SOVIET OCCUPATION ECONOMY IN AUSTRIA
Document Type:
Collection:
Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST):
CIA-RDP80T00246A050300590001-8
Release Decision:
RIPPUB
Original Classification:
S
Document Page Count:
241
Document Creation Date:
December 22, 2016
Document Release Date:
May 7, 2010
Sequence Number:
1
Case Number:
Publication Date:
August 27, 1959
Content Type:
REPORT
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INFORMATION REPORT INFORMATION REPORT
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
This material contains information affecting the National Defense of the United States within the meaning of the Espionage Laws, Title
18, U.S.C. Secs. 793 and 794, the transmission or revelation of which in any manner to an unauthorized person is prohibited by law.
SUBJECT Soviet Occupation Economy
in Austria
$ 7 AUG 1959
25X1
1
NO. PAGES
REQUIREMENT
NO.
DATE OF
INFO.
PLACE &
DATE ACQ.
(study on
the administration and exploitation of the industrial and 25X1
petroleum installations seized as "German assets" by the
Soviets and operated by them.
The section on the petroleum industry covers the historical'
background, Nazi exploitation and development, and Soviet
dismantlings, while.emphasizing Soviet production and distri-
bution techniques, sales and profits,
The section on the other enterprises emphasizes statistical
presentation of estimates of Soviet sales, profits, deliveries
to the Bloc, as well as organizational methods,
ARMY
NAVY
AIR BI
Li
dq-a.2- -.L9
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DOVW OCC117$T 1 SCOMM 1$ AEI$TATA
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Scope and limitations.
First Section.
T U CONDUCT OF "!E SPAT BCOWW
Short Survey of the Or.gin and Development of
Soviet Assets in Austr$A
II
II;
Disposition of Soviet *conaatic Divisions;
Their Relationship to each other, to J scow
and Austria
Tasks of Soviet Occupation Economy in Austria
and Achievements
17
IV
Effects on Austrian Economy
23
Second Section.
26
SOY= PEk
ADSUM3$TRATIDJ
26
I
Development of the Austrian Petroles Industry
before the Anschluss
26
1. Oil Industry Up to 1938
26
2. The Refineries until 1938
32
II
GerMn Occupation PerLod 1938-1945
33
1. Introductory Remarks
33
2. Influence of Oerw^n Oil Capital
34
A. Petrol4mm
34
a. Natural Gas
40
C. Refineries
41
D. Fuel Marketing Organizations
45
UI
Prom War's End to motion of the S
45
1. End of the War P+e*iod
45
2. Soviet Intervention
46
A. Plant Dismantling
46
A. Reasons for the Dismantling Policy
50e
C. Switch to Eootic Exploitation Policy
50a
Page
1
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Page
IT SW nization, Work Methods and Production 52
1. motion of the ' 52
2. Organization 54
A. Development 54
B. Personnel 58
C. Accounting, Plgns and Controls 65
(a) Accounting 65
(b) Plans 69
(c) Controls 71
3. The Role of the 3e in the SW 71
4. Crude oil and Natural Gas Production 76
A. Drilling Activities 76
(a) Opening e*p of Now Oilfields 76
(b) Turbo-Dr usng 78
(c) Productiveness, Drilling Costs
Drilling Maters 80
(d) Opening of Natural Gas Depoms 82
e) Mural ous Production and its
Rxploita ion 84
B. Gasoline Prod .ction 86
(a) Production Points and Production 86
(b) Gasoline Production Accountancy 87
C. Total Oil Proometiou 88
D. Distribution $nd WAS 91
9. S* Installattons by Brune-hen 92
5.. The SW Bstinar1*6 103
A. Lc bau finery 104
104
B. Urheucburg
C. Noosbierbawn 106
D. Yoesendorf f' 108
1. Schvrechat 110
ii
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Page
(a) History, Capacity and Investments
110
(b) Pipelines and Tr a port
112
(C) Storage P*cilitreat
113
F.
Central Laboratory
113
6.
Central Tank Station
114
A.
fipelirAw* Transport and Storage
Crude and Heft
114
T.
The Geophysical DeV elopme nt
117
V.
Surr
ende
r of the SW to the Austrian Republic
118
Third Section.
125
V
PL
M
ANTS
125
I
The
VSIA
Industrial Prate
125
1.
History and Ox ization
125
A.
Administration
125
B.
Internal Develppsent of Industrial
Administration
125
C.
functions of the atrial Adainistrati.on
126
D.
Industrial policy
127
H.
Investment Policy
128
2.
Pertoreeance of tea Industry
129
A.
T irn*ver; its structure and development
129
(a) Total VISU Turnover
129
(b) Turnover krenralapmr t
131
(c) fiver Structure
133
(d) Iffier of . 1oye es
133
B.
& Profits
135
C.
