SALT TWO-1 US/USSR PLENARY MEETING NO. 3 USSR MISSION 1100 HOURS, NOVEMBER 28, 1972

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP80T00294A000300100011-9
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 16
• Document Creation Date: December 12, 2016
• Document Release Date: June 18, 2001
• Sequence Number: 11
• Publication Date: November 28, 1972
• Content Type: MIN

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SALT TWO-I
US/USSR Plenary Meeting No. 3
USSR Mission
1100 Hours, November 2$, 1972
Ambassador Farley
Mr. Nitze
Minister Semenov
General Trusov
General Allison
Mr. Shchulcin
Dr.
Garthoff
Mr. Pleshakov
Mr,
Graybeal
Mr. Grinevsky
Mr,
Shaw
Mr. Chulitsky
Mr.
Earle
General Beletsky
Dr.
Weiler
Col Budantsev
Mr.
Jones
Capt Mazerka.n
Lt Col Yotingflesh
Mr. Skoptsov
Mr,
Stivexs
Mr. Smolin
Dr.
Z exnach
Col Starodubov
Dr.
Timbie
Mr, 5helepin
Mr.
Krimer (Interpreter)
Mr. Klyul:in. (Interpreter)
Mr.
Arensburger (Interpreter)
Mr. Sudonlcin (Inter.preter)
Lt Col Chesnokov (Interpreter)
Minister Semenov opened the third meeting of SALT Two by
welcoming the U,S, Delegation to the Soviet Mission, He then gave
the floor to Ambassador Farley.
Ambassador Farl~y_conveyed the regrets of Ambassador Smith
that he was unable to atEend this P1en.axy. Ambassador Farley
stated he hoped Ambassadox Smith's indisposition would be only a
temporary one. Ambassador Farley thee. delivered the U. S, prepared
statement.
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Minister Semenov acknowledged the U. S. statement and then
delivered his own prepared statement.
Ambassador Farley stated that the U, S, Delegation would
study the Soviet statement with care. He indicated that he had
no other statement to make.
Minister Semenov replied that in that case he could solve
the px?obleni of the next meeting, He proposed the next Plenary
be held at 1100 hours on Friday, December 1, 1972 at the tJ, S.
Mission.
Ambassador Farley agreed with this proposal and the
meeting was adjourned by Minister Semenov.
Drafted by: R.D. Yoia.ngflesh
Approved by: John P. Shaw /`(~~ ,
R. L. Garthoff .~,~,,.
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STATEMENT BY AMBASSADOR 1'A,P,LTY
November 28 ~ -
I
In their initial statements made on November 21, both sides
set forth views regarding the task before us in developing a
mutually acceptable permanent a~;r.eement limiting strategic offen-
sive arms. We are carefully studying the statement of the Soviet
Delegation.
II
., r
Today I wish to set-forth additional considerations regard-
ing the US position. Before doing so, however, I will address an
element in the Soviet Delegation`s opening statement which appears
to introduce a consideration which would constrain our search for
a mutually acceptable permanent agreement. I refer to the state-
ment by the Soviet Delegation on November 21 that, in addition to
providing limitations on those types of strategic offensive arms
not covered by the Interim Agreement, the permanent agreement
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"must include the provisions of the Interim Agreement in the
form in which they have already been agreed by the sides."
We cannot agree with this proposition. As Amb. Smith stated on
November 21, "what is acceptable for an interim standstill arrange-
ment is not the same as what would be equitable under a treaty."
Our task here is to develop a permanent agreement limiting
strategic offensive arms which will replace the interim agreement.
The very title of the interim agreement makes clear that it is
a temporary arrangement, one which is to remain in force for a
period of five years "unless replaced earlier by an agreement on
more complete measures limiting strategic offensive arms."
The interim agreement makes a valuable contribution by
putting a freeze for the interim on certain elements in an other-
wise escalating situation. We have agreed that the j:2rms of the
interim agreement do not constrain the provisions of a permanent
agreement; Article VII specifies that ''the obligations provided
for in this interim agreement shall not prejudice the scope or
terms of the limitations on strategic arms which may be worked out
in the course of further negotiations."
