THE GOLDEN TRIANGLE: NEW DEVELOPMENTS IN NARCOTICS TRAFFICKING

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP80T00702A000400010004-2
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 16
• Document Creation Date: December 12, 2016
• Document Release Date: June 1, 2001
• Sequence Number: 4
• Publication Date: September 1, 1978
• Content Type: REPORT

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NATIONAL SECURITY INFORMATION
Unauthorized Disclosure Subject to Criminal Sanctions
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NOFORN
The Golden Triangle: New Developments
in Narcotics Trafficking
Central Intelligence Agency
National Foreign Assessment Center
Key Judgments
The Golden Triangle, a broad area embracing parts of Burma, Thailand,
and Laos, remains the center of world opium production for illicit purposes.
Production in 1978 is expected to range between 420 and 470 metric tons--
well above 1977s figure of 400 tons, but slightly less than in 1975 and 1976.
Although two-thirds of the area's output is consumed within the three
producing nations, in an average year some 150 tons of opium equivalent
enters into international markets. This probably represents the largest single
source of opium and opium derivatives entering the international illicit trade.
About half of Golden Triangle exports are consumed in other southeast Asian
countries, with Malaysia, Hong Kong, Singapore, and Indonesia being the
largest markets. Typically, another 60 tons of opium equivalent enter the
West European market, while five to 10 tons go to Australia.
In 1977, about one-third of the estimated six tons of heroin (60 tons of
opium equivalents) consumed in the United States was of Golden Triangle
origin. This marks a significant increase over previous years and apparently
results from a reduction in the flow of heroin derived from Mexican opium.
(Mexican heroin, which supplied about 90 percent of the US market in the
mid-1970s, has declined sharply in importance because of Mexico's increas-
ingly effective program of destroying poppy plantations, increased US
interdiction of heroin shipments at the border, and poor climatic conditions.)
Golden Triangle heroin destined for the United States is smuggled abroad
international flights from Thailand and Singapore and by sea shipments
through Malaysia and other Pacific points.
Most Golden Triangle opium distribution traditionally has been in the
hands of ethnic Chinese, usually of Yunnanese origin. The most important of
these Chinese groups are the Chinese-led Shan United Army (SUA) and the
Chinese Irregular Forces. The latter group was originally composed of
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achin
.`;tate i'
Knyah
State
Secret
NOFORN
'~'k`ipde
Golden Triangle
Poppy Growing Areas
- International boundary
- Province or state boundary (Burma
and northwest Thailand only)
---Map
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NOFORN
remnants of Nationalist armies driven from western China when the Commu-
nists consolidated their control. The SUA, on the other hand, has been mainly
a narcotics trafficking organization employing large numbers of ethnic Shans
as soldiers and laborers. The transport role of these groups has declined since
1976, however, because of government interdiction efforts. Independent
traffickers and tribal groups, which because of their smaller size are more
difficult targets for government action, now handle about two-thirds of opium
shipments within the Triangle. Some of these independent traffickers work
under contract for or pay taxes to the Chinese groups. Burmese Communists
are also increasing their role in narcotics activity by offering protection to
opium caravans through their areas of control.
Processing and international shipping is also handled largely by ethnic
Chinese. In particular, narcotics destined for the international market are
often financed by consortia of Chinese businessmen who also may have other,
legitimate interests. International distribution is usually handled by Chinese
of South China ancestry, who deal with compatriots in Chinese communities
throughout the world.
The Burmese Government is engaging in vigorous police and military
actions against growers, processors, and smugglers. Although these efforts
have resulted in some structural changes in the narcotics business-including
a decline in the use of large caravans-they appear to be having little lasting
effect on total opium output. Opium cultivation continues to be the main
source of income for many tribal groups. As government forces are unable to
effectively control all areas of Burma on a continuous basis, tribal groups
have little incentive to give up opium production despite the occasional
destruction of their crops and stocks. As for Thailand, the government has
moved more cautiously against growers, focusing its antinarcotics effort
instead on urban enforcement. The Government of Laos is apparently making
no effort to discourage the narcotics business in its jurisdiction.
