HUMAN RIGHTS REVIEW (15-28 SEPTEMBER 1978)

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP80T00634A000400010027-3
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 7
• Document Creation Date: December 20, 2016
• Document Release Date: November 3, 2006
• Sequence Number: 27
• Publication Date: September 29, 1978
• Content Type: REPORT

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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
NATIONAL FOREIGN ASSESSMENT CENTER
HUMAN RIGHTS REVIEW
(15-28 September 1978)
SOVIET UNION
--Ilya Orlov, an official of the registered Baptist church.,
told a US Embassy official on 27 September that if the group of
Pentecostals left the embassy--where they have vowed to stay until
they are allowed to emigrate--"nothing would happen to them" because
"they had not committed a political offense." He added that "if
they leave the embassy, they eventually will receive exit permission."
Orlov observed that Soviet authorities would never permit the Pente-
costals to leave the country "from the embassy."
Orlov's statement was probably delivered with. official sanction.
Representatives of the officially recognized Baptist church-serve
at the pleasure of the regime and frequently serve as spokesmen for
official policy toward religious groups. Orlov requested the meeting
with the embassy officer and indicated that he intended the message to
be relayed to the appropriate officials at the embassy.
This backdoor. communication provides little guarantee that the
Pentecostals would in fact be allowed to emigrate if they left the
embassy. The release from a forced labor camp of the younger
Vashchenko, son of one of the leaders of the embassy sit-in, would
constitute a more forceful signal of any desire on the part of the
authorities to resolve the case of the Pentecostal "squatters" amicably.
This publication is a compilation of articles prepared by the
geographical divisions-of the Office of Regional and Political Analysis.
25X1 Inquiries may be directed to the Production Staff,
RP-M-78-10377
29 September 1978
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LATIN AMERICA
--Chile: In his speech marking the fifth anniversary of the
overthrow the Allende government on 11 September, President Pinochet
outlined the latest and, as yet, most definite plans for the transition
from military to civilian government. According to Pinochet, a new
constitution, prepared under his guidance, would be submitted to voters
next year, but elections would not be held until 1985. Initial reaction
to the speech has focused on the long interval before civilian rule.
Probably of greater significance, however, is the developing controversy
over the Pinochet constitution, which differs markedly from Chile's
1925 constitution. Pinochet intends to submit the new constitution
for approval in a national plebiscite, some possible outcomes of which
could produce serious, even critical problems for the regime. Whether
Chileans accept or reject the new charter, the Pinochet constitution
and the opposition to it disclose once again the political consequences
of the regime's perception of the profound cleavage in Chilean politics.
In, his lengthy speech., often polemical in tone, Pinochet dealt
with. more than the transition to civilian rule. As he has in the past,
he defended the legitimacy of the coup and the moral mandate of his
military regime, reviewed its progress, highly praised its economic
performance, and covered a wide range of domestic and international
issues. He met head-on many of the past and present criticisms of
his administration and its policies and boldly raised some thorny
matters, most notably the Letelier case. All in all, it was a long
and strongly worded defense of his embattled regime in its continuing
struggle against the forces and ideologies allegedly manifested in the
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overthrown Allende administration. In that struggle, Pinochet claims
to enjoy majority support against his opponents. His claim will be
put to an important test when Chilean voters are given the chance to
accept or reject the regime's constitution--a controversial document,
one of whose major purposes is to prevent legally another Allende-type
government.
So far, there are no signs the regime sees any great risk in
permitting the plebiscite. It apparently believes it enjoys high
civilian support, a perception perhaps colored by the success of its
plebiscite victory last January. Then, 75 percent voted against the
UN resolution condemning the human rights situation in Chile. Though
the choice was forced upon the voters, the election seems to have
been totally honest. It was also a great and unexpected victory for
Pinochet, who spoke of the vote as "legitimizing" his regime. Pino-
chet's position in the forthcoming constitutional plebiscite will
not be assisted by the nationalistic bias of the earlier vote however,
and a negative outcome is possible.
--Argentina-US: Argentina has indefinitely postponed formal
ratification of the Tlateloco Treaty, which seeks to an nuclear weapons
from Latin America. There is a possibility that it will reverse its
earlier decision and decide not to adhere to the accord. The change
of mind stems in part from growing hostility in Buenos Aires to US
pressure on human rights. It also reflects the fact that Argentina
has not received any assurances it will get heavy water technology
from the US. Contrary to the US position, the Argentines insist that
the US offered them heavy water technology last November in exchange
for their ratification of full-scope safeguards. President Videla
went against the advice of many of his advisers when he signed the
treaty earlier this year. He has been under strong pressure to withdraw
his support by those who believe that delay or refusal is the only wa
to stand up to the US. 25X1
--Ecuador: A plot by some senior Ecuadorean military officers
and election officials to announce widespread voting irregularities
and fraud as a prelude to voiding the country's two-stage presidential
election apparently has been shelved temporarily. The postponement
seems to have been prompted by broad exposure in the media and by
denunciations from civilian political leaders. It remains uncertain
whether the conspiracy can succeed, but US Embassy officials in Quito
believe that the plotters probably will t a ain after the public
furor subsides.
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--South Korea: The opening of the National Assembly this month
provides a forum -or the opposition to attack the government during
the campaign preceding the legislative election this December. Dissi-
dents outside the assembly view the preelection period as their last
chance to push for fundamental change in government. They fear that a
strong ruling party victory, combined with President Pak's inauguration
for another six-year term on 27 December, will be read as final public
approval of the political changes introduced in 1972. They hope to
heighten political tensions with stepped-up demonstrations by university
students.
