THE USSR AND LIBYA: COLLUSION IN THE MIDDLE EAST AND AFRICA

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• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP80T00942A000600080002-9
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• Document Page Count: 32
• Document Creation Date: December 21, 2016
• Document Release Date: July 7, 2008
• Sequence Number: 2
• Content Type: LIST

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National T ecu'et
]Foreign
Assessment
Center
The USSR and Libya:
Collusion in the
Middle East and Africa
Top Secret
RP 79-10002C
COPY 0 3 4
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National
Foreign
Assessment
Center
The USSR and Libya:
Collusion in the
Middle East and Africa
The author of this paper is I USSR
Division, Office of Regional and Political Analysis.
Comments and queries are welcome and should be
directed to
RP 79-10002C 25X1
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South Yemen and the Popular Front for the Liberation of Oman (PFLO) 7
Lebanon and the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) 13
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Areas of Soviet-Libyan Collusion
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The USSR and Libya:
Collusion in the
Middle East and Africa
In recent years, the Soviet Union and Libya have
discovered and exploited a common interest in foster-
ing radical elements in the Middle East and Africa.
This mutual interest has proved compelling enough for
them to submerge their philosophic and political
differences and enter into a pragmatic partnership. In
essence, the Libyans have acted as a conduit for Soviet
arms, thus building their own image as a backer of
"progressive" forces and allowing the Soviets to
remain in the background.
There is no question that the ultimate goals of the
Soviets and Libyans are contradictory; the Soviets seek
to expand the world's pro-Soviet Marxist community
while the Libyans dream of a pan-Arab Islamic order.
But both long-term goals are served by the disruption
of regimes considered "traditionalist" and by the
encouragement of so-called "progressive" elements
wherever feasible. In addition, each nation considers
Egypt under Sadat to be the main impediment to its
own advancement in the region, and each therefore
constantly operates with an eye toward undermining
The Soviet-Libyan partnership has functioned actively
in a variety of areas:
? In Oman, where both Libya and the USSR backed
the Popular Front for the Liberation of Oman (PFLO)
and its mentor, South Yemen, albeit with differing
degrees of enthusiasm.
? In the Sahara, where the need felt by the Soviets to
please Algeria by providing at least low-key support to
the Polisario reinforced a Libyan passion to back the
guerrilla force.
? In Lebanon, where Moscow's interest in supporting
leftist and Palestinian forces without totally antagoniz-
ing Syria coincided with Libya's desire to ship arms to
those forces.
? In the Sudan, where Qadhafi's compulsion to
overthrow Numayri had Soviet sympathy and covert
assistance.
? In Ethiopia, where the USSR's initial hope of
disguising the extent of its military assistance to the
Mengistu regime combined with Libya's willingness to
Sadat and his allies.
While they often agree on an immediate course of
action (if not the ultimate destination), the USSR and
Libya tend to take differing positions with respect to
becoming directly involved in conflicts-a factor that
provides the basic motivation for their partnership.
Qadhafi's ambition to become a major leader in the
area spurs him to seek an active supporting role in such
situations, while the Soviets, for the most part, prefer
to remain in the background.
There are a number of reasons for the Soviets'
inclination to maintain a low profile:
? To be recognized as a respectable member of the
international community, they must avoid the stigma
of open association with extremist groups that might
become involved in terrorist operations.
? They desire to avoid confrontations with the West
and prevent setbacks in other areas of negotiation that
might result from their participation in obviously
disruptive activities.
provide open backing.
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January 1979
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? They often wish to maintain relations with several
different parties to a dispute.
? They know that the physical involvement of forces
from a superpower can prove counterproductive in the
Third World.
? An indirect role gives them flexibility should the
cause suffer a setback or should the risks of continued
involvement prove unacceptable.
The most prevalent mechanism of Soviet-Libyan
collusion, the straightforward transfer by Libya of
Soviet equipment, enables the Soviets to deny that they
are supporting the ultimate recipient. They simply
claim that they have no control over their equipment
once they have sold it. In fact, the evidence strongly
suggests that the Soviets try very hard, with consider-
able success, to retain control of the military equip-
ment they supply their customers.
the Soviets may implicitly condone such tactics-as
long as there is little risk that they themselves will be
Other forms of Soviet-Libyan cooperation include
Libyan financing of third party arms purchases from
the USSR and parallel training of Third World
insurgent forces. The Soviets have generally tried to
avoid direct contacts with extreme, terrorist-oriented
groups because they are formally on record in opposi-
tion to terrorism. The Libyans, on the other hand, have
been willing to train such elements and encourage
terrorist operations. There is no evidence that the
Soviets have tried to dissuade them from doing so, and
associated with the groups.
This acquiescence on the part of the Soviets is another
aspect of the overall pattern of Soviet-Libyan collu-
sion. Soviet silence amounts to tacit approval of Libyan
actions. In addition to apparent Soviet acceptance of
Libyan support for terrorist actions, the Soviets have
appeared to condone the large-scale Libyan-backed
effort to overthrow the Government of Chad as well as
a variety of lesser plots against neighboring govern-
ments.
Currently the Soviets and Libyans are not actively
engaged in major cooperative ventures in the Middle
East or Africa. Qadhafi has retreated in Chad for the
time being and appears to be trying to polish his
tarnished reputation as a member of the international
community. Passive collusion continues, however, and
there is no evidence of a basic change in the thrust of
Qadhafi's ambitions. He remains committed to fo-
menting change as do the Soviets. Thus, barring
Qadhafi's removal from office, it is likely that, as time
goes on, new situations will attract Soviet-Libyan
attention. Now that an established pattern of collusion
exists, coordination in each new situation presumably
becomes easier.
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The USSR and Libya:
Collusion in the
Middle East and Africa
The Soviet Union and Libya have developed what
might be termed a pragmatic partnership-an ar-
rangement of convenience in which these very dispar-
ate states have contrived to ignore their basically
incompatible ideologies and objectives in order to
accommodate complementary short-term interests. It
is totally unlike the Soviet-Cuban relationship, which
is based on shared ideology, economic dependence, and
common goals. But on a practical level, the Libyans
have acted for the Soviets in the Third World in a
manner similar to that of the Cubans.
