REPORT ON THE FIVE SOVIET REPUBLICS OF CENTRAL ASIA.2 SOVIET RUSSIAN STRATEGY IN SOUTH TURKESTAN

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP80T00246A060200070001-5
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: C
• Document Page Count: 50
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: January 6, 2012
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: September 5, 1961
• Content Type: REPORT

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X NAVY X
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY '
This material contains information affecting the National Defense of the United States within the.meaning of the Espionage Laws, Title
18, U.S.C. Secs. 793 and 794, the transmission or revelation of which in any manner to an unauthorized person is prohibited by law.
C- 0- N- F_ T- T)- F_ N_ m- s_ A - T
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COUNTRY
DATE OF
INFO.
PLACE &
DATE.ACQ.
1. Report on the Five Soviet. Republics
of `Centra_ Asia
2. Soviet Russian Strategy in South.
Turkestan
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THIS IS TION. SOURCE GRAninirc ncr r,~~,...
two report
uaueu
spring 1Qbl on R
i
I~
uss
an Turkestan. One report
is a Report on the F;,.P cn-* o+ r (23 pages ), L
- _ ~r~?,~+~a U-L lui"xas~an ; the others report
(24 pages plus a Map). is c fii P~ cn,>; o+ o,, - , -
----.v--- - ill= ouviez economic
system and the extent to which the Henri A of m?-,-,.+..- _ ~ ti _
ra.!"t,y ozz1cials; therefore, purges are being carried
out mn Turkestan. In order to consolidate the' 4-
i
t
t posi
ion,. -une Russian
authorized representatives in Turkestan in January 1961 demanded that more
Communists be sent there on the grounds of a labor shortage. Moscow,
consequently, is planning to send one million young Communists.
are of military-and political as well as eco
nomic, significance. Although
the.SovietRussians insist that all th
agriculture and industr and b ese irrigation plants serve merely
y are uilt to supply hitherto uncultivated
steppes with water,- a network of canals and lakes is.a hindrance, to
invading troops, is_. advantageous to partisan movements, and can be used
by the Red Army to convey reinforcements. Besides,says_the report, the
haste with which all these canals are bein b 'lt
g ui shows that the- Soviet
Russians are more concerned with fortifying the frontiers than with making
new areas arable. Moreover, Khrushchev himself admitted that there are
millions of hectares of arable and pasture land which should be fully
utilized. This factomakes implausible the argument that new canals are
being built to get more irrigated land for cultivation. Of political
importance is the intensified settlement of Russians among the untrust-
worthy Turkestanians (sic), which will be forcibly effected upon completion
of the various canals, artificial lakes, dams, and water-power, stations. 50X1-HUM
\x ARMY
REPORT L
DATE DISTR.
NO. PAGES
REFERENCES
5 Seprt'enibe. .LL96.
2 50X1-HUM
XI NIC
~dissttribution indicated by "X"; Field distribution by
TION REPORT INFORMATION REPORT
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e e Russians regard Turkestan as the shop window
for the Orient, political benefit would also come, in Moscow's
opinion, from opening up vast regions of southern Turkestan for
agriculture and industry.
C- 0- N- F- I-D-E- N- T- I-A- L
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m i7 r k e s t a n
(./i_th one .ao)
S o v i e t R us s i a n
S t r a t e y i n S o u t h
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Canals in, K rski-ChoL rcaA, 4~~'
~w-N ,Dar~a - Bwk~ara CargL
A
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ri vtrs
Frerf~'cr bttwtt+-
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ae Pro-atChtot =anaLs
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H ra S
0.r ti FCcia~ La.Kts
prr~ac~'s~ pwri-P~,.~-S14f-Pr~
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C o n t e n t s
B.
Canals, artificial lakes, dams and
';Dater power Sto.t i ons in the southern
region of r'~arke t n
4. Amu Darya - Bokhara Canal
2. Amu Darfl'a - Kar aku]_ Canal
3. New artificial lakes
a) The artificial lake of
Chumkur gan
b) r ara-Darya reservoi r
4- Kara -Kum Canal
5. Nurek Water Power station
6. Art; ficial lel_e on the Suri_ran
Darya
7. Dams, artificial lakes, central
water distribution mints and
can=:Is on the lower course of
the .Amu Darya
page 7
.page 12
page
13
age
13
gage
14
.Page
15
page
15
D ge
18
page 19
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8. New canals, dams and
artificial lakes in
TvMirza Chol
page 23
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CC FIDE TIAL
B. Canals, artificial lakes, ams.an
water power stations in the southern region
of Turkestan
1. Amu Darya - Bokhara Canal
At the plenary session of the Central Committee of the
Communist Party of the Soviet Union in January 1961 in Moscow,
Khrushchov issued instructions that a widely ramified canal
network was to be built in Karehi Chol (= Karehi Steppes).
This is a project to divert the waters of the Amu Darya into
the area between the towns of Bokhara and Karchi and between
Kitab and Amu Darya by means of canals, dams and reservoirs.
Of this area, which covers 2 million hectares, 1 to 1.2
million hectares of land are to be irrigated by means of this
canal network. In addition, that part of the Kizil-Kum
desert which borders on Bokhara is also to be traversed by
a canal. An additional 1.7 million tons of cotton and other
agricultural products will allegedly be harvested on this
newly acquired land.
The purpose of this project, which is known as the Amu Darya
Bokhara Canal project, is to intersect the entire south-
western region of the Soviet Republic of Uzbekistan between
the rivers Amu Darya, Kashka Darya and Zarafshan by canals
and artificial lakes so that a 'direct connection-is effected
between these three rivers. This will guarantee a quick
route by waterway between the frontier of Afghanistan and
Bokhara and Samarkand. Since that section of the Kara-Kum
Canal which begins in the same region on the Amu Darya has
already been completed,there is also a direct connection with
the frontier region bordering. on Iran
It is an established fact that Karshi Chol was always a fertile
district, but the River Kashka Darya loses much of its water
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on its course and the supply is no longer adequate to irrigate
the steppes. This region is now therefore to be irrigated by
the water of the Amu Darya. Hitherto this was not possible, for
the Amu Darya lies 450 to 600 feet lower than Karshi Chol and
a water supply could therefore not be conveyed to the higher
areas. Practically all the other canals in Turkestan are not
dependent on electric power. With the aid of big electric pump
stations the water of the Amu Darya is now to be pumped up to
the higher Karshi Chol area. By this new method it will be
possible to supply the entire region with water.
Since the rivers, towns, railway routes, artificial lakes and
the canal network planned are all marked on the appended map,
a more detailed description of the localities is not necessaryo
We should,, however, like to point out that the Lattakurgan,
Kuymazar and Dengiz-Kul reservoirs, as well as the Eski-Anhor
Canal and the Kara-Kum Canal are already in operation,
There are three different projects to intersect the southwest
regions of Uzbekistan with an extensive canal network - the
Amu Darya - Bokhara Canal, but all three projects have the
same purpose, namely to irrigate the steppe regions between
Karshi and Bokhara with the aid of the Amu Darya. The sole
difference in these projects is the question as to where the
dams are to be built in the Amu Darya and where the canal net-
work is to branch off from the Amu Darya. The length of the
Amu Darya - Bokhara Canal is 312 miles.
The first project provides for a dam to be constructed at
Kelif on the Amu Darya. Kelif is a railway-station on the
route Bokhara - Duchambe (= Stalinabad) and is situated on
the Afghan frontier. From here the canal is to proceed
parallel to the Amu Darya as far as Kurshab reservoir (an
artificial lake). (Marked in green - - - - on the appended
map.) From the Kurshab reservoir the water is to be distri-
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buted by numerous canals in an easterly direction, in the
Karshi Chol region, on the one hand, and in a northerly
direction, on the other hand, to Bokhara and into the delta of
the River Zarafshan.-The disadvantage of this Kelif project,
however, is that the canal in this case would be much longer
than those planned in the other projects and hence would
involve more time.and money as far as construction is concerned.
For this reason a second project, which'has Burdalik as its
starting-point, was evolved in 1959. Burdalik is likewise
situated on the middle reaches of the Amu Darya, downstream from
Kelif. This is the narrowest stretch of the Amu Darya and the
distance from Karshi Chol is less. The town of Karshi is about
62 miles away from the Amu Darya. A dam to collect the water of
the Amu Darya is to. be built in Burdalik according to this
.project. In addition, pump stations,which would convey the
water supply into the canal, situated 600 feet higher, and
would have a pumping capacity of 30 cubic metres of water per
second, are also to be erected there.
