POSSIBLE ALTERNATIVE TO THE ROLLING THUNDER PROGRAM

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP80T01629R000300080007-7
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 20
• Document Creation Date: December 21, 2016
• Document Release Date: October 16, 2008
• Sequence Number: 7
• Publication Date: May 22, 1968
• Content Type: IM

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DIRECTORATE OF
INTELLIGENCE
Top Secret
Intelligence Memorandum
POSSIBLE ALTERNATIVES TO THE ROLLING THUNDER PROGRAM
(The case where the Rolling Thunder Program is
reinstituted under the March 1968 ground rules
limiting attacks within 10 and 4 miles of the centers
of Hanoi and Haiphong, respectively, and within the
Chinese Buffer Zone.) (No. 10)
JCS Review Completed
Top Secret
COPY NO. If
22 MAY 19
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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
Directorate of Intelligence
22 May 1968
Possible Alternatives
to the Rolling Thunder Program
(The case where the Rolling Thunder program
is reinstituted under the March 1968 ground
rules limiting attacks within 10 and 4 miles
of the centers of Hanoi and Haiphong,
respectively, and within the Chinese Buffer
Zone.) (No. 10)
Summary
This memorandum examines the effects of a
resumption of the Rolling Thunder program under
the March 1968 ground rules. These rules permitted
all of North Vietnam to be taken under attack
except for targets within restricted bombing areas
around Hanoi and Haiphong and within the Chinese
Buffer Zone.
A return to the Rolling Thunder program as it
existed before 31 March, particularly if undertaken
during the second and third quarters of the year,
when good weather predominates, could have the
following major effects in the short-run:
1. Restoration of key industrial
facilities, already accomplished or in
process, would be quickly neutralized.
Consequently, electric power output
would again decline to 20 percent of
national capacity, and cement and
fertilizer production would cease.
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2. Coal exports, which in April
1968 had been brought up to 60 percent
of pre-attack levels, would again de-
cline, and prospects for exports of pig
iron, cement, and apatite would be
indefinitely postponed.
3. The restoration of through
traffic on the principal rail and
highway systems, which is being accom-
plished by the repair of key bridges,
would be disrupted. The restored
bridges and rail lines, enlarged truck
parks, and open-storage stockpiles
would constitute lucrative targets in
the logistic supply system. An esti-
mated 20,000 full-time North Viet-
namese workers and 40,000 Chinese con-
struction troops have been devoted to
the restoration of this system since
the partial cessation of bombing on
1 April.
4. It would again be possible to
take under attack the major airfields
in the north holding jet fighter air-
craft. The in-country air order of
Battle now consists of 13 MIG 21's,
12 MIG 17's, and 4 IL-28 bombers.
5. There would be an immediate
decline in the morale of the North
Vietnamese population, since they
would again be faced with the hard-
ships and stress associated with the
bombings. There would be increased
local temporary shortages of food,
more widespread shortages of consumer
goods, and renewed requirements for
extra work in repairs, civil defense,
and other activities. Casualties,
which amounted to approximately 36,000
killed and wounded in 1967 under the
previous Rolling Thunder campaign,
would again make a significant impact.
6. Since the resumption of a
full-scale attack on the north would
probably follow as a consequence of
the complete impasse of peace negotia-
tions and a continuation of a high
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level of infiltration of North Viet-
namese forces into South Vietnam,
presumably the Hanoi regime would
have taken into account the conse-
quences of its intransigence.
7. Although a large segment of
world opinion would be critical of
the United States for resuming the
general bombing program, the extent
of this criticism would depend on
the circumstances under which the
bombing was resumed. These criticisms
would be particularly vocal if the
bombings were expanded while the Paris
talks were still going on, but pro-
portionately less if they had broken
off and heavy fighting continued in
the south. The South Vietnamese
would view the resumption as an indi-
cation of the resolve of the United
States to continue the war.
