SUDAN: THE NUMAYRI REGIME--ORIENTATION AND PROSPECTS

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP80T00634A000400010013-8
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 22
• Document Creation Date: December 20, 2016
• Document Release Date: April 21, 2006
• Sequence Number: 13
• Publication Date: September 6, 1978
• Content Type: IM

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
National Foreign Assessment Center
6 September 1978
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INTELLIGENCE MEMORANDUM
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Sudan: The Numayri Regime--Orientation and Prospects
PRINCIPAL. JUDGMENTS
Despite recent moves to open up the political process
in Sudan, President Numayri, with the support of the armed
forces, still holds almost all real power.
--The greatest threat to stability appears to be the
possibility of serious anti-government protests over
inflation, diminished buying power in key urban areas,
and shortages of consumer goods and services. Over
the near term, however, the army is probably able and
willing to put down any civilian disorders that might
occur.
--Over the longer term, unless the hardships affecting
the public are eased, public resentment and unhappiness
could spread to the military and endanger Numayri's
continued rule.
--The return of exiled Ansar leader Sadiq al-Mahdi to
Sudan has fragmented the conservative opposition National
Front, but it has given Numayri's former enemies an op-
portunity to build a base of support inside the country
that could in time become a challenge to his continued
rule.
This memorandum was coordinated within the Central
Intelligence Agency. The principal author is 25X1
Middle East Division, Office of Regional and Political Analysis.
The section on Development Policy and
conomic Problems was written by Near East- 25X1
Africa Branch, Developing Nations Division, Office of Economic
Research. Comments and queries are welcome.
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--Numayri's effort to achieve reconciliation with his
conservative opponents has not as yet brought about
the return of a significant number of the estimated
1,000-2,000 armed Ansar dissidents in Libya or some
4,000-6,000 in Ethiopia. Although they are not now
a direct threat to the regime, Numayri fears that they
may be used in cross-border guerrilla operations into
Sudan.
Sudanese foreign policy, which since mid-1971 has
become increasingly pro-Western and aligned with that of
the conservative Arab states, assumed a somewhat more
neutral appearance in the past year.
--Moves to ease strains with Libya and Ethiopia, however,
as well as an apparent, although temporary, improvement
in Sudanese-Soviet relations, were motivated by security
considerations and do not represent a fundamental shift
in outlook. Numayri still believes that a fundamental
Soviet goal is the removal of Egyptian President Sadat
and himself as a first step toward dominating the Arab-
ian Peninsula and the Persian Gulf. He sees Libyan and
Ethiopian policies in the Middle East as providing the
Soviets with the opportunity to advance their ambitions
in the area.
--The Sudanese fear that the conflict between the Mengistu
regime and the Eritrean secessionists, if it continues,
could spill over to Sudan and involve Sudanese forces.
The Sudanese would prefer to see the Eritreans settle for
some sort of autonomy because they fear that Marxist
elements might dominate an independent Eritrea. As long
as the Ethiopians press for a military solution, however,
the Sudanese will continue to support the Eritreans and
allow them to be supplied through Sudanese territory.
--Numayri's agreement to International Monetary Fund
demands for financial reform, including a currency de-
valuation and a cut in government expenditures, should
provide greater financial stability over the long run.
Sudan, however, will continue to need balance-of-payments
support for some time.
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DISCUSSION
Numayri: Demonstrated Survivability
President Jafar Muhammad Numayri has been in power for
over nine years, longer than any other Sudanese leader since
the country achieved independence in 1956. The 48-year old
former army officer has survived three major attempts against
his rule. A low-key, unpretentious figure, his staying
power has been due to his ability to keep the loyalty of the
army and to the flexibility he has demonstrated in dealing
with Sudan's problems.
Despite recent moves to create a more open political
system, almost all real power still rests with Numayri. As
president---elected, by plebescite to six-year terms in 1971
and 1977--he appoints the prime minister, cabinet, and vice-
presidents, and has frequently shuffled personnel as a means
of limiting the prestige and independence of any one individual.
Numayri's close supporters, including the few remaining
members of the Revolutionary Command Council formed after
the May 1969 coup, are not in a position to challenge him by
trying to build an independent base of support. Of the
people around him, First Vice President Abu al-Qasim Muhammed
Ibrahim appears to be the most important. In the event of
Numayri's death, the constitution provides for the first
vice president to assume temporarily the presidency;
presidential elections are then to be held within 60 days.
