Dissidence in Eastern Europe (A Research Paper)

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP80T00634A000900110001-5
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 43
• Document Creation Date: December 19, 2016
• Document Release Date: June 30, 2005
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: September 1, 1978
• Content Type: FORM

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 National
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Assessment
Center
STATINTL
Dissidence in Eastern Ei4rvp
Secret
RP 78-10293
September 1978
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SECRET
NOFORN
Dissidence in Eastern Europe
Central Intelligence Agency
National Foreign Assessment Center
Key Points
? The new wave of dissidence in Eastern Europe last year, although now
considerably diminished, shows no signs of vanishing. It has been most
intense in Poland and Czechoslovakia, somewhat less so in Romania
and East Germany.
? The dissidents, few in number, are generally outspoken, nonconformist
intellectuals. They have developed and sustained their causes and have
attracted some popular support, particularly in Poland, where those
who protest are relatively well organized and well led.
? The East European regimes, however, have kept the domestic impact
of dissident activity within bounds. They have made it clear that a
price must be paid for active dissidence-loss of job, harassment,
physical abuse, police detention, or a jail sentence. There is no evidence
that the dissidents' causes have been taken up by influential party or
government officials.
? The formulation of regime policy toward dissent could, however,
become a serious source of discord within local leaderships, particular-
ly as a new generation of leaders displaces the old. The toleration of
any measure of dissent will remain a risky course, both for the national
leaders and for their relations with the USSR.
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Page
Key Points .................................................................................................. i
Foreword .................................................................................................... v
The Roots of Dissidence .......................................................................... 1
New Stimuli to Dissident Activity .......................................................... 3
Who Are the Dissidents? .......................................................................... 4
What Do They Want? .............................................................................. 5
Impact of Dissent .................................................................................... 6
Outlook ...................................................................................................... 8
Appendix: Country Studies
Poland .................................................................................................... 13
Czechoslovakia ...................................................................................... 27
East Germany ........................................................................................ 33
Romania ................................................................................................ 37
iii
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NOFORN
Dissidence in Eastern Europe
The Roots of Dissidence
The authoritarian systems in Eastern Europe
invite dissent by continuing to place a wide range
of human endeavor within a political straitjacket,
by refusing to tolerate criticism, and by insisting
that whatever change takes place be initiated by
an inherently conservative, bureaucratic struc-
ture. Above all, the formal repudiation of the
most onerous Stalinist controls has made possible
the systematic expression of dissent. ~ V.)
The roots of dissident activity reach back into
the mid-1950s and the search for new political,
social, and economic blueprints initiated by
Khrushchev's denunciation of Stalinism. Many
of today's dissidents either participated in, or are
spiritual heirs of, those efforts to revise ideology
and the Stalinist system that was built in its
name. The present-day dissidents, unlike the
earlier "revisionists," do not consider ideological
reform as the key to systemic reform, but they do
seek, as did their predecessors, to expand the
range of individual freedoms allowed by the
authorities. (I)
In the early days of de-Stalinization, dissent
against various aspects of the Stalinist system
was generally tolerated and even officially en-
couraged. Candid discussion and innovative pro-
posals were permitted both for their cathartic
value and as proof that Stalinism had been
rejected. Over time, some of this activity became
officially unacceptable. "Dissidence" that went
beyond the bounds set by local Stalinist leaders
still clinging to power or that led to "radical"
demands for freedoms was banned. U )
In some instances, the advocates of reform
became involved, willingly or accidentally, in
scheming against local Stalinist leaders by politi-
cal moderates, which was made possible by the
concurrent political struggles in the Soviet
Union. In Poland, for example, revisionist Marx-
ists like Leszek Kolakowski publicly battled
against dogmatism and helped bring to power in
1956 a "reformist" party leader, Wladyslaw
Gomulka. Similarly, the fight by Hungarian
writers to end censorship in late 1955 was closely
linked with the efforts by backers of reformer
Imre Nagy to brin down Stalinist party leader
Matyas Rakosi. (i )
The spontaneous ferment of de-Stalinization
was also at work in East Germany and Czecho-
slovakia in the mid-1950s, albeit more subdued.
In East Germany, a young Marxist philosopher,
Wolfgang Harich, led a small group of party
members in advocating economic and political
reforms, "true independence" (that is, an escape
from Soviet hegemony) for East Germany, and
eventual reunification of the two German states.
Unlike developments in Poland and Hungary,
however, the actions of the East German dissi-
dents were of little consequence. Harich made
his move too late (after the suppression of the
Hungarian uprising when there was a general
turn to orthodoxy) and did not make common
cause with party chief Ulbricht's opponents in
the Politburo. fu)
Efforts after 1956 to suppress revisionism, and
to tighten the allowable bounds of de-Staliniza-
tion, gave rise to the first readily identifiable
dissidents, since many of the "revisionists" re-
fused to abide by the new restrictions. In Poland,
where revisionism had run the deepest and where
many revisionists were for a time allowed to air
their views in official publications, Gomulka-
initially considered a reformer-gradually fol-
lowed a more conservative course. By 1963 Go-
mulka's retrenchment in the cultural and ideo-
logical spheres prompted writers and other
intellectuals to react with what have become
classic dissident tools. I U,
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In early 1964 well-known Polish intellectuals
published the "Letter of 34," in which they
protested censorship and other controls on book
publication. Jacek Kuron and Karol Modze-
lewski, two young Marxist scholars who had
studied under Kolakowkki, subsequently circu-
lated a 90-page open letter criticizing Gomulka
personally and calling for the creation of a "true
socialist state." In May 1965 the Warsaw branch
of the Writers' Association demanded that cen-
sorship be abolished. In October 1966 Kola-
kowski commemorated the 10th anniversary of
Gomulka's rise to power with a public condem-
nation of "repressions and lack of democracy in
Poland." In reprisal he was expelled from the
party. Other writers who protested Kolakowksi's
expulsion were, in turn, also expelled. Gomulka's
increasing problems with the dissident intel-
lectuals came to a head in early 1968, when a
ban on staging a classic Polish drama with anti-
Russian overtones led to a writers' "revolt" and
to student riots. Amidst an ensuing party
factional crisis, Kolakowksi and others were
forced to emigrate, and many student leaders,
including Kuron and a newcomer to dissident
activity, Adam Michnik, were jailed. (b)
While Gomulka was tightening up in Poland,
Czechoslovakia's Stalinist leader Novotny, under
the pressure of Khrushchev's second round of de-
Stalinization and the weight of a stagnating
Czechoslovak eeonomN, belatedly undertook the
de-Stalinization that he had avoided in the mid-
1950s. As in that earlier period, the general
feeling that dogmatism was being rejected,
albeit in a hesitant way, encouraged spontaneous
talk of revisionist policy alternatives to prevailing
neo-Stalinism. Much of the pressure on Novotny
to go further than he wanted came from Slovak
intellectuals and journalists, whose public criti-
cisms and calls for reform came to be viewed as
"dissidence." More important, these dissident
acts were probably encouraged by Slovak party
leaders who wanted to force Novotny to redeem
a Slovak nationalism that had been labeled
bourgeois during the Stalinist purges. (IL )
Novotny, beginning in 1963, presided over a
relatively widespread de-Stalinization that coun-
tenanced substantial revisionist discussion, star-
tling freedoms in the arts, and permitted, at least
for a time, considerable frankness in the media.
It was during this period that such revisionist
theoreticians as Zdenek Mlynar developed theo-
ries of how to build a "democratized" Commu-
nism, ideas that were to be put in practice in
1968. The period also had its outright dissidents
who fell victim to Novotny's periodic efforts to
retrench or at least to set limits to de-
Stalinization. !tj )
In 1966 Novotny began to take a tougher
stance toward nonconformist intellectuals, espe-
cially the writers. In so doing, he was following
the lead of the Soviets, who in February of that
year had tried and convicted the nonconformist
writers Sinyavskiy and Daniel. These trials sent
shock waves through the Soviet and East
European intellectual community and marked
the beginning of sustained dissidence in the
Soviet Union. f A )
The East German regime also responded to the
pressure of Khrushchev's second de-Stalinization
with moderation of its cultural policies, but with
greater hesitation, abrupt policy shifts and con-
siderably less domestic effect than in Czechoslo-
vakia. For example, the nonconformist East Ger-
man songster Wolf Biermann, who was criticized
and stripped of party membership in early 1963,
was allowed to publish his poems and perform his
songs in 1964 and, in late 1965, was abruptly
banned from performing and was labeled an
anti-Communist. Another victim of this regime
ambivalence was Robert Havemann, an eminent
scientist who was prohibited from teaching in
1964 and then retire in 1965 because of his
outspoken views. ( U
Many revisionist ideas were put into effect in
Czechoslovakia during the "Prague Spring" of
1968. Perhaps surprisingly, this institutionaliza-
tion of reform ideas did not lead to greater
dissident pressures for similar changes elsewhere
in Eastern Europe. The Soviet-led Warsaw Pact
quashing of the Czechoslovak "experiment" in
August was protested by dissidents in other East
European countries, but it also stifled hope that
popular agitation for a "humane" type of Com-
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munism would bear fruit. That hope has been
rekindled by the convergence of circumstances
during the past two years.
New Stimuli to Dissident Activity
The 1975 Helsinki accord and efforts of the
East European regimes to show a measure of
compliance with its human rights provisions
raised some popular expectation that authoritar-
ian controls might be loosened, and stimulated
dissident efforts to that end. There was a ' wide-
spread anticipation among East Germans in the
summer of 1976, for instance, that because the
accord signified "international recognition" of
East Germany, the regime could not,,or would no
longer, block foreign travel on the grounds that
travel was predicated on such "recognition." ( U-)
Even more important, the decision to review
implementation of the Helsinki agreement in
Belgrade in 1977 prompted some dissidents to
conclude that a Communist desire to show a
good record in Belgrade might make regimes
susceptible to pressures for internal reforms.
Other dissidents were well aware that Moscow
intended Helsinki to signify only Western recog-
nition of Soviet hegemony in Eastern Europe. As
a result, they apparently emphasized the human
rights commitments of the accord ag a way of
inducing the West to reconsider its support for
the agreement or at least to force the Soviets and
their allies to observe human rights as a price of
Western recognition of Soviet hegemony over the
area. (V. )
The calculation that pressure might lead to
some changes for the better was fortified by what
many dissidents saw as important Soviet conces-
sions . regarding national independence made to
the "Eurocommunists" at the Berlin conference
of European Communist parties in June 1976.
For example, the East German dissident philos-
opher Robert Havemann, who considers himself
a Eurocommunist of the Spanish variety, seized
upon the conference as a vindication of his long-
time advocacy of a Communist system that
included domestic pluralism and a "true" sover-
eignty in foreign affairs. Some Polish dissidents
also concluded that the time was ripe for the East
Europeans to strive for greater autonomy from
Moscow. Indeed, public, that is to say, dissident
pressure was seen as an effective way to lead tth~
regime toward seeking "true sovereignty." r
The vigorous US human rights policy enunci-
ated in early 1977 gave some impetus to dissident
activity and emboldened persons to speak out
who otherwise might have remained silent. Many
dissidents probably welcomed the US position
because they believed it would help expose the
vulnerabilities of the East European regimes
with regard. to human rights. Those who were
already actively pressing a cause and considered
international attention important for both its
success and their own protection no doubt calcu-
lated that the US human rights policy would
serve these ends.' (Lt)
East European dissidents were also encour-
aged by publicity and support from West Euro-
pean media, politicians and government leaders,
public organizations, influential intellectuals,
and maverick Communist parties.' This support
has generally been a consequence of the US
initiative, of a naturally keen interest in develop-
ments close to home, and of domestic and region-
al political pressures. Some, particularly East
European, emigres may have seen in the US-led,
Western human rights campaign evidence of a
new, more confrontational policy toward Eastern
Europe, which they welcomed. (U)
Against this international backdrop, region-
wide trends and developments in individual coun-
tries gave a direct stimulus to dissidence. By
mid-1976 many dissidents were undoubtedly
aware that all of the Warsaw Pact countries
'This was not the unanimous view, however. Other dissidents
apparently were wary of the American policy and, recalling what
they consider past US inconsistency toward Eastern Europe, were
skeptical that Washington would press its objective with consisten-
cy or determination. Those who consider themselves Communist
reformers rejected the helping hand of a "capitalist" state for
ideological reasons; others felt vulnerable to charges of being
"agents of imperialism."