Production for the stern Bloc and the
Development of Deliveries thereto
135
iii
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D. Performance of the Individual Adminis-
trations
Borten
Podyomlk
Autovelo
mmmi
Zeement
lCrasim
Letex
Less
Wkus
II M Land and Forestry Zntorpr~Um
1. Deva1o mental History and Rxperise nts in
Exploitation
2. Interval Organization and Personnel
A. Ce> osition of the L XU Main Division
B. Table of Organization of the general
Directorate
III Mien--Film
Page
136
136
139
148
151
160
163
168
174
176
178
178
179
179
182
186
Fourth Section. 187
T?t FIT DA PPI COKPARi (DSC) 187
I History 187
II Organization and Personnel 188
1. Relationship to there scow Directorate 188
2. Relationship to and the Soviet Military Bank 189
3. Inteer"al Organization 191
iv
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I Tashi of the Danube Sh ping Co. Within the
Soviet Occupation Zco -
Attested Pbundati4n of a Soviet-Austrian
D$C
DW and -a lot Is, 11 11211"m rprit~r as Soviet xbmpoly
3. The IDW as a .in Soviet Support point on
the Darmbe
Page
194
194
195
196
IV Survey of Services Drawn Frn the Austrian Sconoa.y 197
Fifth Section.
E 1 IN m OCCUPA 199
and
ol'clt of 'Prods and I
t
~
~~
_ 1
i
gh
t
99
Trade in the Occupation ZoonmW 201
1. The Soviet State TM" organization and firms 201
2. MrJMC and the Comt Party fires 207
UI Org iaation and asks rof the Transport System 213
IT Final Asuarks 216
Sixth Section.
iR BOYM l t l'TA#!' 217
217
I Historical
217
1.
Foundation, of the
217
2.
Dissolution in 1955
218
II Organisation
218
1.
Relationship b the ibacow Directorate
218
2.
Relationship to the leadership in Austria
219
3.
Relationship to other Occupation Institutions
219
4.
Relationship to Austrian institutions
219
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5. Inteenal Organization
Page
220
6. Personnel 220
UI Tssica of the S 221
1. The SIB as Accounting and Paarnts Institution 221
2. The SM ' s Credit PtInction 223
3. Control Over Is* of Credit Znvestaeents 224
4. bole of the Hank in the International payment
S"tea 224
5. SM as Instrment of Soviet Fiscal policy 225
IV =ffects on the Austrian Economy
Seventh Section.
=IA AiCCOMTI +!S' t
225
226
226
I Principles of Planning and Account Balancing 226
I3 Plant Planning and Accounting 228
UI Accounting Between the I ividual plants and
Their Administration 230
Iv Mast Planning and Accounting 230
V Planing and Accountin ithin the MIA Directorate
General and of the Administration of Soviet Assets
Abroad 231
vi
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Iq
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First Section.
= cMM 99 = 22WAM NAM
sa* Is= F 21 ftwn, W- WIL925MI of AVAO at
in Au~tr~.
The origin of Soviet assets in Austria goes back to the occupation
by Soviet troops at the begisning of April 1945. The first Soviet
asset in Austria was thereto*e based an ~, taar ,,,l trrr.
The t e (Trophy Administration) was sat up by
the occupation troops under Oenteral Sorisaov with headquarters at
that ties in !bathing, near Vi enra. This was in inetr aentality whlh
had plainly been previously planned and which was under the orders of
the emwr%der of the occupation armor, or in other words,, under those
of the appropriate division in the Moscow War Ministry. (For details
seae the report entitled s "AUfsetchnung ueber swei Unt*rredungen sit
IgEM Dr. D. 4m 23. and
November 1957-1
The activity of this Trophy Administration has already been
touched upon in our paper entitled " Bericht utsber the Unterredung
von 2. Oktober 1956, page 6." This shows that it was placed under
the orgy's of a division of the War Ministry in Moscow. Further
details are contained in the above- mentioned report.
We therefore can speak of a M TAiitl Fi3'A running from the
nixeg of the occupation to the, foundation of IXIA in spring 1946. This
Military Place can be subdiVided into three parts. The entire Military
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Phase is marlaed by a continual diminishing in importance of the Meaning
and tasks of the Trophy Adnifistration.
In the first period of this phase, everything that had any value
and could be moved was requisitioned or dismantled and, if not needed
by the occupation troops, seat to Russia.
In the second period only plants of military importance were
dismantled or those which were considered to be German property.
In the third period disaMantling was limited to particular eras
and explosives plants. (See our papers "Bericht umber tie Bespr ech-
ungen nit Herrn Dr. H. am Disnatag, den 13. and ams Dienstag, den 20.
November 1956 nacYmtittags. " )
As we have already proved in our three reports on the conversa-
tions with Dr. lganfred &W in the accompanying reports on the conversa-
tions with Dr. D.,j early summer 1946 saw the beginning of the phase
which narked the establishment of the Soviet economic organization in
Aus
As we have already shown in detail, this phase was introduced
through finding and defining -iesan property. The juridical basis
for this was the August 1945 Potsdam Agreement. In accordance with
Article VU of this Agrossont all German property in Austria became
the property of that ooouNi power in whose zone it lay.
