SOVIET BORDER TROOP OPERATIONS AND SECURITY DEVICES IN THE TURKMEN BORDER DISTRICT

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP80T00246A062900200001-1
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 43
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: February 1, 2012
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: May 9, 1962
• Content Type: REPORT

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USSR (Turkmen SSR)
SUBJECT Soviet Border Troop: Operations and
Security Devices in the Turkmen Border
District
DATE OF
INFO.
PLACE &
DATE ACQ.
REPORT
DATE DISTR.
NO. PAGES
REFERENCES
A 42-page report entitled "Soviet Border Troop Operations and
Security Devices in the Turkmen Border District"
2. The report contains information on physical security measures and devices,
training, types of patrols, commanders' decisions and orders, passwords and
signs, communications, dogs, alerts, violations, and operational deployment
of the 8th Outpost, 18th Detachment near Gaudan N 37-42, E 58-2g in the
vicinit~ of Ashkhabad and of the 17th Outpost, 67th Detachment near Kizyl
Atrek LN 37-36, E 54-x+67.
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STATE X ARMY X NAVY X AIR NSA X OCR X NIC X DIA X
JCS X USIA X
(Note: Washington distribution indicated by "V; Field distribution by
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COUNTRY : USSR
Soviet Border Troops Oper- DATE DISTR.
ations and Security Devices
in the Turkmen Border District
DATE OF INFORMATION:I NO. OF PAGF
PLACE ACQUIRED
DOWNGRADED AT 12-YEAR INTERVALS
NOT AUTOMATICALLY DECIASSIFIED
DOD DIR 5200.10
.AAR. 62
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SCVLET BORDER TROOPS OPERATIONS AND SECURITY DEVICES
IN THE TURKMEN BORDER DISTRICT (C)
Introduction--
1. Forbidden Border Zone - - -
2. Forbidden Border Stria -
3. Physical Security Devices in the Border Str
a. Barbed-Wire Fence - - -
b. Entanglement Wire - - -
c. Klen M Signaling Fence-
d. S-100 Signaling Fence
e. S-2 Device- - - - -z - -
Orders-
1. Criteria for Assignment to Border Troop Duty- - - - - - - - - 6
2. Training ----- - - - - - - - - --- _ - - - - - - - - - - 6
3. Duty- - - - - -
a. Types of Patrols. -
b. Charge of Quarters- - -
c. Duty Instrument Operator- -
Commanders' Decisiions and
b.
c.
Outpost Commander - - -
DutyOfficer- .- 9--
5.
Password and Suns- -
6.
Signal Communications -
7.
Dogs-----
8.
Alerts- -
a.
b.
c.
d.
Border Violation Alert-
Alert for Enemy Attack- - - - -
Unidentified Aircraft Alert - -
Fire Alarms -- - - - -
9.
Border Violations
a.
Apprehension Procedures - --
-
b.
c.
Example of a Border Search
Other Border Violations -?
- -
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7
10
10
10
11
12
12
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14.
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SOVIET BORDER TROOPS OPERATIONS AND SECURITY DEVICES
IN THE TURKMEN BORDER DISTRICT (C)
Table of Contents (Cont'd)
Page Nr
C . OPERATIONAL DEPLOYMENT O F OUTPOSTS- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 16
1. Operational Deployment of the 8th Outpost 18th Detachment- - 16
a. General Information - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 16
b. Typical Employment and Scheduling of the Border Patrols - 17
(1) Left Flank - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 17
(2) Right Flank- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 17
(3) In Front of the Outpost--------------- 17
(4) In the Rear of the Outpost ------------- 18
2. Operational Deployment of the 17th Outpost 67th Detachment - 18
a. General Information - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 18
b. Typical Employment and Scheduling of the Border Patrols - 18
(1)
Left Flank - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
(2)
Right Flank- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
(3)
In Front of the Outpost---------------
(4)
In the Rear of the Outpost -------------
18
19
19
19
Comments- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 19
Annexes A through H - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 21-43
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SOVIET SORLER TROOP OPERATIONS AND SECURITY DEVICES
TN THE TURKMEN BORDER DIE TRICT (C
A. SOVIET BORDER ZONES AND PHYSICAL SECURITY MEASURES
1. Forbidden Border Zone (Zapretraaya Pograntchnaya Zrna--ZPZ)
the ZPZ as border terrain over which the Border Troop
detachments exercised operational control (pograni~;-hnyy rezhim), At the
crossing points into the ZPZ there was a border control, ,consisting of three
or four troops from the detachment, headquarters, who checked the documents
of individuals entering and leaving the zone. The !'sical. facilities con-
sisted of a road barr.yer, a o ntrol booth, and a warning sign which indicated
that it was a document, check; ointo There were no bars?iers and no border
controls between the checkpoints, but the population commonly respected the
ZPZ limits, out of fear of the consequences for crossing at, any uncontrolled
point without specific permission.
The limits of the ZPZ usually coincided with those of the local
administrative authority in which the Border Troop detachment operated. For
example, the headquarters of the 67th Detachment (Otryad) of the Turkmen
Border District was situated in KIZYL ATREK, which was the capital of the rayon;
therefore, the entire rayon was within the ZPZO If the detachment head-
quarters were in a capital city of an oblast, the entire oblast was within
the ZPZ, under the laws of the operational control.
the word "rezhim" as meaning regulations and orders
the rights of the inhabitants to reside and to move within the
genera sense prescribed that all persons desiring to live in the ZPZ must
receive permission to do so from their district office of the Ministry of
Internal Affairs (Ministerstvc Vnutrennikh Del?-MVD)o The inhabitants had
their passports stamped by the MV!, Indicating their place of residence in the
ZPZO Otherwise, they lived and conducted their activities without restriction
in the ZPZ and enjoyed the same freedoms as inhabitants of the interior USSR.