In the past five years bilateral relations between the
USSR and Libya have improved enormously despite
the two nations' widely divergent world views and
objectives. Qadhafi's fanatic religious conviction,
which combines a profound anti-Communism and
Arab nationalism with suspicion of superpower in-
volvement in Arab affairs, inhibits the development of
trust in Soviet intentions. Similarly, Soviet concern
about Qadhafi's fanaticism and unpredictability would
seem to impede close ties. The objectives of the two
nations are correspondingly divergent. The Soviets
seek to expand their influence and power as well as
Marxist philosophy while Qadhafi considers it his duty
to extend Libyan influence in order to promote Muslim
political influence wherever possible
There are also substantive political differences be-
tween the two states. Qadhafi advocates the elimina-
tion of the state of Israel and the return of the
Palestinians to all of their homeland. He opposes the
Soviet-backed Geneva peace conference as well as all
other efforts to find a compromise solution in the area.
'Since the spring of 1974, major arms deals have been concluded and
considerable quantities of sophisticated military equipment (includ-
ing MIG-25s) have been delivered to Libya by the USSR. Economic
and technical cooperation has expanded rapidly, and the Soviets
have agreed to supply Libya with a nuclear power plant. The number
of Soviet economic and military advisers now stationed in Libya has
increased to about 1,500-almost double the number in mid-1977.
The Soviets have gained access to Libyan port facilities for their
Qadha i and Brezhnev:
A Pragmatic Friendship
This radical approach to the Middle East is reflected in
Libya's position on the use of terror as an instrument of
policy and its often blatant support for extremist
groups. The Soviets, eager to play a leading role as a
respected member of the international community,
have formally rejected the use of terror and have no
direct dealings with groups that espouse its use.
Although the Soviets have apparently not tried to
restrain Libya in its backing of such groups and may
implicitly condone it, they are clearly more concerned
than the Libyans about the potentially embarrassing
and counterproductive aspects of such connections.
merchant ships. Visits by high-level officials (most recently, the visit
of Qadhafi's deputy Jallud to the USSR in February 1978) have
increased in frequency. And the public attitude demonstrated by
each country toward the other has radually shifted from suspicion
and criticism to support and praise.
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The existence of political divergence between Libya
and the USSR has been vividly demonstrated recently
by Libya's moves to expand its relations with China. In
August, at the time of the conclusion of the Sino-
Japanese Peace and Friendship Treaty, the Soviets
intensified their propaganda against Peking. Reliable
allies of the USSR such as Cuba did the same. In
contrast, the Libyans chose this time to establish
relations with China
These examples tend
to highlight the fact that the Soviets must find
their political dealings with the Libyans at times
unsatisfactory and uncomfortable-as opposed to their
fairly confident relations with the Cubans.
While the problems and differences existing between
the USSR and Libya are deep-rooted and real, the
dynamic cooperative relationship between the two
states is no less real. It is based on compelling and, for
the time being, dominant factors. First, the two nations
are united in their antipathy for Egyptian President
Sadat. The Soviets have cultivated their friendship
with Libya to gain leverage over Egypt as well as to
bolster their weakened position in the Middle East.
Qadhafi, for his part, is emotionally committed to the
union of Egypt and Libya and has tried to undermine
Sadat since the latter vetoed the proposed merger in
1973. His friendship with the Soviet Union and his
acquisition of modern arms denied to Egypt by the
Soviets have increased his stature vis-a-vis Sadat, at
least in his own mind, and have given him added
influence by virtue of his ability to supply arms and
other support to elements opposed to Sadat, both
within and outside Egypt.
The USSR and Libya also agree on their rejection of
Sadat's approach to a settlement in the Middle East-
the Soviets because they do not want to be excluded
from the negotiating process and the Libyans because
they want to prevent any accommodation with Israel.
By strengthening both their bilateral connections and
the broader front of Arab states opposed to Sadat's
moves, the Soviet Union and Libya seek to emphasize
that their views must not be disregarded
For both nations, the relationship is also defensible
from a strictly economic point of view. The Soviets sell
arms to the Libyans for much-needed oil and hard
currency, and they are presumably laying the ground-
work for increased access to Libyan oil in the future.
For its part, Libya has been able to purchase large
quantities of sophisticated weaponry at an acceptable
cost and to acquire economic and technical support.
Another area of Soviet-Libyan compatibility, the
promotion of radical elements in the Middle East and
Africa, has emerged gradually and somewhat tenta-
tively-probably because the ultimate objectives of the
two nations are so different. But their short-term
interest in supporting such elements is clear.
The Soviets have historically made their greatest
political gains in the Third World in areas of instabil-
ity. Their ideological commitment to revolution gener-
ally attracts them to the side of those advocating
radical change in the established order, and their
economic weakness vis-a-vis the West leads them to
seek influence by supplying military equipment and
services. Even in those nations of Africa and the
Middle East where they have become aligned with the
entrenched establishment, the Soviets continue to be
best served by fluid situations in which their ability to
supply military equipment and related sunnort eives
them special importance.
Qadhafi, a self-proclaimed revolutionary, is eager to
participate in the overthrow of what he considers the
"corrupt" old order, exemplified by the traditionalist
Arab Gulf states, and to assist in the establishment of
"radical socialist" regimes wherever possible. While
his Arab nationalism dictates opposition to encroach-
ment by any outside power into the Third World, in
practice he has directed his opposition against the
United States because his main adversaries in the
Arab world (Egypt and Saudi Arabia) as well as Israel
maintain close US ties, and his chosen allies and clients
(the Palestinians, Algeria, Iraq) are closer to the
USSR.
A shared commitment by the USSR and Libya to the
promotion of the forces of change was expressed in the
joint communique issued after Qadhafi's visit to the
USSR in December 1976. The two nations expressed
their:
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consistent support of the African peoples battling
for political, economic, and social freedom. They
confirmed aid and support of the African liber-
ation movements, fighting for freedom and inde-
pendence, and their solidarity with the struggles
of the Zimbabwe and Namibian peoples as well as
the African peoples in southern Africa
Several months after Qadhafi's visit to Moscow, in
March 1977, Cuban leader Castro visited Libya and
spent 10 days there, apparently trying to patch up
what had previously been a strained relationship. The
Soviets clearly welcomed the meeting. TASS of
8 March said that Castro and Qadhafi were discussing
international problems, including the:
combining of the efforts of the two friendly states
in the cause of strengthening the common front of
anti-imperialist forces, in the cause of rendering
support to progressive national liberation move-
ments of Asia, Africa, and Latin America.
