INTERNATIONAL ISSUES REVIEW

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP80T00942A000500010003-6
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 35
• Document Creation Date: December 20, 2016
• Document Release Date: August 3, 2005
• Sequence Number: 3
• Publication Date: May 31, 1979
• Content Type: REPORT

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Foreign V
Av
Assessment
Center
International
Issues Review
31 May 1979
State Department review completed
Secret
PA IlR 79-005
31 May 1979
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INTERNATIONAL ISSUES REVIEW
31 May 1979
CONTENTS
ARMS TRANSFER AND ARMS CONTROL
LITTORAL STATE ATTITUDES TOWARD INDIAN OCEAN
ARMS CONTROL . . . . .
The littoral states want to limit US and So-
viet military presence in the Indian ocean
and establish a regional "Zone of Peace," but
they will probably have difficulty harmoniz-
ing their different approaches to these goals
at their first formal meeting in July. 25X1
THE COMMITTEE ON DISARMAMENT CHARTS ITS
COURSE . . . . . . . . . . .
The newly formed Committee on Disarmament re-
cently set its 1979 agenda, which appears to
favor the West to the detriment of the Com-
munist and nonaligned states.
Turmoil in Indochina and Iran is causing
ASEAN states to review their individual se-
curity policies with the. result that they may
turn to the US or, if disappointed, to other
ASEAN-US RELATIONS: SECURITY ASSISTANCE
countries for the additional security assist-
ance they believe they need.
INTERNATIONAL COMMUNICATIONS
CHINA AND THE WORLD ADMINISTRATIVE RADIO
CONFERENCE . . . . . . . . . . 24
This is the first in a series of articles that
will review key issues and country attitudes
toward the World Administrative Radio Confer-
ence in September.
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TERRORISM
LIBYA'S CHANGING ROLE AS A PATRON STATE
Qadhafi has modified his country's role as a
patron of international terrorism directed at
the West, but he still underwrites Arab guer-
rillas as well as other Third World "national
liberation" groups.
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Littoral State Attitudes Toward Indian Ocean
Arms Control
Arms control in the Indian Ocean centers on two
general objectives:
-- A negotiated limitation of the US and Soviet
military presence.
-- Establishment by the regional states of a
"Zone of Peace."
For several reasons, the Indian Ocean littoral states
will probably express their views on these topics more
forcefully during the coming months than before. Even
though nearly all of them voice support for a zone of
peace and the eventual exclusion of the superpower
military presence, their positions on specific issues
vary considerably. They will thus have difficulty in
harmonizing their views at the first formal meeting of
Indian Ocean littoral and hinterland states, to be
held in early July.
During the last decade, there has been both a grad-
ual buildup of Soviet and US military presence in the
Indian Ocean and an acceleration of multilateral diplo-
macy intended to remove or limit this presence. Littoral
states have become increasingly discontented with the
lack of progress in the US-Soviet negotiations on the
Indian Ocean that were suspended in February 1978. The
USSR has abetted this discontent by voting in favor of
the last two zone of peace resolutions in the UN General
Assembly and publicly blaming the United states for the
lack of progress. The Iranian revolution and the recent
deployment of a Us carrier task force to the Indian Ocean,
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together with continuing conflict in the Horn of Africa
and the Yemens, have further heightened the interest of
the littoral states in the superpowers' intentions in
the area., Against this backdrop, preparations for the
meeting in July have already be un in the UN Ad Hoc
Committee on the Indian Ocean.
Security Concerns of Individual States
Littoral state attitudes toward Indian ocean arms
control vary because of the complexity of the issues in-
volved and because many of these states consider the
subject secondary to more parochial security concerns:
-- Australia shares most US interests but. has
special concerns about US freedom of action
to defend Western Australia.
-- Members of the Association of Southeast Asian
Nations (ASEAN) are active in regional arms
control efforts but are more interested in
Southeast Asia than in the entire Indian
Ocean. They favor a continued US presence
to offset Soviet forces in the region.
-- South Asian littoral states' views reflect
India's dominance in the region. India strongly
supports removal of the superpowers' presence,
and the other littoral states are more ambiva-
lent and increasingly look to outside powers
to check India's ambitions.
-- Iran's new government probably will become
more active in supporting nonaligned themes,
including a zone of peace.
-- Moderate Arab states like Egypt and Saudi
Arabia are apprehensive about Soviet inten-
tions and desire a continued, although not
conspicuous, US presence in the area.
-- Radical Arab regimes are partial to a con-
tinue Soviet military presence in the
Indian Ocean. South Yemen favors, and
Iraq tolerates, such a presence in order
to counter US support of the moderate
states.
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-- African states have widely varied ideologies,
and their views are shaped by conflicts in
the Horn, Uganda, and Southern Africa. On
Indian ocean issues, they tend to support
whatever great power supports positions of
concern to them.
-- The island republics have-diverse ideologies
but share a high interest in Indian ocean
arms control.
Responses to US-Soviet Negotiations
Because the littoral states resent their exclusion
from the bilateral negotiations, they will probably con-
tinue to criticize the talks even if they show progress.
Public attitudes of many littoral states toward the bi-
lateral talks di from their private views, however.
