THE NONALIGNED MOVEMENT: DYNAMICS AND PROSPECTS (Sanitized)

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP80T00942A000900060001-9
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: C
• Document Page Count: 23
• Document Creation Date: December 12, 2016
• Document Release Date: June 10, 2002
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: April 1, 1979
• Content Type: REPORT

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iessnetsesrment
The Nonaligned Movement:
Dynamics and Prospects
An Intelligence Assessment
Research for this report was completed
on 30 March 1979.
Confidential
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The Nonaligned Movement:
Dynamics and Prospects
Key Judgments
The Nonaligned Movement (NAM), a loose political
association with no real power, has nonetheless been
able to influence the priorities and tone of the
international agenda through sustained iteration of the
positions of the less developed countries. For the most
part, the Movement's pronouncements have been anti-
Western, indeed, anti-United States, because of the
Third World's resentment of its colonial legacy and
perceived continued economic subordination to the
industrial countries. The Movement has also been
critical of the USSR, especially on issues of the great
power arms race and inadequate economic assistance
to LDCs. While such criticism is intended to demon-
strate the "evenhanded" pursuit of the interests of the
Movement's members. it has not been as vocal as that
directed at the West.
The NAM's sixth summit?in Havana in Septem-
ber----could prove to be crucial to the future direction
and even the survival of the Movement.
? The Movement's activities and public positions
largely reflect the preoccupations and policy orienta-
tion of its most active members. Cuba, which is to be
titular leader of the NAM for the three years starting
with the summit, will attempt to give the Movement a
more pointedly anti-US and pro-Soviet edge than have
such traditional leaders as Yugoslavia.
? Iraq seems likely to be named to succeed Cuba as
chairman, thus giving the more radical NAM mem-
bers an edge in directing the Movement over the next
six years.
? Heightened Sino-Soviet rivalry, as well as the more
heated contest for leadership between radical and
moderate members, are exacerbating endemic re-
gional, economic, and ideological factionalism, at a
time when members are increasingly questioning the
Movement's utility to their foreign policy interests.
We expect the Havana conference to be highly
contentious even by the NAM's traditional standards,
with such issues as the Egyptian-Israeli peace treaty,
local wars in East Asia, and jockeying for power within
the organization certain to cause discord. Nonetheless,
the forces for compromise and at least rhetorical
unity ?essential to the survival of the Movement? are
likely to prevail. Cuba will do all it can to radicalize the
proceedings, but Yugoslavia and other moderates will
probably succeed in imparting some balance to the
proceedings. The United States will suffer sharper
insults but not necessarily more substantial injurie,,
than in the past. The summit will thus probably be
considered a "success" by most members, in that unity
on issues of common concern will be preserved. whie
more contentious issues will be shelved or the
differences papered over.
More important than the Havana summit will ne tne
direction the Movement takes during the three years
that it will be under Cuba's tutelage and leader ship.
We expect a more active involvement of the NAM in
international forums and issues, similar to that during
Algeria's chairmanship (1973-76):
? The Movement will pay greater attention to issues
related to alleged political domination and econom lc
exploitation of the Third World by the industrialized
West, such as foreign military bases (Guantanamo,
Diego Garcia); unequal trade relations: and nation.tl
liberation movements and the role of Commurust
states in helping these movements.
? Events in southern Africa could adversely influence
US relations with the NAM. If efforts to achieve an
internationally accepted settlement of the current
conflict in Namibia and Rhodesia fail and armed
struggle ensues, further Cuban and Soviet assistance
will be sought by the liberation forces. Anticolonial
sentiment could reach fever pitch and drown out voices
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l'or moderation and compromise in the Movement.
Such a development could, in turn, facilitate Cuba's
efforts to radicalize the Movement.
- The death of Yugoslavia's Tito during Cuba's tenure
as chairman would mean loss of a major opponent of
Cuban domination of the Movement, albeit it also
might force other moderates to play a more active role.
Despite endemic internal strains, we believe the
Movement will maintain a fairly high degree of
cohesion for the next several years because it will
continue to serve the interest of both radical and
moderate leaders, as well as of the rank and file. Most
members view the Movement as one of the most
effective means they have to represent their interests
with the more advanced countries, particularly the
superpowers. For its part, Cuba will be constrained as
titular leader not to force the Movement toward
extreme positions that would threaten its unity, lest
this diminish the NAM's utility to Havana's foreign
policy.
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Contents
Key Judgments
Origins and Growth
Internal Tensions
Charting a New Course
Annexes
A. Evolution and Goals
B. Structure and Organization
C. Chronology of Summits of the Nonaligned Countries
7
I Q
Tables
1. Members of the Nonaligned Movement 7
2. Members of the Group of 77
3. Members of the Nonaligned Coordinating Bureau 4
4. Coordinator Countries of the Action Program for Economic I 6
Cooperation
5. Composition of Working and Related Groups of the Nonaligned 17
Countries in the United Nations
Figures
Nonaligned and Group of 77 Members (map) 11
Nonaligned Movement Organizational Structure (chart) 13
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The Nonaligned Movement:
Dynamics and Prospects
Origins and Growth
The concept of nonalignment originated in the 1950s
as one of several efforts by the less developed countries
(LDCs) to promote their interests in what they
perceived as a dangerous and exploitative bipolar
world. The major goals of what became the
Nonaligned Movement were to mediate the Soviet-US
Cold War conflict, to urge the superpowers to disarm,
to decolonize the world, and to obtain a larger share of
global economic resources for the LDCs.
The conditions that fostered and nurtured the concept
of nonalignment have changed. The Cold War thawed
the anticolonialism, which once provided the binding
force for the Movement, now represents no more than a
common heritage for most of the members. The
energetic pursuit of economic equality with the indus-
trial countries was launched at the Movement's 1973
summit. Since then, however, implementing this objec-
tive has been taken over by the LDCs UN caucus, the
Group of 77, which acts as the Third World's economic
negotiating bloc with the industrialized countries. As a
result, the Movement at present has no one issue
around which it can regenerate itself and for which it is
either the sole or the best spokesman for its member-
ship. Moreover, fundamental differences in political
outlook and stages of economic development, as well as
regional conflicts and interregional jealousies, plague
the group. Indeed, the Movement is characterized only
by a series of meetings and declarations, and has no
internal mechanism to implement its declarations or
resolutions.
Despite the Movement's lack of focus, it still has an
important impact, especially in North-South relations.
Its summits and numerous meetings spawn ideas that
are often translated into resolutions and proposals that
incrementally advance the interests of developing
countries in various multilateral forums.
Indeed, at times the Movement's impact has been
impressive, especially in view of the obstacles that
members must overcome to reach consensus. For
example, the Movement initiated the drive that led to
1
greater LDC representation in various UN bodies,
such as the Security Council, the Economic ana Social
Council (ECOSOC) and the International Atomic
Energy Agency (IAEA); it originated the call for a
New International Economic Order (NIE0); it wa-
the driving force in the creation of the UN Conference
on Trade and Development (UNCTAD); and it is Inc
originator of the present drive to create a New Word
Information Order (NWIO). Its long-term interest in
disarmament issues sparked the recent UN Special
Session on Disarmament, which resulted in the I Th.'s'
gaining more influence in multilateral disarmament
debates.