In the near term we expect heroin that is derived from Golden Triangle
opium to come into the US market in increasing amounts as (a) Mexican
heroin is prevented from entering the United States in customary amounts;
and (b) Golden Triangle heroin is displaced in Western Europe by heroin of
South Asian origin. We see little likelihood that the total supply of Golden
Triangle opium will be significantly reduced. Indeed, government interdiction
efforts may have strengthened the business by forcing traffickers to shorten
lines of communication, take advantage of relatively safe supplies from
Communist-controlled areas, process opium near the site of poppy cultivation,
and use small caravans of independent transporters. Marginal traffickers
have been forced out, and those remaining are better organized and financed
than ever. Moreover, Laos-where regulation is weak and which was only a
minor factor in Golden Triangle production-may be emerging as a major
supplier of narcotics.
iii
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The Golden Triangle: New Developments
in Narcotics Trafficking
Recent Opium Production Trends
Raw opium production in the Golden Triangle
is expected to range between 420 and 470 tons
during the crop year ending in August 1978.
Roughly three-fourths of total production contin-
ues to come from Burma, with Thailand and
Laos accounting for the remainder. Although
output is believed to have risen in ' Burma and
Thailand-and perhaps Laos as well-in crop
year 1978, production is still somewhat below
levels reached in the mid-1970s, as indicated in
table 1.
Burma-Leading Producer
Raw opium output in Burma historically has
averaged between 400 and 500 tons annually.
Since 1976, however, production has consistently
fallen below the historical average, reflecting the
effectiveness of Burma's poppy crop destruction
campaigns and, in some years, poor growing
conditions. During the 1977 crop year Burmese
production dropped to an estimated 300 tons, the
lowest level in recent, history. Roughly half the
Golden Triangle: Estimated Opium Production'
Metric Tons
1975
Total
420-470
400
500
520
Burma
300-350
300
400
440
Thailand
70
50
50
30
Laos
50
50
50
50
' Crop year ending in August of stated year; all estimates rounded
to nearest 10 tons.
# Preliminary.
8 Estimates not comparable from year to year because of differ-
ences in survey coverage.
year-to-year drop in output reflected the govern-
ment's poppy destruction program that affected
4,000 hectares, an area capable of producing 50
tons of raw opium. In addition to the crop
destruction program, adverse weather resulted ir.
a substantial drop in yields.
Burmese opium production in 1978 approxi-
mated 300 to 350 tons as improved growing
conditions more than offset continued crop losses
caused by the government's poppy destruction
programs. During the sensitive growing period
(September 1977-February 1978) some 4,000
hectares of poppies were again destroyed by the
government with most of the destruction occur-
ring in Shan State areas west of the Salween
River. Despite the government's program, the
area west of the Salween still accounts for over
60 percent of total Burmese production. Commu-
nist-controlled areas east of the Salween River
account for most of the remainder; smaller
amounts continue to be produced in Kachin
State, Kayah State, and Chin Hills.
Thailand-Rising Production
The opium harvest in Thailand is expected to
reach somewhat more than 70 tons in 1978. This
estimate derives in part from surveys covering
major areas in northern Thailand where the crop
is raised. Based on these studies, 6,400 hectares
were under cultivation during 1978 with yields
averaging 11 kilograms per hectare. The largest
poppy-producing area remains Chiang Mai Prov-
ince, which contributes some 40 percent of the
total area under poppy cultivation. While we
believe Thai output increased during the current
year, table 1 overstates the gains since previous
annual production estimates were based on less
comprehensive surveys than those used for the
1978 crop.
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Laos-Output Still Uncertain
The level of opium production in Laos remains
little more than an estimate. Prior to the Com-
munist takeover of the country, opium, produc-
tion was believed to approximate 30 tons annual-
ly, most of which was consumed domestically.
However, there are indications that production in
the past was substantially greater than 30 tons
per year, since that figure excludes any output
from Communist areas during the period of the
neutral government. We now believe that output
from these regions may have been consider-
able-perhaps 20 tons annually. As a result we
put total 1978 opium production in Laos at 50
tons.
