AN ANALYSIS OF CUBAN MILITARY INTERVENTION IN ANGOLA AND ETHIOPIA

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP80T00634A000400010046-2
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 18
• Document Creation Date: December 20, 2016
• Document Release Date: April 21, 2006
• Sequence Number: 46
• Publication Date: October 31, 1978
• Content Type: SUMMARY

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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
National Foreign Assessment Center
31 October 1978
An Analysis of Cuban Military Intervention in
Angola and Ethiopia
Key Judgments
In this paper, we have tried to piece together the
definitive story of Cuba's actions in Angola and Ethiopia.
Enough time has elapsed since the high point of conflict in
both theaters for us to profit from a re-examination of some
of our earlier hypotheses, to take into consideration
additional information I land to put 25X1
Cuba's foreign adventures into better perspective. In
general, our research has turned up few surprises, but some
of our earlier judgments that were a bit tentative have been
strengthened 25X1
This Executive Summary is a precis of a Longer paper to be issued
separately. It was prepared in the Cuba Analytic Center, Latin America
Division, Office of Regional and Political Analysis. Questions and
comments ma be addressed to the authors,
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Cuba decided to intervene in Angola and Ethiopia for
these reasons:
--The conviction of Cuban leaders that the US, with
its recent Vietnam experience, was not prepared to
intervene militarily in Africa as a counterweight
to Cuba.
--The serious dedication of Castro to worldwide
revolution and the cause of "international prole-
tarianism." Castro undoubtedly saw military
assistance to the Popular Movement for the Libera-
tion of Angola (MPLA) and later to the Ethiopian
government as a way to enhance his and Cuba's
revolutionary credentials, which had been somewhat
tarnished by Cuban failures in Latin America in
the 1960s.
--The fact that Cuba was "invited in" by a group
that had the trappings of legitimacy (Angola) and
a "progressive" Third World government (Ethiopia).
--The Cuban perception that by giving substantive
support to Soviet goals in Angola and Ethiopia,
Cuba would be ensured of continued Soviet economic
assistance and would perhaps receive modern
equipment for its military inventory.
--The calculation that Cuban intervention would
guarantee victory for the MPLA and the Ethiopians.
--The concern among the Cuban leadership that the
current generation of Cuban youth had not experi-
enced its own "trial by fire," that it had not
paid its revolutionary dues. Active involvement
in Angola would help guarantee the continuation
of the revolutionary process in Cuba itself.
Cuba's interventions in Africa demonstrate that Castro's
leadership style continues the pattern of daring and bold
actions that has characterized his administration since the
early 1950s.
--Despite many setbacks in the past, Castro has
consistently approached major decisions as a com-
pulsive man of action.
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--The hard liners in the leadership are more influ-
ential than those who argue for less stridency
around the world.
--The success of the interventions has strengthened
the military's voice in policy-making decisions in
Havana.
The Cubans' behavior in Angola and Ethiopia gives us a
framework for predicting their future policies.
--Cuba has no "Grand Design" for Africa; it will
exploit targets of opportunity as part of Castro's
long-held strategy of causing maximum difficulties
for the US and other "imperialist powers." But
Havana clearly sees southern Africa as a promising
arena for successful meddling, and the presence of
sizable Cuban military contingents in Angola and
Ethiopia makes the use of Cuban troops elsewhere
in Africa a realistic option.
--Although so far Havana and Moscow have been following
complementary policies in Africa, Havana's commit-
ment to revolutionary actions is likely eventually
to conflict with Moscow's more pragmatic needs and
interests.
--When competing claims arise, such as whether to
improve relations with the US or to support revo-
lutionary states or groups in the Third World,
Havana will sacrifice better relations with Wash-
ington.
The Cubans have yet to suffer the kinds of casualties
that would give them pause in considering future inter-
ventionist actions. They have paid some political costs--
especially in the nonaligned movement--but on balance, their
image in southern Africa has been significantly strengthened.
Havana may well undertake tactical shifts, such as reducing
its troop strength abroad, to undercut Third World critics
and minimize domestic concern. In the long run, however,
the major thrust of Cuban foreign policy is likely to be a
continued commitment to international activism.
