VIETNAM'S REFUGEE MACHINE (SANITIZED)

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP80T00942A001200070001-3
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 8
• Document Creation Date: December 20, 2016
• Document Release Date: November 17, 2006
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: June 1, 1979
• Content Type: REPORT

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ietrga 's Refujuce Machine
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Foreign
Assessment
Center
Vietnam's Refugee Machine
Research for this report was completed
on 26 June 1979.
The author of this paper is Fast
Asia-Pacific Division, Office of Political Analysis.
Comments and ueries are welcome and should be
directed tol
This paper has been coordinated with the Office of
Economic Research, the Office of Geographic and
Cartographic Research, and the National Inielligence
Officer for East Asi
Secret
PA 79-10292
June 1979
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I
Vietnam's Refugee Machine
Key Judgments By mid-June over 250,000 Vietnamese had fled to non-Communise
Southeast Asia, and the number is increasing dramatically. Many more do
not succeed. Some observers estimate that as many as one-half to two--hirds
of those who set out perish at sea-victims of rough weather, unseawcrthv,
overcrowded craft, or pirates. If this ratio is correct, about 250,000 to
375,000 people have died leaving Vietnam.
Vietnam has created elaborate but highly efficient machinery for exp,~lling
what it considers its undesirable population. This involves principally the 1.5
million ethnic Chinese, but also anyone Hanoi regards as potentially
disloyal. Indeed, ethnic Vietnamese are making up an increasing perct ntage
of the boat refugees.
Since the spring of 1978 alone tens of thousands have been systematically
pressured into leaving, subjected to organized extortion, stripped of al but a
few belongings, and put to sea.
By some estimates Hanoi last year netted $115 million-approximatciy
equal to its known official foreign exchange holdings-from the refugee
trade. This economic consideration plus Hanoi's security concerns assures
that the refugee exodus will continue.
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Vietnam's Refugee Machine
The Officials
The Vietnamese Politburo decided in March 1978 that
worsening relations with China made Vietnam's Chi-
nese minority of 1.5 million a fifth column that had to
be eliminated. The Ministry of Interior issued an order
allowing Chinese to leave, and the systematic persecu-
tion that followed made the option attractive. Chinese,
including those who had lived peacefully in the north
since 1954, were dismissed from their jobs and
threatened with conscription or transfer to a New
Economic Zone.' By midsummer, thousands of Chi-
nese had joined the stream of ethnic Vietnamese
fleeing by boat to non-Communist Southeast Asia.
Hanoi cut back on the program in late 1978 after
Vietnam's neighbors complained, but the program
resumed full tilt in late March 1979 after the border
war with China during February and early March.
Two special offices were created in early 1978 to
manage the program: one in Haiphong for the northern
half of the country and one in Ho Chi Minh City
(Saigon) for the southern half. Subordinate offices are
located in provinces with the largest ethnic Chinese
populations. Originally located in government build-
ings, the offices were moved to unofficial facilities to
preserve the fiction that the government is not in-
volved. The offices report to the Ministry of Interior on
the government side and directly to the Politburo on
the party side. either Pham
Van Dong, the number three man in the leadership, or
Nguyen Van Linh, the number twelve man, has the
oversight responsibility for the Politburo.
Public Security officers themselves arrange for tie
purchase and repair of the boats. Total processiie
originally took about six months, but now can be
accomplished in as little as one month.
The Middleman
The middlemen are the link between the official
structure and the people who want to leave. Mos
middlemen or "organizers" are Chinese who were
southern businessmen before the Saigon governs lent
fell in 1975. They often arrange for the departure- of a
number of boats before leaving themselves.
The middleman enlists the passengers, collects t re
going passage price, and negotiates the per capit r exit
tax with the Public Security Bureau that grants
permission to leave. He then locates a boat and
arranges for any needed repairs. Because buildit g
materials are scarce, he must often acquire then from
the Public Security Bureau. The organizer must
arrange for fuel, supplies, a chart, and compass m
his own. These items are available on the black rr arket.
The demand for boats is so great that a boat
construction industry has sprung up in some sou hern
ports. Most are 15 to 25 meters in length with a can-
to, two toilets, and a small cooking platform above
deck. Ventilation pipes carry air to the passenge s
below deck. Small irrigation engines are sometivies
used for power. These frail, often overloaded cre ft are
easily swamped in rough seas.
