CONTROL RECORD FOR SUPPLEMENTAL DISTRIBUTION

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP80T00634A000900100001-6
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 46
• Document Creation Date: December 9, 2016
• Document Release Date: April 18, 2001
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: August 1, 1978
• Content Type: FORM

CONTROL RECORD FOR SUPPLEMENTAL DISTRIBUTION
DISSEM: 28 Aug. 78 (ANALYST: ORPA SOA
SERIES NUMBER
RP 78-10289
CLASSIFICATION OF REPORT
Secret NF NC ORCON
DISTRIBUTION TO RC
66
DATE OF DOCUMENT
Au crust 1978
NUMBER OF COPIES
225
NUM RrA' STL
COPY
RECIPIENT
DATE
NO. (S)
SENT
RETURNED
1-55
Rec'd from PP&D
28 Aug. 78
DCI
2
DDCI
3
SA/DDCI
4
D/NFAC
5
DD/NFAC
6
D/ORPA
7,8
DD/ORPA
9-23
ORPA/ECS
24
STATI
NTL
25
Analyst to Annotate & return
6-30
ORPA/SOA
36
C/O NFAC REG.
STATI
NTL
37
CH/PPG
38
SA/PPG
30 Aug. 78
39
CH/PMB/PPG
40,41
CH PDB PPG
42
CH/TPB/PPG
43
CH/R&D/PPG
"
S- a -Of
44
Carter Librar
45
STATIN
L
d/Y~f
ATI
NTL
''
A _r
DTI
STATW
t 7f
T
TL
I
TL
Sf
TATI
TL
1
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S C '7
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FORM nqCo
 Approtied For Release 2001/0 A O U 4~AU0d9 100001-6
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- ,v -o'e 10,qAc
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Appro c or R e/ /j0 1 DP80T00634A000900100001-6
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 Approved For Release 200 /0 / 3 I fOO0634A000900100001-6
,414 -- 67 f~ 7)/
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 CONF: NFAC/CS INFO: FILE, VR, DDOw4, CRGw3, DDO/DO EA-8I NFAC,
OERw3, ORPA"S, SDO, (29/P) ww4ww"b +~w+.+ra-ww~ww..wwww"m"-wwwww.~rww~~~.~wrywww~w~~ws~.sw~MwwwJ. 4. . i~fL?lrf~w~i~
/33/
SECRET FRP,:
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78 0686954 PAGE 001
TOT: 111636Z MAY 78 DIRECTOR 22074:3
wWwaWw+.soft wWwwwwwwwwswwwwsW w WWwwwf.wwlwwwwwwMwwwwwww?wa?wsrss"Awrw~wwwwwA~rMw:+-wrrwa
SECRET
STAFF
111636Z DIRECTOR 220793
TO:
25X1A
25X1A
REF - 73038 0626929
THE MEMORANDUM "IRAN AFTER THE SHAH" HAS NOT YET BEEN PUBLISHED,
ITS ESTIMATED TIME OF COMPLETION IS LATE MAY OR EARLY JUNE.
NFAC WILL SEND IT TO YOU WHEN IT IS PUBLISHED PROVIDING
THAT 11 CAN BE SENT OVERSEAS. (SECRET) XGOS-2.>
OR : NF_AC/CS ; REL: NFAC COORD:
NFAC/PPG ; CL Y OFY14
86, 25X1A 25X1A 25X1A
_END OF MESSAGE SECRET
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 Approved For110~0/~5~'3V1CIA-F~F~8i0TVV6"34AOOU9000001-6
MEMORANDUM FOUR: Chief, Distribution Section, P&PD/OL
FROM: Chief', Registry and Dissemination Branch, PPG
Dissemination for OER Report, ER 78-10206
(Job 428-397-78), The Oil Market Through
1985, SECRET/NOFORN/NOCONTRACT
Attached is the dissemination list for subject report. Copies # 1
through ?# 60 will be picked up or forwarded to PPG/R&D, Room 7G07,
STATINTL Hq. Please notif
PPG/R&D, x-5203, when you receive
the remaining copies for distribution. When a report has an ELITE, the
STTATI NTL
elite copies must be disseminated before standard distribution is ma e.
Attachment: a/ s
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 ADMINISTRATIVE - INTERNAL USE ONLY
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3 August 1978
MEMORANDUM FOR: Chief, Distribution Section, P&PD/OL
FROM: Chief, Registry and Dissemination Branch, PPG
Dissemination for ORPA Report, RP 78-10289
(Job 428-735-78), Iran After the Shah,
SECRET/NOFORN/NOCONTRACT/ORCON
Attached is the dissemination list for subject report. Copies # 1
through #55 will be picked up or forwarded to PPG/R&D, Room 7G07,
STATINTL Hq. Please notify
PPG/R&D, x-5203, when you receive
the remaining copies for distribution. When a report has an .ELITE, the
elite copies must be disseminated before standard distribution is matte ATINTL
Attachment: a/ s
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ADMINISTRATIVE - INTERNAL USE ONLY
 ADMINISTRATIVE - INTERNAL USE ONLY
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Dissemination List for ORPA Report,RP 78-10289, SECRET/NOFORN/NOCONTRACT/ORCON
(Job 428-735-78)
No. of Copies Recipient
1 White House Situation Room, The.White House
National Security Council, Room 381, Information
Liaison, Executive Office Building
1 Assistant to President for National Security
Affairs
1 Deputy Assistant to President for National
Security Affairs
1 Middle East Affairs
Department of State, INR/CC, Room 6510, New State Bldg.
1 Secretary of State
1 - Director, Policy Planning Staff
1 Under Secretary for Political Affairs
1 Asst. Secretary, Bureau of Near Eastern and
South Asian Affairs
1 - Director, Bureau of Politico-Military Affairs
1 - Director, Bureau of Intelligence and Research
1 Director, INR/Near East & S Asia
Defense Intelligence Agency, RDS-3C, A Bldg., AHS
1 Secretary of Defense
1 - Asst. Secretary of Defense, ISA (Slocombe)
1 - Deputy Asst. Secretary for Near Eastern, African,
and S Asian Affairs, ISA
1 Regional Dir. for Near Eastern, & S Asian
Affairs, ISA
1 - Director, Policy Plans & NSC Affairs, ISA
1 - Director,. DIA
1 - Director, Net Assessments
1 - Policy Planning Staff, OSD/DIA
1 DIO for Middle East/South Asia, DIA
1 - Deputy Dir. for Current Intelligence, DIA
1 - Current Intelligence Production Div., DIA
STATINTL 1 -
DIA/DN2E1, Rm. MB861G, Pentagon
1 -. Deputy Dir. or Estimates, DIA
0
1 - Deputy Dir. for-Intelligence Research, DIA
1 Asst. Chief of Staff, intelligence, USA
1 - Director, Naval Intelligence
1 - Asst. Chief of Staff, Intelligence, USAF
1 - Asst. Dir. for Political & Military Affairs,
ME/Africa Div., JCS
1 Strategic Warning Staff
National Security Agency, Attn: ^
Ft. Meade, Maryland STATINTL
1 - Director
Room 2E024,
Department of the Treasury,. Office of Intelligence
ppSuupport, Dolores A. O'Dell, RmQQ.ff4326, 15th and
Approved For Ree~asel ~th RE).F$ 1'(~ ' Dj90Q 0kF001_%f Special Asst.
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Dissemination List for ORPA Report, RP 78-10289, SECRET/NOFORN/NOCONTRACT/ORCON
(continued) (,Yob 428--735-78)
No. of Copies Recipient
1 Department of Commerce, Control Intelligence Section,
Room 1617M, Main Commerce Bldg.(for Office of
International Trade Policy)
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Dissemination List for ORPA Report, RP 78-10289, SECRET/NOFORN/NOCONTRACT/ORCON
(continued) (=Job 428-735-78)
STATINTL
No. of Copies
x* 4
Recipient
ICS Registry, Rm. BW09, Community Hq. Bldg.,
1 - P ' IDIREX
DDO, Rm. GB38, Hq.
1 DCD, Rm. 811, Key Bldg.
1 DDS&T, Rm. 6E45, Hq.
_Rm. 1005, Key Bldg.
NFAC/Plans and Programs Staff, Rm. 2F28, Hq.
OSR, Rm. 3F50, Hq.
D/OCR, Rm. 2E60, Hq.
OCR/ISG, Rm. 1H19, Hq.
OCR/CLD/DSB, Rm. 1H1129, Hq.
OSI, Rm. 6F24, Hq.
NPIC, Rm. 15315,
1 - IEG
1 - Library
OIA, Rm. 1S518,
OWI, Rm. 1D0401, Hq.
OGCR, Rm. 1232, Ames Bldg:
NFAC/Coordination Staff, Rm. 7G15, Hq.
OPS/CEN, Rm. 7F33, Hq.
ORD, am. 612, Ames Bldg.
DD/NITC, Rm. BW09,
Community Hq. Bldg.,
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STATINTL
 Disse ?,inat~pp is or~PA ~~~brs/29PCIWR0)P?f PD0634AW&6U' ''
r ve or a ease
No. of Copies
STATINTL
OER, Rm. 4F21, Hq.
Recipient
2 OTR, Rm. 936, CoC
1 -
NFAC/RES/CRG/HR, Rm. 3E58, Ha.
6N000NTRACT/ORCON
,Job 428-735-78)
STATINTL'_1 DDS&T Duty Officer, Rm. 6F19, Hq.
STATINTL 1
STATINTL 1
3
OTR/CTS, Rm. 616, CoC
CRG, Rm. 7G15, Hq.
1 - Director
1 - PDB
SA/DDCI, Rm. 1.025, CoC
NFAC/Congressional Support Staff, Rrn. 3F30, Hq.
PPG; R& D, Attn: Rm. 7G 15, Hq. STATINTL
for ORPA dissem
1-ME 1-RC 1--Admin
1-EE 1-AMERS
1-USSR 1-II
1-LA 1-AF
1-WE 1-EAP
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Dissemination List for ORPA Report, RP 78-10289, SECRET/NOFORN/NOCONTRACT/ORC:ON
(continued) (Job 428-735-78)
No. of Copies Recipient
PPG/R&D, Rm. 7G07, Hq.
