THE NORTH KOREAN IRON AND STEEL INDUSTRY

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP80T00246A062900060001-7
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: C
• Document Page Count: 12
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: January 19, 2012
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: May 4, 1962
• Content Type: REPORT

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mxormat as tion t1W. nIM St ithin the meaning
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DATE OF
INFO.
PLACE &
DATE ACQ.
TH
The North Korean Iron
DATE DISTR. May 1962
and Steel Industry
NO. PAGES 1
REFERENCES
EVALUATED INFORMATION. SOURCE GRADINGS ARE DEFINITIVE. APPRAISAL OF CONTENT is rr ur~T~vc
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L L Liu ( -1 ccll i cV, 1G J ~l:Vi1Vi111C,' Fit [ V,J. ku u an annua.L production 02 11, UU(J, 000
tons df pit: iron and 2,500,000 tdti sponge iron. To attain this goal,
the : government placed more stress on its mineral resources surveying
program especially in such areas as tllyul and Hasong on the west coast.
In prod :ction facilities, the Kimch' aek and dwani hae Ironworks, . -uspectively
capable of daily prod_i cing 1100-500 tons and 700 tons in pig iron and
respectivel.1 expected to raise these figures to 700 tons and 1,000 tons in
1961, were supposed to be capable of annially producing 4,000,000 tons of
ni iron together, provided that they should get sufficient supply in iron
ore. Tn other words, whether or not the above two ironworks. could achieve
the above pig iron production goal depended. upon the supply of iron ore. In
act iali tv, the }-Iwangghae Ironworks gad to interrupt its plan to reconstruct
Po. 2 Blast Furnace when it became certain that the anticipated production
of iron ore in i.K did not warrant the plan. In general, NK was believed to
be adequately provided with facilities, technicians, and techniques for
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pifr iron production. On the contrary, ILK lag ed much behind in iron ore
mining because cost NK iron mines switched from the dry mining method to
the wet mining method in 1957 for the purpose of preventing the high
incidence of diseases (such as tuberculosis) among miners. This resulted
in a sharp fall in the morale of miners as well as in the production
amouunt. In 1960, most iron mines averaged abort 60 percent of their pre-
switch production amount of iron ore. The most advanced mines were operating;
at 30 percent. In order to cover up this production lag, some mines were
secretly operating by the dry mining method.
2. -post steel urod.,ced in NK was obtained by eliminating carbon and other
foreign matters from pig iron. Especially, NK was far behind in produc-
tion of alloys, which could be ascribed to poor production facilities and
techn'pues. NK had been trying to produce such alloys as tungsten steel,
chrome steel, nickel steel, and nickel-chrome steel. Of these alloys,
the Songjin Steel Ei11 succeeded in producing tungsten steel, whose produc-
tion plan was said to be 100,000 tons annually in October 1959. As for
nickel steel and chrome steel., some trial products had appeared. These
alloys were said to be no match for foreign prod-Icts in quality, since NK
technicians were still unable to uniformly mix metals. For the development
of T,'K steel. prod,ctiori, the NK government had been annually sending six
students to the ?Moscow Steel College in the Soviet Uniofj. and three students
to the Metallurgical Department of the Ch'inghua niver sity in Peip' ing,
China. In NK, there were no facilities capable of smelting such metals as
tungsten, chrome, nickel, and cobalt which were needed in alloying. The
tungsten used at the Songjin Steel hill for making ferro-tungsten was
probably imported from the Soviet nion. The EI,-ingnam Smelter, where
efforts had been made to produce Pobedit (a Soviet brand for an unidentified
type of high speed steel), succeeded in smelting a very limited amount of
tungsten through some primitive methods for use in making Pobedit. For the
production of the above listed alloying metals, the Hun dam Smelter had
been engaged in research work witho tt any notable result so far.
