INTERNATIONAL ISSUES REVIEW

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP80T00942A000500010009-0
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 43
• Document Creation Date: December 16, 2016
• Document Release Date: November 22, 2004
• Sequence Number: 9
• Publication Date: September 28, 1979
• Content Type: REPORT

A For Release 200402/22: CIA-RDP80TOO942AOO -
Assessment
' Center
25X1 D
International
Issues Review
Secret
PA IIR 79-008
28 September 1979
Approved For Release 2004/12/22: CIA-RDP80T00942A00056O1Q 0-
 25X1 Approved For Release 2004/12/22 : CIA-RDP80T00942A000500010009-0
Approved For Release 2004/12/22 : CIA-RDP80T00942A000500010009-0
 25X1
25X1
Approved For Rele ca. T - T00942A000500010009-0
INTERNATIONAL ISSUES REVIEW
28 September 1979
CONTENTS
NUCLEAR POLITICS
BRAZIL'S NUCLEAR PROGRAM: DYNAMICS AND
In the seven years since Brasilia and Bonn signed
the broad bilateral agreement establishing the
foundations and directions for Brazil's nuclear
development program through the early 1990s,
mounting domestic problems have forced the Brazil-
ians to make major modifications in their original
nuclear development plans.
ARMS CONTROL
REGIONAL ARMS CONTROL: REGIONAL STATE
RESPONSES TO MAJOR POWER ACTIONS
Recent experience indicates that the military and
diplomatic activity of major powers is of only
limited importance in affecting the willingness of
regional states to commit themselves to regional
arms control arrangements. Regional security and
related concerns are considerably more important.
25X1
5X1
INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM
COMBATING TERRORISM: EXTRADITION AS A
STUMBLING BLOCK . . . . . . . . . . 19
Disagreements over the political motivations of
terrorist suspects have led to tensions among West
European states, in US relations with several Mid-
dle Eastern countries, and within the UN regarding
the draft Convention Against the Taking of Hos-
tages. Language allowing several interpretations
of the convention has, however, permitted antiter-
rorist cooperation among otherwise like-minded
5X1 governments. I
Approved For Release 2004/$ -YCIA-RDP80T00942A000500010009-0
25X1
25X1
25X1
 Approved For Relea T CIA-RDR T00942A000500010009-0
HUMAN RIGHTS, INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM
A NEW DIMENSION FOR AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL
Amnesty International has decided to begin moni-
toring human rights violations by nonstate politi-
cally violent groups. While there are practical
and theoretical problems ahead, the organization's
willingness to face them indicates that it is de-
veloping a more complex and credible appreciation
of the source of human rights abuses.
CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORKS
ANALYZING THE POTENTIAL FOR POLITICAL INSTABILITY
IN DEVELOPING COUNTRIES . . . . 30
Given policy interest in this subject, an effort
must be made to gain a deeper insight into the
actual forces for or against change in a given so-
ciety, as well as the boundaries and context
within which the activities of these forces take
place.
25X1
25X1
25X1
ii
Approved For Release 200M OW: CIA-RDP80T00942A000500010009-0
 25X1
Approved For Release 2004MWM- CIA-RDP80T00942A000500010009-0
25X1
25X1
Brazil's Nuclear Program: Dynamics and Prospects
The comprehensive character of Brazil's nuclear
development program, especially the Brazilians' inten-
tion to build uranium enrichment and spent fuel re-
processing facilities, has been a matter of continuing
concern to the United States primarily because of the
increased risk of nuclear proliferation that is inher-
ent in the acquisition of such technology. The fact
that Brasilia refuses to sign the Non-Proliferation
Treaty, on nationalistic grounds, adds to this con-
cern. Mounting problems indigenous to Brazil, how-
ever, have forced the Brazilians to make major modifi-
cations in their original nuclear development plans.
25X1
The Policy Setting
Four years have passed since Brasilia and Bonn
signed the broad bilateral agreement establishing the
foundations and directions for Brazil's nuclear program
through the early 1990s. For the record both govern-
ments still maintain that the accord--which envisages
construction of eight pressurized-water power reactors
(PWR) and a complete nuclear fuel cycle complex--will
be fulfilled in its entirety. It is now virtually cer-
tain, however, that parts of the original agreement will
be scaled down or left unimplemented as Brazil reassesses
its position in the light of experience and changing
political and economic circumstances. Implementation
28 September 1979
1
Approved For Release 2004/9g TCIA-RDP80T00942A000500010009-0
 25X1 Approved For Release 2004/12/22 : CIA-RDP80T00942A000500010009-0
Approved For Release 2004/12/22 : CIA-RDP80T00942A000500010009-0
 Approved For Release 2004 t 2T CIA-RDP80T00942A000500010009-0
has already run into trouble on several fronts. Plan-
ning and construction of the nuclear facilities involved
are proceeding slowly and somewhat haphazardly and the
agreement is coming under increasing criticism within
the Brazilian scientific community.
The Brazilians in fact have already had to stretch
out their nuclear program and acknowledge unofficiall
that it will have to be curtailed.
implementation of the power reactor construction provi-
sions of the Brazilian - West German accord are even
more remote than before.
In particular, the Brazilians continue to be fully
committed to the construction of a pilot nuclear reproc-
essing plant. Because of planning difficulties and de-
lays in reactor construction, however, the development
of a pilot reprocessing facility may be a decade away,
and commercial reprocessing probably will not be justi-
fiable before the late 1990s.
25X1
25X1
25X1
25X1
25X1
President Joao Figueiredo, who took office last May,
is the first military president with a specific mandate
to ease the political restrictions of the authoritarian
system erected by the Brazilian armed forces some 15
years ago. Since his accession, the political climate
in Brazil has continued to become more open and lively--
although gradually and under the watchful eye of the
military.
As a result of these political developments, Brazil-
ians feel much freer than before to examine and criti-
cize the whole spectrum of national policies. Brazil's
nuclear program and its nuclear accord with West Germany
have become fair game for debate in the Brazilian press,
and thus public attitudes toward these issues are ac-
quiring greater political significance.
28 September 1979
25X1
3
Approved For Release 2004/12 T CIA-RDP80T00942A000500010009-0
 Approved For Release 2004/$EiM57C(A-RDP80T00942A000500010009-0
Since early last year, various aspects of Brazil's
nuclear effort have drawn public fire from a number of
politicians, journalists, and scientists--some question-
ing whether the nuclear agreement with West Germany
should have been made at all. This criticism should not,
however, be construed as a flagging national commitment
to the development of nuclear power. Acquisition of
this sophisticated technology is still generally viewed
as an important and tangible measure of Brazil's move-
ment toward becoming a major nation and is thus directly
tied to the achievement of great power status. Moreover,
both Brasilia and Bonn have compelling reasons to imple-
ment as much of their swee in 1975 nuclear accord as
possible.
The Case for Going Ahead: Brazil's View
From Brasilia's vantage point, the development of
nuclear power and the acquisition of a complete nuclear
fuel cycle are seen as key national objectives for a
wide variety of reasons--not the least of which is the
Brazilian desire to secure independent and lasting
sources of energy to su ort their top_- riority economic
development efforts.
The need to develop new power sources for Brazil's
growing cities--especially Sao Paulo, Rio de Janeiro,
and Belo Horizonte, which are South America's leading
industrial centers--is becoming increasingly urgent.
For the near term, at least, hydropower will remain sub-
stantially cheaper to develop in Brazil than nuclear
energy. The cost of developing remote hydroelectric
sites in the far north is higher, but available evidence
suggests that the expense of exploiting Brazil's hydro-
electric potential will not reach the cost of generating
nuclear power until 60 percent of that power has been
tapped. Indeed the policymakers have accelerated the
development of Brazil's vast hydroelectric resources and
intensified exploitation of indigenous coal reserves.
