THE IMPACT ON NEIGHBORING BLACK AFRICAN STATES OF CHAD'S TURMOIL

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP80T00942A000800020002-3
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 10
• Document Creation Date: December 12, 2016
• Document Release Date: April 8, 2002
• Sequence Number: 2
• Publication Date: March 1, 1979
• Content Type: REPORT

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 Approvedg~lease 2002/04/30 :CIA-RDP80T00942A000800020002~gret
Assessment
Center
The Impact on Neighboring
Black African States
of Chad's Turmoil
This Intelligence Assessment was prepared by the
African Division of the Office of Regional and Politi-
cal Analysis and coordinated with the Directorate
of Operations and the Offices of 1Jconomic Research
and Strategic Research. Questions and comments
ma be addressed to the author,
Secret
RP 79-10121
March 1979
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Secret
The Impact on Neighboring
Black African States
of Chad's Turmoil
racial and religious lines.
Chad's future evolution is of growing concern to
surrounding black African states as the long struggle
there between warring Muslim and non-Muslim fac-
tions appears to be becoming increasingly chaotic.
Niger, Nigeria, Cameroon, and Central African Em-
pire are reassessing their vulnerability to instability in
reaction to what they sec as the danger of growing
fragmentation in Chad and intensified civil war along
? The concern of Chad's neighbors partly reflects a
fear that the conflict there-if it intensifies and
spreads-may generate border security problems and
possibly lead to an influx of refugees.
? Bordering countries are worried. that the status quo
in central Africa-a bridge between Arab and black
Africa-may be upset by the emergence of a Muslim-
dominated regime in Chad that includes influcntial
Libyan-oriented elements.
? The real underlying anxiety of adjacent states, all of
which have Muslim populations of varying size, is that
they may become more direct targets of Libyan
activism in the future.
? Regionally influential Nigeria is seeking to play a
more vigorous peacemaking role in Chad than it has in
many previous African disputes.
? Doubts about French determination to stick it out in
Chad may cause moderate francophone states to look
to the United States to be more responsive to their
security needs and to seek better accommodation with
Libya
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 Approved For Release 2002/04/30 :CIA-RDP80T00942A00080002000~e~ret
The Impact on Neighboring
Black African States
of Chad's Turmoil
What's Next in Chad?
Neighboring black African states-like Chad-have
their own ethnic and religious divisions and intra-
Muslim frictions. All of them view Chad's future
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exodus of refugees to neighboring Central African
Empire (CAE) and Cameroon where man fellow
tribesmen live just across the border.
political evolution with considerable confusion and
uncertainty. They are not optimistic that the situation
will stabilize any time soon, even with their own active
peacemaking efforts. They all seem to recognize that
the postindependence period since 1960 of national
domination by Chad's southern Christianized and
French-oriented elite is over, and that opposing Mus-
lim elements-in rebellion since 1965-will be an .~
important part of, if not in control of, any new central3
government arrangement that emerges. Although the
course of events in Chad is difficult for them to foresee,
neighboring African leaders brood about several possi-
ble scenarios:
? They feel that the best that can be expected in Chad
in the immediate future is a more workable cease-fire
and a possible agreement for a new decentralized
federal structure of government. Such a solution,
however, would most likely serve only to legitimize the
present de facto partition of Chad and do little to ease
the threat of intensified civil war.
? A central government dominated by the Libyan-
backed Muslim group led by Toubou tribal chieftain
Goukouni could be imposed by military force of arms,
particularly as the Chadian Army pulls back in the
field and shows signs of disintegrating. Despite
underlying nationalistic proclivities, a Goukouni re- L
gime would be seen as a largely compliant one for
larger Libyan interests in the region because it
probably would be heavily dependent on continued
Libyan support for survival.
