US INTERESTS IN SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP80T00702A000500080006-2
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: C
• Document Page Count: 30
• Document Creation Date: December 12, 2016
• Document Release Date: April 12, 2002
• Sequence Number: 6
• Publication Date: November 1, 1978
• Content Type: RP

ec ,qP%hlease 2002/05/09 : CIA-RDP80T00702A0005000800 fidential
r ign
Assessment
Center
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US Interests in
Sub-Saharan Africa
Confidential
ER 78-10704
November 1978
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US interests in Sub-Saharan Africa
Central Intelligence Agency
National Foreign Assessment Center
Summary
On a global basis, US economic interests in sub-Saharan Africa* are
small. The region accounts for less than 7 percent of total. US imports, less
than 3 percent of US exports, and less than 3 percent of the stock of US
foreign direct investment. Only 7 percent of total US net bilateral aid goes to
the sub-Sahara. The United States does provide substantial aid through
multilateral institutions, which in 1976 channeled almost one-third of their
funds to sub-Saharan Africa.
Statistics for the continent as a whole obscure the importance of a
handful of countries to US economic and strategic/political interests. Using
four quantitative measures of economic interest and two, more subjective
measures that consider strategic/political interests and the potential for
economic growth, we have identified nine top-tier countries that qualify as
"important" to the United States-South Africa, Nigeria, Zaire, Ethiopia,
Gabon, Ghana, Liberia, Sudan, and Zambia. A second tier of 15 countries-
led by Angola, Kenya, Mauritania, Namibia, and Rhodesia-has been
identified as moderately important to US interests. Sub-Saharan countries of
marginal interest by our criteria number 24.
Three top-tier countries-Zaire, Ethiopia, and Zambia-and four sec-
ond-tier countries-Tanzania, Kenya, Senegal, and Guinea-were among the
10 major sub-Saharan recipients of US bilateral economic aid in the mid-
1970s. These countries accounted for close to 60 percent of US aid to sub-
Saharan Africa.
* In this report the terms "sub-Saharan Africa" and "Africa" refer to all of continental Africa-except
the northern tier of Algeria, Egypt, Libya, Morocco, Tunisia, and Western Sahara-plus the islands of
Cape Verde, Comoro, Madagascar, Mauritius, Reunion, Sao Tome and Principe, and Seychelles.
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Summary .................................................................................................... i
Introduction ................................................................................................ 1
First-Tier Countries .................................................................................. 1
Second-Tier Countries .............................................................................. 4
Third-Tier Countries ................................................................................ 4
US Economic Aid Flows .......................................................................... 7
Appendixes
A. Sub-Saharan Africa: Key Mineral and Agricultural Suppliers .... 9
B. Sub-Saharan Africa: Trade Values and Balances with the
United States ................................................................................ 15
C. Sub-Saharan Africa: US Direct Investment .................................. 19
D. Sub-Saharan Africa: Countries of Strategic/ Political
Importance .................................................................................... 23
E. Sub-Saharan Africa: Economic Aid From the United States
and Other Donors ........................................................................... 25
A-1. Sub-Saharan Africa: Principal Sources of Western Mineral
Supplies ...................................................................................... 9
A-2. Major Developed Countries: Imports of Selected Crude
Materials From Sub-Saharan Africa, 1977 ............................ 10
A-3. Major Developed Countries: Imports of Selected Intermediate
Goods From Sub-Saharan Africa, 1977 .................................. 11
A-4. Major Developed Countries: Imports of Selected Agricultural
Products From Sub-Saharan Africa, 1977 .............................. 12
B- 1. Sub-Saharan Africa: Trade With the United States .................. 16
B-2. Sub-Saharan Africa: Trade Balances With the
United States .............................................................................. 17
C-1. Sub-Saharan Africa: Net Book Value of US Direct Investment
by Economic Sector, 1976 ........................................................ 19
E-1. Sub-Saharan Africa: Net Bilateral Economic Aid From the
United States .............................................................................. 26
E-2. Sub-Saharan Africa: Economic Aid From Multilateral
Institutions .................................................................................. 27
E-3. Sub-Saharan Africa: Net Disbursements of Official Funds ...... 28
iii
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Figures
1. Sub-Saharan Africa: Indicato
United States ...................
rs of Importance to the
.............................................................
2
2. Sub-Saharan Africa: Major
Disbursements, 1974-76 ...
US Bilateral Economic Aid
.............................................................
5
3. Sub-Saharan Africa: Major
Disbursements, 1974-76 ...
Multilateral Economic Aid
.............................................................
6
4. Sub-Saharan Africa: Net Boo
Country, 1976 ...................
k Value of US Direct Investment by
.............................................................
20
iv
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US Interests in Sub-Saharan Africa
Introduction
This report examines US economic and strate-
gic/political interests in sub-Saharan Africa on a
country-by-country basis. In evaluating these
interests, we have attempted to array the sub-
Saharan countries by order of importance to the
United States using the following criteria:
? Supplies of strategic materials. Countries of
interest are defined as those providing 10
percent or more of a key mineral import to
the United States and/or Japan and the
major West European countries.
? Total value of trade with the United States.
"Important" countries are identified as those
with an annual trade value of $100 million
or more.
? Trade balance with the United States. "Im-
portant" countries have trade deficits of $15
million or more annually.
? Stock of US direct investment. Countries of
interest are those with a net book value of
US investment of $90 million or more.
In addition to these measurements, we have
included two, more subjective criteria: the poten-
tial for economic growth, and the strategic/ polit-
ical importance to the United States. In judging
the strategic/political importance of a country to
the United States we have taken several factors
into account, including size, location, and politi-
cal influence. Appendixes A through E include
country-by-country detail on each criteria em-
ployed in this report.
Using this framework, the sub-Saharan coun-
tries fall into three basic tiers in terms of their
importance to the United States. The first group
is relatively select, consisting of eight countries
that qualify as "important" under three or more
of the criteria that we have established, plus
Ethiopia, which is included because of the im-
mense strategic importance of its geographic
location. The second tier consists of 14 countries
of moderate interest to the United States, quali-
fying under one or two categories of interest, and
Djibouti. The third and largest tier includes
countries that by our definitions are of marginal
interest.
First-Tier Countries
South Africa is, to the United States, by far
the most important country in sub-Saharan
Africa in terms of trade, investment, strategic/
political importance, and as a source of strategic
minerals to the West.
South Africa is one of the leading world
producers of 10 or so minerals and an impor-
tant supplier of chrome, platinum, uranium, and
other strategic materials to the United States
and its allies. South Africa and Rhodesia ac-
count for some 90 percent of world chrome
reserves. The only other appreciable producer of
this mineral, and platinum as well, is the USSR.
About one-half of US investment in sub-Saharan
Africa is in South Africa, and US trade with that
country is second only to that with Nigeria.
Almost 60 percent of Europe's oil supplies
comes around the Cape of Good Hope. More-
over, South Africa's six ports are the most
developed in southern Africa and handle traffic
for several countries in the area.
South Africa plays a key role in the liberation
struggles in Namibia and Rhodesia. Although
the Pretoria government is currently stable, pres-
sures for majority rule are potentially disruptive
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Figure 1
Sub-Saharan Africa: Indicators of Importance to the United States
Supplier of key minerals
to the United States Large total Trade deficit with Large stock of Economic/
and/or major allies trade value the United States US investments Profit potential Stategic/Political
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to the South African economy and the economies
of neighboring countries, which are closely linked
to the South African market.
Nigeria, the second largest supplier of crude
oil to the United States, is the major US trading
partner in Africa. About 18 percent of the value
of US crude imports originates in Nigeria, giving
Lagos the lion's share of the US trade deficit
with the sub-Saharan-76 percent or just over
$5 billion in 1977. Lagos also is an important oil
supplier to Europe, particularly West Germany.