2 For some dissidents, support by Eurocommunists has not been
consistent enough. Thus, a prominent Czechoslovak dissident pub-
licly acknowledged Eurocommunist support, but said that it "could
be more effective and courageous." He called on the West Europe-
an Communist parties to publish political material by exiled East
Europeans and to establish direct contacts with dissidents in the
East.
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faced difficult economic problems, and probably
calculated that the regimes were thus more
vulnerable to pressures for concessions. (6K)
The economic factor was most important in
Poland, where the workers' riots in June 1976
dramatized popular dissatisfaction and revealed
the regime's political weaknesses. Polish dissi-
dents had already become more active by late-
1975, when they were successful in modifying
government-proposed changes in the constitu-
tion. In September 1976 they seized upon the
issue of the release of imprisoned rioters to show
the need for political reform.' This attracted
popular support and, in turn, helped stimulate
other dissident activity in Poland a d, perhaps,
elsewhere in Eastern Europe. I
In Czechoslovakia, the well-publicized Char-
ter 77 manifesto was triggered by the publication
in the Czechoslovak press in the fall of 1976 of
the UN human rights covenants. Czechoslovak
dissent, in general, has been fed by the despair of
those reformers who had been purged and ostra-
cized since 1968. Many of these persons may
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my would impel the leadership to rehabilitate,
among others, purged economic and managerial
functionaries. In East Germany, Rudolf Bahro's
wide-ranging critique in August 1977 of the
"system's" deficiencies examined at length the
country's economic shortcomings.1 (A
Who Are the Dissidents?
The dissident activists in Eastern Europe have
traditionally come from the educated, articulate
stratum of society, a broadly defined intelligen-
tsia. They are politically dedicated, idealistic
men and women of all ages whose zeal and
commitment make them willing to pay the sub-
stantial personal price that the regimes exact for
openly nonconformist behavior. U
The broad spectrum is evident in the Polish
dissident ranks, which includes academicians,
lawyers, writers, journalists, retired non-Com-
Polish leader Gierek's talk. in the immediate wake of the riots.
about the need for "democratization" probably helped some dissi-
dents to believe that chances for reform were good. As time passed,
however, the regime talked less about the need for political changes.
munist politicians and soldiers, Catholic priests,
and university students. In East Germany, the
voices of dissent have been scientists-turned-
political philosophers, popular entertainers, writ-
ers, and frustrated emigrants. Czechoslovak dis-
sidents, largely those persons who helped gener-
ate or implement the reform ideas of 1968,
include philosophers, writers, dramatists, enter-
tainers, and politicians. In Romania, aside from
a few writers and scholars and a group of Baptist
clergy, the majority of dissidents have been
would-be emigrants or, more recently,/relnbers
of discontented national minorities.
While the dissidents have had some success in
expanding their numbers, they have generally
failed to enlarge their circle of political activists
beyond a small portion of the intelligentsia and
have been unsuccessful in lit' izing other seg-
ments of the population.
The most success at attracting a broader fol-
lowing has been evident in Poland. One dissident
group initially championed a cause-help for and
he release of jailed workers-that garnered con-
iderable popular support. This and another dis-
ident organization have enlisted students into
issident work and may have won popular good
ill through efforts to counsel people about their
veryday problems. The second group also claims
o have financial backing and considerable mipral
upport from private farmers (an important class
?land where three-quarters of the farms are
n private hands) and retired, probably World
War II, military vet re s? Some of the changes
that Polish dissidents advocate are looked on
favorably, if passively, by liberal members of the
Communist Party establishment. Despite consid-
erable effort, however, the Polish dissidents have
not enlisted much worker support. The influen-
tial Catholic Church, moreover, has not backed
them, even though some Catholic priests, seeking
to win g us freedom, are also
dissidents.
Despite the rapid increase in the number of
Czechoslovak dissidents, they continue to be
mostly drawn from the intelligentsia. In Roma-
nia, Goma's "following," swelled from seven to
300 in less than six months. This was largely
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illusory, however, because most persons sub-
scribed purely as a device to get out of the
country. (_ tt)
There are a number of reasons why dissidents
fail to attract meaningful support. The vast
majority of East Europeans obviously considers
the personal cost of participation far too high and
believes there is only a slim chance that dissident
activity can produce change. Political apathy and
anti-intellectualism among workers and a fre-
quent aloofness among intellectuals are the ma-
jor factors that have kept these two key segments
of society apart. The regimes naturally exploit
and encourage these attitudes. Liberals within
the establishment intelligentsia may sympathize
with certain dissident objectives but, more than
likely, they consider many of the goals and
methods unrealistic, if not dangerous. Those
dissidents who have long been open critics are
sometimes viewed, justifiably or not, as gadflies,
whose failure to produce change is proof of their
futility. (a ld.
Frequent personal and philosophical differ-
ences among dissidents have weakened their
overall cause. This diversity and disunity helps in
part to explain why some in the regimes are
relatively tolerant of dissidents; a fraanated
movement cannot draw wide support. Ul
What Do They Want?
The dissidents seek a variety of changes in the
existing systems of rule in Eastern Europe. Some
advocate sweeping reforms that would in fact
constitute revolutionary changes in the way the
Communist systems function. While none of the
dissidents challenge outright the leading role of
the party, as this would make them vulnerable to
charges of treason, some of the dissidents, nota-
bly those associated with one of the leading
Polish groups, incline strongly toward West Eu-
ropean Christian democratic views. Those press-
ing for the broadest changes include most Polish
dissidents, some East Germans, and many
Czechoslovak Chartists. Their political platforms
typically embrace the following demands: u
? A "real" multiparty system or some formal
mechanism for greater interest group repre-
sentation within a one-party system (usually,
but not always explicitly, within a so-called
Communist framework).
? The abolition or significant relaxation of
censorship.
? The reduction of centralized, bureaucratic
controls, especially in the economic and gov-
ernment administrative spheres.
? Greater independence from the USSR.
Nonetheless, most dissidents recognize, how-
ever reluctantly, the imposed necessity of
some type of close relationship with the
Soviet Union.
? Respect for human and civil rights already
delineated in domestic laws and interna-
tional accords signed, by East European
governments. (!A/)
Aside from the "programmatic" dissidents,
there are those who seek more modest changes.
Thus, the Romanian Goma speaks out for a de-
Stalinization patterned after what he calls the
"livable life" in Hungary and Poland. Many of
the Czechoslovak dissidents want rehabilita-
tion-not necessarily of their political views, but
of themselves and their families-and the oppor-
tunity to live a more normal life. Then there are
the more narrowly focused "one issue" dissidents
such as the East German writers, who want more
freedom to write what they wish, and the Roma-
nian Baptists, who want more freedom to preach.
Finally, there have been some, such as many
signatories of Romanian writer Goma's manifes-
to, who have taken to dissent as a device to
facilitate emgiration. (14)
Several prominent dissidents-the East Ger-
mans Havemann and Biermann, the Hungarian
Agnes Heller, and the Czechoslovak Zdenek
Mlynar-consider themselves ideological breth-
ren of the Eurocommunists. Others-such as the
Poles Kolakowski and Michnik-are skeptical
that Eurocommunism will turn out to be dif-
ferent from the Communism practiced in the
Warsaw Pact states. Nonetheless, all have wel-
comed the Eurocommunists' support in the strug-
gle for more independence from the Soviets.( Gt)
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The dissidents frequently differ on ways to
bring about change. The East German Bahro, for
example, appeals to "men of conscience" within
the establishment to work for change. Some
Polish dissidents believe popular pressure on the
leadership can induce it to initiate reforms.
Other Poles do not believe the system can reform
itself and have tried to establish a de facto
pluralism by founding, without regime approval,
publications, groups, and societies that speak to
and on behalf of specific interest groups. The
Polish dissidents so far claim to be satisfied with
these small steps which they feel will slowly
erode regime control. They have shunned vio-
lence, realizing that this would give the regime
cause for repression and would dissi ate the
limited public support they now enjoy. IU )
Some dissidents have formed secret organiza-
tions to avoid regime reprisals. A secret Polish
rou
iermany, the anonymous manifestos that ap-
peared early this year claimed to represent the
views of amorphous groups but, more th
were the work of a very few individual
national boundaries
Such secret groups can presumably exist for a
long time because their members pay little or no
personal cost for belonging. They could also play
an important role during a period of political
transition, when uncertainty and change are in
the air. Generally, however, anonymous dissent
has little impact, if only because there is a
tendency among the population to view it as a
possible police provocation. (U )
There has thus far been little active coopera-
tion and almost no advance coordination among
dissidents in different East European countries.
The few known instances of such contacts across
25X1 i by Polish dissidents.
I
i group has periodic con ac s wi issi eats in Me
[ SSR. The most brazen and ambitious effort at
cooperation occurred in August 1978, when
Polish and Czechoslovak dissidents met in south-
ern Poland to discuss possible joint actions and
then issued a communique.` 1 ::1
Nonetheless, many dissidents see disadvan-
tages in such personal contact. It is difficult to
arrange, and may expose dissidents to serious
legal charges, such as conspiracy. Any attempt at
coordinated actions across national boundaries
would arouse deep suspicion in Moscow and
induce Soviet pressure on the East Europeans to
crack down. Existing evidence that dissidents
respond to or imitate the activities of dissidents
elsewhere in the region most often indicates only
that they are well informed of each others'
activities by Western media broadcasts. ` lL
Impact of Dissent
The dissidents have not altered in any funda-
ental way the East European regimes' style of
ule, nor have they induced the governments to
dopt more conciliatory domestic policies. If
nything, there has been a shift-slight in Po-
and, pronounced in Czechoslovakia-toward
ougher internal controls. Indeed, the dissidents
seem to have brought upon themselves varying
degrees of harassment and repression. Nor has
dissidence helped generate serious politico s-_
ord within the paFtyldddership that.
i e the e ve htc c rdf political--change.
Nonetheless, the mere existence of dissidence
has been an embarrassment to regimes that insist
on making a show of unanimous popular support
and try to conceal the repressive features of their
system. At least initially, dissent confronted the
regimes with a challenge-that Tia to be assessed
an a wt in bounds. It has pro ably caused
sonic differences within leaderships .over tactics
to be use in muzz ing dissent, although these
differences have not been obvious or persistent.
The more organized dissidents-those in Poland
and Czechoslovakia-probably created some
strains, albeit limited, between the regime and
segments of the populace by strengthening en-
' The Poles apparently consider this as the first in a series of
cooperative efforts. They have also been trying to encourage
Hungarian dissident intellectuals to become outspoken and to use
samizdat publications to express their views.
