FIRST MEETING OF 'JOINT SCC WORKING GROUP'

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP80T00294A000300100010-0
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 13
• Document Creation Date: December 12, 2016
• Document Release Date: June 18, 2001
• Sequence Number: 10
• Publication Date: November 30, 1972
• Content Type: MEMO

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MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION
U.S. SALT DELEGATION
GENEVA, SWITZERLAND
DATE: 30 November 1972
TIME: 11:00 - 1:00 p.m.
PLACE: U.S. Mission, Geneva
First Meeting of "Joint SCC Working Group"
Mr.
S.
Graybeal
Mr.
V.
V.
Smolin
Mr.
J.
Shaw
Col.
V.
P.
Starodubov
Mr.
R.
Earle
Mr.
P.
N.
Yevseyev
Col.
C.
FitzGeraid
Mr.
Y.
N.
Kochetkov
LTC
Mr.
F.
D.
DeSimorie
Arensburger
(Interpreter)
(Interpreter)
Gray, chairing the U.S. side and the meeting, welcomed the Soviet
members of the "Joint SCC Special Working Group" (SWG). He suggested that
the SWG procedures be the same as those. observed by previous SALT SWG's
and that meetings be held with the frequency required to complete the task
assigned to the SWG within the time available.
Smolin agreed, saying it was not necessary to recall all the pro-
cedures of past SWGs. He wanted only to clarify the fact that all our
discussions would be ad referendum to Delegations.
Gr. beat agreed and proceeded with the substantive discussion. He
said that the SWG's purpose was to work out, ad referendum to Delegations,
an agreed document establishing the SCC "promptly" in accordance with
Article XIII of the ABM Treaty. The U.S. side proposed that this be done
in the form of a document to be signed at the current Session in Geneva
by the two Heads of Delegation on behalf of Governments. He said that,
when this primary task was completed, we could informally discuss the SCC's
operating procedures if time permitted.
Gr ybeal then stated his belief that the document establishing the
SCC should be limited to items essential or desirable for such a
document which could be made public. Ile added that the SCC should work
out its own detailed operating procedures which could be amended by the
SCC itself without the formal governmental action which would be required
to amend the document establishing the SCC.
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Graybeal said the Soviet "Draft Regulations" had been given careful
study. Ile would propose today a merging of the U.S. and Soviet approaches
into a new document to be tabled as ad. referendum to Delegations. The
new draft incorporated those points in the Soviet Draft which he felt
should be included in the basic document establishing the SCC. Those
points, which were considered to be "rules and operating procedures" best
worked out by the SCC and which the SCC could amend, were omitted. He
then summed up the following approach:
a. The Heads of Delegation would sign in Geneva on behalf of
Governments a document setting up the SCC;
b. The SCC would be granted authority to draw up its own detailed
"rules and operating procedures" so as to retain the flexibility permitting
appropriate amendments.
Smolin then outlined his understanding that the SWG had been given
the task of- discussing questions related to establishing the SCC. Coni-
parison of the drafts tabled by the Delegations on November 24 revealed
points of contact and points of difference. SWG discussions would provide
better understanding of the essence of the U.S. proposal. He was prepared
to consider any views of the U.S.. side. The most important element was
that the sides are agreed on the derirabilitT of finding an operative
solution to the task of creating the SCC. For the present he would like
to raise certain questions and hear the U.S. viewpoints on them so that
he could report to the Soviet Delegation the essence of the U.S. proposal.
He was prepared to clarify any U.S. questions on the Soviet draft after
careful study of the questions. He noted that it would be difficult for
him to comment on the new approach Graybeal had described until he had had
the opportunity to study it.
Gra bcal agreed that there were some differences in approach, and that
the SWG's task is to reach an operative solution. He stated that the U.S.
side had tried to incorporate our understanding of the Soviet approach into
the draft document which he would now give Smolin (Attachment 1). He
wanted to give a brief description of the individual points in this draft,
and our general approach toward resolving the differences in approach
between the U.S. and the Soviet drafts. He welcomed questions on the
general approach and recognizing the difficulties of digesting all the
points in the paper at one time.
Smol_i.ii said he was ready for an ad referendum look at the U.S. ad
referendum document. He noted that an ad referendum "marriage" is a
curious thing. He believed the authors of the Soviet draft would be
pleased to know that some of their wording had been used in the new U.S.
draft. He asked for a 5-minute recess to consult with his colleagues.