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Cuban Involvement in Africa: Background
Cuban foreign policy during the first nine years of the
Castro regime--1959 through 1967--concentrated primarily on
promoting revolutionary movements bent on repeating the
Cuban experience, i.e., attaining power through violent
revolution.
Under certain conditions, however
incumbent governments.
Cuban
military support to legitimate governments drew far fewer
headlines and less international reaction than did Cuban
paramilitary support for groups subverting legitimate govern-
ments. Moreover, world attention focused mainly on Cuban
activities in Latin America despite the far greater invest-
ment in Cuban personnel in Africa than in Latin America.
When the sterility of its policy of fomenting revolution
abroad finally became obvious to Havana, the Castro regime
shifted gears and entered a period in which its main aim was
to overcome Cuba's isolation by expanding ties with legiti-
mate governments. Support for revolutionary movements was
by no means abandoned, but Havana revised its criteria and
became much more selective in deciding which rebel groups to
back. It was in this policy setting that the Cuban leader-
ship made its initial decision in mid-1975 to intervene in
Angola.
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The Process
To understand how Cuba came to provide mass support to
the MPLA, and later to Ethiopia, knowledge of the Cuban
decisionmaking apparatus is needed. This is not easy to
determine in a closed society, so the appraisal that follows
must be to some degree speculative.
Decisionmaking in Cuba has had a personalistic bent
over the last 19 years, with President Fidel Castro taking
an active and deeply personal role in the process. Because
Castro regards foreign policy as his particular domain, the
bureaucratic organs that handle foreign affairs in Western
countries and play a large role in formulating foreign
policy hold very little weight in Cuba. Fidel, however, has
increasingly listened to advice from other members of the
Cuban leadership and from experienced foreign leaders and
officials as well.
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Three main bureaucratic interest groups make up the
Cuban power structure today: the technocrats, the "raulis-
tas," and the "fidelistas."
--The technocrats-pragmatists--primarily concerned
with the efficient running of the Cuban economy
and with the acquisition of needed industrial
goods from the West and the US market--have as
their chief spokesman Carlos Rafael Rodriguez.
--The "raulistas"--the top echelons of the military-
security establishment and those who also seek
close collaboration with Moscow--are led by
Castro's younger brother, Raul.
--The "fidelistas"--close associates of Fidel's from
the days of the guerrilla struggle against Batista--
tend to be the most nationalistic and--along with
the "raulistas"--the most aggressively anti-US of
the regime's hierarchy. Osmani Cienfuegos and
Juan Almeida are representative spokesmen.
The military has had an increasingly large role in
decisions on Cuban involvement in Africa, and its importance
is likely to continue as long as Cuba is active in southern
Africa. The influence on Cuban foreign policy of Raul,
Minister of the Revolutionary Armed Forces, has grown
considerably. On the other hand, the Ministry of Foreign
Affairs, a traditional formulator of foreign policy in the
West, finds itself not only subordinated to the military in
decisionmaking but also to the Cuban Communist Party's (PCC)
Political Bureau and its various geographic departments. In
effect, the Foreign Ministry is virtually excluded from the
decisionmaking process.
At the national level, the PCC Central Committee is, in
theory, the highest policymaking entity in Cuba, but, in
practice, it is largely a rubber stamp for the Political
Bureau, headed by Castro. The Political Bureau is the heart
of the party and of the regime leadership, and from it stem
all major policy decisions. The party Secretariat, however,
has assumed increasing authority and responsibility since
1970. It has acquired a support structure of more than a
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dozen specialized departments to develop policy options, lay
out specific courses of action, and monitor policy imple-
mentation by appropriate offices and agencies.
The small group of key Cuban officials who formulate
and carry out Cuban policy toward Africa include Fidel
Castro; his brother Raul; Carlos Rafael Rodriguez, vice
president of the Council of Ministers; Raul Valdez Vivo, the
PCC Secretariat member responsible for liaison with foreign
communist parties; and Osmani Cienfuegos, former head of the
PCC Africa/Middle East Department and currently secretary of
the Council of Ministers Executive Committee.
