SALT TWO-I US/USSR PLENARY MEETING NO. 6 USSR MISSION 1100 HOURS, DECEMBER 18, 1972

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP80T00294A000300100001-0
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 19
• Document Creation Date: December 12, 2016
• Document Release Date: June 18, 2001
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: December 18, 1972
• Content Type: MIN

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SALT TWO-I
US/USSR Plenary Meeting No. 6
USSR Mission
1100 Hours, December 18, 1972
Persons Present
Ambassador Smith
Minister Semenov
Ambassador Farley
General Trusov
Mr. Nitze
Mr. Shchukin
Dr. Brown
Mr. Grinevsky
General Allison
Mr. Chulitsky
Dr. Garthoff General Beletsky
Colonel FitzGerald Mr. Skoptsov
D r.
Ifft Captain Mazerkin
Dr.
Wade Mr.
Turalin
Mr.
Jones Mr.
Starodubov
Captain Matthes Mr.
Budantsev
Dr.
Weiler.
Mr.
Obukhov
Mr.
Stivers
Mr.
Shelepin
Dr.
Zemach
Mr.
Yevseev
Lt Commander Martin Mr.
Klyukin (Interpreter)
Mr. Arensburger (Interpreter) Mr.
Sudonkin (Interpreter)
Minister Semenov opened the sixth plenary meeting of SALT
Two by welcoming the U. S. Delegation to the Soviet Mission. He
then gave the floor to Ambassador Smith.
Ambassador Smith then delivered the U.S. prepared
statement.
Minister Semenov acknowledged the U. S. statement; he
then delivered his own prepared statement.
Minister Semenov asked Ambassador Smith if the U. S. had
any other considerations.
Ambassador. Smith replied that the U.S. side had no further
considerations to address.
Minister Semenovsstated that in that case it was necessary
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Ambassador Smith proposed that the next meeting be
held at 1100 hours on Wednesday, December 20; he added
that he had in mind that this would be the final plenary
meeting of this session.
Minister Semenov responded that it would be more
suitable to hold the meeting on Friday, December 22.
Ambassador Smith stated that Mr. Garthoff reminded
him that the sides have a document agreed ad referendum
in which December 21 is referred as the terminal date for
this session.
Minister Semenov replied that "Mr. Garthoff is a
master of compromise. " He stated that 1100 hours, Thursday,
December 21, is acceptable for the final plenary meeting, and
that the questions of procedure which might arise can be taken
into consideration by the Executive Secretaries.
.uraitea by: .u ur i... L,,. .IVLC.l LIuL
Approved by: Dr. E.M. Ifft f4
Dr. R. L. Garthoff
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STATEMENT BY AMASSADOR SMITH
(December 18, 1972) .
Today I shall respond to your remarks at this session
addressing elements of force which have come to be known as
forward-based systems (FBS), and related issues. It is evident
that the two sides have, from the outset, had substantially
different approaches to the question of the composition of the
strategic offensive arms to be limited.
The U.S. believes that we are charged with the
limitation of the strategic nuclear arms of the two sides.
Our subject is arms, not bases. Furthermore, not all arms,
but only certain nuclear arms are included; and not all nuclear
offensive arms, but only strategic nuclear offensive arms of
the two sides, are to be included.
In addressing the question of the composition of the
strategic nuclear arms to be limited, the U.S. side from the
outset has taken an essentially pragmatic approach. In other
words, it addressed the question of what nuclear offensive
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arms and what defenses against them should be limited in order
to further the objectives of our talks. We conceived these
objectives to be to increase the security of both sides by
enhancing the stability of the strategic relationship between
us in accordance with the principle of no unilateral advantage
to either side.
The Soviet side has proceeded from a deductive approach
flowing from what seems to us to be a contrived definition of
the word "strategic." The central concept of that approach
appears to be that any nuclear delivery system which could be
caused to strike the national territory of the other side
should be presumed to be strategic. Under this concept, it
was further maintained by the Soviet side that the location of
a launching device at some point in time and the delivery
range of that launching device would determine what
is strategic. However, virtually all aircraft and missile
systems have a range of more than the few miles which separate
the national territories of the Soviet Union from that of
the United States.
Subsequently, the Soviet side introduced modifications
to this concept; one was to suggest that exception should be
made for Chukotka and Alaska. When the U.S. side pointed out
that submarine-launched cruise missiles have the capability
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of destroying coastal cities, the Soviet side argued in this
case that it is not the capability of the system but its
mission--to strike targets at sea--which'is determinative.