Internal Tensions
The increase in the membership of the Movement and
the diverse ideological composition since its first
meeting in 1961 has heightened internal tension; owl-
the direction?and the very meaning?of non-
alignment. Of the influential national leaders who Kid
the drive and competence to organize and direct the
Movement, only Yugoslavia's Tito remains. Those wrio
are now most forcefully aspiring for leadership view
the concept of nonalignment in narrower terms than do
the surviving traditional leaders. Cuba, the currt nt
threat to Yugoslavia's influence, sees the Movement
exculsively as an anti-imperialist (that is, anti-US
force that should be closely aligned with its "natura;
ally, the Soviet Union. To Yugoslavia, Cuba's attitudes
represent a direct and unacceptable Soviet attempt to
exert influence through the Movement. This threat
comes at a time when Yugoslavia may be faced with
succession problems and may not be able to thwart
Cuba's effort to transform the Movement.
Cuba is particularly assertive in defending Soviet
interests within the NAM, but it is not the only
member that over the years has depended on the
military and economic patronage of one of the sutler
powers. Those who at one time or another have taken a
pro-Soviet approach include Egypt, in 1956 when it
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turned to the Soviets to build the Aswan High Dam;
India, after the Sino-Indian conflict in 1962; and
Ethiopia since 1977. The states that lean toward the
West?such as Saudi Arabia, Zaire, I.iberia?are
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Sustaining such relationships with the superpowers,
however, raises the basic conflict between the ideals of
nonalignment and superpower client status, an issue
that causes acerbic debate at nonaligned gatherings as
members attempt to define the role and meaning of
nonalignment. To reduce divisiveness on the issue,
members have dealt with it on the official level by
restating the vague principles of nonalignment, ignor-
ing its inconsistencies, and rarely directly attacking
any member for its alignment with either super-
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The long-running Sino-Soviet struggle for influence
within the NAM has surfaced again in the context of
the Kampuchea-Vietnam conflict. The issue of which
government represents Kampuchea is a divisive one
within the Movement, with the pro-Soviet faction
pitted against most other members. The members were
able to avoid the issue at the most recent meeting of the
NAM's Coordinating Bureau 'in Mozambique by
agreeing to seat without the right to speak both the
already-present representative of the Pol Pot regime
and representatives of the Peoples' Revolutionary
Council. The latter, however, did not send a delega-
tion.
Other political issues continue to strain the unity of the
nonaligned states. Regional conflicts ?such as those
between Morocco, Mauritania, and Algeria; Somalia
and Ethiopia; Kampuchea and Vietnam; Tanzania and
Uganda; Egypt and the rejectionist Arab states?
divert attention from the Movement's major long-term
objective of bringing about a radically different
international system.
' Cuba has recently come under direct attack At the Belgrade
Foreign Ministers meeting in July 1978, Egypt delivered a slashing
attack on Cuba for its involvement in Africa and called for chang-
ing the venue of the summit from Havana. Similar attacks
were delivered by Somalia, Zaire, Morocco, Kuwait, Oman, and
Tunisia.
See annex B, pages 13 to 17 for a description of the Coordinating
Bureau.
Confidential
Charting a New Course
Yet, the Movement continues to exist and even to
grow, because it provides a forum for newly independ-
ent states, as well as small and middle-size states, to
reaffirm their sovereignty.' It also serves domestic
needs, by giving leaders of member countries a third
foreign policy option which, because it sidesteps
favoring US or Soviet positions, avoids arousing the
antagonism of pro-Western or pro-Communist internal
political factions. The most important factor in main-
taining NAM strength and influence is the persistent
appeal of the Movement's underlying objective; that is,
to improve the political and economic positions of
Third World states. Both the nonaligned members and
the other LDCs generally believe that the present
international structure is inherently biased and serves
the interests of only a few industrial states. Further-
more, they see themselves still in bondage to the
developed countries because political sovereignty in
many cases was not accompanied by economic
viability. The members thus view the Movement as a
useful means to enhance their ability to effect what
they see as crucially needed changes in the interna-
tional political and economic system.
Cuba's intentions toward the Movement are not fully
clear. As titular leader of the NAM for the three years
following the Havana summit, it can be assumed that
Cuba will continue its attempts to redefine non-
alignment as an anti-imperialist force, more closely
allied with the Soviet orbit. It has, however, shown a
great deal of flexibility and is not likely to risk pushing
to the point of endangering the unity of the Movement.
Cuba's efforts to transform and redefine the character
of the Movement are likely to be constrained by the
very nature of Castro's goals. If it pushes these goals
too energetically, even some radical members may join
an expected anti-Cuban backlash. Algeria, although
currently preoccupied by its internal succession prob-
lems, may not willingly agree to Cuban control of the
Movement, and some of the other radicals?for
9 Iran applied for admission in early March 1979, following its
withdrawal from CENTO. Pakistan, which also withdrew from
CENTO, is expected to seek membership before the Havana summit.
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example, Iraq and Libya--do not necessarily share
Cuba's view of a natural alliance between the NAM
and the Soviets. If Cuban actions were to result in a
conversion of the NAM into a smaller, clearly revolu-
tionary and anti-Western group, the loss of member-
ship would greatly reduce its international influence.
How polemical the declaration and resolutions of the
Havana summit will be depends on several factors--
the international environment at the time of the
summit; Cuba's exemplary skills at parliamentary
procedures; and willingness of the majority to acqui-
esce to the special interests of a few.
Important external factors that could seriously erode
the moderate faction's ability to temper the radicals in
the years ahead are a sharp decline in the international
economy, failure of the Western initiatives in southern
Africa, a Middle East war, and the death of Tito. A
prolonged international recession could bring about
increasing attention to economic affairs, perhaps in a
more confrontational atmosphere. Events in southern
Africa or the Middle East could force countries to turn
to the Soviets and their allies for assistance, thus
muting the voices of pragmatism and moderation.
Tito's death would probably divert Yugoslavia's atten-
tion inward to the succession problem, and, at least
temporarily, reduce its influence in the Movement.
Without Tito as a counterforce to Cuba's efforts to
dominate the Movement, other moderates might be
prompted to play a more active role.
3
Iraq is slated to assume the chair in 1982. The
direction that Iraq will pursue is open to question, but
it will not likely be as pro-Soviet as Cuba's orientation.
