POLITICS IN SYRIA

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP80T00942A001000030001-0
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: C
• Document Page Count: 19
• Document Creation Date: December 14, 2016
• Document Release Date: July 7, 2003
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: May 1, 1979
• Content Type: PAPER

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.Politics in -~yria
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C'onfiderlti~.l
P~] 79-10207
M.~y 1979
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o eign
Assessment
Center
Politics in Syria
Research for this report was completed
on 1 May 1979.
This paper was coordinated with the Directorate of
Operations and the National lntelligence Officer
for the Near East and South Asia. (u).
Confidential
PA 79-10207
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 Confidential
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Politics in Syria
Key Points President Assad's cautious, calculating personality dominates the Syrian
decisionmaking process. He is extremely patient and tolerant of ambiguity.
Assad's key lieutenants are the Alawite commanders of Syria's military and
intelligence- services, not the formal cabinet or Baath Party leadership.
Syria will n.ot accept a peace agreement unless Israel promises to return the
Golan area and satisfies most Palestinian aspirations.
Assad's diplomatic strategy recognizes Syrian weakness and is based on
securing widespread Arab and international support for his objectives.
Inforrnatioii on the political process in Syria is extremely limited because of
the closed nature of Syrian society. As a result much of the analysis in this
paper is speculative. We have attempted nonetheless to identify some of the
key power brokers and to describe their objectives, constituencies, and style
of operation.
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Politics in Syria
President Hafiz Assad dominates the decisionmaking
process in Syria. He has ruled the country longer than
anyone else since independence was achieved in 1946
by erecting a relatively stable power structure based on
the support of his fellow Alawite military officers,
members of a Muslim minority sect that comprises
about 13 percent of Syria's population.'k
Assad makes all the important decisions himself,
especially in defense and foreign affairs. For example,
Assad oversees all officer promotions, assignments,
training, and travel. He has developed ~~n intricate
system of checks and balances to maintain his hold on
power. None of his subordinates is allowed too much
power, and each is used against the others by Assad.
Assad's personality strongly influences Syrian de-
cisionmaking. He is an extremely cautious man who
prefers to take incremental steps rather than dramatic
initiatives. He eschews radical actions and philos-
ophies, preferring pragmatic, moderate policies. Assad
strongly objected to the strident radicalism of his
predecessor, Salah Jadid, who led Syria into two
defeats, with Israel in 1967 and in Jordan in 1970.
Assad, in contrast, has sought to project an image of
respectability for Syria. Even as a coup plotter, Assad
was cautious. He could have removed Jadid early in
1970, but he waited until November of that year to
ensure that his coup would be relatively bloodless and
smooth. Assad can take dramatic initiatives, such as
his decision to take part in the 1973 war with Israel,
but even then Syria's offensive was carefully planned
and prepared in advance and would not: have been
undertaken if Egypt had not taken the lead.
Assad also has a remarkable tolerance for uncertainty.
He is quite willing to allow an ambiguous situation to
continue when others impatiently demand a resolution
of the problem. Moreover, Assad is willing to reverse
Patient, cautious President H~z Assad,
supported byjellow Alawite military 4/ftcers,
has dominated .Syria's decisionmaking
longer than anyone else since Syria became
direction and retreat from an undesirable position
without apology or hesitation if the situation demands.
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Syria's intervention in the Lebanese civil war aptly
illustrates Assad's decisionmaking style. He moved his
forces into Lebanon slowly and patiently, carefully
judging each step to reduce the risk of disaster. He was
willing to switch sides midway through the war and
fight Syria's traditional ally, the Palestinians, when he
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judged that Syrian interests were better served. Since
~ariy 1978 he has moved cautiously to whittle down the
ower of Israel's Maronite Christian allies, always
25X1 "idling back from confrontation when Tel Aviv threat-
Assad is a quiet, private man who puts in a long
~~+~jrking day. He is usually unemotional, preferring to
~t his Foreign Minister Abd al-Halim Khaddam make
25X1 he fiery speeches while he remains silent. Unlike
?,~ypt's Sadat, Assad rants few interviews and keeps
iris own counsel.
~syria's formal cabinet has little role in policymaking.
Prime Minister Muhammad Halabi and Defense
Minister Mustapha T,alas are figureheads with no
political power base who hold office primarily to
appease the Sunni majority. Foreign Minister
Khaddam, as noted, is a vocal and often passionate
spokesman for Assad' foreign policy but has no power
base within the country. Syrian Chief of Staff Hikmat
Shihabi and Interior '~1inister Adnan Dabbagh are
trusted and able technocrats who only carry out
Assad's policies.