It now appears that certain further modifications
are to be made in this deductive chain. We take it that
the earlier Soviet position that the location of the launching
device at some point of time should be determinative is no
longer so. It is now asserted that all attack aircraft
carriers, irrespective of geographic location, should be
regarded as strategic. There is no suggestion, however, that
other systems which are capable of being moved are to be
covered by such a criterion. And still further, it appears
that range capability of systems is not to be viewed as
being their inherent capability but is to be assumed to be
limited by certain conditions selected by one side.
Pursuit of a complicated set of changing and evidently
self-serving criteria by one side cannot possibly lead to
agreement with the other side. On the other hand, to assure
at the starting point and at each stage of such a deductive chain
that equitable and objective criteria are applied in an even-
handed manner would appear to lead into endless and also needless
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complexities. Would it not be better to address directly
those limitations which are within the subject matter of our
talks and which go to the heart of our objectives with respect
to that subject matter?
As I stated on December 5, SALT deals with the
central nuclear fact of the world today: your country and
ours can essentially destroy each other. The strategic nuclear
balance between us is dynamic. In assuring the stability of
this balance, the controlling offensive weapons systems are
ICBM's, SLBM's, and heavy bombers. Although each of us
possesses a number of non-central systems which in one way
or another could reach the territory of the other, it is the
three central systems on which we should focus since they
play the major role in determining the strategic balance.
Mr. Minister, forward-based systems are not of the
same significance in the nuclear arms competition as the
central systems. The potential posed by these tactical forces
is simply not comparable in kind or magnitude to that of
ICBM's, SLBM's, and heavy bombers.
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III.
In protecting our security interests, both of us
have come to rely not only on our armaments, but also on
alliances. The historical, political, and military reasons
for U.S. alliances and deployment of some U.S. systems on
Allied territory are well known. U.S. tactical aviation and
tactical missile forces are deployed as an integral element
of the military forces which support our alliances. To address
these forces as the Soviet side has proposed would involve
the whole of general-purpose forces. Such an approach would
be both undesirable and impractical.
The Soviet side has suggested that the United States
make unilateral and radical changes in its tactical forces and
alliance arrangements. You have proposed withdrawal to their
national territories of all "nuclear delivery aircraft" and
any missiles with nuclear warheads the geographical deployment
of which enables them to strike targets on the territory of
the other side, and a corresponding liquidation of their
bases in third countries. You have also proposed withdrawal
of all attack aircraft carriers beyond range of the other side's
territory. Mr. Minister, in effect your proposal would work
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basic changes in regional military balances, but would not
deal with the factors which necessitate our defensive
alliances and the stationing of U.S. forces at sea and
abroad.
We are engaged in bilateral negotiations. We will
not consider in these discussions limitations which would
undermine the security of our Allies or our ability to
support the U.S. obligations to our Alliances.
The Soviet side has stated that, in addition to
U.S. forward-based systems, Allied SLBM submarines must be
taken into account. The U.S. position concerning compensation
to the Soviet Union for SLBM submarines belonging to third
countries was made clear by the U.S. Delegation on May 24 and
again on May 26, 1972. Our position has not changed; the U.S.
does not accept the validity of such considerations.
In the past, Mr. Minister, you have suggested that
there are asymmetries in the existing situation with respect
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to U.S. forward bases and aircraft and missiles as now deployed.
The asymmetries in non-central systems that affect the military
balance between us do not favor the United States.
It is clear that both sides rely on ICBM's, SLBM's,
and heavy bombers as the major elements of their strategic
nuclear power. Beyond these elements, there exist on the two
sides various asymmetrical conditions which are not susceptible
to precise comparison or quantification -- nuclear offensive force
elements such as SLCM's, MR/ICBM's, tactical missiles, medium
bombers, and tactical aircraft, and also air defenses,
geographic considerations, approaches to force development,
and alliances.
Disparities in MR/IRBM'> and SLCM's are one-sided;
you possess hundreds of each, and the United States has none.
Moreover, MR/IRBM's,SLCM's, and medium bombers can strike U.S.
bases and forces. SLCM's also possess the capability of striking
major U.S. population centers. Soviet medium bombers also have
the capability of reaching more than half of the United States,
without refueling, from forward bases in the Soviet Union.