It can be assumed that the Middr Last will be lraq's
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In sum, although the Movement will probably r..tain
its "anti-imperialist" approach, it will not necessarily
assume a more pro-Soviet stance. Such a reorientation
would come only at the expense of the NAM's exist-
ence, which neither the "radicals" or the -moderates"
want. The tensions generated by the clash of opposing
forces on the meaning of nonalignment and other
issues will continue to test the Movement's unity Even
so, there is no other Third World forum quite like the
Nonaligned Movement through which the diverse
membership can express its interests. Thus, as long as
the members of the Movement retain a shared sense of
being ill-treated by the industrial and military powers
and a belief in the need to speak with one voice t..
correct the perceived imbalances, the nonaligned will
probably continue to patch over their immediate
differences to pursue their long-term goal of
restructuring the international system.
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Annex A
Evolution and Goals
Origin and Principles
The Nonaligned Movement has its antecedents in the
April 1955 Afro-Asian conference held in Bandung,
Indonesia. Twenty-nine states?mostly newly inde-
pendent?gathered to discuss ways to achieve eco-
nomic, cultural, and political cooperation in order to
secure their own independence at a time when the Cold
War seemed to polarize the world into two antagonistic
blocs. The conference made no mention of "non-
alignment" (a term coined by Yugoslavia's Josip Broz
Tito), but it did incorporate the basic principles of the
concept of nonalignment and peaceful coexistence and
was viewed by Tito as a milestone in the evolution of
the concept.'
The principles of nonalignment and peaceful coexist-
ence were contained in a 1954 bilateral communique
between Yugoslavia's Tito and India's Jawaharlal
Nehru.' These two leaders envisaged nonalignment as
the active pursuit of political and economic independ-
ence, peaceful ideological coexistence, and military
nonalliance, which could exert a considerable influence
on the course of world affairs. Each approached the
concept from a different perspective. Nehru saw it as a
means to exert a moral force for peace between the
United States and the USSR while Tito, for his own
geopolitical reasons, saw it as a way to help Yugoslavia
out of its diplomatic isolation and to form and lead a
third force in international affairs. Egypt's Nasser and
Indonesia's Sukarno embraced the concept in 1956.
Nasser, who at the time was preoccupied with Algerian
independence, predicated his acceptance of the princi-
ples of nonalignment on the condition that colonialism
This communique noted that Yugoslav-Indian relations were based
on the "Panchsheel" principles and further asserted that these
principles should govern international relations. The principles,
prefaced in a 1954 Sino-Indian agreement on Tibetan border traffic,
are mutual respect for each others' territorial integrity and
sovereignty; mutual nonaggression; mutual noninterference;
equality and mutual benefits; and peaceful coexistence. Belgrade
viewed the concept of active coexistence as a blueprint for a new and
radically different system of international relations that would
eventually do away with alignments and free the world of political,
military, or economic abuse of power. Realizing that achievement of
these goals would take a long time, Tito saw the policy of
nonalignment as the best way to hasten the process. I
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and related issues be given high priority. Tito tnought
these issues merited less urgent treatment, but acqui-
esced both because of his respect for Nasser and the
need to garner Afro- Asian support for the concept.
The Movement was slow in starting, partly because
Yugoslavia was reluctant to apply the concepts to
concrete issues or developments sensitive to either ihe
East or the West. However, such events as the Sue/
crisis and Soviet invasion of Hungary in 1956, and the
Congo and Berlin crises in 1960-61 led Yugoslavia to
postulate that the existence of two military blocs and
the armaments race between them were the prima! y
threats to peace. The unstable world situation led the
Movement's founders to call for a summit meeting of
like-minded states to develop a strategy that woulc
avert an open confrontation between the United States
and the USSR.' Four major foreign policy tasks were
established at the 1961 nonaligned summit in Bel-
grade: to mediate between the East and West; to secure
a general and complete disarmament, or at least a halt
in the US-Soviet race; to bring an end to colonialism;
and to restructure the international system to decrease
the perceived abuses of the military and industrial
powers. The issue of decolonization offered the most
promise for effective small-state collective pressure
and became the motive force for the Movemen
Membership
Expanding the membership, which the founders- --
particularly Yugoslavia?believed was necessary to
give the Movement the necessary influence, forced a
flexible application of the criteria for entry into the
Movement. In theory, nonalliance with military blocs
is a requisite for membership. In practice, acceptance
of new applicants is based more on subjective factors.
Although Cuba has questionable credentials as a nonaligned
country, it was invited to attend because of its image as a small
country facing US hostility as reflected in the Bay of Pigs mas on
and the US economic blockade.
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Thus, even countries with clear military alignments
have been allowed to become members. (See table 1 for
a list of members.) For example, with the strong
backing of the active and increasingly influential
socialist members, North Korea was able to secure
membership in 1976, while South Korea was not. The
fact that North Korea's ties to the Soviet Union were
at that time as strong as South Korea's ties to the
United States made little difference. Membership
criteria have also been frequently relaxed on the
assumption that affiliation will strengthen a country's
independent posture. Malta's membership reflects the
NAM members' recognition of the difficulty in termi-
nating base agreements. And even though the Move-
ment has not granted full membership to any country
with formal military alliances to either superpower, the
participation as guests of Portugal (NATO), the
Philippines (US bases), and Romania (Warsaw Pact)
shows the flexible nature of the NAM's membership
criteria.'
By contrast, certain countries have been discouraged
from applying for membership, or their requests have
been blocked at nonaligned meetings. For example,
India had successfully lobbied against Pakistan's full
membership, citing Islamabad's membership in
CENTO. Besides its own reasons for keeping Pakistan
out of the Movement, it may also have been seconding
the Soviet view, which portrays Pakistan as a conduit
of Chinese influence. Pakistan's withdrawal from
CENTO removes the excuse India has used to prevent
Pakistan from joining the Movement. A second
example is Cuba's self-assigned role as the arbiter for
admission of Latin American states, which has thus far
prevented countries not to Havana's liking from
gaining membership. For example, it successfully
blocked discussion of Bolivia's application for member-
ship in 1978.
' The NAM has two categories for nonmember participation?guest
and observer. Both are allowed to attend plenary meetings, but
cannot participate in drafting and generally have no voice. The
difference between the two is vague?some members define criteria
for observer status as meeting all necessary requirements for
membership. Procedurally, the observer category is a permanent
position, while the guest category pertains only to a particular
meeting. Guests must be granted permission to attend each meet-
ing.
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Diversity has increased as membership has grown.
This has heightened the tensions over priorities, policy
direction, and the very meaning of nonalignment.
Although there are various factional alignments for
different issues in the Movement, two forces are the
most dynamic in seeking to define the NAM's role.
The small, but very active group, described as "pro-
gressive and revolutionary" (for example, Afghani-
stan, Cuba, Iraq, North Korea, and Vietnam) gener-
ally define the NAM strictly as an "anti-imperialist"
entity?claiming the ills of the world are caused by the
capitalist states. Cuba, the current leader of this group,
is attempting to push the Movement in that direction
while stressing the natural affinity of the Movement to
the "socialist," that is, Communist, countries. Within
the grouping, the ideological differences and mutual
suspicions among those countries who identify with the
Soviet Union (Cuba, Vietnam), or China (North
Korea, Kampuchea) and those who are anti-Commu-
nist (Libya) prevent adoption of a common definition
of the role of the Movement.