Nonetheless they remain concerned that delays in bring-
ing new capacity onstream could result in electrical
energy shortages in the 1980s in the face of rapid urban
growth. F77 I
28 September 1979
4
Approved For Release 2004/ggTCIA-RDP80T00942A000500010009-0
 Approved For Release 2004/$F TCIA-RDP80T00942A000500010009-0
The Brazilians clearly feel that there are other
economic benefits to be derived from their ambitious
nuclear program, including the expansion and diversifi-
cation of foreign markets for their exports. Moreover,
they believe that mastery of nuclear technology will
greatly enhance their international image as an indus-
trially sophisticated nation. In this spirit, Brazil
has recently shown signs of interest in building new
regional bonds through nuclear cooperation with neigh-
boring Latin American states. This July, for example,
Brazilian Foreign Minister Guerrero signed a bilateral
memorandum of understanding on nuclear cooperation for
peaceful purposes with Venezuela. So far, the Brazilians
have only agreed to provide the Venezuelans with train-
ing and to exchange information on uranium prospecting
and uranium concentration.
Under Brazil's well-established and elaborate de-
fense doctrine, economic development is seen as essen-
tial for national security--which Brazilians define very
broadly to include social, political, and economic sta-
bility. Hence, whatever contributes to national develop-
ment enhances national security.
Classic military and defense preoccupations, on the
other hand, do not now loom large in the calculations of
Brazil's nuclear policy planners. Brazil is still largely
isolated from the main currents of international tensions
and has no fear of military attack from neighboring
states. Even its longstanding and, at times, bitter
rivalry for regional influence with Argentina--which has
the most advanced nuclear program in Latin America--is
not at present a major motivating factor behind Brazil's
nuclear ambitions. On the contrary, the relationship
between Brazil and Argentina has become increasingly
cooperative with the rapid expansion of bilateral trade.
There has even been considerable talk--both public
and private--about potential bilateral nuclear coopera-
tion between the two countries. Fundamental differences
in reactor design as well as issues of nationalist com-
petition will probably continue to restrict the degree
of cooperation, but it is possible that the two nations
28 September 1979
25X1
25X1
5
Approved For Release 2004/ / fiCIA-RDP80T00942A000500010009-0
 Approved For Release 2004ISI)2L2ET CLA-RDP80T00942A000500010009-0
might adopt a common strategy in opposition to supplier-
imposed restrictions on the transfer of nuclear tech-
nology. Argentina and Brazil might also agree to exten-
sive cooperation in the production of radioactive isotopes
for medical and industrial purposes.
Nonetheless, Brazilian leaders are well aware that
their regional security concerns could become more press-
ing over the next few years. They would see their inter-
ests threatened if any of the continent's simmering dis-
putes--for example, the territorial disagreements between
Chile and Argentina and between Chile and Peru--were to
erupt in fighting. Moreover, no conscientious Brazilian
planner would be willing to gamble on Argentina's ulti-
mate intentions or, despite the currently peaceful na-
ture of Brasilia's nuclear program, to argue that Brazil
should unilateral) foreclose the nuclear weapons option.
25X1
and West Germany's View
25X1
25X1
The Schmidt government is dismayed at the complica-
tions that have delayed implementation of joint nuclear
projects with Brazil. But there are several considera-
tions that will strongly motivate the West Germans to
follow through on the commitments they made in the 1975
agreement. In general they believe that the Federal 25X1
Republic must protect its reputation as a reliable sup-
plier of nuclear equipment and technology.
Perhaps the most important specific consideration
for the West Germans is the huge economic stake they now
have in the Brazilian deal. If the agreement flounders,
the consequences would be catastrophic for the West
German nuclear industry, which is already in serious
financial difficulties. The prospect of government sub-
sidies to save the nuclear industry--on top of the
$8 billion Bonn has already invested in that sector--
could become a serious political problem for Chancellor
Schmidt when he faces national elections in October
1980.
The West Germans have other important reasons for
wishing to keep their nuclear cooperation agreement with
Brazil alive. One of the factors that originally en-
couraged them to send advanced nuclear technology to
28 September 1979
6
Approved For Release 2004fty. CIA-RDP80T00942A000500010009-0
 Approved For Release 2004EM 2T CITY-RDP80TOO942A000500010009-0
Brazil was the prospect of guaranteed access to Brazilian
uranium. While the current freeze on new reactor con-
struction in the Federal Republic strongly suggests that
the uranium contracts already signed with the major sup-
plier states might be adequate to meet West German re-
quirements for the coming decade, Bonn still has a sub-
stantial political interest in diversifying its source
of supply. As part of the original nuclear cooperation
agreement, the West Germans were given the right to 20
percent of the uranium discovered and exploited by Nuclam,
a Brazilian - West German company. During the past year,
the Brazilians have raised the estimate of their com-
mercially exploitable uranium reserves to more than
100,000 metric tons.
In addition to this vested interest in uranium ex-
ploration, the West Germans have a general interest in
promoting economic relations with the Brazilians. While
Brazil only accounts for a small share of West German
exports, the West Germans have substantial nonnuclear
investments in this country. The Schmidt government
wants to nurture and expand this economic relationship
as part of a general effort to penetrate the Latin
American market.
Constraints on Brazil's Nuclear As irations
Limited political liberalization has made it more
difficult for the Brazilian Government to keep the ex-
pense of the nuclear program from becoming a divisive
political issue, particularly when Brazil is suffering
from a sustained high rate of inflation and a relative
decline in economic growth. At a time of growing pre-
occupation with socioeconomic problems, spending vast
sums on projects with no short-term, highly visible pay-
off has not gone unchallenged. Nevertheless, the do-
mestic debate over Brazil's nuclear program has remained
moderate in tone. (It is worth noting that, for what-
ever reason, the reprocessing aspects of the nuclear
program have been spared from public criticism.)
While the shift in the domestic political environ-
ment undoubtedly contributed to Brasilia's decision to
stretch out and pare down its original nuclear plans,
economic constraints were the determining factors.
First, soaring costs are undermining Brazil's ability
28 September 1979
25X1
7
Approved For Release 2004/%2J CIA-RDP80T00942A000500010009-0
 Approved For Release 2004/')ZW'CIA-RDP80T00942A000500010009-0
to pay for the ambitious program. The original estimate
of $5 billion for reactors and associated facilities,
for example, may quadruple. Moreover, expensive nuclear
power plants have become increasingly difficult to jus-
tify in view of the slower-than-anticipated rowth in
consumption of electricity. 25X1
Other broad economic developments are also under-
cutting Brazil's ability to absorb the escalating costs
of the nuclear program. Persistent inflation, combined
with less rapid economic growth, is squeezing government
funding allocations for infrastructure projects. Brazil's
mounting foreign debt--presently over $43 billion--is
limiting its ability to import sophisticated foreign
equipment in the amounts required for its nuclear pro-
gram. Although Brazil's generally favorable credit rat-
ing would enable it to secure additional foreign financ-
ing for its nuclear imports, the cost would be high and
the availability of foreign credits for more productive
economic ventures would be reduced.[ I 25X1
Finally, Brazil's lack of an extensive high tech-
nology base has made it difficult to carry out its nu-
clear program. Although the infrastructure set up by
Brazil and West Germany for the implementation of their
accord (including the transfer of technology) is sound
enough, the Brazilians remain severely hampered by a
lack of trained personnel and, more generally, practical
experience in nuclear and related matters. Indeed, the
long time required to train the large number of person-
nel needed in both the technical and industrial fields
has been responsible for much of the slippage in the im-
plementation of Brazil's nuclear program so far. In-
experience and recourse to trial-and-error methods can
also be blamed in part for the soaring costs in all
sectors of the program--and in reacto construction in
particular.