It MY be added at this point that the legality of the Potsdam
Agreement is doubtful. Our Itearch show that on a maber of occasions
this Argta.nt was effectively tam in dealing with the Soviets
by pointing out that neither in America nor in England had the Potsdam
Agreement been ratified. 0
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This objection was raised in 1945, for example, by Dr. ariedi,
who was employed by the Soviets as geological advisor, in talking
with Major It tnski and Colonel Yegorov, Trophy Administration officers
for the oil industry. (Dr. triedl is now Chief Geologist with the
Oesterreichische lltneraloei ver
) a
The Soviets' riposte to this was Army Order No. 17--reproduced
WEE '
in the 1~&BjM/?tu of 6 JUly 1946 under the headings "Surrender
of German Assets in Eastern Austria to the , " in which the assets
regulation of the Potsdam A$reeaent were picked up and declared
of fi.ial for Austria.
It was pointed out that regardless of the legality of the Potsdam
Agreement, this army order w*a in any event valid for Austria and
must be obeyed. However for4eful this argumentation was., it never-
theless shows that the Soviets had some doubts about the validity of
the Potsdam Agreement.
Be" we not briefly motion the period in Soviet occupation
po.l..ay khtah is marked by attempts to set up mixed Soviet-Austrian
Ow abevo-mentioned Dr. Priedi
us that towards the
end of 1945 he took ;part in tiatiolrss during which the Soviets
proposed that the Austrian oil assets lying in the Soviet son* of
occupation should be administered by a # , et-Austrlsn company. The
Aovi ets revaled similar intintions with regards to the organization
of the Der Whipyards they had taker over. This is explained more
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fully in our section dealing with the Danube Shipping Company. Up
until now little attention has been paid in research to this period
because the Austrianafrejected these Soviet proposals to form mixed
companies. Nevertheless, this is not without importance since similar
Soviet plans were carried out in the Satellites. There, in important
sectors, such as aviation, mining and in certain industries, mixed
companies were set up in waxy, Czechoslovakia? Bulgaria, etc., in
which the Soviets soon became clearly predominant. This soon became
an effective instrument of an integrated Soviet economic policy.
The fact that the Soviets had concrete intentions to form such
companies in Austria is also proof that they had as their objective
the incorporation of Austria into the family of Satellites.
Through use of the mixed companies they wanted to ensure themselves
of a "voluntary" and unmistakable collaboration on the part of the
Austrians. When this was denied them, they decided on the formation
of purely Soviet economic corporations in Austria.
The fundamentals of the establishment and development of these
Soviet economic organizations in Austria have already been dealt
with in our YAenfred reports of 1956. The concept formulated at that
time has been appreciably confirmed by further research. In the fol-
lowing chapter these element$ will be pulled together again.
Here, it must be shortly noted that also in this phase of the
development of the Soviet economic organizations there were three
steps.
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The first step went-up to around 1951 and reveals a period of
gene"a.pros s _.ty and hi?(iho fits. It was a time of expansion for
all Soviet economic installations. In this period the economic organi-
rations were also being used in increased measure for political aims.
The Putsch attempt of 1950 shows us that the Soviets, through use of
their economic power and through use of the people who were drawn into
their huge economic apparatus were endeavoring directly to attain
unadulterated political power,
This:-period to also early distinguished by attempts to fit the
Soviet economic enclave in with the Soviet and satellite economic
circuit. (See our report "Sericht weber die Zwei Unterredungen nit
germ Dr. D. an 23. and 27. November 1957" of December 1957.)
The second step is distinguished by the appearance of crises in
the Soviet economic apparatus--decrease of turnover and profit,
liquidation and merging of plants and administrations, attempts at
reorganization. During this period there were tergiversations
In the field of political aims. (See third section, I. The USIA
Industrial Plants.)
The third step started at the beginning of 1955 and is distin-
guished by the ever clearer intention to liquidate the Soviet economic
complex in Austria. It ended with the handing over of the Soviet
assets to Austria in May 1955 and is, in a certain sense, being con-
tinued through the deliveries of materials in accordance with the terms
of the State Treaty.
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II. DLOMISUM of Sov t C R&XWjjAj e
to ALO r 19 ft2ft W1 12 t
Our 1956 wed Report has shown in detail that USIA was founded
in 1946 by emissaries sent from Moscow. These reports were comple-
mented by Dr. D. and they have confirmed the time of the incorporation
of =1A.