1 Agency Archives
Agency Records Center
Total: 225 copies.
STATINTL
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 Approved or Rele s 2 5/ IA-R OTO 634A000900100001-6
N-XA II
ORPA EXTERNAL DISSEMINATION LIST
FOR MEMORANDUMS, STUDIES, ETC.
W-/a.2 7
g
(r)
r~Ef~`rY. a_7.s ~u
vi11nternation.al Situation Room
Asst to the Vice President for Nat'l. Security Aff (Clift)
'Asst to President for Nat Sec Affairs (Brzezinski)
p Asst to President for Nat Sec, Af: a _rs (Aaron)
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Fn-der Secretary for Political Affairs (Newsom)
Under Secretary for Economic Affairs (Cooper)
Asst Secy,
Asst Secy,
Asst Secy,
'Asst Secy,
Asst Secy,
Asst Secy,
Asst Secy,
Asst Secy,
Bureau
Bureau
Bureau
Bureau
Bureau
Bureau
Bureau
Bureau
of East Asian and Pacific Affairs
of
of
of
of
of
of
of
(Holbrooke )
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Dir, INR/Africa (Thorne)
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Reg Dir, EAP Affairs, ISA
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p Asst Sec for Near Eastern African & S Asian Affairs, ISA
/(Leslie A. Janka)
eg Dir for Near Eastern, & S.-Asian Affairs, ISA (Thomas)
Reg Dir for African Affairs, ISA (Reed)
Dir, Inter-American Region, ISA
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-Dir,-Int'ltEconomic Affairs, ISA
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Ste~`. Intelligence Adviser, DIA
"policy Planning Staff OSD/DIA
DIOs
Eur & Soviet Political/Mil Affairs STATINTL
LA and Sub-Saharan Africa STATINTL
lddle East/South Asia
7 East Asia/Pacific
t' tp Dir for Current Intel, DIA
urr nt Intel Production /D . ,``~~DI.A ,,??~~
41 8U0~6~34A0 0 ~([91 61
IVE - INTERNAL USE ONLY
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Dep Dir for Estimates, DIA
Asst Dep Dir, Sov/EE Div
Asst Dep Dir, China/Far East Div
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ep Dir for Intelligence Research
Sov/Warsaw Pact Div
Eastern Div
Western Div
DIA/RDS 3B3 (Lib) (No Codeword)
'Asst Chief of Staff, Intell, USA
Ch" f, Naval Operations
_1r, Naval Intell.
t Chief of Staff, Intell, USAF
Asst to Secy, Int'1 Affairs, USAF
Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff (Brown)
Dir, Joint Staff
Vice Dir, Joint Staff
Dir, J 5 Plans & Policy
Vice Dir, J 5 Plans & Policy
Office of NSC Affairs
Dep Dir for Political & Military Aff
Asst Dir for Political F Military Aff
Eur Div
Far East & S Asia Div
stern Hemisphere Div
ME/Africa Div (Capt. Jack E. McQueston)
''Strategic Warning Staff
Off of Special Asst for Nat'l Sec Aff
COMMERCE:
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NATIONAL WAR COLLEGE
FBI
FEDERAL RESERVE SYSTEM:
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C ? )
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M PA (
(12)
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(15)
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(5)
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Foreign ,;r r
AAssessmei t t/f
'enter
Iran After the Shah
An Intel igence'Assessment
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Warning Notice
Sensitive Intelligence Sources and Methods Involved
(WNINTEL)
NATIONAL SECURITY INFORMATION
Unauthorized Disclosure Subject to Criminal Sanctions
DISSEMINATION CONTROL ABBREVIATIONS
NOFORN- Not Releasable to Foreign Nationals
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Contractor/Consultants
PROPIN- Caution--Proprietary Information Involved
NFIBONLY- NFIB Departments Only
ORCON- Dissemination and Extraction of Information
Controlled by Originator
REL This Information has been Authorized for
Release to ...
Classified by 006266
Exempt from General Declassification Schedule
E.O. 11652, exemption category:
Sec. 5B(1), (2), and (3)
Automatically declassified on:
date impossible to determine
NFAC publications are available on microfiche. To get a
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issuances in addition to or in lieu of hard copies, call 5203 (PPG/RD).
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SECRET
NOFORN-NOCONTRACT-ORCON
Iran After the Shah
Central Intelligence Agency
National Foreign Assessment Center
Key Points
The death of the Shah, whether by assassination or by natural causes,
will be traumatic for Iran. This paper considers the persons, institutions, and
other factors that will play a role in shaping the new government.
When Crown Prince Reza was born in 1960, the Shah for the first time
since he assumed the throne in 1941 could see the likelihood that the Pahlavi
dynasty would continue. In 1967 he established a Regency Council and
designated Empress Farah as Regent to rule if it should become necessary
before Reza is 20 years old. The chances are good that the transition to the
new monarch will go as planned. Farah and the Regency Council-or Shah
Reza after 1980-will almost certainly be supported by all significant
elements of the power structure, including the Army and the Security
Service.
Empress Farah will be a key figure in the new regime, whether as
Regent or as Queen Mother. Although Farah's personal following is un-
known, she seems to have been associated with several men who may favor a
more restricted political role for any future monarch. If this is so, Crown
Prince Reza as shah will share more power with the politicians than has Shah
Mohammad Reza.
The Crown Prince is a normally intelligent and well-adjusted young
man. There is no way to judge his leadership potential. No matter how much
the Shah attempts to tutor his son on Iran's problems and the difficulties of
ruling, the new Shah in the beginning will lack a personal following and be
heavily dependent on those who surround him.
A few of the Shah's inner circle are probably too old to play a significant
role over the next five years. Some, however, such as Minister of Court
Hoveyda and Prime Minister Amuzegar, are likely to remain influential. The
top military leaders and any others who are likely to move into important
positions in the next few years are loyal to the present Shah and will transfer
their allegiance to a new regime without great difficulty.
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SECRET
NOFORN-NOCONTRACT-ORCON
The changing structure of Iranian society will have an impact on the
eventual policies of a new regime, but popular attitudes are not likely to
figure in the succession. A few from all strata of society will see the change of
rulers as an opportunity to overthrow the monarchy or reduce it to a
figurehead. The regime's ability to control such challenges without reverting
to harsh suppression will be an early test of its ability to govern.
Most of the perceptions of the world held by the present Shah will
probably be held by his successors. The main difference will probably be a
change in style rather than content, but increased concern for social problems
and an attempt to deemphasize military expansion are likely to be themes of a
new government.
ii
SECRET
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SECRET
NOFORN-NOCONTRACT-ORCON
PREFACE
This is not an assessment of what will happen when the Shah passes from
the Iranian scene. It is instead an examination of the persons, institutions, and
other factors that will play a role in forming the new regime. The paper
assumes that at the Shah's demise there will be no warring groups competing
to seize the throne but that those who have power, or hope to have power, will
want to see a smooth transition.
The most important--and likely-combination to replace the Shah is
Empress Farah, the Crown Prince, and the Regency Council supported by
the armed forces and the Iranian Intelligence and Security Organization
(SAVAK). The members of the Shah's inner circle, having no place else to
go, will probably also support Farah and the Crown Prince. The major
conflicts will occur within this framework, as individuals or groups of
individuals maneuver for positions of influence. The extent of competition or
cooperation among these elements will have an important bearing on the
ability of the new regime to govern over the long run.
Iran is not in a revolutionary or even a "prerevolutionary" situation.
There are substantial problems in all phases of Iranian life, but the economy
is not stagnant and social mobility is a fact of life. There is dissatisfaction
with the Shah's tight control of the political process, but this does not at
present threaten the government. Perhaps most important, the military, far
from being a hotbed of conspiracies, supports the monarchy. Those who are in
opposition, both the violent and the nonviolent, do not have the ability to be
more than troublesome in any transition to a new regime.'
In the discussion which follows it is assumed that whatever incident
eliminates the Shah, whether it is illness, accident, or assassination, only he
will be affected. If Crown Prince Reza or Empress Farah were also victims,
chaos and the end of the Pahlavi dynasty would be the most likely result.
The time frame of the paper is 1978 to 1982, with the primary focus on
the period from the demise of Mohammad Reza up to a year or 18 months
later. Beyond this, the competitions and rivalries among those in power or
seeking power will become sharper, but what form they will take is not within
the scope of this paper.
' A more complete exposition of the problems facing Iran in the years ahead is found in Iran in the
1980s, PR 77-10124, August 1977, Secret Noforn-Nocontract-Orcon.
iii
SECRET
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SECRET
NOFORN-NOCONTRACT-ORCON
Iran After
Background
The succession of a new Shah to the throne of
Iran has in the past been attended by great
confusion and uncertainty. This has been so
because the succession has usually come about as
a result of the assassination or abdication of the
previous monarch. There is no precedent in
recent Iranian history, however, that enables one
to judge how easy or how difficult the transition
will be from Mohammad Reza Pahlavi to Reza
Cyrus Pahlavi. The present dynasty dates only
from 1925, when Reza, the present Shah's
father, was handed the crown by the Iranian
Parliament. Reza had come to prominence four
years earlier as a Cossack general who led a coup
against a corrupt and ineffective government.
The Shah of the time, Ahmad Qajar, who had
the Shah
himself succeeded to the throne at the age of 12
when his father was deposed by the Constitution-
alists, seemed almost relieved to shed the burden
of the monarchy, and he and his 125-year-old
dynasty passed quietly into history. Reza Shah
ruled only 16 years. He abdicated in 1941 follow-
ing the invasion of Iran by the British and
Russians, who were anxious to secure a safe line
of communication for shipment of military sup-
plies to the Soviet Union. Mohammad Reza
ascended the throne at the sufferance of the
Allies, who had considered abolishing the
monarchy.
