TITOISM AND SOVIET COMMUNISM: AN ANALYSIS AND COMPARISON OF THEORY AND PRACTICE

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP80T00246A073800530001-4
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 56
• Document Creation Date: December 27, 2016
• Document Release Date: January 27, 2014
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: October 1, 1957
• Content Type: REPORT

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TITOISM AND SOVIET COMMUNISM:
Distributed
October 1957
An Analysis and Comparison
of Theory and Practice
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TITOISM AND SOVIET COMMUNISM:
An Analysis and Comparison
of Theory and Practice
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CONTENTS
PAGE
INTRODUCTION
1
ANALYSIS AND COMPARISON OF THEORY AND
PRACTICE
6
Origin of Titoism
6-7
Titoist Ideological Views Compared with the Soviet
Views
12
World Revolution
15
Violent Seizure of Power
20
The Dictatorship of the Proletariat
23
The Bourgeois State
24
The Withering Away of the State
25
The Party
26
Nationalization
28
Collectivization S
29
Socialization
30
Democratic Centralism
31
Conclusions
34
Western Socialist Views on Titoism
37
PRESENT RELATIONS WITH SOVIET COMMUNISM
48
111
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INTRODUCTION
1. The objective of this study is to compare the League of
Communists of Yugoslavia (LCY)* with the Communist Party of
the Soviet Union (CPSU) as to both theory and practice, and then
to appraise Titoism and its position in the Communist-Socialist
world. Generally speaking, both have the same philosophy,
dialectical materialism; the same "theory and practice, " Marxism-
Leninism; and the same basic objectives: overthrow of "bourgeois"
rule, establishment of the dictatorship of the proletariat, abolition
of capitalism, and the creation of a Socialist-Communist society.
Moreover, the LCY in its development had to adhere to CPSU
modes of operation, thinking and planning, since it was sustained
and guided by the CPSU -- of which it was a product or derivative --
until 1948, when it was ejected from the Soviet-dominated community.
Until that time it had been one of the Soviet Union's several East
European satellite parties, obediently, amenably, and even
For purposes of simplicity, the Yugoslav Communist organization
will be referred to throughout this study as LCY, even when
treating of periods when it was still known by its old name, Com-
munist Party of Yugoslavia (CPY). The designation "League"
was adopted at the Sixth Congress in November 1952 in order to
dissociate the Yugoslav CP from the CPSU and to underline con-
tinued allegiance to Marx and Engels, who in 1847 renamed their
workingmen's association the "Communist League". The Serbo-
Croatian word for "league" is often also translated as "union",
"federation", or even "association". The Yugoslays themselves
use the English designation "League of Communists of Yugoslavia"
in their publications in the English language (viz. Yugoslavia,
published by "Jugoslavija", Belgrade, 1954, p. 70) rather than
Union of Communists of Yugoslavia, which is the term used often
by Western political observers of the Yugoslav scene.
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enthusiastically traveling in the orbit prescribed by the CPSU, in
harmony with the other Soviet satellites. Until the break with the
CPSU in 1948, the LCY had no distinctive official interpretation
of the principles of Marxist-Leninist theory and practice.
In this comparison of Titoism with Soviet Communism,
where, solely for the sake of reducing the mass of data, more
emphasis is put on differences than on similarities, one must
not lose sight of the basic fact that Titoism, for all its conflict
with the Soviet world, is and remains Communism.* The LCY,
like all other national Communist parties, is essentially a product
of the Russian October Revolution and of the Communist Inter-
national. What has set it off from other Communist parties is
that it dared to breach the rigid system of discipline subordinating
it to the CPSU and the Soviet Union. As an entity of thought and
practice, Tito's Communism differs in some significant respects
from Soviet Communism, ** especially in the latter's manifestations
* *
During his CBS TV interview on 30 June 1957 in reply to a question
as to differences between the Yugoslav and the Soviet systems
Tito stated: "We have the same aim, the building of socialism;
only the ways, that is the methods of realizing this aim, are
different. "
One, possibly the most significant, difference is the pragmatic
Titoist approach to problems and a slight disrespect for ideolog-
ical justification for policy decisions taken. In a speech to the
First Congress of the Workers' Councils Tito stated: "We have
not the least need to justify theoretically, from a Marxist point of
view, the correctness and extraordinary efficacy of this system
e., the system of the Workers' Councils!, for it has proved
its worth in practice." (Tanyug, Belgrade, 25 June 1957) riVote:
?
All underlining and all bracketed interpolation in quotations
throughout have been supplied by the author of this study.!
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under the leadership of Joseph Stalin. To what ext,ent the post-
Stalin brand of Soviet Communism will eliminate or ameliorate
these differences remains a matter for conjecture, since the
"new line" is yet in the process of crystallization. Tito himself,
as indicated in the quotation from Borba cited on page 12, claims
to see a tendency on the part of the new Soviet leadership to
swing over to his own less rigid views in some important respects.
He and his three highest and most vocal associates, Vice Presidents
Kardelj and Rankovic and Foreign Minister Popovic, seem to
realize quite clearly that Stalinist habits practiced for years and
ingrained in the whole fabric of the Soviet Party and government
apparatus will be very hard to put aside, given even the best
intentions on the part of the Soviet leaders, and he knows that he
cannot count on the good will of some of the high-ranking Soviet
officials.* He is also fully aware of the fact that Stalinism has
permeated not only the whole of Soviet life, but also the whole
International Communist Movement, and that Stalinist influences
from abroad will continue to reinforce Stalinist habits and inclina-
tions in the Soviet Union.
Domestically, Titoism advocates modification of the
dictatorship of the proletariat by reducing the centralization
Some of these anti-Yugoslav Soviet officials were removed
during the 3 July 1957 purge, i. e. , Molotov and Kaganovich.
However any Soviet official who is inclined to stress
ideology particularly heavily is a potential hater of Titoism.
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of power and by curtailing bureaucratic concentration. 'lc It takes
exception to the Soviet practice of "state capitalism" and advo-
cates transferring ownership of the means of production to repre-
sentative bodies of the workers at the working level. It criticizes
the role of the Party in the Soviet system and the harsh, arbitrary
aspects of Stalinist policies. On the other hand, even sympathetic
observers in the European Social Democratic camp concede that
there is still a gap between what Titoism advocates and what
actually exists in Yugoslavia. They also express doubt as to the
validity of Tito's solutions in many aspects. The Party, or rather
the self-appointed leadership of the Party, is still the arbitrary
ruler of the land, having given very few signs of relaxation, and
the style of rule is still repressive and coercive. This repres-
sive character of the Yugoslav system persists despite the official
liberal-sounding pronouncements on decentralization of state
power -- depriving the Party of its executive function, and turning
the administration of the industrial establishments over to the
workers. The extent of Titoist liberalism has been recently
clearly delimited by the fate of a critic of the regime, M. Djilas,
who received a prison sentence for daring to speak his mind and
for foretelling the beginning of the end of Communism as evidenced
in the Hungarian revolt.
Since the XXth CPSU Congress "decentralization" is also
on the Soviet agenda. The Soviet "decentralization", however,
is coupled with centralization (a) through Party channels
and (b) raising of the authority of the Gosplan. Thus the
net effect of the Soviet "decentralization" is small and does
not approach the actual decentralization of state authority in
Yugoslavia. It may, however, come close to it if, as some
reports have it, more central control will be introduced in
Yugoslavia at the VIIth LCY Congress in April 1958.
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The differences between Titoism and Soviet Communism
appear most clearly in the field of international relations and
foreign policy. Tito has rebelled against the utilization of national
Communist parties and movements as instruments of Soviet policy.
He recognizes neither the obligation nor the duty of the individual
Communist parties to serve primarily as adjuncts of the CPSU
and the Soviet state, and only secondarily as domestic political
movements. As a result, Yugoslavia is the only Communist-
ruled country with an independent foreign policy. Although this
makes for one of the most distinguishable features of Titoism --
and Titoism does unquestionably stand for an independent foreign
policy, a policy made in Belgrade and not in Moscow -- this feature
should not be overemphasized. For this foreign policy is very often
identical or almost identical with the Soviet foreign policy, especially
as it pertains to East and Southeast Asia, Near East, Africa, and
South America. Just the same, Tito does not recognize the thesis
of the "capitalist encirclement" of the Communist heartland, the
Soviet Union, and rejects the principle of central direction of the
international workers' movement. He advocates that each national
workers' party be the equal of its brother parties and be allowed
to develop its own policies according to the needs and circumstances
of its own working class.
In adapting Lenin's principle of violent revolution to present
world conditions, Tito insists (possibly for tactical reasons only)
that violent revolution is no longer an absolute and irreducible
requirement for the progress of peoples along the road to Socialism
and ultimate Communism (in the Marxist sense), and concedes that
progressive development in this direction is quite possible (and in
some areas indeed a fact) under the bourgeois multiparty system.
Tito, in his revolt against Soviet imperialism, has even gone on
record against the reduction of the International Communist Move-
ment to a Soviet conspiracy. But (and this must not be overlooked)
Tito has not entirely renounced the principle of violent change and
he certainly advocates its application if absolutely necessary to
socialist development. The fact that he preaches moderation and
IF`
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coexistence, even to the extent of accepting the thesis of
evolutionary development, is probably based more on his revolt
against the CPSU than on basic convictions; that he does not
claim for the Yugoslav Communist movement a dominant role
in the world revolutionary movement is nd-doubt due more to a
realistic appreciation of Yugoslavia's limited potential at the
moment than to any altruistic motives on his own part. With
specific reference to his attitude toward the United States,
for example, he advocates a change in its form of government,
society and economy. He differs from the Soviet stand in
essence only in that he does not require that the change be
violent--violence is necessary only if change or progress to-
ward change cannot be brought about in any other way.