Concentrated in the oil sector, the net book value
of US investment in Nigeria, about $340 million
in 1976, is the third largest in Africa. Nigeria's
size, resources, and nonalignment in East-West
issues make it an important spokesman for
Africa and the Third World. Lagos actively has
sought to mediate between Angola and Zaire,
Chad and Libya, and Ethiopia and Somalia; it is
a strong supporter of the Frontline States, which
are pressing the struggle against white domina-
tion in southern Africa.
Zaire, located in the heart of Africa, has had
close ties with the United States since independ-
ence in 1960 and, among African nations, is
noted for its pro-Western stance. Twice in the
past 18 months, the US Government has helped
Zairian President Mobutu meet threats to his
rule and his economic lifeline in the copper
region of Shaba; in return, Kinshasa provides a
window on the Cuban and Soviet activities in
Angola. Economically, Zaire is the largest non-
Communist supplier of cobalt and the major
source of industrial diamonds. In addition, Kin-
shasa supplies the United States' major Euro-
pean allies and Japan with copper and some
agricultural products. Zaire is the sixth largest
recipient of US investment in the sub-Sahara,
with US firms involved in hydroelectric construc-
tion, tourist facilities, and manufacturing. This
large African country accounts for 2.2 percent of
total US trade with the sub-Sahara and had a
trade surplus of almost $60 million with the
United States in 1977.
Ethiopia, by virtue of its location, the develop-
ment of its large Army with Soviet and Cuban
help, and its historically close ties with Washing-
ton is among the countries of greatest interest to
the United States. In particular, its proximity to
the Red Sea and hence to oil supply routes makes
the policies of the Ethiopian Government of
concern to the West. Although it accounted for
only 1 percent of US-African trade in the mid-
1970s, it was still one of the United States' major
African trading partners before the Mengistu
government took power in 1977.
Gabon, rich in natural resources, supplies
appreciable quantities of petroleum, timber,
manganese, and uranium to the West. Earnings
from these raw materials give Gabon the highest
per capita income in sub-Saharan Africa. While
Gabon's trading partners have traditionally been
in Western Europe-especially France-Libre-
ville supplies 60 percent of US manganese im-
ports. Gabon's stable and pragmatic government
encourages foreign investment, and US invest-
ment-about $90 million on a net basis-is
second only to that of France. A member of the
Organization of African Unity (OAU) and the
Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries,
Gabon has not sought a leadership role in Afri-
can or Third World affairs.
US investment in Ghana's aluminum refinery
and other Ghanian projects makes Accra one of
the top nine recipients of direct US investment in
Africa. Although US involvement is limited
mainly to the aluminum refinery and to pur-
chases of cocoa, Ghana is an important source of
bauxite, manganese, gem and industrial dia-
monds, cocoa, and timber for the Europeans and
Japanese. Even so, Ghana's economy is in bad
shape, and its ineffectual agricultural policy and
soaring inflation rate (more than 80 percent
annually) may affect future production. Al-
though Accra still commands some attention as a
leader in Africa, this is largely a carryover from
the days of Nkrumah and is on the decline.
Liberia's long and close historical ties with the
United States have encouraged trade and invest-
ment there. In 1976, US net direct investment in
Liberia was the second highest in sub-Saharan
Africa, largely reflecting the country's political
stability and the limited number of restrictions
on investment. Monrovia also places ninth
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among US trading partners in Africa and pro-
vides iron ore, rubber, and timber to US allies as
well as to the United States. Monrovia's moder-
ate civilian regime identifies closely with the
United States and is one of its primary support-
ers in African forums.
Sudan, located along the important Red Sea
shipping lanes, has become more important stra-
tegically as Soviet and Cuban involvement in
Ethiopia has grown. It is the United States' 14th
largest trade partner in Africa, with a little less
than 1 percent of total US sub-Saharan trade in
1977. With sales (mostly agricultural goods) of
$19 million and purchases (mostly machinery
and other manufactures) of $87 million last year,
Sudan is one of the few sub-Saharan countries
running a sizable trade deficit with the United
States. Indeed, in the short run Khartoum's
overall trade deficit will serve as a check on US
sales since Sudan is experiencing a severe finan-
cial bind that limits its import ability. Over the
longer run, the country has considerable poten-
tial for economic development and hence for
foreign trade and investment opportunities.
Sudan is one of the few African countries whose
population is not faced with the problem of
overworked land, and its agricultural potential is
considerable-a fact that has not been over-
looked by Arab investors in recent years. Sudan
may also possess some mineral wealth; it already
produces small amounts of gold and chromite
and may have uranium and copper.
Zambia ranks 11th among US trading part-
ners in Africa, andalso accounts for almost $200
million in US net direct investment. Zambia is a
major source of minerals to several US allies,
especially copper to Japan and the United King-
dom; it also produces some cobalt and soon may
be extracting uranium and emeralds. Finally,
Zambia is a moderate, nonaligned nation whose
stability helps to calm an increasingly volatile
environment. The primary political interest of
the United States in Zambia stems from its
position among the Frontline States involved in
the Rhodesian liberation struggle. President
Kaunda has been a voice of moderation among
the Frontline leaders, advocating the Anglo-
American proposals on Rhodesia and supporting
efforts for an all parties conference. These meas-
ures, coupled with Kaunda's support of Joshua
Nkomo and his ZAPU guerrilla forces, have
spotlighted Zambia.
Second-Tier Countries
Fifteen African countries are of some eco-
nomic and strategic/political interest to the
United States, according to our criteria. Kenya,
for example, is eighth in terms of US net direct
investment in Africa and is of some strategic
importance-Mombasa is the only friendly port
for the US Navy on the east coast of the
continent. Madagascar concerns the United
States because it supplies 20 percent of US
graphite imports and some chromium to US
allies. Guinea is an important source of bauxite
for France and West Germany as well as for the
United States; and Rhodesia has important
chrome reserves. Although Djibouti is of little
economic importance to the United States, its
location on the Horn makes it of interest to the
West.
Some of the countries that fell into the second
tier of US interests in the mid-1970s may even-
tually become more important because of their
mineral potential. Both Namibia and Botswana,
for instance, already produce diamonds and
copper; Namibia also is rapidly becoming a
major uranium exporter. Other countries that
qualified as second-tier members on the basis of
1976-77 data may already have dropped into the
third tier of US interest. Most notably, with the
recent US embargo on trade with Uganda, US
trade value with Uganda will drop off sharply
this year.
Third-Tier Countries
Twenty-four sub-Saharan countries are of
little or no economic and strategic interest to the
United States. Many, such as Benin, Mali, and
Upper Volta, are small, with almost no resources.
Others may increase in importance: Mozam-
bique, for example, as it recovers from its post-
independence slump. US attention to most of
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Figure 2
Sub-Saharan Africa: Major US Bilateral Economic Aid Disbursements, 1974-76'
Total 733
Zaire 182
Ethiopia 79
Tanzania 76
Niger 39
Mali 32
Kenya 28
Zambia 21
Senegal 21
Guinea 21
Upper Volta 20
Other 214
Gabon 22
Botswana 22
Mauritania 14
Cape Verde 10
Niger 9
Lesotho 9
Zaire 7
Liberia 6
Swaziland 6
Mali 6
Total 1
Per Capita Aid
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577686 1178 CIA
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Figure 3
Sub-Saharan Africa: Major Multilateral Economic Aid Disbursements, 1974-761
Total
3,424
Kenya
259
Tanzania
204
Sudan
203
Zambia
197
Ivory Coast
180
Ethiopia
174
Zaire
154
Niger
148
Cameroon
147
Mali
143
Other
1,614
Comoro Islands 60
Botswana
57
Swaziland
54
Congo
50
Mauritius
43
Somalia
43
Zambia
40
Reunion
40
Lesotho
35
Senegal
33
Per Capita Aid
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these countries traditionally has been mainly for
humanitarian reasons.