During his first two years in office, Numayri's efforts
to create a socialist economy and his determination to
destroy the political parties that constituted the principal
support of previous regimes brought his government great
unpopularity. Although a nationalist or pro-Arab faction of
the Sudan Communist Party was the only political group to
back the new regime, disagreements between Numayri and the
party began to surface shortly after he took power as he
sought to limit Communist influence in the government.
A doctrinaire faction of the Communist Party, which was
headed by party Secretary General Abd al-Khaliq Mahjub, was
strongly pro-Soviet and only lukewarm in its support of
Numayri. In July 1971, three members of the Revolutionary
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Command Council, with the help of Communists--especially
the doctrinaire faction of the party--managed to seize
power for three days before being deposed by pro-Numayri
forces.
The short-lived "revolution of correction" marked a
turning point for Sudanese domestic and foreign policy.
After Numayri regained control, he launched an effort to
widen his base of support, and moved to address fundamental
domestic problems such as the rebellion of the nation's
southern, Christian and animist population against the
politically dominant Arab Muslims of the north, the lack of
public support for the central government, and the need for
economic and social development. In the foreign policy
field, he made alliances that have tended to promote
domestic stability.
Dealing With Domestic Opposition
Following the Communist effort to oust him in mid-1971,
Numayri began to ease the totalitarian image of the regime
and to provide a way for important tribal, religious, and
political groups to participate in public affairs. While
continuing to retain all real power, he abolished the
military-dominated Revolutionary Command Council, promulgated
a constitution, held presidential plebescites, established
the National Assembly, and created the Sudanese Socialist
Union--the sole legal, political organization modeled on its
Egyptian counterpart.
These changes, however, were not enough to soften the
opposition of the conservative forces which are prominent
in the country. A National Front--composed of members of
the Ansar Muslim sect, the Khatmiyyah Muslim sect, and the
Muslim Brotherhood--was formed and was behind attempts to
depose Numayri in September 1975 and July 1976. The Ansar
who claim the loyalty of about one-fifth of Sudan's almost
17 million people, were intent on revenging the death of
their leader, Imam al-Hadi al-Mahdi, who was killed in a
clash with the army in March 1970. Although the leaders of
the Khatmiyyah, Sudan's second major Islamic sect, were not
as hostile to the Numayri regime as were the Ansar, they
objected to its alleged atheism. The Muslim Brotherhood,
based largely at the University of Khartoum, had operated as
a clandestine organization after Numayri banned political
parties in 1969 and jailed its leader, Dr. Hassan al-Turabi.
The National Front was under the overall leadership, - of
exiled Ansar leader Sadiq al-Mahdi, the nephew of Imam al-
Hadi and a former prime minister, following his release
from prison in March 1974.
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Efforts to topple the regime, especially a Libyan-
sponsored, Ansar-led coup attempt in July 1976, compelled
Numayri to move aggressively to seek a reconciliation with
the National Front. Contacts between the regime and the
Front, which apparently decided to reconsider its strategy
toward the government after the failure of the 1976 coup,
began in early 1977, and in July 1977 Numayri and exiled
Ansar leader Sadiq al-Mahdi met in Port Sudan. As the price
for his return to Sudan and the dissolution of the National
Front, Sadiq got Numayri's agreement to liberalize the
political system and to adopt a less hostile attitude
toward the Ansars. The government has made good on some
specific promises made to Sadiq, such as releasing political
prisoners, returning confiscated property, and making the
Sudanese Socialist Union a more representative mass organization.
It is not clear, however, whether Numayri's repeal in early
August 1978 of parts of the State Security Act will meet
the demands of former opposition politicians for the lifting
of restrictions on personal liberties. Another prominent
National Front leader, Husayn Sharif al-Hindi, still in
exile, has linked his return to Khartoum to the repeal of
the State Security Act.
Since the Communists tried to bring him down in July
1971, Numayri has begun a campaign to depict himself as
a devout Muslim, a process that accelerated with the initi-
ation of the national reconciliation campaign. At least
some of his professions of religious feeling may be inspired
by his desire to please the Saudis. As part of the new
emphasis on Islamic values, Numayri has apparently sanc-
tioned--or at least tolerated--the resurgence of the Muslim
Brotherhood, including its occasional violent activity on
the University of Khartoum campus. Hassan al-Turabi was
released from jail as part of the national reconciliation
and is said to meet often with Numayri. In July 1978, Turabi
was appointed Assistant Secretary General for Information
and Foreign Affairs in the Sudanese Socialist Union. Numayri
would probably crack down on the Brotherhood, however, if it
resorts to terrorism in its attempt to promote reactionary
Islam.