The Soviets have clearly tried to foster cooperation
between Cuba and Libya. Although these two nations
are ideologically and politically disparate, both can act
for the Soviets as well as for each other in the Third
World. While the Cubans supply training support and
combat troops, their actions are an obvious extension
of Soviet policy, and their involvement is limited to
situations where the Soviets are willing to be clearly
identified with the ultimate client. These are situations
which:
? Are a result of a request by a "legitimate authority."
? Have strong moral or legal rationales.
? Have general Third World sympathy.
The Soviets are not always willing to become so
directly connected with Third World causes. Thus, the
Libyan ability to offer circumspect financial assistance
and military equipment to radical elements is an
The Soviets have frequently stated that they cannot
control the disposition of their military equipment by
their clients, a claim that enables them to dissociate
themselves from the questionable use of this equip-
ment. It is clear, however, that the Soviets can exercise
opp~ Libyan transfers of equipment in any of the
cases cited, they would have made their opposition
known; there is no evidence that they have at any time
complained to the Libyans about their arms transfer
policy. 25X1
As the nature of the USSR's relationship with Cuba
differs from its relationship with Libya, so too does its
method of collusion with each. The Soviet-Cuban bond
is relatively tight, and the two nations coordinate their
activities closely to achieve a common objective. In
contrast, the Soviet-Libyan connection is very loose,
and there have undoubtedly been occasions when the
Libyans acted without consulting the Soviets. In cases
where cooperation has occurred, the two nations have
simply exploited situations of mutual interest as they
occurred. 25X1
While each such arrangement has been limited to a
particular time and place, each has been easier to make
than the last. The case studies that follow are
examined chronologically, on the basis of the time
when Soviet-Libyan cooperation began. These epi-
sodes, viewed cumulatively, reveal a pattern of increas-
ingly facile cooperation. Thus, while the basic nature
of the Soviet-Libyan relationship has not changed, the
ability of each nation to justify and enter into collusion
with the other has gradually eased, making theirs a
dynamic as well as pragmatic partnership.
25X1
25X1
obvious asset.
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Soviet-Libyan Support for South Yemen and PFLO
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Promotion of Instability: Case Studies
South Yemen and the Popular Front for the Liberation
of Oman (PFLO)
The earliest, most tentative, and perhaps most ambigu-
ous example of Soviet-Libyan political cooperation
involved South Yemen and the Popular Front for the
Liberation of Oman. Although collusion in this case
was less clear-cut than in a number of subsequent
instances, the interaction that did occur laid the
groundwork for future collaboration
Background. With the Maxist regime in South Yemen
as its primary backer, the PFLO has sought to
overthrow the Sultan of Oman since 1969. Prior to
1974 the PFLO also had a wider commitment to
subvert traditional Arab governments throughout the
Gulf region and had an established network of groups
dedicated to this end. Its decision to divest itself, at
least formally, of this mission reflected a move by its
mentor, South Yemen, to mend its relations with the
conservative Gulf states in order to attract much-
needed financial assistance.
The PFLO had some limited military success in
Dhofar, Oman's southern province, in the early 1970s.
But following Iran's decision to assist the Sultan in late
1973, the PFLO's fortunes declined. In 1975 the
PFLO began to suffer serious defeats, and by late 1975
it had been pushed back across the border into South
Yemen.
Soviet Support for the PFLO. The USSR has given
propaganda backing as well as arms aid and training to
the PFLO through South Yemen since 1969, demon-
strating its commitment to South Yemen as well as its
more general sympathy for "national liberation"
movements. The Soviets reportedly approved, however,
South Yemen's decision in 1974 to seek rapproche-
ment and money from its wealthy neighbors by
restricting its support of subversion throughout the
Gulf. With no presence in most of the traditional Gulf
states, the Soviets probably hoped to benefit from the
presence of the diplomatic missions that South Yemen
would eventually establish in these nations. They also
probably wished to be relieved of the responsibility for
bolstering the impoverished South Yemeni economy.
In addition, the branch PFLO groups in the Gulf had
proved remarkably unsuccessful, and cutting back
their support constituted little loss for the Soviets.
Finally, a lower profile approach complemented the
USSR's efforts to present a benign image in the Gulf in
the hope of fostering closer ties to the oil-rich Gulf
states.
The Soviets retained, however, their commitment to
the guerrilla war in Oman. Following Iran's entry into
the war in 1973, Moscow decided, in spite of the risk of
jeopardizing its relations with Iran, to increase both
propaganda support and military assistance to the
rebels. In November 1975, as the PFLO faced a rout
and South Yemen feared for its own security, the
Soviets mounted an airlift of military equipment to
South Yemen, thus asserting their intention to ensure
South Yemen's survival as well as their underlying
support for the PFLO.
The Libyan Position. Since late 1973 the Libyans,
angered by Iran's intervention in Oman, have backed
the PFLO and supplied arms and equipment to the
rebels through South Yemen. Their enthusiasm for the
policies of South Yemen, however, has vacillated.
Unlike the Soviets, the Libyans did not approve of the
PFLO's decision in 1974 to seek closer ties to Saudi
Arabia and limit subversive activities in the Gulf; and
they expended considerable energy trying to get that
decision reversed. In addition, during 1974 and 1975
the Libyans were reportedly critical of what they
considered to be South Yemen's weak support for the
PFLO's war in Oman.
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A Common Interest. There is no tangible evidence that
the Soviets and Libyans coordinated their activities
with respect to the PFLO during this period. Prime
Minister Kosygin was in Libya in May 1975, however,
at which time the two nations concluded an arms
agreement, and it is likely that the situation was
discussed. In any event, the policies of the two nations
with respect to the PFLO subsequently meshed neatly.
During the summer and fall, arms from both Libya
and the USSR arrived in Aden for transfer to the
PFLO. The equipment delivered by the Libyans was
Soviet in on in and presumably the Soviets a reed to
its transfer.
While there is no confirmation that the Soviets were
urging South Yemen to accept Libya's offers and
advice, it is plausible. The USSR was not inclined to
provide South Yemen with large-scale financial assist-
ance, a primary reason for South Yemen's decision to
seek closer ties to Saudi Arabia. The Soviets undoubt-
edly preferred Libyan to Saudi involvement in South
Yemen. In addition, Libyan willingness to fund and
support subversion in the Gulf states complemented
Soviet policies without requiring direct Soviet involve-
ment.
With the collapse of the PFLO's military efforts in late
1975 and early 1976, the situation was defused. South
Yemen and Saudi Arabia reached agreement on
rapprochement in March 1976
Soviet and Libyan views were appar-
ently compatib e during this period as the USSR
increasingly shared the Libyans' concern about Saudi
influence in South Yemen.
