SOMALIA: SHIFT IN TACTICS IN THE OGADEN (U)

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP80T00942A000800120001-3
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 8
• Document Creation Date: December 12, 2016
• Document Release Date: May 29, 2001
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: March 1, 1979
• Content Type: REPORT

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~~oma ia~
~~hift in r~yacti~cs
In the C)~.~ie~r
An Intelligence Assessment
KP 79-10I hS
A9urch 14 9
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FORN-N000NTRACT-
Foreign ORCON
Assessment
Center
Somalia:
Shift in Tactics
In the Ogaden (u)
An Intelligence Assessment
Research for this report was completed
on 27 March 1979.
The author of this paper is~Africa
Division, Office of Regional an o itical Analysis.
Comments and queries are welcome and. should be
directed to -on -~u~
Secret
RP 79-10165
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ORCON
Somalia:
Shifk in Tactics
In The Ogaden (u)
The Somali Government has recently reduced its
military support to the guerrilla forces in Ethiopia's
Ogaden region to meet conditions laid down by the
United States and other Western countries for badly
needed arms support. It is clear, however, that
President Siad Barre has not renounced Somalia's
extraterritorial claims on its neighbors but is only
lowering the level of conflict until its armed forces are
rebuilt. Once this has been achieved, Siad will be in a
position to resume the struggle to unify the Somali
people. (S NF NC OC)
In making this tactical shift, Siad reportedly has the
support of his military and the agreement of the
insurgent leadership. This lessens greatly the possibil-
ity of an adverse reaction from the armed forces. Siad
has maintained his control over the guerrillas, covered
his tracks at home, and is prepared to increase military
support to the insurgents when he believes the timing is
right. (S NF NC OC)
In spite of periodic tactical shifts, one of the key goals
of Mogadiscio's national policy will continue to be
unification of the Somali people, by whatever means
necessary. (s NF)
iii Secret
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NOFORN-N000NTRACT-
ORCON
Somalia:
Shift in Tactics
In The Ogaden (u)
Background
Since the country's independence in 1960, all Somali
governments have subscribed with varying degrees of
intensity to the notion that ethnic Somalis-including
those in Kenya, Ethiopia, and Djibouti-should be
united under the flag of the Mogadiscio government.'
Beginning in 1967, Prime Minister Mohammed
Ibrahim Egal, although he did not publicly discard the
Greater Somalia policy, tried to improve relations with
Ethiopia and Kenya after years of unproductive
tension and border skirmishes. The coup that brought
Somali President Siad Barre to power in 1969 was
partly the result of dissatisfaction with the Prime
Minister's moderation. (c)
In the immediate postcoup years, Siad played down the
Ogaden issue, recognizing that Somalia was in no
position militarily to pursue actively its goals in the
region. The Army had been soundly defeated by
Ethiopia in 1964 and had done little rebuilding in the
succeeding five years. Numerous economic and inter-
nal political problems also diverted Mogadiscio's
attentions from its ethnic brethren outside its borders.
(c)
By 1974, however, Somalia, with the help of the
USSR, had substantially strengthened its armed
forces. Both in size and weaponry the Somali Army
was at least on a par with the Ethiopian military, and
there was a corresponding rise in Somali international
propaganda efforts directed toward the "liberation" 01
ethnic Somalis in eastern Kenya, Djibouti, and the
Ogaden region of Ethiopia. (c)
'Pan-Somalism permeates the basic laws and symbols of national
life. The constitution dedicated the Republic, a union of former
British and Italian colonial territories, to promote the union of all
Somali-inhabited areas; the fundamental laws of the land provide
that all Somalis, no matter where they reside, are citizens of the
Republic; the flag has afive-pointed star representing the five
Somali-inhabited areas ultimately to be united. (v)
The Ethiopian coup in 1974 was at first welcomed by
Siad who felt the new-and seemingly like-minded-
regime would be willing to hold talks on the Ogaden.
His enthusiasm quickly dampened, however, as the
nationalistic bent of the Ethiopian regime became
evident. In 1975 Siad resurrected the moribund
Ogadeni guerrilla organization-now called the West-
ern Somali Liberation Front (WSLF)-and encour-
aged it to resume guerrilla operations in the Ogaden.