Libyan Ambitions in Central A.lrica
Chad's neighbors, against the backdrop of recent
turmoil there and increased Libyan involvement on
behalf of Chadian Muslim rebels since 1973, are
increasingly concerned over what they see as potential
Libyan threats to their own security. Even so, Libyan
President Qadhafi-for all his ambition and messianic
zeal south of the Sahara-has wanted quite different
things from different states in the central African
region. Libyan activism accordingly has been quite
variable in recent years and by no means matches the
often exaggerated suspicion African states harbor
toward Libya. In all cases, the Libyans would like
African countries to take a far more radical, pro-Arab
line at international gatherings and at the UN. Libya's
long-term interests are also served by the disruption of
regimes considered to be "traditionalist"-the
francophone and pro-Western regimes of CAE, Niger,
and Cameroon would qualify, even though the latter
two states have Muslim leaders-and by the encour-
agement of "progressive," preferably Muslim, ele-
ments wherever they exist 25X1
Chad, where Tripoli has territorial ambitions in the
extreme north,' has been the principal Libyan target to
date. Qadhafi may ultimately hope for a compliant
Muslim regime in Ndjamena which would turn a blind
eye toward Libyan subversive designs aimed through
Chad more at Sudan and Egypt than at any neighbor-
ing African country. In any case, Chad-with a
majority Islamic population long dominated by non-
Muslims supported in turn by "neo-colonialist"
France-has offered the most exploitable opportunity
Christian and pagan tribes in reaction to the prospect ~ Libya claims and has militarily occupied the so-called Aozou strip
of outright domination by Muslims, whose centuries- L~ along the inside length of Chad's northern border, which Tripoli
old hold was broken by French colonizers in the early !maintains was assigned to it by a disputed Franco-Italian draft
20th century. The installation of a Llbyan-backed and treaty of 1935. Libyan claims are also based on the historical
lordship exercised by the Sanusiyyah kings of Libya over most of
potentially repressive Muslim government would in- Chad's Islamic sultanates prior to the French conquest.
crease the possibility of a southern insurgency and the
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for the Libyans, who feel a duty to assist "o ressed" Last year, as the fighting in Chad escalated, Niger
Muslim elements wherever they exist. began moving to build up it' modest military establish-
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Libya has border claims against neighboring and aircraft and French armor_e~i cars-and to reinforce its
predominantly Muslim Niger. The Libyans apparently Saharan patrols. Last mont`r, the armed forces were
supported an abortive coup conducted in 1975 by ~ deployed on maneuvers in s~~utheastern and central
elements of the large Hausa tribe against President G' Niger in part to reassure thy: local population
Kountche. The Niger Government has been dominated
since independence in 1960 by the small Djerma tribe,
and the Hausas have been virtually excluded. In
countries with a partly Muslim population, such as
Nigeria and Cameroon, Tripoli would like to see a
substantial increase in Muslim political influence.
Nigeria, as black Africa's most populous and influen-
tial state, has particular attraction for Tripoli because
it is scheduled to return to civilian rule next October.
There are indications that the Libyans are taking an
increasing interest in the evolution of the Nigerian
political party scene and northern Nigerian Muslim
politics. The largely non-Muslim and politically unsta-
disquieted by events in Chaci. This followed an upsurge
in Chad of Muslim rebel i~c?ivity in the Lake Chad
region by the so-called "third army" of several
hundred men that draws its support from Chadian
residents who straddle the'frontiers of Niger, Nigeria,
and Cameroon. The group c rosses the poorly patrolled
frontiers of all three countries and maintains clandes-
tine recruitment offices in'i=rem.
Nigeria. Head of State Genwral Obasanjo, a non-
Muslim southerner, is quite uneasy over trends in
Chad because he feels Nigeria's own large Muslim
population-which comprises at least 47 percent of its
70 million or more people-may offer more fertile
ble CAE may also present a potential opportunity to
spread the banner of Islam.
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Niger. President Kountche's five-year-old military
government has striven for good relations with Libya
in hopes of making it more difficult for the latter to
~' ground far Libyan exploitation now that the country is
headed for civilian rule bpd a far more fluid political
/L environment. His immediate concern is that possible
foment problems. Nevertheless, Kountche is convinced
that Tripoli has malevolent intentions toward his
regime and territorial designs on Niger's northeastern
region where its economically important uranium
mines are located.z Niger has no insurgent problem,
nor has any of its territory been occupied by Libya.
Libyan involvement in northern Muslim politics could
complicate a successful return to constitutional gov-
ernment this October by reinforcing the proclivity
Nigerian politicians already have for political confron-
tation and violence. Lookin;,; farther ahead, Obasanjo
is concerned that there may- be increased Libyan
pressure to weave a militan~- radicalized Islam into
Nigeria's political fabric.
The Qadhafi government has tried, however, to force The extent of possible Liby; n activity and intrigue in
nomadic Toubou and Tuareg tribesmen-who roam northern Nigerian politics.; i~ far from clear and is
northeastern Niger and the neighboring desert areas of difficult to document. It is I:nown that Tripoli has
Libya and Chad-to adopt Libyan citizenship. Libyan~~offered large sums to Nigerian Islamic organizations,
economic and trade agreements with Niger are as yet ostensibly for religious purr=ores, and is trying to
of minor importance and give Tripoli no real leverage. ~~develop contacts with receptive faculty members and
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f~students at several universities in northern Nigeria.