If the United States formally terminated the talks,
littoral state rhetoric on the subject would change
little, probably becoming only somewhat more critical
of the United States. Resumption of the negotiations
would dampen criticism of the superpowers only slightly
and would not preempt efforts to involve regional states
more directly in Indian ocean arms control. Although
virtually all littoral states would acknowledge a US-
Soviet agreement as a positive step, the extent of public
enthusiasm would chiefly depend on whether the agreement:
Committed the superpowers to future reduction
and eventual elimination of their military
presence, rather than merely freezing the
level of forces in the Indian Ocean.
-- Provided for littoral state participation in
regional arms control, and preferably accepted
the concept of a zone of peace and the need
for a full-scale conference on the Indian Ocean
in the near future.
Private attitudes toward a resumption or termina-
tion of the talks or a bilateral agreement would depend
more on the balance between US and Soviet forces in that
region. Further setbacks in the talks would disappoint
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moderate littoral states that wish to control arms in
the region and restrain their radical neighbors from
taking more extreme positions. These same states would
welcome a resumption of negotiations but would look for
signs--particularly in the two superpowers' naval activ-
ity--that the United States was becoming unwilling to
counter the Soviet presence in the region. Their desire
for reassurance in this regard might lead most of them
to view US termination of the talks as the best response
to any further buildup of Soviet forces in the Indian
25X1 Ocean.
Littoral states have a special interest in issues
in the bilateral negotiations that either involve possi-
ble military activity on their own territories or that
have been specifically mentioned in multilateral diplo-
macy on the Indian Ocean. Australia, for example, is
keenly interested in the superpowers' definition of the
region, that is, the extent of the waters around Australia
that would be subject to an agreement. Several pro-
Western states would view with concern any restriction
on the use of land-based strike aircraft. Even more
states would be interested in the utilization of facili-
ties by US and Soviet warships, and most of them would
support the US position that utilization of a port be-
yond routine port calls should be defined and limited.
Diplomacy of the Zone of Peace Concept
The proposal for an Indian Ocean zone of peace is
part of the general demand for greater progress in dis-
armament that the less developed countries (LDCs) have
made on the industrialized world and thus has broad sup-
port among LDCs, including those outside the Indian Ocean
region. There are significant differences among the
littoral states, however, on the meaning of a zone of
25X1 peace. Such a definition will be based on a 1971 UN
General Assembl resolution,, but that document is only
a framework.
The littoral states agree to the eventual exclusion
from the Indian Ocean of any great power military presence.
There is disagreement, however, on:
-- The definition of military presence (should
it include such activities as intelligence
gathering).
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The limits of the zone (should it include
the littoral and hinterland states, as
well as all foreign controlled islands).
The timing of great power withdrawal (either a
freeze on deployments and a graduated reduc-
tion of forces, or immediate withdrawal).
There is more serious disagreement over the extent
of the restriction of littoral state military activity.
Such disagreement is manifested most clearly in Paki-
stan's proposal--rejected by India--that the littoral
states should maintain forces in a "reasonable ratio"
to those of their neighbors and in the questions of es-
tablishing an Indian Ocean collective security system
and a regional code of conduct. The disagreement stems
from differences in military strength and concern about
the intentions of countries excluded from the zone of
peace or deliberations on it (for example, the concerns
of ASEAN over Vietnam, India over China, the Arab states
over Israel, the Frontline States over South Africa).
The littoral states generally agree that great power
military withdrawal should include the exclusion from
the Indian Ocean of foreign nuclear weapons. Pakistan,
however, has argued that a zone of peace should include
a binding renunciation of nuclear weapons by the littoral
states. Most other littoral states believe that nuclear
proliferation should be examined in a broad context that
includes the need to reduce the nuclear arsenals of the
superpowers. They would, therefore, probably oppose a
formulation that placed them under a special nonprolifera-
Although the meeting in July is intended to harmonize
the views of littoral states, the task will be difficult.
The document currently being prepared for the meeting
is a declaration that will probably be little more spe-
cific than the resolution in 1971 of the UN General As-
sembly--particularly in regard to the obligations of
littoral states. Some littoral states, especially India
and Australia, which believe that negotiation of specifics
should be deferred to an Indian Ocean conference or to
a time when all great powers are ready to accept a zone
of peace, would find such a result satisfactory. There
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may be some pressure to set a date (perhaps as early as 25X1
1980) for a conference, but both the disagreements among
the littoral states and the reservations of the great
powers will encourage further delay.
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25X1
The initial three-month meeting in Geneva of the
new Committee on Disarmament (CD), which ended on 27
April, was devoted mostly to writing the Committee's
agenda. The agenda received this attention because it
became a vehicle for debating the Committee's proper
relationship with other multilateral bodies and the
degree of its involvement in the negotiation of arms
control agreements. This debate, an extension of one
that took place a year ago at the UN General Assem-
bly's Special Session on Disarmament, was also part of
a broader contest for influence in the disarmament
The Committee on Disarmament Charts Its Course
process.
Nonaligned Objectives
The nonaligned states had most strongly favored re-
forming the CCD. Its metamorphosis into the CD, which
included an expansion of membership and abolition of the
'The CCD was one of a series of bodies designated as multilateral
negotiating forums for disarmament. It replaced the Eighteen-Na-
tion Disarmament Committee in 1969 and held its final session last
year.