The Evolution of the Angola Decision
It is our judgment that the Cuban leadership did not
anticipate a major commitment in Angola. Instead, Havana's
involvement evolved through a series of three relatively
distinct phases.
--May/June 1975 - a decision for a moderate increase
in the number of Cuban military technicians.
--August/September 1975 - a decision to send
0
I personnel to help the MPLA.
--Late October/early November 1975 - a decision to
reinforce with combat troops to confront a South
African invasion and successful offensives by the
National Union for the Total Independence of
Angola and the FNLA.
We presume that the decision in May/June 1975 to increase
the number of technicians was treated as a fairly routine
matter. The issue of sending even a relatively small number
of military support personnel to Angola, however, undoubtedly
sparked debate in Havana. The following arguments were
probably presented by various Cuban officials, with Castro
being the final arbiter:
--The technocrats, the strongest opponents to a
substantial commitment to Angola, probably con-
tended that the economic costs of such an adven-
ture would be more than Cuba could bear without a
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firm assurance of Soviet recompense. They may
also have voiced concern over the strains this
commitment might put on Cuban manpower, produc-
tivity, and morale. Any direct economic benefits
to be derived from assistance to Angola, they
probably asserted, would be of little immediate
benefit and could have undesirable repercussions,
such as setbacks in the Western financial commu-
nity and damage to the progress of normalization
of relations with the United States.
--Other, less cautious officials probably argued
that this was an excellent opportunity for Cuba to
gain leverage with the Soviet Union. By taking
the initiative in Angola with a relatively small
commitment, they may have contended, the Cubans
would gain increased foreign policy flexibility
and have a base of operations for further moves in
southern Africa.
--The military most likely pointed out that an
Angolan campaign would provide needed combat
experience for Cuban troops and would give the
Soviets cause to replace Cuba's aging military
equipment with more modern arms.
--Other supporters of Castro undoubtedly felt that
involvement in Angola would provide an opportunity
for Cuba to show some independence of the Soviet
Union by taking as active a role in Angola as
possible. They also may have argued that the war
in Angola provided a good chance to push "the
revolutionary line."
Once Castro had listened to the arguments and weighed
the other factors involved, he came to the conclusion that
the advantages of increased involvement in Angola outweighed
the disadvantages. From then on there was no turning back.
Cuba moved in decisively, prepared to offer substantial
assistance to ensure an MPLA victory.
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Havana dispatched troops when it became evident to both
Cuba and the Soviet Union that an MPLA victory could not be
attained merely by continuing to pump more Soviet military
equipment into Angola. Combat forces were needed that could
handle the equipment and perform as cohesive units on the
battlefield. In August 1975, Havana decided to send a
contingent to Angola, not to save
Angola itself or ac A ri-c from the invading South Afri-
cans--as Havana now claims--but to sway the outcome of an
internal African power struggle.
The MPLA was only one part of a three-faction coalition--
also including the FNLA and UNITA--technically representing
the legal government of Angola. Before 11 November, the
date Portugal turned over control of Angola to the MPLA, the
Cubans, therefore, had no grounds for claiming they were
asked into Angola by a legitimate government.
Havana's decisioni to reassess 25X1
and restructure Cuban involvement in Angola resulted from a
variety of factors. The most basic one was a direct request
from the MPLA for increased assistance. Also important was
the Cubans' conviction that the US would not make a major
military effort to thwart their activities. Cuban decision-
makers believed that the United States was too torn apart
domestically by the Vietnam experience for Washington to
generate support for an African military commitment. They
also reasoned that the upcoming US elections posed an addi-
tional constraint on such a major commitment.
The Cuban leaders' serious dedication to worldwide
revolution and the cause of "international proletarianism"
also played a key role in the Angolan decision. Castro
undoubtedly saw his military assistance to the MPLA as a
means of enhancing his and Cuba's standing in the Third
World as well as burnishing Cuba's revolutionary creden-
tials, somewhat tarnished by Cuban failures in Latin America
in the 1960s.