On balance, the national reconciliation campaign has
divided the conservative opposition and reduced the threat
of trouble from the right. Even if al-Hindi and those
members of the National Front who support him remain in
exile, the endorsement of the regime by Sadiq has been a
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big plus for Numayri. Al-Hindi, for his part, is becoming
more isolated the longer he remains in exile.
The national reconciliation campaign has not, however,
achieved one of its other major objectives--the return of
some 4,000-6,000 Ansar dissidents from Ethiopia and some
1,000-2,000 from Libya. 25X1
the Ethiopians have begun to permit a few of the
dissidents to return to Sudan and that the Libyans may be
prepared to do the same shortly. As long as a significant
portion of these dissidents remain outside of Sudanese
control, however, there is the possibility that they can be
exploited in anti-Sudan guerrilla operations sponsored by
foreign opponents of Numayri.
On the other side of the political spectrum, the
Sudanese Communist Party, regarded as one of the largest
(with 10,000 members) and best organized Communist parties
in the Arab world prior to the abortive mid-1971 coup,, was
seriously damaged by the arrest of many of its members and
the execution of its senior officials. It is not now
regarded as a threat to the government although Sudanese
officials admit that it retains the ability to instigate
strikes and unrest. As of mid-1978, government officials
estimated party membership at slightly more than 2,000
members, and another 8,000 sympathizers. Since 1971, the
party has replaced its leadership and is concentrating its
efforts on extending its influence in student organizations
and labor unions, particularly the Sudan Railway Workers'
Trade Union where Communist Party membership is significant.
Its titular leader, Muhammad Ibrahim Nujud, is in exile
(presumably in Bulgaria).
Peace in the South
In February 1972, Numayri and the leaders of the
southern rebellion meeting at Addis Ababa agreed to a cease-
fire that ended nearly 17 years of fighting. The resentment
of the estimated three million southerners, who are ethnic-
ally, culturally, and linguistically black African, over
economic exploitation, discrimination, and attempts by the
largely Arab Muslim northerners to impose their way of life
on them had led in 1955 to the outbreak of increasingly
intense fighting that brought most development to a stand-
still and led to the deterioration of what little infrastructure
existed in the south. Aware that he could not achieve any
measure of political stability while the fighting in the
south continued to burden the economy and threatened Sudan's
relations with its African neighbors, Numayri finally agreed
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to offer the southern guerrillas a large measure of auto-
nomy. The agreement granted the rebels amnesty and created
a Southern Regional Assembly that decides on local matters.
The central government in Khartoum retained responsibility
for external affairs, defense, currency, communications,
immigration, and national development.
Despite the relative tranquility of the last six years,
the north-south cleavage remains the most serious division
in Sudanese society. The potential for disruptive incidents
remains high. Short-lived mutinies by southern army units
occured in 1974, 1975, and 1976 when former rebel enlisted
men fired on northern troops as well as on their northern
and southern officers. Rioting in Juba in 1974 was apparently
a consequence of rumors that Egyptian farmers and troops
were moving south in connection with a planned joint Egyptian-
Sudanese canal project.
Southern leaders remain anxious over the degree of the
Sudan's involvement in Arab affairs, the reconciliation with
conservative Muslim groups who, when they were in power,
prosecuted the war in the south with great vigor, and what
they consider to be steps toward greater Islamization. Most
also believe that the south should be getting a greater
share of funds spent on development. They are particularly
concerned that they receive a fair share of any oil revenues
that may result from explorations now being conducted by
the Chevron Company. Some of the company's drilling opera-
tions are in the south.
As of mid-1978, Numayri was attempting to ease food
shortages in the south that had been aggravated by the
partial failure of last year's crops and the damage to the
transportation system done by recent floods. Numayri and
southern leaders apparently agreed that the effort should be
given no publicity to avoid northern resentment.
Moving Toward Greater Political Tolerance
Since the national reconciliation agreement took effect
in mid-1977, Numayri has made progress toward the creation
of a more liberal political climate. The country's estimated
1,200 political prisoners, including the last few Communists
remaining in custody after the 1971 coup, have been released.
