other seg-
ment of the target system that has been considered is the breaching of
the levee system on the Red River delta. The potential vulnerability
of North Vietnamese crops to direct attack by chemical agents or plant
pathogens has not been considered.
Agricultural Target System
JCS Target Number Name
Lam Thao Superphosphate Fertilizer Plant
79 Ha Bac Nitrogenous Fertilizer Plant (Bac Giang)
78 Haiphong Phosphate Plant
Viet Tri Sugar Refinery
Van Diem Sugar Mill
The North Vietnamese economy is basically one of subsistence
agriculture. The country imports little food even in poor agricultural
years and depends largely on domestic food production to feed its popu-
lation. More than 80 percent of the labor force is engaged in agricul-
ture, which in 1964 accounted for almost one-half of the gross national
product (GNP). The bulk of this population lives on food produced,
processed, and stored locally. A relatively small shortfall in agricul-
tural production resulting from air attacks could aggravate an already
tight food situation in view of the increased food requirements generated
by the expanded war effort.
1. Industrial Plants
Neutralization of industrial (largely fertilizer) plants
affecting the food supply in North Vietnam would not add significantly
to North Vietnam's problem in feeding its population. Damage to the
targeted fertilizer plants would result in a maximum reduction in
annual output of rice -- totaling 4.5 million to 4.7 million tons in
recent years -- of 50,000 tons. In addition, North Vietnam would be
deprived of the 225,000-ton increase in annual production of rice
which would result from the additions to total capacity for produc-
tion of chemical fertilizer that are scheduled to go into operation
during 1966. Destruction of the sugar refinery would have a negligible
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effect on the food supply. Domestic production of sugar, equalling
about 2 kilograms per capita annually, provides only an average of
21 calories in the daily North Vietnamese diet, and currently unused
capacity at smaller, untargeted facilities could be used to compensate
for the loss of the large plant.
2. The Red River Delta Levees
Another segment of the potential agricultural target is the
levee system in the Red River delta. In order to inflict maximum
damage to the rice crop -- the staple food in North Vietnam -- these
levees would have to be breached at some point in the period mid-July
to mid-August when the Red River is at its height. During this
period, the level of the Red River -- contained by an extensive system
of levees -- is considerably above the level of the surrounding plain.
Also during this period, the newly transplanted fall rice seedlings,
which normally produce about two-thirds of the annual rice harvest,
are most vulnerable to damage.
The areas most vulnerable to flooding if the primary
levees of this system were breached are the Ha Dong area southwest of
the Red River and the Ha Bac area northeast of the river. A secondary
system of levees in these areas has tended to confine the damage from
major floods in the past to roughly 200,000 hectares,* or almost one-
quarter of the total area. Breaching of the secondary levees could
substantially increase the acreage flooded. If only the main levees
were breached, it is estimated that the crop loss would be on the
order of several hundred thousand tons of rice -- or less than 10 per-
cent of the average annual harvest in recent years. If the secondary
levees were also effectively breached, the decrease in rice production
could reach three-quarters of a million tons.
Successful breaching of these levees would also affect
the one and one-half million people in this area, which includes the
city of Hanoi. Furthermore, most of the industrial, commercial, and
military activity in Hanoi and its suburbs would be temporarily halted
until the water receded.
Four factors -- the short time when the attacks on the
levees must be executed, the need for great precision in bombing a
small target, possible North Vietnamese countermeasures, and the
probable adverse public reaction in the West -- detract from "levee
busting." As regards the timing of the attacks, they must be mounted
within the one-month period from mid-July to mid August when the
river is highest -- above 33 feet -- and the fall rice crop is most
vulnerable to flood damage. Within this time period, the attack
should follow an unusually high flood stage (the historic highs of the
river in flood at Hanoi have been just under 39 feet) because the
heights of the primary levees run from 42 to 49 feet.
* One hectare is equal to 2.471 acres.
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As for the factor of precision in bombing, the objective
is to create a series of overlapping craters across the entire crown
of the levee (a distance of approximately 80 feet when the river is at
the 33-foot stage) the lips of which are below the water level in the
river. If achieved, the scouring action of water rushing through the
breach would rapidly deepen and widen the break. A suggested means of
creating the series of overlapping craters is with trains of 1,000-
pound general-purpose bombs consisting of 11 bombs each which penetrate
about 10 feet in average soil and produce craters about 37 feet in
diameter. The following tabulation shows three assurance levels of
cutting the levee when the river is at the 33-foot level:
Percent
Assurance
Number of
Trains
Number of
1,000-Pound
General-Purpose
Bombs
Tonnage
50
5
55
27.5
70
6
66
33.0
85
8
88
44.o
These assurance levels apply only to one breach; from two to four
separate and almost simultaneous breaches are probably required to
achieve the type and extent of flood damage discussed above. Breach-
ing the levees at one point requires heavy bomb loads and accurate
delivery; breaching them at multiple points at the same time is likely
to be even more difficult. The existence of heavy antiaircraft defenses
in the same general area that the levees can be most effectively attacked
further compounds the difficulty.
As regards countermeasures, the North Vietnamese are well
aware of the importance of the levee system to life in the Red River
delta, and the regime has maintained and strengthened the system over
the years. The existence of a secondary system of levees, which are not
here considered as targets for air attack, tends to limit the effects
of breaching the primary system. Well before the initiation of US air
attacks in 1965,'discussions within the North Vietnamese regime of the
importance of the levee system highlighted the success of the Viet Minh
in countering the effects of French destruction of levees and dams and
suggests that past experience has in part prepared the regime for such
an eventuality. One obvious method of countering the effects of a breach
in the levees in the target area is to deliberately breach a number of
the levees upstream and divert the water into less important agricultural
areas. Defensive breaching of this type could rapidly drop the level
of flood water at Hanoi by as much as six feet. A specific illustra-
tion of the sensitivity of the North Vietnamese regime to possible
attacks on levees was contained in a recent report which mentioned the
collection of barrage materials in the Hanoi area to fill breaches in
the levees.