From Burdalik the water supply is to be conveyed in a 'northerly
direction by a 50-mile long canal to Dengis-Kul (sea-water lake).
(Marked in green - - on the appended map.) This arti-
ficial lake has already been completed. With the help of
further pump stations the water of the Amu Darya collected
here is to be conveyed to Karshi Chol and to the Zarafshan
region. Part of the water supply, according to this project,
would be conveyed by means of pump stations and via a widely
ramified network of canals to Karshi Chol. Numerous water
distribution points and pump stations would provide for an
intricate network of canals. Part of the water supply would
also be diverted via the Kurshab reservoir in a northerly
direction to Sokhara, thus linking up with the Kuymasar
reservoir and the delta of the River Zarafshan.
According to this project, some of the water supply from the
Amu Darya would also be diverted into the.Kizil-Kum desert
CONFIDENTI .
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(northwest of Bokhara). The Kizil-Kum Canal begins in Lake
Dengiz-Kul and can also irrigate the districts round the town
of Karakul (on the railway line between Bokhara and Charjui).
The advantage of this project is that the canal would be about
94 miles shorter than the canal from Kelif. In addition, the
soil in this region is also more favourable for the construct-
ion of a canal since it absorbs less water.
With the aid of pump stations and water distribution points,
this canal network would irrigate the regions of Karshi Chol and
of the Zarafshan, as well as the regions of Kizil-Rum and
Karakul. It is estimated that in the regions of Karshi and
Bokhara 700,000 hectares of land could be irrigated, as well as
500,000 hectares in that part of the Kizil-Kum desert located on
the right bank of the Amu Darya.
In addition, there is also a third project, which provides for
the construction of a dam north of Kizil-Ayat. (Kizil-Ayat is
situated slightly south of the town of Kerki on the Amu Darya,
and it is here that the Kara-Kum Canal begins.) From here the
intended canal network in a northerly direction would irrigate
the Karshi region and would link up with the Zarafshan. (This
project is not shown on the appended map.) It is also hoped
that the above-mentioned dam would divert more water into the
Kara-Kum Canal, which would then irrigate several million
hectares more of land.
According to this third project the Kizil-Kum desert is also to
be irrigated. For this reason it is also planned to build an
electric power station, the Eltshik Works, to the north of the
town of Charjui (on the Amu Darya). From here a network of
canals is to extend into the Kizil-Kum desert and irrigate vast
areas of it.
For all three projects various pump stations, which would pump
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the water of the Amu Darya into the Amu Darya - Bokhara Canal,
as well as numerous pump stations at the water distribution
points, which would convey the water supply into the widely
ramified canal network, would be needed and they would use up
a huge amount of electric power. In addition, once the canal is
completed, the region in question will be opened up agricult-
urally and industrially, and this again needs a lot of electric
power. In order to supply this, two big electric power stations
are at present being built.
Since large quantities of natural gas have been found in the
Bokhara area, which are now being used for industrial purposes
a
big power station, which is to be driven by gas from Bokhara,
is now being built there. This power station, known as the
Navaji station, will be able to supply all the above-mentioned
pump stations with electric power.
In addition, a big water power station is being constructed on
the River Wachsh, which in Tadzhikistan flows into the Amu
Darya not far from Pandsh (on the Afghan frontier). This water
power station is close to the village of Nurek and goes by the
same name. (We shall discuss the Nurek power station in more
detail below.) At Khrushchov's explicit orders, construction on
this power station began this year and when completed, it will
be the largest water power station in Central Asia. The Nurek
power station will be in a position to supply not only all the
pump stations of the Amu Darya - Bokhara Canal with electric
power, but also the agricultural and industrial plants in the
entire region. By means of overhead conductors, electricity
will also be supplied to Karshi Chol.
The power station in Nurek is to provide the pump stations
along the Amu Darya with electricity so that these stations
will then be able to pump 30 cubic metres of water per second.
By comparison, the Barchad electric power station ( at the
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confluence of the rivers Chirtchik and Syr Darya, south of
Tashkent) supplies the pump stations of the Mirza Chol Canal
with 3 cubic metres of water per second. The Nurek power
station is to be completed in 1962.
The Amu Darya - Bokhara CAnal will open up a further region
in the southern frontier territory of Turkestan to Soviet
economy. This canal is a continuation of the Kara-Kum Canal in
an easterly direction. By this means it will be possible to
convey transports from the western regions of Turkestan, which
border on Iran, by waterway parallel to the Iranian and Afghan
frontiers
This entire network of canals parallel to the frontiers of
Iran and Afghanistan is an additional traffic and transport
route to the already existing roads and railways, and the
canals and artificial lakes are included in the general
fortifications belt as hindrances. The extent to which in
peace-time additional agricultural products can be obtained
from newly irrigated land and industrial enterprises set up
there, can only be ascertained when the canal has been
completed. But it is already an established fact that a large
number of Russians are flocking into the frontier regions of
Turkestan and that they must be regarded not merely as
workers but, above all, as farmers in a military capacity.
2. Amu Darya - Karakul Canal
On the middle course of the Amu Darya, on a level with the
town of Charjui, a canal is being built,which is to extend
as far as the rayon of Karakul. The town of Karakul is
situated in southwest Uzbekistan and is a railway station on
the line from Bokhara to Charjui. The rayon of Karakul
borders on Turkmenistan.
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The River Zarafshan ends in the rayon of Karakul. The Amu
Darya - Karakul Canal will thus link up the rivers
Barafshan and Amu Darya. The artificial lakes of Kattakurgan
and Kuymazar, which are fed by the Zarafshan, already supply
large areas with water, and hence the preconditions are given
for further canals. The Kattakurgan reservoir near Samarkand
was already completed in 1948. Thus there is a chain of
artificial lakes, dams and canals from Samarkand, via
Bokhara, to Charjui.
The Amu Darya - Karakul Canal is 33 miles long, 180 feet
wide and 75 feet deep. It is obvious from this width and
depth that the canal can be navigated by large freighters
without difficulty. The first section, 9 miles in length, has
practically been completed. Canal construction experts from
Turkmenistan, who have been working on the Kara-Kum Canal
project, have already arrived to give their assistance in
this case, too.
When the canal is finished 50 cubic metres of water will pass
through it per second and will irrigate the steppes of
Mahankul, Chigodchi and Kirk-Eshak. It will complete the above-
mentioned canal network of the Amu Darya - Bokhara Canal
and will be the shortest route between the Amu Darya and
Bokhara, as well as Samarkand.
3. New artificial lakes
In order to complete the chain of artificial lakes and to
provide the various canal networks of the Amu Darya -
Bokhara Canal with an adequate water supply, more and more
reservoirs are being constructed in the regions of Kashka-
Darya and Samarkand.
a) The artificial lake of Chumkurgan
In the rayon of Kamashi (the town of Kamashi lies close to the
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railway line between the towns of Karshi and Kitib) a large
artificial lake, Lake Chumkurgan, is being constructed, which
is to have a water capacity of over half a milliard cubic
metres. Part of this reservoir was completed in Spring 1961
and already contains 170 million cubic metres of water.
Construction on the reservoir is to be completed within a
year's time and it will then be filled to its full capacity.
The water of the Chumkurgan reservoir has already been diverte~
into the region of Chambus-Say and several hundred Russian
koLkhoz farmers have already been settled there. New villages,
Chambay, Tokbay and Madjara, have been built and a kolkhoz,
the Lenin kolkhoz, has been founded. Cultivation of cotton has
already begun. All these new villages and the kolkhoz are
situated in the rayon of Kamashi.
This artificial lake is fed by the River Kashka-Darya. It is
hoped that the new canal network under construction will
result in an additional 40,000 hectares of land being made
available for agriculture. The canals are being constructed in
such a way that it will be possible to drain or fill them, as
required, at any time.
b) Kara-Darya reservoir
A large dam is at present being built on the River Kara-
Darya not far from Samarkand. This will result in the formatio:
of a large artificial lake at this point, Lake Kara-Darya.
The dam will be about 225 feet high, and 6 million cubic
metres of soil and 1 million cubic metres of stone are needed
for its construction. The bottom of this artificial lake is
to be concreted.