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Sm_oli_n, after a brief recess, said that the U.S. ad referendum Draft
would be reported to his Delegation. Before doing so, the need would
arise to raise certain questions on the new U.S. draft, so that he could
provide the Soviet Delegation with more definite understanding of the
U.S. draft. He asked permission to pose some questions at the present
meeting and others subsequently.
Grayhe.al agreed and asked whether Smolin would like to raise questions
on each paragraph individually or go through the entire draft and then ask
questions.
Smolin preferred the former course.
EL beal stated his understanding that Article XIII of the ABM Treaty
uses the term "Regulations" in the sense of our word "Charter." That was
why we labeled our document a Memorandum of Understanding. The U.S. side
tried to take this into account in the new title. He said that, the word
"regulations" in English also carries the connotation of operating pro-
cedures. He believed that there was no substantive difference in the ini:ent
of the U.S. document submitted on November 24 and the draft presented today.
Smolin thanked Graybeal for this clarification and asked him to repeat
that part of his introductory remarl.cs which had to do with not excluding
the possibility of discussing specific "rules and regulations."
_Graybea.l said that he had referred to "operating procedures" which are
more detailed and could best be worked out and amended by the SCC itself
without having to refer hack to Governments as would be the case in amending
a Memorandum of Understanding in accordance with Article XIII. He repeated
the U.S. view that the primary task is to establish the SCC and this requires
a formal governmental document. When this task is finished, and if time
permits, we could do so informally; he wanted to emphasize "informally,"
because he did not believe it desirable to tie the SCC hands in regard to
its own operating procedures.
Smolin recalled that, when speaking about the sides' approaches to
creating the SCC, there are points of difference and points of coincidence.
Based on Graybeal's words, one more point of coincidence had just been added.
Graybeal then noted that the U.S. draft Paragraph II had been taken
almost directly from the Soviet draft provision establishing the functions
of the SCC in regard to the ABM Treaty, Interim Agreement, and Measures
Agreement. Therefore, there appeared to be another point of coincidence.
Smolin did not believe a clarification of the SCC functions would be
necessary, if that meant that the SCC would function, not only in accord-
ance with the ABM Treaty, but also in regard to implementation of the IA.
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Smolin then called attention to the "structure:" of the SCC. lie said
that, according to Article 2 of the soviet Draft, the SCC would consist
of a Soviet and a U.S."Section." This corresponds to established practice
in international affairs and adopted in Soviet-American relations, and to
the procedures adopted, for example, in the US-USSR trade agreement. lie
believed that this approach was not in conflict. with the US approach. He
said the main thing was that the sides have a common understanding. The
language could be developed later, o:_ficially or unofficially.
G beat said he believed that this view on US-USSR Sections was
implicit in the language of the ITS D,-aft Paragraph III. He would, however,
be glad to consider any Soviet-proposed additional language on the point.
Earle said that the matter was really a question of Smolin's suggestion
concerning "existing practices." It would be helpful if the Soviet side
provided a specific reference which could be studied.
Smol.in. thereupon quoted Paragreph 4 of the Terms of Reference for
the Joint US-USSR Commercial. Commission signed by USSR Minister of Trade
Patolichev and Commerce Secretary Peterson, He said that, if his under-
standing was correct, there was no disagreement in principle on this.
question. The Soviet formulation ire. Paragraph 1 of Article II of the
Soviet Draft was a quote of the Con Lercial Agreement. He believed that,
if there was common understanding on this question, the precise wording
and place in the Agreement could be worked out later. It was, of course,
important to find a place for this iormulation.
Smolin then cited the Soviet and U.S. draft provisions for the number
of Commissioners, noting that the new U.S. draft added an Executive
Secretary. He wanted to know why the U.S. side proposed this number.
Gravbeal said that, before answering, he wanted to clarify whether
the USSR Draft provided for two mem>>ers (the Soviet interpreter had
mistakenly said two for Smolin's statement of three members).
Smolin affirmed that the Soviet proposal was for a Chairman plus three
members on each side. Ile said that the Soviet proposal envisaged two
co-chairmen whose responsibilities and functions would be identical and
who would chair meetings in turn. He thought this view did not contradict
the U.S. position.
Gr.aybeal agreed this was essentially correct. The two chairmen of
which the Soviet side called two sections would be Co-Chairmen of the
Conmiission.. He felt, however, that the question of rotation was an
"operating procedure" and should not be reflected in the document estab-
lishing the SCC.
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Smolin asked whether he were correct in concluding that the U.S.
preference was that reference to rotating chairmanship, with which the
U.S. did not disagree, be in a secondary document. Ile asked whether
this meant that the concept of Co-Chairmen could be in the basic
document.