ANALYSIS AND COMPARISON OF THEORY AND PRACTICE
2. In the two years since the first formal step to normalize
Yugoslav-Soviet relations was taken on 2 June 1955 (the Belgrade
Joint Declaration) it has become clear that the distinctive character
of Titoist domestic policy is solidly established and
that neither Soviet blandishments nor threats can sway Yugoslavia
from its own distinctive "road to Socialism'', a road mapped out
during the period of Soviet cold war against Tito, 1948-1955.4
In an interview granted to Dr. Thomas Dehler, member of the
West German Parliament, Vice President Vukmanovic stated
that while "state relations" with the Soviet Union can be main-
tained and even improved, the relations "on the ideological
front" are expected to continue to be "poor". (Borba, 1
June 1957.) In a speech before the First Congress of the
Workers' Councils, 25-27 June 1957, Tito stated: "It is
impossible to speak of good and sincere relations between
ourselves and some Eastern countries if mere lip service
is paid to good relations with Yugoslavia while inside in-
structions are issued on the other side to party members and
the broad masses that Yugoslavia is seething with revisionism,
that this country is not socialist, that it cooperates with the
imperialists to the detriment of the socialist states.. .we can-
not be lulled by words while practice is different." (Tanyug,
Belgrade, 25 June 1957.)
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3. In tracing the origin of Titoism we have to conclude
that ideological differences had very little to do with its emer-
gence as a distinct doctrine. Although ideological reasons were
given for Yugoslavia's expulsion from the Cominform in 1948
and for its condemnation as a "fascist" state in 1949, Yugoslavia's
only "sin" was its resistance to Soviet practices aimed at dominat-
ing Yugoslavia. Yugoslavia "erred" in 1948 because it did not wish
to subordinate Yugoslav interests to Soviet interests and because
it did not acknowledge that the Soviet Union was solely responsible
for the direction of the International Communist Movement. The
Yugoslays realized this clearly from the very beginning. In
their 29 June 1948 "CPY Statement to the Cominform" they
rejected the accusation of having committed ideological errors.
and termed this accusation "absurd", "ridiculous", and "invented".
In their 1951 White Book, the charge is made that the Soviet
Governmentuwas not willing to establish relations with Yugoslavia
which would be based on equality and mutual respect for independence
and sovereignty. On the contrary, the facts show /and the White
Book produces these facts in abundance / that it was precisely the
persistent endeavors of the Yugoslav Government and peoples to
establish such relations with all countries that became an obstacle
to the Soviet Government in implementing a policy of imposition of
its will on the other peoples and subordinating independent socialist
countries to its. hegemony. "*
In 1948 two factors combined to cause a rupture of friendly
relations between the LCY and the CPSU, the latter obediently
backed by all its other satellites. These factors were (a) an abrupt
tightening of the Soviet East European policy, and (b) the unorthodox
White Book on Aggressive Activities by the Governments of the
USSR, Poland, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Rumania, Bulgaria,
and Albania Toward Yugoslavia (Belgrade, Ministry of Foreign
Affairs, 1951), p. 13.
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tendencies of the LCY leadership, developed during the fight for
Yugoslavia's liberation and socialization -- tendencies which came
to the fore only in the situation created by the stiffened Soviet
policy for East Europe.
a. The old Soviet policy, which applied during the time of
friendly Yugoslav-Soviet relations, 1945-1948, was
aimed at the establishment of regimes in East Europe
fully controlled by the respective Communist parties.
Special effort in this direction was unnecessary in
Yugoslavia because it already had, since the end of
World War II, a regime controlled exclusively by the
Communist Party.* By 1948, however, the Communist
parties of the various East European satellite states
had consolidated their control over their respective
countries; they were now ready to enter upon a new,
"higher" phase of Communist development involving
Soviet domination and coordination of the political and
economic structures of the satellite states. This new
phase -- the process of Bolshevization -- required that
the East European satellite Communist parties recognize
more than ever the principle of the "leading role" of the
CPSU. This principle, as interpreted by Stalin, required
that those who acknowledged its validity,willingly and fully
submit to detailed direction of their internal development
Although there was no reason for the Soviet Union to interfere to
any particular extent in the internal affairs of Yugoslavia and the
Yugoslav Communists had been permitted generally to run their
own affairs and to solve their own problems, the Soviet Union did
interfere frequently in the internal affairs of Yugoslavia in order
to check up independently on developments there and in order to
show the Yugoslays that the CPSU and the USSR had a privileged
position in the International Communist Movement.
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by Moscow and closely pattern their forms after the
Soviet model. This change in Soviet policy evoked
some controversy in the satellite Communist parties,
where some leaders reacted "nationalistically" against
Soviet domination; for example, Kostov in Bulgaria,
Xoxe in Albania, Gomulka in Poland, and Rajk in
Hungary.*
b. Among the satellite Communist parties, the Yugoslav
CP was from the outset the one most likely to resist
Soviet interference in its internal affairs, because it
(1) had enjoyed a long period of quite loose association
with Moscow,** (2) was used to solving its own problems,
*
**
The statement that the changed Soviqt policy for Eastern Europe
caused the Soviet-Yugoslav controversy can be (and has been)
challenged by some students of Eastern Europe. The point made
by those who do not agree with the statement is that the situation
in Yugoslavia and elsewhere in Eastern Europe caused the Soviet
policy on Eastern Europe to change. However, this view is hardly
tenable when it is noted that everything that was cited against Yugo-
slavia in 1948 dates back not only to 1945 but also to the days of World
War II. This seems to indicate that the reason Yugoslavia was
not accused of "deviation" before 1948 was that the Soviet policy
prior to that time tolerated behavior which a changed Soviet policy
had to call deviationist.
This loose association with Moscow dates back to 1937, when Tito
became Secretary General of the Yugoslav Party. Between 1937
and the outbreak of World War II, communications between Yugo-
slavia and Moscow were extremely hazardous and therefore infre-
quent; between 1939 and 1944 communications were not only infre-
quent, but almost entirely non-existent; between the end of the war
and 1948 Yugoslavia was the least of the Soviet problems in East
Europe and was granted a maximum of independence in her develop-
ment, with a minimum of support and control.
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and (3) had succeeded in liberating and socializing
Yugoslavia with but minimal assistance from the Red
Army and the CPSU. Cut off from Moscow during
World War II, the Yugoslav Communists had to rely
on their own abilities and their own knowledge of
Marxism-Leninism. When it became obvious that
Stalin was concerned more with the defense of the
Soviet Union than with the strengthening of the Com-
munist cause in Yugoslavia (so much so, as a matter
of fact, that he forbade any strong Communist activity
in Yugoslavia in order not to alienate his Western allies),
the Yugoslav Communists went against Stalin's orders,
and without any advice or control from the CPSU,
organized their own ultimately successful program.
Having, on their own initiative, achieved independence
and control, the Yugoslays found the Soviet demand for
total subordination both unattractive and degrading.
Having accomplished so much in such a short time by
their own effort, they felt quite capable of exercising
autonomy in the affairs and policies of their own country.
Moreover, they apparently did not believe that the Soviet
Union would go so far as to take any really drastic action
against them in retaliation for their defiance. It took
two years of Soviet-directed disciplinary reprisals,
including economic blockade, the encouragement of
internal revolt, and the threat of invasion, before the
Yugoslays finally became convinced that the Soviet Union
was ready and willing to destroy Communist Yugoslavia
unless it submitted to Soviet direction.
4. The Soviet treatment of Yugoslavia during and after
1948 did not cause the Yugoslav leaders to doubt the validity of
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the basic doctrine of Communism,* however, it did prompt them
to undertake a critical appraisal of the body of Communist thought,**
in order to set forth those principles to which they themselves sub-
scribed. The appraisal took two years, from 1949/50 to the end of
1932. In November 1952, at the Sixth Yugoslav Party Congress, the
results of the study were adopted as the official doctrinal basis of
*
According to Communist dogma, Marxism-Leninism leads to the
solution of all international problems, including those pertaining
to good relations between the various national states. The Yugo-
slays point out that it was specifically the Stalinist interpretation
and application of Marxism-Leninism, rather than the doctrine
itself, which led to the Yugoslav-Soviet dispute. Cf. Marshal
Tito, Workers Manage Factories (Belgrade, 1950), pp. 22-31.
** This appraisal was not a genuine search for final truths: its
objective was not to review the essence of Communism, but
to find in basic Communist texts ideological support for the
Yugoslav position. The Stalinist principle of the "leading role"
of the CPSU and of the Soviet Union had to be eliminated even
if "justification" of it could be derived from Marxist-Leninist
writings. Thus, efforts were made to find a Marxist-Leninist
text which would condemn or undermine the "leading role"
principle. Even before finding an ideological basis for con-
demning this Stalinist tenet, the Yugoslays officially rejected
the "leading role" principle. On 26 June 1950 in his speech
before the Yugoslav Federal Assembly, Tito had this to say:
"We deny the existence of any sort of leading nation. As soon
as one allows that such a leading nation does exist, this fact it-
self inevitably leads to national oppression and economic exploita-
tion by the stronger nation which has a monopoly over leadership."
? Tito then added, "This is such a simple matter that it is not
necessary to talk about it much. " (Ibid. , p. 15.) Note that Tito
does not here condemn the "leading role" principle specifically on
? the ground that it is contrary to Marxist-Leninist teachings.
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Yugoslav Communism. The principles adopted were amplified
in subsequent statements made by Tito, Vice President Rankovic,
and three top Yugoslav theoreticians: M. Pijade, E. Kardelj
and V. Vlahovic. It should be noted here, however, that rigid,
dogmatic ideological positions like those in the Soviet Union do
not exist in Yugoslavia. Everything in Yugoslavia, including
its version of Communist doctrine, is in "the process of
becoming" or is to be "transformed gradually".