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The agenda that was adopted is structured to ac-
commodate a variety of concerns, but is generally more
favorable to the West than to the Soviet bloc or the
nonaligned states. The issues that underlay the agen-
da contest have not been resolved and will probably
resurface in the future. The result suggests, how-
ever, that the new committee--like its predecessor,
the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament
(CCD)%,--will deliberate more than it will negotiate.
That is, it will discuss arms control issues but will
be less important in the writing of agreements than
more restricted East-West forums. 25X1
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US-Soviet cochairmanship, appeared to give the nonaligned
countries a greater opportunity to influence its work.
To profit from this opportunity, the nonaligned states
approached the initial CD session with three principal
objectives:
-- To make the CD a true negotiating body, rather
than a mere deliberative appendage to negotia-
tions among the major powers.
-- To strengthen the Committee's link to the UN
General Assembly, whose broad membership and
voting produce decisions that usually lean
far toward the nonaligned viewpoint.
-- To establish the Committee's competence to ad-
dress a broad range of disarmament issues.
The first objective implies a short agenda--a manage-
able list of topics on which the CD could realistically
expect to make progress in the near future. The second
objective implies that these, topics should be tied to
decisions of the UN General Assembly. Accordingly, the
Group of 21 (the nonaligned caucus in the CD) prepared
a preliminary draft agenda containing only seven sub-
stantive items, all but one of which were keyed to reso-
lutions of the 33rd UN General Assembly. 25X1
A more extensive agenda, however, would better es-
tablish the committee's right to examine a large number
of issues. These conflicting goals generated a split in
nonaligned ranks. Several members of the Group of 21
were dissatisfied with the preliminary draft agenda be-
cause they had wanted to include most of the program of
action adopted by the Special Session and obtain a broad
definition of CD authority. Others believed that a more
selective agenda was required to make the new negotiat-
ing body work.
Eastern and Western Objectives
Although neither the Western group nor the Soviet
Bloc shares the desire of the Group of 21 to make the CD
both wide-ranging and influential, they took sharply
contrasting approaches toward the agenda. The East pre-
sented a draft with three specific items and maintained
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that all items should be subject to discussion this year.
The West favored a long, general agenda to serve as a
semipermanent menu from which topics could be selected
in drawing up each year's work program.
Differences within the Western group were over in-
dividual agenda items, rather than the document's overall
form and length. The most contentious of these was veri-
fication; the Netherlands wanted, and the US resisted,
language that could be taken as support for the Dutch
proposal of establishing an international agency to moni-
tor arms control agreements. A compromise, included in
the Western draft agenda, referred more generally to
"appropriate international verification methods and pro-
The long Western draft included several items not
found in the provisional nonaligned draft: conventional
weapons, regional disarmament, verification, arms control
in outer space, and confidence-building and other collat-
eral measures. The introduction states that the agenda
only "took into account" the proposals of committee mem-
bers and recommendations of the UN General Assembly,
rather than being "based exclusively" on them as was the
Group of 21's draft. It also described the individual
items as subjects "to consider" in "its future work at
appropriate stages," and made no commitment to debate
any one of them at a particular session.
The Solution: The Three-Level Agenda
To bridge the differences within the Group of 21,
and between it and the other groups, Mexican Ambassador
Garcia Robles proposed a three-part document, to include:
-- An introductory statement of the subjects the
committee considered itself competent to ad-
dress (the "decalogue").
-- The subjects to be considered in 1979.
-- A work program for the first portion of the
1979 session.
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Garcia Robles' formula was cumbersome but was adopted
because it accommodated the variety of objectives at stake,
or at least permitted the more contentious of the issues
imbedded in the agenda debate to be sidestepped for the
time being.* The "decalogue" satisfied those who wanted
to place on the record a broad mandate for the CD even
if some of the subjects were not ripe for negotiation.
The items are worded in such general terms that none can
be tied to a particular initiative that would be insup-
portable to some states. The separate annual agenda de-
fers to those who believe a negotiating body should.con-
centrate annually on only a portion of its mandate. The
agenda lists items that "would be considered" in conform-
ity with the CD's rules of procedure--ambiguous wording
that enables the West to maintain the distinction between
the agenda and the work program but still permits the
interpretation that every agenda item would at least be
"considered" this year. 25X1
Specific Items
Because some issues are difficult to phrase without
implying how they ought to be resolved, a debate on an
agenda can often slide into one on substance. Agreement
on the overall form of the CD's agenda opened the way for
such debates on several specific items. 25X1
One such issue was a nuclear test ban. Discussion
indirectly raised the questions of peaceful nuclear ex-
plosions (PNEs), and Chinese and French adherence. to a
test ban agreement. The West favored the wording "com-
prehensive test ban," but the USSR preferred a reference
to a "general". ban (that is, including China and France)
on nuclear "weapons" testing (that is, excluding PNEs).
India's compromise language--"nuclear test ban"--was
finally adopted.
A similar disagreement concerned. nuclear disarmament.
The USSR wanted this item to incorporate the Soviet,pro-
posal for negotiations on the production and stockpiling
of nuclear weapons that had been introduced in the commit-
tee in early February. The Group of 21 included the
Soviet proposal in its draft, but, the West opposed spe-
cific reference to it. The committee eventually agreed
*The final agenda is reproduced in the annex to this article.
