SALT TWO-I, US/USSR MINI-PLENARY MEETING NO. 1 U.S. MISSION, 1100 HOURS, DECEMBER 8, 1972

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP80T00294A000300100004-7
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 33
• Document Creation Date: December 12, 2016
• Document Release Date: June 18, 2001
• Sequence Number: 4
• Publication Date: December 8, 1972
• Content Type: MIN

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SALT TWO-I
US/USSR Mini_Plenary Meeting No.
U. S. Mission
1100 Hours, December 8, 1972
Persons Present:
Ambassador Smith
Ambassador Farley
Mr. Niue
Dr. Ii rotivn
General Allison
Dr. Garthoff
Col. C. FitzGexald
Mr. Krimer (Interpreter)
Minister Semenov
Academician Shchulcin
Cxeneral Trusov
Mr. Grinevsky
Mr. Chulitsky
General Beletsky
Mr. Bratchi.kov (Interpreter)
Mr. Sudonkin (Military I.nterpreter)
Discussion:
Ambassador Smith welcomed the members of the Soviet
Delegation to the U. S. Mission for the first Mini-Plenary of
SALT TWO and gave the floor to Minister Semenov.
Minister Semenov gave a statement (see Attachment #1).
Ambassador Smith said the iJ. S. Delegation would study the
statement carefully and asked whether the Soviet side had any
further considerations it wanted to present at that time.
Minister Semenov said that it was traditional far th.e sides
to have a di.al.ogue. He would be interested in continuing along
the same line.
Ambassador Smith said he wanted to make a few preliminary
observations on what he had understood to be in Minister Semenov's
statement. If he had understood him correctly, Minister, Semenov
had said that the U. S. side is somehow or other attempting to amend
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the Interim Agreement which had been concluded in May, 1972,
and had also said that the U. S~. approach in attempting to replace
the Interim Agreement with a permanent agreement was, in some
way, wrong. Ambassador Smith wanted to read for the Soviet
side paragraph 2, Article VIII, of the Interim Agreement.
"2. This Interim Agreement shall remain in force for a
period of five. years unless replaced earlier by an agreement
on more complete measures limiting strategic offensive arms.
It is the objective of the Parties to conduct active follow-on
negotiations with the aim of concluding such an agreement as
soon as possible. "
Ambassador Smith declared that when that Article says
"with the aim of concluding such an agreement as soon as possible, "
he took these words to mean precisely what the U. S. side con-
ceives its responsibility to be -- to conduct active negotiations
to conclude such an agreement to replace the Interim Agreement
as soon as possible.
Ambassador Smith then gave a statement on the Soviet Add-on
Approach (see Attachment #2).
Minister Semenov asked Academician Shchukin to speak.
Academician Shchukin said he intended to address a questian
which, ~ in a way, is related to the qualitative aspect of strategic
offensive weapons. He was speaking about multiple warheads, i. e. ,
what is abbreviated in Russian as "RGCh, " and in English as MRV/MIRV.
Academician Shchukin said that the sides had devoted considerable
attention to this question during the first Vienna phase of SALT.
As is known, the view was repeatedly expressed that MRV/MIRVs are one
response to the development and deployment of ABM systems. Now,
given the fact that the ABM Treaty and Interim Agreement have
been concluded, it would be useful to return to the question of
multiple warheads.
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Academician Shchukin said that the limitation of ABM systems
as it was provided for in the ABM Treaty cannot help but influence
one's reasoning on possible measures related to MRV/MIRV, i. e. ,
the question of limiting strategic offensive arms. Naturally, this
would be on the basis of the principle of equal security and
prevention of unilateral advantages. The U. S. side had expressed
the view at the end of the first Vienna phase of SALT that the
question of MIRVs was left for consideration at a subsequent stage
of the talks. Consequently, it is important to have the opinion
of the U. S. side set forth on the question related to MIRVs in the
light of the changed situation to tivhich he had referred.
Academician Shchukin said. that the question of maneuvering
warheads for ICBMs and SLBMs as one type of response to ABM
systems is also directly linked to the question of the ABM Treaty.
