ECONOMIC PLANNING IN POLAND SINCE 1945

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP80T00246A050900260001-8
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: C
• Document Page Count: 7
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: August 10, 2010
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: October 8, 1959
• Content Type: REPORT

J
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FORMATION RE PORT I t-A F,.-)RMATI ON REPORT
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
meaning of the a
This material contains information affecting the National Defense of the United States within the sDlonKe Lwe. Till
18, U.S.C. Secs. 793 and 794, the !transmission or revelation of which in any manner to an unauthorized person is prohibited by law.
C-O_NF-I-D-E-N-T-I-A-L
Since 1945
SUBJECT Economic Planning in Poland DATE DISTR. 8 OCT ft
COUNTRY Poland
DATE OF
INFO.
PLACE &
DATE ACQ.
REPORT
NO. PAGES 1 50X1-HUM
REFERENCES RD
50X1-HUM
information on economic
.
1958
. TENTATIVE.
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report containing bacizgrouiiu
Poland during the years 1945 -
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(Note: Washington distribution indicated by "X"; field dbhibaiioe by
at AEC
STATE x ARMY X NAVY X (R X
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Introduction
1. During the period from 1946 to 1948, economic planning in Poland was
entrusted to'the Central Planning Office (Centralny Urzad Planowania),
headed by Adam Wang. It was directly subordinate to Hilary Mine, who,
as Minister of Industry and Commerce (Minister Przemyslu i Handlu),
was thehigheet economic official in Poland. In 1949, the Central
Planning Office was redesignated the State Planning Commission (Panstwowa
KomiejaPlanowania Gospodarezego) but its subordination and functions
rem: hed'the same. In 1957, the planning function was officially trans-
ferredeto the lower economic echelons: the associations and the plants
themaelves; higher echelons were officially restricted to coordinating
the plans submitted by the plants and associations.
Planning from 1916 to 1955
2. The most Important figure in Polish economic planning was Adam Wang,
who had received the degree of metallurgical engineer in the USSR
during World'War'II and held the title of vice-minister from 1950 on.
As general-manager (dyrektor gentralny) of the Central Planning Office
and'its"sucoessor,'the State Planning Commission, at least through
Deceniber,1958, he'not only supervised directly every phase of planning
in the 1946-1950 period, but personally wrote most of the details of
the Three-Year (1947-1949) and Six-Year (1950-1955) Plans. He was
highly respected by Polish economic leaders, who supported his Six-
Year Plan with a`great deal of enthusiasm. By 1951, however, Wang's
influence Was beginning to decline. Officially, he was still sub-
ordinate to Mine,*but actually, Eugeniusz Szyr, who had spent the war
years in the USSR, had come between them as Mine's deputy and had begun
to act as chairman at important conferences of the State Planning Com-
mission. In addition, an office headed by the former deputy premier,
Minister Stefan .redrychowski, who also was active in the USSR from
1939 to'19115, was introduced to represent the Central Committee of
the Communist Party and restricted the freedom of both Wang and Mine.
3. By 1952, the State Planning Commission had grown from its original
seven departments -- Administrative, Finance, Cooperation with
Foreign Countries (Wspolpraca z Zagranica), and four technical de-
partments -- to about twenty departments. The personnel had increased
from 100 to 150 in 1948 to 2000 to 3000, but the number of qualified
people had declined, since most of Wang's better assistants had taken
high posts in other institutions. This decline, coupled with Szyr's
influence, reduced the State Planning Commission to little more than
an immense statistical library; almost no one had the ability and
initiative to work independently. Consequently, almost every con-
ference of the State Planning Commission -- and these were held almost
continuously -- was attended by a large number of people, ranging from
directors and planning engineers of individual plants to vice-ministers
of the industrial ministries and representatives of the Communist Party,
various personnel offices, and even the state police.
4. From 1953 to 1956, central planning was virtually nonexistent in Poland.
The State Planning Commission had lost control completely; its directives
were ignored by the ministries, the Party, and the army, and the Ministry
of Finance refused to allocate the funds necessary to implement its plans.
Planning, such as it was, was done in individual plants or association
boards on a day-to-day basis, almost completely without coordination with
other plants or industries. Central control was limited to the Council
of Ministers and the Central Committee of the Communist Party dividing
available',funds among the various ministries and directing the Ministry
of Finance to allocate the funds accordingly. The ministries could
then use the funds as they chose.