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to the neutral phrase, "cessation of the nuclear arms
race and nuclear disarmament," which mentioned neither
the Soviet initiative nor a proposal, included in the
Western draft, of a production cutoff of fissionable
material for weapons purposes.
The final issue of debate was whether to make ex-
plicit mention of verification methods in the decalogue.
The USSR argued that the subject could not be discussed
separately. France, however, which had already agreed
in the Western group to forgo a specific reference to
its proposal for an international verification agency,
insisted that it could. The Soviets tried to use the
"neutron bomb" as a bargaining chip and offered not to
press for a reference to it, if the West would concede
on verification. Mexico proposed a package deal whereby
the issue of the neutron bomb would be left out of the
agenda and verification would be relegated to a chair-
man's interpretative statement about "collateral meas-
ures." The United States maintained, however, that a
reference to the neutron bomb was totally unacceptable
and could not be considered as a trade-off for anything.
The French were adamant about including verification in
the decalogue itself, and the Soviets, who were probably
reluctant to offend them on the eve of President Giscard's 25X1
visit to Moscow, acquiesced to a reference to verific -
tion methods "acceptable to all parties concerned."
Reasons for the Outcome
The structure of the CD agenda appears at first
glance to defer to nonaligned wishes. The decalogue
defines the committee's mandate broadly, and the annual
agenda contains only five substantive items. Closer
inspection, however, reveals that its content is more
satisfactory to Western states: It is not based on UN
General Assembly resolutions, and the items are worded
in the most general possible terms, with no explicit
mention of Soviet or nonaligned proposals.
This outcome was partly due to disunity in the
Group of 21. The nonaligned were divided on the over-
all objectives to be emphasized and on specific issues.
Some members opposed cataloguing all UN General Assembly
stands on disarmament because they were opposed to some
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of the Assembly resolutions and wanted to keep the agenda
manageable. Others spoke in plenary session in favor of
topics that had already been discarded in the Group of
21's caucus (for example, Mexico's discussion on re-
gional disarmament.) Greater harmony existed within the
Western group; even France, an assertive committee mem-
ber, avoided positions far removed from those of its
allies.
To a large extent, the outcome was an unavoidable
product of the logic of agenda-writing, which often re-
quires vague language or outright omission to avoid a
stalemate over substantive issues. In other words, an
agreed agenda is a least common denominator. This is
why the 1979 CD agenda contains few items and why the
are worded in such general terms. 25X1
Implications of the Outcome
The agenda fight demonstrated how nonaligned partic-
ipation in disarmament is limited by fundamental East-
West differences. In most debates on specific issues,
the nonaligned members were spectators or, at most, medi-
ators. For nonaligned states to insist that a major
power accept language that it finds unacceptable on an
issue like nuclear testing ignores the realities that
have so far prevented an agreement on the subject. The
Group of 21 did insist on a cosmetic change to the. veri-
fication item, but this was merely a showing of the flag
to emphasize that the nonaligned states still yearn to
participate meaningfully in CD decisions. 125X1
Once the decalogue and the annual agenda were com-
plete, the work program for the first portion of the
1979 session was easily adopted. This was chiefly be-
cause the battle over the annual agenda left only seven
working days before the CD recessed. It was also due
to a general reluctance to reopen any of the issues that
the Committee had belabored. An attempt by the USSR and
its allies to reintroduce the language of Moscow's nuclear
weapons proposal quickly died from lack of support, and
the more general language from the annual agenda was
used for the work program as well. 25X1
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Writing a work program will probably not be as easy
for the summer portion of the 1979 session, which opens on
12 June. Disagreement over the CD's proper role has been
deferred, not resolved. There is still pressure to in-
volve the Committee more directly in the negotiation of
agreements, particularly one that deals with chemical
weapons.
Nevertheless, the agenda points to a CD that, like
the CCD, will be a deliberative forum more than a nego-
tiating body. The agenda permits members to discuss
their favorite proposals and to ignore those of others.
The members of the Group of 21 have undoubtedly reached
a similar conclusion; they have seen that their disunity
and division--not collusion--between the superpowers re-
sulted in the failure to chart a more precise course for
the Committee. They may have already lowered their hopes
for what the Committee can achieve and consequently might
look more to the larger Disarmament Commission and the
UN General Assembly to convey their messages on disarma-
ment. The USSR, which failed to gain more attention for
its proposal on nuclear weapons, is also less likely to
carry out any plans it had to make more extensive use
of the CD. It will probably continue the conservative
approach it took in the CCD--that is, seek mainly to
minimize any damage that the multilateral body might
do to Moscow's image or to the security objectives it
pursues in negotiations with the United States.
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AGENDA OF THE COMMITTEE ON DISARMAMENT
The Committee on Disarmament, as the multilateral negotiating forum, shall promote the attainment of
general and complete disarmament under effective international control.
(DECALOGUE)
The Committee, taking into account, inter alia, the relevant provisions of the final document of the first
Special Session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament, will deal with the cessation of the arms race
and disarmament and other relevant measures in the following areas:
Nuclear weapons in all aspects.
Chemical weapons.
Other weapons of mass destruction.
Conventional weapons.
Reduction of military budgets.
Reduction of Armed Forces.
Disarmament and development.
Disarmament and international security.
