AFGHANISTAN'S RELATIONS WITH ITS NEIGHBORS (U)

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP80T00942A001100120001-9
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 11
• Document Creation Date: December 12, 2016
• Document Release Date: November 29, 2001
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: June 1, 1979
• Content Type: REPORT

NatiopW
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Assessment
Center
Afghanistan's Relations
With Its Neighbors (v)
Research for this report was completed
on 11 June 1979.
This paper was produced by the Near East - South
Asia Division of the Office of Political Analysis
Comments and queries are welcome and should be
directed to u)
This paper has been coordinated with the National
Intelligence Officer for the Near East and South
Asia and with the Directorate of Operations. (u)
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ORCON
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Afghalistan's R h
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ORCON
Afghanistan's Relations
With Its Neighbors (u)
Key Judgments Afghanistan's relations with its neighbors were fairly smooth at the ti. ne of
the Marxist coup last year. Since then, Soviet influence in Afghanista-I has
increased markedly and Kabul's relations with Iran and Pakistan have
deteriorated. The Khomeini regime is distressed by the atheism of
Afghanistan's rulers and nervous about the Soviet potential for using
Afghanistan as a base for interference in Iran.
Pakistan feels threatened by the Taraki government, and fears revival )f the
long-simmering feud over the Pushtun-inhabited border provinces. The
Pakistanis' worst nightmare is the prospect of conflict with India cour led
with Afghan- or Soviet-sponsored tribal rebellion in Pushtun and Baluchi
provinces.
If the present Afghan Government were to regain control over much c t' the
country, its relations with its neighbors would not change significantl3. Nor
would a replacement of Taraki's faction by a rival but equally pro-Sot let
faction bring any significant improvement in relations.
But if Taraki were replaced by a military government, by the former i using
elite, or by a rightwing Islamic regime, some of the tension in foreign
relations would ease. Even so, any Afghan Government is obliged to come to
terms with the USSR, and both Iran and Pakistan would have abiding fears
of Soviet and Afghan capability for upsetting stability in their countri-;s.
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Afghanistan's Relations
With Its Neighbors (u)
The Marxist coup in Afghanistan on 27 April 1978
brought a major shift in Afghan foreign relations,
increasing fear and hostility in most of neighboring
states, and greatly increasing Soviet influence in
Kabul. The coup came at a time when Afghanistan's
relations with most countries in the region were
unusually good, and whether or not the Soviet-backed
regime-which faces serious insurgency-survives, a
return to the relatively stable situation that existed
before the coup is unlikely. (s)
The installation of a Marxist government uuic illy led
to an increase in Soviet influence. Advisers do ibled in
number and took a more active role in the govt. rnment.
I n December, the two countries signed a Trea v of
Friendship, Goodneighborliness, and Coopera ion. Ar-
ticle 4 of the treaty called for "appropriate mt asures"
to ensure the security of the signatories and alo called
for military cooperation, but left Moscow's co nmit-
ment to Kabul vague. The Soviets responded t
growing insurgency by taking a more active r( ie in
i,:ilitary operations and by applying pressure c n
Pakistan and Iran, the most likely sources oaf ? )reign
s upport for the rebels. (s NF)
Following World War I, the USSR gradually replaced
Great Britain as the most important foreign influence
in Afghanistan, and in the mid-1950s began assistance
programs that made Kabul heavily dependent on
Moscow. By 1978, more than 95 percent of Afghani-
stan's military equipment was of Soviet origin, the
USSR had supplied about $700 million in economic
aid, about 1,000 Soviet advisers were in the country,
and the USSR was Afghanistan's major trading
partner. (s NF)
Despite Afghan dependence on Moscow, the USSR
made little effort to influence domestic programs, and
in foreign affairs-although Kabul took pains to avoid
actions likely to offend Moscow--there was no great
pressure for active support of Soviet policies. Soviet
influence was actually declining slightly at the time of
the coup, as President Daoud vigorously sought
support from a variety of foreign sources in an effort to
lessen Afghan dependence on the USSR. Domes-
tically, Daoud was moving against the Marxists- the
arrest of the leaders of the present government touched
off the coup. (s NF)
Nevertheless, there was no immediate threat to
Moscow's preeminent position in Afghanistan, and the
apparent basic Soviet interest there-preventing Af-
ghanistan from falling under the influence of a third
country-seemed in no danger. (s NF)
II the insurgency continues-as appears likely --even
more Soviet support may be required to keep a Marxist
government in power. Even if the Soviets do nay. make a
conscious effort to increase their influence n l abul,
the Afghan need for military and administratr'e
advice, military equipment, diplomatic supnor , and
economic aid will tend to increase the Soviet n le
throughout the government. As the Soviet pres.~nce has
become more pervasive, Soviet citizens in AfgJ anistan
h-tve become more closely identified in the run is of the
A fghans with the increasingly unpopular gove- nment
in Kabul. Attacks on Soviet advisers have bee( me
more frequent as the insurgency has intensified.