In addition, modern technical means, for example, aerial refueling,
can extend their range. Thus, these systems are relevant in the
context of respective capabilities of non-central systems to
*-ike the territory of the other side.
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To single out for separate attention forward-based
systems which the United States has in support of its alliances
would in effect be to subject that one element to constraint
in a situation where corresponding Soviet force elements went
unconstrained. This would clearly be unequal and to the
unilateral advantage of the Soviet Union, and this is unacceptable
to the United States.
Forward-based aircraft are not in the same category
as heavy bombers because they do not have the same effect on
the strategic relationship. Similarly, we have been willing
to consider medium bombers -- of which the USSR has many
hundreds, and which have a capability to attack the U.S. as not in the same category as heavy bombers.
The definition of strategic aircraft you propose
would seem to require inclusion of all aircraft on each side
capable of carrying nuclear weapons. All. fighter bombers,
light bombers, and medium bombers would have to be included,
since all are or can be made nuclear-capable and can reach
targets on the territory of the other country. How could
limitations on these aircraft be implemented? Clearly, even
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if aircraft were not located within unrefueled range, this
range could readily he extended by refueling. In essence,
all aircraft, regardless of their location, are capable of
reaching the territory of the other side.
V.
The Soviet side has argued that the United States
enjoys unilateral advantage because of its submarine bases in
third countries. You have indicated that such bases "reduce
significantly the time required for operational deployment
of SLBM submarines and eliminate the need for these submarines
to return to rear bases located on their own national territory."
Because of this reduced transit time, you argue that the United
States is able to keep more SLBM's on station than the USSR,
giving unilateral. advantage to the United States.
Transit time is not a useful criterion in assessing the
strategic capability of ballistic missile submarines for a
permanent agreement, especially as the range of SLBM's increases.
On this point, we would note the recent flights of a Soviet SLBM
to a range of about 7,500 km. With SLBM ranges of 7,500 km,
Soviet nuclear submarines are capable of striking targets in
most of the United States even from their home bases.
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Mr. Minister, we do not regard forward-based systems
as "strategic." We have both recognized that our task, to
reach an equitable and verifiable permanent agreement, will
be complex. The U.S. side considers that the essential element
of our negotiating task is to focus on developing a permanent
agreement limiting the central systems of the two sides, without
unilateral advantage to either side. We have set forth our
views on how this should be done on several occasions, most
recently on December 12.
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SEMENOV STATEMENT, December 18, 1972
We have carefully listened to the U. S. Delegation's
statement of today. It will be studied from the angle of
the ongoing negotiations. For our part we would like to
emphasize the following. On the composition of strategic
offensive arms in connection with our ongoing negotiations,
our approaches have indeed been different from the very
beginning. We have repeatedly substantiated our position,
at the current phase in Geneva as well. The specific contents
of the Soviet proposals we submitted in Geneva are well known
to you.
The USSR Delegation has repeatedly pointed out to the
U. S. Delegation that resolution of the question of withdrawal
of strategic offensive nuclear systems and liquidation of
corresponding bases in third countries is a most important
factor in ensuring equal security and precluding unilateral.
advantages. By reason of the well-known Understanding of
May 20, 1971, which resulted in conclusion of the ABM Treaty
and the Interim Agreement:, consideration of these questions
was postponed to the subsequent stage of negotiations, of
which the present Geneva phase constitutes the beginning.
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In connection with entry into force of the Interim
Agreement, consideration of the question of withdrawal
of strategic offensive nuclear systems and liquidation of
corresponding bases, along with limitations on other types
of strategic offensive weapons not covered by the Interim
Agreement, now acquires primary importance.
I would like to emphasize once again that the Soviet side
considers the question of withdrawal of strategic offensive
systems and liquidation of corresponding bases in third
countries to be one of the most important questions involved
in the overall complex of measures to limit strategic offensive
arms, and believes that it must be solved. in working out an
understanding on more complete measures to limit strategic
offensive arms.