The limitation of ABM systems as provided in the Treaty should
evidently exert an appropriate influence on the approach to that
question as well. -
Academician Shchukin then declared that, during the present
phase, the U. S. side has devoted much attention to the throw-weight
question as applied to land-based ICBMs. There is every ground
to doubt the urgency of raising this question. He wanted to recall
that the agreed provisions of the Interim Agreement and related
documents essentially contain an answer to this question. At
the sarzie time, there is an entire series of topical questions related
to limiting strategic offensive arms which the Soviet side referred
to "at the meeting on November 21 and which the Soviet side has
said are important for reaching a mutually-acceptable agreement
and for the success of the negotiations.
Ambassador ,Smith said the U. S. side will study these remarks
with great care. I-ie asked General Allison to take the floor.
General Allison gave a statement on the Soviet proposals for
constraints on strategic aviation (see Attachment #3).
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Minister Semenov asked General Trusov to speak.
Gene r. al Trusov said that, at the last meeting, the USSR
Delegation had put forth the Soviet Union's proposal that the sides
assume obligations in regard to a ban on developing or testing
new typos of strategic offensive weapons which would increase
the threat of outbreak of nuclear war, and thereby conflict with
the goals of these negotiations. Assumption of such obligations,
along with the obligations the sides have already undertaken in the
Interim Agreement as well as other possible agreements on weapons
not covered by the Interim Agreement, would decrease the pre-
requisites for the strategic arms race, increase the security not
only of our two nations but international security as well, and
would be fully consistent with the spirit and letter of Article VI
of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons the continued
viability of which, as Ambassador Smith triad said on November 21,
bath sides are seeking to assure. Naturally, the Soviet side is
speaking about obligations for both sides which would observe the
principle of equal security and not permit any unilateral advantages.
General Trusov said that both sides have stressed the impor-
tance of. the ABM Treaty and Interim Agreement, which were con-
cluded in May, as a substantial factor in curbing the race in
strategic offensive arms. The U. S. sid.e's statement of November
28 declared that, "These ABM limitations tend to reduce the
requirements for strategic offensive force capacity from what they
might have been in the absence of the ABM Treaty. "
General Trusov continued that, at the same time, measures
are being taken in the U. S. to implement new major programs for
strategic offensive weapons. For example, there is expansion
and acceleration of the program for the submarine nuclear ballistic
missile system Trident, and acceleration of the development of
the B-1 strategic bomber, as well as programs for air-to-surface
missiles, such as SRAM and SCAD, and others, despite the ABM
Treaty and its restraining influence on the requirements for the
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capacity of strategic offensive systems to which the U. S. side
had referred. There is also acceleration of Poseidon missiles and
Minuteman III with multiple warheads, and at the same time new
large funds are authorized for these as well as other programs.
General Trusov said that substantial elements in the USSR had
noted that, at virtually the same time as the ABM Treaty and
Interim Agreement entered into force, the U. S. had approved the
largest defense budget in post World War II history, thus playing
a part toward accelerating strategic offensive arms efforts.
Naturally, the question is asked, why is this being done? What
purpose does it serve? How does it correspond to the declared
purpose of limiting strategic offensive arms? These actions
by the U. S. side can only be regarded as designed to upset the
balance in strategic systems and aimed at achieving unilateral
advantages and can essentially only lead to a race in strategic
arms.
General Trusov said that it is perfectly obvious that the sides
cannot ignore such actions together with. all their ensuing con-
sequences as regards the development of our negotiations. He
wanted to say that the Soviet side has repeatedly stressed. during
the negotiations that accelerating the strategic arms race not
only does not correspond to the purpose of our talks but does not
increase the security of the side taking such measures. In light
of this, the USSR Delegation has been instructed to direct the U. S.
side's attention to the importance of the proposals which have
been submitted for exercising restraint and also for the sides
to assume obligations not to develop or test new types of strategic
offensive weapons which would increase tlxe tl:ireat of outbreak
of nuclear war.
Ambassador Smith asked Mr. Niue to make a statement.
Mr. Nitze gave a statement on stability (see Attachment #4).
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Ambassador Smith asked whether Minister Semenov had
any further material to present.
Minister Semenov said not for today.
Ambassador Smith said that, in that case, he would ask
.General Allison to say a few words.
General Allison said that he had not hitherto thought, and
did not now thi.nk,it useful for the sides to enter into recrimi-
nations regarding the strategic force programs on either side.
