SALT TWO-I US/USSR PLENARY MEETING NO. 5 USSR MISSION 1100 HOURS, DECEMBER 5, 1972

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP80T00294A000300100005-6
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 11
• Document Creation Date: December 12, 2016
• Document Release Date: June 18, 2001
• Sequence Number: 5
• Publication Date: December 5, 1972
• Content Type: MIN

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S1?CRIT/IXDIS
SALT T1V0- I
US/USSR Plenary Meeting No. 5
USSR A4ission
1100 Iiou~?s, December 5, 1972
Ambassador Smith
Ambassador harl.ey
Ainister Semeno~U
General Trusov
Mr. l~itze
General Allis
A1r.
on Mr.
Shchulcin
Grinevslcy
Dr.
Garthoff
Mr.
Chulitsky
Dr.
Col
Dr.
Weiler
1~itzGerald.
Zemach
General 13eletsky
Colonel 13udantsev
Colonel Starodubov
Captain 141atthes
Mr.
Skoptsov
Mr.
McCrory
Mr.
Turalin
Mr.
Shearer
Mr.
Obukhov
Dr.
Ifft
Mr.
Shelepin
LCdr
Martin
Mr.
IClyuki_n (Interpreter)
Mr.
Mendelsohn
Mr.
Sudonlcin (Interpreter)
Ivlr.
I:rimer (Interpreter)
LtCol Chesnolcov (Interpre':.er)
Minister Semenov opened the fifth. meeting of
SALT Two~Jby welcoiniig the U.S. Delegation to the Soviet
Mission. IIe then gave the floor to Ambassador Smith.
Ambassador Smith then delivered the U.S. prepared
statement.
Minister Se_m_enov acknowledged the U.S. statement,
sta.ti.ng~that the Sovic>t side would return to the
matter presented by Ambassador Smitli in the early
part of his statement. He then delivered his own
prepared statement.
Minister Semenov asked Ambassador Smith if the
U.S, side wislicd to make any co..~ments on the Soviet
statement.
Ambassador Smith__ stated he had no comments to
make at-t~is~~ time.
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Min_istcr Semcno_v_ replied that in that case
he proposed- t~ieiiextmeeting be a mini-plenary
meeting to be held at'1100 hours on Friday,
December 8, 1972 at the U.S. Mission.
Ambass~.clor Smith agreed with this pr.aposal and
the meeting was adjourned by Minister Semenov.
~i~9i '' _~, ib
llra#ted by: LCdr R.K. Martin ..,,->.
Approved by: Col C.G. PitzGerald
R. I,. Garthofl'~~~~
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STaMFNOV S'I'AT1~NIl~.NT, Dc:cenzber 5, 1.972
With referc;nce to the remarks at t:l~c; beginning of
your statement, we will undoubtedly still have to return
to discussion of tl~e questions addressed. Now I would
like to continue setting forth the cox~.siderations of the
Saviet side.
Canclusion of the agreements on the limitation of
strategic armaments during the summit tall~s in Moscow in
May of this year and their entry into force have created a
sittaatian whose characteristic feature is the fact that certain
most important chanxxels of t:he race in strategic defensive
and offensive armaments have been blocked, as a result of
which it became possible to limit the build-up of strategic
weapons arsenals in a significant degree.
General Secretary of the CPSU Central Committee L. I.
13.rezhn.ev, ~.pprai.sing the significance of the documents signed
in Moscow in May of this ye~~x?, among therri the 'Treaty on the
Limitation of ABA2 Systems and the Interim Agreement, said
on June 5, 1972: "All these are very important axed concrete
? steps toward a more lasting peace which is in the interests
of all peoples. "
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Chairman of the Council of: Ma.nisters of the USSR
A. N. Kosygin, on May 26 of this year, at a dinner given
in Moscow by the President of the U. S. in connection with
conclusi.an of the Soviet-American agreements on the limita-
tion of strategic armaments, said: "Agreement on these
questions, we hope, will go down. in hilt;ory as a major
achievement on the road towards curbing the arms race. It
has become possible only on th.e basis of strict observance
of the principle of equal security of the sides and the
ina.d.missibility of any unilateral advantages. This is a great
victory for the Soviet and .American peoples in. the matter of
casing international tension, this is a victory for all peace-
loving peoples, because security anal peace is their common
goal. "
During consideration of ratification of the Treaty between
the USSR and the USA on the Limitation of A13M Systems
Chairman of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR
N. V. Podgorny emphasized at a meeting of the Presidium of
the Supxexne Soviet of: the USSR: "Briefly defining the substance
of the Treaty and the Interim Agreement, it can be said that
they establish quantitative limitations on the most destructive
types of nuclear weapons of the two largest powers in the
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world while observing the principle of equal sec7.zrity and
inadmissibility of unilateral military advantages. "
It is of substantial impo:rtanee that very similar assess-
ments were expressed on the part of i:he United States. U. S.
President R. Nixon wrote i.n. June of th~_s year in the U. S_
News and World Repox,t: "The Treaty limiting each nation
to two .l1.BiVI sites and the Interim Agrecm.ent fxeezing certain
cai:r.gora.es of offensive missiles for five years marked the
begir~.na.ng of the end of the unchecked nuclear weapons spiral
that began. in 199:5. They enhance the security of both parties,
at t:he same time that they substantially lc;ssen the danger of
global war. "
It Was also noted that the docum.errts which had entered
into force are a first a.nd most signi.Ficant step toward a more
comprehensive solution to the problem of limiting strategic
armaments.