The details can be summo-rized as follows t
The =VA (VFRAVLYB $ tYRTSIWS KCHESTV ! YOSTOC1U X
AVBWM), meaning - Administration of Soviet Assets in Eastern Austria -
later had its designation changed to USIA which stands for Administra-
tion of Soviet Assets in Austria. It was set up by the Moscow organi-
nation called 1PIAVLY=13 S0TFYSTS URCMSSTVtRI ZAGRARITSEY -
Administration of Soviet Ass*ts Abroad - or 17312 for short. An
influential person in this Moscow administration was a man named
Morkulov, a former member of the HCVD.
With regard to the establishment and incorporation of the Soviet
economic organization in Austria there is one fact which is worthy
of note and this is the lack of clarity of jurisdiction. However,
the Western researcher must take into account the fact that such a
lack of clarity is rather the rule in the Soviet system and in many
14
instances is deliberate. The intentional duality of jurisdiction
makes control easier and keeps those exercising the jurisdiction in
a sautl1a state of uncertainty thereby limiting the possibility of
autocratic management.
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As we have already said USIA means Administration of Soviet
Assets in Austria. It therefore follows that all Soviet assets in
Austria should be under the control of this institution. However,
our research has revealed that right from the very beginning several
technical ministries and comond points in Moscow participated in the
direction of Soviet assets in Austria. However, our sources are not
of one mind with regard to the precise division of jurisdiction and
the same applies to the ambers of our research team. But it is more
a question of differences in formula. One thing is certain and that
is our researchers have come across 11 central points in Moscow about
which we shall speak later.
One thing Is absolutely certain and that is the Administration
of Soviet Assets in Austria was directed straight from Moscow. It is
plainly a matter of the establisi=wnt of a Soviet economic enclave
in a foreign country.
As already mentioned, and in accordance with our report entitled
"A
umber s wet UJnterzredungen mit Norm Dr. D. am 23. und 27.
November 57" of December 57, the Soviets at first seem to have enter-
tained the naive idea that those Austrian (formerly Oeuman) economic
corporations which now became Soviet property would automatically
become integrated into the Soviet econc y. Nowever# it became plain
that it was virtually impossible, and certainly very uneconomical to
procure every screw or pencil needed by Soviet assets in Austria from
the Satellites or from the Soviet Uniorn.
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Therefore, very soon after the establishment of the USIA they
had to start thinking of entering into at least a partial exchange
of aoa odities with the surrounding Austrian economic aysten.
For this purpose, the first bigger establishaent named DEGOS
was set up simultaneously with the foundation of USIA. (See "Aulf xoich-
nung usb r zwei Unterredungen nit Serrn Dr. D. am 23. and 27. November
57.")
DOS undertook the representation of the Administration of LigPt
Industry and had to procure those cosmodities necessary for USIA
production activities. This was done by an exchange against those
commodities that USIA could spare and which were not necessary to
fulfill orders for the Bast. A sort of economic mega -xi-vow, was
set up and later became so extended that more than 50 percent of
production under Russian influence somehow found its way into the
Austrian economic circuit. (Be* Third Section)
iiawever, the Soviets were never able to bring themselves to
think of their property on the territory of the Austrian Republic in
the Western sense. The Soviets always thought of administering their
property as meaning? to a certain degree, incorporation into their
*con may and its use for their political aims.
Accordingly, they continually prejudiced the sovereignty of
the Austrian State in regard to its system of taxation. So,, in prin-
ciple, those plants under So let administration did not pay any taxes
on turnover,, capital or profits. Purthermre, they only recognized
8
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the juridical sovereignty of the Austrian State when they felt like
it. It frequently happened that decisions by civil courts against
Soviet-controlled plants were disregarded.
As can be seen in our splRctal reports ,: of May to November 1957,
the Soviets particularly disregarded the customs regulations of the
Austrian State to a very high degree. They also paid no attention
to the regulations concerning raw material, management and transport.
Our reports show that the presence of Soviet property in Austria
had effects far different than the existence of foreign property in
another state normally entails.
The stipulations of the Potsdam Agreement not only resulted in
the loss of very important resources to the Austrian economy, but
they also led to the setting up in Austria of a foreign economic en-
clave of colonial character which had very decided effects on the
State and its economy.
The political contact of this economic enclave with the Austrian
authorities was carried out through the Intermediary of the Offices
of High Ce isstoner s , specifically
through the atandsnturss (See Manfred Report 1956). Through the
latter the Austrian authorities were informed of the requisitioning
of Serrun property when this had been previously decided by the
Interested =1A office or by the Office of the High Commissioner.
We now turn to the estabLishmes~t and incorporation of Soviet
economic organisations in Austria.
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As already pointed out there existed the Trophy Administration
which occupied itself in a one-aided manner with econcymic tasks
inasmuch as it carried out considerable requisitions,, dismantlings
and transportation for the fist.
=IVA (later changed to USIA) was founded in early st er 19+6
in a meeting at the Imperial Hotel between Colonel Borisov of Moscow
and Kr. ]togan of the political division of USXZ.
It is noteworthy that the fouxidation was carried out with the
cooperation of the Austrian Com Mist Party. (See the Manfred Report.)