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We are all more familiar with the factors involved in our
negotiations than we were at the outset of these talks in 1969,
and our discussions over the past three years will be of assist-
ance, but we must now approach anew the task of reaching a
permanent agreement on the limitation of strategic offensive
arms.
III
With this goal i.n mind, I shall now set forth same of our
views on appropriate permanent limitations on strategic offen-
sive arms and the relation of those limitations to the principle
of no unilateral advantage to either side.
An objective of SALT is to limit strategic arms in a
manner which will increase the security of both sides by en-
hancing the stability of the strategic relationship between us
in accordance with the principle of no unilateral advantage to
either side. The Soviet objective, as we understand it, is
essentially consistent with this position.
During the first three phases of SALT due, the two Dele-
gations devoted many hours to an examination of the question
of the mode of limiting strategic offensive weapons. This
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lengthy examination made it clear that both sides agree that
our negotiations should among other things establish an
aggregate limit on ICBM and SLBM launchers and heavy bombers.
They are central, not only because of their roles in deterrence
and in the strategic relationship between the two countries,
but because these systems drive the strategic arms competition
which we aim to curb. Our position on non-central systems is
well known to you, Mr. Minister, and it has not changed.
Together with the primary task of reaching overall limits
on ICBM and S'LBM launchers and heavy bombers, we will want to
negotiate appropriate provisions for substitution of units of
one kind for units of another kind.
As we begin our work in SALT TWO where our task. is to reach
r
a permanent agreement on offensive arms, we should once again
recognize that an agreement of indE~finite duration must provide
for lasting equality.
The strategic balance between the two sides is substantially
affected by the balance between the capacities of the ICBM forces
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of the sideso Both sides have the means to increase the throw
weight and thus add to the ultimate capacity of ICBM forces that
could be deployed within a given numerical launcher limit.. While
there are other differences in design approach and in technology,
such differences could change or cease to exist over time. Under
these circumstances, the throw taeight of ICBM forces is an important
aspect to be limited as a further means of achieving the objectives
of a lasting agreement.
Throughout SAhT ONE the US Delegation pointed out the poten-
tially destabilizing effect of large ballistic missiles. We already
have recognized that a ban on the conversion of light missile launchers
into heavy missile launchers even during the interim period limits
the throw weight of each side's ICBM forces. In our, present task,
achievement of a permanent agreement, it is necessary that there be
an equal ceiling on the overall ICBM throw weight permitted to e~.ch
We believe the best way to attain equality of an overall aggregate,
equality of ICBM launchers, and equality of ICBM force throw weight for
the two sides is by a program of reductions. The task of SL~LT TWO should
be viewed in the context of the pre-existing Treaty which limits to
low levels ABM defenses of the two sides. These L~BM limitations
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tend to reduce the requirements for strategic offensive force
capacity from what they might have been in the absence of the
ABM Treaty, The concept of reductions is compatible with the
need for security of both sides. We will at a later time .discuss
further our views on this matter of reductions.
IV
In conclusion, Mr, Minister, we envisage that in a
permanent agreement for limitation of strategic offensive
farces we should (a) establish an equal aggregate limit on
the number of ICBM and SLBM launchers and heavy bombers for
each side, (b) establish an equal subceiling on the number
of ICBM launchers, and an equal ceiling on the aggregate
throw weight of ICBM forces for each side, and (c) establish
a program for arriving at such limits and ceilings through
Thank you,
S1 CRL T
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SEMI~NcaV ST./~TEM~:NT, Novexnbc.r 28, 1972
At previous meetings the USSR Delegation presented
general considerations regarding the newly begun stage of
the strategic offensive arms limitation negotiations. We
have also had an opportunity to learn. the U. S. Delegation's
vS.ews on certain questions, partially amplifield in todav's
statement.
Today we would like to address one of. the main questions
which must be solved in working out an agreement on more
com.prchen.sive measures with respect to the limitation of.
strategic offensive arms.
As you know, the Interim .l~grecment provides for limita-
tions an land-based IC33M launchers, SL13M launchers and
modern ballistic missile submarines. By mutual ,agreement
the discussion of other questions of limiting strategic offensive
arms was postponed to the subsequent stage of th.e negotiations.