Raw Opium Shipments in 1977-78
About one-third of the opium grown. in the
Golden Triangle is consumed in the area itself.
Another one-third or more is usually shipped for
use elsewhere in the Burma-Thailand-Laos re-
gion. The balance of production --typically 150
tons of opium equivalent annually-makes its
way into international markets.
Burma-Shipments to Border Areas
Opium-producing areas in Burma shipped al-
most 200 tons of opium equivalents during 1977
to transshipment points or refineries located else-
where in Burma or in Thailand. Nearly 60
percent of these supplies originated in the north-
ern Shan State, with the balance coming mainly
from the central and southern Shan State. As
indicated in table 2, deliveries from these re-
gions-measured in raw opium equivalents-
rose sharply between 1976 and 1977 despite
stepped-up Burmese army interdiction oper-
ations. These military actions, however, did force
traffickers to ship a larger share of their output
in the form of impure morphine base (pitzu)
rather than raw opium, which is bulkier and
more difficult to transport.
During 1977 a little over 90 percent of the
opium shipped from Burmese producing areas
went to the Burma-Thailand border. The rest
went to scattered points elsewhere in Burma.
Receiving points for the main narcotics flow
remained concentrated in two major border re-
gions: the Lao Lo Chai-Doi Long area, which
accounted for almost 70 percent of deliveries in
Burma and281 C
Mae Hong Son Province border region. The
Kengtung area in Burma remains an important
transshipment point for many of these border
shipments, accounting for more than 20 percent
of all shipments to border areas. Most of the
Kengtung shipments are believed to have origi-
nated in areas controlled by the Burmese
Communists.
Data for early 1978 indicate that shipments
from major producing areas within Burma are
running well behind those of the comparable
1977 period. During the period January-April
1978, for example, deliveries from the northern
Shan State of a little more than two tons com-
pared with 14 tons for the same 1977 period.
However, much of this reduction is attributed to
delays in shipments resulting from fighting be-
tween the Burmese Army and the Burmese
Communists. Numerous reports indicate that
large stocks of narcotics had been assembled
throughout the Shan State awaiting delivery to
the border during this period. With military
action waning, we expect full-scale shipments to
resume; total shipments for the year should equal
or exceed 1977 levels.
Jan-Apr 1978
1977
1976
Total
41.1
198.4
168.9
Northern Shan State
2.2
116.1
92.4
Central Shan State
25.5
47.9
67.2
Southern Shan State
13.4
30.6
9.3
Kayah State
3.8
0
Raw opium shipments out of Thai producing
areas are difficult to track. Since this crop is an
important source of income for the tribal growers
in north Thailand, a large share eventually finds
' including the opium equivalent of processed narcotics its way into traditional Golden Triangle traffick-
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ing channels where it mingles with the flow of
opium equivalents from Burma. Sizable amounts
of Thai production, however, are consumed
within the Thai producing areas themselves.
While the amounts vary according to tribal
usage rates, this local consumption usually ab-
sorbs 40 percent of annual production-perhaps
30 tons of opium equivalent annually. Thai
opium consumption outside immediate producing
areas amounted to an estimated 100 tons annu-
ally in recent years. Only about 30 percent is
derived from supplies grown in the Thai portion
of the Golden Triangle; the rest comes mainly
from Burma.
Laos-Internal Movements
We have little direct information concerning
the movement of Laotian opium. Assuming the
same pattern. of usage that prevails in producing
areas of Burma and Thailand, we would calcu-
late that some 20 tons of Laotian output is
consumed in or around the producing areas
themselves. Small amounts presumably are dis-
tributed elsewhere in Laos, although the quanti-
ties are impossible to assess. As for shipments to
markets or processing centers outside of Laos-
either Thailand or elsewhere-we have little
data. Contracts for the sale of Laotian narcotics,
however, have reportedly been made with offi-
cials of certain Communist countries as well as
known traffickers in the Golden Triangle.