General Trusov's incorrect assessment, however, reduired a
prompt response. He said that i.t is well known that it is the
Soviet side which has engaged in substantial deployments of new ,
strategic offensive forces and increases in deployed numbers
of strategic offensive launchers during the course of these talks.
Ambassador Smith said that left only the task of arranging
for the next meeting. He asked what Minister Semenov's pre-
ferences were in that regard.
Minister Semenov said that whatever suited Ambassador
Smith was suitable to lum.
Ambassador Smith proposed that the next meeting be a
Mini-Plenary at 11:00 a. m. on December 12 at the Soviet Mission.
Minister Semenov accepted.
Ambassador Smith adjourned the meeting.
Drafted b Col C.G. FitzGerald Approved by: AmbassadorrSmith
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SEMENOV MINI-PLENARY STATEMENT, December S, 1972
In the course of the current Geneva phase the USSR ?Delega-
tion has submitted a number of concrete proposals which
provide for further measures to limit strategic offensive
arms. We do not preclude that there might also be some
other matters to be discussed in connection with working out
agreement on more complete measures to limit strategic
offensive arms.
A1; the same time, we are convinced that implementation
of the measures we have proposed would ensure substantial
progress in limitation of strategic offensive arms on the basis
of the principle of equal security for both sides, "and would
thereby help to reduce the threat of outbreak of nuclear war.
The course of discussions at this phase indicates that the
U. S. Delegation so far does not provide any answers to the
concrete questions raised by the Soviet side. I would like to
note that this gives rise to a feeling of uncertainty on our side
with respect to the U. S. side's posit-~on. We hope that before
the end of this phase we will be able to hear its positive
response to the proposals we have submitted.
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We have noted that in dealing with the question of the
content of a future agreement on more complete measures to
limit strategic offensive arms, as for example on November 28,
the U. S. side spolte only of ICBMs, SLBMs and heavy bombers.
It was argued that "these systems are central, not only because
of theix role in deterrence and in the strategic relationship
between the two countries, but also because these systems
drive the strategic arms competition which we aim to curb. "
On December 5 the U. S. Delegation once again stated that "it
is the three central. systems on which we should focus since
they play the major role in determining the strategic balance.
Forward-based systems are not of the same significance in the
nuclear arms competition as the central systems. "
The Soviet side considers such an approach to consideration
of this important matter as not at all in accord with the principle
of equal security, and therefore unacceptable. We would like to
draw the attention of the U. S. side to the USSR Delegation's
statement of November 28, 1972, which gave a detailed analysis
of the importance of solving the problem of withdrawing strategic
offensive nuclear systems and liquidating corresponding bases in
third countries, and contained concrete proposals. I do not think
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it necessary to repeat the arguments we have cited, which
completely refute the concept of so-called "central" and
non-central systems, as well as the proposition that forward-
based nuclear systems and other strategic nuclear systems
whose capabilities are substantially expanded by use of bases
on foreign territory, supposedly do not have the same signifi-
cance as so-called "central" systems.
I would like to note that we have discussed this matter in
detail at a numb er of phases of the negotiations in Helsinki and
in Vienna, and that careful study of the record of discussions
only reaffirms our belief in the correctness of the position
advanced by the Soviet side at the beginning of the current Geneva
phase .
On the other hand, no one underestimates or can under-
estimate the systems the U. S. side is discussing here. As you
. know, the Interim Agreement on Certain Measures with Respect
to the Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms came about as a
xesult of the May 20, 1871 Understanding between the Governments
of the USSR and the U. S. This Understanding made it possible
to delimit the sphere of th.e initial agreement, in view of
difficulties encountered at the negotiations, to two types of
strategic offensive weapons--IGBMs and SLBMs. It is precisely
these that were covered by the Interim Agreement.
