US/USSR MINI-PLENARY MEETING NO. 2 SOVIET MISSION, 1100 HOURS, DECEMBER 12, 1972

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP80T00294A000300100003-8
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 12
• Document Creation Date: December 12, 2016
• Document Release Date: June 18, 2001
• Sequence Number: 3
• Publication Date: December 12, 1972
• Content Type: MIN

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US/u SSR MINI-PLENARY MEETING NO. 2
Soviet Mission, 1100 hours, December 12, 1972
Persons Present:
Ambassador Smith Minister Semenov
Ambassador Farley Academician Shchukin
Mr.
Nitze
Gen.
Trusov
Dr.
Brown
Mr.
Grinevsky
Gen.
Allison
Mr.
Chulitsky
Dr.
Garthoff
Mr.
Beletsky
Dr.
Ifft
Mr.
Kochetkov
Mr.
Arensburger
Mr.
Chesnokov
Discussion:
Minister Semenov declared the meeting open and offered the
floor to Ambassador Smith.
Ambassador Smith asked Ambassador Farley to make a presenta-
Ambassador Farley then presented his prepared statement on
aggregates and substitution (see Attachment 1).
Minister Semenov said that at today's meeting he wished to
call the attention of the U.S. side once again to the array of tasks
which must be solved in reaching an understanding on more complete
measures regarding strategic offensive arms. The Soviet side
attributes importance to the principle of restraint in new major
programs for strategic offensive arms. The Interim Agreement pro-
vides for obligations regarding two types of strategic offensive
arms. Our task is to go further and expand. the limitations on
strategic offensive arms and in so doing to block all channels for
a race in this area.
To exercise restraint in areas not limited--not to adopt major
new programs in these areas--would create more favorable conditions
for new measures limiting strategic offensive arms. At the same
time, obligations to exercise restraint would be an important
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contribution to the goals of these talks and would correspond to
the spirit and the letter of the AI3M Treaty and the Interim Agree-
ment between the U.S. and the USSR. President Nixon, in a letter
to the Chairman /Speaker/ of the House of Representatives on
June 13, 1972, pointed out that these agreements are a significant
step into a new era of mutually agreed restraint between the two
principal nuclear powers. The sides should set about solving the
limitation. of strategic arms in accordance with the "Basic Princi-
ples of Relations between the USSR and the USA.", which was signed
in May, 1972, in Moscow. This would no doubt cement the foundation
upon which relations between the U.S. and the USSR are based.
The question of restraint acquires special significance in the
case of discussions regarding the renunciation of major new programs
in strategic offensive arms. The Soviet side wished to emphasize
again that throughout these negotiations it has proceeded on the
basis of strict adherence to the principle of equal security and no
unilateral advantage. Any agreement the sides work out which
includes mutually agreed measures will exclude unilateral advantages.
Therefore, the measures proposed by the Soviet side on restraint
would give no unilateral advantage and would apply to both countries.
Minister Semenov said that, as far as the questions raised by
Ambassador Farley today were concerned, he thought that he had
already presented relevant clarification of the Soviet position at
the previous meeting. A careful examination of Soviet statements
would give a sufficiently clear understanding of the Soviet position.
One could have objectives regarding questions which have been
settled in the Interim Agreement. It has been said that a future,
more complete agreement should provide certain more equitable terms
for ICBM's and SLBM's. It is known that "every definition is
negation." The Interim Agreement is the product of a protracted
negotiation in which certain asymmetries were taken into considera-
tion. The attitude of certain circles toward the Interim Agreement
is no secret. Some U.S. politicians have tried to speak against our
talks even before the parliamentarians of third countries. Minister
Semenov declared that he would not be frank if he did not say that,
within the Soviet Delegation, some puzzlement arises when remarks
are heard regarding the equity or inequity of solutions already
found. Minister Semenov's understanding was that if this was direct
or indirect criticism of some authorities, our negotiations were not
a proper forum for airing such internal differences.
The Interim Agreement entered into force quite recently--on
October 3, 1972. No doubt the contents of a permanent agreement
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will not coincide with those of an Interim Agreement. This is what
the Soviet Delegation is referring to when it talks about taking
into account all strategic arms and liquidating bases in third
countries. The U.S. side is also well acquainted with the proposals
of the Soviet side regarding strategic aviation offensive arms. The
U.S. side has its own opinions, but the Soviet side is very hopeful
that it can persuade the U.S. side that the Soviet position is well
grounded. At the same time, voices are heard on the U.S. side call-
ing for revision of agreements in force. Where did this come from?