Persons desiring to leave or enter the ZPZ for a limited time received
special permission issued by the local MVD authorities. Border Troops were
authorized to check the documents of the population within the ZPZO
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Particular emphasis was placed on checking the documents of transients, who
were always suspected of unauthorized residence there.
2. Forbidden Border Strip (Zapretnaya Pogranichnaya Palosa--ZPP)
Within the ZPZ, along the border, there was established a strip of
land called the ZPP, which was completely under the Border Troops' administration
and control. There were no markers indicating its limits. The width varied,
depending on the terrain, the sensitivity of the border, and the importance of
the land to the local economy. In industrial, mining, and rich agricultural
areas, the ZPP could be as little as 30 m wide, the minimum, which the Border
Troops considered inadequate for proper security. In less important areas,
and depending on the visibility and nature of the terrain, the ZPP was from
800 m to 3 km in width. In rugged mountain terrain and uninhabited deserts,
where the maintenance of an outpost close to the border was not practical,
the ZPP was 25 km to 30 km wide. The ZPP was an evacuated area, but by
special permission of the local outpost commander, local farmers and sheep
herders were allowed, for a limited time, to enter a particularly grassy
meadow to harvest the hay or graze a flock. The various widths of the ZPP
were not classed or named. From the point of view of the Border Troops the
wider the ZPP was, the better it was for securit , since all the security
devices and outpost operations (polnoye vedeniye) had to be confined within
the ZPP.
3. Physical Security Devices in the Border Strip
The Border Troops installed a variety of physical obstacles in order to
detect and deter any border violators. The detachment commander, through his
chief of the 3d Section, determined the number and nature of the obstacles,
on the basis of terrain study and the frequency of border violations in the
sector. In general, the obstacles included the barbed-wire fence; entanglement
wire; the Klen M fence; the S-100 fence; the S-2 device; plowed strips and
observation towers. Those devices were used singly or in combinations, at
varying distances from the border depending on the width of the ZPP and the
terrain.
a. Barbed-Wire Fence (Tulskiy Zabor)
The barbed-wire fence was about 2.5 m high, and supported by
wooden posts with two arms at the top, forming a letter Y. Fences were built
either singly or in parallel pairs, and the approaches from both sides were
protected by rolls of concertina wire, or by entanglement wires. (See Annex A
for the obstacle.)
b. Entanglement Wire (Malo-Zametnoye Pripyatstviye--MZP)
was a very thin steel wire net, made of a series of snares. The net weighed about
15 kg, covered an area of about 5 x 10 in, and was laid on grass or in underbrush.
When emplaced, it reached a height of about 50 cm. The MZP was usually used in
conjunction with unprotected barbed-wire fences and in the vicinity of
unprotected natural terrain approaches.
c. Klen M Signaling Fence (See Annexes B, B-1 and B-2)
The Klen M was considered obsolete and was not being replaced.2
The vibration on the Klen M, which signaled the disturbance of the fence,
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this device.
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was so sensitive that it signaled gusts of wind, contact with a tumble weed,
a bird, or a meandering porcupine, which kept the outpost on constant alert.
An improved and cheaper substitute for the Klen M was the signaling fence S-100.
d. S-100 Signaling Fence
See Annexes C, C-1, and C-2 for
e. S-2 Detection Device2
1. Criteria for Assignment to Border Troop Duty
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the S-100 fence.'
The Soviet Border Troop enlisted personnel came from the normal
conscription channels. for selection
by the military commissariats (voyenkomaty),
qualify, a conscript had to have only a clean recor from his school, the
police and the Komsomol (if applicable) for the previous 5 years. Even
though some conscripts assigned to border guard duty were not members of the
Komsomol, they joined the organization within the first year of service,
so that every unit had 100 percent participation. Education did not appear
to be a factor in the assignment, but political reliabilit w s.
city 50X1-HUM
youths, because of their exposure to Western influences through Western music,
dances, films and dress, were considered less politically reliable than
country elements. soldiers referred with contempt 50X1-HUM
to the cynical city youths, and called them "stilyagi." It was rumored that,
because of their political unreliability, conscripts from metropolitan areas
would not be assigned to border guard duty.
Upon his arrival at the detachment headquarters, ata attempt was made
to impress each trooper through slogans and training that his duties on the
borders of the USSR were as important as those of the Minister of Defense. In
fact, the trooper on his post had the authority and duty to challenge any
Soviet official, and stop him from entering the "sacred USSR border," unless
permitted to enter by the local Border Troop commander. The slogan that the
frontier of the USSR was sacred and untouchable, and that it was secured by
"lock and key," was taken literally and seriously by the new conscripts;
their first and most burning desire was to see the "border gate and the lock"
which they were to guard with their lives. Within a year, however, they
became more or less cynical about it. There was a story that a soldier wrote
home asking for 50 rubles to pay for the key to the border lock, which he
had lost through no neglect on his part. the enterprising 50X1-HUM
soldier received the money from his parents by return mail!