Assad relies for suppe rt on a small group of military
and intelligence officers-almost all Alawites-who
are extremely loyal to the President and are character-
ized by their discretion and secretive nature. This
informal-group is known in Syria as the Jamaa or "the
company.'
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positions. Rifaat also seems to have improved his
position in the Baath Party and will probably
strengthen his position in the corning party elections.
criticized Rifaat for corruption. In July, Rifaat bene-
fited from a major shakeup in the Army high
command that placed many of his Alawite allies in key
:Defense Companies under his command in Lebanon
have committed some of the most reprehensible abuses
of Syria's peacekeeping role in that country, including
the massacre of 30 civilians in June 1978 in the Bekaa
Valley and perhaps the assassination of Druze leader
Kamal Jumblatt. At home Rifaat is hated b man for
the heavyhanded tactics of his men. 25X1
Despite this formidable power base, Rifaat has many
enemies. To Syrian Sunnis, he is the symbol of Alawite
arrogance and abuse of power. There is no question of
his involvement in corrupt activities. Rifaat has
powerful enemies in the Alawite community. Many
Alawite officers regard Rifaat as the President's
bodyguard, not his heir, and might be willing to move
against him if he tries to lay claim to the presidency.
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Units of the 25X6
Rtfaat Assad,
key adviser to rot ter iz Assa ,
controls the intelligence network
that guards the Assad.family's hold
on power. (C)
Air Force Intelligence Chief Muhammad Khuli enjoys
a very close and trusting relationship with Assad-he
is the President's security adviser, has been an
emissary in Lebanon, is from the same village, and is
an Alawite. He often performs special projects for
Assad and is said to be efficient, hardworking, self-
asssured, and very ambitious. His subordinates claim
Assad's younger brother Rifaat is a key adviser to the
President and a major figure in ensuring 1.he regime's
survival. Rifaat commands the 20,000-me;rnber De-
fense Companies, an Alawite-dominated elite force
based primarily in Damascus. Rifaat is thus well
placed to influence events in the capital. He also
controls an extensive intelligence network that perme-
ates Syrian society to guard the Assad family's hold on
power.
In the last year Rifaat has succeeded in improving his
power base in Syria. In March 1978 he helped engineer
the downfall of his longtime rival, Air Force Com-
mander Naji Jamil, and replaced him with a Rifaat
loyalist, Subhi Haddad. Rifaat also helped place his
friend Muhammad Halabi as Prime Minister, remov-
ing General Abd al-Rahman Khulayfawi, who had
Khuli is the number-two man in Syria.
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Khuli has a strong power base in Air Force Intelli-
gence. Moreover, he is related by marriage to Alawite
Air Force Chief of Staff Ibrahim Hasan.
A major power broker is military intelligence chief Ali
Duba. Duba's intelligence apparatus-primarily Ala-
wite and Baathi in composition-maintains a close
watch for signs of dissidence in the Army. Ali Duba
has adopted a low profile
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is the First Syrian lea~:~er to have Israeli newspapers
translated for his use ~s a source of information on the
enemy, ana he consuiG.s with Syrian foreign policy
experts outside of the government
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fl~fuhammad Khuli, efficient, hardworking,
sand ambitious, has a strop ower base
ar? .Air Force intelligence.
.special Forces commander Ali Haydar, another
;'~lawite, commands the elite paratrooper and com-
nando units of the Army. Many are currently in
I .ebanon, a factor that may have reduced Haydar's
int~luence in Damascus, where they are usually sta-
loped as a counterweight to Rifaat's Defense Com-
~anies. Assad's nephew Adnan commands a third
~'raetorian guard force, the Struggle Companies, also
.stationed in Damascus.
The one thing that unites all these Alawites is their
goal of keeping the Assad regime in power and the
Alawites dominant in Syria. Many have been ex-
tremely suspicious o~ Assad's efforts to improve
relations with Iraq, which is dominated by Sunni
Muslims. Kifaat is said to be particularly opposed to
any substantive unite moves between the two Baathi
regimes l~~r fear this ~~ould weaken ,Alawite control
and thus endanger hip own position in Syria.
Key Constituencies
"I~he Syrians historiccly have been a badly divided
Community. Religious differences, regional rivalries,
and the conflicting ties of Syrian versus pan-Arab
nationalism produced almost a dozen coups Between
1948 and 1970.