Until 1960 there were only rudimentary ar-
rangements for the succession. The Constitution
states that the oldest son of the Shah is the heir
to the throne, but Mohammad Reza had no son
Figure 1. Crown Prince Reza and Shah Mohammad Reza Pahlavi
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 Approved For Release 2001/05/23 : CIA-RDP80T00634A000900100001-6
for the first 19 years of his reign. Although he
would appoint an ad hoc regency council when-
ever he went abroad, he resisted efforts to per-
suade him to designate one of his half-brothers as
Crown Prince. He anticipated, correctly, that to
do so would increase the intrigues against him.
With the birth of Reza Cyrus in 1960 and his
designation as Crown Prince, succession became
less chancy. The prospects for a peaceful transi-
tion increased markedly when Empress Farah
was named as Regent. At the. same time, a
regency council was designated to assist her.
Finally, in 1974 it was widely reported that the
Shah had drawn up a political "will" and had
distributed it to trusted individuals. The only
suggestion of its contents is the Shah's statement
that "in it I underlined the importance of con-
tinuing the monarchy as well as the political and
military setup envisaged by me."2 Administra-
tively, then, everything seems to have been done
that can be done to ensure a smooth succession to
the throne. The Shah's remaining task is to
create the economic, social, and political condi-
tions that will enable the administrative arrange-
ments to function as they are designed to.
A basic assumption is made in this paper that
all those in a position to be influential will try to
make the transition to the new regime work as it
is designed to do.
One cannot anticipate how the Shah may pass
from the scene. Short of a fatal malady, of which
we have no indication, he is not likely to abdicate
in favor of his son. Abdication could be a more
serious possibility in the late 1980s.
Assassination cannot be completely ruled out.
The Royal Family is a prime target. In 1973 a
plot to kill or kidnap members of the Royal
Family was discovered, and in 1977 Princess
Ashraf narrowly missed being killed in France
when armed men attacked the car in which she
was riding. Although the Shah is surrounded by
tight security, he barely escaped death or serious
injury in 1965 when a member of his guard force
R. K. Karanjia. The Mind cif a Monarch. London; 1977 p. 263,
whether the "will" is merely a hortatory statement or an action
document only time will tell.
shot up his office.' One of the civilians who was
also implicated was sentenced to three years in
prison. He was later involved in the 1973 plot.
One thing can be said with some certainty:
even should the Shah die of natural causes, there
will be a widespread belief that he has been
assassinated.' What impact this perception would
have on the ability of a successor government to
establish itself cannot be measured.
Personalities play a more important role in
Iranian society and government than do institu-
tions. An individual's influence may be great,
even though his official job is minor; conversely,
a job that may seem to be influential may give
the holder little real power.
No one on the scene today shows any potential
for exerting the kind of power the Shah has
attained.' The Shah recognizes this and has tried
to create structures that will endure and substi-
tute for his one-man rule. He probably antici-
pates that Reza Cyrus will have neither the time
nor the opportunity to establish an overwhelming
power position and that therefore institutional
stability is the best guarantee of the contin-
uation of the monarchy and his dynasty. When
Mohammad Reza is no longer on the throne, a
variety of individuals and groups will compete for
power in the new regime.
The following discussion examines in detail
some of the actors, both persons and institutions,
that will play a role in the new regime. A note of
warning. Although we are looking only toward the
next five years, some of those in the running today
might have left the scene before the five years are
finished. Only a year ago two men would by all
estimates have played an important role in the
succession. Both former National Iranian Oil
Company Chairman Manuchehr Eqbal and for-
mer Minister of Court Assadollah Alam have
' Primary responsibility for security rests with the Royal Guard,
which also provides security during foreign travel of members of the
Royal Family.
' The death in 1973 of the Shah's brother-in-law in a hang glider
accident has now in some circles been transmogrified into a
bombing by dissidents of an airplane in which he was riding.
It was only after Mohammad Reza had been on the throne for
20 years that he began to acquire the power that he now has.
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died. Both derived their influence from their
personal relationship with the Shah, which, in the
case of Alam, went back 40 years. Their succes-
sors, Hushang Ansary as NIOC Chairman and
Amir Abbas Hoveyda as Minister of Court, do
not seem to have the same close relationship to the
Shah, and their ability to act as middlemen for
him with other elements of the Iranian social and
political structure may be more limited.
When there is reason to suspect that any
individual discussed in the following pages may
not stay the course, this will be so indicated.
In the immediate aftermath of the demise of
the Shah there will be a strong tendency by all
those in positions of power to hang together in
order to ensure a smooth transition. This will be
more from a desire to protect the privileged
position they have attained than from a princi-
pled support for the Pahlavi dynasty.'
Empress Farah
Farah will clearly be a key figure in the
transition to a new monarch, whether as Regent
or as Queen Mother.
She is 19 years younger than the Shah and
appears to take a more liberal view of political
activity than that of the Shah. There may have
been some friction in the past between the Shah
and Farah over her relatively relaxed view of
dissent, but there has been no permanent rift.7
Farah probably plays little if any part in the
major issues that occupy the Shah-military and
foreign affairs and economics. She has, however,
b If this seems excessively cynical, it can, I think, be supported.
The monarchy has been a constant feature throughout Persian
history and has been accepted by the majority for centuries.
Individual monarchs or dynasties have not, however, been immune
from challenge and have frequently been replaced when they
became incapable of ruling. The elite have never had any difficulty
in transferring allegiance and thus maintaining their positions, and
support for the legitimate succession would be less immediately
threatening to them than a completely new situation.
' It was once reported that three of those arrested in the 1973 plot
against the Royal Family had been recommended for employment
in Iranian television by Farah. It may be worth recording that Reza
Qotbi, a relative of Farah, is Director of the Iranian National
Radio and Television (NIRT) organization, and his wife is an
employee there. Princess Sarvenaz, the Shah's niece, also works at
NIRT.
made official visits by herself to both the Soviet
Union and China, giving her some exposure and
experience independently of the Shah.
Farah has been frank about what she considers
her limited ability to influence the Shah:
I try to talk to him, not as a queen
talking to the king, but as a wife talks
to her husband. Sometimes, though, I
care so much about something, I get so
excited that I can't breathe. But I have
to be careful because if I'm not and I
start raising my voice he will think I am
blaming him for what's wrong and he'll
get angry. So I try to be logical and
cool instead of nagging. And sometimes
I try to do it through ministers; try to
talk to him through them.... I don't
want to trouble him with my problems
during the day, so the only time I can
talk to him is at lunch or in bed and
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that's the worst time to talk about your
problems. Once in a while I have him
alone for five or 10 minutes in the car.
But generally I write to him. If I talk to
him he forgets. So I write little notes to
him and send them to the office so he
will read it with the rest of his papers!
She may be selling herself short. Farah has
staked out women's affairs, health, and philan-
thropy as her areas of influence. She now ap-
points the Ministers of Health and of Women's
Affairs. She is also interested in student-faculty
relations and the honesty of government officials.
The 17th point of the Shah's revolution, declara-
tion of assets by government officials, may be
attributable to her influence.
Farah is in good health and seems sure of her
position and of herself. A recent observer com-
mented that she speaks with more assertiveness
than she did two years ago and demonstrates the
will and toughness to rule if she should have to.
She can be expected to play an active part in any
new government, whether as Regent or as Queen
Mother. Her effectiveness will depend, in part,
on the network of personal support she has built
up, and on this point there is practically no
information. She has been associated with
Minister of Court Hoveyda; Nosratollah Moin-
ian. Chief of the Shah's Special Office; and
Parviz Sabeti, Chief of Department 3 (Internal
Security) of SAVAK. All of these men are
reported to favor a monarchy with reduced pow-
Empress Farah
Career Highlights
19.38 Born in Tehran
1944-56 Attended Jeanne d'Arc Primary School
and Razi (French Alliance) Secon-
dary school. Tehran
4957-59 ... Studied architecture in Paris
Al December 1959 Married the Shah
31 October 1960 Crown Prince Cyrus born
1967-.. Designated Regent
1967_ Formal Coronation of Shah and Em-
press Farah
1970 Visit to USSR
1972 Visit to China
crs. Farah would probably also be supported by
the government's major propaganda agency
through Reza Qotbi, who manages the National
Iranian Radio and Television organization
(NIRT.)
Farah would probably have popular appeal,
but whether this could be translated into support
for her as a regent is a question. In a similar
context 20 years ago there was a semi-public
discussion of whether Princess Shahnaz, the
Shah's first daughter, would be acceptable as
queen should the Shah designate her as his
successor. The US Embassy commented:
It is evident that almost all Iranians
would be reluctant to have a reigning
queen. The Shia clergy is reported to be
particularly opposed to this suggestion
since they feel strongly that a woman
ruler would be contrary to Islamic
teaching and tradition. Even Western-
educated Iranians tend to be conserva-
tive on this point; they point out that
since no woman would be strong
enough to impose her will, the monarch
would soon become a puppet for other
forces 9
Today educated public opinion would probably
be willing to support Farah, especially as she
would be only a regent and for a brief time.
Religious and conservative opinion has probably
not changed. Farah, however, exerting her influ-
ence behind the scenes as Queen Mother, would
be well understood, even though the quality and
type of her influence might be disputed.
Minister of Court Hoveyda is well known from
his long tenure as Prime Minister-nearly 13
years. He was not close to the Shah until-as
Minister of Finance-he was appointed Prime
Minister to succeed his friend Hassan Ali
Mansur who was assassinated by a religious
fanatic in 1965. Two qualities apparently recom-
mended him to the Shah: he had a reputa-
tion as an administrator of integrity, and he
was number-two man in the group of Western-
educated technocrats whom the Shah was count-
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ing on to carry out his ambitious "White
Revolution."