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Now there are broader problems before us which need
to be resolved. If anyone is of the opinion that our task here
consists in somehow amending or replacing the Interim Agree-
ment, which allegedly in some respect or other takes
insufficient account of the existing strategic situation, then
such an opinion is based on incorrect premises. Within the
framework of the systems it covers, the Interim Agreement
is based on the whole on a correct account of the objectively
existing strategic situation, including the particulars of the
geographic situation of the two sides. In this connection,
however, I would like to remind you, Mr. Ambassador, of
the official statement made by the Soviet side in Helsinki on
May 26, 1972, to the effect that the solution for modern SLBM
submarines which is provided for in the Interim Agreement only
partially compensates for the strategic imbalance in the deploy-
ment of the nuclear missile submarines of the USSR and the
U. S. Therefore the Soviet side proceeds from the premise--
and this was also stated by us--that at follow-on negotiations
a solution to this entire problem would be found, and above all
to the problem of liquidating U. S. missile submarine bases
beyond the bordersof the tTnited States.
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Today I would like to remind you of that statement. I
would also like to say that the AI3M Treaty and the Interim
Agreement were affirmed in accordance with the constitutional
procedures of each side, and entered into force on October 3,
1972. The USSR Delegation has not been instructed to engage
in negotiations concerning revision of the agreements which
have entered into force.
A.nd so, in accordance with the May 20, 1971 Understanding,
other types of strategic offensive weapons which were not
included in the Interim Agreement were set aside for a period
of time. Therefore, having fulfilled the objectives established
by the May 20 Understanding, both sides are called upon to take
up broader questions of limitations and possible subsequent
reductions of strategic offensive arms. It is natural that now,
before everything else, those types of strategic offensive arms
which were not covered by the Interim Agreement are coming to
the fore.
As for strategic offensive air weapons, the concrete proposals
of the Soviet side submitted December 1 in aur.view reflect the
importance and necessity of limiting this type of weapon.
Undoubtedly we will have to deal with this.
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The Soviet side proceeds also from the premise that there
are no grounds of any kind. for evading at this stage of negotia-
tions consideration of the question of withdrawal of strategic
offensive nuclear systems and liquidation of corresponding
bases in third countries. As we have already stated, in
addition to land-based ICBMs, SLBMs and strategic bombers,
any other types of missiles with nuclear warheads and any
types of nuclear delivery aircraft whose geographic deployment
enables them to strike targets on the territory of the other
side, must also be considered within the composition of strategic
offensive arms. All carrier aviation, regardless of the
geographic deployment of attack car. viers, must also be considered
within the composition of strategic offensive arms, since they
are mobile systen~xs.
The USSR Delegation p:r.oposed withdrawal of strategic
offensive nuclear systems together with concurrent liquidation
of corresponding bases in third countries. Such a solution of
the issue would fully meet the principle of ensuring equal security
and precluding unilateral advantages.
In light of what has been said it appears obvious that what
the U. S. Delegation for some reason labels "central systems"
not only cannot be treated separately from other strategic
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offensive systems, but neither can any kind of levels be
considered without taking into account the entire totality of
strategic offensive arms.
On November 28, 1972 the U. S. Delegation's statement
advanced a cansideratian an establishing for both sides equal
aggregate levels of ICBMs, SLBMs and strategic bombers.
The USSR Delegation has been instrixcted to state that in
establishing levels for limitation of strategic offensive armaments,
al.l types of such armaments must be taken into account, -includ-
ing forward-based nuclear systems as well as SLBM submarines
of U. 5. NATO allies.
The question of subsequent reduction of strategic offensive
arms will undoubtedly also take -its due place in the negotiations.
The USSR Delegation has already repeatedly drawn attention to this
. matter, for example in its statements of November 17, 1969,
April 20, 1970 and in others. The U. S. side has also given
attention to this matter.
Tn this connection it is natural that the qu.esl:ion of reducing
strategic offensive arms ought to be treated in the context of
limitation of all strategic offensive systems. If our understanding
is correct, the sides proceed from the premise that measures to
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reduce strategic offensive arms must be based on the
principle of equal security for the sides and inadmissibility
of unilateral advantages. We are prepared to discuss this
matter after working out measures which ensure equal
security for both sides.
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STATI;MF'NT I3Y AND3ASSADOrt SrII'1'lI
(December 8, 1972)
We are charged with working out a permanent agreement on
strategic offensive arms to replace the interim measures
agreement.