US Economic Aid Flows
In the mid-1970s, US net bilateral economic
aid to sub-Saharan Africa averaged $244 million
annually, ranking the US second to France as a
bilateral donor to the area. Taking about 7
percent of total US economic aid, the sub-
Saharan countries did not absorb US funds
commensurate with their share of LDC popula-
tion. Out of the 48 countries of sub-Saharan
Africa, five received more than one-half of the
total bilateral aid disbursed and 10 accounted for
about 70 percent of US outlays. With $182
million in net US bilateral assistance in 1974-76,
Zaire was by far the major African beneficiary
of US largesse, its intake more than double that
of the nearest contender-Ethiopia. Zaire's lead
probably would be even stronger if 1977 data
were considered since US flows to Ethiopia
ebbed with the outbreak of hostilities in the area.
On a per capita basis, the top beneficiaries
were somewhat different. Indeed, of the top 10
recipients counted by total value, only Mali,
Niger, and Zaire were among the major per
capita beneficiaries. Gabon and Botswana stand
out on a per capita basis, their inhabitants
gleaning $22 each from the United States in
1974-76. Mauritania also ranks high while Cape
Verde has obtained considerable help since its
independence from Portugal in 1975.
The United States also is a major supplier of
aid to the sub-Saharan area through its contribu-
tions to multilateral institutions, which in
1974-76 contributed $1.1 billion annually to the
region. On the basis of total value, the major
multilateral aid recipients are similar to those
receiving bilateral US assistance-seven out of
the top 10 are the same, although rankings differ
considerably with Kenya, Tanzania, and Sudan
the top three multilateral beneficiaries. Multilat-
eral aid also is more diffused than bilateral flows,
with the top 10 African beneficiaries receiving
only 53 percent of total assistance to the area. On
a per capita basis, multilateral aid little resem-
bles US bilateral outlays; only Botswana, Swazi-
land, and Lesotho appear in the top 10 of both
lists.
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The author of this paper is
welcome should be directed to
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UJJ!ce o co-
nomic Research. Comments and queries are
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APPENDIX A
SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA: KEY MINERAL AND AGRICULTURAL SUPPLIERS
Thirteen countries of sub-Saharan Africa are
appreciable sources of minerals for the West.
Some countries account for a small share of US
imports, but are significant suppliers to Western
Europe or Japan. For example, Madagascar is an
important source of chromium, and Mauritania a
large supplier of iron ore for France, but these
suppliers are not directly important to the United
States.
South Africa
The industrialized West depends heavily on
South Africa for four important metals-plati-
num group metals, chromium, manganese, and
vanadium-and for others of lesser impor-
tance-antimony, gold, gem and industrial
diamonds, nickel, and asbestos. South Africa
accounts for about 87 percent of non-Communist
Sub-Saharan Africa:
Principal Sources of Western Minerul Supplies
Zambia ..................
Gabon ....................
Ghana ....................
Guinea ....................
Liberia... .................
Namibia ................
Angola ..................
Madagascar ..........
Mauritania ............
Rhodesia ................
Nigeria ....................
Platinum group, gold, vanadium, chromium,
manganese, antimony, nickel, asbestos, cop-
per, tin, iron ore, diamonds, uranium
Cobalt, copper, diamonds, tin, manganese,'
zinc'
Cobalt, copper, zinc'
Manganese, uranium, petroleum'
Bauxite, manganese, gold,' diamonds
Bauxite, diamonds'
Iron ore, diamonds'
Diamonds, uranium, tin
Iron ore,' diamonds,' petroleum
Chromium, graphite
Iron ore
Chrome, copper,' gold,' nickel'
Petroleum
' Accounts for less than 10 percent of US, European, or Japanese
imports.
' Iron ore mines currently closed.
production of platinum group metals, 76 percent
of gold, 57 percent of vanadium, 41 percent of
chromium, 31 percent of manganese, 30 percent
of antimony, 27 percent of gem diamonds, and
13 percent of industrial diamonds. It is also the
world's third largest uranium producer and
together with Nam.ibia supplies an estimated 50
percent of the British and West German ura-
nium requirements and about 10 percent of
Japanese needs. South African nickel supplies
are important to Japan and the Netherlands,
while the United States, the United Kingdom,
and Japan are the principal importers of amosite
asbestos, a heat insulating material produced
only by South Africa, used in jet engines.
The bulk of Zaire's and Zambia's cobalt and
copper supplies are exported to Western Europe,
Japan, and the United States. Zaire, the largest
non-Communist producer of cobalt, meets about
one-half of US cobalt requirements. Zambia, a
far smaller producer, exports most of its cobalt to
the United Kingdom and Japan. Zairian copper
is essential to Belgium's copper refining industry,
while Zambian supplies make up a significant
share of Japanese and British copper imports.
Gabon
Gabon supplies approximately 60 percent of
US manganese imports and about the same share
of US consumption requirements. France is
highly dependent on Gabon for manganese-
about 45 percent of imports-and uranium. Al-
most one-half of French uranium needs are
supplied by Gabon and Niger. Gabon, the second
smallest OPEC producer, sends about one-half of
its oil exports to West European and US markets
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where they account for insignificant shares of
total Western oil requirements.
Guinea and Ghana
Bauxite from Guinea, the world's third largest
producer is significant to France, West Ger-
many, and the United States. The United States
relies on Guinea for close to 25 percent of its
bauxite imports. When alumina is added to the
import category as in table A-2, Guinea accounts
for a smaller share of US imports because of its
limited refining capability. Ghana, accounting
Major Developed Countries:
Imports of Selected Crude Materials From Sub-Saharan Africa, 1977 '
Percent of Total Imports
Bauxite and alumina concentrates ........................
Belgium ?
0
France
73.6
Japan
Negl
Netherlands
0
United
Kingdom
62.0
United
States
12.1
West
Germany
45.8
Guinea ...................................................................
71.4
0.5
11.9
36.3
..................................................................
Ghana ..
0
56.7
0
0.5
.
..........................................................
Sierre Leone
0
4.8
0.2
9.0
Chrome ore and concentrates ..............................
48.8
47.9
41.9
83.9
57.9
39.2
51.7
South Africa ............................................................
38.8
23.4
28.7
83.9
53.4
39.2
45.4
Madagascar ............................................................
0
24.1
8.2
0
0
0
2.8
Mozambique ..........................................................
8.0
0
5.0
0
4.5
0
2.3
Sudan ......................................................................
0
0.4
0
0
0
0
1.2
Iron ore and concentrates ......................................
15.0
32.8
6.8
15.4
16.8
3.7
26.2
South Africa ............................................................
0.1
4.6
5.5
0
10.2
0.6
6.4
Liberia ....................................................................
9.2
10.5
0.3
15.4
1.3
3.1
17.2
Mauritania ............................................................
5.7
17.7
0.8
0
5.3
0
2.4
Manganese ore and concentrates ..............
73.8
67.3
47.5
0
80.4
66.1
46.7
South Africa ...........................................................
37.2
21.3
39.9
54.5
3.4
46.4
Gabon .....................................................................
8.5
44.7
4.2
8.3
60.0
0
Ghana ......................................................................
17.5
0.9
0.3
17.6
0
0.2
Zaire .....................................
.....................
4.6
0
0
0
2.6
0.1
Tin ore and concentrates _ .......................................
99.1
0
0
40.6
4.5
Negl
28.8
South Africa .....................................................
0
40.1
4.2
Negl
25.3
Zaire .....................................................................
74.5
0.5
0
0
3.5
Rwanda ..................................................................
22.4
0
0
0
0
Crude Petroleum .....................................................
6.0
9.0
0
16.7
2.1
19.0
10.3
Nigeria ...............................................................
5.5
7.5
16.6
2.0
17.7
9.8
Gabon ......................................................................
0
1.5
0
0
0.5
0.3
Angola ...................................................
0.5
0
0.1
0.1
0.8
0.1
Industrial diamonds 4 ..............................................
6.3
8.2
24.2
17.6
0
51.5
34.8
South Africa ..........................................................
0.8
8.1
18.4
1.9
41.2
33.8
Zaire ....................................................................
0.2
0.1
4.1
8.0
7.6
0.6
Congo .......................................................