Hoveyda turned out to be the right man for
the job. A description of Hoveyda's administra-
tion by the US Embassy encapsulates his
strengths and weaknesses:
Mr. Hoveyda is seen as the best exam-
ple of what it takes to survive in con-
temporary Iranian politics. He is a ma-
nipulator of the system, finely attuned
to the political realities of Iran and,
most importantly, knows his position in
relation to the Shah-a low-profile ad-
ministrator with no overt pretensions of
aggrandizing his power.'0
During most of his premiership he was de
facto leader of the Iran Novin Party, which
dominated the government. Although Hoveyda
never posed a threat to the Shah's supremacy, his
extensive party organization provided him a net-
work of supporters and influence that might, at
Amir Abbas Hoveyda
Minister of Court
Career Highlights
1918 ........................................Born in Tehran
1936-42 ................................Educated in Damascus and Beirut;
higher education in London, Brus-
sels, and Paris
1942 ........................................Joined Ministry of Foreign Affairs
1942-51 ................................Served in Paris, Stuttgart, Washington
D.C.
1951-58 ................................Served in various posts in the Ministry
of Foreign Affairs in Tehran and UN
bodies
1958 ........................................Special assistant to chairman of Nation-
al Iranian Oil Company
1960 ........................................Appointed to Board of Directors, Na-
tional Iranian Oil Company
1959-64 ................................Associated with Hassan Ali Mansur in
the Progressive Center and Iran No-
vin Party
1964 ........................................Minister of Finance in Mansur's
Cabinet
1965 ........................................Appointed Prime Minister after assassi-
nation of Mansur
1977 ........................................Appointed Minister of Court
some point, have given him an independent posi-
tion. In January 1975 at the party's biggest
convention in history, Hoveyda was named Sec-
retary General of the party. This was the first
time in 10 years that the prime ministry and the
top political post were held by the same man.
Two months later the Shah pulled the rug out
from under the party and the Prime Minister by
peremptorily dissolving the Iran Novin and form-
ing a new Rastakhiz Party.
Undaunted, Hoveyda with the aplomb that
had become his trademark, announced that he
had joined the Rastakhiz Party, and the next
month at a massive Party Congress he was
named its Secretary General. His previous influ-
ence was diluted, however, because now he was
sharing power with other high-ranking party
officials who owed him no personal loyalty.
Hoveyda's power position was further dimin-
ished when he was replaced as Secretary General
by Minister of the Interior Amuzegar, a political
rival, at the second Party Congress in November
1976. Finally, in August of 1977, the Shah
appointed Jam.shid Amuzegar as Prime Minister
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and moved Hoveyda to the post of Minister of
Court.
There is no single reason for Hoveyda's re-
placement. The Shah's interest in reducing his
independent political power was probably one
factor; in addition, a series of economic problems
made it convenient to replace a government that
had not been able to solve them, and finally
the Shah may have decided that a new govern-
ment was needed to bring to fruition the Shah's
programs which Hoveyda's government had
commenced.
Hoveyda did not, obviously, fall into disgrace.
As Minister of Court he is still in an influential
position, but his influence grows directly out of
his relationship with the Shah and depends on
the tasks the Shah entrusts to him. Meanwhile,
he is a useful counterweight to Prime Minister
Amuzegar in the Shah's balancing act.
Hoveyda would seem to have an inside track
with Empress Farah that could stand him in
good stead during a transition to a new govern-
ment. His extensive experience in both adminis-
tration and politics would make him a useful ally
in supporting the new government.
Parviz Sabeti and Hoveyda have a longstand-
ing relationship going back to the time when
both were involved in the Youth Center. At that
time Hoveyda gave financial help to Sabeti, who
was a law student. An additional bond might be
Bahai membership. Iloveyda is almost certainly
a Bahai, and Sabcti has been reported to be a
member of that religion."
Sabeti appears to have the confidence o
the Shah
f=igure 4. Parviz Sabeti, Director of Department 3 (Internal
Security), SAVAK
Parviz Sabeti
Chief of Department 3, SAVAK
Career Highlights
1933
1965-66
maintain relations with a large number of Army 1971
officers and politicians, although details of these
contacts are not on the record.
" Membership in the Bahai religion is difficult to determine. A
few Bahais are well known, but because of persecution by conserva-
tive Shiahs the group maintains a compartmented organization and
considerable secrecy.
..Born in Semnan
..Chief, Communist Party Operations,
Department 3, SAVAK
.Chief, Opposition Activities, Depart-
ment 3, SAVAK
Chief. Iranian Student Affairs, Depart-
ment 3, SAVAK
..Chief of Operations, Department 3,
SAVAK
Deputy Director, Department 3.
SAVAK
Director, Department 3, SAVAK
One of Sabeti's more curious relationships is
with Parviz Nikkhah, Director of Programs and
Research for NIRT. Nikkhah, who was once a
member of the Tudeh Party, was arrested in
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1965 for complicity in the attempt on the Shah's
life. He was released in 1970 after he publicly
recanted his Communist activities but was ab-
solved of any responsibility for the actual shoot-
ing. During his imprisonment, SAVAK had ex-
erted considerable pressure on Nikkhah to
renounce his Communist views and affiliation.
Five years later he appeared as a government
official, close to Iran's chief Communist-
hunter and reportedly, the ideologue of the
Shah's Rastakhiz Party. In this case the wages of
sin was a promotion." Nikkhah's superior as
manager of NIRT is Reza Qotbi, a relative of
Queen Farah.
Nosratollah Moinian holds a sensitive position
as chief of the Shah's personal secretariat, a post
he has held since 1966. He works long hours and
has little private social life. He established his
position as a supporter of the Shah when as a
newspaperman he supported the Shah against
former Prime Minister Mossadeq in 1953. He
further commended himself to the Shah by per-
sonally supervising the Shah's anti-Communist
campaign in the late 1950s and early 1960s. He
served as a cabinet minister in 1963-64.
Practically nothing is known of his relatives,
friends, or enemies. Former Minister of Court
Assadollah Alam is said to have recommended
him to the Shah for his present job, but the
monarch and Moinian were certainly acquainted
before then. Moinian is a possible candidate for
Prime Minister should Amuzegar falter.
If Hoveyda, Sabeti, and Moinian are on her
team, Farah will have a core of experienced men
to draw on in support of the regency or the new
Shah.
Much, however, remains unclear. The precise
relationship between Farah and these three, what
bonds they have in common aside from their
Figure 5. Nosratollah Moinian, Chief of the
Shah's Secretariat
Nosratollah Moinian
Chief of the Shah's Secretariat
Career Highlights
1922 ........................................Born in Isfahan
1932-38(?) ............................Razi (French Alliance) Secondary
School, Tehran
1944 ........................................Graduated from Tehran University
Law School
1945-48 ................................Employee of Iranian State Railway
Newspaper writer
1953 ........................................Assistant to Director of Publication and
Broadcasting
1956 ........................................Director General, Publication and
Radio
1958 ........................................Deputy Prime Minister in charge of
Publication and Radio
1963 ........................................ Minister of Roads
1963 ........................................ Minister of Information
1964-65 ................................Ill
1966 ........................................Chief of Shah's Secretariat
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supposed predilection for a less imperial shah,
and the extent to which each has a personal
following are all obscure points but ones that are
important in predicting their precise role in a
new government.
The Crown Prince
Reza Cyrus will be little more than a figure-
head should he ascend the throne in the next five
years. Little is known about Reza, but recent
firsthand observations suggest that he is a confi-
dent, well-adjusted young man. His relationship
with his parents seems to be normal. One report
suggests that he is closer to his mother than to
his father. Crown Prince Reza has been educated
in a private school organized specifically for that
purpose. His classmates are said to be children of
high-ranking military and civilian officials, but
their identities are not known." The Crown
Prince is receiving flight training in the United
States.
Crown Prince Reza Cyrus will be of age to
assume the throne in October 1980 when he is 20
years old. Until that time Empress Farah as
Regent and a Regency Council would act for
him. The Regency Council will be composed of
the Prime Minister, the President of the Senate,
the Speaker of the Majlis, the Chief Justice, and
four persons to be selected by the Regent. The
current holders of those positions are:
Prime Minister ..... Jamshid Amuzegar
Senate President ... Ja'afar Sharif-Emami
possible even to say that the Shah spends X hours a week talking to
his son. The Shah has said, "So far I have never tried to impress
anything on my son. I have wanted him to grow up completely free
and without my influence." The Mind of a Monarch, R. K.
Karanjia, London: 1977, p. 196. He did go on to say, in answer to
the statement that close association of the Shah and his son would
enable the latter to gain expertise in the way the Shah handled
problems, "This he will undoubtedly get, but ultimately the choice
will be his."
Majlis Speaker Abdollah Riazi
Chief Justice .......... Nasser Yeganeh
(Undesignated) ...... 4 individuals
The particular individuals now holding these
positions will, of course, not necessarily still be
there in 1980. They might or might not be
influential in their own right, but representation
of the major organs of government decreases the
chance of bureaucratic opposition during the
transition process.
One must assume that the Shah plays a role in
his son's education. It seem likely, for example.
that the Shah provides some on-the-job training
for Reza Cyrus. Mohammad Reza records that
his father, Reza Shah, used to discuss his plans,
policies, and philosophy with him. The Shah
would be following in his father's footsteps if he
were to do the same thing. In addition, it seems
unlikely that with his concern for Iran's future,
the Shah would neglect to tutor carefully his
chosen successor.1"
Although Riazi and Sharif-Emami are both
close to the Shah, both are over 70 years old and
might drop from the picture at any time. Both
could also theoretically fail to be reelected in
1979, but this is unlikely as long as the Shah still
supports them. Sharif-Emami, in addition to his
parliamentary position, has a personal following
built up over the years which he can call on to
back the monarchy, and he is also director of the
Pahlavi Foundation, which has large investments
in hotels and real estate among other things.
The prime ministership is the most important
post on the Regency Council and if the Hoveyda
example holds for the future, Jamshid Amuzegar
will have a long tenure and may be the prime
minister who presides over the transition." After
two decades of government service, Amuzegar
has emerged as Iran's most important political
figure aside from the Shah. He has, however,
probably no significant following yet, deriving
his power from the Shah. Amuzegar was in the
" There will be frequent rumors of Amuzegar's imminent re-
placement, as there were for years concerning Hoveyda. Such a
replacement would seem likely, however, only if the Shah is
considering a major political change or suffers a substantial
political defeat.