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demic popular antipathy toward such institutions
as the police, bureaucracy, and the censor. The
dissidents frequent use of legalistic tactics in
challenging regime practices has made the auth-
orities, in turn, more attentive to legal procedures
25X1 in dealing with the dissidents.
deter the creation of a dissident movement that
could have an adverse impact on relations with
Washington. Budapest clearly hoped that the
new US administration would be more inclined
than its predecessors to return Hungarian na-
tional treasures and grant Hungary most-
favored-nation trading status. The Hungarian
decision to invite American religious leader Billy
Graham to Hungary in late 1976 was unques-
tionably intended to draw attention to Budapest's
relatively moderate domestic policies at a time of
sharply increased dissident activity elsewhere in
The dissidents' protests against repressive and
restrictive regime policies-including tough po-
lice countermeasures that substantiated the ini-
tial allegations-provided an issue that, within
the context of the Helsinki review process and
the US emphasis on human rights issues, placed
the East European regimes on the defensive in
foreign affairs. How best to throttle dissent
reportedly caused some differences fora time
1etween the ,Soviets nd_ st~Europeans. The
Soviets have clearly been inclined toward a more
heavy-handed apnroach most of their East
215X1 European allies.
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Some of the East European regimes clearly
saw dissent as a potentially troublesome obstacle
to their desire to maintain or expand economic
and, in some cases, political relations with the
United States. Consequently, the regimes' han-
dling of dissident activity appears in some limited
ways to have taken the US human rights interest
into account. The Polish decision in February
1977 to grant amnesty to workers jailed the
previous summer in connection with disturbances
over proposed price increases was announced less
than a week after the United States expressed
concern for Soviet and Czechoslovak dissidents.
The move was an unexpected capitulation to
dissident demands, and was probably intended to
enhance Warsaw's image in Washington and
reduce the possibility that the dissident question
might intrude on bilateral relations. To be sure,
Poland has consistently handled its dissidents
more subtly than most other East European
states, but the regime's moves probably reflected
more its concern with domestic political, factors
than a wish to please th United States
Similarly, the Hungarian regime's decision not
to punish 30 would-be dissidents who in Febru-
ary 1977 supported the Czechoslovak Chartists
may have been taken in the hope that this would
Eastern Europe.
The Romanian regime was acutely concerned
that US attention to human rights could impede
renewal of its most-favored-nation status. More
importantly, Bucharest was worried that this
might set back its "special relationship" with
Washington that has been of major political use
in fending off the Soviets. As a consequence, the
Romanians--except for a brief crackdown in the
spring of 1977, when they apparently feared that
there would be a dramatic increase in dissi-
dence-have encouraged dissidents to emigrate.
The Ceausescu regime has not shown, however,
an inclination to adopt more enlightened do-
mestic policies, and remains perhaps the most
repressive in Eastern Europe. The regime has
privately played down agitation for increased
cultural and linguistic rights by the Hungarian
minority, calling it a Moscow-inspired, Buda-
pest-engineered tactic to tar Romania'
The Czechoslovak Government, desp
terest in settling several longstanding bilateral
issues with the United States, has not moderated
in any way its "hard-line" inclinations and has
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almost completely ignored
dealing with its dissidents 25X1
Western publicity and support for dissidents
has been largely responsible for whatever suc-
cesses and impact the dissenters have made.
Media coverage of their activities, when relayed
back into Eastern Europe, has provided impor-
tant, if indirect lines of communication between
dissidents within a country and across national
boundaries. This coverage has bolstered morale
and has often been the only way for the dissi-
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dents' cause to be publicized within their own
country. As a consequence, most dissidents have
made a special effort to funnel news to the West.
Most frequently, their "connections" have been
friends and colleagues who have emigrated: Poles
in London and Paris, Romanians in Paris, East
Germans in West Germany and Czechoslovaks
in Rome and Vienna.
Outlook
Although dissident activity in many East Eu-
ropean countries has declined considerably since
early 1977, it is likely to persist throughout the
region. Many of the factors that propelled the
recent surge of dissent will still be at work.
Economic problems may worsen and provide
dissidents with renewed hope that some of their
proposals for political reform will be heeded by
regimes weakened by or preoccupied with dissat-
isfied consumers. While such hopes may be
misplaced, the combination of dissident pressures
and a sluggish a create acute do-
25X1 niestic instability
The situation is especially acute in Poland,
where intense popular dissatisfaction over con-
sumer supplies is likely to continue over the next
several years, and where dissidents see their job
of pressing for political change as a long-term
endeavor. In Czechoslovakia, recent dissident
activity has been tied to the 10th anniversary in
August of the Soviet-led invasion, but it will
continue to exist at least as long as the regime
fails to come to terms with the large number of
people who were purged after 1968. The di-
lemma for the Prague regime-how to rehabili-
tate people without rehabilitating their ideas-is
complex, and may be unsolvable without changes
in the leadership. In Romania, the direct link
between dissidence and emigration that was es-
tablished last year should help perpetuate dissent
in a country where a spartan and harshly totali-
tarian li emigration particularly at-
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Other factors that could perpetuate and inten-
sify East European dissidence include:
- A difficult leadership succession problem in
the USSR that engenders either hope for
moderate policies or fear of orthodoxy.
? Continued political sparring between the So-
viets and the Eurocommunists.
? The second Helsinki accords review confer-
ence to be held in Madrid in 1980. This will
remain a factor even though the dissidents'
expectations may have been reduced by the
limited accomplishments of the Belgrade
review conference.
? The continued unsettling effect of Western
contacts with, and presence in, the region.
The area's economic needs argue against any
cutback in Western ties.
? Uncertainties surrounding the succession to
Tito in Yugoslavia.
On the personal level, the camaraderie of the
struggle, the excitement of matching wits with
the authorities, and the hope that is renewed by
even a small success will also propel dissident
The authorities may calculate, perhaps with
reason, that time is on their side in the contest.
The psychological and personal financial price
that dissidents have to pay is difficult for most to
bear for a sustained period. Their failure to get
results not only adds to their personal discour-
agement, but makes it difficult to maintain
popular interest.
At least in Pol, ever, the dissidents can
already claim to have accomplished much, and
are working to secure more. If they continue to
be allowed relative freedom, their activity could
give rise to the claim that a new norm of what is
allowable has been wrested from the regime.
This, in turn, could encourage other dissidents in
Eastern Europe to emulate the Poles, a prospect
that could be destabilizing for the area as a
whole. A prolonged period of active Polish dis-
sent would increase the risk that chance and
miscalculation could lead to violence and pos-
ly to a Soviet intervention.
At present, East European dissidents can be
sib
seen most properly as a small hard core of
political "radicals" who do not have the popular
support or political leverage to force a change in
any of the East European states or to effect a
national uprising. Unlike many of the "revision-
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ists" and dissidents of the past, they do not have
access to the official media, and are not operat-
ing in an environment of acute political discord.
The motive force for abrupt political change has
most frequently been political factionalism with-
in the establishment (Nagy versus Rakosi;
Gomulka versus Ochab; the Slovaks versus
Novotny). Dissidence, when it preceded such
change, was an indicator of existing political
disarray and, frequently, a tool of factional ma-
neuvering. If history is any guide, dissidence will
come to play an important role in forcing politi-
cal change only when it combines with economic
problems that acutely affect the consumer and at
a time of political upheaval within the ruling
elite.
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COUNTRY STUDIES
The following studies of four East European countries-Poland, Czechoslo-
vakia, East Germany, and Romania-examine in detail dissident activity that
gathered momentum in the fall of 1976, accelerated in early 1977, tapered off
by midyear, and was rejuvenated in the fall of 1977. .Since the beginning of
1978, fewer manifestations of dissent have been evident, even in pace-setting
Poland. 1 )
Hungary and Bulgaria are omitted, since neither has exhibited significant
dissent. Hungary remains virtually untouched by dissidence, despite the
existence of a small core of intellectuals who have intermittently clashed with
the authorities, who publicly expressed support for the Czechoslovak dissi-
dents, and who issued in early 1978 a volume of nonconformist articles and
essays. In Bulgaria, overt signs of dissidence came to light only in March
1978 with the appearance of a "Declaration 1978," which claimed to speak
for a dissident group, ABD. Whether such a group exists or what ABD means
is not known. The document called , for an end to various restrictions,
including those on travel and religion.
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Summary
Dissident activity mushroomed throughout
1977. A number of well-organized dissident
groups took advantage of a political authority
preoccupied with popular discontent over inad-
equate food supplies to agitate for such causes as
amnesty for jailed workers and the protection of
human rights. Their activity reflected a typical
Polish ebullience, as well as a more outspoken
attitude that has been evident among dissidents
since late 1975, when the regime proposed
changes in the state constitution that rankled
national pride. tj4
The several dissident groups now active com-
prise at least several hundre activists, a wider,
uncountable circle of incidentally involved sym-
pathizers, and an even more unfathomable num-
ber of passive supporters. Most are drawn from
the intelligentsia and from student circles. None
of the dissidents advocates revolution per se, and
most recognize a need for self-restraint in order
to avoid physical conflict with the authorities.
Nonetheless, the gradual reforms that many of
them are demanding would radically change the
way Poland is-ruled. and the way it relates to the
25X1 USSR.
The sere c regime has used selective harass-
ment, along with some police "dirty tricks" to
keep the dissidents off baraa`nce an to limit their
growth. The overall response, however, has been
fairly weak and cautious, largely because of
Warsaw's desire to avoid a confrontation with
the intelligentsia at a time when there is a
likelihood of trouble with the citizenry over
economic problems. The restraint probably also
reflects a calculation (or wishful thinking) that
the intellectuals will continue to be ineffective in
attracting workers and that the dissident groups
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In the meantime, however, the regime risks a
crisis growing out of miscalculation or chance. It
also allows the establishment of more permissive
standards of citizen conduct that not only could
help along the evolution of a new kind of Polish
Communism, but also could provide an unset-
tling example for the rest of Eastern Europe.
A Workers' Cause
The first major event in the present surge of
dissident activity in Poland occurred in Septem-
ber 1976, when 13 intellectuals formed a com-
mittee to "defend" about 50 workers imprisoned
the previous June after riots over proposed price
increases. The new "Workers Defense League"
(KOR), led by Jacek Kuron, publicly called for
an amnesty, collected and disbursed financial
Jacek Kuron, main spokesman for KOR
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and medical aid for workers' families, and ar-
ranged legal counsel for the workers. In a period
of four months, KOR reportedly disbursed some
2 million zlotys (an average worker's annual
salary is about 60,000 zlotys), sent representa-
tives to observe the trials, called for an investiga-
tion of police conduct during the riots, released
its own report of the June events, and issued
news bulletins recounting its efforts on behalf of
the workers and reporting on dissident clashes
with the police.
KOR attracted considerable sympathy from a
populace always ready to think the worst of the
police and disenchanted with the Gierek regime's
inability to deliver on economic promises. KOR
helped create an atmosphere in which dissidents
and others became willing to speak out on behalf
of the imprisoned workers:
? In early November 1976, almost 900 work-
ers at the Ursus tractor factory appealed to
Gierek to reinstate workers who had been
fired.
? In mid-November, Catholic bishops spon-
sored a collection effort on behalf of the
workers' families.
? On 22 December, 28 university professors
petitioned parliament to set up a commission
to investigate the June disturbances. Within
weeks this was followed by a similar petition
from 162 other intellectuals. f U )
The initial response of the regime to the
formation of KOR was to harass its adherents by
periodic detentions and interrogation and to
threaten more severe measures. The police also
attempted to discredit the dissidents by circulat-
ing falsely attributed documents (several "KOR
communiques" and a KOR letter calling for
sexual freedom). In at least one instance, they
also sent false KOR spokesmen to visit the
family of an imprisoned Worker. The police tried
to choke off contributions to the KOR defense
fund by floating rumors that the funds were
being misused and, when that failed, fined dissi-
dents for "illegal fund collection." In mid-Janu-
ary 1977 the authorities prohibited KOR from
receiving contributions sent openly by emigres in
the West. These tactics failed to stem dissident
activities.
