SALT: CURRENT DEVELOPMENTS

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP80T00294A000300020004-6
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 4
• Document Creation Date: December 9, 2016
• Document Release Date: June 27, 2001
• Sequence Number: 4
• Publication Date: December 5, 1972
• Content Type: NOTES

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TS No. 199262
5 December 1972
SALT: CURRENT DEVELOPMENTS
Through the first two weeks of SALT TWO, the Soviets
have put forward a maximum negotiating position
based on retaining the provisions of the interim
agreement and adding Limits on those systems it
does not include. To this end, Moscow has proposed
the withdrawal of US forward based systems and, in
effect, a ban on nuclear-armed strategic bombers and
air-to-surface missiles (ASMs Soviet formulations
on the Latter issue have apparently been designed
partly in the hope of restraining present or planned
US programs Like the B-1 bomber and new ASMs such
as SRAM. The Soviets have also raised the issue
of qualitative limitations in a manner which suggests
that they are interested in discussing MIRVs. For
its part, the US continues to hammer on the theme
of achieving equal aggregate Levels of central
strategic systems and missile throw-weight. The
Soviets have expressed an interest in having some
agreements ready in time for Brezhnev's expected
visit to the US next spring.
Soviets Seek to Ban the Bombers, and Raise Qualitative
Limitations
1. The Soviets have proposed limits on strategic bombers
in a manner which is aimed at the US B-1 bomber program, the
on-going ASM program, and at nuclear-armed B-52s. In his state-
ment at the plenary session on 1 December, Semenov called for a
ban on the use of strategic bombers for delivery of nuclear
weapons, including ASMs. He also proposed banning the develop-
ment, testing, and deployment of new types of strategic aircraft,
and said that both sides should be limited to modernization of
existing bombers.
2. Concomitant with the bomber ban, the Soviets have
proposed a ban on the development, testing and deployment of
ASMs. In presenting these proposals, Semenov alleged they
"would constitute substantial measures of quantitative and
qualitative limitation of an important type of strategic
offensive arms."
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3. In a subsequent conversation, Soviet delegateed
Grinevsky stated that the Soviets had deliberately introduced
the term "qualitative" into Semenov's presentation, and asked
if the US side was going to bring up qualitative limitations.
He affirmed that when he spoke of qualitative limitations he
was thinking particularly of MIRVs. On several previous
occasions the Soviet representatives have tacitly encouraged
the US side to raise an issue they want to talk about.
4. There is no good indication of what the Soviet
position on MIRVs will be, if indeed they have yet formulated
one. Their thinking may have been foreshadowed, however, by
a conversation Garthoff had with Soviet DCM and resident
authority on SALT in Washington, Yuly Vorontsov, prior to
the current round of talks. After Garthoff advanced the
US position on equality of central systems and throw-
weights, 'Vorontsov. said the Soviet position on these issues
would depend heavily on the US position on MIRVs. He said
he did not mean a freeze, since the US had thousands of MIRVs
and the Soviets none. He indicated he was speaking instead
of a situation in which there would be no MIRVs. The US
delegation's instructions presently call for holding open
the question of qualitative limitations.
Forward Based Systems
5. Semenov also used the sessions of 28 November and
1 December to refine further the limitations the Soviets
are proposing on FBS. Citing Moscow's position that any
limitations agreement must include all nuclear weapons
systatnscapable of striking the territory of the other side,
he called for the inclusion of all carrier-based aircraft
irrespective of the location of carriers, on the grounds
that carriers are mobile strategic systems. He again
attacked forward basing of US submarines and proposed that
all ballistic missile submarines within range of the territory
of the other side be withdrawn and that submarine bases in
third countries be simultaneously liquidated. Interestingly
enough, when challenged on the issue of carriers, Soviet
adv.so:r- Mazerkin, a naval captain, assured Col. FitzGerald
that...':',our aircraft carrier when it is completed" would also
be included.
Soviet Negotiating Tactics and Goals
6. Moscow's approach to the current round of talks is
beginning to take shape. The Soviets clearly want to incor-
porate the provisions of the interim agreement into a perman-
ent agreement, and also to limit those systems not included
in the interim agreement. This would be to their advantage
since, in effect, it would mean negotiating on those systems
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in which the US has an advantage--i.e., strategic air
and forward based systems in their various forms, while
leaving untouched the numerical advantage in ICBMs/SLBMs
Moscow gained in the interim agreement. Soviet delegates
Pleshakov, and Grinevsky, however, have indicated that
once the "other systems" are defined and limited, those
included in the interim agreement could then be re-examined.
Grinevsky has also conceded that the Soviet presentation
is a "maximalist" one, and has indicated that their position
on several issues is negotiable.
7. On several occasions the Soviets have hinted that
they would like some agreements reached fairly quickly.
In commenting on the "add on" approach the Soviets preferred
in negotiating the offensive weapons treaty, Vorontsov
indicated that the Soviets would like to have measures
ready for signature "at the May summit." One of the Soviet
advisers at the talks also said that he had understood
"through press reports" that Brezhnev would be visiting
Washington in the spring, and indicated an interest in
having some kind of SALT-related agreement ready for the
visit.
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