1.0
0
0.4
1.8
0.9
0
Ghana .....................................................................
2.3
0
1.1
3.8
0.2
0.2
Direct imports on a value basis only; does not include reexports.
E 1976 data.
Direct trade data do not accurately reflect country dependence on African diamond supplies because of DeBeers Consolidated Mines'
extensive control- over diamond marketing worldwide. Sub-Saharan Africa produces 73 percent of the world's industrial diamonds and 80
percent of the world's gem diamonds. The USSR accounts for most remaining world output. The largest African industrial diamond producers
are Zaire (40 percent of world output), South Africa (13 percent), Ghana and Botswana (7 percent each). Among African gem diamond
producers, South Africa ranks first (27 percent of world output), followed by Namibia (12 percent), and Zaire (9 percent). The UK classifies all
diamonds as gem diamonds.
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for less than 1 percent of total world output of
bauxite, sends most of its supplies to the United
Kingdom, where it accounts for more than one-
half of British import requirements.
Namibia
Namibia's principal mineral exports to the
West are uranium and gem diamonds. Presently
the world's fourth largest uranium producer,
Namibia could move into the number three
position in the not too distant future given its
sizable reserves. Namibia ranks as the world's
third largest producer of gem diamonds after
South Africa and the USSR.
CONFIDENTIAL
of chromium and 10 percent of ferrochrome
imports in 1976. Last year's repeal of the Byrd
Amendment outlawed US imports of Rhodesian
chrome. Other Western countries do not report
trade with Rhodesia because of its political sensi-
tivity. An indeterminable portion of Rhodesia's
chrome is almost certainly processed in South
Africa and accordingly is exported as a South
African product. Recent technological advances
in stainless steel production have lessened the
importance of Rhodesian high-grade chrome to
the West, but at the same time, have increased
the importance of South African lower grade
supplies.
Rhodesia
Once a major supplier of chromium to the
United States, Rhodesia accounted for 7 percent
Major Agricultural' Suppliers
With Indonesia the only other significant
source of robusta coffee and accounting for only
Major Developed Countries:
Imports of Selected Intermediate Goods From Sub-Saharan Africa, 1977
Gem diamonds' ......................
Belgium 2
6.9
France
1.7
Japan
5.7
Netherlands
3.8
United
Kingdom
29.0
United
States
26.0
West
Germany
1.5
South Africa ..........................
5.6
1.7
1.8
2.9
24.2
22.8
1.5
Zaire ......................................
0.1
0
0
Negl
2.5
Negl
0
Sierre Leone ..........................
0
0
0
0.5
1.6
2.8
0
Ghana ......................................
Negl
0
3.8
0
0.3
Negl
0
Copper ......................................
68.1
14.5
61.3
2.4
28.0
12.6
21.3
South Africa ..........................
7.7
0.8
7.8
0
6.2
1.3
10.1
Zaire ......................................
55.5
2.6
5.8
1.0
0.5
0
0.6
Zambia ..................................
3.2
10.8
47.7
1.3
20.8
11.3
10.4
Ferromanganese ......................
1.2
5.3
0
7.0
38.0
28.2
0
South Africa ..........................
1.2
5.3
7.0
36.0
26.0
Gabon ......................................
0
0
0
0
2.2
Ferrochrome and alloys ........
12.9
5.1
35.0
25.7
9,3
26.7
19.7
South Africa ..........................
11.5
5.1
35.0
25.0
9.3
17.0
19.6
Rhodesia ................................
0
0
0
0
0
9.7
0
Nickel ........................................
5.5
7.6
18.5
17.4
0.8
4.7
10.9
South Africa ..........................
5.5
7.6
18.5
17.4
0.6
1.5
10.9
Rhodesia ................................
0
0
0
0
0
3.2
0
Platinum group ........................
0
17.3
40.6
3.2
73.5
81.7
9.7
South Africa
17.3
40.6
3.2
73.5
61.7
9.7
' Direct imports on a value basis only, does not include reexports.
Q 1976 data.
'See footnote 3 on table A-2.
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Major Developed Countries:
Imports of Selected Agricultural Products From Sub-Saharan Africa, 1977
Percent of Total Imports
United United West
Netherlands Kingdom States Germany
Coffee ...................................... 7.5 60.2 25.7 31.8
Uganda.. ...... . . ......_................ 0.1 3.1 4.8 0.2
Ivory Coast 1.0 28.6 10.2 13.2
Zaire ...................................... 2.0 8.6 0.2 0.5
Ethiopia ................................ 0.1 1.0 3.0 0.1
Tanzania ................................ 0.4 0.3 1.6 0.1
Kenya ................................... 1.4 1.4 0.9 9.6
Cocoa ........................................ 24.5 74.6 64.1 68.9
Ivory Coast 14.2 40.2 1.5 12.6
Ghana .................................... 2.5 5.6 57.8 16.1
Nigeria ......................... . ....... 3.1 13.7 4.4 12.6
Cameroon 2.1 11.1 0.4 20.3
Sugar .......................................... 4.3 42.3 15.2
South Africa .......................... 1.0 0.6 15.2
Mauritius 0.3 0.5 0
Mozambique .......................... 0.4 0.6 0
Reunion ... ............................ 0 34.6 0
Tea ............................................ 12.8 5.2 1.8
Kenya ................................... 1.6 3.3 1.5
Malawi ................................. 1.4 1.5 0
Mozambique .......................... 0.1 0 0
Tanzania .. ............................ 5.3 0.1 0.3
Cloves ........................................ 73.2 91.7 81.3
Tanzania ...................... ........ 5.3 39.1 30.4
Madagascar . .......................... 43.9 36.1 50.9
Comoro islands 22.8 16.5 0
Vanilla ......................................
Madagascar ............................
Reunion ...............................
Comoro Islands ....................
Wood (in the rough) ..............
Ghana ...................
..........._.........
Ivory Coast .....
.._........__........
Cameroon ......
Gabon
5.9 97.2 69.0
1.7 81.6 65.0
0 2.9 0
4.2 12.7 4.0
27.2 66.7 0.3
1.0 0.6 Negl
10.9 28.1 0
8.9 3.6 0.2
54.6 20.5 26.3
9.0 5.8 0.7
13.8 4.4 2.9
0 2.1 2.3
0.2 2.0 0
1.2 1.4 4.0
20.7 1.3 10.1
77.8 29.8 58.6
8.0 13.3 18.4
39.2 9.2 12.1
30.2 6.5 13.3
0.3 0.6 7.2
4.4 34.7 8.3 1.3
0.8 1.4 4.9 0.5
0.8 22.8 1.0 0
2.0 5.1 1.7 0.5
0.2 4.6 0 0.1
26.8 37.8 20.7 5.5
15.0 20.4 12.9 2.7
3.8 6.1 4.7 0.7
6.1 4.4 1.9 1.2
1.8 4.4 0.6 0.3
87.2 76.2 81.3 93.0
51.1 64.2 55.7 45.1
34.4 11.5 23.7 43.9
1.7 0 0 4.0
NA 10.1 85.8 94.8
8.8 80.0 89.1
1.3 5.8 0
0 0 5.7
40.1 56.8 1.8 45.6
2.6 9.4 1.0 9.6
9.2 22.9 0.6 16.4
16.8 5.2 0.2 5.6
6.3 2.1 0 3.5
.
4.1 0
Liberia 2.0 4.2 12.8 0 5.1
Direct imports on a value basis only; does not include reexports.
: 1976 data.
0 26.7 Negl
1
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8 percent of world production, the United States,
Western Europe, and Japan are highly depend-
ent on African robusta supplies, which are used
to produce instant coffee and for inblending with
better quality South American grades. There are
16 sub-Saharan robusta producers, of which the
Ivory Coast, Uganda, and Zaire are the largest.