In late 1977 the situation again changed as the Soviets
shifted their policy in the Horn of Africa. With their
expulsion from the port of Berbera in Somalia in
November 1977, the Soviets turned to Aden for naval
support. In addition, as they increased their assistance
to Ethiopia, they needed Aden to facilitate their airlift
of equipment. The quid pro quo for South Yemen was
increased financial and military support. These devel-
opments led to Saudi Arabia's abandonment of its
efforts to woo Aden and returned the responsibility for
supporting South Yemen to the USSR and the radical
Arab states, including Libya.
ing of radical, pro-Soviet forces in South Yemen that
occurred in June 1978 has further strengthened South
Yemen's ideological desire to pursue such a course.
Whether or not political reality and the balance of
forces in the area will permit them to do so remains to
be seen.
Conclusions and Prospects. Despite differences of
opinion with respect to the policies of South Yemen in
1974 and 1975, the Soviets and Libyans came together
in support of the PFLO in 1975 when that organization
was faced with a crushing defeat. While there is no
evidence of formal coordination, both nations shipped
arms and equipment, and Libya apparently supplied
considerable financial assistance as well. Following the
PFLO's military defeat, both countries continued to
provide assistance to the inactive PFLO, and both
opposed South Yemen's rapprochement with Saudi
Arabia.
It is likely that the radical regime now in power in
South Yemen will resume an active role in backing
the PFLO and its nearly defunct branches throughout
the Gulf. While the Soviets might condone such
activities, they might also prefer not to be directly
identified as supporting them. They might therefore
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approve South Yemeni and Libyan backing for such
operations while they themselves maintain a respect-
able distance.
The Western Sahara
Collaboration between the Soviet Union and Libya in
support of Algeria and the Polisario is clear-cut and
unambiguous. At the same time, this case provides an
example of the differing intensity with which the
Soviets and Libyans pursue their objectives. While the
Soviets have wanted to preserve their options and
minimize their risks with respect to the Sahara issue,
the Libyans have been far more willing to take action.
Background. On 14 November 1975 Morocco,
Mauritania, and Spain signed the Madrid Tripartite
Agreement, providing for a phased handover of the
administration of the Spanish Sahara to the two
African governments. Algeria, which favored self-
determination for the Sahara (presumably under an
administration amenable to its own interests) con-
demned the agreement and pressed for a UN-super-
vised referendum to determine the territory's fate. At
the same time, Algeria increased its support to the
Polisario, a guerrilla movement within the Sahara, and
increased the deployment of its own troops to its
southwest border area. During the end of 1975 and
the first several months of 1976, tension between
Morocco and Algeria was high and war seemed a
possibility.
Soviet Ambivalence. The Soviets were ambivalent
about this situation. They were inclined to support the
national liberation forces represented by the Polisario
and backed by Algeria as well as a handful of Third
World "progressive" elements. In addition, during the
period from late October 1975 to January 1976, they
were particularly anxious not to antagonize Algeria,
which provided an important stop in their massive
airlift to Angola. Yet they wanted to preserve relations
with Morocco, an increasingly attractive trading
partner, and prevent an Algerian-Moroccan war that
might force them to side openly with Algeria. This
combination of factors led the Soviets in the fall of
1975 to adopt a low-key policy of providing circum-
spect support to Algeria while seeking to placate
Morocco.
Qadhafi Embraces Algerian President Boumediene
The Libyan Commitment. Isolated in the Arab world
and pledged to support "national liberation" forces,
Qadhafi sided with the Polisario and Algeria. Al-
though relations between Libya and Algeria were not
particularly close, Qadhafi clearly preferred a Sahara
allied with the "progressive" regime of Boumediene to
one ruled by the monarchy of Hassan. He may also
have hoped for Algerian backing in his continuing
dispute with Tunisia, which had rejected a proposed
merger with Libya in 1974. And Qadhafi probably
wished to demonstrate his leadership ability and
display his country's enhanced power status resulting
from its acquisition of Soviet arms.
A Coincidence of Interests. As the situation in the
Spanish Sahara came to a head in the early fall of 1975
with the "Green March" of Moroccan civilians into
the Sahara, Soviet sympathy for the Algerian position
was fairly clear. Although Soviet public statements
blandly endorsed a peaceful solution to the dispute,
some media coverage, particularly in Eastern Europe,
was critical of the Green March. And, in early
December, the USSR supported Algeria's motion in
the United Nations calling for self-determination for
the Sahara.
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Soviet-Libyan Backing for Algeria in Western Sahara
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During this period the Algerians particularly wanted
rapid military assistance-which the Soviets did not
want to provide openly. At this point, the coincidence
of Soviet and Libyan interests became relevant. The
Soviets sanctioned the transfer of weapons from
Libyan stocks to Algeria for use in the Sahara and the
seems likely that the Soviets refused to commit
themselves to a rapid military supply effort designed to
give Algeria the immediate option of going to war with
Morocco over the Sahara.
A number of factors would have justified such a Soviet
decision. Most importantly, the Soviets did not want
war between Morocco and Algeria and did not want to
rationale for this procedure was that there was no other
way for the Soviets to meet Algeria's needs quickly;
but it also suited the Soviets to remain one step
removed from direct involvement. This approach
enabled them to satisfy Algeria's requirements without
making any dramatic and irrevocable commitment.'
The utility of such indirect support was demonstrated
in early 1976 when, with a minimum of embarrass-
ment, the Soviets were able to avoid being pulled into
deeper involvement. In late January direct clashes
occurred between Algerian/Polisario forces and
Moroccan forces in the Sahara, and talk of war
intensified. At this time the Libyans and Algerians
apparently concluded that their arms transfer arrange-
The Soviets were apparently not
do anything that might precipitate war. Secondly, the
Soviets wanted to avoid alienating the Moroccans,
with whom they were trying to negotiate a major deal
involving phosphate production-and the Moroccans
had already delivered several clear indications of
annoyance with Soviet policy.' In addition, neither the
Arab nor African nations were backing the Algerian
position, and the Soviets did not want to be openly
identified with an unpopular cause. Finally, the Soviet
airlift to Angola was tapering off and the Soviets could
afford to risk offending Algeria. 25X1
The Soviets accompanied their refusal to resupply
Algeria openly with an attempt to smooth Morocco's
ruffled feathers. In late February they warmly re-
ceived Moroccan Prime Minister Osman and assured
him that the USSR would lend neither moral nor
military aid to support an invasion of the Sahara by
Algerian forces. They also indicated that they were
' In mid-November Morocco had broken relations with East
Germany because of the latter's criticism of the Green March, a
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early March, Morocco demonstrated its satisfaction
with this show of evenhandedness by resuming rela-
tions with East Germany.