5. Titoist Ideological Views Compared with the Soviet
Views. A general comparison of the Yugoslav and Soviet
ideological views and systems of government was drawn
by Tito in answering a question put to him by a member of
the Sherwood Eddy Seminar on 2 August 1955. * When asked,
"What are the essential differences between Soviet and Yugoslav
Communism?" Tito said:
"This matter I would not put here as a question of
essential differences between Soviet and Yugoslav
Communism. I would rather refer to different
systems in the Soviet Union and Yugoslavia, or the
methods in which they are building their internal life
and how we do it. Starting from this point, one can
discover that there are differences and that they are
quite big. However, this doe g not mean that these
differences are of such a nature that a conflict between
Yugoslavia and the Soviet Union is absolutely inevitable
in order to exist. In the Soviet Union, the new leaders
who have succeeded Stalin have come to the conclusion
that in the world a single type of any system whatsoever
See the August 1955 issue of Borba, the official news organ
of the Socialist Alliance and the leading newspaper of the
country.
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cannot rule, that in the world today there are many
peoples with different historical backgrounds, and
that it is necessary that every people should deter-
mine its own roads, and that no system can be
forced upon them as a pattern to follow...."
It can be seen from this statement that the establishment of a
Communist society is the objective of both states and both
Parties, that only the methods of achieving it may differ, and
that the sole cause of the quarrel was that the Soviet Union under
Stalin did not allow each Communist-controlled country to use its
own methods of achieving Communism, but insisted on imposing
the Soviet pattern on all of them.
6. The general ideological position of the Yugoslav Com-
munists is determined by the fact that they accept dialectical
materialism as the only method by which all phenomena are to be
investigated and assessed, and that they believe this to be the only
realistic philosophy.* Marxist-Leninist theories are also listed
officially as the theories to which the LCY subscribes. However,
*
"We are practical people... , we look for what we see with our
own eyes, what has been empirically shown to be good, and
we do not rummage through books just to see what is in them.
What we find in them serves us as a guide in a dialectical
approach to problems. IT Marshal Tito, in Borba, 3 August
1955.
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Tito's Marxism-Leninism* is described by Titoists as being not
a "distorted Marxism, which tries to govern the masses in the
name of ideas, but Marxism in its real sense, which understands
people in their political activities, in their wishes and in their
endeavors and so helps them to change the world. "** In 1950
when proposing a new basic law on the management of the State
Economic Enterprises and Higher Economic Associations by
the Workers Collectives, Tito had this to say about Marxism-
Leninism: "Turning to Marx, Engels and Lenin, one can, in the
main, find the answers to all problems in principle". **):c Tito
then added that the CPSU interprets Marxism-Leninism falsely.
The differences between the Marxism-Leninism of the LCY and
that of the CPSU will become more apparent as specifsk elements
of Marxist-Leninist theory are compared.
?T?
The term "Marxism-Leninism" is used here in its broad
sense. It means the whole array of Marxist doctrines and
concrete outlines for specific Communist actions and attitudes
as worked out by Lenin. These pertain to: methods of seizing
power, establishing the dictatorship of the proletariat, economic
policy during the transition from capitalism to socialism,
utilization of non-proletarian classes (e.g. , the peasants) for
proletarian aims, combining the national and the colonial ques-
tion with the question of international proletarian revolution,
cohesiveness and discipline of the Party which alone can
guarantee successful seizure and retention of power, etc.
**
V. Bakaric, member of the Executive Committee of LCY, in
a speech to the Croatian Federal Assembly on the occasion of
Tito's 63rd birthday, Review of International Affairs (Belgrade,
1 June 1955).
***
Marshal Tito, Workers Manage Factories, p. 28. ?
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7. World Revolution. Marx and Engels believed that t1-4.e
proletarian revolution would eventually assume world-wide pro-
portions. Capitalism was the enemy of the working class
throughout the world, and the interests of the proletariat trans-
cended national boundary lines. Solidarity of action was urged
by Marx and Engels.* Before the October Revolution in Russia,
Lenin expressed the belief that revolution in any one country
would be endangered unless supported by the proletarian move-
ment in other countries; moreover, the first nation in which the
proletariat came to power would be expected in turn to promote
and foster revolution in other parts of the world.** After the
establishment of the Soviet state, Lenin expanded on this line to
the effect that the Soviet Union was now a powerful support base
on which world revolution could continue to develop.*** In
providing such a base for the other Communist parties, the Soviet
Party itself came to play an increasingly active revolutionary role.
The CPSU also attracted the various Communist parties because
it was, at that time, the only Communist party continuously gaining
practical experience in the development of socialism. It was but
a short step, then, for the CPSU to formalize its position in a
new doctrinal principle, which accorded to the CPSU and to the
Soviet Union the "leading role" in the international workers'
movement. In Stalin's ultimate interpretation of this "leading
role" principle, the CPSU had the inherent right to direct and
control the various national Communist parties.
M. Fisher, Communist Doctrine and the Free World (Syracuse
University Press, 1952), p. 243.
**
V. I. Lenin, Collected Works (New York,Interna.tional
Publishers, 1945), Vol XXIII, p. 210.
J. Stalin, Leninism (New York,International Publishers, 1928),
Vol I, pp. 212-216.
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Tito and the Yugoslav Party adhered to this principle and
apparently were perfectly willing to follow the Soviet Union until
after World War II.* However, when in 1948 the Soviet Union
wanted not only to lead, but actually to push Yugoslavia in the
direction and in the manner the Soviet Union wanted Yugoslavia
to go, Yugoslavia rebelled. As a result, the Stalinist principle
of the "leading role" of the USSR and the CPSU ceased to be a
part of the body of doctrine of the LCY. Tito stated, "We deny
the existence of any sort of leading nation", and he referred to
the Soviet Union as "a so-called leading nation. "** Starting
*
In his report to the National Assembly on 31 March 1947,
Marshal Tito had this to say concerning Yugoslavia's
willingness to follow the Soviet lead: "Yes, Yugoslavia,
and the other countries of the East as well, are going
together with the Soviet Union, but they are going with it
precisely because they know that it did not threaten their
independence..." Whitebook on the Aggressive Activities
by the Governments of the USSR, Poland, Czechoslovakia,
Hungary, Rumania, Bulgaria and Albania Toward Yugoslavia
(Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Belgrade, 1951), p. 13.
Marshal Tito, Workers Manage Factories, p. 15. Similarly,
Vice President A. Rankovic, in commenting on the submis-
sion and publishing of the draft of the new Party statutes in
all leading Yugoslav newspapers on 14 November 1952, said,
"It was necessary to destroy among us the illusion of some
leading role of.. .the All-Union Socialist Party in the inter-
national workers' movement. "
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with this revision of Stalinism*, the Yugoslav Communists
eventually evolved the following position on world revolution
and on international cooperation among workers' movements:
What matters is not world revolution per se, but the
development of socialism. This development can take place
and is taking place to some extent -- in all countries where
the working class is not being suppressed outright -- under
many diverse political systems. Socialism is often developed
by non-Communists, by non-Marxists, and even by non-
Socialists. The development of socialism can be speeded up
by having all the workers' movements cooperate with each
other. The only way in which these movements can be brought
together under modern conditions is by free association.
Voluntary recognition of a socialist community of interest --
not central direction -- will bring about the broadest unifica-
tion of effort aimed at the development of socialism throughout
the world. Titoism,** in effect, proposes to remove from
This term is used to denote the teachings of Marx, Engels
and Lenin as dogmatically interpreted by Stalin, and as
imposed by him on the International Communist Movement.
The term denotes in particular the theory and practice
connected with Stalin's personal dictatorship -- "one man
rule" -- over the CPSU, the Soviet State, and -- under the
guise of "the leading role" of the CPSU -- over the Inter-
national Communist Movement as a whole.
The term "Titoism" used in this study stands for: (1) the
Yugoslav Communist revolt against Stalinism and (2) several
distinctive doctrines pertaining to methods which are to be
used in the building of Socialism and Communism. These
doctrines were officially made part of Titoism at the Sixth
CPY Congress in November 1952 and are outlined in paragraphs
8 to 16, below.
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Communism the stigma of conspiracy and of serving the interests
of a foreign power.*
As a result of the 1955 rapprochement between the Soviet
Union and Yugoslavia, the present Soviet leaders give the
appearance of having adopted a new approach to relations with
other Socialist states. In effect, they are making what might be
described as concessions in the direction of Titoist thinking on
the problems just discussed. According to the official declaration
growing out of the conference of the heads of the Soviet Union and
Yugoslavia in Belgrade in May-June 1955, the two governments
adopted as a principle to guide their future relations "mutual
respect and non-interference in one another's internal affairs
for whatever reason, whether of an economic, political or
ideological nature, inasmuch as questions of internal organization,
difference of social systems and difference in the concrete forms
of socialist developments are exclusively the concern of the peoples
of the respective countries."
The Cominform journal, For a Lasting Peace, for a
People's Democracy, 22 July 1955, carried an article entitled,
"For the Development of Friendly Relations Between the Soviet
Union and Yugoslavia", from which the following pertinent passage
Cf. for example the Borba account in the issue of 3 August 1955,
of the interview on 25 July 1955 between Tito and members of
the Sherwood Eddy Seminar. The most concise and clear pre-
sentation of this Titoist view has been made by V. Vlahovic,
president of the Commission for International Relations of the
Socialist Alliance. Cf. "On Forms of Cooperation between
Socialist Forces", in the LCY theoretical journal Komunist,
Belgrade, No. 6/7, 1950.