Thus far, foreign events and international pressures
have had no discernible dampening effect on Brasilia's
determination to implement its nuclear program. Indeed,
a number of external developments and pressures--for ex-
ample, the dramatic increase in the cost of oil due in
large part to the pricing policies of the organization
of Petroleum Exportin Countries--have had precisely
the opposite effect.
28 September 1979
8
Approved For Release 2004E /ggji CIA-RDP80T00942A000500010009-0
 Approved For Release 2004/9RLT CIA-RDP80T00942A000500010009-0
Looking Ahead
Predictions concerning the future of Brazilian -
West German nuclear cooperation and of Brazil's nuclear
program as a whole are difficult because Brasilia will
continue to be pulled and pushed in opposite directions
by a wide array of political, economic, technical, and
security considerations. Soaring costs, economic slow-
down, and technical difficulties will operate as in the
past to delay and stunt the program. Expected further
increases in the price of imported oil, the logic of
Brazil's quest for energy independence, and the nation's 25X1
aspirations to great power status will continue to re-
inforce Brazilian determination to preserve and im le-
ment as much of the nuclear program as possible.
For at least the next year or two these opposing
factors seem likely to offset each other and thus allow
Brazil's nuclear program to develop along the more modest
lines that have been emerging in recent months. Whether
this tendency persists will depend in part on the shift-
ing political, economic, and technological environment,
both regional and global. Nonetheless, Brazil will con-
tinue to be highly resistant to outside pressures to
alter its plans in the interest of reducing the attend-
ant proliferation risks. F_ I
Over the next several months, Figueiredo will prob-
ably not be under much domestic political pressure to
make further changes in Brazil's nuclear program, partly
because the changes already made have made it easier to
defend the program. The worsening economic climate in
Brazil will, however, create further problems with re-
spect to developing nuclear power that could have a sig-
nificant effect in the longer run. To cope with an
annual inflation rate of 50 percent (and perhaps more),
Brasilia has cut the budgets for government agency ex-
penditures. In addition, the government's recent pro-
hibitions on commercial bank loans to state entities--
another feature of its anti-inflationary package--place
financial restrictions on Nuclebras, the state-owned
nuclear holding compcompany, that will limit its ability to
fund investments.
28 September 1979
25X1
9
Approved For Release 2004/' @RE:ZCIA-RDP80T00942A000500010009-0
 Approved For Release 2004A MT CLA-RDP80T00942A000500010009-0
Imports of foreign equipment critical to Brazil's
nuclear program will also be harder to manage this year
because of a record current account deficit of $8-9
billion. Moreover, the rising cost of servicing Brazil's
Eurodollar debt will reduce the amount of foreign ex-
change available to Nuclebras for purchase of nuclear
Because of Brazil's worsening economic climate, it
also seems likely that:
-- Brazil will buy no more than four--and possibly
as few as three--of the eight German reactors
originally provided for in the 1975 accord.
-- The Brazilians will eventually abandon, because
of both cost and technological considerations,
tentative plans to expand their projected
demonstration--scale Becker nozzle uranium en-
richment facility to a commercial-scale plant.
Barring serious problems with the commercially un-
proven Becker process or unforeseen political or economic
difficulties of major proportions, however, we doubt that
Brasilia will drop the demonstration-scale uranium en-
richment project or otherwise fundamentally alter its
current plans to acquire a complete nuclear fuel cycle
from West Germany. Nor do we think it likely that Brazil
will buy fewer than three power reactors from the Germans.
I
While Brasilia has watched the progress of other
aspiring nuclear states (especially in Latin America)
with keen interest--and while any notable successes
achieved by those states might have some stimulating ef-
fect on its own nuclear efforts--it is unlikely to be
greatly influenced by any of their specific nuclear pol-
icies or decisions unless those moves appear threaten-
ing. In particular, a decision--whether voluntary or
involuntary--on the part of another state to forgo ac-
quisition of a complete nuclear fuel cycle would rob-
25X1
ably not persuade the Brazilians to follow suit.
28 September 1979
10
Approved For Release 20OR12I : CIA-RDP80T00942A000500010009-0
 Approved For Release 2004 = CIA-RDP80T00942A000500010009-0
In sum, President Figueiredo, who enjoys the advan-
tage of not being publicly indentified with the original
1975 nuclear accord, has quietly but effectively lowered
his government's sights on the nuclear program because
of major economic and technical problems. Further slip-
page and "adjustments" seem likely, especially in the
longer run. Nonetheless, there is little reason to ex-
pect that Figueiredo--whose term expires in 1985--or
any of his most plausible successors will abandon the
essential elements of a program so closely tied to na-
tional pressure to push Brazil back into a stridently
nationalistic defense of its nuclear plans.
28 September 1979
25X1
11
Approved For Release 2004/ig TCIA-RDP80T00942A000500010009-0
 Approved For Release 2004/$T CAA-RDP80T00942A000500010009-0
Regional Arms Control: Regional State Responses to
Major Power Actions
Regional arms control has two aspects: restraint
by major powers and restraint by the regional states
themselves. This article addresses this dichotomy by
analyzing the effects that military and diplomatic ac-
tivity of major powers may have on the willingness of
regional states to commit themselves to arms control
arrangements. Recent experience indicates that these
effects are less important than are regional security
concerns and other factors largely beyond the major
powers' control.
Overview of the Problem
The United States has made regional arms control an
important element in its overall arms control policy. It
has attempted not only to negotiate regional arms restraint
with the USSR (for example, in talks on force reductions
in Europe and on naval limitation in the Indian Ocean)
but also to stimulate initiatives by other states to con-
trol arms in their own regions. Smaller states have, in
fact, made most of the many regional arms control initia-
tives of the past two decades. These have included pro-
posals for "zones of peace," nuclear-weapons-free zones,
and arrangements for the restraint of conventional arms
None of these proposals, however, has yet come to
fruition. Even the one that has produced a formal agree-
ment (the Treaty of Tlatelolco prohibiting nuclear weap-
ons in Latin America) is not yet in force over the entire
region. This suggests a need to consider the extent to
which major powers can affect the ability or willingness
of other states to commit themselves to regional arms
control. How might US and Soviet military and diplomatic
activity encourage--or discourage--progress toward re-
gional arms restraint agreements?
28 September 1979
25X1
25X1
12
Approved For Release 2004$x: CIA-RDP80T00942A000500010009-0
 Approved For Release 2004=$2'T CIA-RDP80T00942A000500010009-0
To date, there has been little analysis of this prob-
lem and thus no generally accepted analytical framework--
or even a set of rival frameworks--that can be applied to
it. Nonetheless, there seem to be three possible general
answers. One is that regional states will work most dil-
igently for arms control in those regions where outside
powers are most active militarily. A second possibility
is the opposite: that the military presence of major
powers acts as a form of neocolonialism that inhibits the
regional states from seeking greater autonomy or security
for their region. This implies that regional arms con-
trol is almost totally dependent on initiatives by major
powers. A third possibility is that the activity of out-
side powers has little effect on the willingness of re-
gional states to undertake arms control commitments, and
that this willingness instead depends more on rivalry
and cooperation among the regional states themselves.
Major Power Military Presence as a Goad
The first alternative is suggested in the accusations
by less developed countries (LDCs) that major powers tread
on the interests of smaller states when they pursue their
worldwide military interests. The LDCs claim that because
of this they have the right to exclude an outside military
presence from their own regions, particularly regions where
that presence is largest and least restrained. One way of
doing so is to start constructing a regional arms control
arrangement and thereby to pressure the major powers into
committing themselves to restraint.