Reported Soviet frustration at the performanc of
President Taraki could lead t? Soviet efforts is replace
the present Afghan leaders, although it is uncl gar
whether Moscow has the capability at this nob .t to do
more than encourage Taraki's rivals. The instF llation
of a government headed by Babrak Karmat. h4 ad of
the Parcham faction, or by a military figure eeually or
more amenable to Soviet advice is not out of tt c
question. The Parchamists were purged by the Taraki
government in the summer of 1978, and their leaders
a = e now in Czechoslovakia. The faction is supT nsedly
more pro-Soviet than Taraki's, but differences be-
tween the two groups are primarily over persoi alities.
Moscow would be unlikely to believe that such a
change would lessen popular hostility to the gc- ern-
rr,ent, but it might hope another leader would make
f. wer mistakes in dealing with insurgency. is)
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The close relationship with Moscow does not guarantee
the survival of a Marxist government. At some point
Moscow could decide that the survival of its friends
was not worth the cost. For example, the USSR would
have serious reservations about committing its ground
forces even if it were clear that the only alternative was
a rebel victory. Moreover, a move against the govern-
ment by military units in Kabul could be over in a few
hours, which would not allow Moscow enough time to
take action to save the present rulers. (s)
Of Afghanistan's neighbors, Pakistan has felt itself the
most directly threatened by the Marxists. At the time
of the coup, relations were at a high point, and
President Daoud's visit to Pakistan in March had
raised hopes that even the Pushtunistan dispute over
the status of Pakistan's frontier provinces could be
settled. Afghanistan's refusal to recognize the border
imposed by the British in the 19th century, and its
periodic demands for independence or at least greater
autonomy for the Pushtun and Baluchi speakers in the
two border provinces of Pakistan have been the major
problems in Pakistani-Afghan relations. It can be
argued, however, that even if Daoud had remained in
power, demands by these provinces for greater auton-
omy and domestic political pressure on the Afghan
Government would eventually have led to a return to
normal in bilateral relations-periods of coolness
interrupted occasionally by heightened tensions and
the threat of open war. (c)
The coup revived longstanding Pakistani fears of
Russian designs on the frontier provinces. A persistent
concern that the Afghans, backed by the Soviets,
would detach the two provinces while India occupied
the remainder of the country was again expressed. As
insurgency mounted in Afghanistan, Islamabad
became less concerned about an immediate threat, but
did not believe the long-term dangers had diminished.
Meanwhile, an exodus of anti-Marxist Afghans began,
and by early June 1979 estimates of refugees living in
Pakistan passed 100,000. (c)
Pakistan explored several options for dealing with
Afghanistan. It has done what it could to preserve
relations with Kabul, but Afghan statements on
Pushtunistan, increasingly strident accusations of
Pakistani support for the rebels, and border incidents
have raised the level of tension between the two
nations.
Islamabad has meanwhile con-
tinued efforts to wor out some accommodation with
Moscow. There was, however, never much chance that
eithel? side would make the concessions necessary for a
rapprochement, and relations appear to be worsening
rather than improving as Soviet criticism of Pakistan
intensified. (s)
The Shah was nearly as concerned as the Pakistanis
with the implications of a Marxist government in
Kabul. He not only feared that Iran's ally, Pakistan,
might break up or turn to the USSR, but that Moscow
could use Afghanistan as a base for supporting leftists
in Iran. Relations between Afghanistan and Iran
before the coup had declined from a high point reached
in the early 1970s when a longstanding water dispute
was resolved and Iranian plans for an economic aid
program even larger than the Soviets' were announced.