International Trade and Usage
Given estimated levels of production and local
and regional consumption, Golden Triangle sup-
plies available for the international market
amounted to as much as 150 tons of opium
equivalent in 1977.' The bulk of this would have
entered international channels in the form of
heroin. Based on seizure statistics to date there
' Efforts to reconcile production estimates with data on ship-
ments is complicated by the fact that production is computed on a
crop year basis whereas intelligence data on shipments is delivered
on a calendar year basis. Thus, shipments in 1977, for example,
largely reflect the output harvested during the crop year ending in
August 1976. Another factor complicating any reconciliation is the
presence of sizable but indeterminant stocks of opium and opium
equivalent at various points in the Golden Triangle region. Our best
estimate places the size of these stocks at about 80 tons at the
beginning of 1978.
seems to have been no abatement in the flow so
far this year. Given our estimate of increased
Golden Triangle production in 1978, inter-
national shipments may in fact be on the rise.
The bulk of Golden Triangle narcotics enter-
ing international channels continues to be con-
sumed within the Southeast Asian area itself.
Consumption estimates, again very tentative,
show heroin consumption in Malaysia and Hong
Kong at three tons each, amounts which together
would require 60 tons of opium equivalent. Their
heroin user population totaled an estimated
75,000 and 90,000 persons, respectively. Singa-
pore and Indonesia provide markets for another
10 tons of opium equivalent.
Another 60 tons of opium equivalent from the
Golden Triangle is believed to have entered West
European markets during 1977 with an addi-
tional five to 10 tons going to Australia. These
figures are derived by multiplying known dosage
rates by, the estimated user populations-
106,000 persons in Western Europe and 35,000
in Australia. The results are roughly consistent
with our estimates of available supplies for these
areas. Although still the leading supplier to
Western Europe, Southeast Asian traffickers are
facing increased competition from narcotics com-
ing from the Pakistan-Afghanistan region.
Illicit shipments from the Triangle to the
North American market in 1977 may have ap-
proximated 2.5 tons of heroin (25 tons of opium
equivalent), of which 2 tons were aimed specifi-
cally at the US market. Deliveries at this rate-
roughly one-third of US requirements-would
imply a significant increase in the share of US
consumption supplied from the Triangle- This
apparent shift no doubt results from the reduc-
tion in the flow of heroin derived from Mexican
grown opium.
International Routes
The bulk of the narcotics produced in the
Golden Triangle for the international market
continues to be routed through Thailand, Malay-
sia, and Singapore. Heroin shipped to Bangkok
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for foreign destinations is usually transferred to
couriers for smuggling aboard international
flights to Western Europe, Australia, and the
United States. Direct shipments from the
Burma-Thailand border to Malaysia constitute
the second major route. Although most of these
shipments follow land routes--bus, train, and.
truck-to the Malaysian border, there have been.
reports of shipments going directly from Bur-
mese ports on the Andaman Sea to Malaysia.
Most of the fishing boats used on these routes
handle other black market commodities as well.
Narcotics routed through Malaysia are gener-
ally transshipped through the port of Penang and
by air from Singapore. Other ports along the
Malaysian coast are used for shipping narcotics
to Indonesia, which serves as a transit point for
heroin destined for the US mainland via the
Philippines and Hawaii. The use of Singapore as
a jumping off point for narcotics produced in the
Golden Triangle has also been expanding in
recent years. One byproduct of using the Malay
Peninsula as a transit point for narcotics has
been a sharp increase in the Peninsula's user
population.
Golden Triangle Traffickers, Processors, and
Traders
Ethnic Chinese, primarily of Yunnarlese ori-
gin, continue to control Golden Triangle narcot-
ics activities including purchasing, processing,
and distribution. Of particular importance are
the Chinese Irregular Forces (Cl F) and the Shan
United Army (SUA), two groups which have
historically controlled a major share of the traf-
fic within the Golden Triangle. Burmese Com-
munists have been increasingly involved in Gold-
en Triangle narcotics activity in recent years, but
even this group is generally controlled by ethnic
Chinese. However, the Burmese Communist
Party (BCP) is not involved in the transport of
narcotics to the Thai border.