The U. S. side has emphasized, specifically on December 8,
1972, that agreement on limitations which would contribute to
maintaining strategic stability is a question of primary importance
at our negotiations and that the U. S. side has maintained this
position from the very beginning of SALT, believing that "it
would be fruitful at our negotiations to strive toward achieve-
ment of [Translators note: This is a misquote. Our statement
read as follows: "a principal objective of our negotiations would
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be to achieve..: ] an agreement that would enhance the
security of both sides and would contribute to stability. "
Viewing the Soviet proposal on withdrawal of strategic
offensive nuclear systems and liquidation of corresponding
bases in third countries from such an angle, it is impossible
not to come to the conclusion that it is aimed at enhancing
the security of both sides, reducing the risk of outbreak of
nuclear war and increasing trust between our two sides.
Speaking of a desire to enhance the security of both sides,
it is impossible to deny the need for also resolving the question
of withdrawal of SLBM submarines beyond agreed limits and
of liquidating the bases for these submarines on the territories
of third countries.
The argument cited by the U. S. side that reduction of the
ocean areas within the limits of which SLBM submarines
operate, would purportedly reduce their "potential survivability, "
cannot possibly be recognized as valid. Such an argument can
be used for one purpose only--somehow to justify the existence
of the bases for these submarines in third countries and to
present matters as though there were no need to resolve the
question of withdrawal of SLBM submarines.
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A component part of the Soviet proposals is withdrawal.
of attack carriers beyond agreed limits which would preclude
the aircraft thereon from being within range of the territory
of the other side. Here we proceed from the premise that all
carrier aviation should be considered strategic offensive arms,
regardless of the geographic location of attack carriers, since
the latter are mobile strategic systems.
The references sometimes made to the relatively short
range of carrier-based attack aviation compared to that of
strategic bombers, and their resulting allegedly limited
capabilities to execute combat missions, are not convincing,
even if only because the limited range of carrier aviation is
fully compensated for by the practically unlimited cruising
range of the aircraft carriers themselves, which in essence
are floating airfields.
The question then arises: under present conditions, when
carrier aviation is equipped with nuclear weapons, can it
be excluded from the composition of strategic offensive arms?
No, it cannot.
The proposal set forth by the Soviet side on November 28,
1972 provides for withdrawal to their own national territories
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of all nuclear delivery aircraft and any missiles with
nuclear warheads whose geographic location enables them
to strike targets on the territory of the other side, together
with liquidation of corresponding bases in third countries.
The motivation is obvious.
The destructive power of the nuclear weapons used by
these systems, and the damage they can inflict, are
commensurate with the destructive power and the possible
damage inflicted by the warheads of those types of strategic
offensive weapons, which are limited by the Interim Agreement.
Therefore exclusion of the question of withdrawal of forward-
based nuclear systems from consideration at the negotiations
and the lack of a mutually acceptable solution for it in working
out agreement on more complete measures to limit strategic
armaments would lead to unilateral advantages; this is not in
accord with the goals of the ongoing negotiations.
A number of favorable prerequisites now exist for success-
ful movement toward working out an agreement on more
complete measures to limit strategic offensive arms. We
have accumulated experience in solving complex problems,
and the Treaty on the Limitation of ABM Systems and the Interim
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Agreement on Certain Measures with Respect to the
Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms, which were con-
cluded in May of this year, have entered into force. At the
present time we are at a new and higher level. in our discus-
sions. In this connection, attempts in some form to return
to the U. S. Delegation's proposals of August 4, 1970 would
be completely unjustified. If we were to take this path, then
instead of moving toward mutually acceptable settlement of
the problems before us now, we would have to return to old,
already travelled ground. After all, the scope and nature of
the limitations provided for in the U. S. proposals of August 4,
1970 were clearly rejected by one side and do not meet the
tasks now before us in achieving permanent agreement on
more complete measures to limit strategic offensive arms.
This should be borne in mind during preparation for the next
phase .
In the course of the present phase the U. S. Delegation
advanced a proposal, according to which one of the most
essential elements of the proposed understanding on limiting
strategic offensive arms would be establishment of a ceiling,
equal for both sides, on the overall throwwcight of land-based
ICBMs. We do not understand the purpose for which this
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proposal is put forward. Can it contribute to progress at
the negotiations and to enhancement of the required. mutual
understanding?
We would like to say that such an approach, which takes
absolutely no account of the whole totality of the strategic
situation, geographic factors and the different directions of
the development of military technology on each side, is not in
accord with the principle of equal security. Nor is it in accord
with the task of working out mutually acceptable agreement on
more complete measures to limit strategic offensive arms.
The USSR Delegation believes that the considerations it
has expressed at the current phase will contribute to the produc-
tive development of our negotiations.
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