From the beginning on, howev*r, the administration and the manner in
which the branches were set up both followed a plan drafted in Moscow.
The administrative methods were Soviet as sere its plans and basic
outline.
The hub of UTA as well as of all Soviet economic corporations
in Austria was the Division for Research into German Property. It
was incorporated into USIA and collaborated intensively with the KPOe.
The directorate of USIA was composed of a Chief of USIA, his
representatives, the Managing Staff and the Branch Associations
Administration.
A USIA Table of Organization will be found in our report entitled
"Rericht ueb.r die Beeprechuhg nit Rerrn Dr. X. an Dienatag, den 13.
and Dienstag den 20. Move ber 1956, nachaittags." From it will be
seen that all industries, farms and real estate and a part of the trade
which were administered by the Soviets were under USIA.
10
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According to oral reports by Dr. D., the Chief of USIA had
three represerntative s s one for political, another for personnel and
a third for cossmsrcial affairs.
The most important divisions weret
Th. Plans Division. Through it production of all Branch Adminis-
tration* was planned in accordance with scow's wishes and approbation.
The Commercial Division. This was in charge of procurement,
sates and of the Secretariat. It was also in charge of imports and
exports. This Division was often re.organized and for a time it had
under it an important organizatiory sub-division called the Central
Conserce Bureau which was mainly in charge of imports and exports.
The Pinanoe Division. This looked after accounting and banking.
It also drafted the financial plans and saw to their implementation.
The Legal Division. This Division was of special importance
particularly since it looked after special corporations such as
Wien-Pilo and the Danube Shipping Company. It worked in close col-
laboration with the above-mentioned W vision for Research Into German
Property.
Special importance was also attached to the Plans Division, the
Secret Division and the Trade lbdon Division, all of which worked
closely with the MM.
The most important chiefs in =U were: Borisov, Tikhomirov,,
Kalyavin, Pedetkov and Krivoshin.
We have not been able to find the names of all their representatives
but the most important were: Tichomirov., Negrassov, xabalevska,
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Voronov.
The important names in the Juridical Division worst Yedotyevs
Zhodtaav and Xa.untsev.
Also must be mentioned gssipov and Shenko, leaders of the Central
Coasmercial Bureau and the erstwhile chief of the Division for Research
into German Property, Orlov.
Our documents show that the careers of nearly all the USIA
chiefs ended in.. arrest and return to Russia.
It should also be mentioned that at the top of USIA sat liaison
men of the Me and of the Co mxnist labor unions. The main ones
worts Dellinger and Steiner,
Tee Third Section for the agricultural enterprises which were in
USIA. The chiefs in this sector wares Rusakin, Smirnov and Avtayev.
Certain corporations, which according to the organizational plan
in the Manfred Report appeared on the directorate level certainly
went throlgh a phase of special development. There are different
opinions regarding the extent of independence and jurisdiction they
had.
It may be surmised that the Soviet economic bodies in Austria
could not be built up systaa*tically and that it was the Potsdam
Agreement which proscribed which plants were to be considered to be
Soviet property, This naturally resulted in an unevenness in the
distribution of the branches.
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For instanee, all of the Austrian oilfields and a great part of
the refineries were immediately considered to be Soviet property and
had to be organized. The importance of the petroleum plants alone
explain the reason for the foundation of the Soviet Petroleum
Administration (SMV).
The Second Section of this paper reports on the exploitation
f ':: Y Y
j,.
and utilization of the Austrian oil installations carried out by the
3MV. At this point, however, let it be remembered that apart from
its connections with USIA, the 3MV was under the command of the Oil
Ministry in Moscow which supplied its personnel. The already mentioned
IM Friedl has reported that Director4eneral Ryabinin telephoned
daily to the Oil Ministry in Moscow.
The Danube Shipping Company is also dealt with exhaustively
in the Fourth Section. It is certain that this enterprise was under
the technical orders of the Moscow Shipping Ministry. It is also
certain that it used the Juridical Division and the Central Staff of
USIA. The chiefs worst Major Kagan, Admiral E. 0. Swborsky,
0. Sutirin, N. Kriukov and J. Kononov.
The least information of all is available on Wien-Film. However,
it is certain that it was under the technical orders of the Film
Ministry in Moscow and also of Sov-Export.
In the Fifth Section we discuss Trade and Transport. These sectors
are characterized by the fact that they could not be entirely taken
care of by Moscow's organizational plans. We present a detailed
description of the Soviet trade organized by USIA as well as of the
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transport concern Juschwneschtrans. We also present an analysis of
that sector-of trade and transport whose direction and administration
was the responsibility of the EPOe, and which thereby enjoyed a certain
degree of independence.
The Soviet Military Bank occupies a special place in our research.
It developed out of a Field Bank. It is discussed in the Sixth Section.