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5. Until 1954, the lower echelons often went directly to the ministries
or through the Central Committee of the Communist Party to the Coun-
cil of Ministers to have their plans approved, completely bypassing
the intermediate levels in the normal chain of command and ignoring
the State Planning Commission. This practice was officially abolished
in 1954, however, when the requirement was made that every plan go
through'channels -- plant or planning organization, central associa-
tion?board, ministry, State Planning Commission, and Council of Min-
isters -- and be passed by a special commission, including two experts,
at each echelon. Plans were formulated in two arts: the so-called
"premises of the project" (zalozenia projektowe) stage, outlining the'
plan in general terms, and a second stage containing the economic and
technical details, workers' housing arrangements, and preliminary
approval of the municipal and military authorities.
Planning in 1957-1958
6. In 1958, a Five-Year Plan, originally announced in 1956 but revised
after the October 1956 uprising, was officially in progress in Poland.
Even after the plan had been confirmed by the Sejm, however, officials
of industry and the Party continued through 1958 to hold meetings and
discussions on the plan, which resulted in many changes with respect
to the direction and sphere of planning and annual quotas. Even plans
for the mining, heavy, and chemical industries had not been definitely
established. This was due primarily to the following factors:
a. The ineffectiveness of the planning apparatus, as described above.
b. The-failure to complete-many of the projects and financial details
of.the previous Six-Year Plana
c. The necessity for coordinating economic plans with those of the
other Bloc countries in order to establish possibilities for
orders and deliveries within the Bloc.
d. Government reorganization.
e. The undetermined armament situation, i.e., the question of whether
Poland was going to be forced to arm with atomic weapons.
7. The economic reorganization of 1957-1958 was directed primarily toward
restoring effective planning in Poland and cutting back the bureaucracy
which had arisen in Warsaw. The planning function was officially trans-
ferred to the lower echelons -- the plants and association boards.
Plane-were to be submitted, in the form of recommendations, through
the normal chain of command, with some form of coordination at each
level. This was, however, largely a political maneuver. The planning
function actually remained in the State Planning Commission, which
had to pass on all plans and could accept, revise, or reject the
recommendations of the lower echelons and initiate plans of its own.
8. The State Planning Commission was reduced in size to five or six
departments and its personnel complement to 800 to 1000. A new
innovation, in both the commission and the lower planning echelons,
was the use of commissions, or planning by committee. All projects
were examined in the State Planning Commission by a commission con-
sisting of members from each department. In addition, a commission,
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headed by Minister of Heavy Indus try Keij tuL Zee?majtit, who h.aa re-
placed Minc, and consisting of Wang, the industrial m3.ni3ter3, the
political ministers, and repre entat.ives of th-; -; Fart.y, Wa termed
in the Planning Commission in September The purpose of this
body, apparently, was to decide on long--temp planning and t' intro-
duce elements of Bloc plans within the framework of CEMA. In Sep
tember 1958, Vice-Minister Josef Salcewicz of t;he Mini.4:t;ry of Heavy
Industry resigned after a meeting of this commis ion, for the .avowed
reason that the commission dI.d not take his Ic'gir:al. arguren,t,= into:
account and made serious changes, without even discussing them with
him, in his plans. Decisions technically rendered by commi ion;,
but in fact already made before the commission met.;, had be,3om.e the
rule by 1957. Such plans were often in surprising c% ntrast. to the
opinions of experts in the sector concerned, and generally favored
Bloc rather than Polish interests. Many leading persona in s o:lish
planning organs were products of Moscow. 50X1-HUM
9. Another body, the State Economic Council, which was working or. t;.ne
so-called "new economic pattern," had not yet achieved a clear role
it might occupy the position formerly hel y inc
h
h
w
en
e
was simultaneously head of the Planning Office and in charge of all.
the industrial ministries) as a committee under he Co:snvl Min-
isters, or it might be acting as coordinator of Poiisn planning with
Bloc plans.
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10. In addition to the official planning mechanisms, various other insti-
tutions in Poland engaged in economic planning on an unofficial basis.
Even before 1956, small divisions for industry and commerce in the
Party committees of provinces and the larger towns made plans. In
1958, this practice had expanded considerably and appeared to be
assuming greater importance. Technical and scientific organizations
were also encouraged to try their hands at planning. In the larger
industrial towns and plants, chemical federations were organized and
held meetings, lasting several days, for planning purposes. Planning
commissions existed in each division of the Academy of Sciences.
11. The greatest part of the actual planning in Pc land was done not by
the official commissions, but by experts they seta neJ, Since the
number of experts was so limited, however, the same :.peclalist;s were
hired by various commissions in the same or related fields. Although
the'system resulted in an enormous loss in work, time, and money, it
had, under the circumstances, some merit, in that a great number of
persons in key positions saw the reports of the same expert:. A
similar situation resulted from the designation, beginning in 1957,
of the Academy of Sciences as an official consultant of the State
Planning Commission. Since there were almost none in the academy,
it was often necessary to go to industry for technicians, and these
had usually participated in the project in question at an earlier date.