IX. Collateral measures; confidence-building measures; effective verification methods in relation to
appropriate disarmament measures, acceptable to all parties concerned.
X. Comprehensive program of disarmament leading to general and complete disarmament under effective
international control.
(1979 AGENDA)
Within the above framework, the Committee on Disarmament adopts the following agenda for 1979 which
includes items that, in conformity with the provisions of Section VIII of its Rules of Procedure, would be
considered by the Committee:
2. Cessation of the. nuclear arms race and nuclear disarmament.
3. Effective international arrangements to assure nonnuclear weapon states against the use or threat of use of
nuclear weapons.
4. Chemical weapons.
5. New types of weapons of mass destruction and new systems of such weapons; radiological weapons.
6. Consideration and adoption of the annual report and any other report as appropriate to the General
Assembly of the United Nations.
(WORK PROGRAM)
In compliance with Rule 28 of its Rules of Procedure, the Committee also adopts the following program of
work for the first part of its 1979 session:
1. Cessation of the nuclear arms race and nuclear disarmament: April 19-23.
2. Chemical weapons: April 24-27.
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ASEAN-US Relations: Security Assistance
During the last six months, turmoil in Iran and
Indochina has given impetus to reexaminations of in-
dividual security policies by each of the five member
governments of the Association of Southeast Asian
Nations--Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, Singa-
pore, and Thailand. Defense officials advocate accel-
erating current--or embarking upon new--programs to
expand and modernize their modest armed forces. There
are indications that most of these governments con-
template additional defense expenditures but that
they hope to avoid any substantial reallocation of
resources. Economic and social development is still
viewed as the best "defense." Hence, the funding of
envisaged military programs will require relatively
generous foreign credits in order to spread the costs
over a number of years and to keep expenditures
around 5 to 7 percent of GNP.
The ASEAN states will look first to the United
States for the additional military, economic, and po-
litical support that they believe they need. In
talks with the US Secretary of State in July, the
foreign ministers of these countries are likely to
address regional security concerns and their expec-
tations of the US role in the region. At the same
time, however, the ASEAN states can be expected to
seek additional (or easier) credit and quicker de-
livery of desired weapons from other suppliers in
order to diversify their sources of arms and to re-
duce dependence on an uncertain US supplier.
In the longer term, should the tangible response
of the United States and other suppliers to local
security concerns fall short of expectations or should
the threat from Vietnam be perceived to worsen, the
ASEAN states would probably reevaluate their security
policies once again. In that event, a number of them
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might feel compelled to cut back on their economic de-
velopment programs and to spend a substantially him
percentage of their scarce funds on defense.
National Defense Policies Reexamined
The desire to combat domestic insurgencies and to
maintain internal security, as well as to bolster na-
tional pride, self-confidence, and prestige, have been
the primary impulses behind the long-term armed forces
modernization plans that have been on the books in all
the ASEAN countries since the mid-1970s. Only Thailand
perceives an immediate threat, but the events in Iran
and Indochina have created new concerns among all these
countries about internal threats to their stability and
have led to a new emphasis on upgrading conventional
warfare capabilities in case of external attack. They
would like more equipment but political and economic
priorities and financial constraints preclude larger
expenditures. They have moved cautiously in buying arms
and look first to the United States to provide additional
military assistance--particularly Foreign Military Sales
(FMS) credits.
Thailand is concerned that Vietnam will use its
new foothold in Kampuchea both to increase subversion
in Thailand and ultimately to try to seize the north-
east portion of the country. In 1979 the military
government contemplates adding $400 million to the $950
million already budgeted for defense; this would total
roughly 21 percent of its 1979 national budget and 4.5
percent of its GNP. Some foreign affairs officials
oppose such expenditures for fear of provoking Vietnam.
Ithe amounts contemplated
could seriously curtail necessary economic and social
programs.
On 1 March 1979, the Malaysian armed forces announced
a major new program to expand the army to double its
present size by adding three divisions and one tank regi-
ment by the end of 1983. It had previously been decided
to upgrade maritime and aerial surveillance of the coast-
line. These decisions were prompted by assessments of
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Communist terrorist and extremist Muslim activity
(abetted from abroad), labor disputes exploited by the
Communists, and longer range fears of invasion or sys-
tematic subversion from Vietnam and/or China. The rela-
tive ease with which Vietnamese refugee boats have found
their way to the Malaysian coast has also demonstrated
Malaysia's vulnerability to attack from the sea.
Some government officials--especially those con-
cerned with foreign affairs and economic development--
have questioned the need for, and additional cost of,
such a radical expansion program--reportedly adding
about $165 million over three years to an already
steadily increasing defense budget. The 1979 defense
budget is 63 percent higher than that for 1g7#
The Singaporean Government perceives an expansionist
Vietnam with Soviet support as the long-term threat.
As a wealthy city-state on the strategic Malacca Straits
surrounded by large and poor countries, Singapore is
particularly concerned about potential air and naval
strikes by superpowers and by neighboring states. It
is expected to continue its high level of defense
spending (approximately 25 percent of total government
expenditures and 6 percent of GNP) with purchases of
sophisticated air and naval defense missile systems.