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Cabinet as early as 1958 and has held one post or
another since 1965, the only man with that kind
of continuity except for the Shah's brother-in-
law.
Although Amuzegar has long been a favorite
of the Shah, he got his start in a familiar
manner. In 1955 at age 32 he was appointed an
undersecretary in the Ministry of Health, pri-
marily because his father was an influential
senator whose backing the Ministry of Health
needed in order to achieve its legislative goals."
He served subsequently as Minister of Labor and
Minister of Agriculture. During his tenure in
Agriculture he was entrusted by the Shah with
the job of carrying out one of the earlier versions
of land redistribution. Amuzegar was dropped
from this post, apparently because he had lost so
much personal support by his obvious ambition
and his abrasive temperament that the Shah felt
he could no longer be effective." Amuzegar spent
the next four years in private business and
on the Economic Committee of the Central
Treaty Organization (CENTO). He returned to
the Cabinet as Minister of Health when Hassan
Ali Mansur, a colleague in an earlier Cabinet,
became Prime Minister, and has remained in the
Cabinet ever since.
Amuzegar has stayed out of Iran Novin Party
politics,'9 but he nevertheless came to be seen as a
competitor not only of Prime Minister Hoveyda but
also of Hushang Ansary, another ambitious Cabi-
net minister whose areas of interest-economics
and oil-overlapped those of Amuzegar.
When the Shah formed the Rastakhiz Party,
Amuzegar was required to join and became in
succession the Chairman of the Executive Board,
the leader of the Progressive Wing and then, as
Prime Minister, Secretary General of the party.
" Another undersecretary was appointed at the same time whose
father was speaker of the Majlis.
" In addition, Amuzegar had a reputation for being pro-US and
was regarded by many veteran politicians as a young upstart. Land
reform was regarded by many politically minded Iranians, includ-
ing those in Parliament, as an American program, and the Shah
may have felt that Amuzegar's removal would facilitate parliamen-
tary support. It did not.
" Amuzegar had been on the Central Committee of the Mel-
liyum (Nationalist) Party, one of the two parties the Shah encour-
aged between 1957 and 1961.
Figure 6. Prime Minister Jamshid Amuzegar
Jamshid Amuzegar
Prime Minister
Career Highlights
1923 ........................................Born in Tehran
1941-42 ................................Attended the University of Tehran
1943 ........................................To US for education
1951 ........................................Ph.D. in hydraulic engineering, Cornell
1951 ........................................Worked for Point IV in Iran
1955 ........................................Undersecretary, Ministry of Health
1958 ........................................Minister of Labor
1959 ........................................Minister of Agriculture
1960-64 ................................Private life
1964 ........................................Minister of Health
1965 ........................................Minister of Finance
1974 ........................................Minister of Interior
1976 ........................................Elected Secretary General of Rastakhiz
Party
1977 ........................................Prime Minister
So, Jamshid Amuzegar has come up through
the ranks of the bureaucracy, establishing a
firm link with the monarchy and collecting his
share of supporters and opponents. If he is still
Prime Minister when the regime changes, he will
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:almost certainly continue to support the monar-
c.;hy. What relationship, if any, he has to the
Crown Prince or Empress Farah is unknown. If
he does not have or cannot establish a relation-
?;hip, he may well be outflanked by those, such as
Hoveyda, who are closer to the new centers of
)ower.
The key roles in the Regency Council might
well be the four persons to be chosen by the
Regent.' In these appointments Farah would
have the chance to put her stamp on the regime
and ensure the positions to those in whom she has
complete trust. It is difficult to identify prospec-
ive appointees, but they will probably hold other
high-ranking positions, such as the Chief of Staff
and/or the chief of SAVAK.Z'
The Military Establishment
The military-more specifically the Army-
will play an important role in the transition. The
military leadership would almost certainly sup-
port the legitimate succession, at least in the
;hort term. In the subsequent jockeying for
power and influence, the military might perceive
threats to its favored position----such as a sharp
slash in the military budget-that would per-
;uade it to seek a dominant role. Under some
onditions a handful of military leaders (or even
:)ne) could dominate the whole government.
Political generals have been prominent in Iran-
ian politics for nearly 60 years. Reza Shah was
the political general par excellence. He parlayed
his post of commander of Iran's only organized
military force-the Iranian Cossack Division-
into the position of Minister of War, Prime
Minister, and finally Shah. During the 20 years
' There is a possibility that if the Shah stepped down as a result
;rf injury or a long illness. he might have the chance to name these
four persons himself.
a' Might it be too speculatve to consider the appointment of a
woman'? Such an appointment could signal the new regime's
dedication to the former Shah's goals and a continuation of the
modernization of Iranian society. but it would certainly arouse the
opposition of the religious and more conservative groups. Possibili-
ties here might be Farah's longtime friend and schoolmate Lili
Arjomand. Director of the Center for Intellectual Development of
Children and Young Adults and a member of the Rastakhiz
Executive Committee; Minister of State for Women's Affairs
Mahnaz Afkhami and a member of the party's Political Bureau;
and Ambassador Mehrangiz Dowlatshahi.
of Reza Shah's predominance, 16 of them as
Shah, his generals established themselves among
the elite, attaining wealth and position." None of
them, however, challenged Reza Shah's political
position, although some had political interests.
During World War II several generals were
involved in German-sponsored clandestine politi-
cal activity; one-Fazlollah Zahedi-later be-
came Prime Minister.
With the disappearance of Reza Shah and the
emergence of Mohammad Reza as the new
monarch, politically ambitious generals came
into their own. The new Shah was seen as
inexperienced and indecisive, and military offi-
cers were prominent among those who moved to
fill in the gap. For the next two decades several
of these generals had to be taken into account in
any political assessment. Mohammad Reza has
been able to eliminate the generals with political
ambitions, but it is likely that if a new regime is
unable to function because of rivalries, conflict-
ing loyalties, and indecision, some officer will
step forward to provide leadership. Indeed, if this
follows a prolonged period of economic, political,
and social turmoil, military intervention might
be popular.
There appears to be considerable unhappiness
in the officer corps below the general officer rank
because of the nepotism, favoritism, and corrup-
tion that plays-as it always has-a key role in
promotions and assignments and because of a
perception of less pay and fewer opportunities for
advancement than civilian counterparts receive.
This dissatisfaction has not as yet translated into
any anti-Shah feeling. Rather, the blame is
placed on civilian ministers and old established
general officers.
One informed opinion holds that a portion of
the officer corps-perhaps 25 percent-sloes not
believe that Crown Prince Reza will have the
ability to replace his father. They would weigh
their choices carefully. These officers chose the
military because of chances for personal ad-
vancement and will remain loyal as long as their
interests and those of the monarchy coincide.
"Some of them, however, were from the previous elite, for
example, the Jahanbanis.
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They would probably be most comfortable with
the emergence of a strong military figure who
could ensure the ascendancy of the military over
the civilian sector.
Ground force officers would be the most influ-
ential. The Navy and Air Force officers would
probably be less important.23 Those military units
in and around Tehran would be the most impor-
tant because to them will fall the task of provid-
ing security during the transition. Some Air
Force officers might play a role but probably for
their individual qualities rather than for the
troops they control.
The Iranian ground forces number about
280,000, most of them enlisted conscriptees.
Seventy-five percent of the officers are profes-
sionals, the other 25 percent are conscripts serv-
ing for two years. Among the noncommissioned
officers, 85 percent are professionals. The atti-
tudes of the common soldier will be important
only if the Army is called on to control or
suppress popular demonstrations. Over the years
Iranian officers have occasionally expressed con-
cern that their troops might under some circum-
stances balk if required to fire on civilians. There
is no independent evidence to suggest that this
might be the case, and discipline has not been a
problem. The rank and file, however, have not
been tried in an extreme case and the officers'
attitudes may reflect a prudent caution. In case
of widespread opposition to a new regime from
conservative, religious elements, the reliability of
the troops might be even more in question since
most of the conscripts come from exactly that
milieu. It seems likely, then, that in a showdown
a new government would prefer to depend mostly
on elite units such as the Imperial Guard, Special
Forces, and commandos.
Within the military, only the higher ranking
officers exert significant political influence.
They are the ones who have had the time and
position to gain the experience and to make the
33 Prince Shafiq, a nephew of the Shah, is a Navy commander
and probably a future chief of the Iranian Navy. His influence, if
any, would derive from his membership in the Royal Family rather
than his post in the Navy.
Chiefs of Key Iranian Military Positions
Supreme Commander's
Staff ....................................General Gholam Reza Azhari
Imperial Guard ....................Lt. General Abad Ali Badreh-Lorestani
Imperial Guard Brigade ..Major General All Neshat
Imperial Guard Division .Major General Mohammad Amin
Beglari
contacts-and the enemies-which will affect
their conduct toward a new regime.
The chief of the Supreme Commander's Staff
(SCS) is a position of potential power, but the
actual power depends on the incumbent. This
staff assists the Shah-the Supreme Command-
er-in the overall direction of the armed forces,
but the Shah maintains direct personal contact
with the commanders of the individual services.
The post obviously calls for a man completely
loyal to the Shah and therefore, presumably, to
the Pahlavi dynasty. It also requires a man with
professional ambition but without personal ambi-
tion. The two predecessors of the present chief
were removed after policy differences with the
Shah. The Shah may also have come to distrust
one of them, General Feridun Jam, a former
brother-in-law of the Shah, because of the
general's personal popularity in the armed forces.
The current chief of the SCS is General
Gholam Reza Azhari, the fourth to hold this post
in 17 years, and has held it longer than any of the
others-since 1971.24
Azhari's successor, then, will probably be the
one to take account of. Three generals are likely
candidates for the post:
? Gholam Ali Oveisi-Commander, Imperial
Iranian Ground Forces (IIGF)
? Hushang Hatam-Deputy for Coordination,
Supreme Commander's Staff (SCS)
? Abbas Karim Gharabaghi-Commander,
Imperial Iranian Gendarmerie
All three are well-trained, competent officers.