T~.i...,.. l~T:.. o..:?.,~ ?~~?ma +l,.,t r ;r.,,o :c ,...n,.i.rinn mnna?
largest uranium reserves in the non-Communist world, which are to northern politicians. The motives they attribute to
exploited by France and other Western consortium partners. Tripoli Such alleged Libyan involvement include encouraging
refuses to recognize the validity of present Libyan-Niger borders,
which were set by a 1931 Franco-Italian treaty. The Libyans feel progressive Muslim elements to play a spoiling role
their southern border with Niger should he expanded to include the against the conservative Muslim political establish-
area once controlled by the Sanusiyyah Islamic brotherhood, a still meet, and ensuring that aMuslim-based party comes
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failing that, to promote the establishment of a separate
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At this point, it appears that the Muslim-oriented
National Party, which represents the traditional north-
ern establishment, is most likely to dominate Nigeria's
future civilian government. Its principal antagonist in
the north is the small People's Redemption Party,
which many Nigerians see as the most logical recipient
of Libyan financial largess. This maverick group
regards the major northern party as reactionary, and
has a generally reformist and xenophobic outlook. It
has been involved in several political clashes with the 0
rival National Party. Some Redemption Party rnem
hers are thought to have Libyan connections. The ~~
party is centered in Kano, where there is a long-
established Libyan community. Kano, moreover, is the
principal center of the Tidjaniyya Islamic brother-
hood, now the largest Muslim sect in Nigeria, whose
adherents are principally younger Nigerians. The
Tidjaniyya reportedly are more puritanical and favor a
more orthodox form of Islam than do other Nigerian
Muslims.
Official relations between Nigeria and Libya are no ~~
more than outwardly cordial and correct. Nigeria is
the only sub-Saharan country Libyan President Qa-
dhafi treats as a relative equal. Lagos has made it clear
that it will not tolerate the patronizing attitude Tripoli
displays toward most African states. Generally, the
Nigerians regard Libya as an unwelcome meddler
south of the Sahara and a competitor there for
the recent turbulence in Chad, where it tends to see
Libya acting as a surrogate for the Soviets. Camer-
oon's own experience in putting down aCommunist-
backed insurgency in the early 1960s makes it feel all
the more vulnerable to outside subversion.
Present Libyan-Cameroon diplomatic relations reflect
an attempt on Tripoli's part to gain influence with
Cameroon as a member of the Chad-Libya reconcili-
ation commission, which was appointed by the Organi-
zation of African Unity (OAU), while Yaounde has
tried to pin down definite Libyan economic and
financial aid with no strings attached. Several years
ago, Libya reportedly expressed interest in developing
Cameroon's thorium deposits, which can be trans-
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Central African Empire. Against the background of
apparently spontaneous antiregime disorders last Jan-
uary, CAE Emperor Bokassa is acutely sensitive to
events in Chad and fears instability there could spill
over to pose even graver problems for his fragile
government. His rupture of relations with Libya late
last month reflects a suspicion that Tripoli was in some
measure behind the January demonstrations and may
be fostering further opposition to the government,
possibly in collusion with the Soviets whose resence
in the CAE may be reduced.
influence. There are no known cultural, economic, or Popular opposition to Bokassa has become more
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military agreements between the two countries. ~ widespread in recent years, and the situation appears
L ripe for further civil unrest and coup plotting. The
Cameroon. Since independence in 1960 under the ~ country's political and economic fortunes have gradu-
leadership of President Ahidjo-a Muslim Fulani y ally eroded since Bokassa seized power in 1966 and
from the country's north-Cameroon has achieved Z / imposed his capricious and mercurial rule. One left-
considerable stability, economic progress, and unity.'
it perceives itself as the most stable and promising
country in central Africa, but one that is threatened by
an increasingly menacing regional environment. Al-
ready nervous about the Soviet and Cuban presence to
the south in leftist Equatorial Guinea, Congo, and
Angola, Cameroon's unease has been heightened by
'Cameroon has faced the challenge of integrating not only Muslim
and non-Muslim peoples, but also French-speaking east Cameroon
and English-speaking west Cameroon, formerly administered by ,r
France and Britain. Although the Muslim Fulani represent only ~~
leaning CAE politician, Barthelemy Yangongo, who is
allegedly funded by Libya, and who may have ambi-
tions for power, has been dismissed from the govern-
ment. He is anon-Muslim and belongs to the small
M'Baka tribe, which has politically dominated the
CAE since independence in
CAE-Libyan relations have been marked by ups and
downs since 1976 when Bokassa briefly embraced the
Islamic faith and opportunistically signed several
economic agreements with Tripoli that have been an
important source of financial support for him. At one
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