Its first Director.Oeneral was Tsirulik. It is also known that
the Soviet Military Bank (Si ) was managed by 001-Hank in Moscow,
which also supplied personnel. It functioned in the same manner as
a Soviet bank, It is equally certain that it was the sole financial
institution for all Soviet bodies operating in Austria. Authorities
and the research team agree that the SI's finance policy was, for all
practical purposes, determined by the leading personalities of the
Soviet economic corporations in Austria.
These were, in first place, the chiefs of USIA and SM!, and also
those of the Danube Shipping Company and of Wien Film and, of course,
the chiefs of Sie itself. It is noteworthy that when USSR was not
up and occupied the not very spacious premises in the Graf Starhemberg
Gust in the IV District, the SMS moved in with it and that when USIA-
moved to the Trattnerhof in the I District, SNO went along too. In
other words, SMS was always united with USIA.
It is also clear that long-term credits were formally outside the
SIS's jurisdiction and that ittook care of the short-term ones.
Furthermore, it is clear that the $to Austria fulfilled the same
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standardizing control functions as the banks in the Sov),
This signified control of currency, of stock-keeping at,
-
similar accounting and quantitive economic factors.
The research team is in agreement that the functions of the Bonet
bank cannot be Compared with those of a western bank since the
financing of an industry is determined in the last analysis by the
production plan. This is drawn up by those people responsible for
production who,, like all other participants must bow to the financial
sector, namely the Bank.
The subordinate position of the $J --subordinate to tai-Bank in
Moscow and to the Central Offloss of the Soviet economic corporations
in Austria--must remain in the dark to a certain degree. Nevertheless,
it is certain that the SM8 was a factor of unity in a system that had
become broken up through the influence of the technical ministries.
The reason for this was that the 30 was the sole financial institu-
tion in the network of Soviet assets in Austria,
Other unifying factors, its our authorities maintain, were the
representatives of the DIICPD an one hand and the Communist Party on
the other, who without expert on were present in all offices of the
Soviet administration in Austria.
All Soviet economic organizations were thus held together by
throe factorst the 80 financial institution= the leadership of
the XCVD (the bureau of Gen. *yelkin in Baden), and through the common
Party leadership,, which had a Party secretary in every organization.
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A further organisatory unifying factor was the High Co nissioner's
Rconomic Division, under the orders of High Commissioner Kulagin's
economic advisor. The chiefs of USIA were, through this Division in
constant contact with the Directors- *neral of SMV, of the Danube
Shipping Company,. of Wien-Film. and or the Sie and also with economic
specialists of the Austrian and Soviet Communist parties and with the
economic experts of the 3. (See our Report " Auf seichnung ueber zwei
Untsrredungen alit Herrn Dr. P. an 23 u. 27 Nov 1957" of December 57.)
In shy, the following can be said of the Soviet economic
corporations in Austriae
In the early days of the occupation, from the Spring of 1945 on,
the economic setup was under military administration. There was the
Trofeinoye Upravleniye. Task wass plunder, dismantling and transport
of machines, installations and stocks of finished products as well as
supplies for the occupation troops. It was Justified by military law.
In 1946 claimed Soviet assets in Austria were taken stock of,
requisitioned and organized by USIZ in Moscow through the intermediary
of special representatives and with the help of the SPO.. This was
dons on the basis of the Potsdam Agreement. USIVA was founded and
later became USIA. The SMV f the Danube Shipping Co., Wien~-Film and
the Slit were created. Within the framework of USIA special importance
was acquired by the Soviet trade chain and by duschwneschtrans. The
same applies to Intrac with regards to Communist Party firers.
Eleven Moscow ministries and central offices went to make up
the directorate. They wares USIZ, the Petrole= Ministry, Ministry
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Ministry of Shipping, Ministry of Films (with which Sov.Zxport and
Q0841lank were connected), Ministry of Foreign Affairs to whom the High
Commissioner was responsible,, Ministry of State Security, Ministry of
Transport and the Ministry of Foreign Trade with which 1IU worked
in matters dealing with trade and transport questions. (see our report
on the foundation of Juschwrs schtranst "Spezialbericht, Transport-.and
$pe itionskentor t7uschwneschtrans, Ivan Popov, Wien IV, Wohllebengasse
8" and the report "Auf2eichnUng umber swei Uhterredungen mit Herrn
Dr. D. an 23. and 27 November 1957
And finally, the land and
forestry divisions of USIA were under the band and Forestry Ministry
in Moscow.
It is clear that the activity of 11 Moscow organizations on
Austrian territory should give rise to complications and tensions.
This situation arose on the one hand because of the method of adminis-
tration employed by Moscow and on the other because we have to deal
here with Soviet assets in Austria which were governed by yet another
Moscow organization, the U$ZZ.
III. Achievements
The tasks which fell to the Soviet economic corporations in
Austria have already been briefly mentioned. In a number of reports,
particularly in the Freliaai $ry Report, this has bean gone into in
detail. In summary, it may be said*
First off, let it be noted that the economic tasks cannot be
separated from the political ones, but must rather be regarded as a
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whole, in accordance with Marxist theory. According to
with cannot be gone into her*-t 0hX&rk balsaae sheet ntroduc+ed.