Moreover, the MPLA was a reasonable candidate for aid,
given the Cuban policy of supporting viable national liberation
movements; in addition, Castro probably felt that it was
Cuba's duty to provide the MPLA with enough assistance to
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ensure its consolidation of control. Anything less might be
regarded by others in the Third World as Cuban betrayal of
the MPLA, since if the MPLA's rivals were to triumph, Angola
would fall into "imperialist" hands.
There is no hard evidence on the precise Soviet-Cuban
relationship at this point--whether Moscow pressed the
Cubans into the Angola conflict. Clearly, however, Soviet
and Cuban policy interests in Africa were in tandem; by
supplying trained and experienced personnel capable of
operating Soviet-provided equipment, the Cubans were able to
demonstrate their support for overall Soviet policy in
Africa. The Cuban leaders most likely concluded that this
Cuban involvement would help to ensure a continuation of the
Soviet economic assistance upon which Cuba is so heavily
dependent, and could induce the Soviets to replace and
modernize military equipment in the Cuban inventory.
The military situation in Angola was no doubt another
factor in Cuba's decision.
The first major outbreak of hosti-
i ies a ween e group vying for control in Angola in
March 1975 was most likely initiated by the FNLA, which
hoped to seize the initiative on the battlefield. But,
bolstered by Soviet arms, the MPLA then launched an offen-
sive to drive FNLA and UNITA forces out of Luanda, leading
to MPLA control of the capital by mid-July. A total MPLA
victory seemed close at hand.
Foreign allies of the FNLA however, became alarmed b
the upsurge of MPLA fortunes.
25X1
reinvigorate NLA, in a rive
toward u n he strategic town of Caxito on 23 July 1975
and the momentum shifted, temporarily at least, to Holden Roberto's
FNLA forces.
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Finally, there had been concern among the Cuban leader-
ship that the current generation of Cuban youth had not
experienced its own "trial by fire," that it had not paid
its revolutionary dues. Active involvement in Angola would,
it was felt, provide Cuban youth with a previously lacking
sense of participation in the revolution; this, in turn,
would help guarantee the continuation of the revolutionary
process in Cuba.
The Ethiopian Decision
Although Cuba had demonstrated in Angola that it was
willing to undertake a major overseas military campaign, the
Castro regime's decision to repeat this action in Ethiopia
less than two years later took most observers by surprise.
While much remains to be learned about the forces that drive
and inhibit Cuban military activism, the following para-
graphs attempt to outline the reasons we now perceive for
Cuba's decision to dispatch troops to Ethiopia. They will
seek to answer questions such as: What did Cuba perceive as
its basic interests in the area? Did Cuba's intervention in
Ethiopia, like that in Angola, represent a convergence of
Cuban and Soviet interests? Or was Ethiopia a clearcut case
of Havana doing Moscow's bidding? Did Cuba, as in Angola,
get drawn gradually into military conflict to protect an
initial investment or did the Castro regime opt from the
outset for an open-ended commitment?
The Castro regime has consistently rationalized the
sending of its troops to Ethiopia on ideological grounds.
It interprets the struggle in the Horn of Africa as part of
the larger global conflict between the socialist camp and
"imperialism" and contends that it came to Chairman Mengistu's
defense to prevent the Ethiopian revolution from being
strangled in its infancy.
This argument has merit but is not totally persuasive.
Havana welcomed the takeover of a leftist government in
Addis Ababa in February 1977, seeing this as a significant
addition to the spread of radical socialist regimes that it
was working to foster in the Red Sea Basin. Even though the
ties to Mengistu were newly formed, Fidel Castro clearly
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felt a strong personal and ideological affinity with the
Ethiopian leader and was greatly impressed with the revo-
lution he was trying to carry out.
Castro's first-hand look at the situation in Ethiopia
in March 1977--just six weeks after Mengistu had taken
control of the government--had a strong impact on the Cuban
leader and reinforced his desire to assist. Even at that
early date the Cubans talked of sending troops if the situ-
ation became critical.
For the next seven months, however, Castro seemed
content to have Cuban military personnel help Mengistu try
to consolidate his hold by training a militia force to
combat the various insurgencies. This limited role was very
much in keeping with Cuban activities in South Yemen and
Somalia--the two other countries in the region where Cuba
had established a. presence.