Yugoslavia, and the "centrist" members (India, Sri
Lanka, and Egypt) continue to express the principles of
nonalignment in the terms established in 1961?
opposition to all forms of foreign domination and
independence from all blocs. In addition, some mem-
bers of this core group want the Movement to focus on
economic and disarmament problems, rather than on
the political issues (seemingly favored by the more
radical members) that tend to divide the NAM.
Within this more moderate core there are also divisions
between some members who are Communist and those
who have a pro-Western orientation (termed "reac-
tionary" by Cuba). Yugoslavia, above all, stresses the
need for unity and solidarity of the entire Movement
and fears that labeling the members "progressives" or
"reactionary" only serves to exacerbate the divisions
inherent among the members and reduce the NAM's
effectiveness. In addition to its political diversity, the
broad economic spectrum of the membership repre-
sents every level of national development, from bare
subsistence to relatively diversified and advanced
economic structures.
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Table 1
Members of the Nonaligned Movement'
Afghanistan (1961)
Algeria (1961)
Angola (1964)
Argentina (1973)
Bahrain (1976)
Bangladesh (1973)
Benin (1964)
Bhutan (1973)
Botswana (1970)
Burma (1961)
Burundi (1964)
Cameroon (1964)
Cape Verde (1976)
Central African Empire (1964)
Chad (1964)
Comoros (1976)
Congo (1964)
Cuba (1961)
Cyprus (1961)
Djibouti
Egypt (1961)
Equatorial Guinea (1970)
Ethiopia (1961)
Gabon (1973)
Gambia (1973)
Ghana (1961)
Guinea (1961)
Guinea-Bissau (1976)
Guyana (1970)
India (1961)
Indonesia (1961)
Iraq (1961)
Ivory Coast (1973)
Jamaica (1970)
Jordan (1964)
Kampuchea (1961)
Kenya (1964)
Korea (Pyongyang) (1976)
Kuwait (1964)
Laos (1964)
Lebanon (1961)
Lesotho (1970)
Liberia (1964)
Libya (1964)
Madagascar (1973)
Malaysia (1964)
Maldives (1976)
Mali (1961)
Malta (1973)
Mauritania (1964)
Mauritius (1973)
Morocco (1961)
Mozambique (1976)
Nepal (1961)
Niger (1973)
Nigeria (1964)
Oman (1973)
Palestine Liberation Organization (1976)
Panama (1976)
Peru (1973)
Qatar (1973)
Rwanda (1970)
Sao Tome and Principe (1976)
Saudi Arabia (1961)
Senegal (1964)
Seychelles (1976)
Sierra Leone (1964)
Singapore (1970)
Somalia (1961)
South-West Africa People's Organization
Sri Lanka (1961)
Sudan (1961)
Swaziland (1970)
Syria (1964)
Tanzania (1964)
Togo (1964)
Trinidad and Tobago (1970)
Tunisia (1961)
Uganda (1964)
United Arab Emirates (1973)
Upper Volta (1973)
Vietnam (1973)
Yemen (Aden) (1970)
Yemen (Sana) (1961)
Yugoslavia (1961)
Zaire (1961)
Zambia (1964)
Zimbabwe Patriotic Front '
'Chile dropped out after being heavily criticized at the 1976
Colombo summit. Although still a member in a formal sense, since
there is no mechanism for expulsion, it is not invited to attend
meetings and, under the present government, probably would not
attend if it were invited. Malawi joined the Movement in 1964.
President Banda denounced nonalignment in 1970, following criti-
cism for its relations with Israel. Neither are counted in the total of
88 members.
7
' Admitted at the NAM foreign ministers' conference in Belgrade in
July 1978. It must be confirmed at the Havana summit.
Admitted at a ministerial meeting of the Nonaligned Coordinating
Bureau (NACB) in New York early in the 33d (1978)11N t ieneral
Assembly. It must be confirmed at the Havana summit.
? Admitted at the ministerial meeting of the NACB in Moza inbique
in February 1979. It must be confirmed at the Havana suini,lit.
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In sum, the Movement is so filled with contradictory
interests that organizing for a sharply focused ap-
proach to issues is often impossible. Nonetheless, it
does maintain an appearance of unity, especially in
general statements about the evils of "imperialism"
and the economic needs of the developing states. The
source of this cohesion is the firm belief of the
members that to improve their position in the interna-
tional political and economic system, they must remain
united.
Relationship to Group of 77
Although the Nonaligned Movement includes most of
the LDCs, it is not identical with the Group of 77,
which has 117 members (see map, page Ii, and tables
1 and 2). The Group of 77 came into being in 1964 in
the context of the first UN Conference on Trade and
Development (UNCTAD). It continues to be, in the
framework of the United Nations, the principal caucus
of all LDCs, for matters of collective economic
interests. The Movement represents a majority in the
Group of 77, and perceives itself as a catalyst within
that body to give it effective political direction. The
shared values of both groups often make it impossible
to distinguish where the influence of one ends and the
other begins. The Movement, however, transcends
economic concerns and offers militarily weak and
economically underdeveloped nations a forum in which
to develop joint positions on noneconomic issues as
well.
Particularly in UN forums, the Movement thus speaks
to such issues as national self-determination, non-
adherence to multilateral military pacts, disarmament,
noninterference in the internal affairs of states,
strengthening of the United Nations, "democratiza-
tion of international relations" (read greater Third
World representation), and such development-related
issues as individual and collective self-reliance.
'Countries in the Group of 77 that are not members of the
Nonaligned Movement either have not met membership criteria (for
example, Romania) or, for their own national policy reasons, have
not asked for membership (for example, Brazil, Mexico).
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Leadership and Direction
The Movement has both a formal and an informal
leadership structure. The NAM foreign ministers
recommend to the summit, the NAM's major organ,
the country that will serve as the next President in
Office (a three-year term that begins with the hosting
of the summit). The procedure usually is to accept a
country's offer to act as host. This year the NAM
Foreign Ministers meeting at Belgrade accepted Iraq's
offer to assume the presidency in 1982. That offer
must be confirmed at the Havana summit in Septem-
ber 1979.
The hosts of the NAM summits are accorded an
important opportunity for influence and control. The
Movement does not have a secretariat and conse-
quently has adopted the practice of allowing the
summit host to prepare the first draft of the agenda,
communiques, and resolutions, which are generally
based on previous NAM documents. The host, as the
summit's chairman, wields a substantial amount of
power in meetings through such parliamentary proce-
dural maneuvers as deciding the rules of order and
sidetracking amendments. The latter tactic, which
constitutes the greater control over the outcome of the
meeting, often means that members are pressured to
accept the original text drafted by the host. During its
tenure, Algeria was most successful in sidetracking
amendments and steamrolling declarations and resolu-
tions by deciding the rules of procedure. Sri Lanka, the
present chairman, also employed this tactic at the 1976
summit, but not so blatantly.