They have had some military training in the
Z' A recent report that Azhari is being replaced by General
Gholam Ali Oveisi is at present unconfirmed.
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General Gholam All Oveisi
Commander, Ground Forces
Career Highlights
Figure 7. Gholam Reza Azhari, Chief, Supreme
Commander's Staff
General Gholam Reza Azhari
Commander, Supreme Commander's Staff
Career Highlights
1917 born in Shiraz
1935 Commissioned 2nd Lieutenant
1958 Commander, I1th infantry Division
1960 Commander, Military Academy
1964. Commander, First Army
1967.-__- Iranian military representative,
t :t?;NTO
Acting Commander, Supreme Com-
mander's Staff
Commander, Supreme Commander's
Staff and promoted to full General
United States and have good reputations in the
military.
Gholam Ali Oveisi has been Commander of
the Imperial Iranian Ground Forces since 1972,
the longest time in office of anyone in this post
for 17 years. He is deemed to be completely loyal
to the Shah. He was a classmate of the Shah at
the military academy graduating in 1938. It is
1918 Born in Qom
1936 Graduated from Military High School
1938 Graduated from Military College
193&55 Various troop commands
1854 Member of Special Court trying Com-
rnunist officers
1955 Chief of Staff, Imperial Guard Division
1958 Promoted to Brigadier General and at-
1960,
1965
tended Command and General Staff
College, Ft. Leavenworth, Kansas
Commander, Imperial Guard Division
Commander, Imperial Iranian Gendar
merie
Commander, Imperial Iranian Ground
Forces
Figure 8. General Gholam Ali Oveisi, Commander,
imperial Iranian Ground Forces
probably more than a coincidence that Oveisi's
two sons are named Mohammad Reza and Ali
Reza.'
" Ali Reza was the Shah's only full brother and for many years
was the likely successor to the Shah although never officially
recognized as such. He was killed in an airplane accident in 1954.
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Oveisi apparently became a protege of General
Nematollah Nassiri when the latter was Com-
mander of the Imperial Guard.26 Oveisi was
appointed Chief of Staff of the Imperial Guard
Division in 1955 and, when Nassiri was moved to
another post in 1960, Oveisi became Commander
of the Imperial Guard Division, a post he held
until 1965.
Several years later Nassiri and Oveisi were
professional rivals, the former as chief of SAVAK,
the latter as Commander of the Gendarmerie.27
There is nothing to indicate that this has led to any
long-lasting personal animosity, and for a number
of years the two have been in posts that do not put
them into competition. By working together rather
than in competition Oveisi and Nassiri could help
ensure a smooth transition of the monarchy.
Lt. General Hushang Hatam, now 59 years
old, appears to be a good candidate. The Shah is
Figure 9. General Hushang Hatam, Deputy for
Coordination on Supreme Commander's Staff
Lt. General Hushang Hatam
Deputy for Coordination, Supreme Commander's Staff
Career Highlights
1919........................................ Born in Rasht
1936 ........................................Secondary school, Bandar Pahlavi
1939 ........................................BS from Tehran University
1941 ........................................Graduated from Military College
1942-57 ................................Various posts at the Military College
and training courses in US and
Germany
1959 ........................................Graduated from Command and Gener-
al Staff College, Ft. Leavenworth,
Kansas
1964 ........................................ Promoted to Brigadier
1966 ........................................Commanding General 1st Guards Divi-
sion, Artillery
1966-69 ................................Commandant Artillery and Rocket
Center, Isfahan
1972-74 ................................Commanding General II Corps
1975............ ........................... Deputy for Coordination, Supreme
Commander's Staff
said to have been grooming him for a dozen years
for eventual appointment to the post of chief,
SCS. This is apparently well known to many
officers. Whether Hatam's reported distant rela-
tionship to the Royal Family has influenced the
Shah's plans for Hatam cannot be judged. The
Shah certainly knows his officer corps well, but
the long-range planning suggested by this story
seems unusual.
Hatarn is an artillery officer who graduated
from the military college in 1941, the same year
the Shah ascended the throne. He is unmarried,
has little social life, and is not well known outside
the military. General Hatam is responsible for
monitoring and coordinating several of the key
programs which the Shah considers very sensi-
tive, Long Range Resource Management, Civil
Defense, and National Command and Control.
General Abbas Karim Qarabaghi, like Oveisi,
was a classmate of the Shah at the military
college. He has been close to the Shah ever since
and, like other Army officers who have risen to
high rank, has served in the Imperial Guard. He
has a reputation as an officer who likes and
knows how to use power. He maintains good
relations with both military and civilian officials
and was one of the few military men who re-
mained on good terms with Hoveyda when the
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Figure 10. Abbas Karim Qarabaghi, Commander of the
Imperial Iranian Gendarmerie
General Abbas Karim Qarabaghi
Commander, Imperial Iranian Gendarmerie
Career Highlights
1918........._....... _
19339______
Born in Rezaiveh, Azerbaijan
graduated from Military
College.
Ph.D. in law, Paris; Imperial Guard
Division
1969
Commanding General 1st
Division
(thief of Staff, Imperial
Guard
Iranian
1972... .........
Ground Fords
Deputy Commanding General. Imperi-
al Iranian Ground Forces
1974. Commander. Imperial Iranian
Gendarmerie
latter was Prime Minister. If this relationship
holds up, Qarabaghi, as chief of the SCS and
Hoveyda as Minister of Court, with his following,
could be a strong force for stability, as well as a
power center in a new government.
Little is known of the Imperial Guard command-
ers. We do not even know their birth dates, al-
though all must be in their 50s. Badreh-Lorestani
appears to have spent most of his career in the
Imperial Guards, and General Beglari may be
related to one or more of the other Beglaris-Army
and Navy-who have attained flag rank.28 The
family appears to be originally from Kermanshah.
Nothing more can be said about General Neshat.
In view of the paucity of information on these
key commanders, it is prudent to anticipate
the military might provide major surprises in%
succession process.
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The Royal Family
Members of the Royal Family have played
only a limited political role in Iran since the
1950s. The one exception is the Shah's twin
sister, Ashraf, who is a strong personality and
has been a rival of each of the Shah's three
wives. If the Shah disappears within the next five
years, Ashraf would probably make a strong bid
for an influential position behind the scenes. She
certainly could count on little popular support,
but she probably has extensive contacts among
politicians, bureaucrats, and businessmen. She
could probably mobilize these to support what-
ever faction she favored, but the extent of her
current network of supporters is unknown. So
little is known of the relationships among the
members of the Royal Family that it is impossi-
ble to judge if she would have support from any
of the Shah's half-brothers or whether it would
make any difference if she did.
The other members of the Royal Family have
served the Shah mostly in protocol and cere-
monial functions. They have not had, and in the
last 25 years have not sought, any political role.
Next to nothing is known of their friends or
associates, but it is unlikely that any of them
have a personal following that could have an
impact on the transition. Prince Gholam Reza,
who is a half-brother of the Shah, is a general
occupying a mostly ceremonial post and is said to
have a personal following of sports-minded youth
and junior officers who share his interests. This
does not seem translatable into any kind of
political influence. Prince Abdor Reza, another
half-brother, is said to be particularly respected
among young Iranians for his high personal
ethics and honesty, which is in marked contrast
to other members of his family. He is also
respected for making a life of his own and
insisting on keeping it separate from the in-
trigues of the royal court.29 In the 1950s and
early 1960s Abdor Reza flirted with the nation-
alists and was the one member of the Royal
Family most acceptable to the National Front.
Those nationalists who saw some role for the
monarchy on the Iranian scene toyed with the
idea of deposing Mohammad Reza and putting
Abdor Reza on the throne. Prince Abdor Reza
and Princess Ashraf have clashed in the past,
and Abdor Reza probably would support Farah
within the family not only to frustrate his half-
sister but also to try to influence the new govern-
ment to go in a more liberal direction. His views
would probably carry little weight, however,
except within the family councils.30
The second generation of the Royal Family-
the nephews and nieces of the Shah-can be
ruled out as significant factors, although one or
two might be willing to attempt a spoilers role.3'
Tehran, A-56, 22 February 1971 (S/NOFORN).
Tehran, A-33, 27 February 1975, The Iranian Imperial Family
(C).
Princess Sarvcnaz, daughter of Abdor Reza, has expressed
intense dislike of the Shah, and Prince Ali Patrick, son of the late
Prince Ali Reza and Christine Cholewsky, was at one time involved
with a dissident group. The Shah had once considered naming Ali
Patrick as Crown Prince.
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The best of the lot seems to be Navy Captain
Shahryar Shafiq. He is the son of Princess
Ashraf and her former husband, the late Ahmad
Shafiq. Captain Shafiq has been described as
intelligent, dynamic, confident, and dedicated,
with widespread influence in the Navy. He has
been considered as a future Chief of Naval
Operations. There is no reason to believe that he
is interested in any career outside the Navy, but
if he is assessed correctly, he could be an influen-
tial figure within the family and perhaps in
public in any conflict over the succession.
At least two other personalities need to be
considered in looking at those who will be actors
in a new regime. They are Ardeshir Zahedi, at
present Iranian Ambassador in the United
States, and Hushang Ansary, director of the
National Iranian Oil Company.
Ardeshir Zahedi is the son of the late General
Fazlollah Zahedi who, in 1953, led the promon-
archist move that ousted Prime Minister Mossa-
deq. Ardeshir acted as a go-between for his
father and the Shah and has been close to the
monarch ever since. Even after Fazlollah lost
favor with the Shah and resigned, spending the
rest of his life in Europe, Ardeshir remained in
the good graces of the throne and only a year
after his father's removal became engaged to the
Shah's 16-year-old daughter Shahnaz.32
In the last two decades Ardeshir has served the
Shah in several high-ranking positions. As Am-
bassador to the United States from 1960 to 1962
he performed in a mediocre manner, and the
Shah's expectation that Zahedi would provide a
better image for the Shah's regime was not
realized. He did not lose favor with the Shah,
however, and was appointed Ambassador in Lon-
don. On returning from London he served as
Foreign Minister for five years. The Shah re-
moved him from this job in 1971 after he had
clashed with Prime Minister Hoveyda, and, pre-
sumably more mature and experienced, he re-
turned to Washington. Since his arrival in the
United States in April 1973 he has acquired a
reputation as a genial host and party goer, and
among his colleagues at the Embassy he is seen
as a hard worker and a strict taskmaster.