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is quoted:
As Lenin pointed out, all nations will come to
socialism -- that is inevitable -- but they will not
come to it in quite the same way. Each will make
its own specific contribution to one or another form
of democracy, to one or another variety of the
dictatorship of the proletariat, to one or another
rate at which the socialist transformation of various
aspects of social life is effected. The historic
experience of the Soviet Union and the People's
Democracies shows that, given the primary and
fundamental matter of safeguarding the victory of
socialism, different countries can employ different
forms and methods of dealing with the concrete
problems of socialist construction, depending on
their distinctive historical and national features. "
That the Titoist stand on these very problems remains
adamant, -in spite of the relaxation of tension between the two
countries, is evident from an-article which appeared on 17
November 1955 in Borba under the title, "Wrong Conception".
Borba takes strong exception to an article which had appeared
on 13 November 1955 in the CPSU organ, Pravda, and quotes
the Pravda article in part as follows:
"The workers of Yugoslavia are soon to celebrate
the 10th anniversary of the proclamation of the
Federated People's Republic of Yugoslavia. The
freed people, full of energy, are strengthening and
developing great achievements. And they have ample
conditions for that purpose. The existence of the
political authority of workers and peasants, the
industry and transport, the development of friendly
ties with the USSR and countries with People's
Democracy -- these are the decisive conditions of
a successful development of Yugoslavia on the road
to socialism."
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"Yugoslavia highly appreciates cooperation with
the Soviet Union, considering it to be of great
mutual interest as well as of positive significance
to peace... , however, this does not contradict the
fact that the internal factors are the decisive condi-
tions of further internal development of every
country. Consequently, the thesis put forth in the
latest Pravda article, according to which the develop-
ment of friendly relations between Yugoslavia on the
one hand and the Soviet Union and the countries with
People's Democracy on the other hand, constitutes
one of the decisive conditions for the successful
development of Yugoslavia on the road to socialism,
is mistaken.... In this connection we would like to
recall the Tito-Bulganin Declaration in which it was
emphasized that the question of internal order,
different social systems and different forms of the
development of socialism are a matter of exclusive
concern to the peoples-of individual countries....
From this follows that... socialist development of
any country is a matter of its organic internal
development,"
The Yugoslav communique of 3 August 1957 on the Soviet-
Yugoslav talks of 1 and 2 August makes it appear that Tito's
positions have been accepted by Khrushchev, at least in public
statements.
8. Violent Seizure of Power. Stalin taught that violent
proletarian revolution was inevitable and that "peaceful"
development was conceivable only in "the remote future" after
the most important capitalist states had been captured by the
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proletariat (i.e. , by the Communist Party).* He condemned
the "reformist" (evolutionary) approach and praised the
"revolutionary" approach -- the use of reforms as a cover for
illegal work to prepare the masses for the overthrow of the
bourgeoisie.** The Titoist approach to this problem, in its
realism, is an extension of the basic teachings of Marxism-
Leninism adapted to local and prevailing socio-economic
conditions and is to a certain extent in direct conflict with
the body of rigid "Leninist" interpretation as promulgated
and commented upon by Stalin. Tito's biographer, V. Dedijer,
says, "No progressive movement should once and for all
renounce the philosophy of the revolutionary path... , but no
one should make a revolution just for the sake of revolution.
If the advancement of society, that is to say, the solution of
economic, social and political problems, can be achieved
without revolutionary means, so much the better. "*** Although
Dedijer has since been expelled from the Party, this view has
been supported by other leading Yugoslav Communists. R.
Colakovic, member of the LCY Central Committee, has this
to say on the subject: "In order to achieve its aim as a class,
the working class must -- in one way or another -- destroy the
power of the bourgeoisie, establish its own rule and transform
the means of production into social property. This can be achieved
through violent class conflicts -- through civil war -- as has been
the case so far wherever the working class has taken power, or
through parliamentary methods which should not be excluded as
J. Stalin, Foundations of Leninism (New York, International
Publishers, 1939), p. 56.
**
Ibid. , pp. 103-104.
**=t-
V. Dedijer, Tito. Speaks, p. 435.
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a possibility under specific conditions in certain countries.... "*
This latter point is recognized by Vice President E. Kardelj as
applying to the evolutionary approach used by the workers in
Scandinavia to gain power. In a statement made in February
1952 before the Fourth Congress of the Socialist Alliance of the
Working People of Yugoslavia, Kardelj said:
The road to power of the working classes and
the Socialist forces is not the same in all countries.
Where strong democratic institutions and firm demo-
cratic traditions exist, every political advance made
by the workers brings them face to face with the ques-
tion of socialist reconstruction. But where internal
tensions and strained political relations render a policy
of compromise impossible, where the ruling classes
will not grant concessions to the workers, the labour
movement may have recourse to revolutionary means
in order to secure its rights and attain its social
objectives. If we were to prescribe one particular
method for every country, irrespective of existing
conditions, we would soon find ourselves in conflict
with reality. Socialists must employ the tactics which
correspond to the actual situation in which they are
conducting their struggle. "**
Thus, while Titoism justifies the revolutionary and violent
seizure of power in non-democratic Russia and non-democratic
Yugoslavia, it also accepts the non-violent approach,e.g., in
the Scandinavian countries.
* Socialist International Information, London, 20 December 1952.
-r
Socialist International Information, London, 4 April 1953.
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9. The Dictatorship of the Proletariat. According to
Lenin, a true Marxist accepts the dictatorship of the pro-
letariat as the only form of government under which socialism
can be developed. Lenin states that a Marxist is "one who
extends the acceptance of the class struggle to the acceptance
of the dictatorship of the proletariat." This is what distin-
guishes a Marxist from a petit bourgeois.*
Titoism applies the same definition of a Marxist when
referring to the internal Yugoslav situation. On the other
hand Titoism teaches also that, while the dictatorship of the
proletariat may be established in some countries, it need
not necessarily be established in all countries which are
building socialism. Vice President E. Kardelj says:
"It would be senseless to lay down for all
countries in which the working class is in power
the same course of action to attain socialism.
The bourgeois democratic multiparty system is
one possible method of advancement. It is suitable
for countries with deep-rooted democratic traditions
where internal conflicts have not developed to
extremes. In countries where conditions in this
respect are different, various forms of revolutionary
dictatorship may be preferred. This applies in
particular to countries with backward social and
economic structure. Yugoslavia belongs to a con-
siderable extent to the latter group of countries.
In our country internal conflicts used to be very
acute, and no other way than the revolutionary one
was open to the working class and the progressive
democratic forces.
* Lenin, "The State and Revolution", Selected Works,
(New York, International Publishers, 1943), Volume VII, p. 33.
** Socialist International Information, London, 20 December 1955.
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10. The Bourgeois State. Lenin and Stalin taught*
that the workers could not merely take over the bourgeois
state and operate it for the establishment of socialism.
They taught that the workers must "smash" the bourgeois
state and replace it with the dictatorship of the proletariat.
Civil liberties, which Lenin recognized as existing in some
bourgeois states, were not to be taken as an excuse or basis
for renouncing or dispensing with the principles of violent
revolution as a necessity on the way to the assumption of
power by the proletariat.**
Titoism, on the other hand, concedes that, where the
working class has a certain amount of power in "countries
with deep-rooted democratic traditions", the advance toward
the goal of socialism can be carried out even under the
"bourgeois multiparty system". Implied in this statement of
Titoist principle i-s the concession that violent destruction of
the bourgeois state is not a basic necessity and that it is pos-
sible for the working class to achieve power under a system of
parliamentary democracy. It should be noted that this conces-
sion in no way implies a renunciation of the need to resort to
violence for the accomplishment of Communist aims, if the
particular national situation so requires, but it does represent
J. Stalin, "Foundations of Leninism", in Problems of
Leninism (Moscow, Foreign Languages Publishing House,
1947), pp. 39-45.
**
Cf. M. Fisher, Communist Doctrine and the Free World
(Syracuse University Press, 1952), Chapters VIII and IX,
which includes numerous source citations.
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a distinct divergence from the Soviet stand of the Stalin period
that violence is required, no matter what the circumstances
might be.*
11. The Withering Away of the State. According to Tito,
Stalin modified the teachings of Marx and Engels concerning the
withering away of the State.
"First of all, /says Tito/he added two
conditions to Engels' formulation on the withering
away of the State, saying: 'Is this proposition
of Engels correct? Yes, it is correct but only
on one of two conditions: (1) if we study the
socialist state only from the angle of the internal
development of the country... ; or, (2) if we
assume that socialism is already victorious in
all countries, or in the majority of countries,
that a Socialist encirclement exists instead of
a capitalist encirclement, that there is no
more danger of foreign attack, and that there
is no more need to strengthen the Army and the
State.... ' In 1939, it could really be said that
the Soviet Union was entirely surrounded by
capitalist countries. But after the Second World
War, when a whole series of new Socialist states
emerged in the proximity of the Soviet Union, there
could no longer be any question of the capitalist
encirclement of the Soviet Union. To say that
the functions of the State as the armed force,
not only of the Army but also the so-called punitive
organs, are directed only outward means talking
with no connection with the present situation in
the Soviet Union. What is the tremendous bureau-
cratic, centralized apparatus doing? Are its
* This aspect of the Titoist view has already been documented
in the two preceding paragraphs.
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functions directed outward? What are the NKVD and
the militia doing? Are their functions directed out-
ward? Who deports millions of citizens of various
nationalities to Siberia and the Far North? Can
anyone claim that these are measures against the
class enemy... ? "*
Titoism avers that the State, the dictatorship of the
proletariat, should begin to wither away as soon as it has
nationalized the basic means of production and distribution.
This view, according to Tito, is in accord with the teachings
of Lenin, whom Tito quotes as follows: "The proletariat needs
state power, a centralized organization of power, an organized
force, for suppressing the resistance of the exploiters and
for leadership of the great masses of the population, peasants,
petty bourgeoisie, semi-proletariat, and also for the establish-
ment of Socialist ownership. 'But it should not be forgotten, '
says Lenin, quoting Marx, 'that the proletariat needs only
the state which is withering away. '"** Nevertheless it should
be pointed out that Tito has not drawn any substantial practical
***
consequences from this position.