2. Training
The scheduling of training and activities of the outpost was made by
the unit commander. It was a rather complex problem, since the border was
guarded by a combination of several patrols, posted on a staggered schedule
for varying lengths of time. Hours of darkness were considered the critical
hours, and consequently, the operations of the unit were most intense during
that time. In preparing the training schedule, the unit commander was guided
by the border situation and a directive which prescribed that each trooper
received 8 hours of sleep daily, 6 to 8 hours of border duty (travel time
to and from post not counted); 2 to 3 hours of training; 3 hours for meals
and preparation for duty; 1 hour of political training; and 2 to 3 hours of
free time. The schedule prescribed each EM's activities by the hour for
the day.
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Usually, mandatory training was scheduled from 1500 hours to 1800 hours,
when most of the personnel were available. It was conducted by the outpost
officers and NCOs and consisted of the following subjects: political training;
weapons drill and, twice a year, weapons qualification firing; anti-chemical
training; field sanitation training; tactical (basic infantry) training;
physical training; wire communications, enginwr training; and border guard
training.
The main stress in training was placed on border guard subjects, theory
and practice, but especially on the detection of tracks (sledopytstvo) on
the plowed strip '(kontrolna sledovaya polosa--KSP). The men were taught how
to inspect minutely every inch of the strip and many ways of detecting and inter-
preting tracks on it, such as backward tracks to mislead as to direction of
crossing; stilt tracks; imitation animals tracks; pickaback crossing, indicating
the crossing of two individuals; two or more persons stepping into the same track;
stepping on bundles of grass then retrieving the bundles; walking on boards,
leaving imprints similar to the plowed stri ; and pole-vaulting tracks.
there was no reliable, undetectable method of crossing a 50X1-HUM
plowed strip. the only successful method of crossing it
without arousing the guard's suspicion was at an authorized crossing point,
where the guard, who was supposed to obliterate his own tracks after crossing
and mark the place with a code sign (e.g., imprinting the letter T inclosed
in a triangle, from the butt of his weapon), would not be critical of a random
obliteration of crossing tracks as long as the code sign appeared with it.
Technical training in engineering and communications was limited to
the most elementary principles in each subject, consistent with the average
mentality of the conscripts. For example, troops did not get any instruction
on operation of field radios, field telephones and switchboards, because they
were considered too ignorant. Specialists such as radio operators, wiremen,
drivers and signaling-fence console operators were trained in the 67th
Detachment's specialist school in a 6-month course.
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3. Duty
a. Types of Border Patrols (Naryady)
The duty of guarding the border was always assigned to a team of
not less than two sentries, called a patrol (naryad). There were several
types of patrols, each assigned a specific duty. every 50X1-HUM
border guard was required to know thoroughly the duties of the following
patrols:
(1) Border Sentinel (Chasovoy Granitsy--ChG)(See Annexes D and E)
The patrol consisted of two or more walking guards,
designated to guard a well-defined sector of the border, about 3 to 4 km
long. The patrol minutely inspected the plowed strip, the signaling fences
and the telephone wires. Their equipment consisted of a flashlight, flare
pistol and flares (three green, three red, and three white), handcuffs, first-
aid packet, and a plug-in telephone handset. Each sentry was armed with
AK SMG and 50 rounds of ammunition carried in two magazines. Walkie-talkie
radios were not used in routine border duty. The equipment was considered
standard for most types of patrol.
(2) Roving Patrol (Dozor--D)(See Annexes D and E)
The patrol consisted of two or more armed border guards,
horse-mounted, motorized, or on foot, designated to inspect one of the flanks
or the entire sector of the outpost. The sector wa ays divided into two
flanks (razryv), the left and right. the D patrol was 50X1-HUM
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usually made up of two guards, a senior and a junior; the senior was mounted,
the junior was on foot. The duties of the patrol encompassed inspection of
the plowed strip, the communication wires, and the border markers. The main
and intermediate border markers (see Annex F) were minutely inspected for
marks of damage, for possible messages left by foreign agents, and for
cleanliness. The D patrol was also sent into the forbidden zone, roamed the
country and at random checked documents of the inhabitants, and checked new,
man-made terrain features. They carried the same equipment as the ChG patrol.
(3) Secret Patrol (Sekret--S)(See Annexes D and E)
The patrol consisted of two unmounted stationary guards desig-
nated to guard natural approaches to the border. It occupied, in secret, a
concealed position and maintained absolute silence. The patrol was equipped
with S-2 signaling devices, in addition to the standard equipment described
for the ChG patrol. A watchdog always accompanied the S patrol. The tour of
duty was limited to about 4 hours, which was the maximum endurance for the dog.
(4) Observation Post (Post Nabludeniya--PN)(See Annexes D and E)
The patrol consisted of two unmounted border guards, designated
to observe the terrain within sight from an observation tower (see Annex G).
Every outpost had three observation towers, one in each of the two flanking
sectors, and one in the vicinity of the outpost's installation. The flanking
towers were manned only during daylight hours; the installation tower was
manned 24 hours. Besides the standard equipment, each member of the PN patrol
carried field glasses. All routine observations were entered in a logbook,
maintained on the tower, but any unusual observations, such as flare signals or a
movement across the border or in the vicinity of the tower, were immediately
telephoned to the outpost headquarters, then logged.