In this connection I would like to note President R. Nixon's
statement: "The more i~.tense the competition, the greater th.e
unceri:ainty about the other side's intentions" (Report to
Congress dated I?,ebru.ary lf~, 1.970), anal also his statement:
"The United States and the Soviet Union I~iave now reached a
point where small numerical advantages in strategic forces
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have little military z?clevance. Tl-~c atten:ipt to obtain
large advantages would spark ari arras race which would,
in the encl, prove pointless" (R.eport dated I'ebruary 25,
1971).
We have also taken note of the U. S. Delegation's state-
ment at the current phase on November 21, 1972 that "the
judgement that history will make of progress toward a lasting
peace will depend a great deal on what o~u.r tv~To nations
accomplish i.n the continuation of our negotiations on strategic
arms ].imitations. "
At present our Delegations face the responsible task of
searching for ways of possible conversion of the Interim Agree-
ment into a permanent: under?sta.nding, wii:h the two sides
assuming appropriate obligations with respect to new, still
not covered types of strat;e~;ic offensive weapons, and also
for ways of possible subsequent reduction of strategic offensive
arms.
Speaking of the obii.gations recorded in the texts of the
AB1VI Treaty and the Interim Agreement, it is obvious that the
Standing Consultative Commission is called upon effectively to
facilitate compliance. It appears that the worleing group we
s?et up to develop proposals for establishment of. this Commis-
sion is doing useful and produci:ive work.
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We recd to look ahca,d from t;he angle of t:he vo.lunzin.ous
and extensive tasks that were xnentionecl in the statements
of the l.caders of our countries. It is obvicu.s that for truly
productive progress of the negatia.tions an further measures
with respect to the limiL-ation of strategic offensive armaments
a general atmosphere of b~tila.nce and sta.blilit:~ :required,
fr. ee of elements of instability which could be~ ~~oduced by
new flare-ups of the arms race in certaixz fields.
In his Report to Congress dated r'ebruary 25, 1971,
President R. Nixon, calling att:enti.on to "the relationship
between t:he process of negotiations--which may be protracted
a~7d involve several stages---and actioxis taken duri-ng tlxe talks
and even after an initial agreement, " dreva the fo1.Io~uirAg con-
elusion: "It is clear that restraizxt is essential. "
In the course of the negotiations both Delegations have
repeatedly exnphasi.zed that an ut7checked build-up in strategic
armaments by one side. does not at all lead to enhancing its
security, but on the contrary, creates new threats and new
problems.
The si:a.i:ement of the USSR Delegation at the meeting of
November 18, 1969 in Helsinki painted out: "At the present
stage, when tl~; world is being saturated by more and mare
weapons, the arms race in general, and particularly the
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strategic arms race can only contribute to a general
increase of the threat of wa:r ... Tlae situation now is such
that mountains of weapor_s are growing, yet security is not
irrxprovi.ng bu.t diminishing t}.tcreby, since the threat of outbreale
of thermonuclear war is increasing. " At the same meeting
tl~e Sovi.ei: side stressed that: curbing, lim.itin.g and completely
halting the arms race "would contribute to the strengthening
of mutual security and to an increase in the well-being of tlxe
peoples. "
At the meeting of November 6, 1970 i:n I3elsinki it was also
emphasised that "the strategic arms race does not at a.11 mean
a.n increase in the security of the state engaged in such a race,
but rather the contrary. "
Interpreting the discussions held since then and above all
the results of the summit meeting in Moscow in M.ay of this
year, and the principal document of that meeting, entitled
13asic Pr. inciples of Relations between the Union of Soviet
Socialist Republics and.the United States of America, and
signed by General Secretary of tl~.e CPSU Central Committee
L. I. Bx?ezhnev and U. S. President .lZ. Nixon, we see that
the efforts applied along this path of strategic arms limita-
tion were replete with real meaning, that the path entered
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upon ley l~otli states was wiclcly recogni;~c:d and ardently
supported by tl-ic peoples of not only our countries, but also
ley the peace-loving peoples of the whole world. It i.s iniporta.nt
not to deviate from this path., to protect the sprouts of mutual.
understanding and trust which have appeared. This is not
propaganda for our discuss ions, since this is partly the
xesult of our efforts, too, rior is it Utopia, since both states
have solemnly declared in international law form that they
are conscious of the need "to make every effort to remove the
threat of war anal to' create conditions which promote the
reduction of tensions in the world and the stz engt:hening of
universal. security and international cooperation. "
We proceed from the premise that there is hardly any need
now to prove here the erroneoU.snes s of assumptions to the
effect that an accelerated build-up of one type of strategic
offensive weapon or another could impel our follow-on negotia-
tions toward positive resuli:s. If one of the sides were to
engage in intensive construction in fiel.cls not regulated by
the agr. Bement concluded, i:al~ing advantage of the fact that
the Ia~terirn Agreement covers apart of the types of strategic
offensive arms to be limited, this would, of course, be a
destabilizing factor.. Such actions, even though formally
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