12. The Party. Tito criticizes the Stalinist concept of
the Party and its role, while indirectly describing the functions
of the Party as he conceives them himself, in the following
words:
"How does Stalin present the question of
the role of the Party in relation to the state?
* Marshal Tito, Workers Manage Factories, pp. 28 and 29.
** Marshal Tito, Workers Manage Factories, p. 23.
***According to Milovan Djilas the essence of a Communist
system, including the Yugoslav, is the exercise and main-
tanance of totalitarian power of the ruling Communist
"class." The concept of the "withering away of the State"
is therefore meaningless. (See Milovan Djilas, The
New Class, New York, F. A. Praeger, 1957).
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In his works he never determined the role of
the Party in the first phase of Communism,
i.e., Socialism. He reduces the role of the
Party to administration of a state apparatus
which still bears the stamp of class society.
Therefore, it is no wonder that, in the Soviet
Union, the Party is becoming more and more
bureaucratic and is growing to be part and
parcel of the bureaucratic state apparatus,
becoming identified With it, and simply a part
of it. It is therefore losing all contact with
the people and with those things which should
be occupying it. Its duty is to be the organizer
and most active participant in all political,
cultural and economic actions, to take active
part in all fields of social activity and to keep
a check on the same, to increase the enthusiasm
of the masses by its own example. To reduce
the role of the Party to being part of the
bureaucratic apparatus, a part of the state
machinery of coercion, for the implementation
of various enforced measures?all this is
contrary to the teaching of Lenin on the role of
the Party in the first transitional period as
leader and educator, and not as per secutor".*
Marshal Tito, Workers Manage Factories, p. 30. Later
statements by responsible Party officials in the same vein
are found in the LCY theoretical journal Komunist, and are
published as resolutions of the various Party congresses,
plenary sessions, and meetings on lower Party echelons.
The results of one such session bearing on the role of the
Party, namely the Second Central Committee Plenum of
the Slovene League of Communists on 17 March 1955, were
published in Komunist, No. 4, 1955.
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According to Titoism, the role of the Party was defined
by Marxism-Leninism only up to the point where it seized actual
political power in a country; regarding any subsequent role, only
a very general reference is made by Lenin to the Party's having
an educational role. But it is logical, the Titoists say, that the
power of the Party under the system of a dictatorship or rule of
the proletariat, i.e., after the seizure of power, is just as much
subject to the process of withering away as is the power of the
state. After the dictatorship of the proletariat is firmly established,
the 2'military" power of the Party is to be transferred gradually
to the state; the "political" power of the Party is to be transferred
gradually to a broad front composed of all the mass social
organizations in the country--in the case of Yugoslavia, to the
Socialist Alliance of the Working People of Yugoslavia. Only
the "ideological" power is to be retained by the Party indefinitely,
or until the country is fully communized_ The ideological
monopoly of the Party, however, is a considerable coercive
instrument, as Djilas correctly points out in the The New Class.
Transference of functions to the state or front organizations
can hardly be evaluated as a withering of the Party which
controls both the state and the front organizations.
13. Nationalization. In conformity with orthodox Communist
doctrine, Titoism holds that the first thing the proletariat should
do upon its seizure of power is .to nationalize the basic means
of production and distribution. In Marxist-Leninist language
this is known as "the establishment of Socialist ownership."
According to Titoist teaching, nationalization is the lowest
form of socialization; the nationalized property has next to be
transformed into truly socialized property by allowing the actual
* See Marshal Tito, Workers Manage Factories, p. 30.
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producers to manage and administer that property. Failure to
bring the workers into the administration of the properties on
which they are engaged in productive work, introduces what
Tito calls the system of state capitalism which exists in the
USSR. The opportunity of developing socialized relations
among the workers is afforded only when the workers are
at the same time in charge of the administration of the factories
and mines in which they work.* After the Soviet-Yugoslav
rapprochement in 1955, however, Tito ceased to attack the
Soviet system as state capitalism. Further, the concept of
workers' participation in the management of socialized
means of production needs to be scrutinized closely to
determine whether it is substantive or merely formal.
Djilas, in the book cited, maintains that it is formal.
14. Collectivization. Titoism agrees with orthodox
Marxism-Leninism that collectivization of the farms is an
absolute necessity if Socialism is to develop in the country-
side. According to Tito, the main reason collectivization
is not being pushed in Yugoslavia at the present time is that
Yugoslav industry is not now capable of producing the farm
implements (tractors, combines, etc.) which would make
collective farming profitable. The determiriation to
collectivize farming eventually was expressed by Tito in
mid-summer of 1955, although he said this would be done
"gradually." In distinction from Stalinism, Titoism
professedly desires to induce the development of collectivi-
zation without resort to coercive methods such as have
been employed throughout the Soviet orbit and intends to
push it full speed ahead only when Yugoslav industry is
* Ibid., pp. 23-25.
** Review of International Affairs, Belgrade, August 1955.
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able to support it. Strong peasant resistance to collectivization
was probably an equally important reason for not pushing collectivi-
zation during the difficult period of resisting Stalinist aggression
and of cold war tactics. Tito at that time needed desperately
the fullest possible support of the broad masses of the Yugoslav
population, of which the peasantry is the largest part. He would
not have received this support under conditions of forced
collectivization.
15. Socialization. According to Marxist-Leninist theory,
the economic instrument of socialization of relations among the
workers is conversion of private means of production into
"common property" or its transfer to "public ownership".*
** ***
Tito and Kardelj both criticize the Soviet view that
"state ownership" of the basic means of production is the
"highest form of social ownership" and claim that such a view
misrepresents Marx and Lenin. They insist that nationalization
of the basic means of production does not in itself bring about
socialist relations among the workers; nationalization alone
introduces only "state capitalism", not socialism. "Common
property" and 'common interest" are introduced into nationalized
property only when "every individual worker /participates/ in the
* Lenin, Toward the Seizure of Power (New York,International
Publishers, 1932), Volume II, p. 224.
** Marshal Tito, Workers Manage Factories, p. 25.
***Kardelj's introduction to the New Fundamental Law of
Yugoslavia (published by the Union of Jurists' Associations
of Yugoslavia, Belgrade, 1953), p. 8.
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management of factories and other economic organizations".
Again, the actual extent of worker participation would be the
acid test of this position.
16. Democratic Centralism. The Leninist principle
of "democratic centralism", which demands of the rank-and -
file "iron discipline bordering on military discipline", *
is the basis on which the Yugoslav State was organized.
Titoists do not quarrel with that principle as such. They
contend, however, that once a State establishes its defenses
against external enemies, eliminates or disarms internal
opposition to the extent that it becomes incapable of organizing
counterrevolution, and nationalizes the basic means of
production, "the conditions for the victory of socialism"
are then achieved. ** The State should then immediately
begin to wither away. One of the ways in which this should
be done is through the decentralization of its powers. ***
**
Lenin, "Conditions of Affiliation to the Communist
International", Selected Works (New York, International
Publishers, 1943), Vol. X, p. 204.
Marshal Tito, Workers Manage Factories, p. 17.
*** Vice President Kardelj in his commentary on the meaning
of the 1953 Fundamental Law (which is sometimes called
the new Yugoslav "constitution"), admitted that this law,
which among other things aims at decentralization of
State power, would not in itself guarantee that there would
be no "revival of the bureaucratic tendencies leading to
bureaucratic forms and state-capitalist methods of
administration", i.e., as in the Soviet system. A re-
surgence of the centralized Soviet-type of government
can be blocked, according to the LCY principle of
"democratic centralism". New Fundamental Law of-
Yugoslavia (Belgrade, Union of Jurists' Associations
of Yugoslavia, 1953), p. 49.
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The central power in Yugoslavia, which is vested in the federal
agencies, is to be reduced to bare essentials: foreign affairs,
national defense, internal affairs (police), federal budget
administration, and general national economic planning. The
power formerly held at the federal level by such ministries
as agriculture, education, industry, etc., is to be transferred
to the six component Yugoslav republics. These republics,
in turn, are to pass down to lower government levels as much
of their power as is consonant with orderly administration
and with the capability and responsibility of these organs.
These lower organs are: (a) Regional People's Committees,
(b) Communal People's Committees ("Communes", which
are the basic administrative and social units in Yugoslavia**),
and the two bodies of the workers' self-administration:
(c) the Workers' Councils and (d) the Management Boards.***
*
In addition to five federal secretariats (Foreign Affairs,
Internal Affairs, People's Economyi People's Defense,
and the Budget and State), there are numerous other
federal agencies called "Administrations" (e.g., Federal
Food Administration), "Offices" (e. g., Federal Patents
Office), "Establishments" (e.g., Federal Establishment
for Economic Planning), "Centers" (Center for the Re-
habilitation of Disabled Workmen ), "Commissions"
(e.g., Federal Commission for Standardization), "In-
stitutes" (e.g., The 'Boris Kidric' Institute for Nuclear
Science) and "Councils" (e.g., Academic Council of the
Federal People's Republic of Yugoslavia).
This reform was introduced country-wide on 1 September 1955.
This is outlined in a handbook called Yugoslavia, pp. 45-61,
published by "Jugoslavija", Belgrade, 1954. The necessity
for and the process of decentralization are described by
Vice President E. Kardelj in his introduction to the New
Fundamental Law of Yugoslavia, pp. 5-50.
