SALT: EXPERTS SESSION OF DECEMBER 15

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP80T00294A000300050011-5
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 8
• Document Creation Date: December 12, 2016
• Document Release Date: December 27, 2001
• Sequence Number: 11
• Publication Date: December 18, 1972
• Content Type: TELEGRAM

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CT . SALT: EXPERTS SESSION OF DECEMBER 15
SUM '/$ Y FOLLOWING AMBASSADOR PARLEY ? S PRESENT AT I.0 N TO NAC,
1
.
GARTHOFF REMAINED FOR EXPERTS SESSION. DISCUSSION FOCUSSED
F IMA LILY ON FBS ISSUES ' ON NATURE AND SCOPE OF POSSIBLE NON-
V.ENTION PROVISION AND ON TIMING AND TACTICS OF ANY US
iFFER` TO CONSIDER SUCH A PROVISION. END SUMMARY.
2. IT ALiAN REP , :(PETRIGNANI) OPENED SESSION BY ASKING STRATEGIC
ALUE ASCRIBED BY THE SOVIET SIDE ON US FBS. GARTHOFF SAID IT
VALUE'
WAS DIFFICULT TO JUDGE THE EXTENT TO WHICH SOVIET EMPHASIS ON
FBS IS BASED ON A GENUINE CONCERN OVER THEIR STRATEGIC POTENTIAL
AND THE EXTENT TO WHICH SOVIETS FIND IT CONVENIENT TO CONCENTRATE
ON FBS FOR POLITICAL PURPOSES. FBS HAVE NOT IN THE PRE-SALT
PAST BEEN CONSIDERED A SEPARATE WEAPONS CATEGORY, BUT RATHER
AS AN INTEGRAL PART OF THE GENERAL ARRAY OF US FORCES FOR
DETERRENCE AND ALLIANCE SUPPORT. ALTHOUGH SOME DIFFERENCE
EXISTS, EVEN BY SOVIET DEFINITION, BETWEEN STRATEGIC AND TACTICAL
FORCE ELEMENTS, IN SALT THE SOVIETS HAVE SINGLED OUT A CATEGORY
OF WEAPONS WHICH HAS THE CAPABILITY 0TH FOR FIELD THEATRE
NUCLEAR SUPPORT AND FOR STRtTEGICx'.
3,, WHILE ONLY A SMALL NUMBER OF US FORWARD-BASED AIRCRAFT (FBA)
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ACTUALLY HAVE ANY MISSION AGAINST THE USSR ITSELF, LOOKED AT
CBS FORCES GODULD HAVE CON TDERABLE
u
STRATEGIC POTENTIAL. NEEDLESS TO SAY, THE US DOES NOT CONCEDE
THIS POINT, BUT IT CANNOT BE COMPLETELY DISMISSED. US FBA
COULD, IF SO USED, ATTACK AND DESTROY A CONSIDERABLE PRO-
PORTION OF THE SOVIET POPULATION, INDUSTRY AND/OR STRATEGIC
FORCES. IN COMPUTER ANALYSIS, WE ESTIMATE OUR FBA, EVEN WITH
50 PERCENT ATTRITION, GO.U.LD DESTROY EITHER 25 PER' CENT OF THE
SOVIET POPULATION, OR 90 PER CENT OF IT;S MR/IRBM FORCE, OR 20
PERCENT OF ITS COMBINED MR/I/Ifs/ICBM FORCE. ALTHOUGH US FBA
ARE NOT ACTUALLY TARGETED IN THIS MANNER, SOVIET MILITARY
PLANNERS UNDOUBTEDLY ARE MORE LIKELY TO STRESS CAPABILITIES
THAN INTENTIONS. IF SOVIET CONCERN OVER FBS WERE
ONLY POLITICALLY MOTIVATED , THE ISSUE MIGHT EVENTUALLY DROP
OUT OF SALT. BUT GIVEN SOVIET PERCEPTIONS OF FB?S STRATEGIC
POTENTIAL, THESE SYSTEMS ARE LIKELY TO REMAIN A SERIOUS
PROBLEM IN. THE NEGOTIATIONS.