Assad's power base is centered on the Alawite military
officers who control the armed forces. The military has
been the determinan~ in Syrian politics since the 1948
Arab defeat by Isra~a. The Alawites, traditionally
mpuverisned farmers with little political power, were
,rl.trrcted rn large numbers to the military in the 1950s
as a means of self-advancement. With the Sunni
officer corps decim~red by coups and purges in the
1950s and 1960s, thc; relatively cohesive Alawites
\ssad's immediate staff has no policymaking powers
,gut does have some influence on implementation. An
~:rnportant personality is Presidential Adviser Adib
~7audi, also an Alawite. Daudi often acts as Assad's
pokesman on foreign affairs and conducts key foreign
trips, such as his last minute trip to Saudi Arabia just
before the second Baghdad conference. He also func-
tions as Assad's chief of staff, overseeing his appoint-
ments and preparing his briefing papers. Assad values
r careful presentation of the pros and cons of issues. He
gained power.
Assad has appointed Alawites to key command-posts in
the military-the armored brigades, air defense com-
mand, elite commandos, and paratroopers--and
placed others in posEt~ons to monitor the military
intelligence services and diplomatic service.
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Most of these Alawite officers are intensely loyal to
Assad and their sect. They fear the conse;quences of
sectarian violence if Assad were removed. There are,
however, divisions within the sect-tribal. and ideologi-
cal-that Assad must minimize to stay in power.
Assad has carefull assuaged Alawite concerns to keep
their favor.
Assad also has been careful to expand his power base to
include other minority groups and the Si-nni majority.
As noted, Sunnis are prominent, although mostly
powerless, in the cabinet. Assad also constantly reiter-
ates his commitment to basic Islamic beliefs to
emphasize the Sunni's and Alawites' cornmon Muslim
identity. Nonetheless, the Sunni urban elite has little
affection for the Assad government and has on
occasion demonstrated its opposition by encouraging
religious rioting.
Syria's ruling Baath Party, which dominates the
coalition National Progressive Front, has only a
nominal voice in Syrian decisionmaking.* Assad uses
the party for patronage and as a means to mobilize
mass support, but he is careful to lead rather than be
led by it. The Baath is generally more rigid than Assad,
and it acts as a constraint in the Arab-Israeli dispute.
As in most societies, the Syrian ruling elite tends to see
the world through the lenses of its own historical
experience. Repeated coups, countercoups, and plots
since 1949 have scarred the Syrian political s the
with a tradition of conspiratorial politics.
The net result has been to encourage Syrians to
perceive events around them in conspiratorial terms.
This perception can go to extremes on occasion.
Syrians often view developments they cannot under-
stand as plots hatched by their enemies Mimed at
destroying their state, and this affects their de-
cisionmaking. They continue to suspect, for example,
that the Lebanese civil war was the result of an
American-Israeli-Egyptian conspiracy to weaken
Syria's opposition to Sinai II.
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Assad's most dangerous potential opposition comes
from within his own Alawite community. Since the
Alawites form the backbone of Assad's hold on power,
a serious factional split within the community could
threaten him. We know of two groups of Alawites who
have been unhappy with Assad in the past and who
might try to move against him if the conditions were
opportune.
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Supporters of Assad's predecessor and fellow Alawite
Salah Jadid (now imprisoned in Damascus) have tried
to restore Jadid to power on at least two occasions since
1970-in November 1972 and December 1976. Assad
has repeatedly purged the officer corps of Jadidists,
but some secret sympathizers undoubtedly remain.
Jadid probably also has supporters within the Baath,
particularly among the extreme left.
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Jadid's years in power-1966 to 1970-were marked
by a strong attachment to pan-Arabist and leftist
ideology. Syria was very close to the USSR and
pursued a policy of total rejection of peace with Israel. 25X1
If Jadid or his supporters returned to power, we would
expect a return to these policies.
The second group of Alawites unhappy with Assad are
supporters of former Defense Minister Muhammad
Umran-one of Assad's rivals in the 1960s who was
assassinated in 1972 while in exile in 25X6
Lebanon. We do not know of any attempts by
Umranisis to oust Assad. The Umran faction has
participated as a junior partner in ruling Syria since
1972.
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i he Umran faction has maneuvered cautiously in the
t3ast to disassociate itself from unpopular policies
~~ithout actually breaking with Assad. They have
~;onsistently refused to cooperate with the Jadidists--a
division that obviously benefits Assad.
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