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The decentralization of administration, the establishment
of the Communes and the creation of the Workers' Councils are
the three things which the Titoists claim to be their singular con-
tribution to Communist doctrine on the methods of building
Socialism after power is seized by the Party. ** These methods
are hailed as superior to what the Yugoslays used to call the
"State Capitalistic Stalinist system". They will, Titoists claim,
accomplish the following: (1) prevent the dictatorship of the
proletariat from degenerating, as in the Soviet Union, into a
dictatorship of bureaucracy, (2) prevent' the rise of a bureau-
cratic class, (3) bring about true socialization of and in the
nationalized industries by permitting the workers themselves
to run the factories in which they work, (4) solve the conflict
between the town and the village (both would be enclosed within
a single Commune, which is the basic, i.e., lowest social
unit recognized by the state), (5) start the process of withering
away on the part of the State--a firm requirement of a true
Marxist, socialist state, and (6) train the masses in self-
administration, so that in time they will in effect administer
themselves as responsible members of the basic social unit,
***
the Commune.
*
**
"Workers Councils" are elected by all the workers of each
factory for the purpose of selecting the "Management
Boards", supervising the management of the factories by
these "Boards", and reporting to the workers.
The Soviet press in reporting on the Yugoslav First
Congress of the Workers' Councils, 25-27 June 1957, has
treated the Titoist Workers' Councils rather sympathetically,
but pains are taken to limit their applicability only to
Yugoslavia.
*** This was outlined by Vice President E. Kardelj in the
New Fundamental Law of Yugoslavia and by Tito in his
book entitled, Workers Manage Factories (Belgrade,
1950), pp. 9-43.
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17. Conclusions. The preceding paragraphs have presented
the more distinctive Titoist theories. Many of them place Titoism
ideologically not too far from what might be called a Marxist
Social Democracy. They appear to be free of many of those
characteristics which Western liberals would find too rigid,
overly aggressive, unappealing and disturbing in Stalinism.
Life under a regime governed by Titoist theories might seem
to be at least tolerable; freedom and democracy under a
Titoist system might seem to be retained at least partially.
A gullible, "progressive" Western individual who knows
Titoism only as a set of certain theories might conclude that
it is liberal, progressive and desirable. Even a shrewd
liberal Western politician can so preoccupy himself with
the Titoist theories and with Yugoslavia's insistence on in-
dependence that he may view Titoism with sympathy and
consider it to be a system which is trying hard to introduce
democracy and social justice.
In an article on "The Yugoslav Experiment" the
following statements appeared.
"To put it, perhaps, in somewhat over-
simplified fashion, one may say that they
/the Yugoslays/ adopt the opposite /stand on
bureaucracy, labor and socialist relations/ to
that taken by Russia.... While doggedly main-
taining the Socialist positions--and in this they
are perfectly right, for it would be foolish of
them to abandon what they have attained at
such great cost--they reject neither the
contacts nor the exchange of information,
nor even collaboration with those who follow
a different course and attempt to move towards
progress in different ways....Having definitely
broken with the bureaucratic centralism of
Russian Communism, and placing confidence
in the working masses, having dismantled the
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whole structural edifice, they have transferred
to the 'collectives' (work councils) the manage-
ment of the enterprises. Thus, they have carried
out a considerable evolution of responsibility.
From a few isolated officials of the State, re-
sponsibility has been shifted to broad masses
throughout the country. Within the framework
of a Socialist economy, competition between
various nationalized industries plays an important
role... .An economic organization of this kind
is bound to have political repercussions and the
* ?
most evident is a return to democracy.?
The foregoing appraisal of Titoism made in 1952 does
not reflect reality even now, five years later. The central
"structural edifice? has not been dismantled and the "return
to democracy" is hardly noticeable. LCY's own self-criticism
admits as much. Tito in a speech at Pula on 15 May 1955 tried
to disabuse "those in the West...who have been cherishing any
illusions...that we shall become something different from what
**
we are". LCY members who thought the time had come to
establish a democratic system in Yugoslavia and who stated that
"the only current and permanent goal is the struggle for demo-
cracy", were told by Vice President Kardelj that their concepts
were "foreign to the Socialist system as it is being developed
under our conditions, " that such concepts were "borrowed
from the West, which has been developing and is developing
under quite different economic and general political conditions."***
Socialist International Information, 6 December 1952,
4* Borba, 16 May 1955.
*** Speech made at the Third LCY/CC plenum on 16 January 1954.
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Kardelj informed them that the multiparty system will not be
introduced in Yugoslavia, even if every one of the proposed
parties sets Socialism as its goal. On another occasion
Kardelj stated: "Political democratism of a Socialist country
presumes.. .the possibility of a struggle of thought, namely
also the possibility of social criticism. But.. .there can be
no doubt that a Socialist state has not only the right but also
the duty to stand up against anti-Socialist criticism by ad-
ministrative /police/ means". Various articles in the ?LCY
theoretical journal, Komunist, state that Cominformist habits
among the Yugoslav Communists are hard to break and that
this interferes with the proper implementation of the new
decentralization-socialization-liberalization program initiated
in 1952. *
Comparison of Titoist theories with Titoist practices
shows most strikingly that the theories are meant to reflect
long-term goals of Titoism. For example, transfer of federal
power to lower administrative units is to be done gradually;
democratization to any noticeable extent will only some day
be introduced; freedom is granted, but only within certain
limits; the workers are at present only learning how they will
manage factories in the non-specified future. Thus, much
of what is set forth in theory is only perspective, general
plan, intention, desirable goal, conditional promise, per-
mitted variation from the pattern. Djilas in The New Class
seriously questions the intent of Yugoslavia's ruling clique
to alter the totalitarian regime significantly.
The Titoist theories pertaining to international
relations were developed in reaction to those Stalinist theories
* One such article appeared in Komunist, No. 4,1955, and
another in Komunist No. 9-10, 1955.
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and practices which Tito found unacceptable when applied against
Yugoslavia by the Soviet Union. Yugoslavia, a small and
economically backward country, cannot honestly hope to lead
the Communist world; it costs Yugoslavia nothing to reject plans
which only the big USSR can have any hope of executing. Disa-
vowal of any ambition to dominate the international workers'
movement, to practice subversion, to interfere in the internal
affairs of others, has nothing to do with what Titoism may or
may not wish, but appears to be the result of a realistic
appraisal of Yugoslavia's capabilities, as compared with those
of the Soviet Union.
18. Western Socialist Views on Titoism. Among the
most avid students of Titoism are Western Social Democrats,
who are keenly interested in finding out how far Titoism
has pulled away from Soviet Communism and in determining
whether Communism of any type can be trusted. The Social
Democratic appraisal of Titoism is in effect a comparison
of Titoism with Soviet Communism. Thus, it is pertinent
to this study to include the findings of representative types
of Social Democrats. Given below are four such findings,
made by members of the French, the Norwegian, and the
Swedish parties. Of significance for the weighing of their
commentaries on Titoism is the fact that the three parties
concerned maintain good relations with the Titoists and
periodically meet with them for the avowed purpose of
exchanging "socialist experiences". These parties, there-
fore, have an excellent opportunity of getting to know Titoism
in theory and practice.
a. French Social Democratic Appraisal of Titoism.
Albert Gazier, executive member of the
French Socialist Party and former Minister
of Information, says there are a number of
obvious objections to Titoist economic doctrine.
First, will the workers' councils be wise enough
to appoint the most competent director and to
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dismiss the incompetent one? Will they not
seek to distribute the profits immediately and
neglect the future of the enterprise they ad-
minister? These questions are all the more
urgent since most Yugoslav workers have
only recently come from the land and are
less trained and experienced than the French
and the British workers. The second objection
refers to the dangers of corporatism which
are inherent in a system such as the Yugoslays
are introducing. It is not at all certain that
the public interest will be adequately safeguarded
by competitive enterprises, each pursuing its
own interests. It is also to be feared that these
enterprises may combine in order to avoid
the disadvantages which might arise out of
competition. The third objection is that in-
dustrial democracy may fail if at the same
time a political dictatorship--or Communist
Party domination in another form--is maintained.
For instance, when the question arises of
appointing a director, will not the Communist
group in the enterprise concerned, by its
influence and opportunities for action, play the
decisive role, leaving the workers merely the
semblance of power? In fact, the Yugoslays
are very reticent about the present role of the
Party in the enterprises, although for the future
they declare that the Party must wither away
together with the state. The stated Yugoslav
aim to establish a system of workers' control
over industrial establishments is very -far from
being practiced today, despite the fact that
Workers' Councils exist on paper at least.
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At present the role of the State in running
Yugoslavia'sindustrial establishment is still
predominant.*
Georges Brutelle, Joint Secretary of the
French Socialist Party, SFIO, states that the
following questions should be asked in assessing
the value of Titoism: Was the Yugoslav Com-
munist seizure of power by revolutionary means
and the abolition of the former regime of benefit
to the community, or did it profit the minority
now controlling the state? Have the political
leaders the support of the workers, and can
they therefore claim to wield power in the name
of the workers, or do they impose their dictator-
ship upon the workers? Is the regime tending
toward the elimination of certain features
peculiar to the revolutionary period? Do the
leaders envisage the preservation of authoritarian
power, or do they see freedom of thought and
expression as their aim? The new Yugoslav
constitution, reflecting the new Titoist doctrine
outlined at the Sixth Party Congress in November
1952, should be studied; however, the character
of a regime can not be judged by its legal
"French Socialist View of the Industrial and Social Policy of
Yugoslavia", Socialist International Information, London,
26 September 1953. This quote and those from the articles
by G. Brutelle, T. Elster and K. Bjork are a condensed
paraphrase of the original texts.
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documents, but only by its practices.
In the eyes of the Titoists, Brutelle continues,
the retention of the initial revolutionary achieve-
ments takes precedence over individual liberties
and a democratic structure of government. The
Yugoslays plan a gradual road to socialism in-
volving first, nationalization of private property,
second, transformation of society as a result of
nationalization, and finally, democratization of
society and government.** Brutelle admits there
are difficulties and obstacles on the way toward
This "new constitution", called "New Fundamental Law Pertaining
to the Bases of the Social and Political Organization of the Federal
People's Republic of Yugoslavia and of the Federal Organs of State
Authority", is not actually a new constitution; it is likewise not
a fundamental law; it does not revoke the old 1946 Stalinist
Constitution. In effect, it merely indicates the desirable changes
away from the Stalinist system which the Yugoslays propse to
introduce gradually. Kardelj describes this planned procedure
as "permitting further gradual harmonizing of the whole Con-
stitutional order with the principles which are now being established"
("Introduction" to the New Fundamental Law, p. 12,) For this
reason, the "new constitution" does not reflect Yugoslav realities,
but only the general aims of the Tito regime.