4. ITALIAN REP THEN ASKED WHETHER SOVIET SIDE HAD MADE ANY
SPECIFIC REFERENCES TO US 6TH FLEET. CARTHOFF SAID 6TH FLEET
HAD - NOT BEEN SPECIFICALLY MENTIONED, EITHER I N SALT ONE OR
AT GENEVA. HOWEVER, SOVIET PROPOSALS IN SALT ONE TO WITH-
DRAW ALL AIRCRAFT CARRIERS OUT.OF RANGE OF THE OTHER SIDE
WOULD HAVE AFFECTED STH FLEET DEPLOYMENTS. .AT SALT TWO, SOVIETS
HAVE GONE BEYOND THEIR EARLIER POSITION BY (INSISTING THAT
ATTACK CARRIERS, AND ALL ATTACK AIRCRAFT THEREON, BE CON-
SIDERED AS STRATEGIC NO MATTER WHERE DEPLOYED. THE CURRENT
SOVIET z FORMULATION ALSO DIFFERS FROM THEIR SALT ONE POSITION
IN ITS( REFERENCE TO "ATTACK"CARRIERS AND "ATTACK" AIRCRAFT.
WE SUSPECT SOVIETS. HAVE USED THIS MORE PRECISE TERMINOLOGY
SO AS TO EXCLUDE THEIR OWN ASW HELECOPTER CARRIERS FROM THESE
LIMITS.
5. CANADIAN REP ASKED WHETHER US, IN REJECTING SOVIET DEFINI-
TION OF STRATEGIC, HAD ATTEMPTED TO FORMULATE ITS OWN DEFINIAT ION0
GARTHOFF SAID THE US HAD NOT PUT FORWARD ANY DEFINITION. WE
HAVE SPOKEN.OF THE STRATEGIC BALANCE AND OF FORCES RELEVANT TO
IT. WE HAVE CONSISTENTLY USED THE TERM "CENTRAL STRATEGIC
SYSTEMS", WHICH WE HOLD TO INCLUDE ICBMS, SLBMS AND HEAVY
BOMBERS AND THE' TERM "NON-CENTRAL SYSTEMS", WHICH IS MEANT TO
ENCOMPASS VARIOUS' SOVIET SYSTEMS. AS WELL AS FBS.
6. FRENCH REP ASKED WHETHER THOSE TACTNICAL AND GEOGRAPHIC
ADVANTAGES WHICH ALLOWED THE US TO ACCEPT NUMBERICAL DISPARITY
IN THE INTERIM AGREEMENT (IA) WILL HAVE DISAPPEARED BY THE TIME
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A 'PERMANENT AGREEMENT BAYD ON EQUAL AGGREATES EMERGES.
GARTHOFF STRESSED THE US HELD A DIFFERENT VI OF T}E IA. WHILE
WE TOOK INTO ACCOUNT OUR TECTNOLIGICAL ADVA (3E 1V AGREEING TO
THE IA, US DEL NEVER ADVANCED THIS RATIONALE TO T}1 OTHER SIDE. AS
A JUSTIFICATION FOR DIFFERENCE I N NUMBERS I N I CBt S AND SLAMS.
WE ACCEPTED A NUMERICAL. DISPARITY BECAUSE WE BELIEVED IT IN OUR
INTEREST FOR INTERIM PERIOD .TO FREEZE. ?N-GOING SOVIET PROGRAMS WHILE
US OFFENSIVE PROGRAMS WERE IN NO WAY CURTAILED. WE HAVE NEVER
CONCEDED THAT DIFFERENCES IN''LAUNGHFR NUMBERS ARE MEANT TO COMP
ENSATE FOR DIFFERENCES IN TA.cH OLOGY OR "O OGRAPHY.