The regime's efforts to explain away the so-
called June events were also unsuccessful. The
authorities had attempted to ease popular suspi-
cions of police brutality during the riots by
releasing a special investigative report in late
October. This tactic failed, however, because the
report, predictably, exonerated the police. At the
same time, the authorities decided to show their
resolve by pressing ahead in December with a
retrial of six workers, whose cases had been
returned to the lower courts by, the Supreme
Court. U1
In an effort to undercut KOR, Gierek an-
nounced in early February that amnesty would
be granted to all the jailed workers except five
"recidivists." The regime recognized the exten-
sive popular sympathy for the jailed workers and
was worried by indications in January that the
circle of KOR sympathizers was growing. The
security services were undoubtedly aware that
other dissident groups were being formed and
may have been concerned that the newly formed
Czechoslovak dissident movement might add a
further impetus. Warsaw probably also calcu-
lated that an amnesty would be looked on favor-
ably by a new human rights-oriented administra-
tion in the United States, which in late January
had criticized Czechoslovak and'Soviet handling
of dissidents. Warsaw probably knew that Mos-
cow was about to crack down on its dissidents
and may have calculated that it would be easier
to make concessions at that time rather than
later, when the action would be more likely to
burden Soviet-Polish relations.
The February 1977 amnesty-though only
partial-slowed KOR's momentum, but other
dissidents had already gone into action:
? A secret "Polish Youth Committee for Im-
plementation of the Helsinki Agreement,"
which had declared its existence the previous
June, showed its first sign of life in Febru-
ary, when it released the inaugural issue of
its journal, U progu (On the Threshold).
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Another secret dissident organization, t e
"Polish League for Independence" (PPN),
which had done little since the declaration of
its formation in May 1976, publicly stated
its intention to issue documents that would
educate Poles in political matters. The first
in the series was not issued, however, until
early summer.
? A member of KOR, Stanislaw Baranczak,
founded the dissident journal Zapis (The
Record). Its first edition, which appeared in
January 1977, contained literary and schol-
arly articles by 16 authors, writings that had
been rejected by the Polish censors. ( )
But the most important development in early
1977 was the founding in March of the "Move-
ment for the Defense of Human and Civil
Rights" (RUCH). The movement was started by
18 dissident intellectuals, three of whom had
ing in 2,500 copies.
worked in KOR, and was headed by a compara-
tive newcomer to the dissident ranks, Leszek
Moczulski. RUCH's publicly stated purpose was
to monitor the observance of human and civil
rights in Poland, to publicize infringements, and
to lobby for appropriate changes in the law. It
quickly established itself as a competitor to KOR
for the loyalties of those prepared to participate
in dissident activities. In mid-April the first two
of many RUCH "counseling" centers to hear
citizen grievances were set up in Warsaw and
Lodz. By month's end, the first edition of its
), was circulat-
monthly journal, Opinia (Opinio
e
)
The founding of RUCH was probably trig-
gered by Poland's ratification, in early March, of
the UN's Universal Declaration of Human
Rights. Other contributing factors were:
? The international focus on human rights
issues because of the approaching Belgrade
review conference and because of the policy
declarations of the new administration in
Washington.
? The examples provided by the Czechoslovak
Charter 77 dissidents and the "manifesto"
issued by the Romanian dissident writer
Paul Goma.
? Differences within KOR over how to proceed
in the wake of the February amnesty, which
undercut KOR's mission.
? A reluctance by some dissidents-for both
philosophical and personal reasons-to asso-
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ciate themselves with KOR and
personality, Jacek Kuron.
While the establishment of can prob-
ably be attributed largely to the international
attention given to human rights in early 1977, its
roots were visible in late 1976. Some of the
founding core of RUCH, perhaps prompted by
the successes of KOR but wanting to stay apart
from that group, were preparing to press for
Polish implementation of the provisions of the
Helsinki agreement on cooperation and security
in Europe. In November 1976 several of thes
dissident intellectuals, under the leadership o
lawyer Karol Glogowski, were documen
abuses of human and civil right
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Philosophical differences between the two
groups are also substantial. RUCH's philosophi-
cal orientation is close to that of the West
European political center or right-center. It is a
loose grouping of Polish Christian Democrats,
populists, "free democrats," ; and adherents of
the national socialism of the Polish military hero
Marshal Pilsudski. The group seeks a multiparty
system, and many of its leaders are former non-
Communist politicians and military men. ( U )
KOR's political orientation may be termed
"leftist" or revisionist Marxist. Two of its most
prominent young leaders, Jacek Kuron and
Adam Michnik, are Marxist reformers. Kuron
advocates "Finlandization" of Poland, which he
defines as the establishment of a "parliamentary
democracy, limited in its foreign and domestic
policy only as it affects the interests of the USSR
stated explicitly." Michnik has called Marxism-
Leninism an "empty shell" in contemporary Po-
land, and advocates "an unceasing struggle for
reforms, in favor of evolution which will extend
civil liberties and guarantee a respect for human
rights." r 4)
The Regime's Reaction
In the wake of the February amnesty, Gierek
reportedly encountered pressure from within the
party for a tougher policy toward the dissidents.
Apparently he largely ignored this pressure until
after RUCH was formed in March, and even
then the regime did not adopt a consistently firm
stand. Gierek presumably believed that a crack-
down w dangerous and counterpro-
ductive.
In late edly received a
letter from 600 party file rs _criticizing his
moderate policy. They may have been reacting
speci Ica yIo the amnesty, an act that, while it
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Adam Michnik, one of the leaders of KOR, 30 years old
and a dissident activist since the early 1960s
may have reduced KOR's raison d'etre, may also
have been seen as an unseemly surrender to
demands that would only embolden the dissi-
dents. Moreover, in early March at the Warsaw
Pact ideological conference in Sofia, the Soviets
reportedly pressed their allies for tougher han-
dling of dissent. gh no specific demands
25X1 were madAside from the roughing up and arrest of a few
dissidents in early March, Gierek still took no
drastic measures. The founding of RUCH in late
March, followed by a petition signed by 1,700
students calling for the observance of human
rights, substantially increased the pressure on
Gierek. At the mid-April party Central Commit-
tee plenum, there were reports of differences over
what should be- e and signst1at some had
attac ed the moderate, policy by criticizi the
showing of4a controversial-film, Mare Man. In
late-`Apri1Gierek intensified the harassment of
dissidents, but avoided the harsh acts that some
no doubt would have preferred. The best indica-
tion that the leadership had moved toward a
tougher policy came on 27 April, when two
leading KOR members were informed that they
were suspected of maintaining "illegal contacts"
with foreign organizations, namely Radio Free
Europe and the Paris-based emigre journal Kul-
tura. The previous December the authorities had
been content to detain them for questioning as
possible witnesses to the supplying of "false
information" to hostile circles abroad. The inves-
tigation, however, was overtakes b., aua IO
Pyjas: A Near Crisis
The death under suspicious circumstances on 7
May of Jan Pyjas, a Krakow student active in
KOR, led to a confrontation between the govern-
ment and the students and prov'ded a new
impetus to dissident activity. (,)
On 10 May Kuron publicly revealed Pyjas'
death and implied that it may have been caused
by a police beating. He proclaimed that two
KOR units--an Intervention Bureau and a So-
cial Self-Defense Fund-had been formed to
investigate the death and to prepare his organi-
zation to deal with any such incidents in the
future. Four days later, as they were leaving for
Krakow to attend Pyjas' funeral, Kuron and six
other KOR leaders were arrested. On 15 May,
after the funeral services, about 5,000 Krakow
students marched in silence through the streets,
with the police watching from a distance. On 18
May a small group of Krakow students formed a
Student Solidarity Committee, declared their
union with KOR, and vowed to assist any
students who got into trouble as a result of
demonstrations over Pyjas' death. On 20 May a
requiem mass for Pyjas )was held in Warsaw
without incident. ( U
The imbroglio not only drew more students
into dissident activism, but also, when the auth-
orities refused to release the KOR leaders, pro-
vided a new cause. Other KOR activists took
over for their imprisoned leaders and launched a
crusade for the release both of the dissidents and
of five workers who had not been freed by the
February amnesty. At the end of May, a number
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of KOR supporters, two Catholic intellectuals,
and relatives of those in prison staged a week-
long hunger strike in St. Martins Church in
Warsaw. Popular support for the release of the
dissidents increased throughout June, and even
the Catholic Church, which had withheld official
support from the dissidents despite the involve-
ment of some priests, gave the campaign open
moral support. In mid-July Polish primate Cardi-
nal Wyszynski called on the regime to "respect
the dignity of man" and release the dissident f it
Once again, the authorities bowed to popular
pressure and, on 22 July---the national holiday --
released the dissident leaders and the workers. It
is less surprising that the authorities did so than
that they waited so long. Gierek may have waited
until the July holiday, traditionally an occasion
for grantipg amnesty, to gain a convenient way
out. I
Dissident activity slowed considerably as a
result of the amnesty, but did not stagnate. KOR
took credit for the amnesty and promptly indi-
cated that it intended to soldier on. In late
August a KOR spokesman made several public
overtures to the authorities, calling for full com-
pensation and job reinstatement for the previous-
ly imprisoned workers. RUCH, which had
opened three more "centers" in July to handle
citizens' grievances, jumped on the bandwagon
with an "open letter" calling for reinstatement of
the workers, an end to harassment of dissidents,
and administrative safeguards to ensure "rule of
law." The PPN also chose this time to issue its
first essays on political education. (One gave a
pessimistic appraisal of the chances for a "dia-
logue" between the rulers and the ruled, and
another was a primer on how to deal with the
police.) (fit )
A Name Change
Polish dissident activity gained impetus in the
autumn. In early September KOR spokesman
Kuron, in an interview with a Swedish newspa-
per, revealed plans to expand KOR's activities.
He said that KOR would:
? Begin publishing a range of samizdat
journals.
? Form a publishing company.
? Expand the number of Student Solidarity
Committees.
? Create numerous investigative groups.
The purpose of these initiatives, according to
Kuron, was to put the group on a more perma-
nent footing and to "create institutions," thereby
moving Poland toward a de facto political
pluralism. l U
At the end of September, KOR took a new
name-the "Committee for Social Self-De-
fense"-while retaining the familiar KOR acro-
nym in parentheses.' At the same time, three
prominent activists prepared and released the
first issue of Robotnik (Worker), a four-page
bulletin targeted at workers. In mid-October
KOR also inaugurated a political-literary quar-
terly, Glos (Voice), the first issue of which
? its full acronym became KSS-KOR, but, for simplicity, KOR.
Leszek Kolakowski, a professor of philosophy who left
Poland in 1968-the only emigre member of KOR
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POLISH DISSIDENT PUBLICATIONS
Bratniak (Fraternity). A monthly founded in October 1977. Published by the Movement
for the Defense of Human and Civil Rights (RUCH). Caters to young people.
Bulletin of the Committee for the Defense of Family and Life. Published irregularly
since committee was founded 28 May 1977. Advocates Christian way of life and argues
against abortion.
Bulletin of the Social Self-Defense Committee (KOR). Published monthly in about
1,000 copies, September 1976. Contains news of dissident activities and police harassment.
Bulletin of the Student Solidarity Committee in Warsaw. Apparently published
quarterly. Contains information about the Warsaw student community.
Collective Works of the Zespol Problemowy (Study Group). Social essays. Produced by
the secret Polish League for Independence (PPN).
Communique of the Social Self-Defense Committee (KOR). Often published concur-
rently with the KOR Bulletins. Contains lists of repressive regime actions against the
dissidents.
Glos (The Voice). Published monthly since 22 October 1977. Socio-political essays.
"Official" organ of KOR.
Gospodarz (The Farmer). Published monthly since October 1977. Carries news and
information for farmers. RUCH.
