ANGOLA'S RELATIONS WITH THE SOVIET UNION

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP80T00634A000400010064-2
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 4
• Document Creation Date: December 20, 2016
• Document Release Date: April 21, 2006
• Sequence Number: 64
• Publication Date: November 15, 1978
• Content Type: MEMO

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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
NATIONAL FOREIGN ASSESSMENT CENTER
Relations between Luanda and Moscow are generally good,
with no indications of serious policy differences. Nevertheless
some strains remain. The Soviets are not well liked in
Angola. Many Angolans regard them as necolonialists interested
primarily in exploiting Angolan resources for the benefit of
the USSR. Moreover, Angolans are disappointed with the
failure of their Soviet and Cuban allies to halt the downward
slide of the economy or to suppress UNITA.
Complaints about poor Soviet performance in the economic
sphere are common in sub-Saharan Africa and in the case of
Angola are probably not taken too seriously by the Soviets.
Of more concern to the Soviets is the belief, held by some
members of the Angolan elite including Neto, that the Soviets
were behind the Alves coup attempt in May 1977. We know of
no evidence to support the charge but it persists despite
repeated Soviet demonstrations of support for Neto.
This memorandum was prepared by the USSR Division of the Office
of Regional and Political Anal sis. Questions and comments may be
25X1 addressed to the author,
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Despite these points of friction, both sides continue
to observe the provisions of the Soviet-Angolan Treaty of
Friendship and Cooperation that was signed in October 1976.
The treaty follows the general format and substance of other
Soviet treaties with third-world states, outlining a commitment
to cooperate in a wide variety of fields. It provides for
the strengthening of military cooperation on the "basis of
corresponding agreements which are being concluded..." I 25X1
The Soviets--and Neto--realize that military assistance
is the foundation of Soviet influence in Angola and Neto is
likely to remain dependent on Soviet and Cuban military
support for some time. The Angolans cannot handle the UNITA
insurgency by themselves and neither the United States nor
other western countries are likely to provide the type of
assistance Neto needs to suppress the insurgents. As long
as Neto needs the Cubans to deal with UNITA, he will need
Moscow.
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The Soviets also probably believe that the large number
of Angolans trained in the USSR and other communist countries
will be more receptive to Soviet than Western influence.
Last year alone some 2,000 Angolans went to the USSR for
training and large numbers went to Cuba, East Germany and
Czechoslovakia. In addition, Soviet and Cuban personnel
provide training in Angola as do contingents from Czechoslovakia,
East Germany, and Bulgaria.
Soviets have also moved to make their influence felt in
key financial and commercial ministries, particularly in the
Finance Ministry and the Central Bank and have reportedly
replaced Cubans in the Transporation, Fisheries and Trade
ministries. Soviets in these mininstries will be in a good
position to monitor contacts between the West and Angola and
perhaps to influence developments in ways favorable to the
USSR.
In sum, the prospect of improved US-Angolan relations
is probably not a major source of concern to the Soviets, or
at least not of great enough concern for them to threaten
their position with Neto by trying to thwart his efforts.
Moscow nonetheless will be alert for any sign of a significant
US presence aggravating existing difficulties in the Soviet-
Angolan relationship.
SECRET
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