The Traffickers
The once overwhelming hold of the SUA and
CIF over Golden Triangle traffic has undergone
some change during the last year or so. The
major change has been the decline in their role as
Burma: Opium Shipments by Organization
Organization
1975
1976
1977
Shan United Army
34
31
23
Chinese Irregular Forces
17
26
6
Shan United Revolutionary Army
0
3
6
Subtotal of Chinese-led Groups
51
60
35
Burmese Self-Defense Groups
(KKY)
8
1
1
Tribal groups
3
3
21
Independent traffickers
38
36
43
Total
100
100
100
transporters of opium from Burma to the Thai
border. As indicated in table 3, the SUA and
CIF together handled almost 60 percent of the
traffic in 1976 but only 30 percent last year.
Although independent traffickers and tribal
groups have filled the vacuum, they often operate
under contract to the SUA or CIF or are subject
to various types of taxes imposed for the privilege
of transporting the opium. In effect, then, the
larger organizations continue to control the
opium shipments.
One reason for the organizational change in
how opium is shipped has been the increase in
government antinarcotics operations against the
large trafficking organizations. Another byprod-
uct of the government program has been a
drastic reduction in the size of caravans carrying
opium. In the mid-1970s, for example, it was not
unusual for CIF and SUA caravans to contain as
many as 300 pack animals and an equal number
of troops and traffickers. Typically, a caravan of
this size would carry over 10 tons of narcotics.
Now it is unusual to find any caravan hauling
more than two tons and the average shipment is
probably less than one ton.
Significant route changes have also occurred
during the past year. The key change has been
toward use of more numerous transshipment
points in order to avoid government interdiction
measures. Moving narcotics in stages also allows
for more effective use of vehicles and porters,
particularly on the route between Kengtung and
the Thai border. The SUA has altered its traf-
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ficking arrangements to use the southern Keng-
tung transshipment point which makes possible
the direct purchase of opium from the Burmese
Communists.
In addition to selling directly to the SUA, the
Burmese Communists have increased their role
in Golden Triangle narcotics activity in several
other ways. In particular they have expanded
their involvement in the trade by offering protec-
tion to caravans carrying narcotics purchased in
Communist. areas east of the Salween River. In
the past the BCP served only as sales agents and
provided no assistance once the new buyer took
control of the opium,. Most of the BCP narcotics
continues to be marketed in traditional Golden
Triangle distribuiton channels through the Keng-
tung area.
was located in the Lao Lo Chai area; others were
in the Doi Long area and the Mae Hong Son
border region. (See map on page 8.)
As for personnel, almost all of the heroin
chemists operating in the Golden Triangle are
Chinese. Many of the chemists now residing in
north Thailand had formerly operated heroin
laboratories in Hong Kong. The crackdown on
laboratories by Hong Kong authorities in 1976
forced a large number of chemists to flee to
Thailand where they are now specializing in the
production of No. 3 heroin tailored for the Hong
Kong market. Thus far processing plants have
had little trouble obtaining the needed chemicals
used in opium processing. Strong demand for the
kinds of chemicals used in the heroin conversion
process did result in temporary shortages during
1977-78.
Opium Processing
The number of facilities processing narcotics
increased in 1977 throughout the Golden Trian-
gle. Much of this increase came about in an
attempt to minimize the risk of shipping raw
opium from the northern Shan State by convert-
ing greater quantities of opium into impure
morphine base prior to departure. In addition,
traffickers were anxious to reduce raw opium
stockpiles in the border area by converting most
of their opium and morphine base supplies into
heroin. During 1977 at least 56 percent of the
opium equivalents shipped into the Burma-Thai-
land border were delivered directly to heroin
refineries. By comparison, during the first four
months of 1978 this figure rose to over 80
percent.
Since the beginning of 1978 at least 11 refiner-
ies specializing in the production of impure mor-
phine base have been identified in the northern
Shan State. Six of the privately owned facilities
were located in areas under the control of the
Kachin Independence Army (KIA). Another five
were located in areas controlled by the BCP.