Hundreds of other former regime opponents have returned from
exile, and some have been given government posts. Ansar
leader Sadiq al-Mahdi, for example, has been appointed to
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the Sudanese Socialist Union Political Bureau. For the
first time since Numayri seized power, public groups and
individuals are expressing views critical of the government.
While press freedom is not complete, newspapers now evaluate
government policies and actions rather than merely justify
them.
The most striking change in the political system was
evidenced by the relatively free elections to the National
People's Assembly in February 1978. For the first time, the
Socialist Union did not nominate candidates, and although it
could still prevent some candidates from running, it apparently
turned down very few applications from prospective candidates.
Party identification was still prohibited, but many regime
opponents were elected on the basis of their former party
affiliation. As a consequence, a significant number of
former opposition politicians--possibly as many as 120-140
in the 304-member body--are now represented in the National
Assembly and a more genuine debate of government activity is
taking place.
The results of the elections in February to the 110-
member Southern Regional Assembly were even more significant.
For the first time since the southern rebellion ended in
1972, former rebels were permitted to enter the elections.
Almost all of the incumbents, most of whom had been loyal to
Khartoum during the insurrection, were defeated. Joseph
Lagu, former commander of the rebels who had been made
military commander in the south by Numayri after the 1972
Addis Ababa agreement, was elected president of the Higher
Executive Council (chief executive officer), replacing Abel
Alier, characterized by many observers as an inefficient
leader. Lagu has also been selected to head the southern
regional secretariat of the Sudan Socialist Union.
Despite these moves toward a freer political climate,
Numayri retains firm control of the country. The National
Assembly leadership is controlled by Numayri and he has used
his power to make 30 direct appointments to the Assembly to
name his own supporters, thus avoiding serious legislative
challenges on most issues. Former regime opponents are
careful not to critize Numayri directly and there is no
doubt that Numayri is prepared to move against those who
might mount a serious challenge to his rule.
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Role of the Militar
The Sudanese armed forces constitute Numayri's principal
power base. The army provided the means by which Numayri
came to power in May 1969, it proved loyal to him during the
conflict with the Ansars in 1970 despite the fact that some
40 percent of the armed forces were nominal members of the
Ansar sect, and it was army support that enabled Numayri to
regain power following the July 1971 Communist-led coup
attempt.
Without at least the acquiescence of a significant part
of the military, a move to depose Numa ri would have little
chance of success.
an anti-Numayri coup, w i e no impossible, appears i.g y
unlikely over the near term. The regime has made a major
effort to keep dissatisfaction in the armed forces at a
minimum by improving pay and allowances and by undertaking
to modernize the military through the acquisition of Western
equipment.
The Sudanese armed forces--army, 65,000; navy, 1,600;
airforce, 1,500, and air defense, 3,000--probably are
capable of defending against ground attacks by Sudan's
neighbors, with the exception of Egypt and Ethiopia. By
the terms of the Addis Ababa agreement, a number of former
southern rebels were incorporated into the armed forces, and
as of early 1978, some 6,000 former rebels matched by an
equal number of northern troops were serving with units in
the south. In mid-1978, as a result of Ethiopian operations
against the Eritrean rebels, the Sudanese began reinforcing
units serving along the eastern border.
In late July, in order to replace weak and ineffective
officials, Numayri made major changes in the leadership of
the armed forces. He named Gen.Abdel Majid Hamid Khalil, an
able professional soldier who is a strong advocate of closer
relations with the US, as chief of staff, and assumed the
post of defense minister himself.
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Development Policy and Economic Problems
In early 1978, the Numayri government's effort to deal
with the chronic problems of a less developed economy was
complicated by a major financial crisis. A deteriorating
foreign exchange situation severely limited the flow of
essential goods into the country. Growing shortages of
food, fuel, and some consumer goods accelerated the in-
flation rate to 25-30 percent annually, raising the poss-
ibility of serious anti-regime protests that could threaten
political stability and moderation in Sudan.
Ironically, the immediate cause of Sudan's balance-of-
payments plight was an upsurge in development expenditures
resulting from stepped-up Arab financial assistance in
1975-77. The wealthy Arab countries began investing heavily
in Sudan--the only moderate Arab state with large amounts of
unused arable land--to lessen their dependence on Western
food imports. The terms of assistance, however, required
that a portion of the financing be provided by the Sudanese.