In the long-run, the most significant effects
of the bombing resumption would probably be on
the labor force because between 500,000 and 600,000
workers would continue to be diverted either full-
time or part-time from normal civilian occupations
to civil and air defense tasks, to repair work,
and to assistance in the movement of goods. There
would also be a continuing drain of military sup-
plies and equipment, not only material moving down
the lines of communication to Laos and South Vietnam
but also material associated with the air defense
system. In combination, we believe these drains
would have the following long-run effects:
1. Hanoi's allies would be required
to maintain a high level of military and
economic assistance in order to replace
losses. This assistance would be largely
uncompensated for because exports would
be curtailed. Levels of supplies such
as those flowing in through Haiphong and
over the land lines from China during
the first quarter of 1968, however, would
appear to be adequate.
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2. After an initial period of
disruption, Hanoi would be able to
cope with the increased costs and
difficulty of maintaining essential
traffic movements and the current
high-level flow of men and supplies
to South Vietnam. In summary, the
military situation would return to
what it was in march, with North
Vietnamese countermeasures and in-
creased imports acting as an effec-
tive offset to the destruction caused
by bombing.
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I. Scale of Rolling Thunder Operations
Through 31 March
The intensity and scope of Rolling Thunder air
operations have increased each year since the air
war began. During 1967, more than 191,000 sorties
were flown over North Vietnam, almost as many as
were flown in the two previous years combined, and
a third of all the sorties flown over Southeast
Asia. Approximately 60 percent of all sorties
flown over North Vietnam were attack sorties.
Ordnance delivered against targets in North Vietnam
during 1967 was almost double that during 1966. The
average tonnage of ordnance delivered per attack
sortie has increased from 1.3 tons in 1965 to 2.3
tons in 1967, largely because of the increasing use
of B-52 bombers in the southern part of North Viet-
nam. Total sorties, attack sorties, and tons of
ordnance by US and Vietnamese Air Forces for the
years of the Rolling Thunder program are shown in
the following tabulation:
Total Attack Tons
Year Sorties a/ Sorties of ordnance
1965 55,560 25,880 34,300
1966 147,840 82,170 128,590
1967 191,250 107,070 247,520
Jan-Mar 1968 35,230 14,800 34,000 b/
a. Vietnamese Air Force sorties constitute less than
one percent of total sorties.
b. Tonnage is estimated for March.
Unfavorable flying weather restricted the level
of attack sorties flown in the first and fourth quar-
ters of each year, as shown in the tabulation below.
The unusually low number of sorties in the first
quarter of 1968 resulted from bad flying weather,
self-imposed bombing restrictions, and the diversion
of a number of sorties to operations in the Khe Sanh
area.
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Average Number
of Attack Sorties
---_per Month
Quarter
1965 1966 1967
1968
Second 280 2,480
1,870 6,850 4,930
Third 5,900 10,590
Fourth 3,560 11,450 10,700
2,930 7,560 7,540
Most of the Rolling Thunder campaign has been
directed against targets in Route Packages i, Ii, and
III. Two-thirds of all attack sorties were in these
Route Packages in 1967 and about 75 percent in the
first quarter of 1968. Attacks against targets in
Route Package Vi, particularly in the and
Haiphong areas, were increased in 1967Htooaboutt 20
percent of all attack sorties.
Lines of communication have been the
targets in the air war. Almost one-half of1thepal
ordnance delivered against North Vietnam in 1967 was
against lines of communication.
40 percent was against non-transportgmilitarystaran
gets, and a small portion was against industrial
targets.
