ANGOLA'S RELATIONS WITH CUBA

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP80T00634A000400010060-6
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 4
• Document Creation Date: December 20, 2016
• Document Release Date: April 21, 2006
• Sequence Number: 60
• Publication Date: November 15, 1978
• Content Type: MEMO

Approved For'Release 20
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
NATIONAL FOREIGN ASSESSMENT CENTER
15 November 1978
MEMORANDUM
ANGOLA'S RELATIONS WITH CUBA
Angola remains a major concern of Cuban foreign policy.
Cuba still maintains 19,000-20,000 troops and 7,000-8,000
civilians in Angola, the largest Cuban presence abroad. The
Cubans, in concert with the Soviets, have played a critical
role in countering the guerrilla threat to the regime of
President Neto and in providing sorely needed technical
assistance and expertise.
Essentially, the military situation is static; the
Cubans are bogged down in their own Vietnam, with no end in
sight to the fighting. As diplomatic efforts to reach a
Namibian settlement have stalled in recent months, Cuba has
responded by increasing its training of South-West Africa
People's Organization (SWAPO) guerrillas. Cuba would like to
avoid a direct military confrontation with South Africa but
will not shrink from defending SWAPO camps in southern
Angola from South African raids. Cuba sees the South African
presence in Namibia as an important obstacle not only to the
"liberation" of that country but--more important to Havana's
This memorandum was prepared by the Cuban Analytical Center,
Latin American Division of the office of Regional and Political Analysis
and coordinated with the Directorate o Operations. e comments
b
may
e addressed to the author,
RP M 78-10425
Approved For Release 2006/05/25 : CIA-RDP80T00634A000 00010060-6
SECRET
 Approved For Release 2006/05/25 : CIA-RDP80T00634A000400010060-6
immediate concerns--to the consolidation of the Neto regime.
In an effort to reduce if not completely remove the South
African presence from Namibia, Cuba has cooperated with
Western diplomatic initiatives, while remaining suspicious
of South African and Western intentions.
Nonetheless, Cuban activities in Angola have provoked
much popular resentment and charges of neocolonialism. The
Angolan government has expressed an interest in a move
toward reconciliation with the West, believing that Western
technicians would be more effective. Neto, however, realizes
that Cuban technical assistance cannot be fully replaced.
Cuba probably would not oppose an Angolan reconciliation
with the West, particularly Portugal, that would provide the
additional technical assistance sorely needed by the Angolans
without threatening present Cuban assistance. (Cuban civilian
advisers currently are involved in developing a national
educational system, running the public health service,
assisting in the coffee and sugar harvests, and reconstructing
roads and bridges destroyed during the civil war. Several
thousand more civilians, mostly teachers and construction
workers, are expected to arrive by the end of the year.)
The Cubans, anxious to improve their image in the non-
aligned movement and increasingly frustrated over Cuban/
Angolan inability to combat insurgency in the northern and
southern regions of Angola, would undoubtedly welcome any
moves that would give them the opportunity to free troops
for operations elsewhere in Africa. A sizable Cuban military
presence is likely to continue for some time, however, as
continuing UNITA insurgency in the south keeps Neto dependent
on the Cuban military presence. Cuba also uses Angola as a
staging base for operations and training of groups targeted
against southern Africa.
Although the Cubans probably would be reluctant to
bring many troops home, this possibility cannot be totally
discounted. The Angolans would view any Cuban troop reductions
as a development that would facilitate their overtures to
the West for economic and technical assistance.
An Angolan move to normalize relations with the United
States would be seen as a mixed blessing by the Cubans. They
would be concerned over the impact of US influence on a
nascent "socialist" Neto regime that is unstable and not
-2-
Approved For Release 2006/05/25 : CIA-RDP80T00634A000400010060-6
sF.rPF.T .
 Approved For Release 2006/05/25 : CIA-RDP80T00634A000400010060-6
yet fully consolidated. The Cubans would be wary of US
attempts to undermine the socialist foundation they have
been helping to build in Angola. On the other hand, the
recognition of Angola by the United States when a consider-
able number of Cuban troops were still in the country could
be manipulated by the Cubans to imply tacit US acceptance of
Cuban troop presence in Africa. The Cubans could use such
tacit approval as a means of undercutting criticism from
moderate nonaligned nations of Cuba's military policy in
Africa.
SECRET
Approved For Release 2006/05/25 : CIA-RDP80T00634A000400010060-6
 25X1 Approved For Release 2006/05/25 : CIA-RDP80T00634A000400010060-6
Approved For Release 2006/05/25 : CIA-RDP80T00634A000400010060-6