While Morocco was pacified, both Algeria and Libya
were displeased by the Soviet position. After his visit
Boumediene was said to be uncertain about Soviet
willingness to support him and dissatisfied by what he
considered the high price of Soviet assistance. In early
February, Algeria decided to lower the risk of war with
Morocco by withdrawing troops from several towns in
the Sahara-perhaps partially as a result of the lack of
Soviet support. And in late February the Algerians
summoned home their ambassador in Moscow before
the Soviet Party Congress, possibly to demonstrate
their annoyance with the USSR. Qadhafi, who had
apparently been ready to move ahead in support of the
Polisario, reportedly criticized Boumediene in Febru-
ary for being too dependent on the USSR and for
"retreating" from the Spanish Sahara.
Mauritania and is an embarrassment to them.
The Pot Simmers. Since February 1976 the Saharan
situation has continued to simmer. In that month, as
the transition from Spanish to Moroccan and
Mauritanian administration occurred, Algeria an-
nounced the formation of the Saharan Democratic
Arab Republic (SDAR) in "liberated territory" within
the Sahara. Libya is one of the few governments that
have recognized the SDAR, while the USSR is not.
Polisario continues to function as a guerrilla force
within the Sahara and has grown significantly in the
past two and a half years. It is currently a well-supplied
military force of some 3,000 to 5,000 men. While not
an immediate threat to control of the region, the force
poses a constant drain on the resources of Morocco and
The growth of Polisario is the result of direct support
agement and support from Libya.
Libya is both paying or Algerian arms
purchases from the USSR and replacing Algerian
equipment given to the Polisario. Direct Soviet involve-
ment in the development of Polisario has been mini-
mal. The Moroccans believe that the Soviets have been
involved, along with the Cubans, in training Polisario
forces in southern Algeria
Whether or not this is so, the Soviets have
supported Polisario indirectly by placing no limits on
the transfer of weapons to the force by Algeria and
In the meantime, the Soviets have continued to seek a
balanced public position on the Saharan issue. They
consistently argue that it is a matter for the states
involved to resolve. And they have been restrained in
their reactions to events in the region-even to the
growing French involvement in support of Mauritania
in late 1977.6 They have, however, generally repeated
the Algerian version of events as they occur, and their
substantive treatment of the issue continues to support
self-determination for the Sahara and describes the
Polisario as the generally recognized national liber-
ation movement of the Sahara.
This position is apparently muted enough for the
Moroccans to tolerate. They have chosen to continue
their increasingly significant economic dealings with
Moscow, and agreements recently concluded would
make Morocco the USSR's largest African trading
partner. A bilateral agreement signed in March 1978
provides for a $2 billion Soviet investment in the
development of the Moroccan phosphate industry, an
operation that both nations have a vested interest in
preserving. At the same time, continued Soviet ap-
proval and indirect backing for Algeria's position in
the Sahara as well as its importance as arms supplier
has enabled the USSR to retain close ties with
Algeria.
? A brief deviation from this restraint occurred in November 1977,
when the Soviet Ambassador in Dakar was quoted as saying that the
USSR would actively oppose foreign intervention in the Sahara. The
French sought and got clarification from Moscow that the USSR
was neutral, and the ambassador subsequently indicated that he had
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Conclusions and Prospects. In the case of the Western
Sahara, Soviet-Libyan interests, while not identical,
proved complementary. In late 1975, the Libyans
wished to pass Soviet weapons to Algeria, and the
Soviets were willing to replenish Libya's depleted
stocks. The Soviet interest in maintaining a low profile
was well served by this method of meeting Algeria's
immediate needs. As tension in the region mounted in
early 1976, the Soviets were able to draw back and
play a restraining role, thus helping to prevent war.
Their original detachment gave them the necessary
flexibility to do so. While neither Libya nor Algeria
was pleased with the Soviet decision, the USSR lost
little as a result of it.
The Soviets will presumably continue to condone
Algerian and Libyan support for the Polisario. They
have been able to pursue this course successfully
without alienating either Algeria or Morocco, and
there is little incentive for them to change.
Lebanon and the Palestine Liberation Organization
(PLO)
As in the Western Sahara, the Soviets were motivated
in Lebanon in 1976 by a desire to maintain relation-
ships with opposing sides in the conflict and to prevent
war. Once again, while the Libyans were willing to
transfer arms discreetly, thus aiding Soviet objectives,
the two countries differed in the intensity of their
support for their clients.
The Soviet Dilemma. As events unfolded in Lebanon
during 1976, the USSR was torn between its desire to
preserve close relations with Syria and its strong
inclination to support the embattled Palestinians and
leftists within Lebanon. Only gradually did the Soviets
decide to back the latter and risk their relationship
with Syria. While they made this preference increas-
ingly clear both publicly and privately, they sought to
maintain the semblance of balance (and thus limit the
risk with respect to their relations with Syria) by
supplying material support to the leftists only through
third parties (for example, Libya).
Throughout most of 1975, Soviet and Syrian objectives
with respect to Lebanon had coincided. Both nations
supported the Palestinian and leftist cause and favored
a solution including concessions to these elements. The
Soviets funneled assistance to the PLO through Syria;
and the latter supplied much of the material assistance
to Kamal Jumblatt's Progressive Socialist Party
(PSP), a leading leftist group with which the Soviets
had also cultivated ties.
As the fighting in Lebanon intensified in early 1976,
however, Syria's role became both more important and
more complex. Seeking to secure a cease-fire, Syria
tried to dampen the conflict by interrupting the
delivery of arms to leftist forces. The Soviets found this
policy increasingly annoying. In addition, they were
opposed to direct Syrian military intervention in
Lebanon, which was a growing possibility; they feared
that Syrian involvement might trigger an Israeli
intervention, which in turn might produce a US-USSR
confrontation. Thus, while they continued to back
Syrian mediation efforts in the hope that this might
lead to a peaceful solution, Soviet disenchantment with
Syrian policies was mounting.
The Libyan Connection. Qadhafi's goal in Lebanon has
been the emergence of a radical Muslim government
that would abandon coexistence with Israel and
provide clear-cut support to the Palestinian cause. His
policy has been one of consistent support for the
In late 1975 and early 1976, as the Syrians moved to
cut off arms deliveries to leftists in Lebanon, these
elements began to seek other means of acquiring
material support.