Limitations on strategic missile launchers in a permanent
replacement agreement would be different than those in the
interim agreement, which were acceptable to both sides for
a temparary period only. Were it otherwise, there would have
been no need for the interim agreement to be temporary. Rather,
we could have concluded a permanent treaty on missile launchers
as we did for anti-ballistic-missile systems. Article VIT of
the Interim Agreement reads:
"The Parties undertake to continue active negotiations
far limitations on strategic offensive arms. The obligations
provided for in this Interim Agreement shall not prejudice
the scope or terms of the limitations on strategic
offensive arms which may be worked out in the course
of further negotiations." ,
This article negates the thesis that the provisions of the Interim
Agreement were negotiated in the expectation that they were
intended to serve in a permanent agreement.
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Your side appears to take the position that in the'
Interim Agreement we have solved the problem of limiting
ICBMs and SLBMs and that all we have to do now is to .carry
over those provisions, work out additional provisions
on certain other systems, and thereby convert the Interim
Agreement into a permanent agreement.
Our view is quite different. We cannot follow such
a restrictive approach if we are to achieve a mutually
acceptable stable and secure arrangement for strategic
offensive arms which will curb the competition in such arms.
The provisions of the Interim Agreement are intended to last
for a maximum of five years. Our task here is to work out a
permanent treaty to replace the Interim Agreement, Such a
treaty must be equitable if it is to last for the long term. It
clearly cannot incorporate the ratios in ICBi~4 and SLBM launcher
numbers that were frozen as a temporary standstill arrangement.
.. I wish to emphasize the unacceptability of the approach
which seems to have been suggested by the Soviet side. Such
an approach. cannot form the basis of an equitable and mutually
acceptable permanent agreement, To postpone the start of a
search by both sides for an equitable and mutually
acceptable permanent agreement would reduce prospects for the
success of our efforts.
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STATL'MDNT 13Y Gl~NN1~AL ALLISON
(December 8, 1972) ___.
I want to make"sotne~preliminary remarks on the Soviet State-
ment of December l;' 1972. As~our comments on stability indicate
__..
your approach raises many questions regarding the nature and
concept of the general Soviet approach to our task. I would
like to aslc certain questions directed at obtaining a
clearer understanding of your thinking.
First, your use of the term "strategic bombers" would lead
us to believe that the Soviet proposals apply to heavy bombers.
However, elsewhere in the proposals reference is made to the
term "strategic aircraft." Under the Soviet proposals of
December 1, by "strategic bombers" and "strategic aircraft"
do you mean "heavy bombers"?
Second, we note the Soviet statement makes reference to
constraints on "long-range" air-to-surface missiles,-but Iacks
clarity as to what is meant.
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In the past, both sides have agreed in principle to limit
heavy bombers together with ICBM and SLBM launchers in an aggregate
total. The U.S. side has reaffirmed this aspect of its position in
recent statements. Do your proposals far limiting strategic bombers
call for a separate limit? If separate, do you have in mind the
existing levels of heavy bombers for each side?
During our negotiations in SALT ONE, there was general
agreement by both sides that for weapon systems being limited
modernization and replacement would be permitted subject to other
limitations that might be agreed upon. The U.S. side still
maintains this view.
Your proposal would prohibit replacement of strategic
bombers with new bombers and would limit modernization to existing
systems. Does this reflect a change in the Soviet position on
modernization and replacement? Why do you single out strategic
bombers for such constraints? Is it your intention that
strategic bomber forces wither away?
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V.
The Soviet side proposes a ban on nuclear payload for
strategic bombers, but calls for no similar measures for ICBMs
and SLBMs. We believe it to be impracticable at this time to
ban nuclear weapons and we do not understand why you single out
strategic bombers, the least destabilizing of the three central
systems, for this special treatment. The logic of this idea
escapes us.
VI.
The~ntroduction of your complex of constraints on strategic aviation
raises._the question of constraints on counterpart air-defense
systems. Discussion of such constraints will require discussion
also of air defenses. We will pursue this latter subject at a
later date.
VII.
It was decided early in SAT.T ONE that each side would
rely primarily on national technical means to verify any arms
limitation agreement. We believe that the complex of constraints
you have proposed on bomber armaments could not be verified by
national technical means. How would either side be assured of
compliance with such constraints on bomber armaments?