The ideological and political leadership of the Move-
ment is not always reflected in the election process;
indeed, such leadership depends on national dynamism
and individual charisma. A small number of countries
dominate the Movement through the influence they
exert by their membership on the Coordinating Bureau
and by active bilateral contacts with a large number of
members. This leadership shifts when key members?
such as India, Egypt, Indonesia, and Algeria?periodi-
cally turn their attention to their own national needs,
or when strong leaders die or their attitudes toward the
Movement change.
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Table 2
Members of the Group of 77
Afghanistan Guinea Palestine Liberation Organization
Algeria Guinea-Bissau Panama
Angola Guyana Papua New Guinea
Argentina Haiti Paraguay
Bahamas Honduras Peru
Bahrain India Philippines
Bangladesh Indonesia Qatar
Barbados Iran Romania
Benin Iraq Rwanda
Bhutan Ivory Coast Sao Tome and Principe
Bolivia Jamaica Saudi Arabia
Botswana Jordan Senegal
Brazil Kampuchea Seychelles
Burma Kenya Sierra Leone
Burundi Korea (Pyongyang) Singapore
Cameroon Korea (Seoul) Solomon Islands
Cape Verde Kuwait Somalia
Central African Empire Laos Sri Lanka
Chad Lebanon Sudan
Chile Lesotho Suriname
Colombia Liberia Swaziland
Comoros Libya Syria
Congo Madagascar Tanzania
Costa Rica Malawi Thailand
Cuba Malaysia Togo
Cyprus Maldives Trinidad and Tobago
Djibouti Mali Tunisia
Dominican Republic Malta Uganda
Ecuador Mauritania United Arab Emirates
Egypt Mauritius Upper Volta
El Salvador Mexico Uruguay
Equatorial Guinea Morocco Venezuela
Ethiopia Mozambique Vietnam
Fiji Nepal Western Samoa
Gabon Nicaragua Yemen (Aden)
Gambia Niger Yemen (Sana)
Ghana Nigeria Yugoslavia
Grenada Oman Zaire
Guatemala Pakistan Zambia
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Another group--Vietnam, Iraq, Jamaica Guyana, and
Syria?have been influential on particular issues. Only
Yugoslavia, which considers the Movement an exten-
sion of its foreign policy, has consistently played a
major role, albeit sometimes from the wings rather
than from center stage (as it did during Algeria's
forceful tenure as chairman).
Since 1970, Cuba, the first Latin American member of
the Movement, has been challenging Yugoslavia's
influence within the Movement. Rejecting the
founders' view that membership is based on adherence
to a policy of peaceful coexistence and independence of
power blocs, Cuba believes the NAM should be a
"revolutionary" force aligned with the Soviet orbit.
The Cubans also seek leadership as a means of
increasing Fidel Castro's and Cuba's international
prestige.
The conflict over the role and direction of the
Movement has been hotly debated at the summits.
Although several members made speeches at the 1973
summit denouncing the irrelevance of the founding
principles, Castro's speech proposing an alliance of the
NAM with the Soviet Union clearly went too far for
most members. Libyan President Qadhafi, at that time
fervently anti-Communist, walked out, and Cam-
bodia's Prince Sihanouk rebutted Castro from the
floor. The issue will be addressed again at Havana and
probably at every succeeding nonaligned gathering?
without resolution.
Such setbacks have not diminished Castro's efforts. As
host of the next summit and president for three years
following, Havana might succeed in pushing a more
confrontational line with the West on certain issues
and will certainly try to sharpen the rhetoric. Never-
theless, the NAM is too large, diverse, and
unstructured for any one state or faction to control it
for long. In the end, the overriding concern for
"solidarity" should bring about compromise of the
major conflicting interests.
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The Nonaligned Movement: Dynamics and Prospects
Confidential
.k_lreertland
Den
Irela
United
Kingdom 4.th
France
Rornanel,_
U.S.
United States
Mexico
Cuba
The Bahamas
Member of the Group of 77
Member of the Nonaligned Movement
and the Group of 77
in endures
GuaternalaX,
Note.
The Palestine Liberation Organization is a
member of the Nonaligned Movement and the
Group of 77 The South-West Africa Peoples'
Organization arid the Zimbabwe Patriotic Front
are mernoers o rne Nooaiigned Muyerne.,i
caragua
Ei Saivaddi
Papama
Costa Rica ton,t
EcuadO
Dominican Repubin.
Barbados
Grenada
Trinidad and TobaGe
\ Venezuela: tiyana
Suriname
- '
Brazil
/1:111?',11T4
itoimpi,103 mot
Portugal,
Spain
Turkey
Western
Sahara
iLiape '4oree Se
The Gambia
Guinea
Bissau
Sierra
Leone
Liberia
Kuwait
i
,-Pakist
China
area orea
S. Korea
ArAi
1,rrf 1" r
touti , 11
tic
Sr Lan.sa
Philippines
Japan
Maldives
Sae Tome and Pr,ncipe -
alay
',neap
7,
Equatorial
Guinea
Seychelles
_ Comoro
doriesia
Papua
New GPinea . Solomon
Islands
ascar
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South
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-
Australia
New
Zealand
Western
Samoa
Fiii
Tonga
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Annex B
Structure and Organization
The Nonaligned Movement has evolved an elaborate,
although informal, organizational structure (sec
chart). Much of the existing structure has developed
since 1973 and reflects the Movement's belief that it
could be more successful as an offensive rather than
defensive entity.
The large, diverse membership has hindered the
NAM's ability to organize itself formally, adopt a
charter or other set of rules, or establish a permanent
secretariat. It has also made it difficult to reconcile
members' special interests in the pursuit of common
objectives. To avoid both domination of the Movement
by any one special interest group and splintering of its
ranks as a result of formal voting, members have
adopted the principle of decisionmaking by consensus.
By operating in this fashion, the members maintain
anonimity and the fragile unity of the group )s
maintained, albeit at the price of many serious
unresolved differences. Adding to the strain is thc
differing view that many of the members have on the
consensus principle. Cuba, Vietnam, and Guyana want
to retain the loose definition agreed to at the 197 3
Kabul Preparatory Committee meeting?that is that
consensus simply means a convergence of views.'
The Preparatory Committee evolved into the Coordinating Bureau.
The Nonaligned Movement: Dynamics and Prospects
Organizational Structure
Special
Conference
Summit
Conference of Heads of State or Government
Conference of Ministers of Foreign Affairs
Coordinating Bureau at the Ministerial Level
Coordinating Bureau at the Level of
Permanent Representatives'
Political Working
Groups and
Related Groups
Coordinator Countries
for the Economic
Action Programme
4 -
Technical Groups
Specializec'
Ministerial
Conference 3
Intergovernmertil
Council
Expert Group
Li
1 The Coordinating Bureau at the Level of Permanent RepresentatiVes also functions as preparatory
committee for summits, foreign minister conferences and meetings at the ministerial level
2. If no competent expert group exists, these meetings may report to any other body of the non-aiignet,
movement.