By the time of the coup, the two governments were
again quarreling about water, and the Iranians had not
yet taken steps to implement their massive aid
proposals. (c)
Despite his concern following the Afghan coup, the
Shah decided to adopt a hands-off policy. Mounting
domestic problems in Iran precluded Iranian interfer-
ence in Afghanistan, and even though Iran's new
religious leaders have strongly denounced Afghani-
stan's atheistic rulers, Tehran is not now in a position
to give more than negligible support to Afghan
insurgents. (c)
Although India did not view the installation of the
Afghan Marxists as a direct threat, it was concerned
about the implications for regional stability. By
extending early recognition and offers of aid, and by
encouraging moderation, India has tried to offset
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Moscow's heavy influence. India has continued on this
course despite disappointment with Kabul's domestic
policies, growing Soviet influence in Kabul, its siding
with radicals in the nonaligned movement, and fear
that Kabul will eventually precipitate a confrontation
between Pakistan and the USSR. (s)
China's past role in Afghanistan was limited to minor
aid programs designed to keep alive some influence.
Aside from confirming Chinese views on Soviet
expansionism, the coup did not directly affect Chinese
interests, but China is concerned about the effect of the
coup on its ally, Pakistan. (s)
Islamic Nations
Although two trips to the Near East by President
Daoud in early 1978 increased Arab interest in aiding
Afghanistan, for most of the Islamic world Afghani-
stan has been a remote country of little immediate
importance. The Marxist takeover has caused consid-
ers about the threat to Islam there, and
Prior to the coup, Afghan governments saw the West,
and the United States in particular, as a valuable
counterweight to the USSR and tried to maintain good
relations. The current leaders seem uninterested in
balancing Soviet influence. Despite the Taraki govern-
ment's protestations that it wants good relations with
all countries, there has been a steady erosion in
relations with the West. Dealings with the Afghans
have grown increasingly difficult-the Afghans have
not cooperated on matters such as the investigation of
the murder of the US Ambassador, and accusations by
Kabul of US and other Western support for the
insurgents have become more frequent. (c)
Most countries in the region would view a Mar?.ist
victory over the insurgents in Afghanistan as a soviet
victory. Fear of the USSR and respect for its p-wer
would both be enhanced. For the Arab oil prod icers,
however, the end of fighting would probably lei sen
immediate concern about the country, althougi the
development of good relations would be unlikel.. (s)
Pakistan and Iran would continue to fear that )R loscow
would use Afghanistan to stir up trouble along ; he
border, to support leftist movements in the two
countries, and perhaps to increase Afghan mile ary
strength into a credible threat against its neighbors. In
both countries, religious feeling would increase hostil-
itt~ toward Afghanistan's atheistic rulers. (st
E'en if the USSR desired to use Afghanistan it such a
role, there would be serious limitations on Afgl an
ability to threaten its neighbors. Afghanistan &,)uld
still be poor and weak. It would be unlikely to al':tin
complete control of some tribal areas for years.
Trained manpower is unavailable for a rapid ex3ansion
of the military. Control of Afghanistan would rot
necessarily enhance Moscow's ability to encour tge
leftist movements in Iran and Pakistan. Moscow would
have much greater access to border areas, and some
separatists-especially in Pakistani Baluchistan; -
w,tuld welcome Afghan and Soviet help. The br,lk of
the tribesmen-especially the Pakistani Pushtn its
along the northern part of the border- are like v to
vi 'w Kabul with considerably more suspicion tf an in
the past.
Despite Afghan limitations, both Iran and Palo ;tan
arc likely to view the threat of Afghan meddlinN with
separatists and support for leftists as serious an-i to
consider a number of options for meeting it. Ar iong
them would be an improvement in relations wit_i both
Kabul and Moscow in an effort to deflect the thi eat, an
increase in military strength to counter both do nestic
subversion and any overt Afghan military thre? t, and
ar effort to find allies and security guarantees. these
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policies would not necessarily be mutually exclusive,
and Tehran and Islamabad may pursue several simul-
taneously. (s)
For the United States and the West, cooperation with
Afghanistan would be at least as difficult as it is now.
Ironically, however, a Marxist government in control
of Afghanistan might be both willing and able to do
something about what before the coup was regarded by
the United Sates as its major problem with Afghani-
stan-opium production. (s)
The fall of the Marxists would lead to a decline in
Soviet influence and some improvement in relations
with other countries, but the changes would not
necessarily be great. No government could last long in
Kabul that did not recognize the fundamental neces-
sity of maintaining at least reasonably good relations
with its huge neighbor, the USSR. (c)
Perhaps the most likely successors to the present
government are the leftist military officers-such as
Defense Minister Watanjar-now in important posts
in the government. Less doctrinaire and more national-,
ist than the civilian rulers, they could seize power so
quickly that Moscow would be faced with afait
accompli. (s NF)
They would most likely move against the government
in the belief that the civilian leadership could not
defeat the insurgents, and because of unhappiness over
the treatment of Islam and the extent of Soviet
influence in Afghanistan. If they decided to continue to
fight against the rebels, with as little popular backing
as their predecessor and less sure support from
Moscow, their days would probably be numbered. On
the other hand, a show of support for Islam, the
withdrawal of troops from the tribal areas, and
movement away from the USSR could win them
enough toleration to survive, although as a fairly weak
government. They would also have the option of
turning power over to civilians quickly, as leftist
officers have done after the last two military coups. (c)
Moscow could live with such a government; there has
even been speculation that the Soviets might at some
point encourage a military coup as a way out.