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STATEMENT BY MR, NITZE
(llecember 8, 1972)
Mr, Minister, at our meeting on December 1, you indicated
that your proposals were aimed at maintaining strategic
stability, which would reduce the risk, of outbreak of nuclear
war, The U.S. side believes that agreeing on constraints
which will contribute to maintaining strategic stability is
a matter of primary importance in our task. As SALT ONE
opened in Helsinki, the U,S, n.oted that a principal objective
of our negotiations would be to achieve an agreement that
would enhance the security of both sides and would contribute
to stability. To that end, the U.S. expressed certain aims
regarding strategic stability:
-- We said that we hope to achieve and maintain a stable U,S.-Soviet
strategic relationship which would minimize the danger of
the autbreak of a nuclear war,
-- We stated our belief that agreed limitations on offensive and
defensive strategic systems can be reached which contribute
to the maintenance of a stable U.S.-Soviet strategic relation-
ship and enhance the security of both countries and of
the entire world.
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I would like to discuss some key conditions bearing on~
strategic stability as we see it; namely, the evident survivability
of retaliatory forces and their evident ability to penetrate defenses.
These conditions for enhancing stability are consistent with
your statement of December 1 where you pointed to the need
to find the most effective solution that would reliably block
the channels for strategic arms competition and contribute to
enhancing the security of both sides. An agreement which
enhances survivability of strategic forces would reduce
perceptions by either side of the necessity, other than for
modernization and replacement purposes, for undertaking major
new arms programs to avoid being placed at a strategic
disadvantage and would reduce the risk of the outbreak of
nuclear war. Confidence in the enduring survivability of
strategic systems is an essential feature of deterrence, and
thus of a stable strategic relationship, and it also contributes
to' effective arms control.
Another factor affecting stability is the capability of
retaliatory forces to penetrate defenses. Stability could be
seriously eroded if one side deployed defenses which the other
side believed could reduce its retaliatory capability below
the level it judged necessary for deterrence. That was the
major reason for the ABM Treaty.
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Z'he U.S, and, I assume, the Soviet Union attach importance
to not having to rely upon any one system alone for deterrence,
since any of them might be degraded in some manner,---The
importance of this consideration, as far as can now be fore-
seen, will continuF~.
If one important part of either side's deterrent were
to be seriously degraded by actions of the other side, the
resulting situation would not contribute to stability or to
the maintenance or improvement of security. Accordingly, one
aim of a more complete agreement on strategic arms limitation
should be reduction of the possibility that any important
deterrent element could become excessively vulnerable or
suffer deterioration of its penetration capability. You,
Mr. Minister, have on several occasions in this session of
SALT referred to the beneficial effects of the ABM Treaty
on the strategic relationship between the two sides.
The ABM Treaty, however, dealt only with assurances of
missile force penetration capability. Since this is but one
element among those which affect stability, our task still
requires consideration of the survivability of missile
launchers and the survivability as well as the penetration
capability of heavy bombers.
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SI,CRET
As is well known, because of time factors and recalla-
bility, heavy bombers are the least destabilizing of current
strategic offensive systems. We cannot reconcile your
proposal to ban the use of heavy bombers for delivery of
nuclear weapons--thereby eliminating the least destabilizing
of the deterrent forces--with the objective of
enhancing the security of both sides.
Preservation of the deterrent capability of heavy
bomber forces would require modernization and replacement to
maintain the survivability and penetration capability of these
forces. Mr. Minister, we are unable to reconcile your
proposed ban on development, testing, and deployment of new
types of strategic. aircraft with the goal of strategic
stability.
We note your statement that the capabilities of strategic
aircraft can be substantially increased; for example, by
equipping them with long-range air-to-surface missiles. Air-to-surface
missiles improve defense penetration capability, which is necessary for
bombers to play a deterrent role. Conse~juently, if.defenses
against bomber forces are not correspondingly limited, your
proposals to limit bomber armaments could reduce strategic stability.
Therefore, it seems strange that you choose this particular
element of the deterrent forces for drastic qualitative limitations.
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SLBM's are in a somewhat different category than are
other strategic forces. 'their mobility and their capability
to operate in the vast ocean areas are major factors in
their pre-launch survivability. If the ocean area within
which they operate is reduced, tlLe potential survivability
of the system is thereby reduced.