3. The following is information on such alloy metals as tungsten, chrome,
nickel, cobalt, molybdenum, and vanadium:
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A. Tungsten: Tungsten ores were mostly produced in the form of scheelite
at such mines as theMannyon. Kyongsu, Kumgang, and Poptonglines all
located in the north of Kangwon-do and northeast of Hwanghae-pukto.
In the volume of ore deposits, theMannyon Nine was leading the others.
It was roughly estimated to have more than 100,000,000 tons of
tungsten deposits, of which,according to a statistic made available
towards the end of 1959, 15,000,000 tons were confirmed to be exploitable.
The Kyongsu i?'ine was reported to have 8,000,000 tons in tungsten deposits.
,The tungsten content of the ores produced at the above two mines averaged
three to four percent, sometimes reaching as high as 16 to 17 percent.
For dressing, theMannyon :-line was installed with a large underground
dressing plant. besides, it had expanded its surface dressing facilities,
which are now enough to process its whole ore produce up to 40 percent
concentrates. TheMannyon :-ine was planning to improve its dressing
facilities and techniques towards the goal of .50 percent concentrates.
For this purpose, the !'lining Research Center of the ',Ministry of Metals
Industry had been engaged in developing a better dressing system. The
Mani-:,Ton ',!Ane had no particular plan as to the disposal of tailings,
which had been put aside for the day when its ore raining lag.,-ed
behind- the chedule)thereby making it necessary to process the tailings
for export. As of 1960, the ;"arnyon line was concentrating its efforts
on the mining of ores rather than on the processing of tailings. Five
research specialists from the above inning Research Center were stationed
at the M1annyrn iAiine for the improvement of dressing metijods. The Kyongsu
Line was also provided with a flotation plant for ore dressing, and its
efficiency was rated almost the same as that of the14annya nine. However,
the Kyongsu nine was in the practice of sending its dressing technicians
to the Mannyon~ine for trair:ing, along with those from the Poptong and
Kump;ang i-:ines, winch set up their own dressing plants sometime after 1)56.
Nonthel.ess, these two mines were required to send dressed tungsten
ores to the Mannyoniane for redressing when they were to be exported.
The tungsten ores were mostly exported to the Soviet lnion and
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Czechoslovakia, and their tungsten content varied with the req.,ireMerit
of each imnortin country. In 1959, UK exported a total of 500,000 tons
of tungsten ores averaging 10 to 15 percent in tungsten content. Tungsten,
being an important element in metal alloying, was in great demand by many
foreign countries as well as domestic industries. Therefore., Nip: was
trying to find a way of smelting tungsten ores. Esp-cJ.ally, the Hungnam
Shelter had been Long engaged in research work for the purpose, without
any notable result so far. Nontheless, the T; ii government was planning
to establish by the end of 1964 tungsten ore smelting--- facilities large
enough for the processing of the whole i+NK tungsten ore prod:-ice, probably
at the Ilungnar., Lmelter or the Nampo L)melter. The Hunlrai Smelter was
capable of smelting a limited amount of tungsten for. use in making
I-obcdit, whose prcdaction q ota of ten tons a year in 1959 was far from
be:inr net due to too many off-grade products. The tungsten smelted by
the Hungnai Omelter was not metallic tungsten, but tungsten oxide (WCs; .
The of '-gradde Pobedit co,,ld be eliminated only by improving the quality
of tun.-.:ten. This nrobl_en; was solved by a technician by the na_ue of
C' 'C (1508/.fnu) who had rct,rned from the Soviet Tnion in 15'58 after
training there. However, his solution had not been translated into a
prod ?.ction system.