Afghanistan's other neighbors, however, would be
highly suspicious of rulers so closely associated with
the Marxists, and any early change in the state of
relations would be slight. (c)
Although somewhat less likely, there are a number of
other possible successors to the Marxists. Each of the
potential successors retains some support in the mili-
tary, and it is conceivable that their supporters could
stage a successful coup at some point. Even without a
coup, the collapse of the present government-or a
leftist military government-in the face of mounting
insurgency could also lead to several alternatives
ranging from the reestablishment of the monarchy to a
state of anarchy in the country. (c)
Among the possibilities would be the return of
Afghanistan's previous elite-men such as Prince
Abdul Wali, a cousin of both the former King and
President Daoud; General Mostagni, once Daoud's
army commander; or a number of politicians associ-
ated either with Daoud or the monarchy. To all of
Afghanistan's neighbors, these men would be known
quantities. Although it might appear that their arrival
would mean a return to business as usual, their position
would probably be far weaker than Daoud's, with less
control of the countryside and greater opposition from
both the left and the right. Ultimately they might
prevail, but instability could be a problem not only for
them, but for Tehran and Islamabad. Relations with
Moscow, while not as close as those between the Taraki
regime and the Soviets, would probably be reasonably
good as the new government, aware of the nation's
exposed position on the Soviet flank, sought to reassure
Soviet leaders and ensure continued Soviet economic
and military aid. (c)
A rightwing Islamic government could also come to
power led perhaps by several of the religious figures
now in exile in Pakistan. Iran might initially be
pleased, but traditional differences between Shia Iran
and Sunni Afghanistan could become an irritant in
relations. Pakistan probably would not regard such a
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government as a threat and would probably seek to
prop it up. With little experience in government, with
considerable dissension among its leaders, without any
well-organized support, and probably with a minimum
of foreign assistance (an Islamic government conceiv-
ably might refuse to deal with Moscow), its ability to
remain in office would be questionable, and its chances
of governing effectively very slight. (c)
New Delhi would probably regard either a leftwing
military government or a return of the former elite as
less of a threat to regional stability than a continuation
of Marxist rule. India would almost certainly move
quickly to establish good relations, continuing its
policy of offering limited Indian aid as an alternative to
total reliance on Moscow. Although India probably
would also seek good relations with an Islamic
government, New Delhi would be concerned by the
emergence of an arc of conservative Islamic nations--
Iran, Pakistan, and Afghanistan-on its western flank.
(c)
It would probably be some time before any successor
government could regain even the degree of control
Daoud had before the coup. Even if the various
insurgent groups form a temporary alliance before the
end of Marxist rule, given their widely differing aims
unity is unlikely to survive victory. The tribesmen are
likely to ignore directions from Kabul. Other groups
that believed they received less than their share of the
spoils might continue the rebellion. Central govern-
ment authority would depend ultimately on undis-
ciplined former insurgents and a demoralized regular
army. Civil war could leave an already poor economy
in shambles, and foreign aid might depend on
Moscow's willingness to back the new rulers. (c)
Although Pakistan would regard an unstable Afghani-
stan as less threatening than one under Soviet guid-
ance, Islamabad would still face problems. Virtual
independence for Afghan tribes would encourage a
similar goal among Pakistani tribesmen, and Pakistani
armed forces could again be forced into action against
tribal insurgents in the two border provinces. Ar
unstable Afghanistan could also tempt Moscow o
recoup its losses by attempting to install a gover ment
more to its liking. (c)
In an effort to win popular support, any new out
unstable Afghan Government would have the op? ion of
pursuing an adventurist foreign policy toward Pakistan
and Iran, attempting to win tribal support by str_)nger
advocacy of Pushtun independence, and by explc iting
deep-seated cultural and religious differences wi:h its
neighbors. The long-sought goal of regional stab lity
may be unattainable in the foreseeable future retard-
less of the outcome in Afghanistan. ((-)
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