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4. K a r a - K u m C a n a l
The Kara-Kum Canal in Turkmenistan has alr ,dy been completed
as far as the large artificial lake of Han Havus, which is
situated between the towns of Mary (= Merv) and Tedchen.
Construction on the next section, between Han Havus and the
River Tedchen, commenced on March 2, 1961. 50X1-HUM
It is obvious from the speed at which work on the Kara-Kum
Canal is progressing that the Russians regard its sompletion
as extremely vital. According to the latest plans, it is now
intended to continue the canal, which was originally only to
lead as far as Archman, a small railway station on the
Ashkabad line, as far as the Caspian Sea. The Soviet Russians
have realized how important a through connection by waterway
between the Amu Darya and the Caspian Sea is for them, in
this region. In addition, the importance of the Kara-Kum
Canal is increased considerably by the above-mentioned
projects of the Amu Darya - Bokhara Canal and the Amu Darya
- Karakul Canal; for in this way the regions of Samarkand
and Bokhara are linked up directly by waterway with the
Caspian Sea, and, vice versa, there are good connections from
the frontier of Turkmenistan to the central regions of
Turkestan
u r e k water.-mower station
The River Wachsh rises in the Pamirs and flows into the Amu
Darya near Pandsh in Tadzhikistan. It is fed by the snow
which melts in the Pamirs and is a rapid and powerful river,
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which at some points, however, is so narrow that one can leap
from bank to bank. On the other hand, it is very deep.
In order to utilize the enormous water Hower of the Wachsh,
Khrushchov issued orders at the plenary session of the Central
Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union in
January 1961, in Moscow, that a large water power station was
to be erected close to the village of Nurek. Construction on
this project has already begun.
The water power station at Nurek is to be the largest in the
Soviet Union and is to have an even larger capacity than the
Stalingrad water power station on the Volga, which has a
capacity of 2.1 million kilowatts. TN:urek would thus be in a
position to supply not only the entire industry of Tadthik-
istan with electricity, but also to pass on milliards of kilo-
watts to other republics, such as Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan and
Kirgizstan. The electricity is to be conveyed by means of
overhead conductors. The power station at Nurek is to be
finished by 1962. It will, be in a position to supply electric-
ity very cheaply. 1 kilowatt hour will only cost 1/4 tien
(= 1/4 Pfennig).
In order to provide the hurek station with ~.e necessary
power, a Large dam is to be built on the River Wachsh. The
artificial lake formed in this way will not be very Large, but
it wilt be extremely deep. T;is reservoir, so it is planned,
will. be able to absorb 70 per cent of the total yearly water
of the Wachsh. It is to have a water capacity of over 10
milliard cubic metres.
With the aid of electric pump stations, this artificial lake
will sunnly the surrounding areas v.,ith water and the
cultivation of cotton is thus to be increased. It is affirmed
that these pump stations will irrigate 200,000 hectares of
land. In the region of Evan construction has already
commenced.
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Furthermore, the electric power supply from Nurek is to
further the industry of Tadzhikistan. The heavy industry is to
be extended and increased and factories for the processing of
metal alloys are to be erected. In addition, engineering works
and food factories are also to be built.
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6. Artificial lake on the S u r k h a n D a r y a
An artificial lake, which when finished will have a water
capacity of 800 million cubic metres, is to be built on the
River Surkhan Darya in Uzbekistan. This river is a right
tributary of the Amu Darya and joins the Amu Darya at Termez
(in Uzbekistan on the Afghan frontier).
Preparations on this project have already commenced, and
labour-camps, roads, communication points and electric light-
ing are now under construction. The first section of this
artificial lake is to be completed by the beginning of 1962,
and when the whole project is finished in 1963, 6,000
hectares of land will be irrigated by this lake.
In order to convey a water supply from this lake to the land
which is to be irrigated, a main canal, as a branch of the
Cherabad Canal, is to be constructed. In the town of Cherabad
(northwest of the town of Termez) nearby, a water power
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50X1-HUM
19
station and a dam have already been completed.
Once the entire project is finished, new industrial plants,
kolkhozes and sovchozes are to be set up in this district. It
is planned, above all, to cultivate sub-tropical plants such
as oranges, lemons, etc., in this area.
This artificial lake on the Surkhan Darya and the connecting
canals are of considerable importance since they are in close
proximity to the Afghan frontier.
7. Dams, artificial lakes, central water distribution points
and canals on the lower course of the A m u D a r a
The Amu Darya has an enormous supply of water, comparable to
that of the Nile. Every year 50 milliard cubic metres of
water flows away unused into Lake Aral. For this reason it is
now planned to use the water of the Amu Darya from the upper
course to the delta for the purposes of Soviet economy. As
we have already seen above, the big power station at Nurek
and the canal network for Karshi Chol, Bokhara and Karakul
are being constructed on the upper course and middle course
respectively. At the same time, various projects are planned
for the delta of the Amu Darya and some of them are already
under construction.
By utilizing the 50 milliard cubic metres of water from the
Amu Darya, which so far have been flowing away unused into
Lake Aral, 5 million hectares of land could be irrigated,
industrial plants could be built and people could be settled
in this region. In the regions along the lower course of the
Amu Darya alone - in Chorezm, Karakalpakistan and
Tashauz, 1.5 million hectares of land could be gained. For
this reason projects are now entertained to set up central
water distribution points, with the aid of dams, along the
lower course of the Amu Darya, in order to supply the
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surrounding; districts with water.
The first step in this direction has been to extend and
concrete the existing irrigation plants in the delta of the
Amu Darya, in order to prevent corrosion and absorption of
the water by the desert soil. It is extremely difficult to
preserve an adequate canal system on this sandy soil, and for
decades the Soviet Russians have suffered one big reverse
after another in this connection in this region. They are now
hoping to surmount these difficulties with the aid of technic-
al measures. But how far their efforts will be crowned with
success, remains to be seen.
The problem of irrigating the regions of Chorezm and Tashauz,
as well as the Autonomous Soviet Republic (ASSR) of Karakal-
pakistan is now to be solved by means of two central water
distribution points. These points are to be built in
Tu j amuj in and Takhya-Tash. Tu j amuj in lies south of Urgench on
the railway line Charjui - Kungrad; Takhya-Tash is likewise
a railway station on the same line and is close to the town
of Nukus.
Large dams are to be erected at both places, and the water
collected in the artificial lakes thus formed is to be divert-
ed via these central water distribution points into the
surrounding areas. When finished, the dam at Tujamujin is to
be 60 feet high, and the reservoir thus formed is to have a
water capacity of 5 milliard cubic metres. At the same time,
water rower stations, which wilt supply the industry and
kolkhozes located along the lower course of the Amu Darya
with electric Dower, are also to be erected at both places.
The power station at Tujamujin is to have a capacity of
120,000 kiLoiatts. In addition, the various electric pump
stations along the Amu Darya are also to be supplied with
electric power, and in this way it wit?.. also be possible to
fill the already existing canals, such as the Chorezm Canal
and the Pahta-Arna Canal, with water. 50X1-HUM
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As the central water distribution point and the dam at
Tujamujin are of considerable political and economic import-
ance, work on this project is to begin without delay, that is
in 1961. A cotton and rice cultivation centre is to be set up
here. It is planned to cultivate rice in the northern areas
of this region which border on Lake Aral, since they are not
suitable for the cultivation of cotton. The largest rice-
growing centre of the Soviet Union is to be established here.
The southern regions of Karakalpakistan, Chorezm and Tashauz
are to be utilized exclusively for the cultivation of cotton.
The preliminary work involved in connection with setting up
kolkhozes and sovchozes and building roads and houses is to be
undertaken immediately, without waiting for the completion of
the water distribution points. Large pump stations could
already provide the water supply needed. The plants in Takhya-
Tash are already under construction.
It is planned to make 470,000 hectares of land arable for
rice cultivation and 300,000 hectares for cotton cultivation
in Karakalpakistan, Chorezm and Tashauz (Turkmenistan).