D-29
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Loss of life, homes, and places of work would be exceedingly
disruptive to the social order in the affected areas in the short run
but over the long run, the effect on rice availabilities would prob-
ably be the hardest problem for the regime. The loss of several hundred
thousand tons of rice, particularly in a year of below-average harvests,
would force the regime to seek outside sources of supply. Communist
China, which in an average year produces 75 million to 85 million tons
of rice, could provide the necessary amount. Under conditions of con-
tinuing air interdiction of the land links between North Vietnam
and Communist China, transport of such supplies could be difficult.
The factors of timing, bombing difficulty, and North Vietnamese counter-
measures all argue against attempting to breach the levees; similarly,
the regime would be quick to exploit the political advantage provided
by such attacks.
F. The Manpower Target System
North Vietnam is an essentially agrarian society with less than
15 percent of the population living in urban areas. Of the more than two
million urban population, 928,000 are concentrated in the eight largest
cities and their populations are as follows:
Population
Hanoi
475,000
Haiphong
210,000
Nam Dinh
90,000
Vinh
46,000
Thank Hoa
35,000
Thai Nguyen
28,000
Viet Tri
26,000
Dong Hoi
18,000
Area bombing attacks of the type mounted against Japan in World
War II could be mounted against these cities. Civilian casualties
in Japan were about 600,000 (excluding those from atomic weapons), or
a ratio of about 4 casualties per ton of bombs. Most of the tonnage was
dropped on urban areas in Japan. Several factors suggest that such
attacks against North Vietnamese cities would not necessarily result in
as high a proportion of casualties as those resulting from the attacks
against Japan. Unlike the very high proportion of wooden structures
in Japanese cities, brick and masonry construction is a common feature
of North Vietnamese cities. Traditional Asian methods of construction
with wood and fibres tend to be seen chiefly on the outskirts of the
larger cities of North Vietnam and do not predominate except in the
smaller towns and villages. Because of their construction, North Viet-
namese cities do not appear to be as vulnerable to incendiary attack
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I I
and fire damage as were Japanese cities. Furthermore, differences in
the layout of North Vietnamese cities further decrease their vulner-
ability to bombing damage. For example, the system of wide boulevards
which compartment the city of Hanoi and the network of canals which runs
through Haiphong city constitute fairly effective firebreaks. Other
examples of differences in urban layout are Thai Nguyen, in which the
two main built-up areas are separated from one another by a few miles
of rice fields and scattered dwellings, and Viet Tri, in which several
built-up areas are dispersed along the banks above the junction of two
rivers.
There are also good indications that the regime's civil defense
program is more effective than the Japanese program in World War II.
Partial evacuation of the larger North Vietnamese cities has already
been undertaken as was the case in Japan prior to the attacks in the
spring of 1945. However, the early warning system of North Vietnam and
its shelter programs in the cities appear to be better conceived and,
during the attacks of 1965, better carried out than was the case in
Japan. Finally, the regime has made it clear to the North Vietnamese
people that they must expect air attacks -- at least some of the
casualties in Japan are credited to the government-sponsored belief
that serious bombing attacks could never occur.
For these reasons, it is believed that casualties (the total
of killed and wounded) in attacked areas of North Vietnamese cities
are likely to be less than was the case in Japan.
Under conditions of continuing industrial activity, bombing
attacks on urban areas would probably have the greatest effect on
North Vietnam's limited supply of skilled manpower. Approximately
85 percent, or about 255,000, of North Vietnam's supply of skilled
manpower lives and works in the eight cities considered as targets.
Roughly 150,000 of this total is concentrated in two cities -- Hanoi,
about 105,000, and Haiphong, L+5,000. Qualitatively, the manpower loss
to the regime from these air attacks would be most severe in the
Hanoi-Haiphong area since the concentration of the more advanced indus-
trial facilities in this area means that the most highly skilled among
the labor force are likely to become casualties.
Extensive physical damage would also result from these attacks
and a large proportion of surviving urban population would evacuate
to near-by rural areas. In the short run, the organizational effort
necessary to reallocate most of the urban labor force in addition to
implementing further defense measures and the necessary adjustments
in the agricultural labor force would strain the limited management
capabilities of North Vietnam's cadre force. Much of the manpower
made available to the regime would be wasted through irrational assign-
ments, and many urban workers would probably be left to their own
devices long enough to scatter into sparsely populated areas where an
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inadequate control system would make it almost impossible to channel
them into essential jobs. The existence of the fairly efficient and
resilient communications system and a reasonably well-disciplined
Vietnamese Workers Party apparatus of around 900,000 members would be
prime assets in the regime's attempts to solve this problem. Never-
theless, the morale of the nonagricultural labor force would probably
decline with a consequent lowering of its potential productivity due
to numerous casualties, transfers from normal jobs, separation from
families, and the probable demand for further amounts of uncompensated
Labor.
Medical services in North Vietnam are inadequate to meet the
nation's normal public health needs. These services, therefore, can
provide only minimum emergency care and treatment of additional
civilian casualties. The small numbers of civilian medical and para-
medical personnel (estimated to include 1,400 physicians, 2,300 doctors'
assistants, and 8,000 nurses in 1965), most of whom are poorly trained,
are unable to cope with the high incidence of nutritional, infectious,
and parasitic diseases. They presumably have been hard pressed to
service the relatively few war casualties sustained thus far. The
civilian and military hospitals (only 25,000 beds), convalescent homes,
and village medical stations are, with few exceptions, poorly equipped
and chronically overcrowded. Moreover, with the exception of several
important combat-related items, medicines are in short supply. The
exceptions are mainly penicillin, blood plasma, and sulfa drugs, large
stocks of which have been accumulated as a result of greatly increased
imports during the past year. The stockpile of penicillin is estimated
to be sufficient, according to US experience, to meet the needs of more
than 800,000 troops in active combat for one year.