1Chrome: The main producer of chrome ores was the Ch'ongam ine in
?amg orm_pukto, u: ere chrome ores were ruined in the form of beryl whos-
cl,rc^:e content avera ed one percent., sometimes cosa_ng up to three to
four percent. The Ch'ongarr Vine was estimated to have a'rbo _t 1.5,000,00')
tons in exploitable chrome ore. However, its ore production, as compared
with the estimated depositts, was -much lii ;it ed. The Ch' or,gam Nine was
nrovided with a flotation for dressing, where only high grade ore;.
from which poor grade ores had been vis..ally sorted out by experienced
miners, were dressed 10p to 20 percent concentrates. The chrome ores
were mostly sent to the Soviet Union and Czechoslovakia, since there
were no smelting, facilities for them in ;Y:. The ?Hun gnam Smelter was
e.qeriment-ng; in chrome smelting without any result K had no plan to
in--t-,a-i-11. smelting facilities for chrome ores for the reason that the
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limited prod action amo Ant of chrome ores did not warrant it. The
Son.riin :)'keel i,:ill was experimenting in order to produce chrome-nickel
steel by importing the required chrome from abroad.
C. Nickel: Nickel ores were produced by such mines as the Sokkye, Puhoe,
and I ' an' gyo Nines,Trr 1959, the Sokkye and P hoe dines were virtually
closed down because of their poor produuction. In 195), the i,'an'gyo
aline produced a total of about 800,000 tons in nickel ore whos, content
ave ra'ed less than one percent. The ores produced at the r' an' gyo Tine
T as said to contain st:lphides, and therefore, they were dressed thro Eh
a flotation system which was installed at the mine. By this method,
the ores were dressed up to five percent concentrates. In order to
raise this percentage to-a ten percent, the aforF-entioned Vining
research Center was exnerirlenting. Howeve,rv, five percent nickel
concentrates were said to be exportable. In 1959, when the nrodoocti on
of nickel ores la?r-ed so behind the export sched; le, the F' an' g,To Vine
had to redress its tailings, thereby collecting a total of 700,000 tons
of nickel ores. Even this redressing had to be interrupted due to its
prohibitive
cost. In the meantime, Yeological surveying groups operating
under the ' i_nistr-y of Metals Industry discovered a promising nickel Trine
in the vicinity of Ch'ongjin in Hamgyong,-pukto, where strin mininu; was
already in pro-,,ress. 0riginai1y, this nine was discovered by Japanese
prospectors during the Japanese rule. Its ores reached as high as 20
pE cent in nickel content, mostly exceeding in nickel content the nickel
ore concentrates of the
'Pyo .line. In December 1959 or in early 1y60,
NK exported 300,000 tons of nickel ore to the USSR ., all of
which was produced at the Ch'cngjin Vine over an unknown :-eriod of time.
At that time, the chemical analysis showed that the exported nickel ores
cci:tained nickel up to 26 percent. Consequently, the nickel ores
produced by the Ch'cngjin Vine were expected to occ!py an important
position in the 1960 1':K mineral export plan. As of larch 1960, it
was still. to be detercined how much nickel was deposited in the vicinity
of C l' on gjin. For this p ;rpose, some Soviet sutrv?yin ; technicians were
working there. NK had no smelting facilities for nickel ores, except
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that the Hungnam Smelter was conducting experiments on the subject.
Therefore, most nickel ores were exported to the USSR in the
form of nickel concentrates. If the Ch'ongjin Mine was capable of
producing; nickel ores as much as expected, they would be also exported
to Czechoslovakia. The NK CV ernment would expedite its plan to set
up facilities for nickel smelting, so that the Songjin Steel Hill could
use nickel for making alloys. The Songjin Steel Mill imported 100 tons
of nickel from the USSR for use in experimenting on chrome-cickel
alloy.'he problem of developing nickel smelting method by 1964 was
assigned to the Hungnam and Nampo Smelters.