Past experience suggests that diplomacy by regional
states can indeed stimulate such responses by major
powers, either by mobilizing sentiment against military
activity in a region or by providing the major powers
with a convenient opportunity to express a commitment to
arms control. For example, the superpowers have accepted
the protocols to the Treaty of Tlatelolco that apply to
their own activities, even though both the treaty and the
protocols were initiated and negotiated by. the Latin
American states themselves. Similarly, commencement in
1977 of the US-Soviet talks on arms limitation in the
Indian Ocean followed several years of diplomatic efforts
by states in that region to establish an Indian Ocean
zone of peace. The recent acceleration of regional state
diplomacy directed toward that goal has encouraged the
28 September 1979
25X1
25X1
13
Approved For Release 2004/1R&t1 CIA-RDP80T00942A000500010009-0
 Approved For Release 2004/ig'( rCyA-RDP80T00942A000500010009-0
neighboring states feel less secure. The exact response
by the regional states depends greatly on the t e of
major power military activity being curtailed. 25X1
Superpower restraint in deployment of nuclear wea-
pons outside their territories probably has relatively
little effect on the decisions of regional states whether
to acquire nuclear weapons of their own. The nuclear
powers have already forsworn the use of nuclear weapons
against nonnuclear weapons states in most circumstances,
and at least for the United States and the USSR, a nu-
clear strike against a smaller state could be carried out
with long-range weapons based thousands of miles away.
Proposed regional restrictions on superpower nuclear
weapons have involved uninhabited areas (Antarctica, the
seabed, or outer space, where nuclear weapons are already
prohibited by treaty), Europe (the only region where any
war is almost certain to become a US-Soviet war), or the
patrol areas for ballistic missile submarines (an issue
in the bilateral Indian ocean talks). None of these is
relevant to the decisions of potential developers of nu-
clear weapons in Asia, Africa, and Latin America. Those
decisions will rest instead on the perceived intentions
of hostile neighbors and perhaps on the desire for pres-
..
Major power initiatives to restrict conventional
arms transfers to a region are more likely to evoke re-
gional state responses because an arms transfer is an
inherently cooperative activity involving both a supplier
(usually an outside power) and a recipient (a regional
state). Restraint by a supplier may reduce fears of large
arms purchases by neighbors and thus make regional states
more willing to commit themselves to restrain their own
purchases. Nevertheless, the exact response depends on
how a restraint scheme appears to affect local military
balances. Even a multilateral agreement involving all
major suppliers could increase a regional state's fears
if that state were at an earlier phase in a weapons mod-
ernization program or were more dependent on imported
arms than an adversary. Furthermore, larger regional
states that are budding arms producers may view such an
arrangement as increasing both the need and the opportu-
nity to accelerate their own production of weapons.
28 September 1979
25X1
16
Approved For Release 2004h,' CIA-RDP80T00942A000500010009-0
 Approved For Release 2004/$V TCIA--RDP80T00942A000500010009-0
Restrictions on deployment of the major powers' own
conventional forces, although not as closely linked to
restraint by regional states as curtailment of arms trans-
fers would be, are more relevant to the security concerns
of these states than are restrictions on the employment
of nuclear weapons. At least some of the larger regional
states are able to match the conventional forces that
major powers have deployed in their area, even though
they cannot hope to be a match on the nuclear level.
Once again, however, major power restraint would not
necessarily lead to corresponding restraint by regional
states. In the Indian Ocean, for example, India's naval
forces are roughly comparable to those of the United
States or the USSR. An agreement by the superpowers to
limit their forces in that region would be unlikely to
reduce New Delhi's desire to expand its own naval pos-
ture. India probably would see joint US-Soviet restraint
as providing an opportunity to establish Indian superior-
ity in that part of the ocean, a longstanding aspiration.
Regional states are more likely to respond with a
reduction in their own forces if they are closely allied
with major powers, as in Europe. Regional state restraint
there, however, would be less a response to withdrawals of
major power forces than a supplement to such withdrawals.
Any reduction in European armed forces that emerged from
the mutual and balanced force reduction negotiations
would almost certainly be part of the same agreement that
provided for withdrawals of US and Soviet troops from
Central Europe, even if the agreement provided that it
take place later.
In sum, only certain types of major power arms con-
trol initiatives are likely to elicit a regional state
response. Moreover, that response may be one of less
arms restraint rather than more.
Conclusion: The Impact of Local Rivalries
The foregoing analysis casts considerable doubt on
each of the first two answers to the question posed at
the outset. The arms control diplomacy of LDCs is not
as closely related, either as cause or as effect, to the
major powers' activity in their regions as much of their
rhetoric suggests. The LDCs do not always campaign most
28 September 1979
25X1
25X1
17
Approved For Release 2004/11EREICIA-RDP80T00942A000500010009-0
 Approved For Release 2004$EET CLA-RDP80T00942A000500010009-0
assiduously for arms control in the regions where major
power military activity is most intrusive. Greater arms
control efforts by the major powers, however, would not
necessarily ins ire the LDCs to re rain their own mili-
tary activity.
These findings lend support to the third hypothesis--
that the arms control activity of regional states depends
chiefly on factors outside the control of major powers.
The key elements in regional states' decisions seem to be
local security considerations and intraregional rivalries.
The answer appears even more plausible in light of the
difficulty of defining a region that is neither too large
nor too small to be a practicable and effective basis for
military restraint. On the one hand, a large region is
likely to embrace local conflicts whose protagonists are
unwilling to accept restrictions, thus spoiling an oppor-
tunity for those elsewhere in the region who are willing
to accept restrictions. For example, the prospects for
arms transfer restraint in Sub-Saharan Africa (one of
the regions mentioned by the United States in its arms
transfer talks with the USSR) are diminished by the con-
flicts in the Horn and Zimbabwe-Rhodesia, which would
make an agreement difficult to reach even though the less
volatile portions of the continent may be ripe for one.
On the other hand, almost every region seems too small
in the sense of excluding forces that are of concern to
some state in the region. The establishment of a zone
of peace in either the Indian Ocean or the Mediterranean
Sea is hindered for this reason; the security concerns
of most littoral states are focused not across the water
but inland, at adversaries that would not be included in,
or restrained by, such a zone. In short, almost no region
is strategically cohesive in all respects. This curtails
the willingness of states to accept regionwide restric-
tions on their military activity--no matter how much the
actions of major powers may oad or stimulate them.
28 September 1979
25X1
18
Approved For Release 2004$2: CIA-RDP80T00942A000500010009-0
 Approved For Release 2004/$E WT'CIA-RDP80T00942A000500010009-0
Combating International Terrorism: Extradition as a
Stumbling Block
Disagreements over the political motivations of
terrorist suspects have frequently led to tensions
among governments otherwise inclined to cooperate on
terrorism matters. These differences in perspective
have led to tensions among West European states, in US
relations with several Middle Eastern countries, and
within the United Nations regarding the draft Conven-
tion on the Taking of Hostages. Language allowing sev-
eral interpretations of treaty obligations has allowed,
however, a number of nations to join international con-
ventions dealing with terrorists.
Western Europe: The Irish Tan le
The assassination of Lord Mountbatten on Irish ter-
ritory rekindled a continuing UK-Irish dispute over the
degree of permissible bilateral cooperation against IRA
terrorists. The British have claimed that Ireland has
frequently been a haven for Republican terrorists who
slip across its borders after raids on Northern Ireland.
British hopes for "hot pursuit" of fleeing terrorists,
or their extradition to stand trial, have been met with
Irish refusals on constitutional grounds. Dublin is
legally prevented from extraditing Irish terrorists,
since Ireland's 1965 Extradition Act provides that a sus-
pect deserves the right to be tried in his own homeland.