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Soviet-Libyan Cooperation in Lebanon
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Ton Secret
The Crunch-June 1976. With the Syrian military
intervention into Lebanon in June 1976, the USSR's
efforts to balance its position virtually ended. A Soviet
TASS statement of 9 June implicitly criticized the
Syrian action, calling on all states to refrain from
interfering in Lebanon and questioning Syrian
intentions.
They coupled
this negative response to Syria with demonstrations
of support for the PLO, receiving a permanent PLO
representative in Moscow, an event they had postponed
for two years, and announcing their intention to
furnish food and medicine to national patriotic forces
and the Palestinian resistance in Lebanon.
In early July 1976, the Soviets were apparently under
pressure from both the PLO and Qadhafi to support
the leftist cause more strongly
tion with the United States; they wanted to preserve
their relations with Syria to the extent possible; and
they probably hoped to encourage mediation of the
growing conflict and did not want to undermine their
In late July, the Lebanese Government protested the
conduct of Soviet Ambassador Soldatov, stating that
he had not met with any Lebanese official since
December 1975, but was meeting continuously with
leaders of the Palestinian resistance and opposition
parties as if he were accredited with them. Soldatov's25X1
behavior strongly suggested Soviet involvement in a
coordinating and advisory role with the leftist move-
In early August 1976, Syria and the PLO reached a
temporary accord that the Soviets probably hoped
would endure. For a brief period Soviet criticism and
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pressure on Syria eased. An 8 September "Observer"
article in Pravda criticized extreme leftist elements as
well as Damascus for the continuing tensions in
Lebanon. With the late September Syrian offensive in
Lebanon, the hiatus in harsh Soviet criticism ended,
and the Soviets once again sided openly with the
Palestinians and leftists.
Conclusions and Prospects. In mid-1976, faced with
the decision of supporting Syria in its intervention into
Lebanon or backing the Palestinians and Lebanese
leftists, the Soviets decided for the latter but tried to do
this without losing Syria as a client. They provided
direct political and propaganda support for the leftists
served as the apparent arms supplier of the leftists,
thus letting the Soviets remain in the background and
avoid being drawn deeper into the conflict. It also
permitted the Soviets to maintain a semblance of
impartiality with respect to the Syrians, while preserv-
ing their credentials with leftist forces.
It should be noted, however, that as in the Western
Sahara, the USSR's efforts to maintain its relations
with two sides to a conflict, while limiting the damage
that a one-sided policy might have caused, did not
fully satisfy anyone. The Palestinians and leftists in
Lebanon had hoped for more from the Soviets and
were disappointed by Soviet manipulations. The
Syrians, for their Hart. were angered by the Soviet
policy.
The Soviets are not currently faced with a dilemma in
Lebanon because the Syrians are not now in opposition
to Palestinian and leftist elements. The Soviets con-
tinue, however, to avoid strong support of Syrian
involvement there because they wish to avoid a Syrian-
Israeli war. They presumably will continue to take
their confrontations with the Christian militias.
At the end of October 1976, the Riyadh Conference
reached an agreement that tended to calm the situation
in Lebanon temporarily. Soviet-Syrian relations re-
mained strained, however, and it was not until Sadat's
trip to Israel in November 1977 that a real improve-
ment occurred. Soviet support for the PLO and
Lebanese leftists has continued, but the situation no
longer involves a direct conflict with Syrian interests,
because the Syrians have become more concerned over
such a cautious stance.
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The Sudan
The Sudan provides a striking example of converging
Soviet and Libyan interests; both the USSR and
Libya would applaud the demise of the Numayri
regime, which they consider hostile to them and
supportive of their shared bete noir, Sadat. The
evidence of collusion in this case, while mostly
circumstantial, is persuasive.
Libyan Support for Coup. Libyan hostility toward the
Numayri regime began with Numayri's rejection of
the Libyan-proposed quadripartite federation of
Libya, Egypt, Syria, and the Sudan in 1971. Qadhafi's
feelings intensified as the Sudan moved closer to
Cairo and Riyadh in 1974 and 1975. Criticizing
Numayri for his alleged repression of the Ansar
(Muslim) sect, located mostly in northern Sudan,
Libya began supporting anti-Numayri exiles and
assisting in planning a coup
Sudan's President Numayri:
Object of Soviet and Libyan Dislike
Numayri was apparently convinced that the Soviets
had masterminded the coup attempt. Originally sup-
portive of Numayri, the Soviets had seen their position
in the Sudan deteriorate since 1971 when the Sudanese
Communist Party participated in a coup directed
against Numayri. While there was no evidence to
support Numayri's many accusations against the
USSR, the rebels were armed with Soviet equipment
supplied by the Libyans, and Soviet public praise for
Libya at the time suggested acquiescence and ap- 25X1
proval. A Soviet official subsequently attempted to
indicate Soviet lack of approval by claiming that the
USSR could not be held responsible for the actions of
states to which it supplied arms. There is no evidence,
however, that the Soviets indicated their disapproval of
Libyan arms transfers to the Ansar dissidents. While
they may not have been fully informed of Libyan
intentions, it is highly probable that they approved of
the Libyan efforts. 25X1
Aftermath of Coup Attempt. The effect of the Libyan-
directed operation was to drive Numayri into an even
more rigid anti-Libyan, anti-Soviet posture. He broke
diplomatic relations with Libya and moved closer to
Egypt, concluding two defense-related agreements
with Egypt clearly directed against Libya.
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Soviet-Libyan Collusion in Sudan
4 f
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Qadhafi remained committed to overthrowing
Numayri, and during the fall of 1976 seems to
have had active Soviet backing in his effort.
The Situation Is Defused. In January 1977, convinced
that the Libyans and Ethiopians, with Soviet backing,
were plotting an attack against him, Numayri took the
offensive. Sudanese troops were sent to the border
region, and Numayri threatened to use military force
or retaliate by equipping Eritrean rebels for operations
against Ethiopia. He also publicly expressed his
support for Eritrean self-determination for the first
By this time, the Soviets had also become concerned
about the Sudanese threat to Ethiopia. They were
becoming increasingly committed to the Mengistu
regime and wished to prevent another front from
developing that might weaken Ethiopia.