The People
Refugees are exploited at every turn once they c eclare
their intention to leave. Those who still have job soon
lose them, and ration cards are often reduced or
invalidated. They generally sell all their persona
property or forfeit it to the state. The price of pe ssage
does not include a safe conduct pass to the point of
embarkation, so bribes must be paid at each cheek-
Day-to-day administration of the program rests with
the local Public Security Bureau, the political police. It
certifies the passenger list for each boat, collects the
fees, and sets the date of departure. In some cases
' New Economic Zones are primitive communes generally located on
remote agricultural land. People assigned to New Economic Zones
receive little if any real assistance from the state; they are expected
to be self-reliant. Many Vietnamese, particularly urba i s re d
transfer to a New Economic Zone as a death sentence.
point along the way.
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 Vietnamese swim from a sinking boat
to a Malaysian beach *
Once at the embarkation point, refugees often must
wait in holding camps until the Public Security Bureau
grants permission to leave. In mid-April, for instance,
several thousand people were waiting for boats at a
camp on the southwest coast of Vietnam. The wait,
which can stretch into months, forces the refugees to
draw down further whatever funds they have with
them
The Vietnamese authorities in charge of the program
wash their hands of the refugees as soon as they board
the boats. The refugees must then still elude the
coastal patrols. If they are stopped by the authorities,
they must pay additional bribes before they ess
on for the open sea.
Not all the refugees deal with middlemen. Many deal
directly with the Public Security Bureau, and the fees
they pay go into the pockets of the security officials. As
a result of such arrangements, the refugees generally
become unofficial passengers who do not appear on any
manifest and who are crowded aboard the boats at the
last minute. As many as 20 percent of the boat's total
passengers may be unofficial
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The Money
The passage price varies, but generally it ranges from
six to 10 taels of gold per adult (approximately $1,800
to $3,000), half of that for children and no charge for
those under six.' Bribes and living costs in the camps
add to the expense. Middlemen can make a consider-
able profit-perhaps as much as $1,000 to $2,000 per
passenger-but their overhead is also high. Large
boats can cost as much as $180 000 not including fuel
and supplies.
The state and corrupt officials along the way make the
greatest profit. An exit tax of approximately $1,000 to
$1,300 per capita is charged. In some cases the Public
Security Bureau collects a portion of the purchase
price of the boats-as much as 40 percent-and in
other cases the bureau itself is in the boat business.
Strict currency regulations force private boat builders
to deposit their earnings in the state bank where they
are hard to retrieve.
2 A tael of gold uals 1.21 ounces or approximately $302 figured at
$250 per ounce.
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Secret
All figures are approximate, but the Far East Eco-
nomic Review's estimate that last year Vietnam made
$115 million from refugee taxes seems reasonable.'
This is approximately equal to Hanoi's annual hard
currency export earnings or to its known official
foreign exchange holdings.
A refugee must pay in gold. A great deal of gold was in
private hands when Saigon fell, and a covert banking
system has evolved to transfer it to the people who need
it. The rich may already have enough gold or may be
able to convert their belongings into sufficient gold to
pay for passage. Others must seek help from an
overseas relative. This benefactor can remit money to
his relative in Vietnam through state channels, but the
exchange rate is unfavorable. Most prefer to transfer a
lump sum in hard currency to a Vietnamese expatriate
who still has funds in Vietnam. He then instructs a
friend or relative in Vietnam to transfer an appropriate
amount of gold to the potential refugee.
The Outlook
The exodus will continue for some time. Each of
southern Vietnam's 20 provinces reportedly has been
given a quota of 15,000 Chinese to expel. The time
within which this quota must be met is unclear.
Vietnam has approximately 1.5 million Chinese resi-
dents to draw from.
Over the long term, it is not just an ethnic Chinese
exodus. More and more ethnic Vietnamese are pur-
chasing bogus papers documenting them as Chinese in
order to escape. In 1978, about 29 percent of the boat
arrivals at the Pulau Bidong camp on the east coast of
Malaysia were ethnic Vietnamese; the proportion is
now 52 percent ethnic Vietnamese.
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