The Soviet side cannot agree with such sentiments. It proceeds from
the premise that the ABM Treaty and the Interim Agreement which we
have concluded are in force and are effective, legally binding
international instruments. Therefore, directly or indirectly casting
doubt on them does not correspond to the task of our talks.
Ambassador Smith stated that Minister Semenov must be hearing
voices not heard by Ambassador Smith. He knew of no American who
proposed revision of the ABM Treaty or the Interim Agreement. Perhaps
this idea came from a third country.
General Allison then presented his prepared statement on the
Soviet proposals of November 28 and December 5 (see Attachment 2).
General Trusov said that, in connection with the remarks made
by General Allison on December 8, he wished to address the Soviet
proposal limiting strategic aviation offensive arms. First of all,
he did not share the view that strategic bombers are the least
destabilizing component of strategic offensive forces, nor did he
agree with attempts to divide strategic offensive forces into primary
and secondary components. The goal of our negotiations is to limit
all types of strategic offensive arms and not simply any parts which
look to one of the sides to be primary and the most destabilizing.
The Interim Agreement limits two types of strategic offensive
arms. The Soviet side had already underscored the importance of
finding solutions for other strategic offensive arms, particularly
with respect to strategic aviation, since the absence of limitations
on such arms could allow substantial channels for the buildup of
other strategic arms.
Attempts to establish a link between limitations on strategic
aviation and systems of air defense are totally unconvincing. It is
unfounded to draw an analogy between attempts to limit strategic
aviation and the limitation of ballistic missiles and the ABM systems
defending against them. It is well known that air defense systems do
not belong to the category of strategic systems and are not a subject
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of our negotiations. Therefore, the Soviet Delegation is not
instructed to consider these systems.
General Trusov said that General Allison's remarks regarding
the U.S. belief that it would be impractical at this time to ban
nuclear weapons did not cast doubt on the Soviet proposal to ban
strategic bombers as nuclear del-very vehicles. The Soviet proposal
would also limit the number of bombers on each side to agreed levels.
Such levels should not be those at the disposal of the sides now,
since such an approach would not be consistent with the principle of
equal security. On December 8, the Soviet side had already dwelt
upon its opposition to the U.S. approach to establishing levels of
strategic offensive arms.
Turning to the Soviet proposal banning new types of strategic
aircraft, General Trusov said that General Allison had called
attention to the understanding that modernization and replacement
would be allowed subject to the limitations of the agreements. The
Soviet position does not contradict this understanding, because this
position precisely concerns the question of the limitations within
which modernization and replacement should be considered. If the
U.S. side has any proposals on this subject, the Soviet side is
ready to consider them.
With regard to what types of air-to-surface missiles would be
considered "long range", General Trusov said he believed this
question would present no difficulty after agreement in principle
was reached to ban the development and deployment of such missiles.
Turning to the question of verification, General Trusov said
that the ABM Treaty and Interim Agreement stipulated that verifica-
tion of compliance would be carried out by national technical means.
The Soviet proposals concerning an agreement on more complete measures
for limiting strategic offensive arms also stipulate that verification
should be ensured by national means. He believed that the U.S. Dele-
gation agreed with this position. At first, there may appear to be
certain difficulties in this regard, but consideration of the way in
which the ABM Treaty and the Interim Agreement were worked out
offered grounds for optimism.
General Trusov concluded his remarks by saying that it would be
useful in preparing for the next stage of our negotiations for the
Soviet side to know the opinion of the U.S. side concerning the
essence of the Soviet proposals on strategic aviation. Referring
to the concluding remarks of General Allison in the previous meeting,
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General Trusov said that he would note that the adoption by the
U.S. of a record-high postwar defense budget, the acceleration of
programs to build up strategic offensive arms, and other facts
speak for themselves.
Ambassador Smith then asked Dr. Brown to present some views.
Dr.. Brown presented his prepared statement in response to
Academician Shchukin's question on MIRV's (see Attachment 3).