Africa's high-quality cocoa is important to
West European chocolate manufacturers. The
Ivory Coast, Ghana, and Nigeria are the largest
suppliers. Kenya, the world's third largest tea
exporter, supplies 20 percent of tea imports for
the United Kingdom, 15 percent for the Nether-
lands, and 13 percent for the United States.
Mauritius is a significant source of sugar for the
United Kingdom as is Reunion for France.
Although Indonesia is the world's largest clove
producer, the West depends on supplies from
Tanzania, Madagascar and the Comoro Islands
because Indonesia consumes virtually all its
output. Madagascar, the Comoro Islands, and
Reunion dominate the vanilla market, account-
ing for about 90 percent of world exports.
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APPENDIX B
SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA: TRADE VALUES AND BALANCES
WITH THE UNITED STATES
On a global basis, sub-Saharan trade with the
United States is small, accounting for less than 5
percent of the total value of US trade in 1977.
Only 14 of the 48 countries in sub-Saharan
Africa have annual total trade values of more
than $100 million with the United States; these
14 account for 93 percent of US trade with
Africa.
Nigeria is by far the United States' major
African trading partner, accounting for 54 per-
cent of total US-African trade at just over $7
billion in 1977. Because of its oil sales, Nigeria's
trade surplus with the United States amounts to
more than $5 billion. South Africa stands a
distant second in US-African trade with more
than $2 billion in trade in 1977-18 percent of
the total. Ivory Coast is third as a sub-Saharan
trade partner of the United States, with $400
million or 3 percent of the total in 1977; the
majority of Ivorian exports to the United States
are agricultural, including cocoa, coffee, and
tropical hardwoods.
Of the 14 major sub-Saharan trade partners,
only two-South Africa and Sudan-generally
had trade deficits (f.o.b.) with the United States
in the mid-1970s. South Africa's major exports
consist of minerals and metals, while its imports
from the United States are higher valued fin-
ished goods. Similarly, the United States pur-
chases little of the agricultural produce Sudan
has to offer, but supplies much of the equipment
and other manufactured goods Khartoum needs
for its development drive. Besides South Africa
and Sudan, only 1.4 African countries ran trade
deficits with the United States in the mid-1970s.
Of these, four along with South Africa and
Sudan-Senegal, Togo, Mauritania, and Came-
roon-had deficits of more than $15 million in
any year.
The sub-Saharan countries generally have re-
corded increasingly large trade surpluses with
the United States since 1972, mainly because of
rising oil, coffee, and cocoa prices. At $6.8 billion
in 1977, the sub-Saharan trade surplus (f.o.b.)
represented one-fourth of the US trade deficit;
Nigeria alone accounted for three-fourths of the
African surplus with the United States.
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Total ..................................
Nigeria ..............................
South Africa ......................
Ivory Coast ......................
Ghana ................................
Angola .............................
Zaire
Uganda .............................
Gabon ...............................
Liberia ..............................
Zambia
Ethiopia ............................
Tanzania ............................
Madagascar ......................
Cameroon .........................
Mozambique ....................
Sierra Leone ....................
Guinea ..............................
Botswana ..........................
Rhodesia ............................
Congo ..............................
Senegal ............................
Rwanda ...........................
Mauritius .........................
Burundi ...........................
Niger ..................................
Togo .................................
Namibia ..........................
Malawi ..............................
Mauritania ......................
Swaziland ........................
Benin ................................
Upper Volta .....................
Chad .................................
Mali .................................
Guinea-Bissau ..................
Somalia ..............................
Gambia ..............................
Central African Empire
Reunion ............................
Lesotho ..............................
Djibouti ............................
Seychelles ........................
Cape Verde ....................
Comoro Islands ................
Equatorial Guinea ............
Sao Tome ..........................
'f.o.b.
Sub-Saharan Africa: Trade With the United States '
1976 1977 Million US $ Million US $
--- -- ---- Percent Share of
African African Total African Trade With African African Total African nT Trade With
Exports Imports Trade the United States Exports Imports Trade the United States
8,014.1 3,183.3 11,197.4 100.0
4,937.6 769.9 5,707.5 50.98
924.8 1,347.6 2,272.4 20.30
247.6 63.6 311.2 2.78
155.0 133.1 288.1 2.57
264.0 34.9 298.9 2.67
193.1 99.4 292.5 2.61
106.7 6.3 113.0 1.01
189.8 45.9 235.7 2.11
98.7 84.6 183.3 1.64
60.0 43.0 103.0 0.92
161.0 48.4 209.4 1.87
94.4 77.7 172.1 1.54
46.8 35.7 82.5 0.74
24.2 105.7 129.9 1.16
59.5 5.8 65.3 0.58
23.9 40.2 64.1 0.57
40.5 13.4 53.9 0.48
50.1 11.5 61.6 0.55
43.5 22.7 66.2 0.59
53.7 3.3 57.0 0.51
45.8 0.8 46.6 0.42
55.2 13.8 69.0 0.62
3.8 41.3 45.1 0.40
53.4 2.4 55.8 0.50
18.0 8.0 26.0 0.23
21.7 2.5 24.2 0.22
Negl 7.8 7.8 0.07
0.7 19.5 20.2 0.18
5.1 12.4 17.5 0.16
10.6 4.6 15.2 0.14
0.1 18.8 18.9 0.17
8.9 1.0 9.9 0.09
1.1 13.8 14.9 0.13
1.4 10.6 12.0 0.11
0.3 3.0 3.3 0.03
0.2 1.9 2.1 0.02
1.9 3.8 5.7 0.05
0.5 9.6 10.1 0,09
0.3 3.4 3.7 0.03
2.3 0.5 2.8 0.02
6.4 1.2 7.6 0.07
0.1 4.6 4.7 0.04
0.9 4.7 5.6 0.05
0.5 0.6 1.1 0.01
NA NA NA NA
NA NA NA NA
NA NA NA NA
NA NA NA NA
9,911.5 3,151,4 13,062.9 100.0
6,096.2 958.3 7,054.5 54.00
1,268.8 1,054.4 2,323.2 17.78
317.6 89.2 406.8 3.11
214.1 145:5 359.6 2.75
309.7 38.4 348.1 2.66
173.2 113.9 287.1 2.20
247.8 14.2 262.0 2.01
224.7 29.6 254.3 1.95
107.3 90.9 198.2 1.52
92.0 76.9 168.9 1.29
104.5 48.6 153.1 1.17
89.6 58.0 147.6 1.13
78.3 38.7 117.0 0.90
19.0 87.1 106.1 0.81
78.8 7.3 86.1 0.66
32.4 53.6 86.0 0.66
66.3 12.9 79.2 0.61
63.2 13.9 77.1 0.59
44.5 16.0 60.5 0.46
49.9 2.1 52.0 0.40
49.3 0.8 50.1 0.38
37.3 12.3 49.6 0.38
1.9 36.3 38.2 0.29
33.5 3.6 37.1 0.28
21.0 9.0 30.0 0.23
25.6 3.4 29.0 0.22
15.1 8.4 23.5 0.18
0.3 23.1 23.4 0.18
6.0 17.1 23.1 0.18
17.8 2.7 20.5 0.16
0.2 17.9 18.1 0.14
13.3 1.6 14.9 0.11
NegI 13.7 13.7 0.10
0.7 12.4 13.1 0.10
0.2 8.2 8.4 0.06
0.2 6.8 7.0 0.05
1.2 5.7 6.9 0.05
1.8 4.8 6.6 0.05
0.3 5.7 6.0 0.04
3.6 0.8 4.4 0.03
3.5 0.8 4.3 0.03
0.2 3.7 3.9 0.03
0.4 2.6 3.0 0.02
0.2 0.5 0.7 0.01
NA NA NA NA
NA NA NA NA
NA NA NA NA
NA NA NA NA
16
CONFIDENTIAL
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Sub-Saharan Africa:
Trade Balances With the United States
Nigeria ............................................
4,167.7
5,137.9
South Africa ....................................
-422.8
214.4
Ivory Coast ......................................
184.0
228.4
Ghana ................................................
21.9
68.6
Angola ..............................................