** In this connection, Kardelj has the following to say on the subject
of democracy: "We are not democrats for the sake of democracy.
We are democrats because we believe that Socialism is able to
? develop substance. And therefore our struggle for democratic
methods in our social life is an integral part of our struggle for
Socialism" (Speech before the Fourth Congress of the Socialist
Alliance held early in 1953; "Titoism and the Contemporary
World", NCFFE, March 1953). Even clearer expression of the
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Titoist democracy. There are remnants of
Cominformist and even of reactionary forces
among the Yugoslav Communists. The French
know that where they control a community,
they influence its members by persuasion and
pressure. Often people join 'freely' in an
action with which they do not really agree.
Prison is not the only way to frighten people
into submission. There is the fear of being
meaning of the Titoist type of democracy came from LCY/CC
member R. Colakovic: "Democracy is always a form of class
rule and its existence is always proof that there are antagonistic
classes, one. of which oppresses the other. History contradicts
those who speak of some kind of pure democracy, above and
beyond classes....Proletarian democracy differs in principle
from all other democracies... .It (proletarian democracy)
will have to act 'dictatorial' towards the overthrown bourgeoisie
whenever the latter attempts to endanger its rule by plotting or
illegal means.... Marxists consider democracy as the rule of
a specific social class which gives it a specific substance in
accordance with its class character. There is no pure demo-
cracy, and there can be none; there is no general type of
democracy which people can achieve gradually while fighting
against those obstructing its development. It is, in the final
analysis, always determined by a given class so that its very
existence means the oppression and non-freedom of one part
of society. Democracy, and even Socialist Democracy cannot
therefore be the ideal of the working class. It is only the
means of achieving its class aims, of emancipating itself from
class slavery, of abolishing all sources of exploitation and
social privileges, all oppression of man by man, all rule....
Democracy as a political category of class society, withers
away with the Socialist State, the last State in history. And
that is--to quote Engels--the 'leap of mankind from the realm
of necessity to the realm of freedom! ".. ("Yugoslav Communists'
View on Democracy", Socialist International Information,
London, 20 December 1952.)
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suspect in the eyes of one's comrades or the fear
of suffering setbacks at work or in one's career.
It is unlikely that after only four years' break
with the Stalinists, the Yugoslays have rid them-
selves entirely of the influence of Stalinist ideas
and methods. 4
b. Norwegian Social Democratic Appraisal (pf Titoism.
Torolf Elster, member of the staff of the
Norwegian Labor Party's daily, Arbeiderbladet,
asks whether Yugoslavia is going towards a demo-
cratic form of society. First of all, there has in
fact been a development towards greater freedom
of opinion and personal security?the atmosphere
in Yugoslavia is entirely different from that whi:ah
prevailed prior to the break with the Cominform.
Although the Cominformists in Yugoslavia no longer
represent a danger to the regime, the Cominformist
mentality is still widespread and this may cause
many difficulties. For the real issue today is not
so much the direct political struggle for power,
as the problem of making the Soviet-like system
work under somewhat less rigid rules.
The Titoists are trying to develop a democratic
system in an underdeveloped country, a feat not
heretofore accomplished in any such country. There
is the possibility that the way the Yugoslays are
going about accomplishing this may not further
democratic developments in Yugoslavia but result
* "A French View on Yugoslavia", Socialist International Information,
London, 18 April 1953.
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in the consolidation of dictatorship.
Although a multiparty system seems practically
impossible at present, one day the Yugoslav Com-
munists will have to face the question of whether they
are prepared to tolerate a political opposition. In
the absence of such opposition, there can be no proper
check on the activities of the rulers. Today, the
Titoist regime may advance abstract arguments about
the "withering away" of all parties as the final solution.
But it is a contradiction in terms to proclaim that the
need for the parties will disappear, and yet to continue,
for any length of time, to prohibit parties other than
than that of the Communists. To prevent a permanent
Communist dictatorship, an increase in the freedom
of criticism and opposition is essential.
c. Swedish Social Democratic Appraisal of Titoism.
Kaj Bjork, International Secretary of the Swedish
Social Democratic Party, observes that there are
important differences of opinion on basic issues
between the Swedish Social Democrats and the Yugoslav
Communists. Although the teachings of Marx and
Engels have had an influence upon Swedish Social
Democratic thinking, the Swedes reject the rigid
interpretation of Marxism represented by the Yugoslav
Communists.
The Yugoslav Communists seem to agree that
progress towards Socialism may well be possible with-
in the framework of Western democracy and that a
* "A Norwegian Socialist View on Yugoslavia", Socialist International
Information, 5 March 1955.
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complete Socialist transformation can be achieved
in some countries without resorting to violent class
struggle. They even speak about elements of,
Socialism in some "bourgeois democracies". This
shows a greater flexibility in thinking than is usually
met among Stalinists. But they still believe that
democracy always represents the power of one class
over other classes, and that the victory of the working
class will bring about an altogether new form of
democracy. Because experience has shown that
power within a democratic state can be partly
shifted from one class to another, it is incorrect
to say that the State expresses simply the rule of
one class. When the State limits the power of
private capitalists (as it does in Sweden), it certainly
does not do so in their interest, and when it becomes
the instrument for the redistribution of the national
income it does so in the interest of the working class.
Also what the Titoists do not take into consideration
is that the nature of the State is changing with the
changes in power-relationship between classes within
the modern democracies. The old means of coercion,
such as the army, the police and the prisons, still
remain but cannot simply be turned against one class
in the interest of another. Furthermore, the Titoists
do not realize that the nature of classes is changing
by the emergence of new social groups and the improve-
ment of the workers' position, so that one cannot
simply speak of a bourgeoisie standing against a
large proletariat. The Titoists fail to see that the
role of ownership of the means of production is also
* This includes the United States.
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changing. The State and municipal and co-operative
enterprises create a situation different from undiluted
private capitalism.
The Titoist regime is a one-party rule. Without
denying that a one-party rule may be justified by
historical necessities under special circumstances,
it is still true that in the long run a one-party rule
always implies the danger of suppressing progressive
forces, the danger of tyranny and oppression. Economic
and social freedoms cannot fully compensate for the
lack of political freedom. What is more, it is not
at all certain that under the Titoist one-party system
the political and economic freedoms can be actually
safeguarded. Since it must be difficult to correct
abuses of power under such a system, it is hard to
understand how the workers can be sure of main-
taining their rights, however much the party in power
(in this case the LCY) claims to represent their
interests. The subjective wishes of the Communist
leaders are not in themselves a sufficient guarantee
that their judgement of the needs of the workers is
the same as the judgement of the workers themselves. It
may be claimed that the workers do not always understand
their own interests and that the vanguard of the proletariat,
(i.e., the Communist Party) must take care of them. It
may be different in Yugoslavia, but in Sweden Social
Democrats have always felt deeply suspicious when the
Swedish Communists have claimed to understand the
interests of the workers better than the workers
themselves. While the Yugoslav Communists are
undoubtedly of much higher quality than the lamentable
figures at present leading the Swedish Communist
Party, it is hard to feel convinced that their point
of view always represents the true interests of
their following. It must be admitted that the Titoists
have the backing of the majority of the people when
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they strive to maintain the independence of
Yugoslavia, but it is not certain that they are
supported by the majority in all their actions
in the social and economic fields.
? The Titoists claim that it is necessaryi to
maintain one-party rule as long as large sctions
of the population could be incited by capitalist
elements to resist Socialist reforms. But the
crucial problem is this: can reforms retain their
Socialist content if they are introduced by force
and not by consent? The danger of an oppressive
bureaucracy is a consequence of the use of force.
The Titoists claim that the LCY strives to
identify itself with the wishes of the people and
that the LCY may even withdraw from government
administration while still maintaining a leading
role in the country. Even so, the results will
depend upon the good will of the Communists,
which is a highly subjective factor. The assumption
that the LCY, which will remain a relatively small
group of people, will always strive in the right
direction, seems to be based on a belief in the
role of personalities which is hardly compatible
with orthodox Marxism.
Parallels between the Soviet Union and
Yugoslavia not intended, the Yugoslav leaders
may nevertheless one day find that an open fight
between different political forces within the
country may be a good corrective to bureaucratic
tendencies. What may arouse some pessimism,
however, is the fact that the Yugoslav leaders
defend the one-party system not only by pointing
to the special situation in Yugoslavia today, but
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also by ideological arguments, which seem to
imply that they regard a Communist one-party
rule as the highest form of democracy on con-
dition that it fight against bureaucracy and
centralism. It is commendable to fight these
phenomena, but it is impossible to regard a
one-party rule as democracy, however well-
intentioned it may claim to be. '<
19. The foregoing Social Democratic findings on Titoism are
amplified by extensive data from other sources, particularly in
the cited book by Milovan Djilas. These sources appear to agree
that, while individual statements by the Yugoslav leaders and
theoreticians have a certain tone of liberality and often appear
to be in accordance with Western concepts of democracy, the
Titoist regime in practice is a totalitarian system. This system
stands for a firm resolution on the part of a small number of
individuals in power that the Soviet concept of Socialism shall
remain the objective at all times and under all circumstances
and that it will be imposed on the country preferably with the
people's consent or non-resistance, but if necessary, by
naked power. This power exists for possible use in an extremely
concentrated non-democratic form. It is a fact, for instance,
that 25 functionaries of the LCY'.4 hold 278 top legislative,
**
Kaj Bjork's article was published in the Swedish paper Tiden,
the Yugoslav paper Mejdunarodni Problemi, and in the Socialist
International Information, London, 27 December 1952.