7. THE US CALCULATED THAT FOR THE FIVE-YEAR PERIOD OF THE IA WE
COULD NOT BE DISADVANTAGED EVEN BY BETTER-THAN-EXPECTED SOVIET
TACHJOLOG CAL ADVANCES. WE. ARE AWARE THAT OUR QUALITATIVE EDGE,
SUCH AS IN MIRVS,. IS NOT LIKELY TO LAST INDEFINATELY AND THAT
WITH LARGE NUMBERS OF HEAVY ICBMS THE SOVIETS COULD EVENTUALLY
DEPLOY MORE MIRV THAN THE US. THIS HAD LED TO OUR EMPHASIS IN-
SALT 5`.WO ON THROW-WEIGHT. WE ARE PROPOSING, IN EFFECT TO FORE-
TAL'L ANY I N CREASE IN PUTATIVE' SOVIET ADVANTAGES BY MOVING INTO A
THfEATY WHICH WOULD PROVIDE. FOR EQUAL NUMBERS AND EQUAL THROW-
WEIGHT.. WERE THE 'SOVIETS TO CONVERT THEIR SS-7S' AND SS-8S INTO
SLBMS AS PERMITTED UNDER THE IA, AND ELIMINATE THEIR SS-9 FORCE,
WE WOULD HAVE EQUAL LEVELS IN; BOTH ICBM NUMBERS AND THRO-
WEIGHT. FROM THE SOVIET STANDPOINT`,,.' WE MAY SEEM TO BE SUGGESTING
THEY DISCARD THE MOST IMPORTANT ELEMENT OF THEIR STRATEGIC
FORCE. BUT WE BELIEVE OUR POSITION IS APPROPROATE I N TERMS OF
VISIBLE INDICES OF EQUALITY AND LONG-TERM STRATEGIC STABILITY.
S. FRENCH REP ALSO ASKED WHETHER US DESIRE TO ACHIEVE PARITY I N
CENTRAL SYSTEMS WOULD NOT OBLIGE SOVIET SIDE TO ATTACH MORE
IMPORTANCE TO . FBS. GARTHOFF THOUGHT THAT WITH REDUCTIONS,,
SOVIETS MAY FEEL THAT THE RELATIVE IMPORTANCE OF FBS INCREASES,
BUT US INTENDS TO CONTINUE TO PLACE EMPHASIS ON THE CENTRAL
STRATEGIC SYSTEMS.
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9. BELGIAN REP (WILLOT) SAID HIS GOVERNMENT FAVORED AN EXPLICIT
NON-CIRCUMVENTION PROVISION TO ANY TACIT OR IMPLIED COMMITMENT.
LATTER WOULD INTORDUCE DIFFICULT PROBLEMS OF INTERPRETATION, AND
WILLOT POINTED TO THE RECENT SOVIET PROPOSALS ON STRATEGIC AVIA-
TION AS AN EXAMPLE. THE SOVIET DEFINITION WAS SO VAGUE AS TO
RAISE THE QUESTION OF WHETHER US OR ALLIED TACTICAL AIRCRAFT
WERE PERMITTED TO GO NUCLEAR. WILLOT AGREED FBS ISSUE COULD NOT
BE AVOIDED, AND THAT A NON-CIRCUMVENTION PROVISION SHOULD BE
PRECISE, ALONG THE LINES OF "FLEXIBLE CEILINGS AT CLOSE TO CUR-
RENT LEVELS WILLOT"S SECOND POINT RELATED TO THE QUESTION OF
TACTICAL TIMING. HE WONDERED AT. WHAT POINT IN THE NEGOTIATIONS
THE US WOULD INDICATE TO THE SOVIETS THAT IT WAS WILLING TO DEAL
WITH FBS AND NON-TRANSFER IN TERMS OF A NON-CIRCUMVENTION PRO-
VISION. WILLOT "S FINAL QUESTION PERTAINED TO THE CURRENT US
POSITION ON LAND-BASED MOBILE ICBMS, WHICH9 HE NOTED, HAD
BEEN OMITTED FROM THE SERIES OF BANS ON LESSER STRATEGIC
SYSTEMS PROPOSED BY THE SOVIETS. HE ASKED IF ALLOWED MIBILE
ICBMS COULD BE VERIFIED.