Zahedi has ambitions, a fact the Shah un-
doubtedly realizes. Possibly, even, the Shah has
decided to keep Zahedi abroad until such a time
as he feels he can use him in the perpetual
balancing that the Shah must carry on among
ambitious underlings. Zahedi has expected on
Ardeshir Zohedi
Ambassador to the United States
Career Highlights
Figure 13. Ardeshir Zohedi, Iranian Ambassador to the
United States
1927 Born in Tehran
1932-42 Education in Iran
1942-45 Attended American University of
Beirut
1950 Graduated from Utah State University
1951-52 Employee of United States Operations
Mission (Point IV) in Iran
1953 Participated in overthrow of Mossadeq
1957 Married Princess Shahnaz; divorced in
1964
1960-62 Ambassador to US
1962-66 Ambassador to the UK
1967-72 Minister of Foreign Affairs
1972 Appointed Ambassador to the United
States
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SECRET
several different occasions that he was about to
return to Iran as Prime Minister or as Minister
of Court. He has said that in 1960 he was offered
a choice of the US post or of the Ministry of
Court.
Aside from the feud with Hoveyda, which
apparently has been patched up in recent
months, Zahedi has major competitors in Prime
Minister Amuzegar and NIOC Chairman Hu-
shang Ansary. He has also been on the outs with
Princess Ashraf, a factor that might complicate
Zahedi's attempts to win support of the Royal
Family.
Zahedi will probably be returning to Iran
within the next year. His next post should give
some clue as to his future position and influence.
If, as one report says, he becomes Minister of
Court and Hoveyda comes to the United States
as Ambassador, Zahedi will be in a position to
build up a solid body of supporters, something
that his long absence from Iran has probably
prevented him from doing. He appears to be
close to-or trying to get close to-Moinian. If
this becomes a close relationship, it might be
possible to throw Zahedi into the small group
associated with Farah who favors a diminished
royal authority.
Hushang Ansary must have been disappointed
when his rival in the Rastakhiz Party, Jamshid
Amuzegar, became Prime Minister. Ansary had
been considered a strong candidate for the post,
and when the Shah transferred him from his post
as Minister of Economics and Finance to the
chairmanship of the National Iranian Oil Com-
pany, most observers concluded that he had, at
least temporarily, been relegated to the back-
ground. Most likely, however, the Shah is keep-
ing him in reserve as a potential prime minister
should Amuzegar stumble. Ansary certainly still
has the Shah's confidence. The NIOC post is not
one that the Shah would give to someone he does
not trust, and Ansary continues to participate in
the management of the Shah's personal finances
and investments. In commenting on his plans for
the National Iranian Oil Company, Ansary has
pointed out that the Shah wishes him to expand
operations into nonoil sectors of the economy.
Figure 14. Hushang Ansary, Director of National Iranian
Oil Company
The politically influential position Ansary
holds is demonstrated by the reaction of one of
the officials in the Prime Minister's office. When
told in April 1978 that visiting British opposition
leader Margaret Thatcher wanted to meet with
Ansary in his capacity as chairman of NIOC, the
official initially objected, saying that it would be
too much like her calling on the chief of the
opposition.
So, four of the potentially most important
figures on the Iranian political scene today,
Amuzegar, Zahedi, Hoveyda, and Ansary, are
all likely to be available to compete or cooperate
in any new regime that might emerge in the next
five years. None could admit it publicly, but it is
likely that at least part of their planning and
activities in their present jobs will be devoted to
considering their futures when the Shah, is no
longer around to support their ambitions.
Social Class Roles
The great masses of the Iranian people-still
primarily rural-will have little voice in any new
government. As always, they will have to go
along with whatever government results. Most
SECRET 19
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Hushang Ansary
Director, National Iranian Oil Company
Career Highlights
1928......... ............ ..... Born in Iran
1940s Worked for Iranian textile import-ex-
port firm in London. Allegedly edu-
cated there but hiswhole education-
al history is unclear
Worked in Tokyo as representative of
Iranian textile import-export firm.
Widely believed in Iran that irregu-
lar handling of firm's funds provided
basis for his later wealth and
influence
1954.._._ Press attache and economic attache in
Iranian Embassy, Tokyo
1966-61 ..._.... Returned to Iran and managed textile
factory
1962----- C ndersecretary, Ministry of Com-
noerce; resigned to become once
more a manager of a textile factory
\ice President, Tehran Chamber of
(Aommeree; a founder of Iran Novin
Party
1964. Appointed roving ambassador to Africa
1965..- -- Ambassador to Pakistan
1967-69 Ambassador to the United States
1969-74 Minister of Economics and Minister of
Economics and Finance
Leader of Constructive Wing of Ras-
takhiz Party
Appointed Managing Director, Nation-
al Iranian Oil Company
popular sentiment will be expressed in the towns
and cities, especially Tehran where nearly 15
percent of the population lives.
The reactions of groups of people are difficult
to estimate. The urban "crowd" in Iran has
historically been easy to inflame and has often
played an important role in the political maneu-
vering of individuals and of special interest
groups. In recent years the Shah has used popu-
lar demonstrations organized and orchestrated
by his Rastakhiz Party to show public support
for him and his programs. The party has also
sponsored demonstrations against the resurgent
National Front and the "Islamic Marxists"-the
government's term for the violent opposition of
all stripes. If Rastakhiz is still in existence at the
time of the Shah's demise, it will probably be the
new government's main tool for marshaling ex-
pressions of popular support.33 The lack of a
strong hand, however, could make Rastakhiz as
ineffective as Iranian political parties usually
are.
The religious leaders and their followers are
the group most likely to try to mobilize the
masses against the new goverment. The disap-
pearance of their arch-enemy will encourage
them to believe that concessions can be forced
from a new government," and they are likely to
be more effective in mobilizing popular support
than the government. How much religious re-
sentment will be focused against Farah because
she is a woman is impossible to judge at this
time. None of the attacks by religious leaders so
far appears to have been directed against her. If,
however, she assumes a key role in the regime,
this will change.
No one who is likely to be influential in a new
government appears to have any ties to the
religious community that would give the religious
leaders a voice in government.. Should the new
government take a more liberal approach to
dissent, as seems likely, it will find its major
problem in maintaining public order will arise
from those groups that are influenced by reli-
gious leaders.
The two terrorist groups-the People's Strug-
glers and the People's Sacrifice Guerrillas-if
they are still in existence as separate entities at
the Shah's demise, are likely to be important
only by infiltrating and inflaming the religious
opposition. At present the terrorists seem to have
neither the organization nor the following that
would give them a significant independent role.
If the threat of government reprisal is no longer
credible, however, they might become more
effective.
" There is no reason to believe that the Rastakhiz will not
continue to flourish over the next rive years. Should the Shah
become displeased with the party for any reason he could, of course,
abolish it. lie would, however, probably replace it with a new party
structure which would serve the same function.
"Clerical power was drastically curbed by Reza Shah. When he
abdicated, the clergy had a resurgence of influence as seen, for
example, in the reemergence of the head-to-ankle body covering-
the chador-whose removal in 1936 had enraged so much of the
clergy.
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An important element of the population on
which any Iranian government must depend to
implement programs and policies is the professional
middle class. This class, which has developed rela-
tively recently, is primarily urban. Its members
possess a modern higher education and base their
power position on acquired skills rather that
wealth, family ties, or property. They are engaged
in salaried professional, technical, and administra-
tive occupations, a large number of them in govern-
ment. They generally have little interest in political
affairs, partly because they are unwilling or unable
to adopt the traditional methods necessary to gain
influence.
Most of them would probably hope that a new
regime would be less authoritarian than the
present one, but they would be cautious about
participating in activities designed to put pres-
sure on the new government. The risk of choosing
the wrong side and thus ending up in a worse
position would be too great. Many of this class
choose to leave Iran for Europe or the United
States, providing a manpower drain that Iran can
ill afford.
A portion of the professional middle class is
attaining the status of a political elite. Those in
this group hold positions of power and influence
within the Shah's governmental structure," and
therefore have a high stake in political stability.
Many would be ambitious to better themselves
under a new monarch. They would have to
" A full picture and understanding of this new component of the
political elite still needs to be developed. A century and more ago
many men of obscure origin attained elite status by acquiring
wealth-mostly land-by marrying into the Royal Family of the
time, the Qajars, and by being of some service to the dynasty.
When the Qajars were ousted in 1925 by Reza Shah, many of the
notables retained their elite status by switching to Reza Shah. They
were joined by a new elite component, primarily from the family of
those military men who supported Reza Shah. The new elite
element solidified their position in the usual manner-good mar-
riages, attaining wealth, usually land, but often from trade and
commerce, and by loyalty to the dynasty. The elites of the Reza
Shah period-both old and new-switched easily to Mohammad
Reza, and he depended on them for the first 20 years of his reign.
Just as the Qajars needed the landowners with local influence and
Reza Shah needed his military men, so Mohammad Reza needs his
professional/technical men. Many of these will be absorbed into the
political elite in the same time-honored manner, by accepting and
practicing the traditional procedures of Iranian political conduct,
by good marriages, and by acquiring wealth.
choose sides eventually but, like their less politi-
cal countrymen, would be cautious about a pre-
mature decision. The bulk of the elite, too, would
probably find it possible-and expedient-to
throw its support to whatever dominant figure
might emerge, whether he be shah, general,
prime minister, or commissar.
