SALT TWO-I US/USSR PLENARY MEETING NO. 4 US MISSION 1100 HOURS, DECEMBER 1, 1972

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP80T00294A000300100008-3
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 13
• Document Creation Date: December 12, 2016
• Document Release Date: June 18, 2001
• Sequence Number: 8
• Publication Date: December 1, 1972
• Content Type: MIN

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SALT TWO-I
US/USSR Plenary Meeting No. 4
US Mission
1100 Hours, December 1, 1972
Persons Present
Ambassador Smith
Ambassador Farley
Mr. Nitze
General Allison
Dr. Garthoff
Mr. Craybeal
Mr. Shaw
Mr. Earle
Capt. Matthes
Dr. Weiler
Mr. Stoertz
Dr. Zemach
Mr. Ausland
Mr. Shearer
Mr. Arensburger (Interpreter)
Minister Semenov
General Trusov
Mr. Shchukin.
Mr. Pl.eshakov
Mr. Grinevsky
Mr. Chulitsky
General Beletsky
Capt. Mazerkin
Mr. Evseev
Mr. Gorokhov
Mr. Tr_epykhalin
Col. Starodubov
Mr. Smolin
Col. Budantsev
Mr. Sudonkin
Mr. Bratchikov (Interpreter)
Lt. Col. Chesnokov
Ambassador Smith opened the meeting by welcoming the Soviet
Delegation. He then gave the floor to Minister Semenov.
Minister Semenov then delivered his prepared statement.
Ambassador Smith stated that the U.S. Delegation would study the
Soviet Delegation's statement with the care it deserved. He then
delivered his prepared statement.
Ambassador Smith asked if Minister Semenov had any further
material he would like to present.
Minister Semenov said he did not.
Ambassador Smith raised the question of the date of the next
meeting and proposed that it be held Tuesday, December 5, 1972
at 1100 hours at the Soviet Residence.
Minister Semenov agreed with this proposal and the meeting
was adjourned by Ambassador Smith.
Drafted by: L.D. Weiler &, _lV r
Approved by: John P. Shaw
R. L. Garthoff
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STATEMENT BY AMP,A.SSADOR SMITH
December 1, 1972
I
Mr. Minister, I wish to take a moment at the start to comment
on a point you raised during our Plenary session on November 28th.
You said, " . . . at one time the U.S. Delegation addressed the
question of not deploying strategic ballistic missiles on airborne
or waterborne platforms, or on fixed or mobile devices on the
seabed or the ocean floor." Your statement gives the impression
that the U.S. looked upon or discussed each of these constraints
in a favorable light. Such an impression is not wholly correct.
The U.S. side has not proposed a ban on strategic ballistic
missiles on airborne platforms. Our recollection is that it was
the Soviet side which raised this issue.
II
Today I shall present some additional U.S. views on the
limitation of the overall levels of strategic offensive systems.
As I have already explained, we believe that land-based ICBM
launchers, SLBM launchers, and heavy bombers--those systems central
to the strategic equation--should be limited in their aggregate.
The establishment of an equal aggregate ceiling for each side
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on these central systems is fundamental to the achievement of a
more comprehensive and permanent agreement on strategic offensive
arms. Equality further requires that for a permanent agreement
there be equal ceilings on the number of ICBM launchers and on the
total ICBM throw weight of each side. Within these limits,
appropriate provision would be made for substitution of weapon
units of one kind for units of another kind.
III
An objective of SALT is to limit strategic arms in a manner
which will increase the security of both sides by enhancing
strategic stability. Stability is better served if both sides
move toward equality in the levels of the aggregate of central
systems, in the number of ICBM launchers, and in throw weight of
the ICBM force through reductions, rather than through increases,
in strategic arms.
Uncertainties in each side's assessment of the future
strategic programs of the other side have been a principal factor
responsible for the arms competition in they past. Reductions of
central strategic systems would help reduce some of these
uncertainties and lead toward a more stable situation.