Moreover, the Irish wish to retain the option of denying
extradition if the offender was motivated by political
Using similar legal reasoning, the Irish have balked
at signing the European Convention on the Suppression
of Terrorism. This agreement seeks to deal with terror-
ism more effectively by ensuring that certain specific
offenses would not be regarded as political crimes, and
28 September 1979
25X1
25X1
19
Approved For Release 2004/li iCIA-RDP80T00942A000500010009-0
 Approved For Release 200, MM: CIA-RDP80T00942A000500010009-0
that those involved in such acts would be swiftly extra-
dited and brought to trial in the country where the crime
had been committed.* The Convention also requires that
in cases where extradition is refused, the offender be
brought to trial without undue delay.
The wording of the Convention allowed states, at
the time of signature or ratification, to reserve the
right to refuse extradition in cases they regard as in-
volving political offenses. A proviso to this escape
clause stipulated that a state must take into considera-
tion the motives of the case, the means used, and the
threat to public safety when denying extradition for
political reasons.
The Convention was agreed to by the 21-member Coun-
cil of Europe in late 1976 and signed in early 1977 by
the entire membership except for Malta and Ireland.
Eight countries entered reservations, including six
(Italy, Norway, Sweden, Denmark, Portugal, and Cyprus)
that stated they would not extradite for political
offenses.
Cooperation among West European governments against
terrorism has continued since the signing of the Conven-
tion. Following a preliminary gathering held in Bern in
April 1978, representatives of Austria, Switzerland,
Italy, France, and West Germany met in Vienna that Sep-
tember to discuss cooperative measures for combating and
detecting terrorist activities. The group agreed on
establishing training and armament programs for national
antiterrorist specialists. In November 1978, the 63rd
meeting of the Council of Europe Committee of Ministers
adopted a declaration calling for increased cooperation
to combat terrorism, and declared its support for the
European Convention on the Suppression of Terrorism. In
early 1979, the chiefs of police of several West Euro-
pean metropolitan areas met to discuss coo eration
against criminal and terrorist offenses.
*The crimes listed include seizing aircraft; taking hostages; at-
tacking diplomats; using a bomb, grenade, rocket, automatic weapon,
letter bomb; or attempting to do any of these things; or being an
accomplice of such an attempt.
28 September 1979
25X1
25X1
25X1
20
Approved For Release 2004$ r CIA-RDP80T00942A000500010009-0
 Approved For Release 2004 tF CIA-RDP80T00942A000500010009-0
Hoping to remove an impediment to otherwise harmon-
ious efforts by these nations in dealing with. terrorists,
the nine members of the European Economic Community have
drafted an agreement among themselves to deal with the
legal problems of those nations which have refused to
sign the European Convention or have signed with reser-
vations. The new agreement, which will be opened for
signature in Dublin next month, drops the proviso to
the escape clause while still requiring a nation to
prosecute a suspect it refuses to extradite. It appears
that Ireland will sign this new agreement, hoping to
dispel criticism leveled against it for refusing to sign
the convention.
Despite such legal maneuvers, neither the Nine nor
the Council of Europe have been able to arrive at a
definition of political crimes that ensures both civil
liberties and the need for close cooperation in combat-
ing terrorism.
28 September 1979
25X1
125X1
21
Approved For Release 2004l22T CIA-RDP80T00942A000500010009-0
 Approved For Release 2004/fiF2Y CIA-RDP80T00942A000500010009-0
25X1
25X1
UN Responses
A West German draft convention against the taking
of hostages, which had been reported out of its commit-
tee earlier this year, has been complicated by the UN
General Assembly's effort to resolve a dispute pitting
Mexico and Jordan against the West European nations on
the extradition issue. Mexico wishes to preserve the
Latin American tradition of granting political asylum,
while Jordan objects to the possibility of extraditing
suspects to--and thereby indirectly recognizing--Israel.
These two nations have therefore offered amendments,
which were postponed for plenary consideration by the
General Assembly, seeking to make exceptions to the
West German draft's mandatory extradite-or-prosecute
Despite these sticking points, prospects seem
bright for eventual passage of the hostages convention
by the United Nations. The final sessions of the draft-
ing committee show a spirit of cooperation between the
proposal's initiators and the less developed countries.
Moreover, several LDCs have recently joined the four
major UN conventions against international terrorism,
three of which include extradite-or-prosecute provisions.
During 1979, Botswana and Nepal adhered to the Tokyo
Convention on Offenses and Certain Other Acts Committed
on Board Aircraft. Bolivia, Ethiopia, Kuwait, Nepal,
28 September 1979
22
Approved For Release 2004/8.tT CIA-RDP80T00942A000500010009-0
 Approved For Release 2004/$74T'CIA-RDP80T00942A000500010009-0
Sudan, and Togo joined The Hague Convention for the sup-
pression of Unlawful Seizure of Aircraft. Bolivia, El
Salvador, Nepal, Sierra Leone, Sudan, and Togo acceded
to the Montreal Convention for the Suppression of Un-
lawful Acts Against the Safety of Civil Aviation.
In addition, the United Kingdom and Trinidad and
Tobago became parties to the UN Convention on the Pre-
vention and Punishment of Crimes Against Internationally
Protected Persons Including Diplomatic Agents. The Con-
tact Group of approximately 20 nations has decided to
coordinate another round of demarches to countries that
have not yet joined the three antihijacking agreements.
Their chances for expanding participation in the conven-
tions are promising--most of the nonsignatories have
not yet joined because of bureaucratic delays, not be-
cause of fundamental political or le al objections.
28 September 1979
25X1
23
Approved For Release 2004//.TCIA-RDP80T00942A000500010009-0
 Approved For Release 2004 UW: CLA-RDP80T00942A000500010009-0
A New Dimension for Amnesty International
In September, Amnesty International (AI), the in-
ternational human rights organization, announced that
it would henceforth pay serious attention to human
rights violations by "liberation" movements and ter-
rorist groups. AI's tendency until now has been to
concentrate on human rights abuses by governments, and
to play down the violence committed by political op-
ponents of these governments. Monitoring both cate-
gories of abuses systematically represents a signifi-
cant departure from AI's past practice and will help
it to gain a greater international reputation for
evenhandedness. Moreover, AI is positioning itself to
address some vexing problems faced by democratic gov-
ernments in combating political violence.
Behind the Decision
As recently as June 1978, AI's position on human
rights violations by nongovernmental groups was to de-
plore such actions privately but virtually ignore them
publicly. An Al spokesman at the organization's head-
quarters in London said at the time that AI regretted
politically motivated kidnaping and murder by paramili-
tary groups in such places as Latin America and Northern
Ireland. He added, however, that AI could only demand
adherence to human rights standards from established
regimes. Respect for such standards was "not to be ex-
pected" of groups seeking the forcible overthrow of
"constituted governments."
The September 1979 statement issued at AI's annual
policy meeting in Brussels thus represented a signifi-
cant change of pace for the organization. Two reasons
were offered for the shift in emphasis:
28 September 1979
25X1
25X1
24
Approved For Release 20048V222 CIA-RDP80T00942A000500010009-0
 Approved For Release 2004M4121 CIA-RDP80T00942A000500010009-0
-- AI's continued growth in active membership--
there are now 200,000 members, up by a third
in the two years since Al won the Nobel Peace
Prize--make it possible for AI to expand the
range of its human rights concerns.
-- For several years various governments have been
urging AI not to confine its focus to govern-
mental abuses, but also to look at the other
side of the coin.
The killing of Lord Mountbatten and his party as
well as 18 British soldiers by the Provisional IRA
("Provos"), which occurred barely a fortnight before
the Brussels meeting, probably influenced the timing of
AI's decision. The Provos have repeatedly exploited
AI's investigations of alleged human rights by security
forces in Northern Ireland in order to justify their own
continued campaign of terrorism.*
Problems Ahead
AI will have its hands full in trying to monitor
even a representative sampling of the more than 200 po-
litically violent groups currently operating in more
than 50 countries. Though its active membership is in-
creasing rapidly, the full-time AI staff numbers fewer
than 150 and the annual operating budget is less than
$5 million. Considerable resources will be needed just
to make initial contact with most of these groups; re-
liable information about them will be hard to obtain.