(5) Concealed Observation Post (Skrytyy Post Nabludeniya--SPN)
The composition and duties of the SPN patrol were the same
as those of the PN patrol., except that it was concealed right on the border,
and its field of observation was primarily the area directly across the border.
The post was occupied from daybreak to after dusk.
(6) Ambush Patrol (Zasada--Z)
It consisted of five or more armed border guards on foot,
designated to apprehend border violators, acting on a previously received
warning, which gave the place and time of possible border violation. In
addition to the standard equipment, the members of the Z patrol carried
knives. The Z patrol was composed of an officer or an experienced NCO and
a dog-handler with a dog, who formed the nucleus (yadro), and three or more
guards, who formed the apprehending force (gruppa zakhvata--GZ).
In setting up the ambush, the GZ was deployed and concealed
along the expected route of approach of the violator, and the nucleus con-
cealed itself about 30 m behind the GZ. The GZ maintained communications with
the nucleus by visual means in daytime, and by pull-signals on a rope at
night. While the GZ made the apprehension as quietly as possible, the
nucleus was on the alert for possible accomplices of the violator, and was in
position to give assistance to the GZ if needed. The ambush was organized
as much as possible within the forbidden border strip in order to obtain
full proof of intention of the violator to defect.
(7) Screening Patrol (Zaslon-ZL)
It consisted of eight or more armed guards, designated to
seal off penetrated areas within the forbidden border zone and strip.
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The ZL was always comwsnded by a Border Troop officer. Its strength could
vary from several to ~e~recal hundred men, and it could be reinforced by
regular military units, temporarily attached to Border Troop operations. In
such a case, the military troops were under the command of the senior Border
Troop officer. The ZL used its own personnel to organize the various patrols
(D, PG, S, Cho) necessary to accomplish the mission. The operation was coordinated
by means of R-105 radios and signal flares.
(8) Search Party (Poiskovaya Gruppa-.-PG)
This patrol consisted of three or more guards, designated to
search within the forbidden border zone and strip for a border violator. It
was mounted or on foot, or both, depending on the terrain, and consisted of a
dog-handler with a dog (instruktor rozisknoy sobaki--IRS), who was the point;
and two or more guards deployed parallel to the left and right flanks of the IRS.
(9) Special Guard (Chasovoy u osobogo obyekta--ChO)
This was a single sentry posted to guard a special object.
For example, if a border violator discarded a parcel or any other article
during his escape, the patrol commander posted a Cho to safeguard the object
until an officer arrived and removed it.
(10) Sentinel (Chasovoy--Ch)
This was a single, armed guard posted to routine sentinel
duty, such as guarding a bridge or a Klem M fence crossing point.
(11) Barrier Sentinel (Chasovoy Shlagbauma--ChSh)
This was a single, armed guard, designated to control traffic
into the border strip. He had to be well versed in recognition of documents and
the technique of searching cars, trucks and cargo which entered or departed
the forbidden zone.
(12) Outpost Sentinel (Chasovoy Zastavy--ChZ)
The ChZ was a single, armed guard designated to guard the
outpost. In daylight hours he was posted on the outpost tower and performed
the duties described for the PN patrol. At night he walked his post on the
ground near the tower, keeping alert and giving telephone reports of flare
signals, approaching vehicles and personnel, including departing and arriving
border patrols.
(13) Border Convoy (Pogranichnyy Konvoy--PK)
The patrol. consisted of two or more armed guards (the number
always exceeded by one the number of escorted persons), designated to escort
apprehended violators to the Komendatura or detachment headquarters. The
senior guard was responsible for the apprehended person or persons and for
all the belongings found on him, as listed on a jointly prepared inventory.
All apprehended persons were handcuffed before being removed from the zone.
(14) Border Post Office (Pogranichnaya Pochta--PP)
The patrol consisted of two or more armed EM, designated
to pick up and deliver regular mail and official (including classified)
communications. The guards were instructed to destroy the contents of the
pouch at all costs, rather than to allow them tofall into unauthorized hands
as a result of attack or emergency.
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b. Charge of Quarters (Dezhurnyy po Zastave-DZh)
The duties of the DZh were considered the most important in the,
outpost. Only the best sergeants and the best-qualified third-year Men were
assigned to it. The duty was for 12 hours; however, the DZh was required to
be thoroughly familiar with all the operational, training and adminiptrhtivfunctions of the outpost for a 24-hour period, starting with his firet hour
of duty. His duties included: to wake up each member of a patrol 30 minutes
before duty time; to issue each EM the equipment, ammunition and supplies
necessary for performing the specific patrol duty; to bring the patrols to
the duty officer for orders and to be present at the time orders were given;
to dispatch the patrols and to admit them into the outpost upon completion
of their tour of duty; to know the number, type, location and personnel of
patrols on duty and those to be posted, including their mission, length of duty
and march routes; to know at all times the number of reserve horses and dogs
off duty; to make a physical inventory of all operational equipment; to follow
the training schedule diligently and get the proper personnel to the proper
place at the proper time; to know the whereabouts of all the officers and
personnel off duty; to make a tole hone re port eve t1i I'll
4 hours to the DZh at
higher headquarters
to receive all messages, 50X1-HUM
log them, and bring them to the attention of the du y officer; to receive
from border guards reports on the sighting of any aircraft in the vicinity of
the border, and to telephone the information to the radar section (lokatornyy
post), to receive from all border patrols periodic (about every hour) telephone
reports; to furnish, on request, operational information and instructions
to border patrols.
c. Duty Instrument Operator (dezhurnyy u apparata--DA)
A school-trained signalman was designated to operate the console of
the Klen M or S-100 signaling fence (see Annexes B-2 and C-2). He maintained
a journal in which he registered all alarms signaled by the fence; reported the
incidents to the DZh; and entered in a logbook explanations of the alarm, as
reported by the patrol designated to check the disturbance. He was on duty
6 hours, rested 6 hours, was on duty again for 6 hours, then rested 24 hours.