The Zoorneuburg Refinery whose capital was predominantly Swiss and
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umanian, was acquired by the Deutsche Gasolln AG. The Swiss franc
claims of 640, 547.38 of the Wigamur Company of Chur,, Switzerland and
874,254.15 of Aktiengesellschaft Alma? also of Chur against the
Korneuburg .neraloelraffinorio were transferred to the Credit-u1 Minier
S.A.R. of Bucharest and to the ontan-Urxton AG, Vienna and then tray -
ferred by these firms to Deut6che 4asoitn, Berlin.
10 'arben hold a 50 percent interost in Deutsche Gaooli.n, while
Anglo-Saxon and Standard Oil each hold 25 percent. In September 1940
capital was # 300,,400.
Until 1934 the installation of the., refinery was of the continual
crude oil distillation process (four blowers of 35-tone capacity:
daily capacity 160.200 tons); high vacuum installations.. benzin recti,
erso lubrication oil refiners as well as atz iliary installation
each as boiler house, shops, tanks, rails and divers bldinCs
now installations were bull
From 1939-1945 Qasolln AG erected
a filling station for light products on the site of the tank instal-
lations and at the wharf, on the Danube, the crude oil ruapinL station.
As far as the quality of the equipment was concerned in 1944 it
must be noted that It was antiquated.
Voesendor' Refiner
1938 Reichswerke Hermann Goering (later named Benzin-and Denzol-
Verband, Bochum) acquired Voesendorf from David E'anto AG (Crad tansta lt,
Dutch intermediary), Production equipment at Voosendorf consisted of
an atmospheric installation, with a maximum daily output of 6#000 uono,,
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plus a lubrication oil refinery with a maximum monthly production of
500 tons.
It is to be noted that the atmospheric distillation installation
was changed to a vacuum system which resulted in a capacity of 2,000
tons monthly of heating oil.
WAS MUM
In 1939 the hebau Re
rovided with great subterranean
tanks by the Ostemterkischs Nineraloetwsrken G.m.b.H. Participating
in this company were the German sister concerns of Socony Vacuum and
Shell, the Geraaan-American Petroleum Company and fhenan a Oss aga Mineral
Oil Works A4;, each to the extent of five percent. The refinery t con-
nected with the oil field by a pipeline. In 194+ the labsu refinery
had a crude oil production of 950 tone a day.
Up until 1945 the heosbtsrbaum refinery belonged to the Donau-
Chasie AG,, coupled with 10?Amseaniakwsrke, *erseburg. In 1941, the
brought 30 carloads of refining equipment out of France and used
it to set up the so-called "Dora" distillation plant. It was a combined
atmospheric--vacuum crude oil distillation plant (Poster Wheeler system).
In addition to "Dora" a S.F. installation was built with a S.F. I and
N.P. 2 oven plant and coupled to g. Y. I and N.V. 2. The N.Y. installa-
tion was a catalytic benzin (gasoline) reforming one. Its purpose was
to produce aviation gasoline out of normal straight;-run benzin (gasoline)
through catalytic dehydration processes. Beside the X.F. installation
they also built an 88 installation.
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This was coupled with the polymerization installation, and with
the oil distillation and the refining installations. Thee produced
the finest lubricants (for submari s) .
The Economic Research CoMpany (Wirtschaftliche
WHO) constructed during the first yeare of the war a great tank instal-
lation at Lobau with pipelines to the Danube port and with lines to
the oil fields.
D. j
The Germans also showed great activity in the field of fuel. The
ring Works purchased the filli
tion organization of
Fanto Ail,, while Deutsche Gasolin acquired the tank installations of
Creditul Hinter S.A. The pump station organization was broadened and
in the provincial capitals groat tank installations were built. Besides
these there was also the German Olex firm which was interested in the
filling station business. In the war years the petroleum Central
Bureau was established with administrative centers in Vienna and 3als-
burg. The entire fuel busines
through the letroleca Central
became nothing more than ad jUncts of this
Bureau.
MIL
1.
M9
9L NZ
IM M
As has already been explained and shown in a tables the develop-
ment of the oil industry and refineries was destroyed by bombing in
the final months of the war, and also
other means. Oil
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production dropped by about one-third and the output of the refineries
went down by 50 percent. DrimLng machines and other apparatus were
taken out of Lower Austria oil fields and sent to the west where they
would be in lees danger (St. Poslten, Aeestettten, Vypor Austria and
Sal sburg. This
and the whiners were lost forever for the
most part. wearer, on orders of the Nigh CommaW nothing was to be
destroyed but put out of working order by the removal of electric motors,
eta. Little doge was done to the oil fields in the fighting.
2.