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Reductions, under appropriate conditions, would promote a
more stable balance and would enhance the confidence of both
sides in their retaliatory capabilities. Specifically, a
substantial reduction of total ICBM throw weight would reduce
the capacity of ICBM forces that could be deployed within a
given numerical launcher limit and would do so in a manner which
diminishes the impact of potential technological advances.
Furthermore, the ABM Treaty prohibits the deployment of an
extensive anti-ballistic missile defense, thus reducing the
requirements for offensive strategic force capacity. Your
opening statement in this session indicates that we are in
agreement on this point.
IV
The actual method or methods of reduction to reach the
equal agreed ceilings could be accomplished in various ways.
Questions of the rate of reduction and the time period
during which reductions would be effected are also relevant.
We propose that the Work Program incl. de a topic covering
these questions.
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We would welcome your view.: on the value of reductions in
the process of reaching equality, and how you believe reductions
can be effected.
V
It is our belief that the issue of reductions should be given
full consideration during the present negotiations. We both
recognize that the reduction of arms would allow considerable
savings in the long run, both in material and human resources,
which could be applied to the benefit of our peoples. Moreover,
reductions would signify plainly to the world a reversal in the
direction of the arms competition.
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SEMLNC7V S':lA'I'E?vlEN''1:, December 1, 1972
As you know, both Governments attach great importance
to those positive results in the limitation of strategic
armaments, which are nailed down in the agreements
signed May 26, 1972. The new stage of negotiations has
been given the task of finding ways to reach agreement on
more comprehensive measures with respect to the limita-
tion of strategic offensive arms, which must extend to
those areas that are not covered by the Interim Agreement.
It is obvious that the solution of this problem must be
approached in terms of the need [to find] the most effective
solution that would reliably block the channels for strategic
arms competition and contribute to enhancing the security
of the two sides.
Now that the Interim Agreement has established certain
limitations on land-based ICBMs and on SLBMs, it is obvious
that the area in which, along with the other areas we
mentioned earlier, measures to limit strategic offensive
arms are required, is that of strategic offensive air weapons.
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In the course of discussions at previous phases of
the negotiations it became evidont that the positions of
the sides coincided as concerns the need to limit
strategic air systems. The USSR and U. S. Delegations
were in agreement as regards the fact that these systems
are part of the composition of strategic armaments in
terms of our negotiations and, as shown by the initial
meetings of the new stage of negotiations, at present, too,
the sides believe that strategic air systems must be limited
in an agreement on more comprehensive measures to limit
strategic offensive arms. In our view this gives us grounds
to hope that if both sides follow the principle of equal security
and no unilateral advantages, it will be possible to find a
mutually acceptable solution to the problem of limiting strategic;
offensive air weapons.
I think the experience of both sides indicates that under
conditions of modern scientific and technological development,
when strategic armaments as a. whole as well as individual.
types of weapons can be developed and improved quickly,
accelerated development of one type of weapon or another by
one side inevitably evokes an adequate response [by the other
and all this by no means loads to increasing the security of
the former, but rather the opposite.
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Therefore the timelines;; and importance of this
question from the point of view of solving the problem of
limiting strategic arms as we have been instructed to
do, cannot but be viewed from the angle of striving for
further expansion of areas of agreement and consolidation
of the positive aspects inherent in the agreements which
have already entered into force.
Evidently none of us has any doubt that agreement on
limiting strategic offensive air weapons would be a sub-
stantial contribution to solving the problem of further limita-
tion of strategic offensive arms.
This naturally also raises the question of limiting the
number of strategic bombers at the disposal. of the sides,
for the absence of that kind of quantitative limitations would
leave a path open for building up a pool of strategic bombers,
i. e. , for continuing the race in strategic offensive arms,
although in a different sphere, to be sure. Therefore we
believe that the proposal to limit the number of strategic
bomber aircraft to agreed levels for both sides corresponds
to the objectives of our negotiations.