In May 1977 Numayri expelled all Soviet military
advisers and ordered a reduction in the size of the
Soviet Embassy staff. In June he visited China, a trip
obviously designed to balance his deteriorating rela-
tionship with the USSR. The visit resulted in several
anti-Soviet statements and a Chinese agreement to
supply the Sudan with some small arms and equip-
ment. The Soviets responded by recalling their ambas-
sador to the Sudan and issuing a TASS statement that
warned the Sudan not to initiate hostilities against
Ethiopia. The statement accused the Sudan and its
"imperialist" backers of supporting the Eritrean
insurgents in Ethiopia and of preparing an attack on
Ethiopia's western border. Soviet press commentary
accused NATO of seeking to use the Sudan to oppose
"anti-imperialist" states such as Ethiopia and Libya.
The Libyans were increasingly distracted,
however, by the mounting tensions on their border with
Egypt. They were therefore probably willing to
postpone active efforts to overthrow Numayri. The
Soviets and Ethiopians, as indicated, wished to avoid
trouble on the Sudanese-Ethiopian border. And
Numayri wanted to neutralize the coalition seeking his
demise
Focusing his continuing public hostility on the Soviets,
Numayri sought reconciliation with the opposition
groups within the Sudan and tried with some success to
improve relations with Libya and Ethiopia. By Febru-
ary 1978 the Sudan and Libya had agreed to resume
diplomatic relations, which had been broken following
the July 1976 coup attempt. During 1978 Numayri
also moved to patch up relations with the USSR.
While muting his public hostility toward the Soviets,
Numayri has continued his criticism of the USSR, and
real improvement in relations seems remote. Similarly,
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it is likely that Sudanese-Libyan hostility will reappear
at some point.
Conclusions and Prospects. Soviet-Libyan interests
have coincided in the Sudan over the past several years,
enabling them to pursue complementary policies. Both
nations have favored the overthrow of Numayri, but
the Soviets have clearly not wanted to be identified
with plots against him; the Libyans in contrast appear
to relish such involvement. Thus the Soviets have
provided arms to the Libyans, who have transferred
Ethiopian Leader Mengistu
Receives Soviet and Libyan Support
combined Soviet-Libyan activity against it
During the past year Sudanese relations with both the
USSR and Libya have improved somewhat as the
Sudanese have sought to neutralize the pressures
against them. Numayri remains strongly hostile to-
ward both nations, however, and they to him. It is
therefore probable that, should other sources of tension
subside, the Sudan will at some point again face
in trying to overthrow Numayri in the Sudan.
Ethiopia
This final example of Soviet-Libyan collusion demon-
strates the relative ease with which the two nations
were able to collaborate by late 1976-even though
their reasons for doing so in this case were very
different. In backing Ethiopia, the Soviets were
supporting an avowedly Marxist, increasingly pro-
Soviet regime; the Libyans, for their part, were
primarily interested in gaining Mengistu's cooperation
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Top Secret
Soviet-Libyan Support for Ethiopia
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Soviets Seek Disguised Shift. The Soviet interest in cooperation in undermining the Numayri regime in
improving relations with Ethiopia began with the neighboring Sudan.
military takeover in that country in 1974 and intensi-
fied with the radicalization of the regime in 1975-76.10
But this interest was balanced by a desire not to
endanger the close ties the USSR was developing with
Ethiopia's hostile neighbor, Somalia, and particularly
their access to the Somali port of Berbera.
By mid-1976 the USSR and Ethiopia had signed a
cultural agreement, and the Soviet press was praising
strongman Mengistu, who was now reportedly eager to
Similar Libyan Shift. Libya had been a longstanding
supporter of the Eritrean separatist movement, viewing
it primarily as a Muslim insurgency directed against a
repressive Christian state. When the young Ethiopian
officers came to power in 1974, Qadhafi was initially
intrigued by their revolutionary fervor and reportedly
suspended aid to the Eritrean separatists for a time.
With the intensification of the Eritrean insurgency in
early 1975, however, he resumed supplying arms to the
Eritreans and continued to do so into 1976.
By the fall of 1976, Qadhafi was once again willing to
switch his support to the Ethiopian Government at the
expense of the Eritreans. His primary motivation
appears to have been his desire for Ethiopian
10 Similarly, Soviet policy toward Eritrea shifted during this period.
The longstanding Soviet position had been support for the liberation
of the territory. But early in 1975 the Soviets began supporting the
clear that by December 1976 the USSR and Libya
were prepared to act together in support of Ethiopia.
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Top Secret
Soviet Support Becomes Apparent. Early in 1977,
following Mengistu's consolidation of power in Ethio-
pia, the Soviets increased their commitment to his
regime and by s rin their involvement was quite
visible.
The following month Fidel
Castro visited Ethiopia as well as Algeria, Libya, and
In the spring of 1977 Mengistu sought to strengthen
his ties with the USSR even further, signaling his
intentions by taking some anti-US measures. He was
rewarded with a military aid package worth about
$500 million, negotiated during a visit in May to the
USSR. This agreement represented a significant step
by the Soviets; the deal totaled twice the amount of
their commitment to Somalia and demonstrated how
important Ethiopia had become to them.
1
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South Yemen.
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While the Soviets' efforts to mask their support of
Ethiopia may have had considerable success in the
beginning, by the spring of 1977 their involvement
could not be hidden. As early as April Somali
President Siad Barre had begun seeking alternative
assistance. He also apparently decided to push for a
victory in the Ogaden before Ethiopia was able to
absorb the equipment it was receiving from the USSR.
In June and July the Somali-backed insurgency in the
Ogaden increased, and Somali regulars were seen
there for the first time. By the end of July, the real
battle was on in the Ogaden, and on 14 August a TASS
statement on the situation formally and publicly
announced the Soviet preference for Ethiopia.
By late August 1977 a steady, direct flow of Soviet
arms to Ethiopia had begun, and in mid-September a
new Ethiopian-Soviet military aid agreement was
reached. During the same month, the Soviets report-
edly stopped delivering strategic arms to Somalia. In
November, Somalia unilaterally abrogated its friend-
ship treaty with the USSR and expelled Soviet
technical and military personnel from the country.
Shortly thereafter the Soviet airlift of equipment to
Ethiopia began.
The Eritrean Dilemma. In late 1977, as direct Soviet
support to the Ethiopians was increasing, there were
some indications that the Libyan position was again
shifting." This was primarily reflected in a renewed
opening to the Eritrean insurgents;
In February 1978, while in Moscow,
Libyan leader Jallud publicly announced that Libya
was "with the Eritreans up to independence."