It has not been possible in the time available to arrive at an esti-
mate of the bomb tonnage required to bring the eight leading cities of
North Vietnam under air attack. Nor was an estimate made of the prob-
able level of casualties. Clearly, heavy attack on these cities would
result both in severe physical damage as well as widespread casualties,
particularly if the attacks were concentrated in time. The major reason
for giving skilled manpower a lower target priority at this time is
that of the probable adverse effects of such attack on Western opinion
while a large number of industrial and military targets remained in-
tact. The manpower attack is one which, by its very nature, is attrac-
tive as a "last ditch" effort, after other target systems have been
generally neutralized and the regime nevertheless continues to press
on with the conflict.\
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2E
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D-1 North Vietnam: JCS Transportation Targets Attacked and Not Attacked
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THE EFFECTIVENESS OF AIR ATTACKS IN OTHER WARS
The United States has engaged in three previous wars in which air
power has played a major role as a means of conducting offensive war-
fare.
The air war against Korea. is most
similar to the air war being conducted in North Vietnam. For this reason
the Korean War is examined in considerable detail to evaluate the at-
tempts to interdict North Korea's transport system and to evaluate the
lessons this experience may have for the Rolling Thunder program.
SECRET
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Next 11 Page(s) In Document Denied
Iq
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 Approved For Release 2008/10/16: CIA-RDP80TO1629R000300080014-9
III. The Air War Against North Korea
A. Introduction
The lessons learned in one war against an adversar
strategy and tactics a y using
applied with success ppanotherropriatewar foe ht me and place cannot often be
Improved weapons alone can negate the lessonsdof anfearliercwar. Fur.
more, each war is unique in its total setti t
nomic realities of a North Vietnam are not those of eapNoith Ko ea ad eco-
than the tropical setting of the former is equal to theoharshcl mate more
the latter.
This appendix reviews the environment of the two wars and places
particular emphasis on the attempts by US aviation forces to interdict
the transportation system and to destroy the heavy
Korea. In spite of the differences between North oreas and NorthrVSetnam
these aspects of US operations in North Korea are relevant to current US
air operations in North Vietnam.
B. Similarities and Differences of Environment
Numerous similarities exist between the present war in Vietnam
and the Korean. War. Each conflict involves a divided country
nist China looms over the northern border of both North Korea.andommu-
Vietnam as a major supplier of war materiel and as a North
parti or
participant. Many contrasts exist also. The ocoprnt is
and climatic setting of the military actions in South Vietnam are unlike
those fought in Korea. Instead of the guerrilla and infiltration tactics
characteristic of today's war in South Vietnam, the Korean War eventu-
ally involved large-scale land armies.
Other contrasts can help put the two conflicts in perspective.
North Korea occupies an area of about 47,000 square miles and in 1953
had a Population of 9 million; North Vietnam has an area of 61,000
square miles and a population of 18 million.
C. Interdiction in North Korea
1. Introduction
In the summer of 1951 as talks about a truce began and the
fighting lulled, the US Eighth Army
Korea were stockpiling daily 800 tons calculated
of supplies behind their lines.
It was feared that the enemy would "reach a degree of preparedness
previously unparalleled in the Korean War."
peratione Iran this
buildup, the Far East Air Force (FEAF
) planned To
a comprehensive interdiction cam ai n Operation Strangle,
and highways. p g against North Korea's railroads
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(1}
ectives: the
Operation Strangle had two principal obj continuing
out of the North Korean rail system by maintaining
ai l c lkcnguts at numerous points and by destroying rolling stock and equip-
r
ra
a Sorwh which Korean
ment, and (2) the disrupting of rail services so that the
effective totoutransportse the of their
and Chinese u u der forces
could be e brought ght un
military supplies.
postmortems on Operation Strangle have claimed that the
codename was an unfortunate choice because e it implied Are hanehad mirrors initial
been intended. Nevertheless, that ro ram.
optimism about the probable effectiveness of an interdiction p
For example, one official statement at the beginning of Operation
Strangle claimed:
The Fifth Air Force and attached units in
conjunction with US Naval Air units and
FEAF Bomber Command have the capabiltyn
of destroying the enemy's rail system
North Korea, and of hindering his highway
transportation system to such an extent
that he will not be capable of opposing
the US Eighth Army effectively.
Starting in August 1951 and extending over the next
11 months, 81,600 interdiction and armed reconnaissance sorties were
flown by the USAF, and more than l04,000 tons of bombs were droppedrast,
during the interdiction and armed reconnaissance
North Vin a similar time period (February- naorth Vietnam,
ie rockets
27,900 sorties were flown and 3+,300 tons of bombs, e,a During
? were expended against fixed and OOOstonseofabombs were
The e average
month for Rolling Thunder occurred in
dropped operation monthly. . an
drop and rockets were
December 1965 when 5,500 tons of bombs, napalm,
ar comparison of air operations in the Korean War
and d in neN North Viet et nam (Rolling
e. A y Thunder) is presented in Table E-2. first US Operation Strangle was first hvof,theeKorean WarathemAir
at interdiction in Korea. In the first year
Force had flown 70,000 interdiction and armed reconnaissance sorties
port
out of a total of 1+0,000 combat sortie, but given the f tid military
situation had required that major emphasis of combat troops.
le contro-
~- Because of its unfortunate athettimespas considerable si aderay Opc
an con
history are
versy The Korean War) about
Strangle. The time limits usOdaStrangle (later rOperation
used in this Appendix. Thus Operation June ~9~2.
Saturate) began in August 1951 and continued through
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2? Railroad Interdiction -
- Operation Strangle
ces For the first three months
sful. Major rail lines were disruptedperation Strangle was suc-
railroad track faster than the enem , and righter-bombers destroyed
1951, rail movements ceased, even on the ldoubleitrdacked line from the
capital of p o By early October
~y ngyang south to Sariwon just north zone.