This same ?project also includes a large circular canal, the
so-called "collective" or "friendship canal", which is being
constructed in the regions of Tashauz and Chorezm south of
Lake Aral. This canal commences at Urgench (situated in the
region of Chorezm) and proceeds in a northwesterly direction
into Turkmenistan, via Tashauz, to the low-lying plain of
Sari Kamish. In a big loop it then proceeds in a southwest-
erly direction, via Khiva, as far as Tujamujin and the Amu
Darya. The plain of Sari Kamish is an old dried-up lake,which
was once the source of the River Ozboy. It lies 600 feet below
sea-level.
The first section of this circular canal, 132 miles in length,
was finished at the beginning of April 1961. Once the whole
project is finished, the marshes and salt-lakes in the
regions of Chorezm and Tashauz will be drained and the water
diverted into the Sari Kamish plain. In this way 200,000
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hectares of land will be drained and 120,000 hectares of
arable land will be gained. New industrial plants, settlements
and kolkhozes are then to be built here.
This canal has been named the "collective" or "friendship
canal" because, in addition to Turkestanians, including Uzbeks,
Turkmens and Kazakhs, Russians and other Slavs, too, are
employed on this project. This name is meant to emphasize the
alleged friendship between the Turkestanians and Russians.
None of these projects on the lower course of the Amu Darya
are new. This circular canal is planned for the same region in
which the so-called Turkmen Main Canal (linking up the Amu
Darya and the Caspian Sea) was to be built and on which
construction was begun, but abandoned in 1953. Nor was this
an original plan on the part of the Soviets, for the same
project was already considered in tsarist times. Similarly,
plans were also entertained in those days regarding the
construction of a number of canals in the delta of the Amu
Darya. This region was greatly favoured by the Russians in the
tsarist era, and numerous canals were already constructed in
those days. Even in the pre-tsarist era there was already an
extensive network of canals in this region. The fact that the
Soviet Russians have now taken up all these old plans again
and intend to realize them shows how great their interest in
this region is. In former times there was frequently a
shortage of labour which made it impossible to carry out such
big projects, but since the Russians have been able to con-
solidate their position in the northern regions, they are now
advancing further and further south in order to settle here,
too. Indeed, they continue to push on further south to the
Turkestanian frontier and Iran and Afghanistan. 50X1-HUM
It is obvious from the existing plans that the southern
region of Turkestan is to become a new food basis for Russia
and a new settlement region for the Russians.
new centres of rice and cotton cultivation
and of other agricultural products are to be established here.
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23
The Russians always aim to equip every region in which they
settle for the eventuality of war, so that it shall be self-
supporting as far as the food situation is concerned, should
it be cut off from other regions. Moreover, by means of this
extensive network of lakes and canals, Russia intends to
secure this region for the settlement of Russians in order to
gain a firmer control of South Turkestan.
~. New canals dams and artificial lakes in Mirza Chol
Just as the water of the Amu Darya is being used to build
canals, dams and artificial lakes, the water of the Syr Darya,
the second largest river in Turkestan, is also to be used for
the same purpose. In this report, however, we only intend to
mention the new projects in Mirza Choi (= Mirza steppes).
Mirza Choi, which is situated on the middle course of the Syr
Darya not far from Tashkent and borders on the Kizil-Kum
desert, has an area of 1 million hectares.
The plans to irrigate Mirza Choi are likewise very old. Even
prior to conquest by the Russians, canals were already built
here, and during the tsarist era the Russians concentrated
their attention on this region. In those days the Romanov
Canal was built, but it was renamed the Kirov Canal by the
Soviet Russians after it had been extended in 1940. The Kirov
Canal, which is 300 miles long, irrigates the districts round
the town of Chinaz (Chinaz is situated south of Tashkent on
the Syr Darya and is a railway station on the line between
Tashkent and Samarkand). In May 1948 the South Mirza Choi
Canal, which irrigates the rayon of Havas and is known as the
Baywud Canal, was opened. (Havas lies south of Chinaz on the
same railway route.)
In December 1960 a further canal, 58 miles long, 180 feet
wide and 15 feet deep, was opened in the southern part of
Mirza Choi. At present a 37-mile long road, which leads from
this canal into the desert, is being constructed. A new town,
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complete with schools, a hospital, dwelling-houses; gas and
electricity plants, etc., is to be erected here. The big
electric power station at Farchad, with a capacity of
200,000 kilowatts, which was opened on the Syr Darya in 1948,
supplies this region with electricity. So far, asphalted and
gravelled roads, 375 miles long, have been built in Mirza Chol
and they intersect the steppes from one end to the other.
It is planned to gain 350,000 hectares of land in Uzbekistan
and 10,000 hectares in Tadzhikistan and Kazakhstan, once the
various canals in Mirza Chol have been completed,, The canal
network is to extend as far as Dzisak (a railway station
between Tashkent and Samarkand).
The northern regions of Mirza Chol, which are part of Kazakh-
stan, are also to be linked up by waterways. A dam, 3 miles in
length, is to be built on the Syr Darya close to the town of
Chardara, which lies west of Tashkent on the Syr Darya, and the
water of the Syr Darya collected at this dam is to be diverted
into an artificial lake, which will be known as the Chardara
reservoir. This artificial lake will be 47 miles long and 22
miles wide. Construction on this project has already begun,
and when finished, the Chardara reservoir will have a water
capacity of 6 milliard cubic metres. A canal is to be con-
structed from this lake to the rayon of Chinaz and in this way
the canal networks of Mirza Chol, which are being built by
Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan, will be linked up with each other.
These canals, dams and artificial lakes in Mirza Chol are of
equally great importance for-the republics of Uzbekistan,
Kazakhstan and Tadzhikistan, for they will thus be provided
with additional traffic and transport routes by waterway. In
addition, a new food and industrial centre is to be set up
here on the periphery of Tashkent. Since the Turkestanian
people are not numerous enough to settle these regions, to
cultivate the kolkhozes and to supply industry with the
necessary labour, countless Russians will as usual swarm into
these areas.
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R e p o r t on t h e
f i v e S o v i e t
R e pub l i c a of
T u r k e s t a n
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C o n t e n t s:
A.
I n t r o d u c t i o n
page
2
B.
The Present Situation in the five Soviet
Republics of Turkestan
page
6
C.
Summary
page
22
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A. Introduction
In the five Soviet Republics of Turkestan relations are at
present strained between the Communist Party and the popul-
ation. The functionaries insist that the peasants and workers
must fulfil the quotas of the agricultural and industrial
plans for 1961 and they are being censured most severly for
not having fulfilled the 1960 plans. Not only the population
but also many functionaries of the Communist Party, as for
instance secretaries of the districts and rayons, super-
visors of the sovchozes and kolkhozes, leading directors of
industrial concerns and factories, and even ministers and
secretaries of the Communist Party have recently been
sabotaging Soviet economy and Soviet planning in Turkestan and
have caused huge losses in these sectors.
Internal Party sessions and congresses of the agricultural
functionaries and advisory commissions are at present being
held in the five Soviet Republics of Turkestan. It is obvious
from these sessions, which are in part secret and in part
public, that for the past three years - as we already
mentioned in Report No. ,3 on Tadzhikistan - catastrophic
conditions have prevailed. Various information has leaked out
in the course of the secret sessions.
Party secretaries, ministers and Party functionaries, of
the state, districts and rayons have been dismissed from
office and called to account. These secretaries of the district
committees, chairmen of the executive committees and other
functionaries appointed by the Communist Party, as well as the
kolkhoz supervisors and peasants have all been working hand
in hand and have sabotaged the economy. In this respect it
should be stressed that the functionaries in this case are
young persons who have grown up during the Soviet era and
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50X1-HUM
have been trained in the Communist spirit in school, in the
the Komsomol and the Communist Party.
Por years Moscow has been trying to hush up the true state of
affairs in the five Soviet Republics of Turkestan, which,
incidentally, have been known to us for a long time and which
we have stressed again and again, and has only talked about
the success and achievements of Communist economy and of
Communism and about the loyal devotion of the population. Now,
however, since the catastrophic conditions in the economic and
agricultural sectors have assumed such proportions, Moscow is
forced to discuss the state of affairs which exists, to resort
to counter-measures and to find out who is to blame. Por, under
Khrushchov'e &een-Year Plan,production was to be increased to
such an extent that the American standard of living was to be
attained or, in fact, even overtaken. But it has now transpired
that, as a result of passive resistance and sabotage on the
part of the population, agricultural production has not in-
creased, but, on the contrary, has decreased.