1? During his December 1977 visit to Tripoli, Soviet Deputy Defense
Minister Ogarkov reportedly weighed in heavily to keep Libya on a
strong, pro-Ethiopian course. As of late December, Libya was still
shipping arms to Ethiopia. And, in December, TASS reported that
the leaders of Libya and Algeria, which Ogarkov had also visited,
had reaffirmed their full support for the Ethiopian revolution and
had expressed their readiness to give assistance to that country. F_
This move back toward the Eritreans was a logical one
for Qadhafi, who had probably never been comfortable
supporting a Christian government that was combat-
ing a Muslim insurgency. Other "progressive" Arab
states (for example, Iraq and Syria) had continued to
support the Eritrean cause, and Qadhafi probably did
not wish to be seen as an antagonist of a "progressive"
Muslim cause. In addition, preoccupied with his border
problems with Egypt, Qadhafi was muting his antipa-
thy for Numayri and was thus not so willing to appease
the Mengistu regime.
It is very possible that the Soviets were not upset by
Qadhafi's shift. The Soviets, too, have had a dilemma
with respect to the Eritrean cause, because they have
risked straining their relations with Iraq and Syria
further by actively assisting the Ethiopians in crushing
the insurgency. Their interests would therefore be best
served by a negotiated settlement.
Moscow obviously hopes to preserve its influence with
both Ethiopia and the radical Arab states and would
probably prefer to broker a political solution without
third-party participation. Short of this they might
settle for Libyan mediation.
Conclusions and Prospects. In Ethiopia, Soviet and
Libyan short-term objectives meshed at the appropri-
ate time, although their actual interests were quite
different. The Soviet decision to assist the Mengistu
regime in mid-1976 was based on the perception that a
leftist, pro-Soviet government in this strategically
located nation would serve their long-term goals. The
Libyans, on the other hand, wanted a temporary
alliance with Ethiopia in exchange for its cooperation
in undermining the Numayri regime in the Sudan. P
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A Soviet desire to provide surreptitious assistance to
Ethiopia to preserve its relations with Somalia was
complemented by Libyan willingness to provide So-
viet-made arms to Ethiopia and to finance Ethiopian
purchases of such arms. Thus, in late 1976 and early
1977 the Libyans fulfilled the function of arms
supplier for the Soviets, permitting the USSR to
remain a step removed from direct involvement and
prolong its ties to Somalia. By the spring of 1977 the
deception was inadequate because the Soviets had
stepped up their own role; relations between Somalia
and the USSR deteriorated rapidly.
As the utility of maintaining a facade of Soviet
noninvolvement vanished, so, too, did the need for
Soviet-Libyan collusion. This coincided with Libya's
suspension of its subversive efforts against Numayri
and its consequent need to court Mengistu. Since late
1977 the USSR and Libya have pursued separate
policies with respect to Ethiopia-the Soviets remain-
ing committed to the central government and the
Libyans resuming their dialogue with the Eritrean
separatists.
Since both the Soviets and the Libyans appear to be
seeking a negotiated solution to the Eritrean problem,
their interests are not totally at odds, and some
cooperation toward this end is conceivable. Short of
this, the prospects for significant Soviet-Libyan collu-
sion in Ethiopia are limited. The Soviets have no need
for a middleman in their dealings with Mengistu, and
the Libyans have no immediate reason to assist him.
Should the Libyans once again turn their energies to
overthrowing Numayri, however, some form of Soviet-
Libyan-Ethiopian cooperation would again become
Since their cooperation in Ethiopia ended in 1977,
there have been no comparable instances of active
Soviet-Libyan collusion.There is another form of
collusion, however, that does have a bearing on the
overall pattern of Soviet-Libyan collaboration. This is
the Soviet Union's silent acquiescence in Libya's uses
of Soviet equipment.
This acquiescence, which apparently enables the
Libyans to transfer Soviet weapons to insurgent or
extremist forces at will, amounts to tacit approval of
they have no control over such transfers by their
customers has only limited validity. Their trade
prove sales (presumably gifts as well) of Soviet
cannot prevent a client from making such transfers
they can respond when they do not approve.
ever complained to the Libyans about their arms
transfer policy. There are several obvious stiuations
that illustrate this type of passive collusion.
Chad
In mid-1977 Frolinat, a Libyan-backed Muslim rebel
force, seized control of a large portion of northwestern
Chad. In the following year the French became
increasingly involved in supporting the Chad Govern-
1978 some Libyan military units had been moved into
early fall the military situation was essentially stale-
troops out of Chad.
There is no evidence that the Soviets were involved in
the Chad civil war or that they encouraged the Libyans
actively in any way.15 By the same token, there is no
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indication that they ever tried to discourage the
Libyans from support of insurgency in Chad or
expressed displeasure with the Libyan transfer of
Soviet arms to the rebels. In this particular case the
Soviets were obviously willing to sit back and see what
the results would be. Their own interests were quite
well served by the Libyan operation. Their relationship
with the Chad Government was not a close one, and
they probably assumed that its demise would work to
their benefit. Thus, as long as they could not be
blamed, the Soviets had nothing to lose and possibly
something to gain from Libyan machinations.
Terrorism
Libyan support for extremist groups that engage in
terrorist operations is well documented. The Libyans
have provided weapons, training, financial assistance,
and logistics support to a wide variety of organizations.
The formal Soviet position on the use of terrorism is
straightforward condemnation. They disapprove its
use and, in addition, have occasionally indicated that it
may prove counterproductive. Once again, however,
there is no indication that they have expressed
opposition to the Libyans or requested that Soviet
weapons and equipment sold to Libya not be diverted
to this purpose. It seems highly probable that the
Soviets tacitly approve the Libyan policy, believing
that the disruption and instability that may result from
terrorist operations could eventually work to their
advantage. Thus, as long as they cannot be charged
with backing such activities, the Soviets are willing to
sit back and reap whatever benefits may accrue.
The Soviet Union's acquiescence in Libya's support for
destabilizing elements in the Middle East and Africa
reinforces the examples of active collaboration cited
above. In combination, these cases reveal a widespread
pattern of collusion, albeit of a pragmatic, frequently
temporary, nature. It is highly probable that so long as
Qadhafi remains in power and retains his revolution-
ary fervor, he and the Soviets will continue to perceive
and exploit situations in which their short-term inter-
ests and assets are complementary.
Approved For Release 2008/07/07: CIA-RDP80T00942A000600080002-9