With support from Mogadiscio, the WSLF gradually
stepped up its activity against demoralized, thinly
spread, poorly supported, and poorly armed Ethiopian
garrisons in the south and east. By late 1976 the
guerrillas had rnade significant advances against the
Ethiopians. (c)
In early 1977 Siad, spurred on by the continued
bloodletting within the Ethiopian ruling circle, Ethio-
pian setbacks in Eritrea, the termination of the US-
Ethiopian military relationship, and-shockingly for
.the Somalis-the beginning of military sales to Addis
Ababa by Moscow, adopted a more aggressive policy.
The Somali Government decided to move quickly to
capture the Ogaden and adjacent areas before the
weakened Ethiopians began to enjoy the full military
benefits of their relationship with the Soviets. When by
the end of July the WSLF had failed to achieve
decisive gains, Mogadiscio introduced its regular
Army into the fighting. After eight months of conflict,
however, Mogadiscio's Army was forced to withdraw,
losing large quantities of military equipment in the
process. Its own tactical and political errors and
massive amounts of Soviet military assistance to
Ethiopian and Cuban troops had left Somalia with a
demoralized and militarily weak defense establish-
ment to face the threat of Ethiopian retaliation. (s rrF)
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The Postwar Period
[n November 1977 Siad abrogated the friendship
treaty with the Soviet Union,. expelled all. Soviet
military and civilian advisers, and terminated Soviet
access to Somali military facilities including those
constructed primarily or exclusively for Soviet use.
Siad was certain that for both political and strategic
reasons the West would fill the vacuum left by the
Soviets. To Siad's dismay, the West not only failed to
rush in to help but subsequently tied the provision of
arms to the cessation of Somali military support to the
Ogaden_guerrillas. Despite the Army's weakened
condition, Siad nevertheless chose to continue the
confrontation in the Horn. The prewar relationship
between the guerrillas and the Somali Army was
reestablished, with an office in the Ministry of Defense
assuming the task of arming, supplying, training,
funding, and directing guerrilla operations. In addi-
tion, regular Army personnel were surreptitiously
transferred to the guerrillas as advisers and combat-
ants. (s NF)
There are a number of explanations for Siad's decision
to continue Somalia's involvement in the Ogaden
fighting:
? Tribal rivalries that had receded during the war were
again coming to-the fore.' In April 1978 a coup
attempt, led by members of a rival tribe, convinced
Siad that he must keep the Ogaden issue alive in order
to preserve tribal unity within Somalia.
? Siad has always attempted to portray Somalia as the
victim of Ethiopian aggression, and he may-have been
trying to use the continuing conflict in the Ogaden to
provoke an Ethiopian attack that would generate
Western "defensive arms" and a political commitment
to defend Somalia.
Z This action was a result not only of open Soviet political and
military support for Ethiopia during the war but also Moscow's
refusal to sign new military agreements with Mogadiscio or increase
deliveries of needed war material. The Soviets did, hawever,
continue delivery of previously contracted for nonlethal equipment.
(S NF)
' The Somalis share a language, culture, and national identity that
are distinctive and remarkably homogeneous by African standards.
Siad, however, like other Somali leaders, has difficulties in balancing
the demands of antagonistic tribes. One of the few issues that all
rally around is the concept of a greater Somalia. (u)
? By maintaining military pressure in the Ogaden
while the Eritreans continted scoring successes against
Addis Ababa in the north, Siad may have hoped to
force Ethiopia to negotiate on the Ogaden because it
could not afford the continuing drain caused by the two
conflicts. The government's success in reversing the
tide in Eritrea Province, h~~wever, ended this hope.
? Siad may have reasoned that continued turmoil in
the countryside might in~ljtce the Soviet Union to put
pressure on Chairman Mengistu to grant some meas-
ure of political autonomy to the Ogaden tribes. The
Somali President was probably aware of Soviet efforts
to negotiate an end to the Eritrean conflict and hoped
Moscow would attempt to find an acceptable political
solution for the Ogaden as well. For this reason, Siad
still maintained diplomatic relations with Moscow.`
(S NF)
Latest Policy Change
It appears that Siad has nt~w decided to reduce, though
not end, Somali military support to the insurgents.