Opinia (Opinion). Published monthly, in an average of 2,000 copies, since 30 April
1977. Contains news and longer political essays and articles. RUCH.
Organ (Organ). Probably an irregular publication; founded in the spring of 1978.
Contains satire. RUCH.
Poradnik Spoleczny (Social Manual). Published irregularly; first issued July 1977.
Primers on basic political themes. PPN.
Postep (Progress). Two issues published in July and October 1977. Deals with worker
affairs.
Pals (PULSE). Appears irregularly; inaugurated in autumn 1977. Literary journal.
Robotnik (Worker). Apparently a monthly. First issue appeared on 30 September 1977.
Targeted at workers, written in plain and simple Polish. KOR.
Spotkania (Encounters). Issues published in October 1977 and January 1978. Initiated
by unnamed young Catholics, apparently associated with the officially sanctioned (there-
fore heavily censored) Catholic monthly, Wiez (Tower).
U Progu (On the Threshold). Appears irregularly in about 2,000 copies; inaugurated
in February 1977. Vehicle of the secret Polish Youth Committee for Implementation of the
Helsinki Agreement, apparently with some input from the Student Solidarity Committee.
Also reportedly has links with the young Catholics' publication, Spotkania.
Zapis (The Record). Published quarterly; first appeared in January 1977. Publication of
record for any literary and scholarly articles banned by the Polish censor. Stanislaw
Baranczak, member of KOR, appears to play prominent role in putting together Zapis.
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contained a general statement of KOR's philos-
ophy, "The Declaration of the Democratic
Movement," which was signed by 110 members
and active supporters. The declaration demanded
the restoration of "sovereignty and democracy"
and the "establishment of independent, self-
governing institutions. seeking to fulfill specific
tasks in the defense of human and civil rights." It
called for the right to strike, free trade unions,
abolition of censorship, and reform of the elector-
al system. At the end of October KOR an-
nounced that its membership had increased from
'3 to 31 persons,' including KOR's first emigre
member, an Oxford professor, Leszek Kola-
kowski. Kolakowski, a close friend and former
professor of both Kuron and Michnik, had left
Poland in 1969 but continued to have frequent
contacts with his former pupils." if u )
In November 1977 the dissidents further ex-
panded their activities:
? KOR claimed that a dissident workers'
"cell" had been formed in Radom under the
leadership of a worker who had been sprung
from jail by KOR agitation.
? More KOR-affiliated student groups
sprouted.
? Michnik organized privately-held lectures on
politically sensitive subjects, initially for stu-
dents in Krakow. The course was named the
"flying university." after a similar institu-
tion that had existed in 19th century Polandt V)
KOR's main competitor, RUCI-l, was also
energized. At a two-day "national conference" in
Warsaw in mid-September, it issued two docu-
cnents that reiterated the organization's objective
of strengthening human rights in Poland, and
called for close scrutiny of human rights issues at
the Helsinki review conference. The signatories
asserted that detente could become permanent
only if "internal differentiation" and political
pluralism were recognized everywhere. They also
argued that only an end to the "spheres of
influence doctrine in Europe would allow imple-
mentation of the CSCE principles of self-deter-
mination, equality, and sovereignty." In early
October some RUCH members who also be-
longed to Amnesty International aggressively
began to solicit signatures on campuses in War-
saw and elsewhere, and apparently at factories,
for an Al petition against imprisonment for
political reasons. u
Moczulski, RUCH's principal spokesman, in
early October tried his hand for the first time at
the type of publicist work practiced successfully
by his KOR counterpart, Kuron, and told West-
ern correspondents of a miners' strike in Silesia.
Also in October and November, RUCH founded
two publications-Gospodarz (Farmer) and
Bratniak (Fraternity) and inaugurated more
"counseling centers" and "discussion groups" in
various cities. ' U
The dissident spirit also infected others:
? A group of young Catholics-probably asso-
ciated with the officially approved and
heavily censored Catholic monthly Wiez
(Tower)---- started their own samizdat jour-
nal, Spotkanie (Encounter), in October.
Some of these people had participated in the
now largely moribund "Polish Youth Com-
mittee for Implementation of the Helsinki
Accord," which was responsible for the ap-
pearance of the sarruzdat publication U
progu (On the Threshold) in Febuary 1977.
? Unnamed dissidents in Lodz, probably mem-
bers of RUCH, started a literary journal,
Puls (Pulse).
In October and November the secret organi-
zation PPN published in the emigre press
several documents analyzing the Polish situ-
ation and instructing Poles in the techniques
of outwitting the system. (This primer re-
vealed ways to gain information legally
about events not reported in the official
press.) t W
The flurry of Activity was propelled partly by
the return of students to the campuses and by the
competition between KOR and RUCH. Some
activity was keyed to the Belgrade review con-
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ference, which opened in mid-October, and-
perhaps less openly-to the visit to Poland of
President Carter, which was initially slated for
late November. At least some dissidents calcu-
lated that the regime would not be inclined to
respond harshly to new boldness on their part
during the US President's visit
created a syllabus of 13 courses, each to eet
three times during the winter semester. ( U)
The regime's reaction to these new challenges
was two-pronged. On the one hand, it chose to
ignore the public challenge to the single-candi-
date electoral system. (Similar challenges
rought lengthy jail sentences to Czechoslovak
The police did, however, re
the dissident ventures. In early October they
confiscated the petitions collected for the
Amnesty International cause; in mid-November
they broke up several of the initial sessions of the
"flying university"; and in early December they
seized some mimeograph machines. ( t
The Polish dissidents were quiet during Presi-
dent Carter's visit in late December. The editor
of RUCH's publication, Opinia, did remind both
hosts and visitors of Polish dissent by requesting,
futilely, admission to President Carter's land-
mark news conference in Warsaw. A KOR activ-
ist, Kazimierz Switon-a worker who turned to
dissident activity after being freed from prison as
a consequence of KOR agitation-staged a hun-
ger strike in a Warsaw church to dramatize the
arrest of his two sons on charges of theft, a
charge that some dissidents felt was trumped up.
The dissidents' relative passiveness may have
been intended to show support for a visit that
they hoped would expand Poland's ties with the
United States and reduce its dependence on the
USSR.
Dissident activists continued in early 1978 to
try to keep their causes in the public eye. RUCH
activists handed out leaflets during local elec-
tions in February, reminding citizens of their
voting rights. Three RUCH activists in Katowice
launched a drive in late February to organize
"national free trade unions."' Meanwhile, KOR
took steps to upgrade and expand its "flying
university" seminars by getting support and par-
ticipation from respected academicians and writ-
ers. In late January, 58 intellectuals signed a
document that set up a new organization, "The
Society for Scientific Coursework." The society
' The main organizer is Kazimierz Switon. His colleagues
reportedly are a coal miner and a lawyer turned welder.
issidents in 1971.) On the other hand, it reacted
to the expansion of the "flying universities" and
the free trade union initiative with aggressive
harassment and frequent detentions of the key
people involved! I t&)
One of the dissident causes-an easing of
censorship--garnered important public support
from other elements of Polish society early this
spring. The 162nd Conference of Polish Bishops
issued a communique labeling censorship "re-
grettable and harmful" and expressing support
for "initiatives" that allow unfettered cultural,
intellectual, and academic expression. Many dis-
sidents interpreted this statement, rightly or
wrongly, as indirect support for the "flying uni-
versities" and its efforts to circumvent censor-
ship. In early April, at the National Writers'
Union Congress, several people (including nor-
mally conformist writers) made calls for an
easing of censorship that were reminiscent of the
mid-1960s, when Polish writers were battling a
cultural crackdown. ( t[
Buoyed by these shows of support, dissidents
continued to press their causes vigorously. In
early April KOR released two long documents on
censorship and police brutality, the latter con-
taining 10 documented case histories. Switon's
Free Trade Union Committee reiterated its ap-
peal for free trade unions in mid-April on the
occasion of a meeting in Prague of the Commu-
nist-controlled World Federation of Trade Un-
ions. In late April three people from Gdansk,
following Switon's lead, formed a free trade
union of the Baltic coast. The appeals of these
somewhat amorphous trade union committees,
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accompanied by police detention and harass-
ment ' of their founders, prompted a number of
West European trade unions to urge internation-
al labor organizations to issue formal complaints
against Poland. ; 44~
The dissidents also expanded their network of
extralegal lectures and classes. In mid-May
RUCH founded its own version of the "flying
university," naming it the "Independent Aca-
demic Group for Cooperation." The group plans
to publish academic works that have been re-
jected by state publishers; to provide a forum for
an exchange of ideas and experiences among
those banished from the official educational sys-
tem; and to lend assistance, presumably finan-
cial, to dissidents suffering hardships as a result
of their activities. KOR activists began seeking
to secure large halls for classes to be held this
fall. The police began taking more action against
the "flying universities" (fines, short detentions,
and the firing of dissident instructors from uni-
versity faculties), but the regime refrained from
closing them down and the "flying universities"
activism has continued. = lit 1
A Polish sociologist, who is knowledgeable
about, but not involved with, dissident activity,
believes the "flying university" classes are
attractive to students because they recall the
romantic stories they have heard about the Polish
underground during World War II and because
official university classes are so dull. Although
the "flying universities" involve a small number
of people, some of them are very well organized.
One in Lodz, for instance, has 20 instructors, led
by an ex-graduate student from the local univer-
sity, and 50 students, including textile workers
and other nonstudents. The students, who are
studying sociopolitical thought in the interwar
period and relating it to contemporary Poland
are required to do homrwnrtc 2nd t2ke eynmsr
The Future I I
Dissident activity in Poland in mid-1978 is led
by aggressive, determined men and women who
are politically astute and philosophically well
grounded. They have put pressure on the regime
to accept reforms and have increased the number
of their followers. The democracy they advocate
and their anti-Soviet, nationalist views are prob-
ably appealing to a substantial portion of the
population, and even to many in the estab-
lishment.
Yet the do uence of the dissidents is clearly
limited. Polish dissent is fragmented, beset by
personal, racial, religious, and philosophical an-
tipathies, and all these divisions are exploited by
the police. It has not captured a significant
number of followers outside the ranks of the
intelligentsia. The man-in-the-street has ignored
the dissidents' appeals, presumably because of
his primary concern for bread-and-butter issues,
his deep-rooted anti-intellectualism, and his po-
litical apathy. Individual clergymen have on
occasion supported the dissidents, but the Catho-
lic Church has stayed aloof because of its distrust
of some dissident leaders, its lack of sympathy
for some of their views, and its belief that the
Church cannot allow itself to be directly tied to a
cause so clearly political. And even many intel
lectuals, who might agree on the need for more
moderate regime policies, believe the dissidents
are unrealistic and their goals unreachable. They
are skeptical that lasting changes can be forced
and fear that pressure may be counterproductive,
blocking changes that might otherwise evolve
from within the system.
The mild and cautious response of t e regime
to the dissidents' activities has been a tactic born
of necessity. Keenly aware that public unhappi-
ness over shortages of food and consumer goods
could, as in the past, lead to serious civil unrest,
the leadership does not want a confrontation with
dissidents at this time. Its concern is probably
directed more at the possibility of an attack on
two fronts than at the possibility of being faced
by an intellectual-worker coalition. After all, the
workers did not rally to the student cause in
1968, and the intellectuals did not instigate, the
worker "revolts" of 1970 or 1976. 1 ::1
The authorities may calculate that limited
pressure-intelligently applied-will succeed in
restricting dissident activity to a small segment
of the intelligentsia. They may also believe that
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allowing a certain amount of dissent provides an
efficacious way for people to let off steam. The
regime undoubtedly thinks that time is on its
side. Some of the dissidents will break ranks
because of personal and psychological strains; in
the absence of measureable progress, others will
become disillusioned and will be seen as quixotic
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There is, of course, a serious political danger
for the regime in pursuing such a long-term cure.