229.1
271.3
Zaire ................................................
93.7
59.3
Uganda ..............................................
100.4
233.6
Gabon ................................................
143.9
195.1
Liberia ............................................
14.1
16.4
Kenya ..............................................
17.0
15.1
Zambia ............................................
112.6
55.9
Ethiopia ..........................................
16.7
31.6
Tanzania ..........................................
11.1
39.6
Sudan ..............................................
-81.5
-68.1
Cameroon ........................................
-16.3
-21.2
Madagascar .....................................
53.7
71.5
Mozambique ....................................
27.1
53.4
Sierra Leone ....................................
38.6
49.3
Guinea ............................................
20.8
28.5
Botswana ..........................................
50.4
47.8
Rhodesia ..........................................
45.0
48.5
Congo ..............................................
41.4
25.0
Senegal ............................................
-37.5
-34.4
Rwanda ............................................
51.0
29.9
Mauritius ........................................
10.0
12.0
Burundi ............................................
19.2
22.2
Namibia ..........................................
-7.3
-11.1
Niger ................................................
-7.8
6.7
Togo ................................................
-18.8
-22.8
Malawi ............................................
6.0
15.1
Mauritania ......................................
-18.7
-17.7
Swaziland ........................................
7.9
11.7
Benin ................................................
-12.7
-13.7
Upper Volta ....................................
-9.2
-11.7
Chad ................................................
-2.7
-8.0
Mali ..................................................
-1.7
-6.6
Guinea-Bissau ..................................
-1.9
-4.5
Somalia ............................................
-9.1
-3.0
Gambia ............................................
-3.1
-5.4
Central African Empire
1.8
2.8
Reunion ..........................................
5.2
2.7
Lesotho ............................................
-4.5
--3.5
Djibouti ............................................
-3.8
--2.2
Seychelles ........................................
-0.1
-.0.3
Cape Verde ....................................
NA
NA
Comoro Islands ..............................
NA
NA
Equatorial Guinea
NA
NA
Sao Tome ........................................
NA
NA
CONFIDENTIAL 17
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 Approved For Release 2002/05/09 : CIA-RDP80T00702A000500080006-2
SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA: US DIRECT INVESTMENT
Sub-Saharan Africa traditionally has not at-
tracted a great deal of US direct investment
because most countries in the area suffer from
skilled labor shortages, small domestic markets,
and frequent political instability. More recently,
Africanization policies by host governments have
discouraged US businessmen. At yearend 1976,
only 2.6 percent of the stock of US foreign direct
investment was in the sub-Sahara-a share that
has held relatively steady for several decades.
The net book value * of these investments stood
at just over $3.5 billion, with more than one-half
the total in the extractive industries.
South Africa consistently has been the focus of
US business interests in the sub-Sahara and at
yearend 1976 accounted for almost one-half the
stock of US investment in Africa at $1.7 billion.
Only eight other sub-Saharan economies- Li-
beria, Nigeria, Zambia, Ghana, Zaire, Rhodesia,
Kenya, and Gabon-have investments of more
than $90 million. The nine countries together
* Net book values are the cumulative values of holdings on
companies' accounts and generally reflect the cost (after depreci-
ation) of investment and reinvestment of earnings less liabilities.
While book values are subject to a large degree of error and are
likely to understate current values of investment, they have been
used in this report because they are more uniformly defined and
collected than any alternative valuation.
account for almost 90 percent of US investment
in Africa.
South Africa has traditionally been of interest
to foreign investors because of the country's
mineral resources, relatively developed services
sector, generally high rates of economic growth,
and favorable government investment policies.
Only in the past few years have racial outbreaks
against Pretoria's apartheid system as well as
prolonged economic recession dampened US
business interest. In 1975-76, US investment in
the country grew only 14 percent, and South
Africa's share of US sub-Saharan investment fell
5 percentage points.
In marked contrast to US investment patterns
elsewhere in Africa, investment in manufactur-
ing represented 42 percent of the US stock at
yearend 1976. These investments play a major
role in the South African economy. US compa-
nies dominate South African markets for some
high-technology items, such as computers and
aircraft parts, and are major competitors with
European companies in large segments of the
consumer and capital goods markets, including
automobiles, home appliances, petroleum pro-
ducts, farm and construction tractors, and the
Sub-Saharan Africa:
Net Book Value of US Direct Investment By Economic Sector, 1976
Total
Mining and
Smelting
Petroleum
Manufacturing
Other
of which:
South Africa ..........
1,665
707
259
Liberia ..................
348
NA
83
NA
195
Nigeria ..................
341
NA
281
35
25
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Figure 4
Sub-Saharan Africa: Net Book Value of US Direct Investment by Country, 1976
South Africa MILLION -(is-'$
Liberia 348
Nigeria 341
Zambia 199
Ghana 171
Zaire 103
Rhodesia 100
Kenya 93
Gabon 91
Madagascar 27
Senegal
24
Ethiopia
22
Sudan
22
Ivory Coast
19
Cameroon
16
Mauritania
16
Tanzania
15
Somalia
14
Namibia
14
Togo
9
Benin
5
Sierra Leone
5
Uganda
4
Lesotho
3
Malawi
3
Swaziland
3
Mozambique
2
Upper Volta
2
Gambia
1
Burundi
-1
,04
Other 245
Sn6A~1TT CIA
20 25X1 CONFIDENTIAL
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like. Another 42 percent was distributed among
the mining, smelting, and petroleum industries.
Liberia accounted for 10 percent of US direct
investment in sub-Saharan Africa in 1976. Po-
litical stability, the limited number of restrictions
on foreign investors, and historically close ties
with the United States have been among Monro-
via's major drawing cards. About one-fourth of
US investment in the country is in the transpor-
tation and communications sectors, reflecting the
interests of US mining and rubber companies in
developing routes to serve their own facilities.
Investment in petroleum refining accounts for
another one-fourth, while the traditional sectors
of rubber and iron ore explain most of the rest.
The bulk of US investment in Nigeria in
recent years-80 to 90 percent-has been con-
nected with the petroleum industry. However,
exploration activities were curtailed sharply in
1976 in response to Lagos' aggressive oil pricing
policies, which cut into company profits. More
recently, a revenue pinch has prodded the gov-
ernment into more liberal oil pricing policies, but
the shift has not been dramatic enough to induce
US companies to increase sharply investment
funds. Overall, the investment climate in Nigeria
has been far from ideal since the current govern-
ment came to power in 1975 and changed invest-
ment laws to require partial Nigerian Govern-
ment ownership in foreign investments.
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SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA: COUNTRIES OF STRATEGIC/POLITICAL IMPORTANCE
Although a number of African countries are
important to the United States for various politi-
cal reasons, we believe that four countries stand
out for their strategic/political significance to
the West. These countries-Ethiopia, Nigeria,
South Africa, and Zaire-were selected on the
basis of: (1) their size, (2) their geographic
locations, and (3) the implications and/or influ-
ence of political developments within their bor-
ders for other African countries.
Ethiopia is strategically important because of
its large size relative to most other countries of
northeast Africa and its proximity to the oil
shipping lanes of the Red Sea and Indian Ocean.
Both clearly make Addis Ababa the dominant
power in the Horn of Africa. Moreover, the
infusion over the past 18 months or so of $1.5-2
billion of Soviet military hardware has made the
Ethiopian military second in strength and re-
sources only to those of Egypt and South Africa
on the continent as a whole.
Ethiopia's strategic importance has certainly
not been lost on the Soviets. Indeed, Moscow was
willing to jeopardize and ultimately sacrifice
nearly a decade of strategic equities it had
painstakingly built up in neighboring Somalia-
including the Soviet missile-handling facility at
Berbera-in order to ingratiate itself with the
military regime in Addis Ababa.
While ideological and political considerations
clearly played a key role in Moscow's decision
last year to switch sides in the Horn, the Soviets
were doubtless also motivated in large measure
by the desire to use their position in Ethiopia as a
strategic springboard for influencing events in
East Africa, the Persian Gulf, and perhaps other
areas of the Middle East as well.