At present the kolkhoz farmers in the five Soviet Republics of
Turkestan are being accused of having deceived the government
and the Party in all sectors of agriculture. They have left
millions of hectares of irrigated land uncultivated and in
some rayons have divided up the land belonging to the kolkhozes
amongst themselves for private use. They have for the most
tart been working for their own private enterprise and their
own private interests and have left the agricultural products
of the state farms, such as grain and cotton, to rot on the
fields. The farmers have stolen the agricultural products of
the kolkhozes and have intentionally allowed millions of
sheep, calves and cows to starve to death. In 1960 for
instance, 15 per cent of the sheep and lambs in'Kirpisatan,
4 million sheep in Kazakhstan, and a total number of 10
million sheep in all five Soviet Republics of Turkestan
perished.
The farmers show no interest whatever as far as the state
farms and state property are concerned and are definitely
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50X1-HUM
hostile in their attitude towards the Soviet economy. For this
reason they do not look after the cattle properly and do not
get in sufficient fodder for the winter months, with the
result that the animals die of starvation. In Uzbekistan, for
example, the kolkhozes and sovchozes in 1959 needed 4.7
million tons of silo fodder and 4.2 million tons of hay as
winter fodder for the amount of live-stock there, but only
2.1 million tons of silo fodder and 2.1 million tons of hay
were available. There was likewise a shortage of winter fodder
in Tadzhikistan, where the kolkhozes and sovchozes needed
314,000 tons of silo fodder and 260,000 tons of hay. But here,
too, the quotas were not fulfilled and many of the animals
died of starvation.
In addition, there are not enough stables, and those that are
available are so badly in need of repair that the r4in and
snow leak through and the animals perish from cold. Very often
animals are slaughtered on the pretext that they are sick or
old, which of course is not the case.
Millions of roubles have been spent in order to renew the
live-stock and cattle have been imported into the five Soviet
Republics of Turkestan. But instead of using this pedigree
stock for breeding more cattle and for increasing dairy
production, a large percentage has been slaughtered and the
meat handed over to the state in order to fulfil quotas.
Similar conditions prevail in poultry breeding. In Kazakhstan,
for instance, only 3 million hens out of 28 million chickens
were handed over by the farmers, whilst 25 million disappeared
and allegedly starved to death within a year.
Conditions are equally bad in grain and cotton cultivation.
Irrigated land is not cultivated, acres are overgrown with
weeds, the crops are not harvested in time but are left to rot
on the fields. Machines and valuable fertilizers are left out
in the rain and snow by the farmers and consequently rot. And
the so-called trained cadres fail to carry out the tasks
entrusted to them.
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On the other hand, however, the Party fhnotionaries of the
rayons and districts and the kolkhos supervisors arras r);hll
kinds of festivities together with the kolkhos-farm.rs, at
whi t, the ".achievements" of the kolkhosea ?are celebrated. But
these f ustionaries, as we s l see later on, are themselves
respolw$Vt4,, for the said condition. and cover up the acts of
sabotq. p inst the state '*-,forging reosi : for teat, fats
or* grain, etc* # that has allegedly been deb; iersd, and thus
deceive the state.
The Soviets have now been obliged to admit that a process of
deterioration is in progress in every sector of OlAmunist
economy in the five Soviet Republics of Turkestan and that the
Turkestanian farmers are not in the least interested in their
work. The Party functionaries have long been aware of this
state of affairs but have not taken any steps to alter matters.
For this reason political purges are once more being carried
out, and Ihrushohov recently toured the Soviet Union in order
to look into conditions himself. On March 20, 1961, he was in
Alma Ata, but he then broke off his tour of inspection on
account of the international situation, without visiting the
other capitals of the Soviet Republics of Turkestan.
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 cnv-i ui inn
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B. The Present Situation in the five Soviet Republics
of Turkestan
In spite of the fact that the Central Committee of the
Communist Party of the Soviet Union and the Soviet government
have for years been trying to conceal the true state of affairs
in Tadzhikistan, the Central Committee of the Communist Party
of Tadzhikistan was,,on February 15, 1961, obliged to admit in
a special session as well as in internal conferences that
conditions in agriculture have become worse since 1957 and that
the population is still putting up a passive resistance against
the Sovietization of the country. This fact has, incidentally,
been pointed out by us repeatedly. We have been aware of'this
a long time and during the past few weeks it has now been
officially corroborated.
Naturally, the nationalists, the clergy and the "agents of the
West", who have allegedly misled the people of Tadzhikistan,
are held responsible for conditions there. Actually, not only
the farmers, workers and young people* but also the middle and
lower classes of the Party functionaries have for years been
putting up a secret resistance in the villages, towns, rayons
and districts; and the latter have supported the acts of
sabotage carried out by the farmers. It has transpired that a
large number of the Communist functionaries in the towns and
rural areas are nationalists in disguise,who have harmed not
only Soviet economy but also the Communist ideology very
considerably. The real Communists only constitute a minority.
50X1-HUM
The First Secretary of the Communist Party of Tadshikistan,
Tu?unbai Oldchabay(ev), admitted
that the economic situation in T50X1-HUM
istan had reached a depression and that agriculture and
industry had not handed over enough products to the state. In
spite of the fact that these circumstances and the "criminal
activity" of the functionaries wale known to many ministers
and responsible persons of the Party, so he added, no steps
were taken against the persons concerned .nor were they called
to account. The kolkhoz and sovchoz farmers, for instance,
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bUA1I -H U IVI
had not delivered sufficient agricultural products to the
state, but had been dividing them up amongst themselves, and,
so he stressed, had been slaughtering hundreds of thousands
of calves, sheep and cows yearly or had allowed them to die.
Kolkhoz land had even been partly divided up amongst the
farmers in some rayons. 50X1-HUM
the kolkho
zes
ana sovchozes there in 1960, for example, produced 4,500 tons
of meat, 26,500 tons of milk and 680,000 tons of wool, all of
which however disappeared. The poultry farms produced 19
million eggs and likewise did not deliver these to the state.
On the other hand, the inclination of the kolkhoz farmers to
private enterprise has increased.
This state of affairs has been known to the supervisors of
the kolkhozes and to the Party secretaries of the districts
and rayons for years, but they have concealed it from the
government and have made out faked receipts for the kolkhozes
stating that the latter had allegedly delivered sufficient
agricultural products to the state, when in reality these
quantities have not been handed over at all.
The same thing hac been happening in Uzbekistan, Here, the
kolkhoz supervisors together with the Party functionaries in
the rayons of Termez, Charkur an, Sakat and Cherabad, for
instance, have been sunporting the acts of sabotage on the
part of the kolkhoz farmers by means of faked receipts. In
May and June 1960 the Party bureau in Cherabad made out
receipts for 316 tons of meat which were never handed over,
and receipts were likewise made out for the kolkhozes in the
rayons of Churdchi for 485 tons of meat, which were never
delivered to the state. The farmers of the kolkhozes Kirov
and Norveu in the rayons of Samarkand divided the products
of the kolkhozes amongst themselves and cultivated kolkhoz
land for their own purpose.
At a congress of active Party members on February 4, 1961, in
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 50X1-HIJM
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Tashkent and at the congress of the Supreme Soviet of Uzbek-
istan on February 5, 1961, the First Party Secretary of the
Communist Party of Uzbekistan, Rashid(ov), and the Prime
Minister Alim(ov) gave reports on the conditions which prevail,
and with considerable indignation Rashid(ov) referred to the
gradual undermining of industry and agriculture which has been
going on for years&
"During the past years and also in 1960 Uzbekistan
han failed to fulfil the production quotas. For years
there has been no increase in production, and the
government and the Party are being deceived and
swindled not only by the kolkhoz supervisors and
farmers but also by numerous Party functionaries of
the districts, rayons and towns. These Party secret-
aries and heads of the executive committees of the
Party, as for instance the Party secretary of the
district committee of Surhan-Darya, the secretary of
the district committee of Samarkand, Sharif, the
head of the executive committee of Samarkand,
Abdulla, and others, have for years been aware of
these conditions, deceptions and thefts of state
property and they have even shielded those kolkhoz
farmers who have intentionally robbed the state".
Rashid(ov) quoted numerous examples from various districts of
Uzbekistan and said in conclusion:
"The Bureau of the Central Committee of the Communist
Party of Uzbekistan and the government of Uzbekistan
bear the responsibility for all these incidents. We
must not forget the admonitions of Khrushchov at the
session of the Central Committee of the Communist
Party of the Soviet Union in Moscow in January 1961.