BY November 1951, virtually all direct major rail routes to Manchuria
had been severed
g
although limited serviceability existed by shunting
traffic inland and then back to either coastal or other interior
lines. Interdiction and armed reconnss
60 percent of a_ll combat sorties fromatheance accounted for over rail
through the end of 1951? The start of Operation Strangle
expngd heached a pe numbers of sorties flown and bomb tonnages
reconnaissance sorties wein 9700 ion
reOflownrandhmore,thhan110e00 tons o and tambsd
were dropped. In the first two months of Operation Stranl f eri
and reconnaissance targets claimed more than
weight of bombs droe,ntdiction
Aped. 90 percent of the total
These attacks reached a peak of destructiveness in
September through November 1
lamd the restucio or g51. In September, Air Force
vehicles 3 locomotives, 558 freight pilots alone
c and about 1,400 buildings. Rail lines were severed5abouut
15,000 times.*
North Immense damage was done to the transportation system of
Korea, even when allowance is made for the exaggerated
of destruction. The first intense blows did not knck out the system,
however, and in the follows
Korean transport following months the serviceability of the o ter,
system imprved on the
on the railroads and highways were
aonlially. Tonnages bon North
y a small fractioff peacetdime
Y," but the supplies getting through were more than sufficient
The official USAF Historical Study of
War recognizes that pilot's claims of vehicles~destroyedlweree
exaggerated, the results of night attacks being Korean
exalga or check. greatly
In September 1 especially
directive 951 the Fifth Air Force issued a
Force issued to
permitting night intruders to claim enemy
only when the vehicles were seen to burn or explode. requirement probably did not vehicles destroyed
prevent multiple c Yet even this
North Korean truck drivers carried oily r claims. Fliexempla,
they were under attack to feign destructi osandlbe further lighted when
attack. g
when attacks . Eventually., laim of locomotive "kills" werep
only allowed
which the locom
were made using otive was to bebderailed lor in at le owed
three larger and after
separate parts. least
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Table E-2
Comparison of Air Operations in Korea and North Vietnam
Korean War a/ North Vietnam
Entire War Operation Strangle Rolling Thunder
June 1950 - July 1953 August 1951 - June 1952 February - December 1965
Total 710,886 214,485 N.A.
Total combat 461,554 144,724 N.A.
Total interdiction
and armed
reconnaissance J 220,168 81,E;13 27,932
Total combat
expenditures
Bombs (tons) 386,037 118,207 N.A.
Napalm (tons) 32,357 4,313 N.A.
Rockets (rounds) 313,600 50,707 N.A.
Expenditures for
interdiction and
armed reconnaissance
Bombs (tons) 218,448 104,115
Napalm (tons) 3,815 2,192 34,261
Rockets (rounds) 97,885 30,492
Damage J
Bridges
Destroyed
Damaged
1,153 223 161
3,049 763 432
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Comparison of Air Operations in Korea and North Vietnam
(Continued)
Korean War J North Vietnam
Entire War Operation Strangle Rolling Thunder
June 1950 - July 1953 August 1951 - June 1952 February - December 1965
Damage (Continued)
Destroyed
65
41
N.A.
Damaged
939
257
N.A.
Destroyed
963
272
6
Damaged
1,171
345
6
Freight cars
Destroyed
l0,407
3,638
227
Damaged
22,674
7,069
592
Ra
ilroad cuts
28,621
24,251
N.A.
Tr
v
ucks and other
ehicles
Destroyed
82,920
33,210
483
Damaged
33,131
14,768
565
Bu
ildings
Destroyed
118,231
9,109
1,837 J
Damaged
88,461
17,382
2,266 J
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Table E-2
(Continued)
Korean War J
North Vietnam
Entire War
June 1950 - July 1953
Operation Strangle
August 1951 - June 1952
Rolling Thunder
February - December 1965
Damage (Continued)
Oil storage tanks
Destroyed
16
N.A.
Damaged
3
N.A.
Barges and boats
Destroyed
593
225
460
Damaged
'821
284
753
Average inventory
Bombers, light
192 /
150
Bombers, medium
118/
103
Fighters
1,511 i/
982 J
Operational losses
B-26
168
57
B-29
57
24
F-51
300
98
F-80
277
67
F-82
11
2
F-84
21+9
121
F-86
184
66
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Comparison of Air Operations In Korea and North Vietnam
(Continued)
a. Excluding sorties flown by the US Navy and Marines and by other friendly forces. During the
Korean War, Navy and Marine aircraft flew 275,912 combat sorties: 204,995 offensive, 44,160
defensive, and 26,757 reconnaissance. Ordnance expenditures were 178,399 tons of bombs and
274,189 rounds of rockets. Navy aircraft were heavily engaged in Operation Strangle, but no
specific data, comparable to USAF statistics, are available.
b. Including close support, strategic, counter-a,ir-offensive, counter-air-defensive, recon-
naissance, and interdiction and armed reconnaissance, but excluding combat support sorties such
as rescue, cargo, and tactical control.
c. A mission with the primary purpose of penetrating enemy lines and destroying or damaging
traffic, communications, and movement significant to the enemy's military operation in a given
area..
d. Including 6,928 sorties against fixed targets and 17,129 armed reconnaissance sorties.
e. In addition,,Na.vy and Marine aircraft destroyed during the Korean War: 2,005 bridges, 391
locomotives, 5,896 freight cars, 7,437 vehicles, and 44,828 buildings.
f. Barracks, warehouses, and miscellaneous buildings.
g. Peak average inventory, April-June 1953.
h. Average inventory, July-September 1951.
i. In addition, 564 Navy and Marine aircraft were lost to enemy action between 25 June 1950
and 27 July 1953.
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to support the Communist armies in the field. The North Koreans and
Chinese developed an increasing capability to repair damage from air
attacks and to get both rail and highway traffic moving again. Repairs
were being made so rapidly that by late December 1951 the Fifth Air
Force recognized that "the enemy had broken our railroad blockade of
P'yongyang and ... [has] won the use of all key rail arteries."
In February 1952, Operation Strangle (renamed Operation
Saturate) was modified to reflect the lessons of the previous six months.
Railroad interdiction was still emphasized, but attacks were concen-
trated against specific pre-targeted segments of the rail line. The
change in air operations, and its successes and failures, can be seen in
a description of one attack made against the rail line between Chongju
and Sinanju. In a leadoff attack in late March 1952, 307 fighter-bombers
dropped 530 1,000-pound bombs and 81- 500-pound bombs. The following day,
160 fighters dropped 322 1,000-pound bombs. During the night, B-26's
dropped 42 500-pound bombs on what had already become a major gap in
the rail line. However, the ability of the North Koreans to repair
rail damage had further improved; within six days the roadbed was almost
completely rebuilt and the tracks were replaced. The 48-hour attack
and the expenditure of 450 tons of bombs had interdicted the rail line
for 6 to 7 days but had required the commitment of almost the entire
fighter-bomber force. At the same time other rail lines had remained
open.