The more conservative elements, both in Poland
itself and in other East European countries, will
find it hard to sit still while the cure takes effect,
and undoubtedly will wonder whether the patient
(a Communist Poland) will still be around when
the cure is complete. There is also always the
chance of miscalculation. The dissidents, who
now almost unanimously recognize the need for
restraint, might forget their self-imposed con-
straints in the heat of the moment. And the
authorities might at some point also lose their
composure and set in motion an irreversible
series of events.
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The only organized dissident group, Charter
77, revealed itself in the first week of January
1977, with the publication in the Western press
of a general manifesto. The document criticized
the government's failure to observe human and
civil rights provisions of domestic laws and the
international accords to which Czechoslovakia is
a party. The declaration-timed to coincide with
the start of Amnesty International's "prisoner of
conscience year"-described Charter 77 as an
"informal association" of citizens dedicated to
lobbying for human and civil rights in Czechoslo-
vakia and elsewhere and asked for a dialogue
with the authorities. (ii
The group (it refuses to call itself a "group" to
avoid grounds for legal prosecution) was initially
represented by three spokesmen and encom-
passed 241 people, who signed the manifesto.`
The signers were a mixture of Marxists, non-
Marxists, Catholics, and Eurocommunist sympa-
thizers, and almost all were members of the
Czech intelligentsia. Most important, virtually
all had been deeply involved in the effort to wed
Communism and democracy in 1968 under the
leadership of Alexander Dubcek, and, when it
was suppressed, suffered the political, economic,
and social consequences. (UJ
Their motives for banding together in the
largest show of Czechoslovak dissent since 1968
were as varied as their ideological beliefs. Some
' They were: Jan Patocka, a non-Communist philosopher long
banned from teaching except for a short time in 1968; Vaclav
Havel, a playwright heavily engaged in the political reform spirit of
1968; and Jiri Hajek, a lawyer and the foreign minister in 1968
under Dubcek.
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simply wanted personal rehabilitation, to be al-
lowed normalcy in their private lives.' Others
wanted to embarrass the Husak regime and its
Soviet masters before the opening in Belgrade of
the conference to review compliance with the
Helsinki accords. For some, like Zdenek Mlynar,
who looked on the accords as signifying Western
recognition of Soviet hegemony in Eastern
Europe, dissent was a way to keep Western
attention focused on the accords and on East
European conditions. A few may have calculated
that the country's deepening economic problems
made a powerful argument for again employing
their expertise. Several signed the manifesto
because they wanted to emigrate and believed
their participation would lead the regime to
grant them permission to leave. The enterprise
also seems to have grown as much out of despair
as out of hope for success. Chartist spokesman
Jan Patocka once said that only "those who
already had nothing more to lose" were asked to
sign the manifesto. .f Ut!
Those who had such a hope may have been misled by a rare
example of government leniency in December 1976, when some
political reformers-turned-dissidents (like the Chartists, people
discredited after the collapse of the "Prague spring") were granted
early release from jail terms they had been serving since 1972.
Pavel Kohout, a playwright-helped draft the Charter
77 manifesto
Vaclav Havel, a playwright and one of three original Charter 77 spokesman-tried in
October 1977 and received a suspended prison sentence
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Those who initiated Charter 77-playwrights
Vaclav Havel and Pavel Kohout-say they were
moved to do so by the trial in July and Septem-
ber 1976 of members of a nonconformist musical
group and by the publication in Czechoslovakia
in October of UN human rights covenants. They
may have also been encouraged by dissident
stirrings at that time in East Germany and
Poland. Patocka, for one, showed some similarity
of purpose with Polish dissidents when he
claimed that Charter 77 sought to teach people
to defend themselves and to know and argue for
their rights. I IL)
The impact of the manifesto was immediate.
Within a month, the number of signatories al-
most doubled, and Charter spokesmen released
to Western correspondents a series of followup
documents. The regime arrested three prominent
signatories "for maintaining contact with hostile
forces," and two younger followers, reportedly
for disseminating the manifesto in the industrial
center of Ostrava. The media launched a torrent
of invective, describing the manifesto as "a slan-
derous pamphlet" instigated by "anti-Commu-
nist and Zionist centers," and calling its leaders
"agents of imperialism." The regime's harsh
reaction triggered criticism from such diverse
Western quarters as the Italian Communist
Party, Austrian Chancellor Kreisky, and the US
State Department. Other East European dissi-
dents promptly expressed solidarity with the
Chartists.
(Lo
This three-way interaction between the dissi-
dents, the regime, and Western observers con-
tinued, albeit at a less feverish pace, for the next
several months. The regime moved aggressively
to intimidate dissidents through job dismissals,
interrogations, threats, and other harassment.'
The dissidents responded with more publicity
and new criticisms. The regime offered to let the
Chartists emigrate, but they refused. The auth-
orities hinted that Charter 77 was "illegal," but
did not press the point in court. Finally, the
police tried to sever dissident contacts with West-
ern correspondents, a move that prompted even
3 The dissidents claimed in a letter to parliament in late May
1977 that 80 people had lost their jobs because of their adherence to
Charter 77.
more criticism in the West, and that earned
Prague a black mark for violating the Helsinki
agreement's provision regar ing better working
conditions for journalists.4
Prague's harsh reaction to Charter 77 activi-
ties reflected the regime's conservatism, its
awareness that it had little popular support, and
its fear that the dissident manifesto might, if not
clearly labeled unacceptable, become the focal
point for general discontent, particularly among
many of the 400,000 persons who had been
purged after 1968. Party leader Husak probably
also saw a political need to show resolve. Husak
had been advocating selective rehabilitation of
those purged after 1968, and the flurry of dissent
seemed to vindicate - ro onents of an
uncompromising line.
By mid-May, the movement a lost mucn of
its momentum. Two of the three spokesmen were
no longer active, and Mlynar became the first
prominent Chartist to accept the regime's emi-
gration offer.5 Dissident activity stagnated dur-
ing the summer under the impact of continued
police pressure and amidst false rumors that
those arrested in January would finally be
brought to trial. (u)
The dissidents showed signs of regrouping in
late September when two new Charter spokes-
men were named.6 This resurgence was probably
prompted by the scheduled opening in October of
the Belgrade conference to review the Helsinki
accords, and perhaps by the new signs of vigor
among Polish dissidents. The regime reacted
quickly by putting on trial and giving three-and-
a-half-year prison sentences to the two Chartists
who had been arrested in January, and by trying
? In February 1977 the regime detained Western journalists on
at least six occasions. In April it declared that journalists would be
issued an entry visa only if they agreed not to contact dissidents.
Prague subsequently backed away from this requirement, but it
remains selective about issuing visas to foreign correspondents.
'Jan Patocka died in early March following, and perhaps partly
because of, a lengthy police interrogation; Vaclav Havel negotiated
his way out of jail in mid-May by agreeing to step aside as a
Charter spokesman. Mlynar, fired from his low-level job at the
National Museum shortly after Charter 77 appeared, reportedly
had tired of regime harassment.
6 They were Ladislav Hejdanek, a philosopher and apparent
student of deceased Charter spokesman Jan Patocka, and Marta
Kubisova, a singer banned from performing since 1968.
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in mid-October four other prominent dissidents.
Although the four received relatively light sen-
lences, the trial coincided with the opening of the
Belgrade conference and provoked considerable
Western criticism at Belgrade and elsewhere. U
The Husak regime's motives for holding the
trials while the Belgrade conferees were begin-
ning work probably included apprehension over
the rise of dissident activity in Poland, uneasiness
over new signs of life on the part of the Chartists,
and a desire to discourage a new round of
activism. Prague may have also intended to
demonstrate that it would not let such external
factors as the Belgrade conference provide pro-
tective cover for Czechoslovak dissident activity.
It is also possible that the trials were inspired by
Moscow as a trial balloon to gauge Western
reactions to long-expected dissident trials in
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The trials apparently generated differences
over tactics among the Chartists. Old splits
reopened, and a new Trotskyite faction was
formed. There apparently was substantial dis-
agreement over whether to issue a Charter 78.8 A
substantial number of the dissidents, including
spokeswoman Marta Kubisova, reportedly advo-
cated more aggressive, dramatic actions than
Charter 77 had employed. At the other end of
the spectrum, original Charter spokesman Hajek
argued for the need to stay well within the letter
of the law to a text for
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The increasing influence of the "radicals" may
have been responsible for such actions as hunger
strikes by two dissidents in November and Janu-
ary and an attempt to crash a workers' social
event in January 1978. The latter led to a fracas
with the police and landed three Chartists in jail
for more than six weeks. Hajek resigned as
spokesman in early April. He attributed his
ota Ornest, the principal defendant and not a signatory of
Charter 77. was given a three-year prison sentence (subsequently
reduced to two and a half years for good behavior) for alleged
subversive activity, that is, maintaining "conspiratorial links" with
emigres considered "foreign agents." Jiri Lederer. journalist and
Chartist, wasgiven a three-and-a-hall-year jail term on the same
charge. Vaclav Have] and Frantisek Pavlicek, both playwrights and
Charter adherents, were given suspended sentences.
It has not been issued.
Jiri Ftajek, a former Czechoslovak Foreign Minister-the
main voice of Charter 77 dissidents for more than a year
decision primarily to nervous strain and a wish to
spend more time with his family, but it may also
be an indication that those who advocate a more
confrontational poli
Chartist movement.
Charter 77 reportedly attracted over the
course of a year almost a thousand signers.
While this is numerically insignificant in a popu-
lation of 15 million, it nonetheless is symbolically
important among a people that had intimately
experienced the dangers of political involvement
after 1968. The Husak regime, which no doubt
was surprised that 241 persons initially signed
the document, must have been astounded and
concerned that almost three times as many
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would add their signatures in the face of to
intense media criticism and police hard smen
The group's sheer survival for 18 months is a
major accomplishment. It has skillfully pressed
and embarrassed the authorities by its detailed
accounts of instances of official abuse and re-
pression and its firm rebuttals of media attacks.
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This success at embarrassing the regime in its Slovakia since 1968, and some saw Charter 77 as
foreign relations, most apparent in the early a Czech effort nd jeopardize
months of 1977, was again evident last April Slovak gains. iaY UC UI1 Me verge when the Chartists embarrassed Husak during Charter 77 m of significant
his landmark visit to West Germany by releasin change.'? The loss of Hajek, a driving force
an open letter detailing new regime repressionL_J within the movement, could cause it to drift
Nevertheless, the Chartists have ale to at-
tract nonintellectual segments of the society or to
inspire others to speak out on other issues.' The
regime's decisive attack on Charter 77-while it
gave the dissidents more domestic publicity than
they probably expected and reportedly stimu-
lated popular interest and sympathy-showed
that dissenters had to pay a heavy price for
speaking out.
The cause has also failed to gain a following
among the Slovaks, the junior partner in the
Czechoslovak federation. Fewer Slovaks than
Czechs had been caught up in the reformist
atmosphere of 1968, and, consequently, there
were few Slovaks suffering political exile in 1977
who could be attracted to the dissident cause.
Slovaks appreciated the political equality and
economic growth that their compatriot, party
and state leader Gustav Husak, had brought to
without purpose and eventually to crumble into a
number of smaller organizations. One dissident
has publicly suggested that "perhaps" Charter
77 is no longer necessary." On the other hand,
those advocating more aggressive actions may
indeed have taken over the group, and may lead
it into more direct confrontation with the
authorities.