Khrushchov demanded that drastic measures should be
taken against functionaries and all public enemies
in order to punish them and exclude them from office
and from the Party."
The same state of affairs prevails in Turkmenistan, whilst in
Kazakhstan the Party leaders talk quite openly about "frauds"
and "false reports" which have been practised and passed on
by the kolkhoz supervisors. By means of these faked receipts
the kolkhoz supervisors and farmers have an alibi, with which
the Party functionaries have provided them.
In Kir_gizstan Party functionaries - from the lowest to the
highest ranks - until a short time ago worked hand in hand
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with the population. Since the Kirgiz have suffered terribly
under the Soviet regime they have a strong feeling of affinity
and unity irrespective of any difference in their political
views. Even today the patriarchal system still prevails in
Kirgizstan. On February 12, 1961, the Minister of the Interior
of the Republic, Isa(jev) and six members of the Central
Committee of the Communist Party of Kirgizstan were dismissed
from office and excluded from the Party. This measure was
however only carried out at Moscow's orders.
X
Razak(ov),.the Secretary of the Communist Party of Kirgizstan,
admitted that the organization of the Party was very poor and
that the Party secretaries neglected their duties and together
with the population and the kolkhoz farmers were causing
considerable harm to the economy. Many of the high-ranking
Party leaders, so he added, had not fulfilled the tasks
assigned to them but had swindled the government and the Party
and endangered the ideology and economy. They had so far
secretly supported and strengthened the anti-Communist and
anti-Russian feelings of the populationUfter having been
severely censured by Khrushchov in January 1961 in Moscow,
Razak(ov) announced that the Communist Party of Kirgizstan
would now take drastic steps to deal with the Party function-
aries of the country, of the districts and rayons and with
the kolkhoz supervisors who had committed "frauds".
The Party functionaries in the five Soviet Retublics of
Turkestan and in particular in Tadzhikistan, instead of
taking measures against the kolkhoz farmers, have, jointly
with the latter and the kolkhoz supervisors, arranged big
festivities, celebrated their "socialist achievements" and
held boastful speeches, and in this way intentionally
sabotaged work. Restaurants and pavilions for these festiv-
ities have been built in the gardens of the kolkhozes; the
funds of the kolkhozes have thus been squandered, instead of
being used, as prescribed, in order to build schools,
Irrigation plants, roads and propaganda clubs. The Party
functionaries have been furthering their own private
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financial interests and in Uzbekistan, for instance, have been
building luxury villas from state funds. Corruption predominates
in the Party and government, and state funds are being
squandered.
The following examples will serve to illustrate the catastrophic
conditions in agriculture in the five Soviet Republics of
Turkestan.
Cattle-breeding in particular, which has always played an
important Dart in Turkestan, has suffered considerably. It was
ascertained in Tadzhikistan that in three years alone hundreds
of thousands of sheep perished as a result of lack of fodder
and care. In 1960,10 million sheep died in Turkestan, and of
this number 4 million in Kazakhstan alone. The biggest losses,
namely slmost 2 million, were in the districts of Alma Ata,
Dzhambul and Semipalatinsk.
In addition, many horned cattle and calves also perished. In
the Tashkent district, for example, there were
in 1959, of which only 23,000 were still alive
animals died as a result of lack of fodder and
poor stablinu.
127,000 calves
in 1960. The
proper care and
there is a serious shortage of winter fodder. In Kazakhstan,
for instance, the hav is not gathered in in many districts.
The entirely inadequate number of stables are in such poor
condition that many of the animals die as a result of exposure
to rain and snow. Last winter 6 million animals in Kazakhstan
had no stables and were thus left out in the open at night.
This is one of the reasons for the big loss in young animals.
In Kirgizstan, which has been especially chosen to increase
cattle-breeding, 15 per cent of the stock of sheep perished in
1960, and the number of horned cattle and calves has likewise
decreased. As Razak(ov), the First Secretary of the Communist
Party of Kirgizstan, was himself obliged to admit, the kolkhoz
farmers did not give the animals sufficient fodder in winter
and they died of hunger in the cold weather. Even the cattle
on the state farms were not watered sufficiently. In the winter
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they were driven out onto the pastures in the mountainous
districts and a large number perished as they could not find
any food because the soil was frozen and covered with snow.
This is one of the reasons why Kirgizstan has for years not
been delivering sufficient milk, wool, beef, poultry and fats
to the state.
On the other hand, however, the Kirgiz have for years been
fostering and intensifying private enterprise. They have
privately distributed amongst themselves many of the animals
which belong to the state. The kolkhoz farmers have been
occupying themselves more with the one or two cows and
poultry, etc., which they are allowed to own, than with their
work on the state farms. And this is not only the case in
Kirgizstan, but also everywhere else in the entire Soviet
Union. Private enterprise in the Soviet Union has produced
50 per cent of the fats, 50 per cent of the meat and.80 per
cent of the eggs and sold them to the state authorities.
Officially the kolkhoz farmers are allowed to cultivate up to
1 hectare of land for their own private agricultural and
horticultural use. They are also allowed to keep a few
animals for their own use, such as cows, sheep and poultry on
this land.
At the session of the Central Committee of the Communist
Party of the Soviet Union in Moscow in January 1961, the First
Secretary of the Communist Party of Kirgizstan, Razak(ov),
promised that Kirgizstan would fulfil the quotas of the
production plan in 1961. The quotas of the 1960 plan were by
no means fulfilled, and at the said session Razak(ov) was
severely reprimanded by Khrushchov. After Razak(ov)'s
promise for 1961, Khrushchov said: "The gipsies make all sorts
of promises, but when the time comes to fulfil them they
disappear to another country". To which Razak(ov) replied in
true Kirgiz manner: "But we have no other country to which we
can go". Whereupon Khrushchov retorted: "That's true, the
mountains in Kirgizstan are very high". These remarks
characterize the position and the feeling in Kirgizstan.
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12
In Turkmenistan, too, the kolkhoz farmers occupy themselves for
the most part with their own cattle and their own hortieultureo
And here, too, there has been a considerable decrease in the
state stock of cattle. For this reason the local Party
functionaries were authorized by a decree of the Oommunist
Party of Turkmenistan to collect all "surplus" cattle and
give a refund for it according to the set tariff. In this way
private property is to be reduced so that the kolkhoz farmers
will occupy themselves more with state cattle. An attempt is
being made to control the farmers and workers more strictly
and if possible to abolish private property.
In order to improve home cattle-breeding and dairy-farming,
valuable pedigree stock from abroad was imported into the five
Soviet Republics of Turkestan. But instead of improving and
increasing the stock of cattle by breeding calves, the kolkhoz
farmers slaughtered these valuable pedigree animals and milch
cows and delivered the meat to the state authorities in order
to fulfil the quotas of the production plan.
During the past five years the Soviets have imported into
Uzbekistan 45,000 pedigree calves, to the value of 130 million
roubles, for breeding purposes. But in the districts of
Andizhan and Fergana, for instance, within the past three
years 61,000 dairy cattle, which were to be used to increase
breeding and dairy-farming, were slaughtered. The kolkhozes
in the Tashkent district have likewise slaughtered 25,000
valuable milch cows, which had been purchased for considerable
sums, and as a substitute have bought 19,000 lean cows out of
kolkhoz funds. Thus Uzbekistan is greatly in arrears with its
meat and milk deliveries, but the Party functionaries have
taken no steps to remedy this state of affairs.
The kolkhoz system in Tadzhikistan has likewise been under-
mined. In the kolkhozes in the district of Leninabad, for
example, more than 5,300 pedigree cows, that. is one-fourth of
the total stock, were slaughtered in 1960 in order to fulfil
delivery quotas. On the cattle-farms of the kolkhozes in the
rayon: Lf Kolchosabad, Pandch, Moscow and Perhad valuable
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13
milch cows were also slaughtered. In the kolkhozes of the
rayon of Soviet alone, 850 milch cows, that is to say 35 per
cent of the total stock, were rigorously slaughtered in 1960
and the meat delivered to the state. The high-ranking
functionaries complain that this type of crime has been going
on for years, but that nobody ever took any steps to stop it.