Border refineries specializing in the production
of heroin were particularly active in 1977 and
early 1978 when 19 facilities were identified as
producing morphine base and all types of heroin.
The greatest concentration-seven refineries-
International Shipping
Narcotics destined for the international mar-
ket from the Golden Triangle are often handled
by consortia of Chinese businessmen. Although
narcotics trafficking is the major source of in-
come for many of them, some are upstanding
community leaders with varied profitable busi-
ness interests. The latter type of investor is not
usually a permanent member of a trading group
but moves in and out of the market depending on
opportunities. Generally there is little if any
association by these investors with the actual
handling of narcotics. International distribution
is mostly under the control of ethnic Chinese of
South China ancestry. They deal only with their
compatriots in the numerous overseas Chinese
communities throughout the world. Because of
the notoriety associated with narcotics traffick-
ing and the Chinese community in Europe and
other areas of the world served by the Golden
Triangle, these groups now employ Caucasian
couriers for transporting heroin out of Southeast
Asia.
Government Programs
During 1977 and early 1978 the Burmese and
Thai Governments continued to engage in a wide
variety of operations designed to reduce the
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effectiveness of the traffickers and their organi-
zations in the Golden Triangle and peripheral
areas. In Burma these operations involved the
use of government officials, police, and military
forces in efforts to destroy poppies and refineries
and to interdict caravans. In Thailand, major
emphasis was placed on stepped-up enforcement
efforts between the Burma border and Bangkok,
the implementation of crop substitution pro-
grams in the growing areas, and a recently
promulgated order by the government to expell
all anti-Burmese dissident groups from the coun-
try. Laos had no antinarcotics program of
significance.
Burmese poppy crop destruction prograim.s ap-
pear to have leveled off during the past three
years to an annual destruction rate of about
4,000 hectares, which is equivalent to approxi-
mately 50 tons of potential output each year.
Most of the affected area lies west of the Sal-
ween River where Burmese troops are able to
penetrate without the use of excessive force.
Most of the traditional growing areas west of the
Salween, like those to the east, are cultivated by
tribal groups for whom the opium poppy is a
main source of income. Their reluctance to give
up poppy cultivation, coupled with the inability
of the Burmese army to maintain a permanent
presence in many of these areas, has minimized
the long-term impact of the program.
Other Burmese programs involve the interdic-
tion of narcotics caravans moving between pro-
ducing areas and the Thai border. Burmese
blocking operations along major north-south
trails and river fords have drastically curtailed
the size of caravan operations, particularly from
areas in the northern Shan State to the Thai
border. The Chinese Irregular Forces, in particu-
lar, have reduced their transport operations in
the northern Shan State and now restrict them-
selves to areas closer to the Thai border. As a
result, Burmese interdiction operations have been
increasingly directed against the Shan United
Army, which had taken over the role as, the
leading trafficking organization in the Golden
Triangle.
Aside from attacking caravans, the Burmese
army s actively engaged in military raids against
the physical headquarters of trafficking organi-
zations and their processing and storage facilities
in the Burma-Thailand border area. These oper-
ations are designed for maximum disruption of
the narcotics infrastructure. In their most recent
operations, the Burmese army has made use of
US-supplied helicopters provided under narcotics
aid programs for ferrying attacking troops into
staging areas for these raids. In June 1977, more
than 1,000 troops attacked and overran six refin-
ery and storage sites in the western border area
adjacent to Mae Hong Son Province, Thailand,
seizing considerable quantities of illicit materi-
als. Although this raid, like the Mohein IV
campaign in April 1978 was limited to specific
targets along the border, the fear of additional
attack operations caused many traffickers to
cease their refining activities temporarily. (See
map on page 9.)
In Thailand the Border Patrol Police (BPP)
maintained pressure against traffickers in the
border last year. There were several successful
interdictions of shipments of narcotics and the
chemicals used in the heroin conversion process.