In April 1952 a penetrating staff study by the Air Force
recognized that in spite of the vast damage inflicted the interdiction
operation had not achieved its objectives and that such operations were
becoming more costly in terms of casualties to air crews and aircraft
lost and damaged. Furthermore, some of the most modern US weaponry was
being effectively countered by hordes of unskilled labor and minimum
amounts of easily attainable materials.
Policy changes which emerged from the staff study
emphasized the need to inflict maximum damage on the enemy and to
minimize US losses, and included some shifts in targets. Thus, while
locomotives, motor vehicles, and other transportation targets were
still rated as prime targets, equal or greater emphasis was given to
radar, guns, supply depots, mines, powerplants, and military schools.
In effect, the new targeting took account of economic principles.
From attempts to physically cut the rail and highway systems the
attack moved to inflict maximum damage upon the enemy's limited stock
of military and transport capital in North Korea, capital which could
not be replaced by the labor of unskilled peasants. Nevertheless,
the new attack policy, announced in July 1952, admitted that "obstruc-
tion of enemy supply movement in Korea cannot prevent the enemy from
gradually building up his stockpile." Although the Air Force con-
tinued to bomb selected bridges and rail targets during the remaining
year of the war, Operations Strangle and Saturate were at an end.
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3. Evaluation of Operation Strangle
Operation Strangle and Operation Saturate failed to
achieve their objectives not only because there was an insufficient
number of aircraft to maintain an adequate number of rail cuts but
also because enemy countermeasures were more successful than had been
estimated. Communist antiaircraft defenses increased markedly, and
the Communists showed an increasing ability to improvise repairs, to
build bypass lines, and to mass peasant labor to maintain and repair
essential supply lines.
The decline in returns from Operation Strangle can
be seen from an analysis of bombs expended and damage achieved. During
July 1951, the month before Operation Strangle got under way, approxi-
mately 6,600 tons of bombs had been dropped on interdiction targets
in North Korea. Bombs expended increased sharply in August to 8,300
tons. From August to September, bombs expended increased by about
2,000 tons, or one-fourth, and the estimated value of destruction
increased by about three times. After November, however, there was
a steady trend of diminishing returns from the bombing attacks despite
a fairly steady expenditure of bombs at an average rate of 9,800 tons
per month. As shown in Figure E-3, the index of value of damage per
ton of bombs declined from a peak of 100 in September 1951 to 39 in
January 1952 and a low of about 26 in April and June.
b. Railroad Interdiction
During 1950-53 the North Korean rail system consisted
of about 2,300 miles of line, largely standard gauge, and included
approximately 1,800 bridges and 400 tunnels. During the initial stages
of Operation Strangle the Air Force engaged in a multiprong attack
against bridges, rolling stock, tunnels, roadbeds, and rails. Tunnels,
used extensively to protect trains and supplies in daytime attacks,
proved in most instances to be impossible to destroy. Bridges were
difficult targets, but were destroyed consistently.
After the interdiction campaign had been under way for
several months the enemy showed a rapidly increasing capability to
restore damaged bridges. Construction materials were being stockpiled
near key bridges even before US attacks. Simple bypass bridges were
built frequently in from 2 to 4 days. Rail cuts were repaired in
from 2 to 6 hours. Priority was placed on getting a bridge back in
partial operation so that some supplies could begin to flow again
although traffic might remain far below capacity levels.
The North Koreans and Chinese stationed railroad
construction troops along all main supply routes which were under
attack. Units of 50 troops were located at all major rail stations,
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and crews of 10 men were located every 4 miles along the route. In
addition, rail walkers spotted damage to the rail or roadbed. Nearby
inhabitants were recruited for common labor, and sometimes as many
as 1,000 persons were used to repair a damaged section. At dark,
experienced railroad construction crews would move in and make the
actual repairs to the rail line. Furthermore, in portage-like opera-
tions, rail service was maintained on very short stretches of usable
track -- as short as 11 miles -- and freight was unloaded, carried
around rail cuts or damaged bridges, and then reloaded on another train.
c. Highway Interdiction
The road network in North Korea, originally developed
by the Japanese, had always been of secondary importance to the railroads.
Trucks had been used typically for short hauls and served as links
between industrial and commercial centers and the major railroads. North
Korea's principal highways roughly followed the major rail routes from
Manchuria southward. Altogether about 10,000 miles of highways existed,
at best surfaced with gravel or crushed stone.
Although the major interdiction effort of Operation
Strangle was against the North Korean rail system, attacks against trucks
were also pressed, especially night attacks led by B-26's. On one
occasion, an Air Force wing reportedly sighted 3,800 motor vehicles and
attacked 2,600 vehicles in one day. The Air Force claimed that 6,400
trucks were destroyed in October 1951 alone. Highway bridges were also
attacked but proved to be more difficult to interdict effectively than
rail bridges. Bypasses were sometimes built at a considerable distance
from the original bridge and were thus not easily sighted; fords were
built and used during much of the year.
Truck traffic was uncommon during the daylight hours
and at night was hard to locate and to attack effectively. The results
of night attacks against motor vehicles as well as rolling stock were
especially difficult to assess. Trucks usually traveled in convoys of
15 to 20 vehicles, ordinarily under blackout conditions. The mileage
norm for trucks per night was about 60 miles. For example, a round
trip from the Manchurian border to the battle zone required about
10 nights' travel.
d. Night Operations
Even before Operation Strangle began, the North Koreans
had started to move virtually all rail and road traffic at night. The
B-26 bomber was used extensively as a night intruder to harass trucks
and trains along major enemy supply routes. During Operation Strangle,
1,500 to 2,000 sorties were flown monthly by B-26 bombers, about
90 percent of them at night. The heavier B-29 bombers were used to
attack targets at night.