10. REGARDING WILLOT "S COMMENTS ON A NON-CIRCUMVENTION
PROVISION, GARTHOFF REMARKED THAT PROS AND CONS EXISTED ON
BEHALF OF BOTH A VAGUE AND A SPECIFIC NON-CIRCUMVENTION
FORMULA. BUT IN EITHER CASE, THERE WAS A CLEAR ADVANTAGE
IN PLACING THE BURDEN UPON THE COMPLAINANT. AS FOR THE
TACTICAL MOMENT TO SIGNAL FOR OUR WILLINGNESS TO LOOK AT A NON
CIRCUMVENTION PROVISION, GARTHOFF SAID THE US HAS TAKEN NO
DECISION YET AND THE ENTIRE QUESTION WILL REQUIRE SERIOUS
Sf UDY AND CONSULTATION. ONE POSSIBILITY WOULD BE TO SIGNAL
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THIS- READINESS RELATIVELY EARLY, BUT DECLINE TO DISCUSS THE
ISSUE IN DETAIL UNTIL MAIN LINES OF LIMITATIONS IN CENTRAL
SYSTEMS AGREED. IN REPLY TO WILLOT ?S QUESTION ON LAND-BASED
MOBILE ICBMS9 GARTHOFF OBSERVED THAT NEITHER SIDE HAD RAISED
THE ISSUE IN GENEVE, ALTHOUGH THE US WAS PREPARED TO SPEAK ON
1T o WE HAVE CONCLUDED THAT IT IS FAR EARIER TO VERIFY A BAN
ON MOBILE ICBMS THAN IT WOULD BE TO VERIFY A GIVEN NUMBER OF
MOBILE & HOWEVER 9 EVEN A GIVEN NUMBER PROBABLY COULD BE
VERTIFIED WITHIN AN ACCEPTABLE RANGE SINCE LAND-MOBILES ARE
LESS ACCURATE AND HAVE LESS THROW-WEIGHT THAN SILO-LAUNCHED
MISSILES. IN GENERAL, THE 'US FAVORS A COMPLETE BAN ON SUCH
SYSTEMS, AND WILL RAISE THE QUESTION OF MOBILES AT SOME POINT
IN SALT TWO,
11. FRG REP (MENNE) ASKED FOR A DEFINITION OF THROW-WEIGHT,
AND FOR SOME INDICATION OF THE CONTENT OF THE WORK PROGRAM.
GARTHOFF DEFINED THROW-WEIGHT AS THE MAXIMUM WEIGHT WHICH CAN
EE- THROWN BY. AN ICBM WITH ITS MAIN MOTORS TO A NOMINAL
(109000 KMS DISTANCE). THIS WEIGHT INCLUDES THE NOSE CONE,
SHROUD, WARHEAD9 PENAIDS AND ANY DISPENSING MECHANISMS FOR THE
PENAIDS OR WARHEADS. IN SHORT, EVERYTHING BEYOND THE BASIC
PROPULSION STAGES OF THE MISSILES. ON THE WORK PROGRAM9 GARTHOFF
MENTIONED THAT BOTH SIDES HAD FOUND SUCH A D UCUME NT MODERATELY
USEFUL IN SALT ONE. IT WAS NOT AN AGENDA,. SINCE IT DID NOT
PREDICATE THE ORDER OD DISCUSSIONS BUT RATHER A COMMON CHECK-
LIST OF TOPICS T O BE CONSIDERED THE CURRENT PROGRAM OF WORK
PROVIDES FOR DISCUSSION OF THE COMPOSITION OF THE STRATEGIC
OFFENSIVE ARMS TO BE INCLUDED IN A MORE COMPLETE AGREEMENT 9
OF THE MODES OF LIMITATIONS ON THESE ARMS9 AND OF OTHER MEASURES
RELATED TO AN AGREEMENT ON MORE COMPLETE OFFENSIVE LIMITATIONS.