Source: The Third World Without the Superpowers, Jankowitsch and Sau.ant (1978)
nd Other Groups'
mposia, Seminars 1
578904 4-79
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2 5 X 1
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Indonesia, Yugoslavia, India, Peru, Singapore, and
others want a more precise definition, leaving less
discretion to the chairman. Yugoslavia also argues that
decisions adopted with many formal reservations do
not carry weight, while Cuba argues that reservations
cannot veto or obstruct consensus. The issue will be
addressed at Havana, but probably will not be
completely resolved.
The Movement has evolved a three-year cycle of
meetings, which builds upon itself. In each of the three
years, the 25-member Coordinating Bureau meets at
the level of the foreign ministers. In the second year,
the Bureau ministerial meeting is followed by a
plenary meeting of all nonaligned foreign ministers,
while in the third year these two gatherings are
followed by a summit meeting of the heads of state and
government.
The principal organ of the Movement is the conference
of the heads of state and government, that is, the
summit.' The leader of the country hosting a summit
becomes a President in Office or nominal head of the
Movement until the next summit. He is responsible for
maintaining continuity and contact with member
states, implementing the decisions and directives of the
summit and coordinating all NAM activities.
Summit conferences are immediately preceded by a
conference of foreign ministers, which prepares the
final agenda and drafts of the declaration and resolu-
tions for the summit. The foreign ministers also meet
at other times to review and coordinate the work of the
Movement or to deal with special questions. They have
recently initiated the practice of meeting in New York
just before General Assembly sessions to coordinate
NAM actions. The plenary Foreign Ministers meeting
thus constitutes the second structural element of the
Movement
The third element is the 25-member Coordinating
Bureau (see table 3 for a list of members) which is the
fulcrum of nonaligned activities in the United Nations
and the coordinating center for the Movement between
? Costs for organizing a summit meeting are largely borne by the
host. There is, however, a formula for cost-sharing which is based on
contributions made by the member countries to the United Nations,
subject to a prescription that no member pay more than 10 percent of
the expenses. Expenses for hiring technicians and staff assistance
from the UN secretariat staff, translation services, and printing are
some of the common costs.'
('onfidential
Table 3
Members of the Nonaligned Coordinating Bureau
Afghanistan
Angola
Algeria
Botswana
Cuba
Chad
Guinea
Guyana
India
Indonesia
Iraq
Jamaica
Liberia
Niger
Nigeria
Palestine Liberation Organization
Peru
Syria
Sri Lanka '
Sudan
Tanzania
Vietnam
Yugoslavia
Zaire
Zambia
' In the chair until the summit.
summit conferences. Through its coordinating func-
tion the Coordinating Bureau is able to exert a certain
amount of influence over the Movement's positions.
The Bureau evolved from a compromise concept
adopted at the 1973 Algiers summit, when Houari
Boumediene, Algeria's forceful leader and host for
that meeting, attempted to establish a permanent
secretariat but was blocked by India and Yugoslavia.
Other attempts by various members to institutionalize
the Movement also have been unsuccessful. The
unenthusiastic response to bureaucracy from most
members probably reflects their concern that in
addition to the costs involved, such a body would be
dominated by one or a few countries.
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Seats on the Bureau are apportioned on the basis of
geographical distribution, in the same way that UN
bodies apportion seats. The Bureau, which may be
enlarged by 10 additional members at the 1979
summit, has a present allocation of 12 seats for Africa,
8 for Asia, 4 for Latin America, and 1 for Europe.
Membership selection is made at each summit. Gener-
ally, the more active, influential members are
revalidated by their regional groups, with rotation
occurring among the less active NAM members. Egypt
failed to retain its seat on the Bureau at the 1976
Colombo summit, which reflected a drop in stature for
Egypt in addition to giving the radicals (especially
Arab states) more influence within the Bureau. The
Bureau is roughly divided between "moderates" and
"radicals," but the radicals display more unity. In-
creasing the number of Bureau seats is not likely to
change the tone of Bureau pronouncements signifi-
cantly.
The Coordinating Bureau's annual foreign ministers
meetings prepare a communique dealing with issues of
concern to the Movement?international peace and
security, disarmament, and economics?which is then
circulated to the membership. The Bureau meets
regularly at the ambassadorial level at the United
Nations in New York and sometimes at the UN
headquarters in Geneva (on economic matters) and,
claiming to speak for all nonaligned, issues statements
or communiques on various topics)"
Although Bureau pronouncements are sometimes
more radical in tone than those issuing from plenary
meetings of all the nonaligned foreign ministers, the
tone varies depending on where the meeting is held,
how focused the attention of the "moderates" is, the
degree to which one or more countries wish to push a
particular view, and the prevailing international cli-
mate.
That the Bureau's decisions may not represent the
inclination of the entire membership was brought
home at the May 1978 ministerial meeting in Havana.
' The contentious issue of whether the Bureau has the right to issue
any communique without plenary approval arose again following the
Bureau's release of a communique on the Middle East on 7 March
1979. A hastily arranged plenary meeting of all NAM ambassadors
at New York decided, after spirited debate, that the Bureau could
issue communiques in its own name. This action sets a precedent that
Cuba may be able to exploit when it assumes the chairmanship of the
Bureau.
15
By tradition, as the host, Cuba had much latitude in
drafting the final communique and dictating the rules
of order. Cuba appointed its allies to key committee
chairmanships and restricted the participation of
observers (which are full members of the Movement,
but not of the Bureau). The result was a harsher, more
confrontational approach to the issues than had been
the case at the first meeting of the Bureau in New
Delhi in 1977.
In addition to the three main elements of the Move-
ment, there are numerous expert and working groups
that report to the Movement through the Coordinating
Bureau. The economic activities of the Movement are
carried out under the aegis of the Coordinator Coun-
tries of the Action Program for Economic Cooperation
Among Nonaligned Countries, which was established
at the 1972 Georgetown Foreign Ministers Conference
(see table 4). The program represented the codification
of attempts by the nonaligned countries to cultivate the
spirit of self-reliance and to agree on a policy to
promote their own socioeconomic development. The
program laid out ground rules in the fields of planning,
trade, cooperation and development, the improvement
of infrastructure, and the application of science and
technology. These groups meet periodically, but their
recommendations have had limited impact on the
Group of 77. Cuba is pushing to increase the activity
and influence of these, as well as of the Nonaligned
Movement's political, groups (see table 5).
25X1
In certain areas the Coordinator Countries draw on the 25X1
results of expert groups that were created after 1973."