Two factors were paramount in leading
to e Castro regime s decision to commit combat troops.
First, the military situation was becoming critical.
Somalia was threatening to capture Harar and Dire Dawa--
Ethiopia's remaining footholds in the Ogaden--and the mili-
tary efforts of the Eritrean separatists had reached a high-
water mark. The loss of these regions would have been
disastrous to the prestige of Mengistu and would have
imperiled his continued rule.
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The second crucial factor for Havana was that major
Soviet strategic interests were threatened. On 13 November
Somalia closed its military facilities to Soviet personnel,
thereby depriving Moscow of its window to the Red Sea and
the Indian Ocean; Moscow's policy toward the Horn of Africa
was in a shambles. The Soviets were faced with a situation
in which they had been tossed out of Somalia and risked
losing potential replacement facilities if Ethiopia became
truncated, as appeared increasingly possible.
In Ethiopia, in contrast to Angola, Soviet desires were
doubtless a vital--and perhaps a decisive--consideration in
Havana's policy calculations. The USSR had substantially
more at stake than did Cuba--greater material investment, a
vital strategic interest, and the need, as a great power, to
salvage its pride. From the beginning of Cuba's involvement
in Ethiopia, the Castro government had closely coordinated
its actions with the Soviet Union. At overy critical junc-
ture in Cuba's deepening involvement, Cuban officials traveled
to Moscow to consult. The Cubans' close working relations
with the USSR in Ethiopia made it all the more difficult for
Castro to turn aside a Soviet request for Cuban combat
involvement.
This is not to say that the Cubans were forced into
action against their will. Cuba and Ethiopia were linked by
leader-to-leader ties and by the Castro regime's genuine
commitment to revolutionary solidarity. Like Moscow, the
Cuban leadership not only prized Ethiopia as a foothold for
radical socialism in a vital strategic area, but recognized
that its importance far exceeded that of Somalia because of
its much larger population. Moreover, the Cuban leadership
was no doubt glad to seek revenge against Somali President
Siad, who had not only undermined Cuban attempts to promote
a federation of radical states in the region but had then
turned to the "reactionary" Arabs and the West for military
support. In addition, after the relatively easy victory
during the conventional stage of the Angolan war, the Cuban
leadership doubtless welcomed the opportunity once again to
demonstrate the prowess of its military forces, especially
since it believed that Cuban assistance could be decisive.
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Havana probably decided from the outset that if it were
going to send troops to Ethiopia, a large expeditionary
force--on the order of that then in Angola--would be needed.
For the second time in a little over two years, Cuban
troops demonstrated the impact that a relatively small force
of highly motivated, well-trained, and well-equipped troops
can have on a conventional, set-piece campaign against a
large but less professional African army. The importance of
the Cuban role was far greater than its size suggests.
Despite the fact that only one Cuban division fought in the
Ogaden, alongside at least five Ethiopian divisions, the
Cuban contribution was decisive in permitting Ethiopia to
gain its swift victory.
Outlook
Cuba's military successes in Angola and Ethiopia have
convinced the Castro regime that its forces can play a
decisive role in the African struggle--the key theater for
Cuban activism abroad. The Cubans have been seriously
threatened only by the South Africans and then only briefly.
The cost so far to Cuba in terms of casualties has appar-
ently been within acceptable limits. We estimate that 1,500
to 2,000 Cubans have been killed in Angola since the fall of
1975, and Cuba may have lost a few hundred men in Ethiopia.
Mounting evidence indicates, however, that continued
responsibility in Angola's counterinsurgency effort is not
sitting well with Havana. The Castro regime does not seem
to be psychologically equipped to handle the slow but
apparently endless hemorrhaging resulting from this cam-
paign. Consequently, until recently the Cubans were careful
to avoid being saddled with a similar role in the Ogaden
against Somali-backed guerrilla groups.
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Cuba's military successes have given Armed Forces
Minister Raul Castro and his subordinates a greater position
of authority from which to argue for continued military
activism. The increased influence of the "Raulistas" bodes
ill for reducing tensions with the US. Among Cuban elite
groups, the Raulistas have retained the most deeply in-
grained animosity toward the US and have been the least
inclined to alter their behavior in Africa in order to reach
an accommodation with Washington.