12. The logical consequence of the complicated planning systen in Poland
was a waste of time. To obtain the authorization for a project
successively from the plant management, the industrial association,
the central administration board, the ministry, the State Planning
Commission, and finally the Council of Ministers normally required
one and a half to two years for a coke plant, two to three years for
a low-temperature carbonization plant, and three to four years for
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a'inethanol synthesis plant. The final approval of a project, even
twice at''the highest levels, did not, moreover, guarantee its execu-
tion;atwo'examplee were the project for reconstruction of the low-
temperature carbonization plant at Blachownia and that for construe-
tion'of a similar plant at Konin. The time needed for planning a
plant was roughly half that needed for construction.
13. Although industry in Poland was entirely nationalized, considerable
rivalry still'existed between various industries. Plans were often
made by'one industry or group of industries to the detriment of
other industries. Until about 1952, discussion in and action by the
State Power"Council (Panstwowa Rada Energetyczna), directly subordinate
to the'Council'of Ministers, counterbalanced these divergent tendencies.
In 1956, the Council of Ministers established the Commission for the
Planning- of Raw. Materials (Komisia Planowania Surowcow), in which
power"plans were to be discussed and settled. This commission was
or1ginally"scheduled to complete its mission by June 1957, but it
had not"done to by the end of 1958, and all indications pointed to
its"continuance for a number of years. The commission's goal was
primarily to-eetablish a plan for the use of brown coal and for the
supply of petroleum and olefins.
a. The secretary of the commission was Taban (fnu), Vice-Minister
of Chemical Industry. Other members were:
Director Laidler (fnu), Ministry of Chemical Industry
Director Sobolewski (fnu), Ministry of Chemistry.
Director-Hosowicz (fnu), Ministry of Chemistry.
Vice Minister Jopek (fnu),'Ministry of Mining Industry.
Director'Gutherz (fnu), Ministry of Mining.
Professor Blase] Roga, Ministry of Mining Industry.
Director Staszewski (`fnu), Ministry'of Mining Industry.-
Vice=Minister ('subsequently consultant) Josef Salcewicz, Ministry
._ .I _of `Heavy Industry.
Director Stefan Rosinski 'Ministry of Heavy Industry.
Director Szpilewicz (fnu), Ministry of Heavy Industry.
Director Kobos (fnu), Ministry of Heavy Industry.
Director Jerzy Kowalski, Ministry of Heavy Industry.
b. The following subcommissions were established:
Power Production, in Turow and Konin.
Gaeification-of Lignite Under Pressure.
Carbonization of Lignite.
Ektraction"of MOntan Wax from Lignite.
Xylite Processing.
Planning of Mineral Oil Supply.
Mineral Oil Processing.
Olefin Production.
14. With regard to planning for the whole Soviet Bloc,
some kind of coordinating central board existed for that
purpose in addition to the CEMA organization. The permanent CEMA
office in Moscow had delegates-from all the satellite countries pro-
ducing coke. The Soviet members of CEMA undoubtedly tried to exer-
cise influence on the appointment of Polish industrial officials
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In 1957, the Polish delegate was Szpilewicz, but he was
summone -home because of his anti-Gomulka attitude and left the Party
.
In June 1958, Kaczmarczyk (fnu), an engineer in the Coking Department
of the Ministry of Heavy Industry, was appointed Polish delegate to
CEMA, but as of October 1958 he had not yet received his Soviet visa.
15. The' principle that every Bloc country should develop its industry
mainly on the basis of its own raw materials was grossly violated as
far as Poland was concerned. Exploitation of the abundant deposits
of lignite, coal, and natural gas for creation of an adequate chemi-
cal industry was greatly neglected. Instead, although Poland lacked
iron ore and coking coal, she was compelled to build up a huge, super-
fluous metallurgical industry, which was at the mercy of Moscow for
raw materials and practically was working for the USSR. One of the
most flagrant examples of this Soviet influence on Polish planning
was the Nowa Huta steel pro ect, with, ,a planned coking coal through-
put of 16,000 tons per day (1958 capacity 6000 tons per day), repre-
senting more than 50 percent of Polish coking capacity. The project
was forced through by the Soviets against Polish protests.
16. Poor planning during the 13 years since World War II and Soviet
influence brought Poland to the unbalanced economic situation it was
experiencing in 1958s too great capacity for coal production, too
high output of iron and steel, and insufficiently developed chemical
and machine industries.
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