Academician Shchukin said that he would like to present several
considerations related to the exchange of opinions at the previous
meeting. If he understood correctly, Mr. Nitze had stated that the
key conditions for strategic stability are survivability and the
capability to penetrate the defenses of the other side. Academician
Shchukin said that he considered that conditions of this kind could
not be accepted without reservations. An increase in arms could be
carried out under the pretext of improving survivability and,
conversely, measures which appeared superficially to decrease
survivability could serve the goals of our negotiations.
It is known that the Soviet Union and the U.S. have concluded
an ABM Treaty, and this should be regarded as an important constraint
on the arms race. He wished to note that the Soviet proposal to
withdraw submarines with ballistic missiles beyond agreed limits
would not upset strategic stability and would create no additional
threat to, nor decrease the survivability of, such submarines. On
the contrary, the withdrawal of SLBM submarines could be an important
factor in avoiding an instability in the arms race, which instability
he understood to result from a feeling of insufficient security. In
the case of SLBM's, there were other ways to increase their efficiency
as a deterrent. Academician Shchukin then repeated that Mr. Nitze's
first condition for strategic stability could in no way be regarded
as true without any conditions.
Academician Shchukin said that according to Mr. Nitze's second
condition, any increase in the capability of strategic offensive
arms to penetrate opposing defenses would be stabilizing. This gave
rise to the question of whether such a condition would not give
impetus to a further arms race. Academician Shchukin said that it
seemed to him that such a condition could not be accepted as a
guiding principle in these negotiations.
The proposal of the Soviet side on strategic aviation would
increase strategic stability rather than decrease it, and would
impede the development of the arms race. He wished to point out
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the obviously destabilizing effect of long-range ASM's. Such
missiles could be launched from over the territory of third countries
or over water. In view of the load-carrying capability of modern
aircraft, the number of such missiles could be fully commensurate
with the number of land-based and sea-based missile forces of the
two sides. Under these conditions, would not such ASM's be a factor
in the strategic arms race? Therefore, it was obvious that the
proposal of the Soviet side not to create, test, or deploy such
weapons was precisely directed toward increasing strategic stability
and containing the strategic arms race.
Academician Shchukin said that in addition to what General Trusov
had said on the subject of verification, he wished to add that there
are cases in which the sides have undertaken important obligations
not fully verifiable by national means--for example, the obligation
not to put nuclear charges. in outer space. Such obligations, no
doubt, have a positive and stabilizing effect.
Mr. Nitze then presented his statement on throw-weight (see
Attachment 4).
Minister Semenov asked whether any Delegates wished to present
any further remarks. There being none, he proposed that the next
meeting be held on Friday, December 15, at 11:00 a.m. in the U.S.
Mission, and suggested that a continuation of the mini-plenary
format would be useful.
Ambassador Smith agreed, and Minister Semenov adjourned the
meeting.
ChS Drafted by: Edward M. Ifft Approved by: Ambassador Smith
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 ATTACHMENT 1
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December 12, 1972
STATEMENT ON AGGREGATES AND SUBSTITUTION
(Ambassador Farley)
During the period in SALT ONE when we were discussing
a permanent agreement with respect to strategic offensive
arms rather than a temporary freeze, there was general
agreement between our two Delegations that our negotiations
on strategic offensive arms should establish a limit on the
aggregate number of ICBM launchers, SLBM launchers, and heavy
bombers. The U.S. side put forward a specific proposal
on this subject on August 4, 1970; however, the two sides did not
reach the point of coming to agreement on the level of the
aggregate.
The U.S. Delegation believes that the considerations
which led our two sides to the concept of limiting the aggre-
gate of central systems remain valid. The U.S. Delegation has consistently
held that the level established for an aggregate must be
equal for both sides. We reaffirm that our present objective
should be to negotiate a permanent agreement, and that that
agreement should embody the fundamental principle of overall
numerical equality in the central systems; that is, ICBM
launchers, SLBM launchers, and heavy bombers.
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Within the framework of equal. aggregates on central
systems, the U.S. side also believes that there should be equal
ceilings on the number of deployed ICBM launchers and on the
overall ICBM throw-weight of each side. We have also expressed
our view that the sides should reach agreed ceilings through
reductions, rather than through a buildup, What is your
view of these concepts?