28 September 1979
25X1
25X1
25X1
25
Approved For Release 2004EZ2ET CIA-RDP80T00942A000500010009-0
 Approved For Release 2004/42!3CLA-RDP80T00942A000500010009-0
Al will probably seek to tackle the problem incre-
mentally, that is, by reporting on 10 to 20 groups this
year, on 50 to 60 next year, and so on. In choosing
which groups to monitor first, however, AI will lay it-
self open to more accusations of using double standards.
Many groups will object strongly if they are described
under the same general rubric as certain other groups,
and few groups will give any cooperation to AI investi-
gators if they know that they will be publicly identi-
fied as "terrorists." The organization thus may find
itself spending much time and energy in trying to clas-
sify politically violent groups into categories accept-
able to those groups.
On a more theoretical level, AI's condemnation of
the use of duress, including psychological duress, may
also have to be reconsidered. AI's traditional view,
set forth at length in its 1973 monograph entitled
Torture, was to reject the classic defense of the use of
duress ("We have in our hands a man who has planted a
bomb somewhere out in that city; it will go off in four
hours; would you not use every means to save the lives
of innocent people?") partly on the grounds that such an
extreme case would be very rare, and partly because it
would be difficult to set limits on the use of duress
once it were permitted at all. AI reasoned that duress
could then be logically justified for use "on people who
might plant bombs, or on people who might think of plant-
ing bombs, or on people who defend the kind of person
who might think of planting bombs."
25X1
Given the increasina use by terroriqtq of remote
control bombs he extreme 25X1
circumstance referred to in 1973 does not seem to be as
rare in 1979. Moreover, AI did not then address the
possibility, however remote it might seem even in 1979,
that some terrorist group might acquire a weapon of mass
destruction. For these reasons it is more difficult for
AI to defend the contention that regardless of what kind
of bomb is at issue or how many people will be killed,
the terrorist suspected of planting it cannot be coerced
28 September 1979
26
Approved For Release 2004/92 TCIA-RDP80T00942A000500010009-0
 Approved For Release 2004/JT CIA-RDP80T00942A000500010009-0
into revealing its location. Such a position would
seem to mock the respect for life implied in AI's oppo-
sition to the death penalty.
Confronting a Global Paradox
None of the above-mentioned practical and theoreti-
cal difficulties are likely to deflect Al from its in-
tended new course. On the contrary, the process of cop-
ing with them, added to AI's cumulative experience in
dealing with human rights abuses in a variety of set-
tings, almost certainly will give AI better understand-
ing of the sources of such abuses than it has often
shown in the past. In the early and mid-1970s its pub-
lications reflected a relatively one-dimensional per-
ception of the cause-and-effect relationship between
governmental abuses and the prevalence of political vio-
lence perpetrated by nonstate groups. Broadly put, and
with a few exceptions, AI maintained that such violence
was almost always the reaction to human rights abuses
and almost never caused them.
Were this interpretation generally valid, it would
logically follow that the worse a country's human rights
performance, the more likely it would be for the result-
ing political climate to nurture the growth of violent
opposition; conversely, the better the human rights re-
cord, the smaller the likelihood that such groups would
flourish. But AI's continuing investigations should
have suggested some time ago that the contrary is often
true. Of the 50 or more countries presently afflicted
with nonstate political violence, the overwhelming ma-
jority have either generally good or spotty human rights
records. At least 15 of these afflicted countries--for
example, several in Western Europe, as well as Colombia,
Israel, India, and Sri Lanka--fall into the generally
good category.
Regimes with poor human rights records, on the
other hand, are rarely so troubled. Where they are--for
example, in Afghanistan, Ethiopia, and Angola--it is
usually because the regimes have not yet fully consoli-
dated their power. Among Communist states, where the
regimes are well established, the one with the best human
rights record, Yugoslavia, is the one most often targeted
28 September 1979
27
Approved For Release 2004151 jji CIA-RDP80T00942A000500010009-0
 Approved For Release 2004A T CLA-RDP80T00942A000500010009-0
by terrorists (in this case from within emigre groups).
The threat to the Cuban regime from similar quarters is
relatively less serious.*
The cynic's gloss on this situation might be to
conclude that the better a country's human rights record,
the better the chances for political violence there.
A number of West European journalists, officials, and
academicians, contemplating the prevalence of terrorism
in their respective, democratic countries, have come
close to endorsing just that conclusion. After a series
of meetings on terrorism in 1977 and 1978, the Royal
United Services Institute for Defense Studies in London
offered this sweeping, mournful appraisal:
"Let us make no mistake about it: the
only victories that Terrorism has so far won
have been over liberal democracy. Thus, in
Holland, we have seen compassion strained to
its limits by further South Moluccan excesses;
in Germany, a still-young and somewhat uncer-
tain democracy has been shaken and injured by
the Schleyer murder, and the suicide of Andreas
Baader and his accomplices in circumstances
which throw grave doubts upon prison security
and the integrity of its administrators; in
Italy, the Red Brigades mock the state, and
the unfortunate Signor Moro has been but one
of their victims. The grim Ulster story, of
course, continues to unfold, despite revulsion
on both sides of the border. . . ."**
There is no reason to expect that Al would accept
this appraisal without considerable qualification. Most
AI leaders would regard it as politically too reaction-
ary and, in any case, as an inadequate reflection of the
recent role of politically violent groups outside West-
ern Europe--for example, in Nicaragua and Iran. What
28 September 1979
25X1
28
Approved For Release 2004/92t TCIA-RDP80T00942A000500010009-0
 Approved For Release 2004/ig+CIA-RDP80T00942A000500010009-0
seems more likely is that henceforth AI's judgments on
the human rights performance of both governments and
violent opposition groups will pay due regard to the
ways in which those prone to organized violence some-
times grossly abuse the freedoms guaranteed by their
governments.
25X1
28 September 1979
29
Approved For Release 2004/gi%iCIA-RDP80T00942A000500010009-0
 Approved For Release 2004BM2ET CIA-RDP80T00942A000500010009-0
25X1
Analyzing the Potential for Political Instability in
Developing Countries
From time to time the International Issues Divi-
sion publishes essays which attempt to construct con-
ceptual frameworks to guide the analysis of major
global political questions. One such issue that has
recently gained new currency is that of the potential
for political instability in developing countries.
The article that follows is a first attempt to lay out
an analytical framework with which an intelligence
analyst can better organize the questions that need to
be asked about how and why political instability oc-
curs in major developing countries. In a few cases
the hope of policymakers may be that greater under-
standing of the roots of instability in a particular
country may help the United States take actions to re-
duce it or to influence its outcome. A more realistic
expectation, however, is that deeper insight into the
potential for political instability in a country will
better prepare the United States to comprehend the
kind of political change that may occur, its possible
timing, and its probable consequences.
Questions and comments about the ideas in the
article are invited so that our future efforts to cope
with the analytical problems posed by this issue and
to apply the concepts to country-specific analyses can
be improved.
Introduction
The purpose of this paper is to propose a framework
for analyzing how and why political instability develops,
for detecting signs of its occurrence, and for identify-
ing gaps in critical information. Political instability
is, of course, a vague term. As used in this paper, it
will refer to acute societal tensions that signal a po-
tential for drastic, often revolutionary change in the
political values and rules by which a country is governed,
its economy is organized, its social classes are struc-
tured, or its external relations are conducted. Lower
28 September 1979
30
Approved For Release 2004 1 . T CIA-RDP80T00942A000500010009-0
 Approved For Release 2004/q~TCIA-RDP80T00942A000500010009-0
levels of political turmoil are included as a subject
of analysis only to the extent that they are harbingers
or triggers of sweeping change rather than relatively
normal events in the political life of the country. In
fact, one of the most difficult but important analytical
tasks in dealing with political instability is develop-
ing the capability to distinguish between occurrences of
turmoil (for example, riots, demonstrations, frequent
changes of government) that are indicators of a potential
collapse of a system and those that are endemic to rou-
tine political life.