Similar conditions prevail in poultry breeding. The poultry
farms boosted with so much propaganda in Tadzhikistan, which
were set up in the rayons of Kolchosabad and Kannibadam, have
deteriorated completely within the past three years. 40,000
50X1-HUM
poultry perished there either as a result of negligence oi-
lack of food, - this was alleged by the kolkhoz supervisors.
40,000 poultry had been privately distributed amongst
the kolkhoz farmers. In 1960 there were only 13,000 poultry
left on the said roultry farms. But 24 special poultry
breeders were permanently engaged to look after this stock
and they spent 185,000 roubles a year, ioeo 555,000 roubles in
three years. In addition, the director engaged so-called
seasonal poultry workers who received 400,000 roubles a yearn
Thus 1.75 million roubles were squandered in three years,
from 1957 onwards.
One poultry farm in the rayon of Kannibadam only delivered
238 cwts of poultry meat from 26,000 poultry. In view of the
high costs of the poultry farm, this means that the cost price
per kilogram amounts to 17.4 roubles and price per egg to
1024 roubles (1 rouble = approximately 1 Deutsche Mark).
Here, too, the kolkhoz farmers are mainly occupied with their
own poultry and have no interest whatever in the state poultry
farms. On the contrary, they sabotage them, hence the huge
losses in stock and exorbitant prices of the products.
In 1953 the Russians began forcing the Moslems in the five
.Soviet Republics of !urkestan to engage in pig-breeding, but
the Turkestanians refused to comply with these orders. The
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Soviets imported 76,000 pigs into Tadzhikistan, but as a
result of the opposition of the population this experiment
proved a failure, though this fact was hitherto always hushed
up. Up.to 1960 the Party-seoretaries of the districts and
rayons and the kolkhoz supervisors always talked about large
pig-breeding farms, but in reality the farms in this case
only possessed a stock of one to nine pigs.-This fact now had.
to be admitted by the Deputy Prime Minister of Tadzhikistan,
Dad~(ev),, when he said that the situation in this branch of
cattle-breeding was catastrophic. The kolkhoz farmers have
simply neglected the animals and allowed them to die of
starvation.
The most important task of agriculture in the Soviet Union is
to fulfil the quotas of the production plan, and the kolkhoz
supervisors and Party functionaries are forced to fulfil these
quotas. But there is a shortage of products in every sector,
and consequently the functionaries in charge are constantly
threatened with severe punishment. In order to cause .chaos and
confusion in the Soviet economic system, the kolkhos super-
visors and farmers have for years been resorting to the'
following methods they have been buying agricultural products
such as fats, milk, meat,. etc. , from the state stores with
kolkhoz funds and have then delivered these products to the
state as "own production", as if they were the produce of
their kolkhoses. ?or years the local Party functionaries have
been covering up this activity, and the heads of the rayons
have been making out faked receipts for the quantity of
products delivered to the state. In some cases private produce
has also been bought from the population and then delivered
to the state by the kolkhoz as "fulfilled quotas".
In Tadzhikistan, for instance, the Tomin kolkhoz near the
town of lul ab bought 31,000 tons of milk from the population
and 7 tons from the fat works in the town and then delivered
this quantity to the state as kolkhoz produced Incidentally,
some of the kolkhozes produced planty of milk but they sold
it privately to the population. The kolkhozes in the TB4O
region, for instance, produced 323,000 tons of milk on their
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15
farms, but only handed over 421 tons to the government. The
rest of the milk simply vanished.
The Party Secretary of the district of Tienchan in Kirgizstan,
Isa(4ev), had hitherto instructed the heads of-the kolkhozes,
sovchozes and rayons to buy the agricultural products needed
to fulfil the quotas from the state stores and then deliver
them to the state as "own produce". With the approval of the
Party and the government this same Isa(jev) was recently
appointed Minister of the Interior of the Republic of Kirgiz-
stan. He has now, however, been removed from office, as was
already mentioned above.
In Kazakhstan numerous complaints are being voiced about the
poor cultivation of vegetables, for vegetables are one of the.
staple foods. But supplies to the population are by no means
adequate. There is a shortage of machines everywhere and
cultivation has so far not been mechanized properly. In the
past three years the kolkhozes in Tadzhikistan have only
fulfilled 60.5 per cent of the quotas in this sector, and in
1960 there was a decrease of 40 to 50 per cent in the
production of vegetables. In 1960 the kolkhozes in Tadzhik-
istan produced 84,000 cwts of vegetables, but only delivered
26,000 cwts to the state. 50 to 60 per cent of the produce
disappeared.
The cultivation of grain, especially in Kazakhstan, is by no
means satisfactory. Instead of 794 million puds, only 642
million puds, i.e. 80 per cent of the total amount of grain
oultivated, were delivered to the state (1 pud - 16.38 kilo-
grams). The yield per hectare only amounted to 8.4 double cwts,
instead of the fixed 10.5 double cwts. By comparison Germany
harvests 30 double cwts per hectare. In the grain areas of
Kuetanai, Akmolinsk and Kokchetau in particular, the harvest
was very poor, due to improper cultivation of the soil,
fields overgrown with weeds, sowing of poor seed, as well as
losses during transportation and inadequate agricultural
mechanization. The corn was in many cases mown whilst it was
still green and before the grain had formed. In order to
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16
fulfil their quotas, the kolkhos farmers ploughed the soil so
flat that the grain either did not grow properly or also was
choked by weeds. The machines could not be used to the full
extent, for over half the kolkhozes and sovohoses have no
repair-shops; hence the machines could very often not be used
for weeks on end. Since the farmers are not in the least
interested in state property, the machines and fertilizers are
left out in the open and, as a result of exposure to rain and
snow, are ruined. Only half the fertilizers needed were
supplied. The workers sabotaged transportation of the grain by
tying up the sacks so loosely and stacking the sheaves so
carelessly that part of the grain was lost en route during
transportation. Brigades of agricultural workers then had to
be employed to collect the sheaves that had been lost en route.
At the delivery centres a large amount of the grain was found
to be missing; it had been sold on the black market at
exorbitant prices.
There is a shortage of trained personnel everywhere. 80,000
mechanics are now to be trained in special courses, but even
this number will not cover the present needs. As a result of
sabotage, squandering of funds and unnecessary expenditure,
the cost price of a double cwt of grain is far too high. It
amounts to 45.83 roubles, whereas according to the agricultural
plan it should only be 39.59 roubles.
Although the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the
Soviet Union decreed that in 1960 73,000 hectares of virgin
land were to be opened up in the Hunger Steppes, not a single
heotare has so far been cultivated.
On account of the unsatisfactory state of afftirs, the Minister
of Agriculture of Kazakhstan was dismissed from office in
March 1961. But apparently it has meanwhile been realized that
the grain harvest in Kazakhstan will not be any better in
1961, for the plan for 1961 only provides for 650million
96uds
of grain. This is the same amount that was harvested
But, as we already mentioned above, only 80 per cent of the
production plan was fulfilled in 1960.
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A similar state of affairs exists in Tadzhikistan. For years
the Soviet press has been propagating the idea that the area
of grain cultivation has been increased. In reality, however,
the opposite is the case. During the past seven years the
area of grain cultivation in the kolkhozes in Tadzhikistan has
decreased by 106,000 hectares and 45,000 cwts less of grain
have been harvested. The area of grain cultivation has thus
decreased by one-fourth.
In Turkmenistan, too, the fields have not been cultivated to
the full extent and are overgrown with weeds. The kolkhoz
workers show no interest,whatever and leave the grain to rot
on the fields. Indeed, the same holds good for all five Soviet
Republics of Turkestan.
Although conditions for the cultivation of cotton in Tadzhik-
istan are excellent and this Republic is to become the second
cotton supply centre of the Soviet Union, next to Uzbekistan,
the farmers have failed to fulfil the quotas in this sector.
The cotton shrubs have not been watered, the soil has not been
cultivated properly and fertilizers have not been used in
sufficient quantities. Thus the farmers of Tadzhikistan have
intentionally sabotaged the cotton cultivation, a fact which
the Secretary of the Communist Party of the district of
Leninabad, Ibrahim(ov), was obliged to admit. He accused the
Party functionaries of this district of having tolerated this
mismanagement. At present a political purge is being carried
out all over the country, and agitators have been sent into
the rural areas in order to re-train the population and in
particular the young people ideologically. Above all, the
womenfolk, too, are now to be rounded up for work on the land,
At Moscow's orders an additimal 12,000 girls and women were to
be mobilized in KIrgizstan in 1960 for work on the state farms,
But only 5 to 6000 could be recruited pro forma and they soon
.quitted their place of work again.