Cuba's policy of military activism has had political
costs, mainly in alienating a number of important nonaligned
governments. Some difficulties have also been incurred in
its relations with its natural allies--those governments
with shared ideologies but competing interests. In Ethi-
opia, for example, Cuba risks antagonizing Mengistu if it
does not cooperate against the Eritrean rebels. By helping
to suppress the Eritreans, however, Cuba would jeopardize
its ties with important friends among the radical Arab
states and tarnish its image among world revolutionaries who
believe that the Eritreans are fighting a legitimate libera-
tion struggle.
The Cubans are learning that the nationalistic sensi-
tivities of local leaders such as Mengistu can preclude
unfettered Cuban political influence. Nevertheless, despite
some serious disagreements with the Mengistu government--
especially over the composition of a new ruling party--there
is as yet no indication that Havana believes that its troops
have shed their blood in vain.
On balance, Cuba has no doubt that the political gains
resulting from its military activism far outweigh the costs.
When the decade began, Cuba was a pariah in the Western
Hemisphere. Even in the Caribbean Basin--where Havana could
most naturally expect to project its influence--not a single
nation except Mexico had diplomatic relations with the
Castro regime. Now Cuba is a force to be reckoned with in
international politics; it plays an important role from one
end of the African continent to the other, and--as develop-
ments in South Yemen indicate--on the Arabian peninsula as
well. Cuba has also become a major leader of one camp
within the nonaligned movement.
I
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The thrust of Cuban foreign policy for the foreseeable
future has, therefore, been established. Castro is well
aware that southern Africa, especially, is passing through a
critical stage in its development, and, with an eye to his
own place in history, he wants Cuba to play a heavy role in
that "liberation struggle." The Cuban leadership has set in
motion such a massive propaganda effort to prepare its
people for continued sacrifice that only a decisive reversal--
probably on the battlefield--would be likely to cause the
regime to change course. Although Havana's goal is likely
to remain steadfast, it may well be willing to undertake
tactical shifts in response to heavy pressure, especially
from key nonaligned countries or from the Soviet Union.
The extent to which Cuba can continue to pursue a
policy of military activism will depend, of course, upon its
own resources. So far the 35,000 to 38,500 Cuban troops
serving in Africa account for less than 10 percent of Cuba's
military. Moreover, Havana is using Angola and Ethiopia as
staging areas for military actions in the surrounding re-
gions and could draw on its forces in those two countries
for a variety of military tasks short of full-scale confron-
tations without having to bring in additional troops from
Cuba.
Moscow's willingness to offset the costs of Cuba's
military actions abroad will be a crucial determinant for
future Cuban activism. The Soviets, in addition to pro-
viding the bulk of the military equipment Cuba used in
Angola and Ethiopial 25X1
have also increased its economic aid to u a.
year Soviet economic support for Cuba will rise to the
equivalent of at least $2.3 billion in sugar and petroleum
subsidies. This figure represents an increase of about 45
percent over last year and is more than triple the 1975
level when large-scale subsidization first began.
The USSR has also increased its military assistance to
Cuba. Since Cuba's involvement in Angola in 1975, Soviet
arms deliveries have risen steadily;] o 25X1
reover,
Moscow is e pinq to modernize and upgra e the uban Air
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realize that Africa has a lower priority for Moscow than it
does for Havana, and the Castro regime doubtless worries
that in response to other concerns Moscow may opt for a less
aggressive policy in Africa. The Cubans, moreover, have
never lost their fear that Washington and Moscow will strike
a deal that undercuts Cuban interests.
When it halted its aggressive effort to export its
revolution to Latin America in the late 1960s, Cuba showed
that it can abandon a policy that seems bound to fail. As
long as the Cubans believe "imperialism" is in retreat,
however, and that their support can be decisive in aiding
the cause of radical socialism, the Castro regime's commit-
ment to "proletarian internationalism" is likely to remain
undiminished.
Nonetheless, the Cubans
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