The dissidents want to force the government to choose between
the public embarrassment of street protests or the reimposition of
strict controls on political activism. If Pak clamps down on dissent,
it would mark the end of the more relaxed attitude the government has
adopted in dealing with protesters and a reversal of some of the
recent progress made on the South Korean human rights front.
--Phili ines: President Marcos' 21 September speech on the sixth
anniversary of martial law was low-key and most notable for what it
did not address. He made no mention of human rights issues,nor did
he indicate an early end to martial law, noting only that a "parliamentary
tradition" must be established in the Philippines to "ease the country
into full political normalization." Marcos' references to local elec-
tions that will soon be held in the Muslim areas of the southern
Philippines seemed intended to dampen speculation over recent reports
of an upsurge in fighting in the region. Marcos is probably concerned
over possible repercussions on the human rights front. if the interna-
tionalmedia focus on the use of US military equipment by the Philippine
military units fighting the Muslim insurgents. 25X1
AFRICA
--South Africa: The impending demoliton of Crossroads, the black
squatter town of 20,000 people on the outskirts of Cape Town, illustrates
the determination of the South African Government to force the families
of black workers out of the western part of Cape Province. At its
annual congress late last month, the Cape branch. of the ruling National
Party reaffirmed both its hardline policy toward blacks and its deter-
mination to preserve the Cape as a permanent home solely for whites and
Coloreds, the 2.5 million South Africans of mixed blood who are concen-
trated there.
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In 1955, the government drew a north-south boundary, the Eiselen
Line, through Cape Province and set off the western third of the country
as an area in which Coloreds have employment and housing privileges not
given to blacks--although far fewer than those accorded to whites.
The government decided at that time that it would gradually remove
all black laborers from western Cape Province and relocate them in
nearby black homelands. Ten years later the government proclaimed a
5-percent annual reduction in the number of blacks allowed to work in
the area and put a moratorium on the construction of new housing for
black families.
The government did not, however, foresee the industrial boom and
economic expansion of the late 1960s, which made black labor more
essential than ever. Since the Eiselen Line was drawn, the number of
blacks legally in the area has doubled to about 360,000, and there
may be an equal number there illegally. Despite this increase, the
ban on legal family housing remained in force. Squatter towns mush-
roomed, and the government is now systematically eliminating them and
ousting dependents--in part to forestall disorders such as those spear-
headed in the past two years by young blacks living in the townships.
Despite some muttering from Afrikaner intellectuals about the
need for a better deal for blacks, the provincial party congress
last month voted unanimously to tighten controls on the influx of
blacks and make black labor more expensive for the employer. The
congress ruled out any prospect that urban blacks west of the Eiselen
Line might be allowed to hold property leases, an innovation intro-
duced elsewhere in the country in an effort to stabilize some of the
urban population.
The hardline tone of the congress was set by Minister of Defense
P. W. Botha, the Cape Province party leader who has just been
named to succeed Prime Minister Vorster. Minister of Plural Relations
and Development Connie Mulder, one of Botha's political rivals,
jumped on the bandwagon and took a strong stand against a black labor
force with permanent residence rights in the province. Mulder,
whose department controls nearly every aspect of black life in
South Africa, promised to remove Crossroads, the last of the Cape's
major black squatter communities, despite protests from many Cape
Town whites.
The congress also completely ruled out the possibility of political
rights for blacks. The government, however, is still considering pro-
posals to give a limited political franchise to Coloreds. Afrikaners
in the Cape obviously believe they can coexist with. the Colored
community, which observes white mores while remaining subservient to
white domination.
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The Eiselen Line is one of the boundaries that is often cited
in speculation about the possibility of a federated system--or even of
partition in the long-term South African future. The Cape National
Party has shown, by its determination to remove as many blacks as
possible, that it intends to continue to mold the area west of the line
into a white homeland that could remain intact whatever the future holds
for South Africa. 25X1
--South Africa: Fourteen friends and relatives of Steve Biko
were arreste earlier this moth. According to the South African press,
the government ordered the arrests in anticipation of disturbances on
12 September--the first anniversary of Biko's death. None occurred.
Biko's brother, Khaya, was detained overnight, but was released
the following day because of illness. The rest, however, are still
being detained without charge under the internal security act.
Close associates of the Biko family believe that at least some
of those arrested will soon be released and that the government intended
the arrests to serve as a warning that the activities of Biko's family
and friends were still being monitored. F_ I 25X1
--Uganda: President Idi Amin, true to his promise, has established
a human rig is committee. According to the official announcement,
the committee is to ensure there is no breach of human rights in Uganda;
if there is, the culprits are to be "put on trial without distinction."
The committee is to be chaired by the Minister of Justice and includes
the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court, the Army Chief of Staff, and
a former Ugandan UN Ambassador.
The establishment of the committee is an effort by Amin to improve
his regime's badly tarnished image and gain some international acceptance.
Third country ambassadors and other observers have reported that there
has been a general absence of unrest and repression in Uganda over the
past year.
At the committee's inauguration ceremony, however, the erratic
Amin--possibly by design--left open the chance he may again find it
necessary to revert'to heavyhanded suppression. He said that there
were armed Ugandan exiles planning to invade Uganda--a situation Amin
has used in the past to justify some of his repressive actions.
Amin's power does not appear to be seriously threatened at the
moment. Even if he were removed, the internal situation in Uganda
would probably not change very much given the country's basic tribal
and religious divisions.
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