Two-thirds
Aped on lines
of communicattionfin11967ewasddirectddo
highway system. About 25 percent was on ad agaioad the
trucks; almost 30 percent on road crossings suchnd
as bridges, culverts, and causeways;
and st
percent on road supply handling areas. Taemfol 15
lo-
ing tabulation shows the distribution of ordnanc
ew
on lines of communication during 1967, by type of
targets:
Roads
Railroads
Waterways
Route Segments Bridges,
and Culverts,
E ui ment and Causeways Handling auseways Handling Areas
Totals
28,720
2,045
9,710
34,285 16,105
9,315 15,110 791110
560 a/ 1,720 26,470
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Most of the ordnance on military targets in
North Vietnam during 1967 was against ground forces
and ground forces installations. About one-third
was against military troop areas, one-third against
gun emplacements, including antiaircraft artillery,
one-fourth against storage and supply areas, and less
than 10 percent against airfields, naval bases, radar,
and SAM sites.
US losses of aircraft and personnel have been
substantial, but aircraft losses have not increased
as rapidly as the scale of operations, see the table.
A total of 823 fixed wing aircraft and ten helicopters
have been lost in combat action over North Vietnam
from 1965 through March 1968, and about 1,200 person-
nel have been reported downed with their aircraft.
Aircraft losses have been declining, however, in
proportion to the total number of sorties over the
past three years.
Attacks against industrial and other targets in
heavily defended areas, particularly in Route
Package VI which contains Hanoi and Haiphong, have
had the highest combat loss rates. Attacks against
industrial targets suffered loss rates of 21.4 air-
craft per 1,000 attack sorties in 1967, and a loss
rate of 17.9 per 1,000 attack sorties was sustained
in attacks against targets within 10 nautical miles
of Hanoi and Haiphong during the last three quarters
of 1967. By comparison, the average for all targets
in 1967 was 2.4 aircraft per 1,000 sorties, and losses
for attacks against lines of communication were only
2.1 per 1,000 attack sorties.
The cost to the United States of Rolling Thunder
air operations has gone up each year with the
increasing intensity of the air campaigns. The
production cost of aircraft lost, the direct opera-
tional cost of sorties flown, and costs of ordnance
delivered during 1966, 1967, and the first quarter
of 1968 are shown in the following tabulation:
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Sorties, Losses, and Loss Rates of US Fixed Wing Aircraft over North Vietnam
1965-67 and January-March 1968
Sorties J
Losses
Combat Losses
per 1,000 Sorties
1965
25,270
129
5.1
1966
81,360
226
2.8
1967
106,940
252
2.4
Jan-Mar 1968
14,800
31
2.1
228,37o
668
Support missions
1965
29,570
39
1.3
1966
65,660
57
0.9
1967
84,180
76
0.9
Jan-Mar 1968
20,430
13
0.6
199,84o
185
1965
54,84o
168
3.1
1966
147,020
283
1.9
1967
191,120
328
1.7
Jan-Mar 1968
35,230
44
1.2
428,210
821
Combat and operational
losses
1965
54,840
185
3.4
1966
147,020
316
2.1
1967
191,120
366
1.9
Jan-Mar 1968
35,230
54
1.5
428,210
221
a. Attack sorties carry out strike and flak-suppression missions. Support
sorties make up the remainder, which conduct photo and electronic recon-
naissance, combat air patrol, search and rescue, electronic countermeasure,
refueling, and forward air control missions.
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Million US $
1966 1967 Jan-Mar 1968
Production Cost 605.6 739.0 125.9
Operational Cost
of Sorties Flown 330.4 451.2 79.1
Ordnance 311.5 479.2 70.6 a/
Total 1, 247.5 1, 669.4 275.6
a. Cost of ordnance is estimated for 1968.
In addition to direct costs, there are substantial in-
direct but unmeasurable costs associated with the bomb-
ing.
The direct cost to the United States of inflict-
ing one dollar's worth of damage on North Vietnam
declined from $10.98 in 1966 to $7.07 in 1967, but
the possibilities of a continued decline are limited
as the number of significant economic targets
decreases. During the first quarter of 1968, for
example, cost of damage inflicted was estimated to
be $18.0 million and direct operational costs were
estimated to be $275.6 million, an average cost of
$15.30 for each dollar's worth of damage inflicted.