The Soviet Union has repeatedly presented arguments in
favor of its position regarding the compo:;ition of the strategic
offensive armaments of the sides, which are subject to limita-
tion in the context of the ongoing negotiations. Tn addition to
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land-based ICBMs, SL,IiMs and strategic bombers, any
other types of missiles with nuclear warheads axzd any types
of nuclear delivery aircraft, whose geographic deployment
enables them to strike targets on the territory of the other
side, must also be considered within the composition of
strategic offensive arms. All carrier aircraft, irrespective
of the geographic deployment of attack aircraft carriers,
should also be regarded as strategic offensive weapons, since
they are mobile strategic systems. Such an approach will in
practice ensure that the fundamental principle of equal security
and no unilateral advantages will be embodied in the agreement
we are now negotiating.
Of course, if stra.tegi.c offensive arms were located only
within the national territories of the sides, then the problem
of limiting them could be substantially simplified. This is not
the case, however, and any attempt not to take into account
the real situation as it exists cannot be understood.
It is quite evident that any nuclear systems of on.e of the
sides (let us call it A), deployed on corrE:sponding bases on
the territory of third countries and capable of striking targets
an the territory of the other side (side B), have a direct
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influence on the overall strategic situation. I have here
in mind strategic offensive weapons which belong 4:o side A
anal pose a threat of nuclear attaclc on targets on the national
territory of side B. The situation does not change in the least
because these nuclear systems are located on bases on the
territory of third countries in accordance with some military-
political agreement or other.
Of course, we are ta.llcing about the influence of this
factor on the overall strategic situation i:n principle, regard-
less of the side on which such a factor is present, In this
connection I have in mind not only forward-based nuclear
systems, but also other strategic offensive weapons whose
capabilities would be substantially expanded by the use of
bases on foreign territory.
Take for instance the question of fortivard submarine bases
on the territories of third countries. Let us assume that
side A has at its disposal forward submarine bases which
enable it to reduce significantly the time required for opera-
tional deployment of SL13M submarines and eliminate the need
for these submarines to return to rear bases located on their
own national territory. In the final analysis such a situation
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would enable that side to maintain almost all its cambat-
ready SLBM submarines in areas of close proximity to
the territory of side B; in a strategic respect this is
equivalent to increasing the overal]. number of SLBM sub-
marines for side A. In this I am not even mentioning L-he
peculiarities of the geographic situation of the sides, wriich
must also be taken into account in canform:ity with the
principle of equal security and no unilateral advantages; we
have made statements concerning this, as you well recall,
at the end of the last Helsinki phase, and the situation with
respect to this question has not changed.
This is why, proceeding from the principle of equal
security and no unilateral advantages, as well as on t-he basis
of what we believe is the common desire of both sides to take
mutual actions to reduce the danger of outbreak of nuclear war
between them, the Soviet side proposes agreeing on the with-
drawal of submarines with ballistic missiles beyond agreed
limits, placing these missiles out of range of the territory of
the other side, and simuli;aneotxs liquidatian of submarine bases
on the territories of third countxies.
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Strategic offensive systems having a substantial
influence on the overall strategic situation also include
nuclear delivery aircraft based on attack aircraft carriers.
Attack aircraft carriers, being floating airfields for air-
craft, enable them to carry out nuclear strikes on the
territory of the other side within range of the aircraft.
Deployment of attack aircraft carriers of side A, for example,
near the territory of side B gives the former the capability
of maintaining a threat of nuclear attack on targets on the
territory of the other side. Withdrawal of aircraft carriers
beyond aircraft range of the other side's territory would make
it significantly more difficult for carrier aircraft to strike
the territory of the other side; this would facilitate achievement
of the goals of our negotiations.
Desiring to achieve as quickly as possible an agreement
on more comprehensive measures to limit strategic offensive
arms, we are authorized to submit a proposal for the withdrav~al
of attack aircraft carx?iers beyond agreed limits, which would
place air. craft based thereon out of range: of the territory of
the other side.
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In connection with negotiation of a broader agreement
on the limitation of sfrate~;ic offensive arms it is necessary
to consider one further group of nuclear systems whose
geagraphic deployment en