12. MENNE THEN REMARKED THAT I F_ BOTH SALT PARTIES SOUGHT TO
REDUCE THE NUMBERS OF THOSE SYSTEMS WHICH THEY PRECEIVED AS
MOST THREATENING9 THE SOVIETS WOULD CERTAINLY WANT TO INCLUDE
STRATEGIC BOMBERS AND FBS ON THEIR BALANCE SHEET, AS FBS ARE OF' A
SIGNIFICANTLY DIFFERENT NATURE THAN CENTRAL STRATEGIC SYSTEMS9
MENNE WONDERED HOW THE US WOULD RECONCILE THE PRINCIPLE OF
STRATEGIC PARITY WITH THE GOAL OF EQUAL AGGREATES, GARTHOFF
EMPHASIZED THAT THE US CONCEPT IS T O ESTABLISH EQUAL AGGREATES
BY LINKING HEAVY BOMBERS TO ICBMS AND SLBMS AND USING THE
EXISTING BOMBER DIFFERENTIAL IN OUR FAVOR LARGELY TO BALANCE
THE SOVIET ADVANTAGE IN ICBMS AND SLBMS. ALTHOUGH THE SOVIETS
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WILL NO DOUBT SEEK TO BRING FBS INTO THIS EQUATION, THE US
WILL RESIST ALL SUCH EFFORTS AND INSIST THAT FBS ARE RELEVANT
ONLY IN RELATION TO SOVIET NON-CENTRAL SYSTEMS. MENNE?S FINAL
POINT WAS A PROPOSAL TO SCHEDULE THE NEXT EXPERTS SESSION TO
PRECEDE THE COUNCIL MEETING SCHEDULED NEXT JANUARY TO ADDRESS
.SYG SUMMARY PAPER (SEE USNATO 5423, REPORT ON COUNCIL. MEETING),,
THIS WOULD ENABLE THE PERMREPS TO COMMENT MORE FULLY ON THE
TOPICS UNDER DISCUSSION. GARTHOFF SAID HE HAD NO COMMENT ON
THIS PROPOSAL, BUT WISHED TO POINT OUT THAT JANUARY WOULD FIND THE
US IN THE MIDST OF PREPARATIONS FOR THE NEXT SALT ROUND AND IT
WAS UNLIKELY THE US WOULD BE ABLE TO. INTRODUCE ANY NEW ELEMENTS
INTO THE DISCUSSION AT THAT TIME. HOWEVER, A JANUARY MEETING
COULD PROVIDE WASHINGTON WITH SOME USEFUL INPUT FOR THE NEXT
,.AGE OF THE NEGOTIATIONS.
13. BRITISH REP. (ROSE) SAID THE UK HOPED OF COURSE FBS COULD
BE DISPOSED OF WITHOUT ANY COMMITMENT, BUT ASSUMING THIS NOT
POSSIBLE SOMETHING ALONG THE LINES OF A NON-CIRCUMVENTION PRO-
VISION WOULD BE ACCEPTABLE. UK, HOWEVER., HOPED TO AVOID ANY-
THING MORE SPECIFIC THAN A GENERALIZED NON-CIRCUMVENTION CLAUSE"
AT THIS POINT, ROSE QUESTIONED WILLOT ABOUT THE PRECISE
MEANING OF HIS EARLIER STATEMENT ON "FLEXIBLE CEILING AT CLOSE
TO CURRENT LEVELS". WILLOT EXPLAINED HE HAD NOT MEANT A SPECIFIED
CEILING, BUT MERELY A GENERAL COMMITMENT NOT TO EXCEED
CURRENT LEVELS.