These groups are important because their work?
which is politically fine-tuned by the Bureau- -to a
large extent determines the substantive economic
" They include the Group of Experts on Science and Technology, the
Group of Experts on the Information and Research System in the
Field of Economic Cooperation; the Committee of Experts or
Private Foreign Investment; the Intergovernmental Group of
Nonaligned Countries on Raw Materials; the Group of Experts on
the Establishment of a Council of Association of Developing
Country Producers-Exporters of Raw Materials; and the Expert
Group on the Establishment of a Fund for the Financing of Buffer
Stocks of Raw Materials and Primary Products Exported by
Developing Countries. The latter three groups were created a, the
1975 Raw Materials Conference in Dakar. I
25X1
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Table 4
('oordinator Countries of the Action Program
for Economic Cooperation
Field of Activity
International cooperation for economic development
Trade, transport, and industry
Financial and monetary cooperation
Scientific and technological development
Technical cooperation and consultancy services
Food and agriculture
Fisheries
'Telecommunications
Insurance
II ealth
Employment and human resources development
Tourism
Transnational corporations
Sports
Raw materials
Research and information system
Ad hoc group for the solidarity fund for economic and social
development
Role of women in development
Peaceful uses of nuclear energy
Coordinator Country
Egypt, Nigeria, Panama
Afghanistan, Guyana
Cuba, India, Indonesia, Peru, Sri Lanka, Yugoslavia
Algeria, India, Peru, Somalia, Yugoslavia
India, Panama
Ethiopia, Korea (Pyongyang), Morocco, Somalia, Sri Lanka, Sudan,
Tanzania, Vietnam
Angola, Cuba, Libya, Malta, Morocco, Somalia, Sri Lanka,
Vietnam
Burundi, Cameroon, Central African Empire
(None designated)
Central African Empire, Cuba, Yugoslavia
Bangladesh, Cuba, Nigeria, Panama, Sri Lanka, Tunisia
Cameroon, Cyprus, Morocco, Tunisia, Yemen (Sana)
Algeria, Cuba
Algeria, Cuba
Afghanistan, Algeria, Cameroon, Cuba, Indonesia, Iraq, Panama,
Peru, Senegal
India, Peru, Sri Lanka, Tunisia, Yugoslavia
Bangladesh, Kuwait, Sri Lanka
Angola, Bangladesh, Cameroon, Central African Empire, Cuba,
India, Iraq, Jamaica, Korea (Pyongyang), Liberia, Yugoslavia
Algeria, Argentina, Central African Empire, Cuba, Egypt, Ethiopia,
Gabon, Indonesia, Libya, Morocco, Niger, Nigeria, Tunisia,
Yugoslavia
content of nonaligned declarations. In addition, all
DCs are invited to participate in the meetings of
these expert groups, thus intermeshing the economic
work of the Movement with that of the Group of 77.
Substantive preparatory work on political matters to
be raised at a summit is usually carried out by working
groups that operate within the framework of the main
political organs of the United Nations. They evolved in
a formal manner after the Algiers summit and have the
specific purpose of defining a common position for the
Movement and of suggesting appropriate courses of
action in the General Assembly. Members of the
working groups initiate resolutions, organize support
for them, and generally perform a management
Confidential
function for members of the Nonaligned Movement at
the United Nations.
The nonaligned have also held a number of ad hoc and
specialized ministerial meetings. Principal among the
former were the Conference on the Problems of
Economic Development in Cairo in 1962, and the
Conference of Developing Countries on Raw Materials
in Dakar in 1975. The Cairo meeting led to the
creation of UNCTAD. The Dakar meeting gave
impetus to the economic work of the Movement that
culminated at Algiers in 1973?the emergence of
development and related economic issues as principal
objectives of the Movement. Specialized ministerial
meetings began in 1977?at Sarajevo, Yugoslavia,
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Table 5
Composition of Working and Related Groups of the
Nonaligned Countries in the United Nations '
Group
Working Group of Korea
Working Group on Disarmament and International Security
Working Group for the Solidarity Fund for the Reconstruction of
Vietnam and Laos
Working Group on Southern Africa
Working Group for Solidarity Fund for the Liberation of
Southern Africa
Working Group on Palestine and the Middle East
Working Group on the United Nations
Contact Group on Cyprus
Drafting Group on Interference in International Affairs of States
Members
Algeria, Cuba, Somalia, Sri Lanka, Syria
Algeria 2, Argentina 2, Bangladesh, Brazil' , Cyprus, Egypt 2,
Ethiopia, India 2, Indonesia, Iraq, Malaysia , Mali, Mexico ",
Morocco, Nepal, Nigeria 2, Peru', Sri Lanka 2, Yugoslavin
Algeria 5, Angola, Cuba Guyana, India, Iraq, Laos, LibN a,
Panama, Sri Lanka Tanzania, Vietnam, Yugoslavia
Angola, Botswana, Chad, Cuba, Guinea, Guyana, India, Jamaica,
Liberia, Nigeria, Palestine Liberation Organization, Sri
Sudan, Syria, Vietnam, Yugoslavia
Algeria, Cuba, Guyana, India, Sri Lanka, Yugoslavia
Algeria, Chad, Cuba, Guinea, India, Iraq, Jordan, Kuwait Mali,
Niger, Palestine Liberation Organization, Sri Lanka, Sudn n. Syria,
Vietnam, Yugoslavia
Algeria, Bangladesh, India, Iraq, Jamaica, Libya, Sri Lanka,
Yugoslavia, Zambia
Algeria, Guyana, India, Mali, Sri Lanka ', Yugoslavia
Algeria, Angola, Bangladesh, Botswana, Guyana, Liberia, Sri
Lanka, Yugoslavia, Zambia
'The Working Group on the Admission of Vietnam to the United
Nations ceased to exist upon the admission of Vietnam in 1977. Its
members were Algeria, Angola, Cuba, Guyana, Sri Lanka, and
Vietnam,
2 Member of the Drafting Group for the Special Session of the
General Assembly devoted to disarmament.
' Observer in the NAM.
4 After the establishment of the Solidarity Fund for the Reconstruc-
tion of Vietnam and Laos, the Working Group converted itself into
the Administrative Council for the purpose of operating this fund.
Originally, this fund was also planned to be earmarked for
Kampuchea; however that country declined any foreign assistance.
dealing with information and mass media, and at
Havana dealing with cooperation in fisheries. Since
then, there have been more frequent meetings at this
level to deal with specific issues, and perhaps to avoid
the political infighting that usually occurs at the
plenary or Bureau meetings. Such specialized meetings
of the NAM are in some ways analogous to the UN
specialized agencies, which were created to carry out
specific mandates with relatively little interference
from political rhetoric.
17
Coordinator.
After the establishment of the Solidarity Fund for the Liberation of
Southern Africa, the Working Group converted itself into the
Administrative Council for the purposes of operating this L ncl.
' Ex officio.
Source: Third World Without the Superpowers Janki wits h and
Sauvant, 1978.
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SUMMIT
? 1961 (Belgrade)
Cold War tensions prompted meeting. Soviets broke
atmosphere nuclear testing moratorium on eve of
conference.