For the longer term, dissidents will continue to
be active at least until the regime makes a
serious effort to come to terms with the people
purged after 1968 and to implement more mod-
erate domestic policies. Hard-liners within the
leadership and lower party ranks will probably
continue to be able to block any moderation in
policies for as long as Moscow, which holds the
key to domestic Czechoslovak developments, is
unwilling or unable to throw ?" **?
weight behind such a course.
10It has not yet changed its name, ho
' This may be only partially true. There have been other
reported instances of dissidence, including a letter to Husak in early
October 1977 from 55 "Christians" criticizing religious
discrimination.
materialized.
" He also claimed new groups "are springing up," but this
cannot be confirmed.
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The East German regime, unlike Poland and
Czechoslovakia, was not confronted by a flurry
of organized dissident activity last year, presum-
ably because it had dispersed the most likely
nucleus for such discontent in November 1976.
The limited dissent that did occur was composed
entirely of individual acts and statements. Early
in 1977 it included complaints about censorship
and other cultural restrictions by outspoken writ-
ers and performing artists. In August, dissent
took a more programmatic, philosophical, and,
from the regime's viewpoint, subversive turn with
the airing in the West of Rudolf Bahro's stinging
critique of deficiencies in the "existing social-
ism." Bahro's action triggered several anony-
mous critiques, published in West Germany ear-
ly this year, and reportedly stimulated critical
thinking with regard to regime policies in white
collar circles. The authorities handily stifled
their critics through imprisonment, emigration,
or by rewarding them when they displayed con-
formist behavior, but it remains to be seen
whether it can eliminate the "corrosion" of
Bahro's reformist ideas.' (U )
A potential dissident group revealed itself in
November 1976, and the regime was able to
disperse it before it became established. Whether
by luck or by calculation, the authorities uncov-
ered this dissidence when it deprived Wolf Bier-
mann, a dissident songwriter and performer, of
his citizenship in November and denied him
reentry after he completed a tour of West Ger-
many.' The action provoked an unprecedented
protest from the East German intellectual estab-
lishment. A public letter asking the leadership to
' Bahro was sentenced to eight years in prison in late June 1978,
for alleged intelligence activity.
' Biermann, 42, had not been allowed to perform his pointedly
critical ballads since 1965. His work, however, was available to the
East Germans through the West German media. He frequently
taped interviews and performances in his East Berlin apartment
that were subsequently smuggled into West Germany. The East
German authorities largely ignored this activity, apparently believ-
ing that Biermann's broadcasts had little impact in East Germany.
reconsider was initiated by 13 persons and even-
tually was signed by an additional 66 people,
many of them young writers from the Jena area.
Biermann's friend and former teacher, Robert
Havemann, penned an open letter to party leader
Honecker seeking a reversal. Havemann, himself
a longtime critic of bureaucratic and repressive
excesses, had bee Honecker's cellmate in the
Nazi period. ( Gl
The authorities responded to this challenge in
a measured way. Havemann was placed under
virtual house arrest, a condition that has per-
sisted with varied intensity since September
1976. Most of Biermann's sympathizers from
Jena were ' d, although some were allowed to
emigrate. The most prominent signers were
pressed to retry were subjected to "admin-
party, and two received party reprimnndcll 125X1
f) GV-I
At the same time, the regimd
over some of its critics. It attempted to buy off
some by RE vding_publishm and travel Kities for the more prominent intellectuals, partly 11 eca?6 ause they were wwell known in the West and
harassment would create unfavorable publicity
and partly because their work was important to
advance East German international prestige. To
avoid driving the more "reasonable" writers into
opposition, the authorities showed a willingness
to forgive in early December 1976, when they
released innovative writings by Christa Wolf and
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Guenter Kunert, both of whom hnd sianed.the
pro-Biermann petition.
This token reassurance probably had a signifi-
cant calming effect. Many apparently had rallied
around Biermann because they q_ his exi e
more restrictive cultural policy.
Honecker had allowed writers and artists pro-
gressively more leeway since 1971, and despite
the inevitable backing and filling by the regime,
some app ently thought -censorship would be
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further eased. This optimism, however, was
sfia mmediately before the Biermann expul-
sion. In October 1976 the Writers' Union ex-
pelled the nonconformist poet Reiner Kunze,
who was very popular with younger writers (es-
pecially in Jena) and whose book The Wonderful
Years, a frank account of the problems faced by
East German youth, was then in third place on
the West German best seller list. On the same
day, in a high-level shakeup, Horst Sindermann
was fired as head of government, most likely
because the government was not coming to grips
n ~
with the country's economic problems. So
intellectuals credited Sindermann, probably
wrba g1 iberali-
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Why the regime suddenly expatriated Bier-
mann after it had ignored him for more than 10
years is impossible to answer. Some cynical
observers in East Germany believe the regime
acted in a calculated way to flush out other
dissidents. There is evidence, however, suggest-
ing that the authorities were surprised by the
show of support for Biermann. The police, who
have a long history of overresponding, r & Ye
believed that Biermann and H4vCMann, longtime
collaborators in interviews carried by the West
German media, we about to found a dissident
Liroup. There is evince that Biermann was
c_a talogui indivLdua grievances, and Have
mann had become more outspoken after the
Soviet "concessions" at the East Berlin meeting
of European Communist parties that June about
the need for domestic political reform and
greater East German independence from Mos-
cow? The police probably were alsoalerted to the
possible formation of a dissident group by the
incidence of such activity elsewhere, notably the
founding by Polish intellectuals of the "Workers
Defense League" in September. The most prob-
able immediate reason for Biermann's ouster,
however, was his criticism of the regime during a
large performance in West Germany that many
' Havemann. 68, a scientist banned from teaching and expelled
from the Academy of Sciences in the mid-1960s. advocates a "true
Communism" that allows freedom of speech, information, job
selection, and travel. He has called for East Germany to make its
own contribution to the development of Communism and has talked
of eventual German reunification.
East
sets..
Whatever the regime's rationale at the time, it
seems clear that the decision to expatriate Bier-
mann was taken with several concurrent develop-
ments in mind:
? A ~reater outst)okcnness about restrictions
on religion by the previously quiescent Evan-
gelical church. This attitude was largely the
result of the self-immolation of a pastor in
August and the regime's subsequent clumsy
handling of the incident.
? Signs of possible, co usion between some
pas Tors and dissident intellectuals. Kunze,
for instance, had attempted unsuccessfully to
speak at a church youth rally before his
ouster from the Writers' Union.
? Increased agitation among the populace over
travel and emigration restrictions. Thou-
sands were applying for permission to travel,
and some, when rebuffed, persisted with
petitions to , _govfer nu
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? Economic problems, a concern that by itself
Biermann's expulsion w f the
measures taken by the regime in reaction to these
unsettling developments. Another action that
had even wider repercussions, and one that
helped discourage dissent, was the adoption of a
tougher posture toward West Germany and,
specifically, Berlin. It is possible that the regime
hoped the minicrisis over Berlin that it started in
late 1976 and continued until May 1977 would
signal its unhappiness over what it considered
West German encouragement of dissent in East
Germany and would lower its own population's
expectations about easier travel (blaming the
West Germans, of course, for the restrictions).
The Berlin controversy of early 1977 may indeed
have inhibited would-be dissidents. Writers who
Karl-Heinz Nitschke, who applied 18 times for permission to
live with his sister in west Germany, prepared a petition in July
1976 on freedom of travel that was signed by 33 citizens from
Riesa.
may have argued for a tightening up, even
though the East Germans were not in pearl
as serious difficulty as the Poles. 25X1
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had protested the Biermann exile 1211JS
official in January.bt whie-th6ewre aware of
Polish and Czechoslovak dissi
cif not intend tofollow 'suit.
The infectious atmosphere of East European
dissident activity of early 1977 did not, however,
entirely bypass East Germany:
? Rudolf Bahro, whose book criticizing Com-
munism as practiced in East Germany was
to be publicized in West Germany later in
the year, was sufficiently inspired to submit
the manuscript he had been working on since
T97 1 to an East German publisher.
? Several would-be emigrants (for example,
Wilfred Meissner and Hellmuth Nitsche)
wrote to President Carter criticizing the
inadequate observance of human rights in
East Germany. Both were imprisoned after
reports on their letters were published in the
West. Nitsche, known for his longtime criti-
cism of the system, was subsequently al-
lowed to leave the country, but Meissner
apparently is serving a four-year jail
sentence.
r
? In early April several persons who signed the
Biermann petition tried to organize another
petition protesting the continued imprison-
ment of young writers jailed after the Bier-
mann incident. The attempt foundered when
several prominent writers refused to nartici-
Xate.
Such isolated dna a mg
East German dissidents during the first half of
last year. In early July, rumors that the young
Jena writers would go on trial moved some of the
older writers to weigh in with criticism-pub-
lished in the West German press-of repression
in East Germany. Their statements were presum-
ably intended to focus Western attention on East
Germany and head off trials or a widespread
crackdown. The fact that the writers spoke out
individually, but within a very short time, sug-
decision not to
gests a
with a joint statement.
In the midst of this effort to exile critical
elements, East Berlin experienced a new incident
of dissidence. On 22 August, excerpts of Rudolf
Bahro's critique of the East German political and
economic system were published in Der Spiegel.
Bahro was arrested the next day on charges of
"intelligence activities," and in September, at
least four others were arrested, presumably for
suspected complicity. ( u
Bahro's book, which was published in West
Germany last September, is both a stinging
indictment of the "traditional Stalinist system"
in East Germany and a utopian prescription for
correcting "social and political repression, cor-
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Hellmuth Nitsche, imprisoned in 1977 after writing a letter
to President Carter, was subsequently allowed to emigrate
proynke the authorities
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ruption, bureaucratic squandering, and deceit."
Bahro characterizes himself as a Marxist who
seeks to stimulate men of conscience in the
establishment to think critically of how the sys-
tem works. His criticisms are telling, especially
on economic matters, because he has worked for
years on the staff of an industrial enterprise. But
his depiction of The Alternative, as his book is
titled, is utopian-abolish the "division of la-
bor"-and vague-the Communist Party, rather
than seeking to control and direct events, should
become an open organization acting as the "liv-
ing conscience" of the people. His advice on how
io effect change is nothing more than a call for
unspecified coordinated actions by reform-mind-
ed persons throughout Eastern Europe and the
USSR and for the eventual formation of a new
Communist Party (a "League of Communists")(tA')
Despite its drawbacks, the book has prompted
others to compose lengthy indictments of the way
Communism is practiced in East Germany. The
first, published in September, 1977, by Der
Spiegel and purportedly the work of a "high-level
SEE) official," enthusiastically endorses Bahro.
A second manifesto, mailed to West Germany
the same month by an anonymous "League of
German Communists" and subsequently pub-
lished in the West German Koelner Stadt-An-
zeiger in January 1978, also leveled severe criti-
cisms at the regime. , U I
The most publicized manifesto, reportedly
written in October and December and published
in Der Spiegel last January, is a strongly worded
criticism of the "deceit, corruption, repression,
arbitrariness, favoritism, and incompetence" of
the "semischizophrenic socialism" that exists in
East Germany. It claims to represent the views of
a small group of lower level party members. The
document includes personal attacks on the East
German leaders, acid criticism of Soviet "red
fascism," a blunt rejection of Leninism as "use-
less," and an appeal for a neutral, leftist, and
reunited Germany. The anonymous writers advo-
cate a "totally reformed Communism" that in-
cludes party and institutional pluralism; free-
doms of the press, organization, association,
travel, and emigration; price reform and the
elimination of economic irrationalities; and a
reduction in the bureaucracy. ' U.)
The manifesto's publication in West Germany
caused a chill in East - West German relations
and prompted East German media specialists to
dismiss it as a West German provocation. While
many of the thoughts in the manifesto reflect
views held by many East Germans, the document
has in fact had very little impact. Its exaggerated
language and anonymous authorship have appar-
ently prompted many to dismi it as a
fabrication.