Another factor important to long-term stability is the
pre-launch survivability of ICBM's. Some protective measures
can be accomplished without secondary effects which would be
inconsistent with our objectives. For example, hardening
of ICBM silos is being done by both sides. The mast
feasible and meaningful contribution, consistent with
limiting rather than increasing strategic arms, is to have in a per-
manent agreement equality on both sides by providing for equal numbers of
ICBM launchers for the two sides and reducing ICBM throw-
weight to an equal ceiling. This would constrain the principal
threat to ICBM pre-launch survivability.
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In summary, Mr. Minister, the Soviet approach to enhance-
ment of stability does no't appear to us to be consistent or effective,
The U.S. Government has consistently maintained the posi-
tion that deterrence is fundamental to the preven-
tion of a nuclear war. The view of the Soviet Union,
expressed during SALT ONE, that the damage in the event of
a nuclear exchange would be unacceptable to both sides no
matter who started the war, implies that both sides have
weapons which exist primarily to prevent their use. This
implicit recognition that deterrence is the foundation of
the nuclear strategic relationship between our two sides is
derived also from the fact that both sides stress the
importance of stability in the strategic balance. If we are
to advance toward the objective of our negotiations, it is
essential that we seek limitations which. will enhance rather
than degrade the stability of the strategic relationship
between the two sides.
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SEMENOV MINI-PLENARY STATEMENT, December 8, 1972
In the course of the current Geneva phase the USSR Delega-
tion has submitted a number of concrete proposals which
provide for further measures to limit strategic offensive
arms. We do not preclude that there might also be some
other matters to be discussed in connection tivith working out
agreement on more complete measures to limit strategic
offensive arms.
At the same time, we are convinced that implementation
of the measures we have proposed would ensure substantial
progress in limitation of strategic offensive arms on the basis
of the principle of equal security for both sides, and would
thereby help to reduce the threat of outbreak of nuclear war.
The course of discussions at this phase indicates that the
U. S. Delegation so far does not provide any answers to the
concrete questions raised by the Soviet side. I would like to
note that this gives rise to a feeling of uncertainty on our side
with respect to the U. S. side's posit-~on. We hope that before
the end of this phase we will be able to hear its positive
response to the proposals we have submitted.
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We have noted that in dealing with the question of the
content of a future agreement on more complete measures to
limit strategic offensive arms, as for example on November 28,
the U. S. side spoke only of ICBMs, SL13Ms and heavy bombers.
It was argued that "these systems are central, not only because
of their role in deterrence and in the strategic relationship
between the two countries, but also because these systems
drive the strategic arms competition which we aim to curb. "
On December 5 the U. S. Delegation once again stated that "it
is the three central systems on which we should focus since
they play the major role in determining the strategic balance.
Forward-based systems are not of the same significance in the
nuclear arms competition as the central. systems. "
The Soviet side considers such an approach to consideration
of this important matter as not at all in accord with the principle
of equal security, and therefore unacceptable. We would like to
draw the attention of the U. S. side to the USSR Delegation's
statement of November 28, 1972, which gave a detailed analysis
of the importance of solving the problem of withdrawing strategic
offensive nuclear systems and liquidating corresponding bases in
third countries, and contained concrete proposals. I do not think
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it necessary to repeat the arguments we have cited,. which
completely refute the concept of so-called "central" and
non-central systems, as well as the proposition that forward-
based nuclear systems and other strategic nuclear systen~.s
whose capabilities are substantially expanded by use of bases
on foreign territory, supposedly do not have the same signifi-
cance as so-called "central" systems.
I would like to note that we have discussed this matter in
detail at a number of phases of the negotiations in Helsinki and
in Vienna, and that careful study of the record of discussions
only reaffirms our belief in the correctness of the position
advanced by the Soviet side at the beginning of the current Geneva
phase.
On the other hand, no one underesL-imates or can under-
estimate the systems the U. S. side is discussing here. As you
know, tlxe Interim Agreement on Certain Measures with Respect
to the Lirnit-ation of Strategic Offensive Arms came about as a
result of the May 20, 1971 Understanding between the Governments
of the USSR and the U. S. This Understanding made it possible
to delimit the sphere of the initial agreement, in view of
difficulties encountered at the negotiations, to two types of
strategic offensive weapons--ICBMs and SLBMs. It is precisely
these that were covered by the Interim Agreement.