Ii. Effects of the Rolling Thunder Program
A. Value of Damage
The value of measurable damage inflicted on
the North Vietnamese by the Rolling Thunder campaign
reached $436 million through March 1968. Economic
damage reached about $300 million through March 1968,
of which about $158 million was inflicted in 1967.
Attacks against North Vietnam's military establish-
ment -- SAM's, aircraft, radars, barracks, supply
depots, airfields, naval equipment, and the like --
have inflicted additional damage estimated at about
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$136 million since the start of the bombing. In
addition, North Vietnam has incurred other signifi-
cant but unmeasurable losses from the bombing. An
estimated 500,000 to 600,000 civilian workers were
diverted to full-time and part-time repair and
defense work related to the bombing. The lot of the
average citizen became more trying; families have
been separated, some cities have been partly evacu-
ated, and loss of life and property has been sub-
stantial. Large quantities of military and economic
aid, however -- $1 billion in 1967 alone -- more
than offset the cost of damage inflicted by air
attacks.
B. Transportation
The rail system has been extensively damaged,
but it continues to move a substantial volume of
supplies. Attacks against the rail lines have been
heaviest on the Hanoi-Vinh line south of Hanoi, and
through rail service from Hanoi to Vinh has been
effectively halted during much of the air campaign.
In mid-June 1967, railroad targets on the Dong Dang
and Lao Cai lines in the north and in previously
restricted areas of Hanoi, Haiphong, and the buffer
zone along the Chinese border were brought under
repeated and heavy attack. Key bridges in Hanoi and
Haiphong were interdicted for varying periods,
hindering through rail service in and out of Hanoi
and the port of Haiphong. The Doumer Bridge over
the Red River has been out of service for rail traf-
fic about 80 percent of the time since August 1967,
and continuously since being extensively damaged by
air strikes in mid-December. The Hanoi Railroad/
Highway Bridge over the Canal des Rapides near Hanoi
has been out of use almost 40 percent of the time
since late April 1967. The Haiphong Railroad/High-
way Bridge was out of service continuously from
28 September 1967 to April 1968. However, rail
service on the Dong Dang line -- the primary over-
land import route from Communist China -- to the
Canal des Rapides Bridge near Hanoi has continued
almost without interruption. Elsewhere, at least
shuttle service between interdicted points has been
maintained and most interdicted rail bridges have
been bypassed by multiple ferry and pontoon crossings.
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Despite the Rolling Thunder campaign, the
capacity and f lexibilities of the rail system have
been increased by new construction and improve-
ments -- much of it by Chinese construction units.
The Dong Dang line from Ping-h'siang to Kep, and
the Thai Nguyen to Yen Vien line, have been con-
verted to dual gauge;* together with a standard
gauge route from Kep to Thai Nguyen, these lines
provide a standard gauge route from the China border
to the Hanoi area with a capacity almost double that
of a meter gauge system. Portions of the Hanoi-
Dong Dang line south of Kep to Yen Vien are now
being converted from meter gauge to dual gauge. In
addition, a new rail line is under construction
from Kep east to Hon Gai, a secondary port and coal
producing area.
The highway system has not been seriously
disrupted by the Rolling Thunder program, although
the system has been heavily attacked. Most of the
airstrikes against highways have been concentrated
south of Thanh Hoa along Routes IA and 15 and against
key bridges in the Hanoi and Haiphong areas. In-
tensive armed reconnaissance strikes have also been
maintained against routes leading into the DMZ and
Laos. An increased volume of truck traffic has been
noted in recent months, however, and substitutes for
damaged highway bridges in Hanoi, Haiphong, and else-
where are less vulnerable and have capacities higher
than the roads which they support.
Despite the Rolling Thunder program, the
highway system has been continuously improved and
expanded, with construction in the north aided by
Chinese road construction units. In the northeast,
a new all-weather road linking the Ning-ming area
of China with Haiphong is near completion and will
increase the transborder road capacity to this major
Chinese logistic center. In the Panhandle of North
Vietnam, Route 101, a major north-south inland
alternate to Route lA, and Route 137, a second
major route for infiltration into Laos, have been
7 The term "dal-gauge" refers to the use of three
or four rails on the same roadbed, making possible
the use of both meter gauge and standard gauge roll-
ing stock. It is not to be confused with "double
tracking" -- two separate tracks on two or double
road beds with a total of four rails.