US strategic/political interest in Nigeria rests
on the fact that Lagos is emerging as a spokes-
man for Africa and supplies almost 20 percent of
US oil imports. In particular, Nigeria is playing
an increasingly influential and generally prag-
matic role on the African and international
scene. Lagos aspires to become the political
leader of Africa and to be heard as its voice in
Third World councils. Nigerian views on US
motives and policies toward Africa and the Third
World can be important to the success of these
policies. Nigerian attitudes have a direct impact
on southern Africa, OPEC, and North-South
issues.
Theoretically, Nigeria could use its economic
clout in dealing with the United States because
of its position as the second largest supplier of
crude oil and a sub-Saharan state with one of the
largest stocks of direct US private investment.
While few Nigerians think in terms of resorting
to an oil boycott in support of their foreign
policy, the government has stated its intention to
boycott firms with investments in both Nigeria
and South Africa. In view of Nigeria's currently
favorable attitude toward US southern Africa
policy and its own strong need for foreign ex-
change to support economic development, Ni-
geria would consid~r some version of an eco-
nomic boycott and the oil weapon only if all
efforts fail to achieve a negotiated settlement for
peaceful transition to majority rule in southern
Africa.
US-Nigerian relations have become markedly
warmer in the past year and a half as political
goals of the two countries have converged, espe-
cially with regard. to the conflict in Rhodesia.
The improved climate of US-Nigerian relations
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is heavily dependent upon a continued favorable
Nigerian perception of US intentions and actions
in southern Africa and could be seriously set
back by negative developments in the region.
South Africa, the most industrialized country
in Africa, is the focal point for economic develop-
ment and regional stability in southern Africa.
US interests in South Africa extend beyond the
economic considerations of trade and investment
to the political situation in southern Africa. Not
only is the internal situation important, but the
impact of these internal problems on South
Africa's neighbors is of concern as well. The sea
route around South Africa is of strategic impor-
tance to the United States and to a lesser degree
to Western Europe.
If majority rule comes to South Africa in a
long and bloody struggle or if it results in mass
emigration of whites, other countries in southern
Africa could suffer real economic hardships. The
repatriated earnings of migrant laborers in South
Africa provide some of Pretoria's neighbors-
Lesotho, Botswana, Swaziland, Mozambique,
Malawi, and Rhodesia-with a significant por-
tion of their foreign exchange. South Africa also
provides these neighbors with a large market in
which to sell their exports and offers them a
wider range of goods to import than might
otherwise be the case. For example, Botswana
exports a substantial amount of its beef to South
Africa.
The liberation of southern Africa from the
dominance of the white minority is the long-term
objective of externally based South African liber-
ation organizations, backed by the OAU and
supported by the USSR and to a lesser extent
China. Their efforts must be viewed in tandem
with the extensive rioting and internal disruption
by urban black South Africans that has taken
place over the past two years. Unless the South
African Government begins to make political
concessions to blacks that involve genuine power
sharing-a prospect that appears highly unlikely
in the near future--there will be continued agita-
tion and strife in South Africa.
Almost 60 percent of West European oil im-
ports and 33 percent of US oil imports are
carried around the Cape of Good Hope. South
Africa's six ports are the most developed and
sophisticated in the southern African transporta-
tion system, which includes rail and combination
of water-rail routes running from Pointe Noire in
the Congo on the west coast around the Cape to
Mombasa in Kenya on the east coast. A large
proportion of southern Africa's exports transit
South African ports; without them, transporta-
tion systems in Botswana, Lesotho, and, under
the current political situation, Rhodesia, would
be hamstrung.
Zaire's vast size-roughly equal to the United
States east of the Mississippi-and its location in
the heart of Africa with borders on nine states
give it an important role in Africa. In addition,
Zaire's pro-Western stance and traditional close
political and economic ties with the United
States make Kinshasa of continuing interest to
US policymakers. Kinshasa has also provided the
West with a window on the Cuban and Soviet
activities in Angola.
Since seizing power in 1965, President
Mobutu has held Zaire together in spite of a
variety of intractable problems that periodically
lead to disorders and raise the specter of a return
to the bloody postindependence chaos of the
early 1960s. The problems include deep ethnic
and regional cleavages (Zaire consists of more
than 200 tribes speaking 700 languages and
dialects), severe economic difficulties, and ani-
mosities with some neighboring countries, par-
ticularly leftist-ruled Angola. Twice in the past
18 months, the United States and its allies have
helped President Mobutu meet threats to Zaire's
economic lifeline in the copper region of Shaba.
In seeking Western support, Mobutu has been
successful in portraying the challenges to his
regime as Soviet or Cuban inspired. He also has
successfully portrayed himself as a moderate
elder statesman holding the line against Commu-
nist encroachment in Africa. Mobutu probably
believes, as do many observers, that his death
would plunge Zaire into internal disorder, which
would have a destabilizing effect on the entire
central African region and create a situation
favorable to exploitation by the Communists.
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SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA: ECONOMIC AID FROM THE
UNITED STATES AND OTHER DONORS
Net bilateral US economic assistance to sub-
Saharan Africa, which totaled $773 million in
1974-76, is small compared to aid provided by
former European colonizers. France is by far the
largest individual aid donor, while economic
assistance from Arab OPEC states has been
growing rapidly in recent years. In contrast,
bilateral US aid to the region declined, in part
due to a growing preference in Washington for
multilateral assistance. The size of the Commu-
nist economic aid contribution, about 70 percent
of which is given by China, remains roughly
comparable to that of the United States. (See
page 7 and tables E-1 and E-2 for a discussion of
multilateral aid and US bilateral aid recipients.)