D. Cobalt: Cobalt ores were mostly produced at the Hoeryong Mine in
Harir.Tyrong-oukto, and their cobalt content averaged below one percent,
rarely coming up to three percent. The iioeryong Mine was said to have
a 1,500,000 tons of explcable cobalt ore deposits excluding bismuth
ores. In view of the fact that a number of foreign countries wanted to
import cobalt ores from NH, all the cobalt ores would be mined. The
major importers were the
renuest from Nast Jermany for cobalt ores, NK was planning to export
cobalt tailings after dressing, for the purpose of which the Iinin;;
''esearch Center was conducting experiments. The iunn' yore and Namp' o
Smelters were smelting a very limited amount of cobalt, while the
Tokch'on automotive Factory was engaged in developing cobalt alloys.
he Hun,-nap. and Hamp' o Smelters had been assigned a task to develop a
method of cobalt smelting by the end of 1964.
I:olybdenum: H',ol-bdenum ores were mostly produced in the t umgang
area in Karg_,won-do, along with tungsten ores. The molybdenum content
ranged from 0.3 to 1.0 percent. The amount of exported molybdenum
ores was much limited. In 1959, dUu,UU,: tons of molybdenum ores
a.1 til a 25 to 26 percent coontent were exported to the Soviet Union.
`'here was no definite elan as to the development of molybdenum
si,.elti ng method, nontheless the I'.ungnam and HHamn'o Smelters were
experimenting for the purpose.
anadiuxn: Vanadium,. ores were r. ostler produced in the inch' on area of
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Ham;yong-namdo. In 1959, NK exported 3,200 tons of vanadium ores to
the Soviet Union, which contained vanadium 0.6 to 0.8 percerit? For the
dressing and smelting of vanadium ores, NK had no particular plan
)j. ajior manufacturers of steel products included the Ch'ongjin, Songjin, and
F:angson Steel. hills. In addition, the Kimch'aek and '_Hwanghae Ironworks
were also engaged in producing steel -orodacts. The Ch'ongjin, Songjin, and
Kangson Steel kills respectively consumed steel 250 tons, 500 tons, and 250
tons daily. The Kimch'aek Ironworks did not produce finished steel products,
but steel ingots, which were supplied for various machine manufactories.
The Kimch' aek Ironworks was enga,,red in producing castings at request from
individual machine manufactories and other enterprises. Its daily casting
capacity was allegedly 50 tons. The Songjin Steel !.fill produced steel
ingots and steel alloys, most of which were supplied for various machine
manufactories incl ding the Huich' o,., Nagwon, and Yongsong Machine
?Manufactories. For these manufactories, the Songjin Steel .ill also
produced castings. Its rolled steel plate production amounted to 300,000
tons a year in 1959, of wr ich about 150,000 tors was plated with zinc. The
produced steel plates were mostly three to six millimeters thick. Steel
bars varying from one to three centimeters in diameter with the specifica-
tions of each. consumer, were annually produced 300,000 tons at the Songjin
Steel kill. The production amo,::nt of rolled steel plates and steel bars
cculd be considerably raised if to produce them in larger sizes. In
addition to such basia steel items as mentioned above, the Songjin Steel
Mill received orders from individual enterprises for various steel. its
s i.ch as construction materials and machine parts, including iron frames,
steel beds, and steel gates. The Kangson Steel Dill was chiefly engaged in
manufacturing steel beams for bridge construction and other steel structures,
including bolts, nuts, wires, nails, screws, etc. Its 'ca.sting plant, which
was rather limited in size, produced various machine parts for individual
machine manufactories and other enterprises. The Hwanghae Ironworks , the
larg;e:;t of all iron and steel production facilities in NK, produced steel
as well as pi; iron. Its major steel products included rails, rolled steel
plates, steel bars, and seamless pipes. The rails, though not sufficient to
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meet the entire NF; demand, were chiefly used in laying railroad branch
lines. The rolled plates were daily produced about 30 tons in various sizes.
The pipes were limited to large- diameters for use in water works. Besides
these items, the Hwanghae Ironworks manufactured such steel products as
bears for brid e construction, steel Poles for street lighting, and others
required for the construction of new factories and power plants. Its
.bsidiary -oducts lant was enga.,ed in manufacturing such household items
as steel beds, buckets, basins, scissors, knives, grates, tongs, and pots.