The 25 men in question are: Marshal Tito, E. Kardelj,
A. Rankovic, I. Gosnjak, M. Pijade (died since this study was
compiled), S. Vukmanovic-Tempo, R. Colakovic, K. Popovic,
S. Stefanovic, I. Gretic, N. Bozinovic, V. Bakaric, B. Jovanovic,
L. Kolisevski, F. Leskosek, M. Marinko, D. Pucar, D. Salaj,
P. Stambolic, L. Arsov, F. Bajkovic, J. Blazevic, A. Humo,
B. Kraigher and J. Veselinov.
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executive, political and social positions at the federal and
republic level. This pre-empts all top positions in the
Federal Assembly, all important permanent, committees of
the Federal Assembly, Federal Executive Council, State
Secretariats, military establishment, police, intelligence
service, Party, Socialist Alliance, press, trade unions, and
all such positions (or similar ones) at the federal and republic levels.
PRESENT RELATIONS WITH SOVIET COMMUNISM
20. From the Western point of view the main characteristic
of Titoism in theory and in practice has been its unquestionable
independence of the Soviet Union. This held true throughout
the whole period of the existence of Titoism and has been, in
the opinion of many, its very essence. Four past events may,
however, bear significantly on the independence of Titoism
and also on its very existence. These events are: The
normalization of Soviet-Yugoslav state relations (documented
in the joint Soviet-Yugoslav declaration made 2 June 1955 at
Belgrade), the official Soviet adoption of Titoist policy on
peaceful active coexistence (adopted at the XXth CPSU Congress
in February 1956), the normalization of Soviet-Yugoslav Party
relations (documented in the joint Soviet-Yugoslav declaration
made 20 June 1956 in Moscow), and the communique issued
after the Tito-Khrushchev talks of 1 and 2 August 1957. All
four of these documents describe a large area of common
Soviet-Yugoslav and CPSU-LCY interests. Soviet actions,
however, such as the September 1956 circular letter warning
the East European Satellites not to follow the Yugoslav model
of Socialism, proved that the above Soviet statements were
only declaratory in nature. Tito recognizes them as such,
and demands that they be followed by appropriate deeds.4
In a speech of 25 June 1957 at the First Congress of the
Workers' Councils Tito .stated: "It is impossible to speak
of good and sincere relations between ourselves and some
Eastern countries if mere lip service is paid to good re-
lations with Yugoslavia while inside instructions are issued
on the other side to party members and the broad masses
that Yugoslavia is seething with revisionism, that this
country is not socialist, that it cooperates with the im-
perialists to the detriment of the socialist states...we
cannot be lulled by words while practice is different."
(Tanyug, Belgrade, 25 June 1957).
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21. Probably the simplest way in which to determine whether
Titoism remains independent is to observe its attitude toward
cettain established key policies. In accordance with these Titoist
policies Titoism must:
a. continue to denounce Stalinist practices and forms in
the whole Sino-Soviet bloc, particularly the principle
of the "leading role of the CPSU and of the USSR";
b. continue to persist in refusing to join the known Soviet-
dominated Communist and Communist-front inter-
natiohal organizations.like the World Peace Council
and the. World Federation, of Trade Unions; *
r4c
As late as two years ago the Yugoslays toyed with the idea that
a neW Socialist international organization may come into
existence and Yugoslavia, together with other socialist and
workers' parties, would be a member of it; this organization
would have to be democratic, each member equal with any
other member, and criticisms and suggestions made by the
organization would be voluntarily accepted or rejected by the
members. (This is in accordance with the "principle of
voluntariness", ) However, probably as a result of experience
of the last two years indicating that the Soviets will continue
to try to dominate other Communist parties, Yugoslav
theoreticians began to stress the "principle of bilateralism. "
(Cf. Komunist, Belgrade, '21 June 1957.) Since the 1 and
2 August 1957 Tito-Khrushchev talks, this principle seems
no longer to be stressed, Now stressed are "efforts aimed
at gradually overcoming the split within the workers' move-
ment and at achieving unity upon new foundations, " (Komunist,
Belgrade, 9 August 1957.) This should alert us to the danger
of Tito rejoining the Soviet-led International Communist
Movement. It should, however, not lead us to the conclusion
that Tito has already done so. This can come about only
"gradually" and on "new foundations", i.e? foundations
consonant With rejection of the "leading role of the Soviet
Union," "Numerous obstacles remain to be overcome."
(Komunist, 9 August 1957.)
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c. refuse to become a full member of the three known
'Soviet bloc integrating agencies; CEMA (Council of
Economic Mutual Assistance), the Warsaw (military)
Treaty, and the PCC (Political Consultative Com-
mittee);
d. denounce any foreign Soviet or Western policy which
would result in clearly changing the East-West
balance of power decisively in favor of either of the
two blocs,
The above policies have been observed by Titoism since
the 1948 break 'with the Cominform and were clearly evident
during the uprising of the Polish workers in Poznan, during the
VIIIth Plenum of the PoliSh party which brought Gomulka to power,
and during the Hungarian revolution, According to a 6 August 1957
Borba article concerning the 1 and 2 August 1957 Tito-Khrushchev
talks, Tito is convinced that Yugoslavia is "on the right road"
in maintaining an independent policy and that if that policy were
changed this would be "harmful not only, to internal Efugoslag
interests but to further socialist development, and would likewise
not contribute to an easing of tension in the world. "
The 29 June 1957 CC/CPSU resolutions provided a test
for Titoism and the Yugoslav separate road to socialism. These
resolutions ousted Molotov, Malenkov and Kaganovich for opposing
the implementation of policies outlined in the XXth CPSU Congress
and in the Belgrade and Moscow joint Soviet-Yugoslav resolutions,
The resolutions of 29 June 1957 state that "Comrade Molotov, in
his 'capacity as Foreign Minister, far from taking, through the
Ministry of Foreign Affairs, measures to improve relations be-
tween the USSR?and Yugoslavia, repeatedly came out against the
Measures which the Presidium of the Central Committee was
carrying out to improve relations with Yugoslavia. ? ?He opposed
the fundamental proposition worked out by the party.: ? on the
possibility of different ways of transition to socialism in
different countries, on the necessity of strengthening contacts
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between the'SoViet?party and progressive parties abroad." *
- On the SUrfce,' this teads like a Yugoslav interpretation of
the "cortect" international policy for the present time. It
?-seems .to indicate that Moscow has retreated from its position
outlined in the 30 June 1956 CC/CPSU resolutions (attributing -
that earlier position to the influence of the Molotov-Malenkov-
Kaganovich "anti-Party group") in whinh the Tito-Togliatti
idea of polycentrism was denounced. It seems to indicate that
?
the Soviet Union wants to make a fresh start along the line
-initiated at the XXth CPSU Congress but subsequently impeded
by Molotov's anti-Party group which tried to "drag the Party
back to the erroneous methods of leadership condemned at the
.XX-th Party Congress. " Such a hopeful interpretation of the
29th .Jurie.1957 resolution was made by the Yugoslays immediately
after was published in Moscow on-3 June 1957.**
Titoism as an ideological entity separate from the orthodox
type of Communism was generated by the Soviet-Yugoslav power
conflict. The realities of Soviet power in terms of relations
'
* The New York Times, 4 July 1957.
**
l"As regards the prospects of further development of relations
between Yugoslavia and the Soviet Union, the latest-events
(i.e;; the CC/CPSU resolutions) fortify the conviction that
the changes which have taken place will go t;.17 to remove
the vacillations and negative manifestations in international
relations more rapidly which during various periods and
various forms were evident in Soviet policy toward Yugoslavia
not only after 1948, but also after the normalization of mutual
relations. We expect that the further 'development of mutual
relations will establish even more firmly the principles on
which 'the declaration of the two governments of 1955 and the
declaration on relations between the League of Communists
of Yugoslavia and of the Soviet Communist Party of 1956
were drawn up." (Belgrade, Tanyug, 3 July 1957.)
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between East and West in general as well as between the Soviet
Union and Yugoslavia in particular will determine whether Titoism
will continue to exist in its present form, whether it will be dis-
carded as an obsolete tactical weapon, or whether a mutual adjust-
ment of Titoism and Soviet Communism will take place. Should
the Khrushchev- Tito talks of 1 and 2 August 1957 actually be
implemented by the Soviets, Tito would have no reason for
refusing to become a member of the "commonwealth of socialist
countries, " a commonwealth of independent and equal Communist
nations, held together by common basic ideology and a community
of interests.
Several events since the 1 and 2 August 1957 Tito-Khrushchev
meeting indicate that some progress has been made in the direction
of Tito's reconciliation with the Sino-Soviet Bloc, although it is
still too early to state whether it will be permanent and irrevocable.
Diplomatic recognition of East Germany made Yugoslavia
the first, and thus far, the only non-Bloc country to have extended
diplomatic recognition to East Germany. This action, which only
harmed Yugoslavia's political and economic positions in the West,
must have been taken by Yugoslavia basically in the interest of
the International Communist Movement and of the Sino-Soviet
Bloc.
Tito's recognition of Kadar, who was put in power by Soviet
bayonets, was a violation of the once 'principled" Titoist policy
of non-intervention in internal affairs of other countries.
The lack of overt Yugoslav press criticism of anything
Soviet 'since the 1 and 2 August 1957 meeting, must have been
a result of that meeting. This lack of criticism of the Soviet
Bloc has been coupled with sharpened criticism of the West.
Although the Western NATO Pact had once been pictured as an
unavoidable evil brought about to counter Soviet aggression, now
the Communi:st Warsaw Pact is defended on the ground that it
came into being only as a result of the aggressive policy of NATO.
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