CURRENT TENSIONS BETWEEN ANGOLA AND SOUTH AFRICA

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP80T00634A000400010062-4
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 5
• Document Creation Date: December 20, 2016
• Document Release Date: April 21, 2006
• Sequence Number: 62
• Publication Date: November 15, 1978
• Content Type: MEMO

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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
NATIONAL FOREIGN ASSESSMENT CENTER
CURRENT TENSIONS BETWEEN ANGOLA AND SOUTH AFRICA
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South Africa ended its military intervention in
the Angolan civil war because Soviet and Cuban military aid
for the MPLA surpassed South Africa's capabilities for
a sustained confrontation, and also because Prime Minister
Vorster realized that prolonging open intervention would
wreck his diplomatic strategy of constructive coexistence
with Black Africa. Subsequently, Pretoria has sought
persistently to cultivate informal. dinlnmat.i(- contacts
with the Neto government, to induce Luanda to curtail
SWAPO's cross-border operations and take other steps
toward reducing military pressures along the Angolan
border with Namibia, and to salvage the major Cunene
River hydroelectric and irrigation projects that were
nearing completion when the Portuguese withdrew from Angola.
Although Luanda has more often than not rebuffed
Pretoria's overtures, there has been a rough standoff
since the pullout of South African troops in early 1976.
The rationale that motivated the troop withdrawal has deterred
the South Africans from another sustained military inter-
vention, even though SWAPO infiltrations have gradually
This memorandum was prepared by the African Division of the
Office of Regional and Political Analysis and coordinated with the
Directorate of erations. Questions and continents may be addressed
to the author,
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increased since 1976 and the South Africans have been
increasingly concerned about the SWAPO buildup in southern
Angola. The Angolans, on the other hand, apparently have
not done as much as they could to support SWAPO's cross-border
operations; fear of South African counter measures no doubt
has figured among the deterrents.
Both the South Africans and the Angolans have hoped
that the Western settlement proposal would result in
dispelling the risks of an escalating guerrilla war in
Namibia, and the hope has motivated both sides toward
accepting some restraints. By the same token, South
Africa's decision to hold an election in Namibia without
UN participation, and SWAPO's apparent determination to
disrupt the election, have reopened the risk of a serious
military confrontation between South Africa and Angola.
The South Africans clearly consider it imperative
to deter a surge of guerrilla infiltrations before the
December election.
Brand Fourie, Permanent Secretary of the
South A an Department of Foreign Affairs, was quietly
trying to dissuade the Angolans from supporting a guerrilla
offensive. Last week, however, an Angolan Defense Ministry
communique warned that South African attacks on Angolan
towns were imminent and called for an emergency curfew.
Fourie's latest efforts to open high-level contacts
with the Angolan government suggests that South Africa will
withhold major military strikes against the SWAPO bases
in Angola until diplomatic overtures are definitely
rebuffed, or until an Angolan pledge to restrain guerrilla
infiltration is proved to be empty. Angolan President
Neto, however, is unlikely to make a categorical pledge
in the absence of a UN-sponsored truce. Moreover, it
is doubtful that Angolan authorities can fully restrain
SWAPO staging operations, although they probably can
delay major guerrilla infiltrations by withholding local
logistic support.
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Hence the most likely outcome of quiet diplomatic
discussions of border problems under present circumstances
is a warning that continuing guerrilla infiltrations will
compel South Africa to react militarily. The South Africans
are also likely to stress that the scale of their military
incursions into Angola will match the scale of guerrilla
infiltrations.
It therefore appears more likely than not that South
Africa will soon launch limited strikes against the SWAPO
bases situated near the Namibia border. South African
military operations probably would be designed to minimize
the risks of confrontation with Angolan or Cuban troops. We
doubt that the Angolans--or the Cubans--will attempt to
defend all of SWAPO's many forward bases
South African Prime Minister P.W. Botha, however, very
likely will refrain from major military incursions into
Angola as long as there is no marked increase in SWAPO's
cross-border operations, and the Angolans indicate willingness
to maintain some restraints. Last May, Botha, who was then
Minister of Defense, advocated going ahead with the raid on
Cassinga, but now, as Prime Minister, he is likely to pay
more heed to the diplomatic consequences of such action.
Under present circumstances a major military incursion,
especially if it penetrates deeply into Angola, would not
only scuttle Western efforts to salvage the UN settlement
program for Namibia but also make it extremely difficult for
Western members of the Security Council to rebuff African
demands for mandatory economic sanctions against South
Africa.
SWAPO spokesmen have been calling for increased inter-
national support for armed struggle since former Prime
Minister Vorster announced on 20 September that South Africa
would go ahead with an election in Namibia without UN participation.
Angolan leaders are sensitive to international pressures,
but they also fear South African counter measures if there
is a marked increase in cross-border operations--not only
military incursions, but also substantial South African
support for UNITA guerillas in southern Angola. It seems
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fairly likely that Luanda will try to maintain some restraints
on cross-border operations as long as there are no major
South African incursions into Angola, and present hopes are
not dashed for an early UN-sponsored settlement that would
end the formidable South African military presence in Namibia.
Such a tenuous accommodation, however, could be suddenly
upset by a few dramatic terrorist incidents, such as the
assassination of a prominent figure in the Turnhalle Alliance
or a single land mine explosion that kills a dozen children
on their way to school. Although such incidents in the past
have not triggered immediate military strikes into Angola,
as the election date approaches the South African Prime
Minister will be under mounting political pressures to react
quickly with a dramatic display of military power. Thus
there is a risk that small-scale terrorist acts by SWAPO may
impel the South Africans into such provocative action that
the Angolans will feel compelled to respond by giving unstinting
support for a major guerrilla offensive and thus gain increased
international support for an apparently unavoidable conflict
with South Africa.
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