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completed. A new all-weather road, a third major
Laotian infiltration route, is under construction
from the vicinity of Dong Hoi toward the southwest-
ern corner of the DMZ. A number of bypass and
connecting roads have also been built and many old
roads improved. In the northwest, construction and
improvement of roads will provide a more direct
motorable link between China and northern Laos
through North Vietnam.
Inland waterways have not been seriously
disrupted by air attacks. The main attacks against
inland water transportation have consisted of armed
reconnaissance strikes against watercraft and water-
way facilities, including transshipment points. In
addition, from June 1967 through April 1968, 26,000
MK-36 mines were seeded to harass watercraft and
disrupt waterway operations. However, a substantial
volume of traffic continues to move over inland
waterways, and the North Vietnamese have demonstrated
the ability to use mined areas soon after seedings.
Transport equipment has been destroyed and
damaged in large quantities, but increased imports
and domestic repair and construction have maintained
or improved equipment inventories. Pilots have
reported the destruction and damage of large numbers
of railroad rolling stock, motor vehicles, and water-
craft in North Vietnam, and reports of truck destruc-
tion increased significantly in early 1968. However,
inventories of railroad rolling stock and trucks
have actually been increased above the prebombing
levels by imports from North Vietnam's allies.
Domestic construction of boats and imports of barges
and prefabricated barge sections probably have com-
pensated for most of the watercraft losses.
C. Other Economic Target Systems
North Vietnam's modern industries have been
either inoperative or operating at partial capacity
since the initiation of intensive attacks on
industrial targets in early 1967. Electric gen-
erating capacity was reduced by bombing to 20 per-
cent of the prestrike capacity of 187,000 kilowatts
from June through October 1967. However, the respite
from bombing since November 1967 has permitted
electric generating capacity to be restored to 30 or
40 percent of prebombing capacity. If the bombing
pause continues, output of electric power could
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increase to about 60 percent of capacity in about
six months. The Thai Nguyen Iron and Steel Plant
has been inoperative since being heavily damaged
in mid-April 1967. The Haiphong Cement Plant was
inoperative for one year until late April 1968,
when repairs apparently permitted a test run on at
least one kiln. Bomb damage also halted production
at the Bac Giang Chemical Fertilizer Plant, the
Phu Tho Phosphate Fertilizer Plant, the Lang Chi
Explosives Plant, the Viet Tri Paper Plant, and
portions of the Hon Gai and Cam Pha coal-processing
facilities. In addition, the Viet Tri Chemical
Complex was inoperative for a large part of the
year as a result of a shortage of electric power.
Repairs, however, have permitted at least some
production to resume at the Phu Tho Fertilizer
Plant, the Viet Tri Chemical Complex, and the coal
facilities at Hon Gai and Cam Pha. The direct cost
of restoring industry damaged by bombing totals
more than $50 million, and reconstruction would
require up to two years to complete.
The machine building industry has been
relatively undamaged by US airstrikes. Small re-
pair shops and foundries are widely dispersed
throughout the country, and the three plants in
Hanoi and Haiphong that account for the principal
output of machinery and machine tools are within
restricted bombing zones-. The products and services
of this industry are oriented primarily toward
support of transportation and of agriculture. In
its support of transportation, machine building
comes closer than any other domestic industry to
direct support of the war in the south. Capacity
for machine building and metal processing probably
has been enlarged since the beginning of the air
war through substantial imports of machinery and
equipment. Most imports of machine tools during
1966 were appropriate for repair work and probably
were intended for the dispersed repair shops. How-
ever, during 1967 a large portion of imports were
high-output machine tools, suggesting that the three
central machine building plants are engaged in pro-
duction of significant quantities of agricultural
pumps, generators, and diesel engines.