Dissent in East Germany is likely to continue
to be expressed by isolated individual statements
and acts and in many cases, especially if done
jointly, will be anonymous. Its political effect has
been limited. Havemann's hope that the state-
ment of dissent in 1976 by Biermann's friends
and colleagues indicated a new willingness by
regime critics to stand together was ill-founded.
For those not willing to be bought off, the regime
has made the cost of dissent too high. People are
kept in jail without trial, often for lengthy per-
iods, and then sometimes, if lucl -
somed to West Germany.
Bahro's idealistic criticisms pricked the con-
sciences of closet dissidents within the establish-
ment, perhaps mostly because his appeal as a
fellow establishmentarian has a freshness and
sense of commitment that they have lost. This
could be troublesome, however, because ide-
ology-or more accurately what the regime says
East Germany stands for-is crucial in a country
where appeals for support must be based on
essentially ideological than national -rather
grounds.
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There wil pro a y be other statements from
East German dissidents, old and new, to fortify
Bahro's message. Havemann plans to publish his
own Bahro-like critique. And Biermann, in exile
in West Germany, still passionately declares his
loyalty to a Communist East Germany and his
intention to crusade for its perfection. Even
though they may have little significant following
within East Germany, their actions love
discussion about the need for change.II II 25X1
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2;5X1
Dissident activity in Romania both last year
and so far this year has been at a relatively low
level. It did not have the dynamic personalities,
the organization, or the ideological underpin-
nings comparable to that of the Polish dissident
movement. Nonetheless, the activity that did
occur was a rare instance in Romania's Commu-
nist history, when a small, but relatively broad
cross section of the public was bold enough to
express public unhappiness with pervasive politi-
cal controls. The dissidents raised human rights
issues when the new, human rights-oriented ad-
ministration was inaugurated in Washington.
This timing no doubt caused anxiety in the
Romanian hierarchy that its throttling of dissent
might jeopardize its efforts to continue its "spe-
cial relationship" with the United States. Addi-
tionally, ever-suspicious President Ceausescu
probably wonders to what degree dissident com-
plaints qbout his person it cult reflect broader
opinion.
The central figure in this brief flurry of activ-
ity that began in February last year and peaked
by April, was Paul Goma, a 42-year-old writer.'
Goma, perhaps distressed by the forced emigra-
tion in January 1977 of a friend, says he was
moved by the Czechoslovak Chartists to write
two "open letters" in February criticizing the
regime's violation of rights guaranteed by law.
The first letter expressed solidarity with dissi-
dents elsewhere in Eastern Europe, particularly
in Czechoslovakia, and blasted the "sword of
repression" throughout the region ("for you, the
Russian sword, for us, the Romanian sword").
He accused Ceausescu and his politically promi-
nent wife ("the two Cs") of instituting a reign of
bludgeon-ga.g-corruption (in Romanian, three `
d)
Cs) and of pushing Romania back 1,000 years.(
His second letter, signed by six other Roma-
nians and subsequently dubbed the Goma Mani-
festo, accused Bucharest of making a mockery of
rights guaranteeed in the Constitution and the
principles of freer movement set down in the
Helsinki accord. The manifesto asked the dele-
gates to the conference reviewing implementa-
tion of the accord to pay close attention to
human rights issues. To the apparent astonish-
ment of the authorities-and perhaps to Goma
as well-the manifesto, which was publicized in
the West, attracted an increasing number of
signatures and established Goma as the center of
a "dissident; movement." By Goma's count, the
document was eventually signed by more than
300 people.
' Goma had been publicly criticizing the Ceausescu regime since
1973 when, after a year's stay in Paris, he returned to Romania to
research a novel on Romanian prisons in the late 1940s.
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Signers of the manifesto included an assort-
ment of frustrated would-be emigrants (by far
the largest element), religious dissenters (mainly
Baptists), and a handful of persons from the
ntelligentsia. Goma claims 60 percent of his
-'following" were "workers," but it is likely that
nost of the signers were, in fact, white-collar
workers. -
Whatever their social origins or occupations,
the vast majority who signed the letter did so
because signature was seen as a way to get the
regime's attention and subsequent permission to
leave Romania. This belief was well-founded: the
s,ix who initially signed, all frustrated emigrants,
were immediately offered and accepted pass-
ports.' Partly as a consequence of the regime's
initial willingness to grant passports in these
cases, Goma's following at any one time was very
small and at no time was it organized. Goma
does not appear to have been especially aggres-
sive in seeking out signers. He considered regis-
tering his "group" with the authorities as the
`-Commiftee on the Imple[dentatidh of Roma-
riian Laws," but never took that step. His one
piece of foliowup_work to the manifesto was an
effort to document instances of the political use
of mental i
published.'
It is not Licar wnat goals, i any, oma had in
Mind when he wrote his letters. After his depar-
ture from Romania last November, he said that
he seeks the de-Stalinization of his country and
that he made common cause with the Chartists
because he saw their demands as reformist and
consequently having some chance of success.
Goma implied that he wants to see Romania
adopt what he considers th "livable life" of
Hungary and Poland. 11
The appearance of Goma's "dissident inove-
ntent"-against the human rights backdrop cre-
The authorities soon realized that their actions were encourag-
ing others to sign Goma's document and began delaying- -but did
not end- issuing permits to emigrate.
' f;oma's interest in documenting the political use of psychiatry
in Romania may reflect the influence of ton Vianu. a psychiatrist
who had written about the misuse of psychiatry in an October 1976
issue of a Romanian literary monthly. Vianu was one of the few
members of the intelligentsia to sign Goma's manifesto.
ated by the then-upcoming conference to review
the Helsinki accord and the new US administra-
tion--helped embolden others.
? In February 1977 a small group of religious
dissidents issued a 17-page statelment pro-
testing religious oppression. U
? In March a well-established historian, frus-
trated by the rejection of his latest book and
his inability to travel, drafted a broad-gauge
manifesto announcing the formation of a
CSCE monitoring group. His manifesto was
never publicized; the police arrested him and
simultaneously rounded up a number of dis-
25X1
In June, Karoly Kiraly,
a n
and former member of the Romanian leader-
ship, wrote the first of several letters to the
authorities calling for a more enlightened
policy toward Romania's large Hungarian
minority. These letters subsequently ap-
peared in the "-~ 25X1
? Five young h
had signed the Goma Manifesto and all of
whom were eager to -emigrate-issued an
open letter in June calling for Western scru-
tiny of Romania's poor human rights record.
Joined later by 17 friends and sympathizers,
they agitated throe hour jibe CtlmrylPr Re-
spite staving een sent re in _July . to_ e-
mo a work projects.? Amnesty International 25X1
ma a representations on their behalf in the
fall, and Bucharest started lettinyr them
leave Romania in November.
Romanian religious dissidents,
and determined, needed little impetus from
Goma's initiative to air their complaints about
religious discrimination. A nucleus of dissident
Baptist clergy under the leadership of Oxford-
educated losif Ton had actives agitated_sitite
early 1973 for rebus freedom.' And in early
'They had free weekends.
'The dissident Baptists had been waging a two-front war
against the political authorities and older pastors more inclined to
cooperate with the authorities and opposed to the dissidents'
doctrinal views. Nonetheless, the dissidents acquired some follow-
ing among seminary students in Bucharest and in several of the
Baptist communities outside Bucharest. In January 1977 Ton was
elected head of the Oradea Baptist community-the largest in
Romania. with some 1.300 members.
sidents, including Goma.
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February 1977, they lost a more than year-long
battle of wits with the regime for control of the
Baptist organization in Romania. As a
consequence of this defeat and Ton'-s--5e-lief that
the erlod-,befQZe ,,_t._ Belgrade con erence rpro-
vided }an omppportupe ,lme, the dissidents issued a
oent explaining the forms of religious dis-
crimination in Romania and arguing that the
safeguarding of human rights was no longer of
internal, but international concern.6 Ton followed
this up with another document in March, urging
the government to heed its Hel
or admit to religious
The campaign did not last long, however,
because the regime apparently was soon reas-
sured enough to relax. Goma-who was expelled
from the Writers' Union while in jail, an action
that officially barred him from publishing in
Romania-was released in early May, shaken
enough to cease any further dissident activism.
Georgescu, _ whose activity had prompted the
'
crackdown and who a een c arge
In June, Bucharest allowed severa
-s of the manifesto to leave, apparently to
rnmemorate the opening in Belgrade of the
preparatory conference to review the Helsinki
accord. Over the summer the regi~ me sparred
with a send qte group-. of young hotel elexks, and
The authorities' to dissident
activity included persuasion and threat, harass-
ment, periodic detentions, internal exile, forced
labor sentences, Lob dismissals, an MrNlut -
quently, offers of emigration papers.
their sympathizers until it decided, apparently in
late Septemer, to grant them the permission to
25X1
Reflecting a sensitivity to Western publicity emigrate they had sought all along. In Novem-
ut on a good face for the
rest tried to
h
B
b
p
uc
a
er,
and opinion, Bucharest generally avoided_ using
uh_ harsh measures as imprisonment against Belgrade conferees by letting Goma, the hotel
individuals-,who were well known in 'the West. clerks, and other dissidents leave the country.
The brief flurry of dissident activity in February
and Marc Thus, Goma was inrtiall s ected to surveil- >7 hall thus been almost AD ally
ness to engage in a "dialogue." One consequence straint in handling dissidents. Bu _ .'os. was
of these meetings was the publication in a Roma- veer concerned that~_slistdent?rev_elattgns=of re-
h f
service and anonymous threats of personal harm. """" C11
Party Secretary forCuffiral Affairs Burtica held The Ceausescu regime's concern about main-
two publicized meetings with Goma in an effort taining its special relationship with the United
to,buy him off and to display Bucharest's wiling- States appears to account for some of its re-
nian journal of a benign literary essay by Goma, press on or bad publicity over t e ar
the first time in seven y?^-? *''^* ''? i,^~ anttan a:?senters might_ endger renewal of itsost-
A crackdown came at t >
the police learned of plans fora new dissident
organization and responded by arresting ore-_
"~ 20 people, including Goma and a
wininggaboutP
prominent historian, Vlad Georgescu. Nine peo-
ple were immediately sentenced to one year of
forced labor. Dissident Baptist leaders were
called in for daily interrogations. The abrupt
police actions were accompanied by an anti-US
for years.'
rights newsletter patterned after the Soviet dissident Chronicle.
' Bucharest apparently believed for a time that US officials were
directly involved in stirring up dissidence in Romania.
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ght prompt the Carter administr re-
consider US policy towa
The chances for dissidL
may have been enhanced by last year's develop-
ments. Goma has left the country, but those few
of his "followers" who remain could again draw
Western media attention to restrictive domestic
policies. The dissident Baptists, although few in
number, are determined, well organized, and
have connections in the West In May 1978, they
25X
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again issued docume
religion in Romania.
Goma's "movement" may have been indicative
of and helped promote a new outspoken attitude
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among broader segments of the populace. Al-
though too early to call it a trend, a new boldness
is apparent in the Jiu valley miners' strike last
August, in the Hungarian minority's demonstra-
tive airing of its grievances early this year, and in
the renewed demands to emigrate in the wake of
Ceausescu's trip to the United States this spring.
At least in the latter case, this new attitude stems
from a calculation by a surprisingly large num-
ber of Romanians that the Ceausescu regime's
interest in good relations with the United States
makes
issues.
on human rights
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This , even tnougn it may stop short of
harnessing the average Romanian to a political
cause, may make it more difficult for Bucharest
to continue to enforce Stalinist economic and
political policies. It may also prompt human
rights issues to crop up more frequently in US-
Romanian relations.
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Secret
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