In January 1979, the Indonesian Government reacted
to the Chinese-Vietnamese border conflict and to develop-
ments in Iran by launching an ambitious long-term (1979-83)
program to accelerate the development of 60 augmented
battalions into a strike force capable of handling all
contingencies. The plan also calls for the construction
of two bases--in South Sumatra and South Sulawesi--to
block potential invasion routes. In addition, Indonesia
is continuing a longstanding program to improve its counter-
insurgency and sea defense/surveillance ability in order
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to protect its "archipelagic" claim to the interisland
seas and to control smugglers, pirates, and Indochinese
refugees.
Indonesia's cash and credit problems and commitment
to economic development limit its ability to fulfill
its ambitions. Over the next five years, it reportedly
plans to spend $200 million more than the yearly defense
allocation which has increased slowly since 1977 to be-
come nearly $1.7 billion in 1979 and has represented a
steady 3 to 3.5 percent of GNP.*
The Philippine Government has been relatively san-
guine about the near-term threat to its security arising
from events in Indochina. The armed forces continue to
be concerned mainly with internal security, in which
they include the defense of Kalayaan Island (one of the
Spratleys). Philippine military leaders, unable to deal
effectively with debilitating Muslim insurgency in the
south, were concerned by the fall of the Shah's government
in Iran. Budgetary constraints, caused in part by the
high price of imported oil and inflation, led to the
decision to reduce the 1979 defense budget--by $36.4
million from the 1978 level--to $764.3 million or 14.6
percent of the national budget. Defense spending has
averaged 3.5 percent of GNP since 1976.
ASEAN Perceptions of the US Role
The individual governments of ASEAN have assessed
their security threats and required responses somewhat
differently. In general, however, they expect the
United States to:
-- Remain politically willing and militarily able
to influence the balance of power in the region.
The defense portion of the 1979 budget actually declined slightly
from the 1978 level due to a currency devaluation. Public figures
may be misleading, however, because an undetermined but probably
sizable amount finds its way into military programs through extra-
budgetary means.
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Asia and provide additional military assistance to them
under the Five Power Defense Arrangement. The ASEAN
governments for the most part have a realistic appre-
ciation of the limitations of the United States as a
reliable arms supplier and are prepared to sacrifice--
and have done so in the past--their preference for US
equipment and to buy from other suppliers, particularly
France, West Germany, the United Kingdom, Taiwan, Yugo-
slavia, and South Korea. While the quality of the equip-
ment is not always as good, the price and delivery terms--
and the absence of political "strings"--are often more
attractive. F
Crisis of Confidence
As a result of the conflict among the Communist
powers in Indochina, the ASEAN governments are under-
going a general "crisis of confidence" both in them-
selves and toward the United States--a crisis not un-
like the soul-searching that ensued in 1975-76 after
the Communist victory in Indochina and the US withdrawal
from Thailand. Upgrading their modest individual defense
capabilities--with or without US assistance--is one facet
of the ASEAN states' reaction to what they perceive as
a new balance of power in Southeast Asia. They will
continue to rely on political and diplomatic initiatives
to attenuate Vietnamese hostility and on economic and
social development strategies to thwart domestic insta-
bility. However, should they feel more directly
threatened--either externally or internally--or should
they fail to secure the desired levels of military, po-
litical, and economic support from the United States and
other Western security partners and suppliers, most of
the ASEAN states would feel compelled to spend a higher
percentage of their scarce resources on defense.
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ASEAN Defense Budgets, 1975-79
(Millions of US Dollars)
Percent of Central
FY Defense Budget* Government Budget Percent of GNP
INDONESIA
1975
70
8.7
18.9
3.5
1976
1,10
0.0
16.7
3.8
1977
1,26
1.9
14.0
3.0
1978
1,51
3.5
14.8
3.0
1979
1,69
1.5
MALAYSIA
14.5
3.3
1975
47
7.1
15.5
5.5
1976
50
0.0
17.3
4.9
1977
54
7.6
12.5
4.4
1978
1,06
0.3
19.9
7.3
1979
1,10
7.0
18.0
NA
PHILIPPINES
1975
52
9.2
27.4
4.0
1976
52
4.1
16.8
3.1
1977
67
4.8
18.0
3.4
1978
80
0.7
17.2
3.6
1979
76
4.3
SINGAPORE
14.6
3.3
1975
26
8.2
14.7
4.8
1976
38
6.3
18.5
6.1
1977
41
3.5
18.5
5.9
1978
41
1.2
16.6
5.6
1979
NA
THAILAND
1975
37
7.9
16.1
4.0
1976
51
5.1
16.7
3.2
1977
60
3.9
17.9
3.8
1978
80
4.2
20.3
3.6
1979
95
0.0
20.6
4.5
*There
are undo
ubtedly
other funds
for defense h
idden i
n the
national budgets or supplied from nonbudgetary sources.
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China and the World Administrative Radio Conference
In September in Geneva the International Telecom-
munications Union will open the first full-scale re-
view since 1959 of radio frequency allocations and
rules regulating telecommunications. The World Admin-
istrative Radio Conference (WARC) is scheduled to last
10 weeks and preparations by participating governments
have been under way for some time. This article is
the first in a series that will review key issues and
country attitudes toward WARC.