The approach suggested in this paper is to develop
a systematic set of questions that can be used as a
guide for analysis of any country. To be useful as a
guide, the questions need to be comprehensive and direct
attention to all aspects of a society, so that the pos-
sibility of overlooking an important source of instabil-
ity is reduced. They should also be logically related
to each other in two senses. First, any set of questions
that seeks to be comprehensive and coherent has to flow
from underlying central assumptions about what generally
causes political instability. Second, the framework of
questions should be organized systematically so that
they lead analytically from the general to the specific.
That is, answers to questions at one level of generality
will assist the analyst frame new, more specific ques-
tions that will help organize and elucidate the data
available at the moment of analysis.
Outline of the Framework
For the purposes of this paper the central assump-
tions are as follows: political instability of the kind
that results in revolutionary political change is caused
by a relative increase in demands by societal groups for
goods and services or for relief from what are perceived
to be intolerable political or economic burdens, with
which the governing elite cannot successfully cope.*
The governing elite refers to that group of people which controls
the essential machinery of government for making and carrying out
social, economic, and political policy. A relative increase in de-
mands can occur either because new groups enter the political arena
and/or existing groups gain new power, or the government's resource
generating and distributing capabilities deteriorate so that demands
which were previously sucessfully dealt with can no longer be met.
28 September 1979
31
Approved For Release 2004/]2T CIA-RDP80T00942A000500010009-0
 Approved For Release 2004/W T CLA-RDP80T00942A000500010009-0
Incompetent or unresponsive government performance then
leads to increasing disbelief in the government's right
to require obedience. The questions outlined below to
guide analysis examine the context within which the de-
mands are made; the nature, strength, and interaction of
the groups that make them; and the capacities of the
government and its associated allies to cope with them.*
A. The Context
1. What aspects of the physical endowment of
the country (for example, size, territorial compo-
sition, geographic location, boundaries, pattern
of population distribution, and so on) might have
an effect on the particular kinds of political
stress to which the country may be predisposed?
2. What are the cultural and historical fact-
ors that influence how demands and needs are ex-
pressed in the society, the political impact they
will have, and the likelihood the government can
meet them?
a. How strong are ethnic, religious, or
regional differences in the society? Do they
tend to reinforce or run counter to economic
or social class differences?
b. What are the basic patterns of author-
ity at various levels in the society (for ex-
ample, family, institutional, government)? Are
they roughly congruent?
Because the approach suggested here focuses on organized groups as
agents of the pressures for change that lead to instability and on
the strategies and institutional capacities of governments to cope
with these pressures for change, the framework offered may be more
suitable for analyzing the potential for instability in relatively
advanced developing countries than those that are at a lower level of
development. These, however, are the countries usually of most con-
cern to the United States in that whether they are politically sta-
ble or unstable will often directly affect vital US interests.
28 September 1979
32
Approved For Release 2004/12 MT CIA-RDP80T00942A000500010009-0
 Approved For Release 2004/121 TCIA-RDP80T00942A000500010009-0
c. What are the traditional sources of
legitimacy for ruling authorities? How easy
or hard is it for an authority to lose basic
support from other elites? From the masses?
d. What are the normal and generally ac-
cepted rules of the game for politics? How
effective are they for dealing with new groups?
e. To what degree are personal grievances
commonly translated into political demands?
What is the level of tolerance for imperfect
government performance?
f. What is the traditional level of po-
litical violence in the society? How accept-
able is it as a political tool?
g. What is the traditional level of cor-
ruption in the society? Does it have a politi-
cal function?
3. What are the major external influences on
the country that might stimulate new demands on the
government or affect its ability to perform?
a. How integrated is the country's economy
into the regional or global economies? What
are the most likely kinds of external economic
shocks that could create major internal politi-
cal repercussions? What kinds of developments
could shore up a government?
b. What are the strength and nature of
the country's strategic significance to stronger
neighbors or to major world powers, and what
is the likelihood that these external powers
will attempt to exert influence on the country's
political or economic life?
c. To what extent is the society subject
to foreign social, political, or intellectual
influences? Do these external influences tend
to support the values of the governing elite
or run counter to them?
28 September 1979
33
Approved For Release 2004/TAUT CIA-RDP80T00942A000500010009-0
 Approved For Release 20041: CIA-RDP80T00942A000500010009-0
Commentary
The purpose of studying the geopolitical, historico-
cultural, and external context within which present day
political, economic, and social activity takes place is
primarily to establish baselines from which the meaning
of observed events and trends--as they relate to the
chances of political upheaval--can be better understood.
It is useful, for example, to know that the incidence of
political violence in a country is increasing, but it is
extremely difficult to use this fact as an indicator of
significant political instability unless there is some
prior understanding of the capacity of the political
culture to absorb political violence in the past.
Similarly, a measure of current economic discontent
takes on much more analytical usefulness if it can be
viewed against background knowledge of the traditional
level of political intensity in the society. A politi-
cally relatively passive people, for instance, are less
likely to translate personal grievances into organized
political demands and are more easily co-opted by those
in power than the population of a more politically in-
tense society.
Two other good benchmarks for judging the likeli-
hood for political instability are knowledge of patterns
of authority and sources of legitimacy in a society.
Both can give some indication as to significance of ob-
served or prospective changes in government. In the
first case, a potential source of instability can be
spotted if it appears that a new government's basic
authority pattern (for example, competitive and demo-
cratic) is noticeably different from the authority
patterns (for example, patronal and hierarchical) at
other levels in the society. In the second instance,
knowing what have been the most important reasons why
people have obeyed their rulers in the past will con-
tribute to estimating what kinds and what level of stress
will be necessary for a people to deny the legitimacy
of their present regime.
B. The Internal Forces For and A ainst Change
1. General factors that affect the availabil-
ity of members for and rate of politicization of
groups advocating or resisting change:
28 September 1979
34
Approved For Release 2004 T: CIA-RDP80T00942A000500010009-0
 Approved For Release 2004/1?,TCIA-RDP80T00942A000500010009-0
a. What kinds of social changes are oc-
curring that might expand the number of people
concerned with, or change their attitudes to-
ward, government performance? This might in-
clude changes in educational levels, social and
economic mobility, internal migration patterns
(such as urbanization), and communications
patterns.
b. What kinds of economic changes are oc-
curring that might generally affect the needs
or demands of the politically relevant popula-
tion or expand the number affected by govern-
ment economic decisions? This might include
major increases or decreases in available in-
come or wealth (such as land), new patterns of
income and wealth distribution, and changes in
productivity and investment.
2. Specific factors which affect the capacities
of groups to stimulate or resist change and which
affect their interaction:
a. What groups have traditionally levied
demands on the government?
b. What new politically active groups
have recently appeared, or are soon likely to
emerge, that will compete for societal resources?
What outlets exist through which their demands
or needs can be expressed?
c. What is the intensity of concern, co-
hesiveness, degree of popular support, and
ability to influence government decisions of
each of the above groups?
ship?
d. What is the quality of their leader-
e. What is the rate, direction, and type
of interaction among these politically relevant
groups? What is the net effect of their inter-
action with respect to increasing or decreasing
pressure on the government?
28 September 1979
35
Approved For Release 2004/51 R?T CIA-RDP80T00942A000500010009-0
 Approved For Release 2004U MC: CJA-RDP80T00942A000500010009-0
f. What is the attitude of each group on
the efficacy and effectiveness of the govern-
ment? What is the net effect of their inter-
action on attitudes about efficacy and effec-
tiveness?
g. What is the attitude of each group on
the legitimacy of the government? What is the
net effect of their interaction on beliefs
about legitimacy?