These actions, combined with a tightening of
enforcement efforts between northern Thailand
and Bangkok temporarily drove traffickers un-
derground during the first half of 1977. Al-
though the traffic picked up momentum during
the second half of 1977 and early 1978, traffick-
ers tended to avoid Bangkok rather than risk
confiscation of their shipments. Enforcement ef-
forts in Thailand during 1977 accounted for
record total seizures of opium equivalents of
more than 16 tons as compared to 11 tons in
1976 and three tons in 1975. As a result, the
price differential for No. 4 heroin between the
Burma-Thailand border and Bangkok increased
by almost 75 percent between 1976 and 1977,
and indications are that a similar increase will
again take place in 1978.
Perhaps the most significant action taken to
date by the Thai Government in its antinarcotics
campaigns was the 6 March 1978 decision by the
6 SECRET
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National Security Council to expel from the
country all Burmese dissident groups operating
from bases in north Thailand. This order was
primarily directed at the SUA. Although the
SUA has moved from its former headquarters at
Ban Hin Tack, Thailand, it is still maintaining
an armed presence on the Thai side of the border
and is heavily engaged in the production of
heroin. Despite the common narcotics problem
along the Thai-Burma border, there is little
combined activity or cooperation between the
two governments on control efforts. The presence
of Burmese dissidents in Thailand has been
partly responsible for the lack of trust that exists
between the two governments.
The UN has an active crop substitution pro-
gram in the tribal areas of north Thailand.
Efforts are being made to find crops suitable for
growing in a poppy culture environment. Thus
far some success has been accomplished with
crops such as soybeans and coffee cultivation.
However, the Thai effort is still in an experimen-
tal stage, despite some special marketing ar-
rangements made for substitute crops. A major
limiting factor to the success of this program
appears to be marketing constraints.
Danger Points Ahead
While antinarcotics programs have been dis-
ruptive to some extent, they have not seriously
impeded the capability of the Golden Triangle to
grow, ship, and process narcotics. Indeed the
adjustments already made by traffickers-using
independent transporters, converting to high-
value but low-volume finished narcotics near
areas of production, shortening lines of commu-
nications, and taking advantage of relatively safe
Communist supplies-have gone a long way to-
wards neutralizing government interdiction ef-
forts. Moreover, this has been accomplished
without any loss in control over the traffic exer-
cised by the large Chinese organizations.
The disruptions in recent years have also
tended to eliminate the inefficient marginal oper-
ator and producer from the traffic. Those that
remain are generally more soundly financed and
enjoy considerable support from the critically
important Chinese organizations. Although the
total number of heroin refineries has been re-
duced in recent years because of this filtering-out
process, the remaining ones are better organized
and managed. They also enjoy the protection of
the major trafficking organizations, who provide
communication services and access to markets.
In fact many of these operations are now verti-
cally integrated so that they enjoy a guaranteed
supply of raw narcotics materials as well as
chemicals.
Another problem threatening narcotics control
in the future is the possible emergence of Laos as
a major supplier of narcotics. The creation of
new narcotics trafficking routes between Laos
and Thailand has frequently been reported dur-
ing the past year. (See map on page 10.)
Although the extent of this traffic is unknown,
the ease with which narcotics can be smuggled
into Thailand at almost any point along the
Mekong River border holds a strong potential for
making this region a significant channel for
narcotics smuggling. This situation is further
complicated by the reported involvement of
Laotian officials in the traffic. Aside from this
fact, there appears to be an increase in output
from South Asian areas which will increasingly
compete with Golden Triangle supplies now go-
ing to Western Europe. To the extent this occurs,
Triangle traffickers may increasingly focus their
international sales effort on the United States.
25X1A
The author of this paper is
Office of Economic Researc . Comments and
queries are welcome and should he directed to
on 351-6202.
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Lung-ling n
Bhama / Mornauk
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Lashio
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414 April 10 and 13 attacks
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 Approved For Release 2001/08/02 : CIA-RDP80T00702A000400010004-2
Laos: Narcotics entry points into Thailand
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