The construction materials which were prod iced by the Hwanghae Iron
were mostly used for various construction projects in pro,uress in Songnim-si.
!tegarding the overall NK program for the expansion of steel prod action
facilities, the interrupted reconstruction project of No. 2 Blast Furnace
of the Hwanghae Iron would be resumed when those iron resources under
prosnection on the west coast were fully exploited, and when it was
impossible for the Hwanghae Ironworks . to handle the increased iron
ore produce with its No. 1 Blast Furnace alone. Besides, the same Iron-
works had a plan to expand itself into a universal steel mill where
finished prod cts s ich as bars, sheet metals, and pipes could be manufactured.
In the steel rolling process, the work of picking up hot plates would be
mechanized, along with other dangerous and labor-consimi.ng works. The
entire pipe manufacturing process would be mechanized and so expanded as
to be able to produce pipes of various sizes. The Songjin Steel ?Bill
would be eg1.Lipoed for production of steel alloys such as chrome steel and
nickel steel, which, as of 1960, were mostly imported from abroad. The
Kangson Steel gill was expected to operate all of its five elLctric
furnaces in 1960 in the face of the voluminous national demand for construc-
tion materials. The Ch'ongjin Steel i!ill would make efforts to increase
its sponge iron production. The Kimch'aek Ironworks 50X1-HUM
would reconstruct its war-time derma;:red blast furnace,
In local areas, small
iron mills were trying to self-supnly pig iron for their products by
installing small blast furnaces. As of 1960, local industries had to rely on
major steel .Pills for most steel products. They were plani.ing to start
prodliction of simole steel products by themselves from 1964. The overall
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a>>tomatic pipe manufacturing system so desi ;red as to hole (pipe) arri ter,per
them in a continued process. This system was said to come into operation by
the end of 1960. The Hwan7hae Ironworks had another plan to import from
the Soviet Union an automatic machine capable of cutting and loading steel
bars. This plan was discarded when one of its technicians desi_d,ned such a
system, whose technical oossibi3ity was still under consideration
the pipe plant was waiting for the arrival from the USSR
was pres.zmed to have been completed by the end of 1960.
?\'K steel industry expansion program required that the entire NK steel demand
should be met domestically, and that the existing basic steel prod::ction
facilities which were considered to be eno 'gh to provide vario rs steel
prod!?cts, except steel alloys, should be installed with modern processing
eq :ipment of i'oreign make in. order to improve their poor quality. 'or
instance, the Hwanrhae Ironwork8 had a plan to :.:sport from Czechoslovakia
a new rolling steel system desi,ned to automatically feed the roller with
hot iron plates. This plan was not materialized until October 1959, bIrt
For the Sonjin Steel i' ihJ_, the USSR made a promise to
establish a high frequency _flzsi.on plant,
The Sons; jin iii Steel :4.ill was
also elan in to set up a ;:galvanizing plant which was to be equaic>iped with
electrodes and other precision devices of Soviet, make.
NK was basically self-sufficient in the supply of steal prod,uc'ts.
Sore specific steel items s.ch as rails, pipes, and automotive springs had
to be a':nuall-,r impor ed from abroad. NK annually imported from the
USSR. 100,000 tons of rail until the construction of the Haeju-diasong
railroad line, where the rails r anufa.ct~?red by the Hwan ghae irornitorks
were used. The ironworks was thelesaid to be a;:le to supply rails for the
laying of branch line s. Rails re(; .,fired for main railroad lines were still
to be r : c ^i;ed. The amount of imported special steel (such as for use as
to
automotive springs) from the ` USSR amounte; 700 tons annually. Pipes
were ,~-oz?t;:,? from China 73,000 tons each year until 1959 when the IHwar. hiae
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