4. Commanders' Decisions and Orders
a. Detachment Commander
All operational activities of a Border Troop unit were initiated by
the commander's order. The commander of the detachment, being familiar with
the requirements from the district (Okrug) headquarters and knowing the over-
all picture of the sector of his responsibility, determined the necessary
security measures to be employed by each of his subordinate units. His decision
was expressed to the subordinate commanders through one of his staff officers,
who personally visited the subordinate headquarters and wrote the commander's
orders into the unit's Border Troop Service Book (kniga pogranichnoy sluzhby),
classified secret. The border situation was reviewed by the detachment
commander every 15 days, at which time new orders were issued.
A typical detachment commander's order read as follows:
"The borders of the USSR will be guarded in a normal manner. The
greatest number of patrols will be posted during hours of darkness between
2300 hours and 0400 hours. The most likely area of the border violation is
the Ilidzha and the Kizyl Kaya Valley, and the Idralum Ford, which will be
covered with S-2 devices and dogs. The KSP will be inspected no less than
twice during a 24-hour period, once before the hours of darkness and once at
daybreak." The detachment commander could specify in the first paragraph of
his order that the border would be guarded stringently (usilno). Such an order
was issued in emergencies, when it was known from intelligence information
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that, for example, somewhere in the USSR a worker had disappeared from a secret
factory, prisoners had broken out of confinement, or a suspected foreign
agent would attempt a crossing.
As a matter of routine, the border was also guarded stringently
during the season of official Soviet holidays, from 28 April to 6 May, and
from 5 to 9 November. It was believed that, because of the holiday celebrations,
the intensified travel of the population, and a natural tendency of the guards
to relax their vigilance during holidays, the incidences of border violations
increased.
The detachment commander, on his own authority, could order stringent
guarding for a maximum of 5 days; the Komendatura commander, for 3 days; and the
outpost commander, for 24 hours. The border 5 0 X 1 - H U M
approve any extension beyond those limits.
b. Outpost Commander
In preparing his own orders, the outpost commander used the order of
the detachment commander as minimum guidance. He made an evaluation of the
border situation every 24 hours, and wrote his order daily by 1800 hours. A
typical order of the outpost commander was as follows:
"I decided to guard the border of the USSR in a normal manner:
1. To employ the maximum number of patrols on the sector of
most likely border violation, which I consider to be from Border Marker ^^
to grid square
to 0500 hours.
on the left, during the hours of darkness from 2300 hours
2. To guard the above-mentioned critical terrain with eight
patrols at night and with two patrols in daytime.
3. To guard the remainder of the sector with four patrols at
night and two patrols in daytime.
4. To inspect the KSP by use of ChG and D, each patrol to
inspect the KSP once at daybreak and once before hours of darkness.
5. In daytime to guard the border with PN and SPN, and to
cover each of the two most likely routes of approach with one S-2 device and
service dogs.
6. To employ the civilian informers in grid square[::] at 50X1-HUM
their place of duty.
7. To use the searchlight for illuminating the right flank of
the outpost's sector.
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12 50X1-HUM
8,. To use one truck and all available horses for posting the
patrols.
9. To keep one vehicle as standby."
After the outpost commander made the decision on how to guard the
border and wrote it in the unit's Border Troop Service Book, he prepared a
detailed plan of action and entered it in the operations logbook (chernovik).
In the plan, he designated the types of patrols and equipment to be employed
and the exact time and sector to be patrolled, and assigned personnel by name
to each duty. In selecting the men for a specific duty, he kept in mind their
reliability, efficiency and experience. As a rule the reliable 2d- and 3d-year
men were assigned as the patrol commanders, while the unseasoned 1st-year men
and unreliable 2d- and 3d-year men were assigned as basics. Also, by regulation,
a man could not be assigned twice in a row to the same type of patrol, to the
same area, for the same hours of duty and with the same partner. Even though, for
garrison duty and telephone purposes each member of the outpost had a code
number assigned according to rank (the commanding officer was assigned the
numberal 1), in operational orders and border duty only the full name of the
man was used.
c. Duty Officer
All the patrols were dispatched by order of the duty officer, who
personally inspected each man going on duty and asked him whether he was able
to perform his duty. Following the inspection, the duty officer repeated to
the patrol the outpost commander's over-all plan (decision) to guard the border,
then issued a direct order to the patrol similar to the following:
"I order you to perform your duty to guard the border of the USSR,
as D patrol on the left sector of the outpost. Your mission on the way to
your post, as well as at your post, will be to prevent unauthorized disturbance
of the state's border, either from the side of the neighboring country or from
our rear. Your route march: from the outpost, horse-mounted, move directly
toward the KSP and start inspecting it for tracks from the sector division-point
(razryv) to the junction with the adjacent outpost. In the event of uncovering
tracks on the KSP immediately notify the outpost, by two means and study the
clearly-made imprints to determine the course of the violator. If the tracks
indicate that the violator is headed toward the border, pursue him up to the border
line. If the tracks indicate penetration into the rear, pursue him until appre-
hended or destroyed. If the violator disregards your orders, use your weapons
in accordance with the 195th article of the Service Regulations for a Border
Patrol (Instruktsiya Sluzhby Pogranichnogo Naryada-ISPN). Establish contact
and cooperate with ChG patrol (names given), and the S patrol (names given).