For Khartoum, the imports required by new projects further
squeezed foreign exchange holdings already stretched by
purchases to improve the primitive infrastructure and keep
up existing development projects. The badly maintained, and
in many areas nonexistent, transportation system has been
a major obstacle to development efforts in Sudan, the largest
African state with almost one million square miles in area.
As imports rose, export growth lagged. In recent
years, government policy has favored domestic food production--
notably wheat--at the expense of export crops, particularly
cotton. In addition, cotton price increases have been
moderated by weak demand in major industrial country markets.
At the same time, population growth has outstripped increases
in food output preventing any import substitution.
Sudan's international reserves began to fall in 1975,
plummeting by some $100 million, to about $24 million in
July 1978. By March 1978, the foreign exchange situation
had reached a precarious state, with Sudanese reserves
equivalent to less than half a month's imports. Sudan's
credit rating fell to near zero. Almost all lines of credit
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were exhausted, with most major international commercial
banks refusing to honor letters of credit from the Bank of
Sudan. Debt arrearages as of July 1978 were estimated to
be as high as $300-400 million.
Without sufficient foreign currency to import spare
parts and transportation equipment, almost half of the
country's 150 locomotives were idled in the second quarter
of 1978 and industry still is running at only 40 percent of
capacity. The government had difficulty mustering the cash
to pay for insecticides essential to protect this year's
cotton crop. Inability to make delinquent payments to Iraq
for oil imports resulted in the closure of the Port Sudan
oil refinery for days at a time, creating shortages of fuel
in Khartoum as well as outlying regions of the country.
To prop up its payments position, Sudan solicited aid
from individual Arab countries and the International Mone-
tary Fund. Both sources made aid contingent upon acceptance
of a reform package including reduced government expenditures
and a devaluation. While Numayri was willing to concede to
IMF demands for some of the stabilizing measures, he balked
at devaluation, fearing that the additional loss of buying
power in urban areas would cause serious disturbances and
erode support for other policies of his government.
In early June, Numayri finally capitulated, announcing
a 20 percent devaluation. This was viewed by the IMF as a
major step in the resolution of Sudan's financial problems
and led to the conclusion of two IMF loans totaling $63
million. At the same time, the growth in government expendi-
tures was cut sharply to reduce inflationary pressures.
Although a new wage and job classification scheme was
developed to boost government wages and mitigate labor
unrest that had erupted in a rash of strikes among railroad
workers, technicians, and physicians early this year,
development expenditures were cut. Plans also were announced
to restructure costs and prices in the public agricultural
sector to boost export crops.
While these measures eventually should reduce the balance-
of-payments deficit, in the interim Sudan will require substantial
additional assistance. Saudi Arabia, which has a large stake
in Sudan's development, already had begun to supply some
relief. In addition to providing debt relief of some $50
million, the Saudis will supply two million tons of crude oil
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to Sudan on concessional terms. Besides increasing partici-
pation in some major Sudanese development projects, the Saudis
are expected to provide several hundred million dollars in
balance-of-payments support.
Relief is also being provided from other sources. A
$7.3 million loan from the Abu Dhabi-based Arab Monetary Fund
for balance-of-payments support was announced in mid-August.
Most of Sudan's debt to Kuwait and other Arab states has also
been rescheduled. West Europeans have rescheduled $150 million
in official obligations, and commercial banks have rescheduled
$280-300 million in commercial obligations.
A Pragmatic Foreign Policy
Following the July 1971 coup attempt, Numayri abruptly
altered Sudanese foreign policy. Since then, Sudan has
ceased to be identified with radical Arab states, abandoned
its dependence on the USSR and other Communist states for
military and economic assistance, and has assumed a more
pro-Western orientation and concentrated on attracting
development aid and assistance from conservative and wealthy
Arab states. In the past year Sudanese foreign policy has
taken on a somewhat more neutral appearance. Efforts to
ease strains in relations with Ethiopia and Libya as well as
an apparent improvement in Sudanese-Soviet relations, how-
ever, are essentially tactical moves intended to improve
Sudanese security and do not represent a significant altera-
tion in Sudan's basically moderate stance.