Br
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14. ROSE- THEN TURNED TO THE QUESTION OF TIMING ON FBSO THE
SOVIETS HAVE STAKED OUT AN EXTREME POSITION, AND THE US REBUTTFL
WILL COME AT THE END OF THIS SALT SESSION. THUS, IT IS UNL.IKEL\
THAT SOVIETS WLL BE ABLE TO RESPOND UNTIL NEXT FEBRUARY OR
MARCH. AT SOME POINT, PRESUMABLY EARLY IN THE NEXT ROUND, THE
S 'D'ELEGATION WILL PUT FORWARD MORE DETAILS ON ITS POSITION
-ND REVEAL ITS DESIRE TO ELIMINATE SS-9S. THIS WOULD PUT TWO
..EXTREME POSITIONS ON THE TABLE AND THE TIMING OF ANY US PRO-
POSAL ON GBS WOULD BE CRUCIALLY IMPORTANT. ROSE SAID THE UK
HOPED THAT WHEN THIS POINT IS REACHED, CLOSE CONSULTATIONS .
WILL BE HELD IN THE COUNCIL.
15. GARTHOFF POINTED OUT THAT A NON-CIRCUMVENTION PROPOSAL
SHOULD NOT BE REGARDED AS A US ACCEPTANCE TO THE SOVIET
VIEW ON FBS, BUT RATHER AS A COUNTER-PROPOSAL DEALING NOT WITH
FB;s ALONE BUT THE NON-CENTRAL SYSTEMS PROBLEM. A NON-
CIRCUMVENTI.ON PROVISION WOULD NOT RAISE THE QUESTION OF REDUC-
TIONS, WOULD D)AL EQUITABLY WITH NON-CENTRAL SYSTEMS ON BOTH SIDES,
AND WOULD MAKE EXPLICIT SOMETHING OTHER WISE TAKEN FOR
GRANTED THAT-THE TREATY ITSELF WILL NOT BE UNDERCUT. ON
THIS LAST POINT THE SOVIETS AT PRESENT CAN ARGUE AGAINST
A CENTRAL SYSTEM 40GREATE BY CLAIMING THAT US CAN SUR-
ROUND THE USSR WITH INTERMEDIATE RANGE WEAPONS. READINESS
TO AGREE ON A NON-CIRCUMVENTIQN CLAUSE WOULD REMOVE THIS
ARGUMENT AS FQR ROSE?S SECON4 POINT REARING EVENTUAL
SOVIET REACTION TO THE EXTREMi US POSITION, GARTHOFF SAID
THE SOVIETS HAVE ALREADY SENSED THE SIGNIFICANCE-OF THE US
PROPOSALS. THIS COULD, INDEED, BRING US TO THE IMPASSE
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DESCRIBED BY THE UK REP, WHERE THE SOVIETS MIGHT REFUSE TO
DISCUSS THROW-WEIGHT OF EQUAL AGGREATES AS LONG AS THE. US
WAS NOT WILLINt TO DISCUSS FBSO
16. DUTCH REP REQUESTED CLARIFICATION OF US EQUAL AGGREATES/
EQUAL THRO-WEIGHT PROPOSAL. DID EQUAL AGGREATES APPLY TO
EACH OF THE THREE CENTRAL SYSTEMS AND.DID EQUAL THROW-WEIGHT
APPLY TO BOMBERS AS WELL AS BALLISTIC MISSILES? GARTHOFF
EXPLAINED THAT EQUAL AGGREATES REFERRED TO THE COMBINED
TOTAL OF THE THREE CENTRAL SYSTEMS WITH-,- HOWEVER, EQUAL SUB-
LIMIT ON ICBM i AUNCHERS THROW-WEIGHT LIMITATIONS APPLIED ONLY TO
ICBMS AND NOT TO THE OVERALL AGGREATE. GARTHOFF ALSO MADE IT
CLEAR THAT THE US CONSIDERS ANY AGREED AGGREATE LEVEL SHOULD
SE ATTAINED BY REDUCTIONS AND NOT INCREASES IN FORCE LEVELS..
AIFFE
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