Most of North Vietnam's petroleum storage
facilities that existed before the bombing have
been destroyed. Use of dispersed tank sites and
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petroleum drums, however, has reestablished satis-
factory supply and distribution of petroleum
products and has enabled the North Vietnamese to
maintain a three-month reserve supply of petroleum.
D. Other Economic Losses
The cumulative measurable loss in North
Vietnam's seaborne exports attributable to the
Rolling Thunder program reached about $35 million
at the end of 1967, but these losses have had little
adverse effect on the economy. Measurable export
losses represented less than 20 percent of the value
of North Vietnam's annual exports before the initi-
ation of the bombing program and were small compared
with the estimated $340 million of economic aid
contributed by the Communist countries in 1967 alone.
Stepped-up attacks on industrial facilities during
the first half of 1967 accounted for almost one-half
of the cumulative export losses. Exports of pig
iron and cement have not been observed since May
1967, and exports of coal, which averaged about
78,000 tons per month in 1966, were reduced to only
21,000 tons per month in the second half of 1967.
Agriculture and fishing have been adversely
affected by bombing, although neither has ever been
targeted nor suffered more than minor accidental
bomb damage. The decline in rice output since the
beginning of the bombing -- only partly attributable
to the air campaign -- has been valued at about $60
million. The agricultural labor force, about 70 per-
cent of the total labor force, has been the main
source of manpower for defense and construction work
generated by the bombing program. The low per capita
productivity of agricultural workers, the unskilled
nature of the work, the high agricultural underemploy-
ment, and the ready substitutability of women for men
undoubtedly mitigated the effects on agriculture of the
diversion. The Rolling Thunder program has also
contributed, in conjunction with the Sea Dragon
Program, to a decline in salt water fishing esti-
mated to be valued at $12.5 million. Despite reduced
rice and fish production, however, minimum diets
have been maintained by strict rationing, by sub-
stituting less palatable foods, and, in 1967, by
greatly increasing imports of foodstuffs.
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D. Military Targets
The most significant damage inflicted by
the Rolling Thunder program on the North Vietnamese
military establishment has been against the air
defense system, particularly against aircraft. Cumu-
lative destruction of fighter aircraft through the
first quarter of 1968 amounted to 32 MIG-21's and
87 MIG-17's. All major airfields except that at Gia
Lam, an international commercial airport as well as
a military airfield, have been struck repeatedly.
Numerous early warning and ground-control in ercept
radars, antiaircraft artillery, and SAM facilities
and equipment have been destroyed or damaged, and
airstrikes have probably reduced the efficiency of
SAM units by forcing frequent redeployment of equip-
However, countermeasures, imports of
equipment, and rapid repair work have offset the
damage inflicted to the air defense system. F
Damage to airfields has been
quickly repaired, and all primary jet airfields were
capable of supporting fighter operations at the end
of March.
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Valuable military supplies, equipment,
storage facilities, barracks, and ordnance depots
have also been destroyed or abandoned because of
air attacks, but the loss of these supplies and
facilities has not seriously impaired the overall
effectiveness of North Vietnam's military capabil-
ities. Imports of supplies and equipment from the
USSR and China have exceeded destruction at depots,
and the North Vietnamese have adequately adjusted to
the loss of fixed facilities by the dispersal of men
and supplies. The North Vietnamese have had no
serious difficulty in supporting increased military
activity in South Vietnam.
Nearly one-third of North Vietnam's naval
base support facilities have been destroyed or
rendered inactive, and 12 naval craft have been
destroyed by air attacks under the Rolling Thunder
program. However, the small North Vietnamese navy --
about 40 patrol boats, gunboats, torpedo boats, and
subchasers -- has played a relatively minor part in
the war effort, and it has been largely confined to
the Hanoi and Haiphong areas to bolster the air
defense system.
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up Oecrei
Top Secret
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