Over the years, Sudan's primary external concern has
been its relationship with Egypt. The Egyptians, who have
long sought to control the headwaters of the Nile, have
indicated that Sudan is one of the few countries to which
Egyptian troops would be deployed if a security threat
developed. Sudanese relations with Cairo were good during
the early years of the Numayri regime, but deteriorated in
the early 1970s when Numayri, as he moved the orientation of
his government to the right, purged pro-Egyptian elements
from the government. In recent years, relations improved
again as the views of both countries on key issues in the
Middle East have grown closer. Following the July 1976 coup
attempt the two countries signed a mutual defense agreement.
Numayri has been a strong supporter of Egyptian President
Sadat's peace initiative since its inception. In the first
half of 1978, Numayri, as chairman of the Arab League
Solidarity Committee visited a number of Arab states in an
as yet unsuccessful effort to reconcile Egypt and Sadat's
rejectionist opponents as a preliminary step to an Arab
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summit meeting. Some strains began to appear in relations
between the two countries in mid-1978, however, probably
because the Egyptians suspect that Numayri may be softening
his support for the Egyptian position in the Middle East
peace negotiations. The Egyptians, moreover, have been
anxious over the return to Sudan of Ansar leader Sadiq al-
Ma
e nsars Have ra i Iona y resisted Egyptian attempts
to extend their influence in the Sudan, while Cairo has over
the years tended to ally itself with the rival Khatmiyyah
sect.
Since Numayri has moderated his domestic policies and
adopted an anti-Soviet posture, Sudanese relations with the
more conservative Arab states, especially Saudi Arabia, have
improved markedly. Because of Sudan's increasing dependence
on Saudi Arabia for aid and financial support, Numayri is
careful not to adopt policies that might offend Saudi
leaders. To some degree, Saudi influence may have been
responsible for Numayri's decision to seek a reconciliation
with his conservative opponents and probably played a large
part in Numayri's effort to portray himself as a more devout
Muslim.
The end of the civil war in the south allowed Sudan to
assume an African as well as an Arab identity--a process
that has resulted in Numayri becoming chairman of the
Organization of African Unity for the current year. Numayri
sees his assumption of the OAU post as a means of opposing
Cuban and Soviet presence on the continent and advocating
peaceful solutions to disputes that could-provide new
opportunities for foreign intervention in Africa.
Relations with Moscow have been poor since the 1971
coup attempt, although Numayri has avoided a complete
rupture as he has sought alternative sources of military aid
and markets for Sudanese cotton. Numayri remains convinced
that a major Soviet goal in the Middle East is the removal
of Sadat and himself as a first step toward dominating the
Arabian Peninsula and Persian Gulf. He suspects that the
Soviets were involved in the Libyan-backed effort to over-
throw him in July 1976, although there is no evidence to
support this.
In June 1977, after the Sudanese expelled the last
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remaining Soviet military experts and ordered the .USSR, to, reduce
the size of its embassy, the Soviets recalled their ambassador.
In May, the Soviet ambassador returned to Khartoum, possibly
partly in response to the release of the local Communists
remaining in Sudanese jails. Despite this hostile view of
Soviet motives and his concern over expanded Soviet in-
fluence in Africa, Numayri apparently welcomed the resump-
tion of correct relations with Moscow as a means of limiting
the damage that the Soviets might do to Sudanese interests.
Numayri eased the anti-Soviet tone of his speeches in mid-
1978 in an effort to appear moderate during the OAU con-
ference, but has since then reverted to the anti-Soviet
theme.
Numayri tends to see Libya and Ethiopia as Soviet
surrogates. Despite recent moves to improve relations with
Tripoli and Addis Ababa, he remains suspicious of the inten-
tions of Mengistu and Qadhafi. His efforts in early 1978 to
shore up ties with the two states were motivated by his
awareness of Sudan's inability to defend its long and remote
borders and his fear that Libya and Ethiopia might exploit
the presence of the armed Ansar dissidents within their
borders to mount guerrilla attacks into Sudan.
Despite the restoration of Sudanese-Libyan diplomatic
relations, which were severed after the July 1976 coup
attempt, the Libyans probably will not agree to the quick
return to Sudan of all of the 1,000-2,000 Ansar refugees in
Libya. Numayri is also concerned that a victory for the
Frolinat rebels in their conflict with the Chad Government
would result in an extension of Libyan influence in the
area. As a consequence, the Sudanese have stepped up their
efforts to bring about a negotiated settlement and hope
that if a ceasefire can be arranged, the Frolinat leadership
will accept reintegration into the Chad Government. The
Sudanese regard the Libyan role as the key to whether the
rebels agree to a negotiated settlement and although pessimistic
about the prospects for peace in Chad, intend to press
Tripoli to urge Frolinat leaders to cooperate with mediation
efforts.