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Sub-Saharan Africa: Net Bilateral Economic Aid From the United States
1974 1975 1976 1974-76
Total Per Capita Total Per Capita Total Per Capita Total Per Capita
(Million US $) (US $) (Million US $) (US $) (Million US $) (US $) (Million US $) (US $)
Sub-Saharan Africa ............ 234.0 0.8 261.0 0.8 238.0 0.7 733.0 0.8
Angola -1.0 -0.2 0 0 -1.0 -0.2 -2.0 -0.4
Benin ............................... 3.0 1.0 2.0 0.6 6.0 1.9 11.0 3.5
Botswana ......................... 4.0 6.0 5.0 7.3 6.0 8.7 15.0 22.0
Burundi ............................ Negl Negl 1.0 0.3 1.0 0.3 2.0 0.6
Cameroon ........................ 1.0 0.2 5.0 0.8 4.0 0.6 10.0 1.6
Cape Verde .................... 0 0 0 0 3.0 10.0 3.0 10.0
Central African Empire Negl Negl 1.0 0.6 Negl Negl 1.0 0.6
Chad ................................ 6.0 1.5 4.0 1.0 5.0 1.2 15.0 3.7
Comoro Islands .............. 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Congo ._ ........................... 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Djibouti ........................... 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Equatorial Guinea .......... 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Ethiopia ......................... 26.0 1.0 24.0 0.9 29.0 1.0 79.0 2.9
Gabon ............................... 3.0 5.6 3.0 5.5 6.0 10.9 12.0 22.0
Gambia ............................ 1.0 2.0 Negl Negl 1.0 1.9 2.0 3.9
Ghana ................................ -1.0 -0.1 4.0 0.4 13.0 1.3 16.0 1.6
Guinea ............................ 5.0 1.2 8.0 1.8 8.0 1.8 21.0 4.8
Guinea-Bissau .................. 0 0 0 0 1.0 2.0 1.0 2.0
Ivory Coast ...................... 3.0 0.6 0 0 1.0 0.1 4.0 0.7
Kenya .............................. 10.0 0.8 7.0 0.5 11.0 0.8 28.0 2.1
Lesotho ............................ 3.0 3.0 2.0 2.0 4.0 3.6 9.0 8.6
Liberia ............................ -2.0 -1.2 -2.0 -1.1 13.0 8.7 9.0 6.4
Madagascar ..................... Negl Negl 2.0 0.3 1.0 0.1 3.0 0.4
Malawi ........................... 4.0 0.8 4.0 0.8 5.0 1.0 13.0 2.6
Mali .............. ................. 17.0 3.1 10.0 1.8 5.0 0.9 32.0 5.8
Mauritania ..................... 9.0 6.9 3.0 2.3 7.0 5.0 19.0 14.2
Mauritius ....................... 3.0 3.3 1.0 1.1 Negi Negl 4.0 4.4
Mozambique .................... 0 0 0 0 10.0 1.1 10.0 1.1
Namibia .......................... 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0
Niger ................................ 21.0 4.8 9.0 2.0 9.0 1.9 39.0 8.7
Nigeria ............................ 8.0 0.1 6.0 0.1 3.0 0.1 17.0 0.3
Reunion .......................... 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Rhodesia .......................... 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Rwanda ........................... 1.0 0.2 3.0 0.7 2.0 0.5 6.0 1.4
Sao Tome 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Senegal ........................... 6.0 1.4 8.0 1.9 7.0 1.6 21.0 4.9
Seychelles Negl Negi Negl Negl Negl Negl Neg) Negl
Sierre Leone .................... 3.0 1.1 4.0 1.5 3.0 1.1 10.0 3.7
Somalia ............................ Negl Negl 5.0 1.6 2.0 0.6 7.0 2.2
South Africa .................... 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Sudan .............................. 7.0 0.4 4.0 0.2 -5.0 -0.3 6.0 0.3
Swaziland ........................ 1.0 2.1 1.0 2.0 1.0 2.0 3.0 6.1
Tanzania .......................... 10.0 0.7 33.0 2.2 33.0 2.1 76.0 5.0
Togo ................................ 3.0 1.4 2.0 0.9 2.0 0.9 7.0 3.2
Uganda .............................. 1.0 0.1 Negl Negl Negl Negl 1.0 0.1
Upper Volta .......... _....... 7.0 1.2 5.0 0.8 8.0 1.3 20.0 3.3
Zaire ............................... 63.0 2.6 92.0 3.7 27.0 1.1 182.0 7.4
Zambia ........ 9.0 1.9 5.0 1.0 7.0 1.4 21.0 4.3
1ODA and OOF.
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Sub-Saharan Africa: Economic Aid From Multilateral Institutions
1974 1975 1976
Total Per Capita Total Per Capita Total Per Capita Total Per Capita
Sub-Saharan Africa .......... 921.1 3.0 1,290.9 4.0 1,212.4 3.7 3,424.4 3.6
Angola .............................. 0.1 Negl 0.8 0.1 7.1 1.2 8.0 1.3
Benin ................................ 16.2 5.4 24.1 7.8 24.6 7.7 64.9 20.9
Botswana .......................... 15.1 21.6 15.4 22.0 9.1 13.0 39.6 56.6
Burundi ............................ 15.4 4.1 23.2 6.1 19.9 5.1 58.5 15.3
Cameroon ........................ 27.5 4.4 66.3 10.4 53.4 8.2 147.2 23.0
Cape Verde .................... NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA
Central African Empire 18.3 10.8 23.7 13.2 12.6 7.0 54.6 31.0
Chad ................................ 31.6 8.1 33.2 8.3 17.7 4.3 82.5 20.7
Comoro Islands .............. 0.2 0.7 4.1 13.7 13.6 45.3 17.9 59.7
Congo .............................. 17.6 17.6 18.7 14.4 25.6 18.3 61.9 50.3
Djibouti ............................ 0.7 7.0 0.3 3.0 0 0 1.0 10.0
Equatorial Guinea .......... NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA
Ethiopia .......................... 45.7 1.7 67.4 2.2 65.9 2.3 174.0 6.2
Gabon ................................ 0.3 0.6 5.9 11.8 4.3 7.2 10.5 19.6
Gambia ............................ 5.5 11.0 4.5 9.0 4.5 9.0 14.5 29.0
Ghana ................................ 13.8 1.4 20.0 2.0 30.0 2.9 63.8 6.3
Guinea ............................ 1.2 0.3 5.1 1.2 5.0 1.1 11.3 2.6
Guinea-Bissau .................. NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA
Ivory Coast ...................... 58.4 11.0 68.8 12.5 52.7 7.6 179.9 31.1
Kenya .............................. 54.7 4.2 97.0 7.3 107.4 7.7 259.1 19.2
Lesotho ............................ 9.7 9.7 14.0 14.0 12.0 10.9 35.7 34.6
Liberia ............................ 11.0 6.5 14.9 8.3 14.8 9.9 40.7 24.7
Madagascar ...................... 31.9 4.3 63.4 8.6 36.1 4.7 131.4 17.6
Malawi ............................ 11.5 2.3 17.1 3.4 20.0 3.8 48.6 9.5
Mali .................................. 47.7 8.7 63.2 11.3 32.6 5.7 143.5 25.7
Mauritania ...................... 17.0 13.0 3.1 2.4 24.0 17.1 44.1 32.5
Mauritius ........................ 11.5 12.8 17.3 19.2 9.9 11.0 38.7 43.0
Mozambique .................... 0.1 Negl 8.0 0.9 35.7 3.9 43.8 4.8
Namibia .......................... NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA
Niger ................................ 56.5 12.8 46.7 10.2 45.2 9.6 148.4 32.6
Nigeria ............................ 49.8 0.8 43.2 0.7 46.2 0.7 139.2 2.2
Reunion .......................... 4.2 8.4 8.7 17.4 6.9 13.8 19.8 39.6
Rhodesia .......................... -4.5 -0.7 -4.6 -0.7 -4.2 -0.6 -13.3 -2.0
Rwanda ............................ 15.1 3.7 29.1 6.9 22.2 5.2 66.4 15.8
Sao Tome ........................ NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA
Senegal ............................ 43.5 10.4 56.5 13.1 42.2 9.6 142.2 33.1
Seychelles ........................ 0.1 1.7 0.2 3.3 0.5 8.3 0.8 13.3
Sierre Leone .................... 9.2 3.4 12.2 4.5 8.7 3.1 30.1 11.0
Somalia ............................ 33.5 10.8 51.5 16.1 51.6 16.1 136.6 43.0
South Africa .................... NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA
Sudan .............................. 59.7 3.5 63.7 3.6 79.2 4.4 202.6 11.5
Swaziland ........................ 5.7 11.4 10.5 .21.0 10.6 21.2 38.3 53.6
Tanzania .......................... 30.4 2.1 107.4 7.1 66.7 4.3 204.5 13.5
Togo ................................ 14.9 6.8 16.3 7.4 20.6 9.0 51.8 23.2
Uganda .............................. 10.3 0.9 15.1 1.3 13.2 1.1 38.6 3.3
Upper Volta .................... 43.9 7.6 35.7 6.0 23.9 3.9 103.5 17.5
Zaire ................................ 30.3 1.3 60.0 2.4 63.8 2.5 154.1 6.2
Zambia ............................ 55.8 11.6 64.2 13.1 76.6 15.3 196.6 40.0
CONFIDENTIAL 27
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Sub-Saharan Africa:
Net Disbursements of Official Funds
1974
1975
1976
1974-76
Total ........................................
3,039
3,978
4,387
11,402
United States ....................
234
261
238
733
France ................................
648
806
821
2,275
Other industrial ..................
861
1,234
1,350
3,445
of which:
West Germany .........
181
163
305
649
Canada ......................
137
222
175
534
Belgium ......................
140
175
165
480
United Kingdom ........
121
131
152
404
Sweden ........................
76
129
135
340
OPEC Arab ........................
195
214
511
920
Communist ..........................
180
170
255
605
of which:
China ............................
130
109
184
423
Soviet Union ..............
43
39
31
113
Eastern Europe .........
7
22
40
69
Multilateral
921
1,291
1,212
3,424
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Confidential
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