Contact the outpost by telephone and by flare signals. The password for the
day is "Mushka" "Murmansk." When challenged, your identification sign will
be your weapon raised vertically at your right hand. You challenge by raising
your left hand horizontally, holding your weapon in a horizontal position.
Your identification mark for crossing the KSP will be a letter T made of
three imprints of your weapon's butt, enclosed in a square--Do you have any
questions?" If there were no questions, the duty officer required the patrol
commander to repeat the commanding officer's decision and the direct order,
then he released the patrol with the mandatory words, 'Carry out the orders."
d. Patrol Commander
The patrol commander was fully responsible for the fulfillment of
the patrol's mission. He was also responsible for the functioning of all
equipment, weapons dnd ammunition; and for the health and performance of men,
horses and dogs in his charge.
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As soon as the patrol commander received his orders, he assigned
his subordinates their duties. The briefing covered the march route to take,
the distance to be kept between them, the speed of movement, visual signals to
be used in emergencies, where and what to observe (divided fields of observa-
tion), actions to take in case of discovery of a border violation, and actions
to take on apprehension of the violator. Upon completion of the tour of duty,
the patrol commander made an oral report to the duty officer.
5. Password and Signs
The challenge (propusk) and the reply (otzyv) of the password for the
day was fixed by the detachment commander. The challenge was always a component
part of a weapon; the reply was, as a rule, the name of a city or, rarely, the
name of a river which started with the same letter as the challenge word. The
procedure for challenging and replying was as follows:
Challenger: "Propusk!"
Challenged: "Boyek (striker), otzyv?"
Challenger: "Biysk"
Other means of mutual identification were recognition signs, such as
those described in the duty officer's orders; and, in the darkness, a pattern
of taps on the stock of a weapon (e.g., two taps for challenge; three taps for
reply).
6. Signal Communications
A telephone communications line, suspended from telephone poles which
ran parallel to and in the proximity of KSP, was the primary means of communi-
cation between the patrol and the outpost headquarters. Every 300 or 400 in
a telephone pole had a telephone receptacle, which received' a male plug attached
to a telephone handset and made connection with the switchboard at the outpost
headquarters. (For the handset and switchboards see 50X1-HUM
Annexes H, H-1, and H-2).
The secondary means of communication was the pistol flare. The
standard flare signals were as follows:
a. One green: violation in the direction of the border
b. One red and one green: violation in the direction of the rear
c. Two green: send out the reserves
d. One red: help (sickness or accident)
e. One red, one green and one white: cease all activities and return
f. One green, one white, and one green: send officer to the border
g. One white and one green: Plug into the telephone net
h. One white: illumination only (used as a matter of routine)
7. Dogs
There were four dogs One of them 50X1-HUM
was a trailing dog; the remainder were duty dogs. Each had his own instructor,
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14
and all were trained as teams at a 9-month course in a dog-handling school in
STALINABAD. All dogs were trained not to bark at all and to attack a man from
behind, knocking him to the ground. Four times a week they were taken out for
training, during which a soldier was designated to traverse a 10-km course, making
turns and leaps in an attempt to confuse the dog. The soldier wore protective
clothing, and at the end of the exercise allowed himself to be attacked and
captured by the dog.
of normal dut there were man false alerts activated by jumpy guards on
the border The most frequent
causes for the false alerts were meandering animals which walked into the
Klen M signaling fence, or which in the dark were mistaken for a violator.
When an alert was received, the DZh sounded the alarm, "to arms"
(v ruzhe), and, on that command, everybody available at the outpost hastily
dressed in the usual duty uniform; was issued arms, 50 rounds of ammunition,
a flare pistol and flares, a flashlight, first-aid packet, and a telephone
handset; and then fell into a formation. The cavalry soldiers saddled up and
formed cavalry squads. The duty officer then organized the patrols and
assigned each a specific mission. The "v ruzhe" alerts were of short duration
and were called off as soon as the disturbance was explained, usually before
the unit had a chance to deploy.
b. Alert for Enemy Attack
"To battle" (k boyu) was the command given in the event of an
enemy attack across the border. Immediately on that command, every soldier,
regardless of his state of dress, seized his weapon, 50 rounds of ammunition,
a gas mask, and an entrenching tool, and ran to his predesignated battle
station on the defensive perimeter of the outpost. The alert was practiced
rarely, but one paragraph in the orders for the day, posted on the bulletin
board, contained the assignment of personnel to battle stations. The
assignments were permanent.
"Air attack"(vozdukh) was the command given in the event of the
presence of an unidentified aircraft in the area. The alert was executed
exactly as the "k boyu," except that everybody donned masks. The alert was
seldom called.
The fire alarm (pozhar) was usually called by a visiting staff
officer from the detachment headquarters, who wanted to test the unit's
alertness. On command, the troops, as they were, occupied predesignated
fire stations, where they picked up the fire-fighting equipment, consisting of
water buckets, shovels and axes.