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Now there are broader problems before us which need
to be resolved. If anyone is of the opinion that our task here
consists in somehow amending or replacing the Interim Agree-
ment, which allegedly in some respect or other takes
insufficient account of the existing strategic situation, then
such an opinion is based on incorrect premises. Within the
framework of the systems it covers, the Interim Agreement
is based on the whole on a correct account of the objectively
existing strategic situation, including the particulars of the
geographic situation of the two sides. In this connection,
however, I would like to remind you, Mr. Ambassador, of
the official statement made by the Soviet side in Helsinki on
May 26, 1972, to the effect that the solution for modern SLBM
submarines which is provided for in the Interim Agreement only
partially compensates for the strategic imbalance in the deploy-
ment of the nuclear missile submarines of the USS12, and the
U. S. Therefore the Soviet side proceeds from the premise--
and this was also stated by us--that at follow-on negotiations
a solution to this entire problem would be found, and above all
to the problem of liquidating U. S. missile submarine bases
beyond the bordersof the United States.
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Today I would like to remind you of that statement. I
would also like to say that the ABM Treaty and the Interim
Agreement were affirmed in accordance with the constitutional
procedures of each side, and entered into force on October 3,
1972. !'he USSR Delegation has not been instructed to engage
in negotiations concerning revision of the agreements which
have entered into force.
And so, in accordance with the May 20, 1971 Understanding,
other types of strategic offensive weapons which were not
included in the Interim Agreement were set aside for a period
of time. Therefore, having fulfilled the objectives established
by the May 20 Understanding, both sides are called upon to take
up broader questions of limitations and possible subsequent
reductions of strategic offensive arms. It is natural that now,
before everything else, those types of strategic offensive arms
which were not covered by the Interim Agreement are corning to
the fore.
As for strategic offensive air weapons, the concrete proposals
of the Soviet side submitted December 1 in our view reflect the
importance and necessity of limiting this type of weapon.
Undoubtedly we will have to deal with this.
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The Soviet side proceeds also from the premise that there
are no grounds of any kind for evading at this stage of negotia-
tions consideration of the gt~.estion of withdrawal of strategic
offensive nuclear systems and liquidation of corresponding
bases in third countries. As we have already stated, in
addition to land-based ICBMs, SLBMs and strategic bombers,
any other types of missiles with nuclear warheads and any
types of nuclear delivery aircraft whose geographic deployment
enables them to strike targets on the territory of the other
side, must also be considered within the composition of strategic
offensive arms. All carrier aviation, regardless of the
geographic deployment of attack carriers, must also be"considered
within the composition of strategic offensive arms, since they
are mobile systems.
The USSR Delegation proposed withdrawal of strategic
offensive nuclear systems together with concurrent liquidation
of corresponding bases in third countries. Such a solution of
the issue would fully meet the principle of ensuring equal security
and precluding unilateral advantages.
In light of what has been said it appears obvious that what
the U. S. Delegation for some reason labels "central systems"
not only cannot be treated separately frorri other strategic
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offensive systems, but neither can any kind of levels be
considered tivithout talcing into account the entire totality of
strategic offensive arms.
On November 2$, 1972 the U. S. Delegation's statement
advanced a consideration on establishing for both sides equal
aggregate levels of ICBMs, SLBMs and strategic bombers.
The USSR Delegation has been instructed to state that in
establishing levels for limitation of strategic offensive armaments,
all types of such armaments must be taken into account, includ-
ing forward-based nuclear systems as well as SLBM submarines
of U. S. NATO allies.
The question of subsequent reduction of strategic offensive
arms will undoubtedly also take its due place in the negotiations.
The USSR Delegation has already repeatedly drawn attention to this
matter, for example in its statements of November 17, 1969,
April 20, 1970 and in others. The U. S. side has also given
attention to this matter.
In this connection it is natural that the question of reducing
strategic offensive arms ought to be treated in the context of
limitation of all strategic offensive systems. If our understanding
is correct, the sides proceed from the premise that measures to
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reduce strategic offensive arms must be based on the
principle of equal security for the sides and inadmissibility
of unilateral advantages. We are prepared to discuss this
matter after working out measuxes which ensure equal
security for both sides.
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