China's policy on specific WARC issues is only
now being formulated. It probably will be strongly
influenced by the ambitious domestic modernization
program and should give priority to economic and tech-
nical rather than international political goals. This
means in the first instance that various domestic com-
munications interest groups are likely to have a sig-
nificant influence on Chinese policy at WARC. Second,
China is unlikely to play a major role in any North-
South confrontation that might develop at WARC, be-
cause some of its economic and technical interests at
the conference will coincide with those of the devel-
oped countries, while others will place it in the
ranks of the less developed countries.
The Influence of Modernization
The importance to the Chinese leadership of the
comprehensive modernization of the economy and, more
specifically, of the communications sector provides the
underpinning to understanding the Chinese approach to
WARC. Heightened attention to domestic economic growth
already has had an appreciable impact on China's foreign
economic posture. China has adopted a more flexible and
open trade policy toward private Western firms and has es-
tablished stronger ties with Western governments through
a series of commercial, financial, and scientific and
technological cooperation agreements. Moreover, Beijing
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has modified its past negative attitude toward important
international laws, such as the Paris Convention for the
Protection of Industrial Property, and has increased its
activity in such international social and economic organi-
zations as the United Nations Education, Scientific and
Cultural Organization (UNESCO), the United Nations Indus-
trial Development Organization (UNIDO), and the United Na-
tions Development Program (UNDP).
Last summer the Chinese Government signed a con-
tract with Japan for the acquisition of color television
technology and manufacturing capability. In December
1978, it initiated discussions with the Swedish telecom-
munications firm L.M. Ericsson to modernize portions of
the Chinese telephone network. In February, Beijing
concluded a long-term agreement on cooperation in space
technology with a West German firm and in may began dis-
cussions with the communications satellite Corporation
(COMSAT) about the establishment of an extensive domestic
satellite system in China.
Although dwindling foreign exchange reserves have
led to a slowdown in the drive to acquire Western tech-
nology, China clearly recognizes the importance of tech-
nology transfer to the development of the communications
sector and continues to solicit technical and educational
assistance from Western governments. In part to facili-
tate the importation of sophisticated communications
technology, Beijing-recently created the Great Wall Cor-
poration, which deals with space and ground station
equipment and technology.
Although China's modernization program depends on
good relations with the West, it also aims at close ties
with the LDCs. Part of the reason is economic; China
looks to LDCs to some extent for export markets and shares
interests with them in many multilateral economic negotia-
tions. Part of the reason is political, stemming from
China's self-perception as a member, if not necessarily
a leader, of the developing world
Defining Needs and Politices
China's domestic drive for modernization will con-
tinue to affect its attitudes toward WARC on at least two
levels: the national because of increased competition
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among domestic telecommunications; and the international
because of China's increasingly complex role in multi-
lateral economic and technological negotiations.*
At the national level, the attention given to mod-
ernizing the communications sector, has resulted in the
political awakening of rival communications services
sponsored by such various ministries, as that of Defense,
of Communications, of Posts and Telecommunications, and
of Education. Each service group can now compete more
freely in seekin influence over major policy decisions.
It is impossible to predict with confidence the
degree of influence any one service will have over
another in determining Chinese policy at WARC, but sev-
eral services will undoubtedly enjoy some special con-
sideration:
-- Broadcasting services must be expanded to handle
growing overseas requirements and to support
an ambitious national education campaign de-
signed to reach China's remote regions by radio
and television.
-- Maritime and Aeronautical communications must
be developed to provide support to an expanded
merchant fleet and to increased civil air traffic,
both resulting from a more active foreign trade.
-- Military Communications networks will continue
to receive priority attention especially in
the light of hostilities with Vietnam, tensions
with Kampuchea and Laos, and the continuing
Soviet threat.
*For purposes of the WARC, the eight most important communications
service users (along with concrete examples of each) are: Defense
(radar); Aviation (control tower to aircraft); Maritime (ship-to-
shore); Broadcast (radio and television); Land Mobile (police and
emergency vehicle services); Fixed (point-to-point domestic and
international communications such as telephone and telegraph via
terrestrial and/or satellite stations); Scientific (radio astron-
omy); Amateur (ham radio).
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-- The desire for Satellite expansion to facilitate
the growth of domestic television broadcasting
and burgeoning international communications
traffic has been noted in ongoing negotiations
for technological assistance and equipment
purchase with US and West European business
and government leaders. 25X1
Discussions at the WARC that will concern Chinese
interests such as expanded aeronautical and maritime
communications capabilities are likely to be highly tech-
nical, involving little or no political controversy.
The issues involving allocations for military use are
apt to be more political and to involve both a conflict
among potential domestic users of national allocations 25X1
and international debates on which services (e.g., fixed,
mobile, broadcasting) will receive emphasis.
China's Role in North-South Issues
Many other issues at the conference, however, could
pit the industrial countries, which monopolize communica-
tions capability and potential, against the LDCs, which
want to improve their own communications infrastructure
and limit the ability of others to disseminate informa-
tion within their borders. Because China has character-
istics of both a major power and an LDC, its interests
on some of these questions will sometimes coincide with
those of the North and at other times with those of the
South. It will probably not be a consistent member of
any coalition at WARC or take a hi hl visible political
role at the conference.