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In the absence of bright moonlight, B-26 attacks
achieved only limited success, and numerous experiments were conducted
with flares to light the targets. Infrared detection systems were
used on a limited scale to locate targets such as locomotives, tanks,
vehicles, and industrial locations. The results of these innovations
were limited, however.
In 1952, as Operation Strangle disrupted railroad
lines, the North Koreans and Chinese made more intensive use of trucks
to transport supplies to the front. In the fall and winter months,
sightings of vehicles declined, and the B-26 night attacks were shifted
to rail cutting and to harassing North Korean night repair activities.
The major lessons from US night-intruder operations
during the Korean War were the following: (1) aircraft, especially the
B-26 that had been designed for day operations, had only limited success
at night in detecting, identifying, and attacking moving targets;
(2) air crews required careful selection and special training for night
operations; and (3) a strong need existed for a family of "denial"
weapons that would successfully interdict rail lines and highways for
periods that would eliminate the need for essentially inefficient
night operations. Night operations were hampered throughout by the
inadequacy of night photography to provide adequate assessment of bomb
damage.
e. The Wa-dong Chokepoint
The Korean War offers an excellent example of the
difficulty of successfully interdicting a transportation chokepoint
by large-scale aerial bombing. In the winter of 1952, while Operation
Saturate was getting under way, target specialists located what appeared
to be a vital chokepoint near the village of Wa-dong in central Korea
about 20 miles north of the 39th parallel. Here a major east-west
railroad passed over a highway from Wonsan on the east coast to the
capital at Pyongyang. About 100 yards further to the west the rail-
road entered a short tunnel. The railroad and highway did not follow
identical alignments across North Korea but came together only at
Wa-dong. Adjacent hills rising to about 300 feet above the valley
floor would have made Wa-dong stand out as an ideal chokepoint to even
the most unimaginative target analyst. The North Koreans had used
both the lateral highway and the railroad to shuttle supplies between
the east and west coastal railroads, thus substantially increasing
the flexibility of the badly damaged rail system. The objective of the
attacks was to block all rail and vehicle movement in the area. Due
to the area's rough terrain, bypassing the chokepoint would have proved
very costly.
For 44 days, from 26 January to 11 March 1952, 77 B-29
and 126 B-26 sorties saturated the target of about 18 acres with
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3,928 500-pound general-purpose bombs, one bomb for every 22 square
yards of target. Bomb assessment reports for 24 days of the 44-day
attack period showed the following results:
Serviceable
10
days
Unserviceable
8
days
Status unknown
6
days
Highway
Serviceable
15
days
Unserviceable
4
days
Status unknown
5
days
24 days
24 days
Bomb assessment reports also revealed that the total
effort had resulted in only 18 actual rail cuts and 15 highway cuts.
The effort at best resulted in the railroad being interdicted for
8 days and the highway for 4 days. Except for temporary disruptions
the North Koreans had suffered very little damage. The bombs had
done little more than churn up the countryside; landslides that had
been hoped for did not occur.
Evaluations made of the Wa-dong experience during the
Korean War led to the conclusion that it is a fallacy to assume that
there is an "area target" for traffic interdiction, and the Far East
Air Forces recommended that airpower be concentrated on pinpoint
bombing against definite targets in preference to area bombing in
any future interdiction attacks.
D. Strategic Bombing
1. Early Bombing
North Korea's modern industry, which was developed by the
Japanese, was considerably greater in total capacity and range of
output in 1950 than North Vietnam's industry in 1965. During the
initial months of the Korean War the B-29's available in the war
theater were engaged in close tactical support of the hard-pressed
US and South Korean forces. Attacks on industrial targets in North
Korea were not feasible until mid-July 1950. In the next three
months the FEAF Bomber Command dropped 10,400 tons of bombs, with
excellent results, on the major targets listed below in Table E-3-
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Strategic Targets Attacked in North Korea
1950
Location
Target
Bomb
Tonnage
Percent of Target
Destroyed or Damaged
Wonsan Dock ar
e
a,
244
50
Locomo
ti
ve shops
372
70
Railro
ad
yards
477
70
Chosen
o
il refinery
327
95
Hungnam Bogun
Ch
emical Plant
695
70
Chosen
Compa
N
ny
itrogen Fertilizer
563
85
Chosen
Compa
N
ny
itrogen Explosives
500
85
Pyongyang Arsena
l
99
70
Kan-Ni
500
15
Shunti
ng
yards
356
30
Railwa
y
shops and yards
584
70
Chongjin Harbor
a
nd submarine base
249
5
Mitsub
is
hi
132
30
Chongjin Iron w
or
ks
203
20
Railro
ad
yards and shops
1,063
55
Rashin Oil st
or
age
49
Negl.
Dock a
re
a,
218
Negl.
Railro
ad
shops and yards
110
Negl.
Chinnampo Marsha
li
ng yards
121
80
Port a
nd
subbase
5
Negl.
Mining
a
nd smelter
248
35
Chosen
R
iken Metals Co.
284
70
Changjingang
Reservoir Pujon
Hy
droelectric Plant No. 1
39
10
Hamhung Railwa
y
shops and yards
547
70
Haeju Chosen
Compa
N
ny
itrogen Explosives
568
10
Railwa
y
shops and yards
104
70
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Strategic Targets Attacked in North Korea,
1950
(Continued)
Location
Target
Bomb P
Tonnage De
ercent
stroye
of Target
d or Damaged
Kyomipo
Iron works
252
40
Marshaling yard
23
Negl.
Kowon
Railway shops and yards
102
10
Songjin
Steel works
326
90
Magnesite Chemical Industry
183
30
Railway shops and yards
280
60
Yangdok
Railway shops and yards
75
85
Namgungni
Storage area,
58
80
Munpyongni
Rising Sun Oil Storage
2
J
Chongju
Railway shops and yards
170
10
Kilchu
Marshaling yards
99
50
Sunchon
Chemical industry and
marshaling yard
138
30
Sariwon
Marshaling yard
81
50
Total
10,446
a. No bomb damage assessment.