25 members
3 observers
ISSUES IN
DESCENDING ORDER
Mediating Cold War, disarmament, anticolonialism,
noninterference in internal affairs of states, greater
LDC representation in world bodies, economic
equality.
LEADERS
Tito (Yugoslavia)
Nasser (Egypt)
Nehru (India)
Sukarno (Indonesia)
OUTCOME
LDCs obtained greater representation in UN bodies
(Security Council, ECOSOC, Disarmament
Commission).
Convened conference of 31 developing countries
which led to creation of UNCTAD.
ATTITUDES OF SUPERPOWERS
West generally hostile or indifferent. Found it diffi-
cult to reconcile professed neutrality of Movement
and seemingly pro-Soviet bias.
Soviets apprehensive; nonalignment is a concept
which the Soviet Union found difficult to reconcile
with its political doctrine.
SIGNIFICANT INTERNATIONAL
EVENTS
? 1964 (Cairo)
Conference prompted by China's attempt (with Paki-
stan and Indonesia) to organize 2nd Afro-Asian
conference. Chinese thrust for influence threatened
Yugoslav and Indian influence in region. Heightened
tension within Movement among pro-Soviet, pro-
Chinese factions. Membership criteria relaxed to
allow broader representation.
47 members
13 observers
Anticolonialism (to include approval of liberation by
force), racial discrimination and apartheid; reference
to "a new international economic policy" appeared for
first time in nonaligned declaration.
Nasser, Tito played large role, but bowed to pressures
from militant African leaders?all recipients of Soviet
aid. Ben Bella (Algeria), Keita (Mali), Toure
(Guinea), Nkrumah (Ghana). India's preoccupation
with China following Sino-Indian conflict in 1962
almost led to open cleavage between it and other
members.
Dissension within the group, aggravated by lack of
achievement at Cairo, left Movement moribund for 4
years. Not even Middle East war in 1967 sparked
enough interest to convene meeting.
West still not favorable in attitude. Its attempts to
influence group not successful.
Soviets, partly because of leadership change, partly
because of Chinese challenge, declare a "consistency
of views" between nonaligned and themselves.
? 1970 (Lusaka)
By this time, major world problems had lost
urgency?Czechoslovak crisis cooled, Vietnam con-
flict scaled down, Middle East had tenuous cease-fire
in effect.
53 members
12 observers (UN represented)
7 guests
Anticolonialism, apartheid, economic equality (first
separate declaration on economic issues?emphasized
self-reliance).
Kaunda (Zambia), Tito (Yugoslavia),
Indonesia, Kenya, Ethiopia
Latin American states began to show more interest in
Movement. At Lusaka, 4 were members and 8
attended as observers.
The Movement began to expand its institutional
layers. The Preparatory Committee was entrusted
with responsibility for coordinating activities of the
Movement between summits. Foreign Ministers be-
gan meeting at New York to coordinate issues before
UN General Assembly.
West concludes it is fruitless to attempt to influence
group. US press takes generally condescending
approach to NAM.
Soviets continue public support of nonalignment.
Warn NAM of "imperialist" attempts to set the
members against each other.
? 1973 (Algiers)
Algeria was chosen over rival Sri Lanka in continuing
jockeying for power between African and Asian
countries. Summit attracted largest attendance of
heads of state (50) up to that time.
75 members
28 observers
3 guests
Economic restructure (a South vs. North view),
Middle East, southern Africa, disarmament, Law of
the Sea.
Boumediene (Algeria),
Yugoslavia (in the wings),
Cuba active
NAM began a strong offensive through the UN.
Internally, a Coordinating Committee with expanded
functions was created as a compromise to secretariat
issue.
Soviets irked over Boumediene's "two imperialists"
theme, which stated all developed countries, whether
Communist or capitalist, were economic oppressors of
Third World.
1968 - Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia prompted
Tito to call for another meeting. India and Egypt, now
heavily dependent on Soviet aid, were reluctant to
irritate Soviets, who made known their opposition to
meeting. Tito kept up pressure and by late spring of
1970, Africans, who were aroused by the prospects of
British arms sales to South Africa, gave support for
another summit.
1974- Boumediene called for UN special session on
raw materials in wake of Washington consumers
meeting. This brought about a head-on collision
between US and LDCs, with US isolated even from
many Western allies. Change in attitude of US from
neglect of Movement to confronting NAM and
answering charges. This approach dropped by US in
1975 in favor of quiet diplomacy at UN and in
bilateral contacts.
1975 - Conference of Developing Countries on Raw
Materials in Dakar. Attended by 86 countries, includ-
ing non-NAM LDCs. Affirmed LDC conviction that
they needed to control marketing of their products to
gain greater revenues, but not successful in forging
commodity agreement programs that could be imple-
mented effectively by LDCs themselves.
1975 - Foreign Ministers' meeting in Lima, Peru
focused on forthcoming 7th Special Session on Devel-
opment and International Economic Cooperation.
Conference approved three important economic meas-
ures?creating a Solidarity Fund for Economic and
Social Development; Special Fund for financing
buffer stocks of raw materials and primary products
exported by LDCs; and Council of Association of
Developing Country Producers-Exporters of Raw
Materiak Meeting sharply focused on "action pi o?
gram- originated at Algiers on measures to be taken
to achieve economic goals.
1975 - 7th UN Special Session. Meeting took place at
time of world recession characterized by high petro-
leum prices, industrial countries' slowdown in produc-
tion and employment, which affected LDC
commodity markets and foreign exchange earnings.
Nevertheless, industrialized countries agreed to con-
sider LDC demands; helpful US approach led to
restraint of LDC rhetoric in campaign to restructure
international system.
? 1976 (Colombo)
Movement marked 15th anniversary.
86 members
19 observers
7 guests
Tension over direction Movement should pursue.
Traditional political issues discussed?southern
Africa, Middle East, detente, disarmament,
decolonization. Detailed attention to Indian Ocean
peace zone proposal raised at Lusaka. Economic
declaration emphasized action nonaligned could take
to furtAterriihrt(fIrad
Bandaranaike (Sri Lanka),
Yugoslavia,
India, Cuba active
Conflicting tensions and international realities made
it difficult for NAM to forge unified approach. Role
of Group of 77 in negotiating with industrial countries
left NAM without role in forging economic policy.
Emergence of a moderate leadership coalition?
Yugoslavia, India, and Sri Lanka.
FgriPiielease 2002/08/07 : CIA-RDP80T00942A000900060001-9
US begins to take a more open approach to
nonaligned. Bilateral discussions with key countries
discuss nonaligned issues of concern to US.
Soviets continue attempt to ingratiate themselves with
members, especially to compete with increased US
attention to NAM. Main concern of Soviet comment
is to stress NAM principles that fit in with Soviet
foreign policy objectives?particularly anti-imperial-
ism.
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Approved For Release 2002/08/07 : CIA-RDP80T00942A000900060001-9
'proved For Release 2062/08/07 CIA-RDP80T00942A000900060001-9