China is already one of the six most active inter-
national broadcasters. Like the developed countries,
it would, therefore, like to preserve the status quo in
national access to High Frequency (HF) broadcasting,
that is, spectrum assignments. Most LDCs favor a priori
planning for HF broadcasting and want to impose con-
straints on the active international broadcasters. This
means placing limitations both on the power of transmis-
sions in certain geographic areas such as the Middle
East where local broadcasters are overridden by high-
powered European transmitters, and on assignments so as
to exclude international broadcasters from operation in
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certain saturated regions whose nations are now devel-
oping capabilities in HF out-of-band broadcasting; this
is a sensitive issue in the tropical zone region.
The HF band is also allocated between broadcasting
and fixed services. The industrial states would like
greater relative allocation to broadcasting. Most LDCs
want the opposite, or at least the maintenance of the
status quo, because of the economy of HF fixed services
and the low level of technology required. On this ques-
tion as well, China's interests should coincide with
those of the industrial states because of its ability
to substitute more advanced technologies for HF fixed
applications such as microwave, land lines, and satel-
lite, and because of its international interests as a
major power.
On satellite communications, China's interests tend
to coincide with those of the more advanced developing
countries. China has been a member of INTELSAT since
August 1977 and it is currently developing a domestic
communication satellite system. As a relative newcomer
to the Super High Frequency (SHF) band--the portion of
the radio spectrum primarily used for radar and satellite
communications--China can be expected to demand more
extensive entry, especially in terms of fixed satellite
expansion. The major developed countries--the current
heavy users of the SHF band--will seek to maintain the
international status quo, in part by encouraging the
utilization of even higher frequency levels of the spec-
trum, which may be objectionable to the LDCs because of
the requirement for ex ensive, sophisticated technologies.
A final contentious issue at WARC will be that of
"spectrum management," that is, the means by which fre-
quencies are registered and coordinated. The LDCs want
a planned system, which would guarantee them entry into
various spectrum frequencies either now, or--more rele-
vantly--when they are able to take advantage of it. The
developed countries, which are the present and not just
potential users, want the preservation of a system of
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flexible coordination (the existing system distributes
frequencies by and large on a first-come, first-served
basis).*
China's interests in the question of spectrum man-
agement vary according to the spectrum involved. Be-
cause China is already a heavy user of the HF band, it
would like retention of the present system there. On
the SHF band for satellite usage, however, China's in-
terests would be best served by a planned system that
guaranteed entry into the lower frequency range. China
could resolve these conflicting interests by favoring a
limited planned system that would make allocations on
the basis of noninterference and most efficient utili-
zation of spectrum--but would guarantee entry to only a
small number of potential users, that is, a system involv-
ing a priori frequency assignments. China would resist
any "equitable" distribution that would result in an
inefficient utilization or wastage of available spectrum.
Moderate Posture
China's bifurcated interests in the specific issues
under discussion at WARC, as well as its wider interna-
tional political and economic aims, indicate that it will
adopt a low profile at the conference. It would not want
to do anything at the conference that could jeopardize its
effort to acquire Western technology, but neither would it
want to harm its relations with the LDCs. It will, there-
fore, probably try to keep discussions at a technical level
and avoid being drawn into any North-South political con-
frontation.
The present system is embodied in Article 48.1 of the ITU con-
vention, which provides:
"All stations, whatever their purpose, must be estab-
lished and operated in such a manner as not to cause
harmful interference to the radio services or communi-
cations of other Members or Associate Members or of
recognized private operating agencies, or of other duly
authorized operating agencies which carry on radio
service, and which operate in accordance with the pro-
visions of the Radio Regulations."
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China could quite possibly play a moderating role
at the conference. It could, for example, advocate a
limited planned system of spectrum management that would
satisfy at least the short-term aims of both the devel-
oped and developing countries. It could also provide
useful technical assistance to the developing nations
in areas where its technical sophistication is sound,
and where technical solutions may exist to problems
that LDCs now perceive as political. Such assistance
would probably be welcome to many LDCs, as well as to
the developed countries who have an interest in down-
playing the political contents of the issues at WARC.
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Libya's Changing Role as a Patron State
Libya's Colonel Qadhafi continues to operate as a
major patron of terrorist organizations. Since late
1977, however, there have been some noteworthy changes
in Libyan activities, which at least temporarily re-
dound to the benefit of Western industrial states.
Qadhafi still seeks the destruction of Israel, the un-
dermining of certain "enemy" Arab governments, and the
strengthening of militant Islamic causes worldwide--
and he is still willing to provide considerable mate-
rial support to terrorist groups pursuing like ends.
But he seems to have recently realized that his whole-
sale support of terrorist movements has significantly
hurt his international image--particularly in the
West--and could even be weakenin his political posi-
tion at home.
In any event, he evidently has decided to risk
fewer resources and to involve less of his prestige in
sponsoring terrorist operations, at least those di-
rected against the industrial democracies. He has
even expressed to Western officials a willingness to
cooperate in curbing the activities of groups based in
such countries. This stance has been in response to
considerable Western pressure and, in good measure,
has been handled as a public relations gambit. But it
probably also reflects his political insecurity and a
degree of personal disillusion with some anti-Western
terrorist groups.
25X1
Qadhafi's somewhat more discriminating support of
terrorism is more a change of tactics than a change of
heart, and even now he is not consistent in his activ-
ities. Because of his mercurial political style, he
could quickly reverse his course especially if he re-
assessed the significance of the raised
against his patronage of terrorists. ressures 25X1
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