Commentary
This portion of the analysis focuses on the actual
forces for or against change in a society as contrasted
with the first section which attempts to establish the
boundaries and context within which the activities of
these forces take place. For the purposes of this analy-
sis, these forces are defined as groups of politically
active or responsive individuals who have common griev-
ances or needs that they attempt to satisfy by making
demands on the government for organizational, symbolic,
or material resources.
The approach suggested here is to ask two sets of
questions. The answers to the first set should shed
light on the societal conditions which tend to precipi-
tate the formation of these groups. The second set
should reveal how politically potent they are both in-
dividually and, in particular, as they interact. Analy-
sis of the groups should indicate not only the kinds of
needs they have and the strength with which they levy
demands on government but should also uncover the beliefs
they have about the efficacy and effectiveness of the
government. Efficacy, in this approach, refers to the
capacity of a governing elite to specify solutions to
the basic problems facing its particular society (that
is, the perceived wisdom of decisions of government
leaders), while effectiveness refers to the government's
ability to actually implement the policies it formulates
and to achieve desired results.
The final step in this part of the analysis is to
assess the attitudes and behavior of groups as they re-
late to the groups' perceptions of the government's
legitimacy, or its right to require obedience. This
28 September 1979
36
Approved For Release 2004IR2T CIA-RDP80T00942A000500010009-0
 Approved For Release 2004/i21 'CIA RDP80T00942A000500010009-0
assessment should be based on an appreciation of to what
degree the government is capable of drawing upon tradi-
tional sources of legitimacy in the society in addition
to how well it seems to be satisfying the demands and
aspirations of each group. As with other parts of the
analysis, the work will be most revealing if it demon-
strates the rapidity and direction of change in a group's
position or behavior rather than attitudes or actions
at isolated moments. It will also be most useful when
it deals with the impact of groups on each other since
the movement toward breakdown in political stability is
almost always cumulative and is more than the arithmetic
sum of strength of demands and level of dissatisfaction
with regime performance for any single group.
C. The Capacity of Government To Cope With Press-
ures for Change or To Implement Change
1. How much of a strategy does the government
have for the development and use of resources and
power in its society?
a. What are the values on which this
strategy is based? Do they tend toward pro-
moting radical change or toward maintaining
traditional forms? To what extent do they
tend to coincide or conflict with the values
of important pressure groups?
b. What are the key policy tradeoffs the
government faces and how well does government
decisionmaking deal with them?
c. How congruent are the political, eco-
nomic, and social components of the strategy?
How compatible are the government's domestic
and foreign policy goals?
2. What institutional capacities does the
government need in order to cope successfully with
pressures for change?
a. To what extent has it been able to
strengthen existing institutions or develop
new ones to stimulate the changes it desires?
28 September 1979
37
Approved For Release 2004/1TCIA-RDP80T00942A000500010009-0
 Approved For Release 2004t MM CJA-RDP80T00942A000500010009-0
b. Has it been able to develop the capa-
city it needs to block or modify changes it does
not desire?
c. Does it have the institutional capacity
successfully to adapt its policies and programs
to unavoidable changes coming from either the
domestic or the foreign environment?
Commentary
In order to limit the level of political instability
so that its own existence is not threatened, a govern-
ment must develop the capacity to regulate the activity
of and to create and distribute resources among competing
societal groups. This competition is generally for
limited resources and usually takes place between those
which are already politically powerful and the many new
groups which, in societies undergoing significant pres-
sures for change, are becoming politically aware.
The choices that a government must make in coping
with what is often a rapidly escalating level of demand
for resources usually have both short-term and longer
term consequences which are often in conflict. In judg-
ing the likelihood of political instability, then, one
of the most important aspects of the analysis is to ex-
amine whether the government has a strategy with which
to organize its choices. A strategy is, in essence, a
framework or plan within which the difficult governing
decisions can be made about how and where to concentrate
scarce resources, which groups shall pay in the short
run and which shall benefit, and how to motivate (by in-
centive or threat) the support from the population gen-
erally that is necessary to generate new resources to
meet the growing demands.
In examining the government's strategy it is useful
to focus on three general questions. First, how radical
is the change in values and priorities proposed by the
government's strategy from that of its immediate prede-
cessor? Dramatic changes in the desired distribution
of political and economic power or in the structuring
of foreign relations are likely to place considerable
strain on the government's control of its situation be-
cause of the discontinuities thus created. A second
28 September 1979
38
Approved For Release 2004~W CIA-RDP80T00942A000500010009-0
 Approved For Release 2004/IgaZj CIA-RDP80T00942A000500010009-0
question to consider is what are the most important
dilemmas the society faces, given its existing political
and economic situation, and does the strategy recognize
and attempt to deal with them? The most common dilemmas
include key tradeoffs between such choices as consuming
existing wealth today or investing for future growth,
distributing existing wealth more evenly among individ-
uals or groups or concentrating it in the hands of those
judged most capable of multiplying it, whether to permit
the acceleration of popular economic and political par-
ticipation in the modernizing sectors of society or to
contain participation so that ability to make decisions
about allocation of opportunities and benefits does not
break down, and what balance to seek between striving
for national unity and permitting some degree of politi-
cal or economic autonomy by regional or ethnic separat-
ist groups.
A final area to examine is the degree of congruency
among the political, economic, and social parts of a
government's strategy. Economic decisions that insuf-
ficiently consider the amount of political opposition
they are likely to create are a harbinger of political
instability, as are political decisions that unwittingly
reduce the amount of economic resources available for
distribution or investment.
In addition to a relatively comprehensive strategy,
perceptions of a government's efficacy and effectiveness
depend upon its ability to develop the institutional
capacities--for decisionmaking and decision enforcement--
necessary to translate the strategy into discrete actions.
Some of these capacities involve bringing about changes
designed to advance values that the government supports
and can result in either strengthening existing institu-
tions (such as the educational system) or creating new
ones (such as new planning capabilities). Others in-
volve blocking or modifying undesired influence, such
as disruptive political activity by groups hostile to
the government. A third kind of capacity is the ability
to adapt policies to changes in the environment which
are essentially not avoidable, such as sharp movements
in international terms of trade or crop losses because
of bad weather.
28 September 1979
39
Approved For Release 2004/gg%iCIA-RDP80T00942A000500010009-0
 Approved For Release 200OWNP CIA-RDP80T00942A000500010009-0
In each case the improved institutional capacity is
important for projecting governmental effectiveness in
individual policy areas. With regard to political sta-
bility, which is generally a longer term proposition, a
detailed analysis of the trend in the government's in-
stitutional capacity can provide insight into three
other elements leading to maintenance in office. First,
a general sign that a government will succeed in staying
in power is evidence that it is extending its reach from
the center to the periphery through institutions that
engage more and more of the population cooperatively or,
in some cases, coercively. Second, an improving insti-
tutional capacity contributes to government stability
by providing a high degree of policy continuity. The
predictability of policy helps to stimulate cooperation
by key groups, even if grudgingly by those who are forced
to make sacrifices when they see they have little other
choice. Finally, a growing capacity to expand or create
new institutions is almost always necessary to foster
steady economic growth. Success in the economic realm
contributes to political stability by helping to estab-
lish the legitimacy of the government and its strategy,
by providing rewards for cooperative groups, and by low-
ering the level of strife caused by competition for
scarce resources.
25X1
28 September 1979
40
Approved For Release 20048M2I! CIA-RDP80T00942A000500010009-0
 Secret
Approved For Release 2004/12/22 : CIA-RDP80T00942A000500010009-0
Secret
Approved For Release 2004/12/22 : CIA-RDP80T00942A000500010009-0