9. Border Violations
a. Apprehension Procedures
When a patrol saw a border violator, the observation was first
signaled by a flare, then reported by telephone to the outpost headquarters.
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15
If the patrol was in a position tc, intercept the violator, the junior guard
intercepted, while the senior guard covered the operation with his weapon,
keeping on the alert for possible accomplices of the violator. Upon being
captured, the violator was required to hold his hands up while the guard
searched him for weapons. Next, he was handcuffed and required to lie face
down. While the priscner was watched by the junior guard, the senior guard
searched the immediate area for accomplices or discarded documents and other
items. The prisoner was kept at the place of capture until the outpost
reserve party, consisting of an officer, a dog-handler with a dog, and three or
more men arrived. After a detailed search of the vicinity of capture, the
reserve party escorted the prisoner to the outpost headquarters, where he was
kept in the dog kennel under armed guard, until a representative from the
detachment headquarters arrived to take him away. As a rule the violator
was first interrogated at the detachment headquarters.
The members of the patrol capturing the border violator were
rewarded with a 10-day home leave plus travel time, or were given an achievement
button (otlichnyy pogranichnik)o
bo Examples of a Border Search
sor ya midn g
the Alen M fence signaled a disturbance. Since a similar disturbance,
an hour earlier in the opposite sector flank, had proved to have been caused by
a porcupine, the young and inexperienced duty officer did not react with the
required urgency. He liesurely dispatched a PG patrol to investigate. In
the meantime, the ChG patrol discovered the violator?s trail on the plowed
strip; fired one green star, which the PN patrol mistookfor the illuminating
star and did not telephone the PZhe and, in the excitement, failed to notify
the outpost by telephone, which delayed considerably the sounding of the
alarm, "To arms."
The ChG patrol traced the violator to a hay shed, where they lost
his tracks. They assumed he was hiding in the hay and started a systematic
combing of the shed. After searching the shed twice without result, they
were still wondering about the disappearance of the violator, when the PG
patrol arrived. The dog, although confused for awhile by all the tracks
made by the guards, finally found the trail and indicated that the violator
was not in the hay shed. It was at this point that the outpost was telephoned,
and the general alarm was sounded throughout the detachment.
At the point of penetration, the border strip was about 15 km
wide. Since the terrain was mountainous and rugged, the detachment commander
assumed that the violator could not reach the border by daylight and, therefore,
ordered maximum screening patrols (ZL) to be deployed of the border. With
daylight, helicopters and light aircraft joined the search without results.
By afternoon the detachment was informed by Moscow Border Troop headquarters
that a military unit from the Ashkhabad garrison (element of an unidentified
infantry division) was attached to the detachment to support the operation. The
joint effort directed by the detachment commander lasted 6 days and produced
no results. On the sixth day, the operation was called off by the Border
Troop headquarters in MOSCOW. The military unit, allegedly 2000 men strong,
returned to the garrison. The Border Troops, however, on orders from the
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16
detachment commander, remained in .he field another day and captured the
exhausted and seriously injured violator in the mountains at about 0600
hours The prisoner was evacuated by 50X1-HUM
helicopter to the Ashkhabad Military Hospital.
The prisoner was reportedly a 21-year-old White Russian, a member of
an unidentified nationalistic White Russian underground center (podpolnyy
tsentr, or anti-Sovetskiy tsentr), who was allegedly dispatched with military
intelligence information 0 Allegedly, a list of Soviet air bases, 50X1-HUM
including the number of aircraft and personnel, was recovered, plus a compass
and am ap of the border where the crossing was attempted.
There were only four other incidents of border violations which
took place in the sector of the 8th Outpost, 18th Detachment, between 1945 and
1959. Allegedly, two of the violations were 0 into the USSR, year 50X1-HUM
unknown, and were never solved. In 1957, two Russian criminal prisoners
attempted to cross 0 on the right flank of the outpost's sector, but 50X1-HUM
both were apprehended shortly after crossing the plowed strip.
the Border Troops were alerted to the subversive 50X1-HUM
activities of the local o ulation 50X1-HUM
resia ante cen era or
national liberty tsentr borby za natsionalmuyu svobodu) existed in the Ukraine,
Lithuania, Latvia, Estonia, and Belorussian SSRO In southwestern Siberia, in
Turkmenia, Tadzhikistan, Uzbekistan and the Caucasus, the local tribes also
formed resistance centers, and the members, called by the Soviets "the
Mussavotisti,' were dedicated to anti-Soviet and anti-Communist movements.
The political officers insisted that the centers could not possibly exist
without outside, foreign help. Therefore, they had to be considered and
handled as enemies of the USSR.
Co OPERATIONAL DEPLOYMENT OF OUTPOSTS
50X1-HUM
Operational De to ent of the 8th Outposts 18th Detachment (See Annex D
the organization of the security measures in the sector.)
The 8th Outpost occupied a very important location, in that the
terrain in its sector was mountainous and rugged and formed many natural
avenues of approach, and the nearness of ASHKHABAD, a non-restricted city (ne-
tezhimniy gorod), served the border crossers in both directions as a convenient
shelter and point of departure. The outpost straddled a major land-crossing
route the Gaudanskoye Shosse, and had at its termination at GAUDAN a 50X1-HUM
border- ra c checkpoint (KPP), operated by the personnel of the 18th Detach-
ment headquarters.