Efforts have been made tc~ disassociate regular Somali
Army personnel from the guerrilla movement. Recent
signs of increased tensions between the guerrillas and
their political leaders in Mogadiscio, almost all of
whom are controlled by Siad, may be a result of the
reduction in support. (s ;tit= Ne oC)
Siad badly needs to rejuvenate the Somali Army.
During the year since he t?rdered the withdrawal of
Somali armed forces frort~ the region, Siad has
received limited amounts ..~f military equipment from
other Arab nations and also financial assistance,
primarily from Saudi Arabia, to purchase arms. While
he has been able to purchase antitank missiles from
France and obtain some,equipment from Italy, Siad
has failed to acquire; a Western benefactor willing to
provide artillery, aircraft, armor, and related weapon
Systems. (S NF)
' Discussions concerning the possibility of a Soviet mediation role
have probably occurred during the past year. (s NF)
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Somali military leaders, who reportedly have agreed to
Siad's new policy, are probably increasingly concerned
over the deterioration of the major weapons in their
inventory since the ill-fated attack on Ethiopia. Soma-
lia is not able either to defend against Ethiopian air
attacks in northern Somalia or to cope with an
Ethiopian attack across the border-an ever present
Somali fear. The Somali President probably feels some
attempt must now be made to restore the military to its
former level of strength and proficiency before he will
again be in a position to pursue his irrdentist goals in
the region. (s NF)
His decision was influenced by the fact that Somalia's
active support of the Ogadeni tribes has not produced
the political benefits he had anticipated. Although the
guerrillas have been able to dominate most of the
Ogaden countryside, their gains have not been suffi-
cient to challenge seriously Addis Ababa's control.
Moreover, the Soviets have not put pressure on the
Ethiopians to compromise on the Ogaden issue, and the
WSLF has failed to gain international. recognition as a
liberation movement. Siad probably feels, then, that
new tactics designed to rebuild the Somali military
would not damage his short-term political goals. (s NF)
Outlook
The guerrillas operating in the Ogaden are sure to
react negatively to the reduction in arms support, but
Siad can probably keep them in check. The WSLF
political leaders have reportedly acceded to Siad's new
policy and have agreed to scale down the level of
fighting. Given the dependence of WSLF military
forces on Mogadiscio for support, they have, at least
for a while, no alternative. The Somali Government
has tried to lessen the impact by assuring the guerrillas
that nonmilitary support, including food, medicine,
communications equipment, and vehicles, would con-
tinueand that previous levels of military support would
be resumed if the Ethiopians gain the upper hand in the
fighting or the United States fails to provide arms.s
(S NF NC OC)
' Somali officials, however, reportedly have assured representatives
of the WSLF that the curtailment of support results from US
demands and that it would not necessarily be permanent, implying
that arms supplies to the guerrillas could be resumed even if the
United States agrees to provide arms to Somalia. (s NF xc oc)
Siad probably hopes that by curtailing his support to
the insurgents and eliminating the obvious involvement
of regular Army forces with the WSLF, the criteria for
arms deliveries by the West will be met without public
renunciation of Mogadiscio's Pan-Somali policy. The
agreement of the WSLF leadership and Siad's key
advisers and military officers gives Siad time to try this
new tactic. There is only a slight chance the general
population will become aware of this and little they can
do even if it becomes common knowledge. Siad is
gambling, as he did when he expelled the Soviets, that
the response from the West will enable him to rebuild
his armed forces; if this does not occur, he could well
face criticism of his policies and perhaps another
attempt to remove him from office. Siad's position
could be endangered by pressure from the guerrillas
and frustrated military officers who blame Siad
personally for Somalia's weakness and may feel his
removal would generate a positive response from the
West or perhaps a reconciliation with the Soviet
Union. (s NF)
Siad, however, is a durable figure who has survived
numerous threats to his position and has cautiously
preserved his option of making policy shifts. He has
maintained his control over the WSLF, has been
careful to preserve the guerrillas' fighting capabilities,
and is prepared quickly to resume the previous level of
support. Siad recognizes that while he may be able to
make tactical shifts, one of the key goals of Somali
national policy must continue to be unification of the
Somali people, by whatever means necessary. We
foresee no change, by Siad or any other Somali leader,
in this objective. (s NF)
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