Efforts by the OAU to mediate between Sudan and Ethiopia
have been unsuccessful in easing the strains between the two
countries although neither side wants to be responsible for
breaking off negotiations. The Sudanese are particularly
fearful that fighting between Eritrean secessionists and
Ethiopian forces could spill across the border and involve
Sudanese forces. The Sudanese have vacillated in their
support for the separatists' desire for an independent
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Eritrea,
but would now prefer to see the Eritreans
granted
autonomy
within a federation with Ethiopia. While
the
Sudanese
attitude may be in part an appreciation of
the
inability
of the insurgents effectively to challenge an
Ethiopia
not distracted by a war in the Ogaden and supported
by the Cubans and the Soviets, it may also reflect the fear
that the better organized Marxist-oriented Eritrean People's
Liberation Front (EPLF) would eventually dominate an indepen-
dent Eritrean state. Moreover, there are an estimated
125,000-150,000 Eritrean refugees in the Sudan, where
they constitute a security problem and a drain on the country's
meager resources. Numayri apparently has decided that an
agreement between the Eritreans and the Mengistu regime that
would permit the refugees to return to Eritrea would be
preferable to continued fighting and possible Sudanese
involvement. As long as the Ethiopians seem intent on a
military solution, however, the Sudanese will continue
politically to support the insurgents.
Although the Sudanese have occasionally supplied small
arms and ammunition to the insurgents, they have acted
primarily as a channel for food, arms, . and ammunition supplied
by other donors. A major effort by the Sudanese to get all
three Eritrean insurgent groups to cooperate has as yet
been unsuccessful.
US Interests in Sudan
Sudan's location on the Red Sea as well as its potential
as a major-food exporter and a significant source of raw
materials, including iron, copper, and possibly oil, has
drawn attention not only from the US but also from Washington's
closest West European and Arab friends. A stabilizing force
capable of exerting a moderating influence in the Middle
East and Africa, Sudan also acts as an obstacle to the
expansion of Soviet influence in the area.
In line with its shift in orientation following the
July 1971 Communist-led coup away from the radical Arab
states and the USSR and toward the West, the Numayri regime
in mid-1972 resumed diplomatic relations with the US that
had been severed after the 1967 Middle East war. US-Sudanese
relations, however, suffered a major setback in June 1974
when Numayri, under pressure from Arab leaders and fearing
retaliation by Palestinian groups against Sudanese personnel
and installations, released to Egyptian custody the Black
September Organization terrorists who had murdered US
Ambassador Cleo Noel and Deputy Chief of Mission G. Curtis
Moore in March 1973. The US protested and withdrew its
ambassador. Although the US ambassador returned five
months later and normal contacts were resumed, restrictions
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on aid were maintained until April 1976 when they were
dropped as being no longer in the US interest.
In June 1976, when Numayri visited the US and met with
President Ford and other officials, modest economic and
military aid programs were initiated. In September 1977, in
the context of US concern about developments in the Horn of
Africa, it was decided to accelerate US support for Sudan.
As of mid-1978, US-Sudanese relations are extremely cordial.
Sudan and the US share similar viewpoints on major middle
East and African political issues and Sudan has been supportive
of US initiatives in these areas. Senior Sudanese officials
have indicated that when Numayri is in Washington in mid-
September, he will press for stepped-up US assistance to
ease Sudan's financial and economic problems and will raise
security problems in the region.
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OUTLOOK
Over the short term, the prospects for Numayri's retention
of power--barring assassination--appear generally good.
Ithere is no indication that any group in the
mi i ary is preparing to move against the regime at the
present time. By Sudanese standards, the armed forces are
well paid and morale is good. Moreover, recent actions by
the government have improved its ability to detect and
counter actions by disloyal military groups.
The most immediate threat to the regime appears to be
the possibility of serious disorders arising out of public
frustration over inflation, shortages of basic commodities
and services, and reduced buying power. In an effort to
ease public resentment, Numayri has blamed consumer shortages
on the recent floods, and has used the disasters as a means
of seeking foreign aid. In any event, the army is probably
able and willing to control any serious protests that might
occur over the next few months.