The outpost headquarters was in the center of its sector along the
Gaudanskoye Shosse, almost adjacent to the S-100 and Klen M signaling fences.
The passage over the Gaudanskoye Shosse was barred, first by a road barrier
controlled by a barrier sentinel (ChSh), and then by three consecutive ChG-
controlled gates, one at each of the two signaling fences and one at the KSP.
The outpost installation did not have its customary observation
tower because of its proximity to the security fences and because of the
relatively short length of the sector. The sector was 7.2 km long and was
divided into two flanks: the left, 3.8 km long, and the right, 3.4 km long.
Each flank was equipped with a wooden observation tower. The dividing point
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(razryv) was at a veep ~,avine, called "Boba :30," with, rocky, vertical walls
about 150 m high, As one approached the border from the USSR side, an S-100
signaling fence constituted the first security measure. About 20 m beyond
and parallel to it was the Klen M signaling fence. Beyond the Klen M,
and at irregular distances from it, was the plowed strip, which covered about
3 km of the critical center sector with double, plowed strips, and the
remainder of the sector with a single plowed strip. Between the far limits
of the plowed strip and the border there was about 15 km of very rugged
mountainous terrain, which was occasionally patrolled, but otherwise was not
secured. The main effort of the outpost was directed toward securing its
sector in the vicinity of the signaling fences and the plowed strip.
b. Typical Employment and Scheduling of the Border Patrols (See Annex D
for graphic illustration)
(1) Left Flank
It started in the center of the outpost's sector, where there
was a physical break in the security devices, and rare to the limits of the
adjacent outpost.
(a) One D Patrol, with duty from dusk to dawn, patrolled
the entire left flank on the far side of the plowed strip.
(b) Two PN Patrols, with duty from dawn to dusk, occupied
the left tower. The period of duty was divided equally between the two
patrols, and only one was required during the winter months when the hours
of daylight were short.
(c) Two ChG Patrols patrolled one-half' of the left flank
between the plowed strip and Klen M signaling fence; one had duty from 2000
hours to 0300 hours; the other from 0100 hours to 0700 hours.
(d) Two ChG Patrols for the other half of the left flank
between the plowed strip and Klen M Signaling fence; one had duty from 2100
hours to 0400 hours; the other from 0200 hours to 0800 hours.
(2) Right Flank
outpost.
It started at the break and ran to the 'limits of the adjacent
(a) One D Patrol., with duty from dusk to dawn., patrolled the
entire right flank, on the far side of the plowed strip,
(b) Two PN Patrols, with duty from dawn to disk divided
equally between them, occupied the right tower. During winter months, when
daylight was short, only one patrol was required.
(c) Two ChG Patrols for one-half of the flank, between the
plowed strip and Klen M; one had duty from 2000 hours to 0300 hours; the
other from 0100 hours to 0700 hours.
(d) Two ChG Patrols for the other half of the flank, between the
plowed strip and Klen M; one had duty from 2100 hours to 0400 hours; the other
from 0200 hours to 0800 hours.
(3) In Front of the Outpost
(a) One D Patrol. duty from 0800 hours to 1600 hours, to
patrol the Boba 30 ravine to a designated point.
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I., ^;e S Patrol with S--2 .fie-. !re, to patrol the Boba 30
ravine in a designated urea. The hours of duty ware 2200 to 0400 hours.
(c) One D Patrol, consisting of 10 LN,, wad- assigned for 10
days' duty to patrol the border line it aif" in day14rY;h `_ he-sirs only and to
act as ZL in emexgenc.ies.- The patrol stayed it a d.zgcat aui.lt at the point
where the Boba 30 ravine approached the border line.
(4) In the Rear of the Outpost;
There was one D Patrol, with duty from 1400 hours to 1900
hours, to patrol the ZPZ.
2. Operational Deployment of the 17th Out ost 67th Detachment (See Annex E
the organization of security measures in the sector) 50X1-HUM
The outpost occupied uninhabited desert terrain, far away from
populated areas, where the nomadic Turkmen shepherds (chabany) only occasionally
grazed their sheep and donkeys. There were no roads there 50X1-HUM
were no legal border-crossing points and no known incidents of border violation.
The outpost's sector was 21 kmTong and had no security fences or physical
obstacles in its entire length, The plowed strip was the only violation- G?\14 ",,,,,,
detection device employed. The border in the sector was marked :wni -Flu Ivi
from right to left (west to east) by border marker 50X1-HUM
Between each two main border markers there were three intermediate markers,
1 2 3
The outpost headquarters was in open terrain, about 4 km south of
a dirt road running from KARA-KALA to KIZYL ATREKO At an arbitrary point in
the KSP, the sector was divided by a break (razryv) into a 12-km-long right
flank, and a 9-km-long left flank.
b. Typical Employment and Scheduling of the Border Patrols (See Annex E
for graphic illustration)
(1) Left Flank
(a) Two D (cavalry) patrols were assigned the left flank of
the border line and the entire left flank or. the south side of the plowed
strip: One had duty from 1600 hours to 2400 . ;.;f ,., other from 0300
hours to 1000 hours.
(b) One ChG Patrol, with duty from 2100 hour: to 0400
hours, patrolled one-half of the flank or, the rtah s _' e of the plowed strip.
(c) One ChG Patrol, with duty from 2230 hours to 0530 hours,
patrolled the other half of the flank on the north side of the plowed strip.
This sector, being the more distant, was posted by a t:.,?c