An important element of a permanent agreement would
be certain provisions for substitution of one type of
launcher for another among the central systems. This would
allow each side flexibility to adjust its force composition
to preserve the effectiveness of its deterrent capabilities,
and thus could contribute to strategic stability. The degree
of freedom-to-mix would depend upon the other limits. The
Soviet Delegation advocated such a provision in Helsinki and
Vienna. Does the Soviet position on this issue remain the
same?
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December 12, 1972
STATEMENT ON SOVIET PROPOSAL'; OF NOVEMBER 28 AND DECEMBER 5
(General Allison)
The U.S. side has studied the Soviet statement of November 28
on the subject of "assuming obligations to ban deployment of
strategic ballistic missiles on airborne or waterborne plat-
forms (except submarines), as well as on any fixed or mobile
devices which could be deployed on the seabed or the ocean
floor, or in the subsoil thereof, including the territorial
sea and internal waters." We also have studied the Soviet proposal of
December 5 to "ban the development, testing and deployment
of intercontinental cruise missiles and sea-based cruise
missiles specially designed to strike land targets."
You will recall that on August 4, 1970, the U.S. side
proposed comprehensive limitations which included a ban on
testing of cruise missiles of intercontinental range, and
on deployment of launchers for such missiles. The U.S. side
also proposed at that time banning the production, testing,
and deployment of ICBM systems utilizing waterborne vehicles
on inland waterways. The Soviet views noted above are
also compatible with those set forth by the U.S. side on
April 8, 1971, in regard to the seabed zone.
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The Soviet side proposed on December 5 a ban on deployment
of strategic ballistic missiles on airborne platforms. As
indicated in my remarks on December 8, your
proposals on strategic aircraft and armaments raise several
issues and questions. Among these are the matters of non-
verifiability by national technical means of the complex of
constraints you propose on strategic aviation, and the matter
of the relationship of air defenses to the constraints you
propose. We will pursue this latter point at a later date.
On the proposal to ban testing and deployment of sea-
based cruise missiles "specially designed to strike land
targets," we would ask two questions: How do you propose
to distinguish between cruise missiles which are specially
designed to strike land targets and other cruise missiles which
are also capable of striking land targets? Does the Soviet
side believe that, if a cruise missile has not been specifically
designed to strike land targets, its capability to do so is
irrelevant?
In conclusion, it appears that there is a convergence of
views on some of these points; there is apparent disagreement
on others. We believe these matters can be taken up later as
a part of our consideration of limitations on strategic offensive
forces.
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ATTACHMENT 3
December 12, 1972
STATEMENT IN RESPONSE TOSHCIIUICIN QUESTION ON MIRV's
(Dr. Brown)
On December 8, Academician Shchukin raised the question
of qualitative limitations and referred specifically to
multiple re-entry vehicles (MRV':s/MIRV's) and maneuvering
re-entry Vehicles (MaRV's).
It is the view of the U.S. Delegation that the question
of qualitative limitations on strategic offensive weapons
is open for discussion during the course of our negotiations.
The question of qualitative limitations i8 understood to be
covered by the formulations of the draft Program of Work
now in preparation.
The U.S. Delegation would be interested in hearing any
further views on this subject which the Soviet Delegation wishes
to put forward at this time.
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STATEMENT ONTHROW-WEIGI'T
(Mr.Ni tze)
December 12, 1972
At the December 8 mini-plenary, Academician Shchukin said that
he doubted the urgency of agreeing to an equal ceiling on the
throw-weight of ICBM's, arguing that the Interim Agreement contains
an answer to the throw-weight problem. We question the validity of
these comments.
The Interim Agreement provides a temporary freeze on ICBM forces
which is helpful in the short term but is not adequate for the long
term. We believe a permanent agreement should provide for equal
ceilings on ICBM throw-weight, as well as on numbers of ICBM launchers,
to be achieved through a program of reductions.
We believe that it is urgent that we get on with the task to which
both sides agreed in Articles VII and VIII of the Interim Agreement.
In the context of a permanent agreement, throw-weight should be
recognized to be one of the important measures of the potential capability
of ICBM's. A ceiling on aggregate ICBM throw-weight would place a limit,
relatively insensitive to future developments of technology, on the
potential of an ICBM force. Thus agreement on ICBM throw-weight is
important to our current negotiations.
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