In Turkmenistan the First Secretary of the Communist Party,
Ovez(ov), admitted that the production plans for 1960 had not
been fulfilled and that 123,000 tons of cotton,i.e. 30 per
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1?
cent, less than the fixed quotas had been d
li
.
e
vered
Only
317,000 tons were delivered to the state, although the quota
of cotton to be delivered by Turkmenistan was fixed at
440,000 tons. But the workers showed no interest whatever in
collective work and devoted themselves to their own private
work. The Party functionaries affirm that ideological training
is inadequate and that even the trained cadres are not
interested. In Turkmenistan most of the cotton crop had to be
picked by hand, since the number of harvesting machines
available is by no means adequate. Owing to the tedious and
lengthy hand-picking, additional high costs were incurred,
which had not been provided for.
In Uzbekistan the area for the cultivation of cotton has been
increased during the past years, but in many districts this
irrigated area has not been planted with cotton, as for
instance the districts of Andizhan, Per~ana and Bokhara. Many
of the kolkhoz farmers have simply neglected the shrubs, have
allowed the boils to shrivel up and the plantations to be
choked with weeds. The cotton crop on the state farms has in
some cases been divided up amongst themselves by the farmers,
whilst in some districts land belonging to the kolkhozes was
secretly given to the kolkhoz farmers, who then sold the crop
to the state as their own produce.
The cotton production quotas in Kazakhstan have likewise not
been fulfilled. The quotas were fixed at 205,000 tons, but
only 175,i000 tons were delivered to the state, that is to say
only 85 per cent. This represents a considerable loss to
Soviet economy.
As is obvious from the above, a state of mismanagement
prevails in every sector of agriculture in the five Soviet
Republics of Turkestan. The Party and the government blame
negligence in dealing with ideological questions for this
state of affairs. They maintain that if the people are loyal
Communists and "Soviet beings", their interest in work on the
state farms, and hence production, too, increases. But this is
precisely the reason why-this state of mismanagement prevails
everywhere. Whenever they have an opportunity, the people
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19
sabotage the Soviet economy. The passive resistance of the
people against Soviet leadership and planning is, as we have
seen, supported by the middle and lower classes of the Party
functionaries in the districts, rayons and towns. For this
reason purges are now being carried out everywhere and they
have already claimed countless victims.
Local Party functionaries and the central government in Moscow
have so far endeavoured to hush up the said conditions, which
have prevailed for years, in order to save their prestige.
Purges have been carried out again and again, changes in
appointments to Party and government posts have been made on
numerous occasions, but all these measures have proved futile
since the population is opposed to the Sovietization of their
country and continues to put up a passive resistance.
At an internal congress of the Communist Party of Tadzhikistan
on February 8th and 9th, 1961, high-ranking Party function-
aries, members of the Central Committee and trustworthy Party
functionaries of the districts, rayons and towns, as well as
propagandists conferred on the question of adopting the
strictest measures possible to deal with the prevailing
conditions and to punish those elements that are hostile. But
whether these measures will be successful, is another matter.
In the ideological sphere the general attitude is, as ever, one
of complete indifference, not only amongst the kolkhoz farmers
but also amongst the so-called representatives of culture. For
this reason the First Secretary of the Communist Party of
Uzbekistan, Hashid(ov), on February 14, 1961, organized a
congress in Tashkent for writers, artists, painters, musicians,
actors, journalists, composers, poets, and teachers, etc., from
Uzbekistan, in order to stir up their, enthusiasm anew for the
Communist ideals and Soviet economy. In addition, all the
members and candidates of the Central Committee of the
Communist Party of.Uzbekistan and the representatives of the
security service were also present on this occasion. Ra d(ov)
censured the representatives of culture who had not fulfilled
their duty towards the Party most sharply. In the name of the
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Communist Party of Uzbekistan he exhorted all representatives
of culture to contribute towards the realization of the decrees
of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet
Union in 1961 and to propagate the significance of the Seven-
Year Plan amongst the population by their works, films, plays,
lectures and articles. They are to arouse the enthusiasm of
the people for the fulfilment of the quotas. He sharply
criticized the attitude of the representatives of culture. The
themes of their works, so he stressed, did not deal with the
socialist achievements and the heroes of work; they did not,
for instance, give an account of the latest irrigation plants
or electric power stations, but chose themes for their works,
which,in Rashid(ov)'s opinion, glorified the past or dealt
with romanticism, He said:
"Recently, it is true, works have been written about
the achievements of the workers, but these works are
very few in number and they are too superficial. The
intellectual elite must choose themes about individ-
ual heroes of work, about farmers who fulfil the
quotas and even more. This is the task of literature.
So far no books or plays have been produced which
have as their subject the great Fergana Canal or the
Farchad electric power station, etc. Everybody knows
that we have declared war on the uncultivated steppes
and intend to open up virgin regions, as for instance
i1irza Chol. But the writers do not mention this at
all and do not choose current topics for their works.
The subjects of the painters and. the themes of the
poets and artists are not dedicated to Soviet
achievements, but deal with romantic old traditions.
The renrese:.tatives of culture must be completely
familiar with the doctrine of Marxism and Leninism.,
with socialist realism, and must stand in the fore-
most ranks of the fighting; -front in order to make
the people familiar with the propaganda of the Party,
with the Party line and the interests of the govern-
ment".
In the name of their organizations in Uzbekistan and the
members of these organizations, the following persons publicly
pledged their word at this congress to contribute an active
share in influencing the people and, in particular, the young
generation in cultural, ideological and economic respect, and
to help to realize the decrees of the Central Committee of
the Communist Party:
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21
K. J a s h i n, First Secretary of the Writers' Union
E s h a n t o r a (jev), people's actor
B a b a (jev), chairman of the Composers' Union
I k r a m (ov), chairman of the Society of Fine Arts
A h m e d (ov), chief producer of the Tashkent theatre
M u h a m e d (ov), Minister of Culture of Uzbekistan
A i m i r z a (jev), chairman of the Writers' Union of
Karakalp aki st an
A 1 1 o a n (ov), in the name of the kolkhoz farmers
S a 1 a m o v a, in the name of the industrial workers
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C. S u m m a r y
By means of various typical examples,we have) in this report
illustrated the trend of the present situation in the five J
Soviet Republics of Turkestan; but this trend against the Soviet
regime is by no means new. 4s early as 1937 organized anti-
Soviet and anti-Russian movements were discovered in the five
Soviet Republics of Turkestan; and first Party secretaries,
members of the Central Committee of the Communist Party,
ministers, presidents, inteU_lectuals, kolkhoz supervisors and
others were arrested and shot in mock trials) Indeed,50X1-HUM
Turkestan was bled on a large scale.
Moscow has been endeavouring to increase the
production of milk, meat, fats, etc., as well as the stock of
cattle; but in 1960 there were still only 505 million horned
cattle in Kazakhstan, that is to say the same stock as in 19300
Such is the result after 40 years of Soviet rule in Kazakhstan,
and, incidentally, the 40th anniversary of this Soviet
Republic is to be celebrated on a large scale in 1961!
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23
This report endeavours to show the trend and development of
the Soviet economic system and the extent to which the people
put up a resistance. Khrushchov, however, tries to blame his
defeat in the agricultural sector and in the ideological field
-on the local Party functionaries in Turkestan; and for this
reason purges are now being carried out there. In order to
consolidate their position, the Russian-authorized represent-
atives in the five Soviet Republics of Turkestan in January
1961 demanded that additional young. Communists should be sent
to Turkestan,V on the grounds that there was a shortage of
labour there. Moscow is therefore planning to send one million
young Communists to Turke st ark.
The situation as described in this report shows what the
general feeling is in the five Soviet Republics of Turkestan.
.In spite of passive resistance1the people are, of course, aware
that they cannot overthrow the regime by such measures; but
they harm the regime whenever they have an opportunity. The
Turkestanian population is still a factor of danger which the
Kremlin will have to face in the event of a conflict.
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/01/06: CIA-RDP80T00246AO60200070001-5