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Of 20 strategic targets designated by the JCS, 18 had been destroyed
or severely damaged by late September.
In September 1950, plans were under way to destroy the
modern complex of hydroelectric generating plants that had been
built by the Japanese. On 26 September, 17 B-29's attacked and
inflicted minor damage on the Pujon Hydroelectric Plant, which had
an installed capacity of 128,000 kilowatts. The same day, however,
the JCS suspended attacks on strategic targets.
By late September the Commander of FEAF was able to claim,
"Practically all of the major military targets strategically important
to the enemy forces and to their war potential have now been neutralized."
In a few weeks, North Korea's modern industry had been destroyed. Al-
though such destruction obviously inflicted "punishment" on North Korea's
leadership, the military effect of the strategic bombing was of little
consequence. Military equipment and ammunition continued to flow into
North Korea from China and the USSR.
2. Later Strategic Bombing Efforts
It was not until June 1952 that the hydroelectric
installations previously regarded as "politically sensitive" targets
were again considered as legitimate targets. Over a 3-day period in
June 1952, 730 fighter-bomber sorties by the Fifth Air Force, supported
by sorties from a Navy Task Force, were flown against the power com-
plexes, including the Sui-ho Generating Plant on the Yalu River. Post
strike evaluation of the bombing attack indicated that 90 percent of
North Korea's electric power capacity had been knocked out. For more
than two weeks there was almost a complete blackout in North Korea
until small thermal plants and undamaged hydroelectric plants restored
a small portion of North Korea's pre-attack capacity. Although the
small, dispersed "war-industries" in North Korea obviously suffered
from the loss of electric power, the extent of the damage to industry
in Manchuria, which received much of its electric power from North
Korea, was difficult to assess.
Attacks against the hydroelectric installations came
much too late in the Korean War to have much impact on the outcome or
to do serious damage to North Korea's war effort. The attacks were
designed primarily to exert continued air pressure on the North Koreans
and Chinese to accept UN truce proposals.
b. Irrigation Dams
In the spring of 1953, only slow. progress was being
made at the Panmunjom truce talks. Air Force targets specialists
seeking additional means of increasing air pressure against the
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Communists recognized the importance of the irrigation dams to Korean
rice production. There followed a large-scale and highly successful
attack against a 2,300-foot earth and stone dam about 20 miles north
of P'yongyang. Along with severe damage to a major rail line, the
floodwaters also damaged 5 square miles of prime rice crops.
Other Korean dams were attacked by US fighter-bombers
and B-29's, ostensibly to interdict transportation lines. These later
attacks were less successful because the North Koreans, as in other
circumstances, improvised countermeasures. For example, by rapidly
lowering the water level the North. Koreans made it much more difficult
to destroy or seriously damage the dams.
1. Introduction
The 27,900 sorties flown and the 31+,300 tons of bombs,
napalm, and rockets expended under the Rolling Thunder program from
February through December 1965 are less than one-third the 81,600 sorties
flown and the 104,000 tons of bombs dropped by the Air Force during the
interdiction and armed reconnaissance sorties in the 11 months of Opera-
tion Strangle. In addition, during the Korean War Navy and Marine
aircraft operating from carriers probably also dropped about one-third
as much tonnage as was dropped by the Air Force on interdiction targets.
Even allowing for exaggerated damage claims, it is clear
that there were far more lucrative targets in North Korea than are
being located and destroyed presently in North Vietnam. Destruction
claimed in the 11 months of Operation Strangle in Korea compared with
that claimed for Rolling Thunder in Vietnam through December 1965 is
shown in the following tabulation:
Operation Strangle Rolling Thunder
Locomotives 272 6
Freight cars 3,638 227
Vehicles 33,210 483
Bridges 223 161
Buildings 9,109 1,837
Barges and boats 225 46o
The greater destruction achieved in Korea compared with
North Vietnam is not solely a function of the number of sorties and
the tonnage of bombs dropped. The Rolling Thunder program has had to
operate under an extremely restrictive policy which sharply limits
both the areas in which it can operate and the targets it can attack.
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North Korea's railroads and highways had to supply almost 1 million
troops, 600,000 of whom were at the front. North Korea had almost
2,300 miles of rail lines and 10,000 miles of highways, compared
with North Vietnam's meager 485 miles of rail lines and 5,800 miles
of highways. North Korea had a much larger park of both rolling
stock and trucks. In addition, although the population of North
Vietnam substantially exceeds North Korea's, there was more modern
and semimodern industry in North Korea than is found in North Vietnam.
2. Failure of the Interdiction Campaign
At the time Operation Strangle was under way, it was
estimated that each Chinese division required 50 tons of supplies per
day.* With 60 divisions at the front, approximately 3,000 tons of
supplies had to be moved from Manchuria to the battlefront each day.
Peacetime capacity of the double-tracked line in western
Korea from Sinuiju to Pyongyang was estimated to have a capacity of
from 6,000 to 9,000 tons per day. After maximum interdiction efforts,
it was conservatively estimated that only 500 to 1,500 tons per day
were getting through to the battle zone. The capacity of the east
coast rail line, 5,000 tons per day in peacetime, was reduced to less
than 500 tons per day. Thus railroads were still able to transport
about one-half of the daily requirements. In addition, the North
Koreans and Chinese also relied heavily on trucks and on peasants
carrying supplies strapped to A-frames and even bicycles for moving
supplies to the front. A staff study completed in April 1952 by
two Air Force officers concluded that after seven months of maximum
US effort the Communists still were more than meeting minimum supply
requirements. The study concluded that the accepted figure for the
enemy's minimum supply requirements was 2,700 tons per day under
existing conditions but that more than this amount was being received.
The staff study also stated that over and above daily requirements
the enemy had been able to stockpile approximately 100,000 tons, or
a 37-day supply, during the seven months of the rail interdiction
program.
Another logistics study from the Korean War illustrates
how difficult it is to prevent what was called "seeping resupply."