Numayri's success in persuading Ansar leader Sadiq al-
Mahdi to abandon his opposition to the regime, return to
Khartoum, and support regime policies has divided the conserv-
ative opposition that had backed anti-Numayri coup attempts
in 1975 and 1976. The government, however, has as yet been
unsuccessful in arranging the return of the armed Ansar
dissidents living in Libya and Ethiopia. Although the dis-
sidents do not constitute a direct threat to Numayri's con-
tinued rule, as long as they remain outside the country,
their use by his opponents--foreign and domestic--for cross-
border guerrilla operations into the Sudan is possible.
Libyan President Qadhafi probably will refuse to permit the
return of a significant number of the Ansars in Libya as
long as Numayri supports the Sadat peace initiative. While
the Mengistu regime in Ethiopia reportedly has allowed some
Ansars to return to Sudan,-it will not permit all of them
to leave as long as Sudan allows the Eritrean dissidents to
be supplied through Sudanese territory.
Over the longer run, unless the hardships felt by the
public are eased, civilian unhappiness could affect military
attitudes and provide Numayri's opponents with the means of
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moving against the regime. Numayri's effort to persuade
former regime opponents to work within the present one-party
system is a calculated risk. Although the national recon-
ciliation has eased the immediate threat to the regime posed
by the opposition National Front, the incorporation of
former opponents into the government could allow them to
become a significant force on the political scene.
Numayri, however, will not permit their influence to
reach the point where his control over the country and its
policies is seriously threatened. Serious disagreements
with former members of the opposition probably would force
him to reverse the trend toward greater political tolerance
and, in turn, stimulate renewed efforts by Numayri's conservative
opponents to bring down the regime.
In the south, the renewal of serious fighting is unlikely
in the near term. The government's quiet effort to alleviate
hardships there, as well as Numayri's considerable popularity
among southerners have eased southern concerns for the time
being. Relations between the two parts of the country are
still delicate, however, and southern leaders tend to judge
relations with the north on the basis of how much support
and development aid is forthcoming. The limited resources
available to the central government will make it difficult
to meet the expectations of the southerners. Efforts by
southern leaders to make the southern region more economically
independent and less vulnerable to northern pressure appear
intended to preserve secession as an option and to strengthen
the southern negotiating position in dealing with Numayri's
successor.
The economic outlook for the Sudan over the short term
is not favorable. The loss of some of the cotton crop as a
result of the recent flooding in the Gezira Province will
reduce the prime source of export earnings. As a consequence,
Sudan's growth rate probably will drop and planned development
goals will be delayed. Implementation of the economic
reform measures, however, should provide greater financial
and economic stability over the longer term. Aid inflows
will bolster reserves, and the country's credit rating
should improve as Arab assistance materializes. The devaluation
and the restructuring of agricultural incentives should
eventually improve the current account by stimulating
export performance. I
Successor regimes. In the event Numayri and his supporters
were deposed, elements of the armed forces would almost certainly
dominate any successor regime. Military officers might be
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encouraged to move against Numayri by widespread government
mismanagement and the continued inability of the government
to move the economy from the edge of bankruptcy.
If officers opposed to Numayri's national reconcil-
iation policy or concerned over the Numayri regime's support
for Egyptian President Sadat's peace initiative were to
control a successor government, major changes in foreign and
domestic policy would result. The need for continued financial
support from conservative Arab states, however, would
probably work against abrupt shifts away from the present
pro-Western orientation and toward alignment with radical
Arab governments.
In the event conservative political groups, such as the
Ansar or the Muslim Brotherhood, were involved in an anti-
Numayri coup and participated in a successor regime, the
foreign policy orientation of the regime probably would
remain essentially the same although such a government could
be expected to move away from the close identification with
Egypt adopted by Numayri. Although leftist elements are
still reported to be present in the armed forces, their
numbers are probably limited and the possibility of a
successor government dominated by the left, with or without
Communist support, is less likely.
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mid-1972 Diplomatic relations with US reestablished.
1975 September Ansar-backed coup attempt led by Lt.
Col. Hassan Hussein Osman put down.
1976 July Ansar-led Libyan-backed coup attempt
narrowly fails.
1977 July Numayri and exiled Ansar leader Sadiq
al-Mahdi meet at Port Sudan. Agreement
marks beginning of national reconciliation.
1977 September Sadiq al-Mahdi returns to Sudan.
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