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Since both sides have spoken in favor of reaching
agreement on quantitative limitation of strategic bombers,
the USSR Delegation believes that we should make efforts
to search for mutually acceptable solutions on the basis
of the principle of equal security and no unilateral advantages.
It should be noted that modern strategic aircraft can
deliver nuclear bombs as well as air-to-ground missiles
with nuclear warheads, whose yield is commensurate to that
of other strategic offensive weapons. In essence, modern
strategic aircraft, armed with air-to-ground missiles, can
be regarded as airborne platforms for launching these missiles,
which are capable of striking targets on the territory of the
other side.
It is therefore natural that when discussing the question
of strategic offensive air weapons, not only the bombers them-
selves, but also the nuclear weapons systems placed thereon
should be borne in mind. It follows that limitation of the
nuclear armament of strategic aircraft, whether nuclear
bombs or air-to-ground missiles with nuclear warheads, is
of great importance. Such an approach would make possible
fuller and more thorough consideration of the question of
limiting this type of weapon in line with the principle of equal
security.
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On this basis the Soviet side submits a proposal to
ban the use of strategic bombers for delivery of nuclear
weapons, including air--to-aground missiles. Reaching
agreement on this matter would be a major step toward
resolving the questions of limiting strategic offensive air
weapons.
With respect to the limitation of strategic offensive air
weapons, the question of limitations on the development of
new types of strategic aircraft and their armaments also
cannot but be a subject for consideration. Indeed, resolution
of this question would enhance the effectiveness of an agree-?
ment on limiting strategic offensive air weapons and would
make more definite the prospects for maintaining strategic
stability in this respect as well. It is clear that limitations
on the development of new types of strategic offensive air
weapons would preclude the potential possibility that even
more destructive air weapons systems could appear, which,
when equipped with nuclear charges, could have an. unfavorable
influence upon the strategic situation. In this connection the
Soviet side proposes a ban on the development, testing and
deployment of new types of strategic aircraft, limiting the
sides to modernization of existing bombers, without the right
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to convert, them into delivery vehicles for nuclear weapons,
including air-to-ground missiles with nuclear warheads.
You know that the capabilities of strategic aircraft can
be substantially increased by equipping them with long-range
air-to-ground missiles. In essence, in the absence of a ban
on such missiles, equipping aircraft with them can lead to
an unfavorable development and to upsetting strategic stability,
since the capabilities of long-range air-to-ground missiles,
particularly in view of the possible dynamics of their technical
development, can be commensurate with certain other strategic
offensive weapons that are already limited by the agreement
which has entered into force, or with. those which both sides
recognize need to be limited.
Therefore we propose alrio a ban on the development,
testing and deployment of long-range air-to-ground missiles.
We proceed from the premise that the proposals set forth
by the Soviet side are of great and constructive significance
for the solution of the problem of more comprehensive limita-
tion of strategic offensive arms. Reciprocal commitments
by the sides along the lines of the proposals set forth would
constitute substantial. measures of quantitative and qualitative
limitation of an important type of strategic offensive arms.
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These proposals fully meet the requirement of equal
security and no unilateral advantages and are thereby
aimed at maintaining strategic stability, which would
reduce the risk of outbreak of nuclear war.
The USSR Delegation expresses the hope that the U. S.
side will take a positive attitude toward these Soviet proposals,
with a view to ensuring necessary constructive movement
toward reaching mutually acceptable agreement on more
comprehensive measures to limit strategic offensive arms.
Mr. Ambassador, your statement of November 24
emphasized the need promptly to take up the matter of
agreed procedures for the destruction, dismantling and
replacement of strategic weapons systems or their components
in accordance with the provisions of the existing agreements.
I think that it would serve the interests of advancing our
negotiations if the U. S. side were to set forth its concrete
proposals in as much detail as possible, particularly on the
matter of a possible procedure for replacing older types of
ICBM launchers and SLBM launchers on older submarines by
SLBM launchers on modern. submarines, as provided in the
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Interim Agreement. In thi.; connection the approach to
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