During three months in the winter of 1951-52 the Chinese and North
Koreans were firing 15,000 mortar shells per month, or 500 shells
a day. Each shell weighed 10 pounds; thus it was possible for a
peasant to carry five of them on an A-frame. One hundred peasants
arriving at the front from supply depots in the rear could supply
all the enemy's daily needs for mortar ammunition. One truck a day
could replenish the supply depots.
* About 48 percent food; 22 percent clothing, weapons, and equipage;
10 percent POL; and 20 percent ammunition.
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Operation Strangle clearly did great damage to the trans-
port system of North Korea and conceivably prevented Communist China
from mounting additional large-scale offensives in Korea. At the same
time, it is also clear that the Chinese and North Korean troops received
sufficient logistic support to contain the offensive pressures exerted
by the Eighth Army. In short, the defensive capabilities of the
Chinese and North Koreans showed no sign of collapsing as a result of
the interdiction campaign, and indeed the enemy was able to mount sharp
battalion-size attacks on occasion.
The air interdiction campaign failed to deny Communist
forces the supplies they needed to contain the US Army because the North
Koreans and Chinese were able to take effective countermeasures. One
major lesson that emerged from the Korean War was that US planners
underestimated the effectiveness of the enemy countermeasures. The
North Koreans and Chinese showed increasing rapidity in rebuilding
damaged rail and road bridges and other key installations. Chokepoints,
often given exaggerated importance, were frequently bypassed without
undue enemy effort. Darkness shrouded most of the enemy's movements
from effective attack. A major lesson of the Korean War was the clearly
demonstrated need for the development of a family of weapons that could
successfully interdict night railroad and highway traffic.
3. Air Pressure Tactics and Psychological Warfare
It is difficult to judge the overall effect of US inter-
diction and strategic bombing on the will of the political leadership
and the morale of the civilian population of North Korea. There are
numerous examples, however, of the North Koreans and Chinese responding
with effective countermeasures to each new phase of air operations
against North Korea. The North Koreans were able to devise effective
means to counteract the program of massive rail interdiction. The
North Korean response to the bombing of irrigation dams also illus-
trates the tenacity and cleverness with which the Communists met new
phases of US air operations.
Claims by some historians that air operations were almost
solely responsible for the North Koreans and Chinese initially coming
to the conference table and finally signing a truce agreement cannot
be substantiated.* The Chinese and North Koreans came to the confer-
ence table mainly because their total losses accruing from the war
had become greater than their total gains, all military, political, and
economic factors considered, including losses from air attacks. US
airpower played an important role in convincing the Communists to come
to terms, but the evidence does not support the view that airstrikes
were the decisive factor.
One Air Force historian, for example, in discussing FEAF operations
in Korea in mid-1952, wrote,"the destructive force of FEAF's airpower
had broken the stalemate.."
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Because of a host of factors, including the unique nature
of UN "police action" in Korea and the uncertain position of US
officials about the advantages and disadvantages of psychological
air warfare, the psychological warfare phase of US operations in
North Korea was little understood and only intermittently applied.
4. Lessons for Vietnam
The lessons from the Korean War indicate that it will prove
difficult to cut off supplies flowing from North Vietnam to South Vietnam.
The total daily tonnages needed by the Viet Cong and North Vietnamese
regulars engaged in South Vietnam are far less per man than was the case
in Korea, largely because most food and clothing supplies are obtained
locally in the South. Relatively small numbers of trucks, carts, and
human bearers can maintain more than the enemy's minimum requirements
unless the Vietnamese war is sharply escalated. Furthermore, the
experiences of the Korean War suggest that as long as they continue to
receive support from China and the USSR the North Vietnamese are likely
to show an increasing capability to improvise countermeasures to circum-
vent a continuing US air interdiction. The Korean War suggests also
that diminishing returns can be expected from continuing air inter-
diction. At the same time, the increasing effectiveness of conventional
antiaircraft weapons and air defense missiles raises the cost of con-
tinuing the campaign. The rebuilding of bridges, the building of by-
passes., and the other countermeasures in evidence in North Vietnam
in no way suggest a less determined enemy than was encountered in Korea.
The primitiveness of North Vietnam -- the lack of potentially decisive
military and industrial targets -- will make it difficult if not im-
possible for airpower alone to extract a prohibitive price for North
Vietnamese intransigence. Only the application of large numbers of new
interdiction weapons which are more effective than those that were
available in the Korean War would tip the scales in favor of successful,
long-term interdiction.
The bombing of "strategic" industrial targets in North
Vietnam, based on the experience of the Korean War, would probably
have little effect on the course of the war. Communist leaders in
North Vietnam would almost certainly prefer not to lose the rudimentary
modern industry that has been established in recent years. However,
the much larger and more diversified industry of North Korea was
destroyed in the first three months of the Korean War and neither
deterred China from entering the war nor seriously impeded the North
Korean military effort. Furthermore, Soviet and Chinese assistance
was used to rebuild the damaged plants in North Korea after the war.
In North Korea there was not sufficient industry to provide a critical
test of the hostage concept of industrial destruction as a means of
deterring aggression. In North Vietnam there is even less reason to
believe that the loss of a small modern industry would alter the course
of the war or make the Communists more prone to negotiate.
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Effect of Allied Bombing on German Munitions Production
Munitions Production
(Average month 1941 =I 00)
Bombs Dropped
7942 1943 1944, 1x45
E-1 Effect of Allied Bombing on German Munitions Production
Monitions
Prodvctfon
Effect of Allied Bombing on Japanese Munitions Production
and Maritime Shipping
ewe- Munitions Production
(Average month 1941=100)
Bombs Dropped
Seaborne Traffic by Civilian
1941 1942 1943 1944 1945 1946
>- (affect of Allied Bombing on Japanese Munitions Production and Maritime Shipping
Bombs - Seaborne Traffic
(Thousand tons .:(Thousand-metric
per quarter) ton, per quarter)
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Indexes of Bombs Expended and Value of Destruction in the Korean War
Sept. Oct.
1951
E 3 Indexes of Bombs Expended and Value of Destruction in the Korean War
During Operation Strangle
During Operation Strangle
August 1951-June 1952 .~ A
Jan. Feb. Mar. Ap
1952
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TOP SECRET 25X1
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