G_raybcal personally saw no reason why the latter point could not be
in the basic document. IIe did not, however, see any need for it since th
U.S. proposes a Chairman and a Deputy and when the SCC meets the Chairman
of the U.S. Part and the USSR Part would automatically be Co-Chairmen.
Smolin said there appeared to be an identity of understanding on
this question. As regards the feasibility of such wording, the formula-
tion and its place could be agreed later if this were desirable. However,
although there is no disagreement on the essence of the question, he still
had a question as to whether this should be covered in the basic document
or in the document on procedures.
Smolin then said he would like to turn to the question of SCC meetings.
He repeated the two formulations tabled on November 24 and noted the new
U.S. Draft provided a somewhat different wording which he would like to
discuss subsequently. He did, however, want to say that the Soviet formula-
tion provided more flexibility since it would not be necessary to hold
periodic meetings if there were no questions to be discussed. He also
requested clarification as to why the new U.S. Draft provided that meetings
be held "no less than times a year," and why the previous Draft
called for meetings "upon request" while the new Draft said "promptly."
Graybcal saw no inconsistency between the two U.S. Drafts. The
importance of the functions assigned. to the SCC by the three Agreements
dictated the importance of the SCC's role. Thus the document establishing
the SCC should clearly indicate that the SCC should meet. The frequency
of the meetings should be established by the SCC itself. He did, however,
believe the frequency should not be once every five years, fora example.
The SCC should meet at least a certain number of times each year. The
frequency might be once, twice, or more. It could be agreed here.
Graybeal then stated that, while both Drafts provide flexibility
in regard to special meetings, the U.S. Draft ''id specify "promptly," thus
suggesting a reasonably early time. lie felt that, because of the importance
of the topics the SCC would be discussing on behalf of the two Governments,
each side should respond promptly to the other's request, and there should
be no unreasonable delay between the request for a meeting and the actual
convening of the meeting.
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Smolin then postulated two different situations:
1. On'the supposition that all is going well, neither side has
any questions; would it be necessary to hold an SCC meeting merely to
learn that there are no questions to be raised?
2. It is reported that the SCC is being convened for a special
meeting at the request of one of the Governments. wouldn't there be
grounds for public opinion to speculate that there are some extraordinary
negative moments in the implementation of the agreements?
Under the Soviet proposal Situation One would mean there would
be no meeting since neither. Government saw any nee.ll for a meeting. Thus,
Situation Two could not arise.
Under the Soviet proposal, suppose one side has a questio~z and
the normal procedure called for such a meeting, then there would be no
basis for press speculation and the second situation would also be
eliminated.
Graybcal stated his view that the importance of special meeting; in
terms of worldwide visibility would be present under either proposal. As
regards Situation Two such speculation is less likely under the U.S.
proposal for periodic meetings. Moreover, if there were regularly-scl:ledu.lc:d
meetings, there would be hopefully, no need for special meetings. He
thought that, given the scope of the SCC's responsibilities, it was highly
unlikely there would be nothing to talk about. If over time, the SCC
felt the established frequency was too high, then it would be possible
to discuss a change.
Smolin noted that time had passed more rapidly than h.e had thought.
He asked whether it. might not be possible to continue the discussion
later.
Gra bbeal agreed. He wanted, however, to sum up his sense of the dis-
cussion. He felt there were differences of views on two questions:
1. The composition of. the SCC; he had not explained the U.S.
rationale for two Connnissioners. In his opinion two senior officials--
probably of Ambassadorial rank -- are adequate to dishargeothe SCC's
functions. Under the U.S. concept, both present
one would not substitute for the other as in the case of a head and deputy
head of an agency.
2. Periodic meetings versus meetings on call; he hoped his pro-
posal would not present any difficulties, in light of today's clarification!.
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tip..
beal, then proposed that the next meeting be held at 11:00 a.m.
Cray
on December 4, in the Soviet Mission,
Smolin noted that the Soviet side had had questions in regard to
points where the approaches coincided and also where they differed. He
was pleased to note that as a result of today's meeting the number of
the former had increased and the number of the latter had decreased.
He accepted the proposal for the second meeting but wondered whether
the need might not arise for an earlier meeting which could he arranged
by telephone.
Graybeal agreed, saying the U.S. side of the SWG was ready to meet
as often as necessary.
Graybeal adjourned the meeting. (Conmlent: Smolin subsequently called
to request a meeting on December 1. Craybeal agreed to meet at 3:00 p,m.
on December 1.)
Drafted by: Col, C. G. FitzGerald:bji; Approved by: S. N. Graybeal
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