Domestic Policies
Domestic policies in the long run will undergo
considerable change as the result of a new
regime. These changes would probably come
piecemeal, however, and over a period of time.
Most will not occur during the time frame of this
paper. Any regime claiming to be the legitimate
successor to Mohammad Reza would almost of
necessity have to embrace the programs he has
advocated. There is little in the Shah's overall
reform program that would be objectionable
except to the most reactionary and conservative
groups.
The criticism centers around the claim that
the Shah's programs have been a fraud and were
never intended to be successful. In point of fact
the reforms have generally been a success be-
cause the Shah has had enough authority to push
them in the face of the usual bureaucratic ineffi-
ciency and lethargy.
The major problem of a new regime, then,
would not be to produce a new program but to
keep the present ones going. In the face of
uncertainty as to the actual authority of the new
government (as opposed to the paper authority),
we might expect a general slowdown in many
projects, especially those requiring large expendi-
tures of money. It has already been suggested
that a new government might find it expedient to
reduce the rate of military expansion. This would
deemphasize the program most likely to meet
resistance when Shah Mohammad Reza is no
longer around and would release resources for
widely supported social programs. Military de-
velopments for the next five years have, however,
been for the most part determined by the pur-
chases and plans already under way and immedi-
ate benefits would be difficult to come by.
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What other changes might be felt necessary to
garner public support can hardly be suggested.
The particular domestic situation at the time
would be a determining factor. A tranquil polity
presumably would require less conciliation than a
quarrelsome one.
The Shah has hoped to create institutions that
will have a life of their own and be able to carry on
when he is no longer around to direct his programs
personally. It is not clear that he has yet succeeded
in doing this, and a new government will have to
spend considerable time just to ensure that the
various ministries and commissions, Parliament,
Cabinet, and other governmental and quasi-govern-
mental institutions remain loyal and not become
the means for personal aggrandizement by individ-
ual politicians.
Foreign Policy
Iran's major foreign policy lines are not likely
to change signficantly within the time frame of
this paper. The major goal of every Iranian
regime has been to achieve as much autonomy as
possible in its relations with its foreign friends
and enemies. Aside from its geographic position,
which through the centuries has made it a
valuable prize as an ally-or a puppet-Iran's
approach to its foreign relations has been
strongly conditioned by the character of the
Shah as the principal foreign policy official and
by internal weakness as a limiting factor on
external relations. One writer's analysis of Iran-
ian foreign policy at a considerably earlier period
is still relevant:
The monarchy was the most structured
unit of foreign policymaking. The na-
ture of the foreign-policy decisions was
significantly influenced by the charac-
ter of individual monarchs. An incom-
petent ruler would be incapable of
maintaining political order and his fail-
ure to do so would invite foreign inter-
vention and occupation. A strong ruler,
on the other hand, would be able to
revive the state after its collapse and
reestablish its former political bound-
aries and independence.16
Ruhollah Ramazani, The Foreign Policy of Iran, 1500-
1941, Charlottesville, 1966, p. 32.
A key element in this personalism of
foreign policy was a lack of realism. Earlier
Shahs were irredentist. The glances that Mo-
hammad Reza gives to the past as sources of
Iranian pride and inspiration are not uniquely
his. Qajar Shahs, too, looked to the past and
hoped to revive Iran by recouping territories
that the empire had lost over the centuries. In
no case, however, did its capabilities match
this vision, and the result was a series of
defeats by Russians, Turks, British, and even
Afghans that leave scars to this day.
But lack of realism was not the product
only of the monarchs. In the first quarter of
the 20th century, when nationalism superseded
irredentism as the perceived path to a restora-
tion of Iranian power, the principal foreign
policymakers were the politicians and the Maj-
lis. The nationalists' objectives of "absolute
independence" regardless of the chaotic inter-
nal situation in the early part of the century
resulted in a virtual partition of the country
between Russia and Great Britain. And a few
years later Iran's declaration of neutrality in
the two world wars was not matched by its
ability to maintain that neutrality. Again, in
the early 1950s, Prime Minister Mossadeq's
policy of "negative equilibrium"-that is, bal-
ancing the refusal to give the Soviet Union an
oil concession by the nationalization of the
British-controlled industry-failed because of
the nationalists' misconception of Iran's power
to make the policy work.
Mohammad Reza, in producing his policy of
"positive nationalism" and his later "indepen-
dent national policy," has revived the early role
of the Shah as the principal maker of foreign
policy but with a keener sense of Iran's capabili-
ties at any given time.
The main objectives of the Shah's overall
strategy have been to establish domestic stability
by consolidating control over all aspects of politi-
cal life and by pushing forward with extensive
reforms. With his rear secure, he has been freed
to cooperate extensively with the Soviet Union in
economic matters; to establish a relationship
toward the United States that parallels, but is
not dictated by, policies of the United States;
and, finally, to project Iran's power throughout
the Persian Gulf and into the Indian Ocean.
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This, then, is the substance of the foreign
policies that a successor regime will inherit from
the present Shah. There is no reason to think that
any of those likely to have a policymaking role in
a new government will be in a hurry to alter
these policies. What is likely to change, however,
is the style and some of the content of the larger
issues. An initial, and perhaps a long-lasting,
result of a change of regime will be confusion as
to who speaks authoritatively for the new govern-
ment in foreign affairs. Certainly, the Regent or
new Shah will insist on this role, but the foreign
affairs bureaucracy in the person of the foreign
minister may try to reclaim the prerogatives it
has lost to Mohammad Reza. The Majlis is also
likely to try to increase its influence. Some
Parliaments in the past have played decisive
roles. Even in more recent years when the Parlia-
ment has acted primarily as an arm of the
political elite, it has played an important role in
foreign policymaking. It has delayed action,
criticized, modified, and even rejected proposals
on which the elite itself did not wish to take a
stand, such as the 1954 oil nationalization issue,
the Eisenhower Doctrine, and the status of forces
agreement with the United States. Close advisers
to the ruler have also played and will continue to
play a role, even though they may have no
official place in the policymaking apparatus. The
result of trying to accommodate all the claimants
to a voice will probably be a slower and less
decisive response to problems and initiatives in
foreign affairs.
One probable development is a slowdown in
the pace of military development and thus a
reduction in the US function as an arms supplier.
This would not be likely to affect the basis of
close US-Iranian relations. A new regime would
probably seek expressions of US confidence and
support in order to counter the Soviet Union's
probing for weaknesses in the new government.
The Soviet Union must always loom large in
Iranian calculations, and the relationship that
Shah Mohammad Reza has established between
the two countries is likely to serve a new govern-
ment well. Suspicion of Moscow is part of the
mental baggage of most Iranians, as is the
awareness of the overwhelming power that the
USSR could bring to bear. Correct but cautious
official relations and mutually profitable com-
mercial relations can be expected to continue. A
new leader may be warier than the present Shah,
who over the years has become confident of his
ability to handle the USSR. The precise Iranian
response to specific Soviet pressures or overtures
cannot be gauged until a new government has
had an opportunity to demonstrate its percep-
tions of the world.
Iran's uneasy relations with its other neighbors
and its interest in projecting its influence into the
Persian Gulf are likely to remain constant. Iraq,
Afghanistan, and Pakistan all present potential
problems for Iran which no government ' can
ignore. Iran's eastern and western borders are
long and difficult to police, and illegal movement
across the borders by smugglers, migrant labor,
and tribal groups has always been an irritant.
The extent to which this is permitted to trouble
relations between Iran and Iraq, or Iran and
Afghanistan, depends on other factors in the
relationship. Except for the Kurds-and perhaps
the Baluchis--who will always remain a poten-
tial source of trouble, none of the border irrita-
tions seems important enough to create major
crises.
The April 1978 coup in Afghanistan put in
power a regime which, from Iran's point of view,
could be as threatening to Iran as the 1958 coup
in Baghdad. The Shah perceives the Soviet grand
design in the Middle East as surrounding Iran
with hostile regimes. This view may not be
shared by his successors. Nevertheless, nearly
every Iranian "knows" that Moscow has always
had designs on Iran, and some version of the
encirclement theory is likely to be accepted when
the Shah's successor looks at Iran's neighbors.
Nevertheless, Tehran will continue to try to
maintain correct, if not close, relations with all
its neighbors.
Unless domestic political or economic prob-
lems overwhelm them, the new rulers will prob-
ably retain the Shah's present interest in main-
taining Iranian hegemony in the Persian Gulf
and pushing a presence of some sort into the
Indian Ocean. Should a new regime choose to
deemphasize the Iranian military establishment,
the Indian Ocean aspect could be sacrificed.
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This review of people, institutions, and forces
that will play a role in the succession to the
Iranian throne suffers from lack of information
at key points. Masses of paper are available, but
with few exceptions the kind of detail necessary
to suggest how people might act is lacking.
The web of influence possessed by key figures
cannot be mapped with any certainty; the debts
owed and the favors received are virtually un-
known. Some things known to be true a decade
ago have not been addressed since then.
If the passing of the Shah is viewed as a
significant event for US policies in the region, a
firmer grip on less tangible influences seems
advisable. To what extent does the traditional
loyalty to the concept of a monarchy as distin-
guished from a particular dynasty still hold true?
To what extent do the urban masses in Tehran
provide an exploitable tool to support or oppose a
new government? What institutions are so de-
pendent on royal patronage that they would
collapse if this patronage were withdrawn?
Much charitable activity, for example, is directly
connected with the Royal Family. The true
opinions of key Iranians toward the monarch is
scantily documented. We knew much more about
their views 15 or 20 years ago when many of
these Iranians discussed with American officials
the position of the Shah, his strengths and
weaknesses, and even doubts about the viability
of the monarchy.
Caution suggests that in future years persons,
institutions, and trends be looked at not only for
their current significance but also for whatever
impact they may have on the succession of Shah
Reza Cyrus Pahlavi, third and perhaps last of his
dynasty.
The author of this paper is Sou0bX 1 A
Asia Division, Office of Regiona an olitical
Analysis. Comments and queries are welcome
and should be directed to - on 3525X1 A
6783.
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