POTENTIAL WEST EUROPEAN REACTION TO SALT OPTION OF REMOVAL OF NUCLEAR SUBMARINES FROM (Sanitized) HOLY LOCH

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP80T00294A000300020002-8
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 2
• Document Creation Date: December 9, 2016
• Document Release Date: June 12, 2001
• Sequence Number: 2
• Publication Date: December 20, 1972
• Content Type: MEMO

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SUBJECT: Potential West European Reaction to SALT Option
of Removal of Nuclear Submarines from
Holy Loch
The West European reaction to US closure of the nuclear
25X6 submarine bases at _ and Holy Loch in the context of
SALT would, on balance, be negative. There are a number
of factors which would determine the intensity of the
reactions, including: the manner in which the closure was
negotiated; the attitude of the NATO allies to our consul-
tations with them about the move; and the ability of the
US to demonstrate that the step would not diminish the
credibility of the US deterrent. We see the following
negative and mitigating considerations:
Negative Considerations:
1. In the context of the rough nuclear parity with
the Soviet Union that the US has accepted and the European
perception of an American tendency toward withdrawal
worldwide, many of our allies would see the step as another
confirmation of the US move toward a more restricted
military posture. To the extent that these bases are
conceived as part of the "Atlantic" defense--as distinct
from their role as part of the central US nuclear capabi-
lity--this reaction would be aggravated.
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2. The West Europeans would see the step as a specific
concession to the long-standing Soviet campaign against US
bases in foreign countries. As such, the concession would
appear significant politically even if the military viability
of the move were proven.
3. To the extent that the bases are part of the linkage
between the defense of Europe and the US deterrent, the allies
would worry about the effect of the move on this linkage.
4. The move would also be seen, at least by the
British, as diminishing allied involvement in control of
the deterrent.
Mitigating Considerations:
1. Removal of the bases might be seen by the Euro-
peans as something that could be traded for Soviet dismantling
of MRBMs targeted on Western Europe.
2. Those Europeans who in fact favor eliminating
Western Europe as a potential nuclear battlefield would see
this as a desirable step in that direction.
3. Provided that it can be shown that the US is
moving toward a substitute force of :Longer-range submarines
which do not require overseas bases, the Europeans might
be persuaded that their security is not adversely affected
and that the US is maintaining a technological lead in
deploying an even more secure deterrent. (It should be
noted that we successfully quieted European fears when we
removed obsolescent MRBMs from Italy and Turkey.)
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