.W abMMUM
A. ,iP
As a result of the arriva:
e was don* to the oil Indust
trios, one serer the beginning of a
viets, grave and lone-lasting
as well as in other Indus-
f ruthless diwntling.
This was acco *nied by the effort of anything that cad be moved.
was carted off Witout a kind of system or sense towards
In the cour"
Zl. 50 125 04/415 frau the
an order entitled
authorities regarding the
quantities and type of o ditios carted off. It re"a
Order e! 8 ilrne 1945
plete drilling equ snt
81
4. 21*ctric esters &
46
zoo
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%tit.-0
100
145
Cables and electric wires
365
8.
Stoma boilers
32
9.
Drilling equipsemt
1,004 tons
10.
Hoisting blocks
21 pieces
11.
Pipes
15,494 tons
12.
Pump rods
Wire cable
245
14.
Armatures
15.
Tools, Supplies
1,500 t,
16.
Chains (roller chains)
144 it
This was s one of the order.
Kounndo of the Red Array
the **tic* of the
Authority
Councillors Dr. R. Myer.
Col. Jftineer Akishin
Lt. -l . Aktshrarin
Engineer Lt. Col. Kaminski
Lt. Col. Crosdov.
s) not part of complete installations.
Order Of 8 Juno 1945. (Continued)
Oeraan Property
48 pieces
48 pieces
11 35% 10
73 75% 60
47
10 pieces
19 "
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aerman property
192 pieces
94
.145
320 tons
10 pieces
Tea' t
84% 168 pieces
74% 74
32
26
feces
739 107 38
680 5 tons 115 tons
310 10 pieces 22 pieces
14 11 61% 14 " 7 it
862 tons 800 805 tons 195 tons
.1? , 900 is
192 11
260 11
800 12,000
it 3,090 11
70% 160 it 85 11
80% 210
ti 50 it
r1
483 11 62% 356
1,410 11 70% 1,,060
92 it 650
85 11
132 r1
440 r1
55 "
Noted by Committee of Austrian Oil Companim.
(signed) R.O. Nlrik
Director: Ateyrer
ltgineer Gerzobek
Dr.uswirth
This protocol shows that of the available materiel in the oil
fields up to 83% was taken off to the 3oviat Union. The table also
shows that the Soviets paid particular attention to drilling equipment.
On 8 June 1945 a meeting was held in the offices of the Rohoel
Company, 8chwarzenberg Flats No. 18, in which participated not only
the representatives of the Oil Committee and the highest -. representatives
of the Mines Authority, but above all a delegation of Russian officers.
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Our authoritative documents report that this meeting resulted
in severe differences of opinion between the Russian officers as there
were two groups fighting over the requisitioning of the available
production materiel in the oil fields. The argument was about the
method of utilization of such materiel. Judging by the results of our
earch it may be assumed that the two groups represented the one,
the Trophy Administration, (and that meant the Moscow Kinistry of War)
and the other, the representatives of VSZZ* that is to say the Ministry
or Petroleum.
The discussion at this meeting hinged on requisitioning and on
the quickest possible transportation of materiel to the Soviet Union
on one hand and on the other the quickest possible utilization of the
oil and natural gas industry withtiaat remained of the equipment.
Thus, there were two contradictory thmos under discussion. The meeting
ended, as already indicated, in loud argument since the Russian officers
could not *me to an agrei
However, as has been seen, the installations and materiel of
the refineries and the Reusiedl Works (7000 kw) were not taken away.
The 20 July 19+5 meeting followed the same course and the fol.
lowing protocol was drawn ups
Proto j 1245
Taken into consideration are the amounts of gas necessary for
automotive transport for the Cnity of Vienna and for the Ssesaando
of the Red Army,
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1. Natural gas installations at $em rring, Adarkiaa and
Zistersdorf will remain intact where they are.
2. In $taa mersdorf there will remain a functioning gas
pumping station comprising three compressors.
BY Nothan undertakes to complete building of the three remaining cmaw
pressers which are to be taken to Russia.
From the same installation 24 storage tanks are to be taken to the
Soviet Union.
3. Natural gas tanks at Bullsndorf, Heusiedi, Bohenruppersdort and
Gross Schweinbarth are to be taken complete to Russia.
IV Nathan undertakes to complete the three, compressors at Gross
$chweinbarth, namely to complete the lacking armatures.
o of the Red Aare
Engineer Lt. Col. B. Kaminski
Committee of Austrian oil firms
Dr. Aberer
Dr. Friedl
Dr. Hauswirth.
NV Nathan OmbN
Koller.
$uedostdeutsche Ferngas AO
Engineer Guentner.
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a OEM for the''21,49 tl m Poll
dis antlingst
give the following assumed reason for the Russian
order, plainly sting from lbscow, that as amuch
productive machinery as possible should be dismantled and
brought to the Soviet ion..
2. The possi, .ity, that was not at first recognized, of
exploiting the oil fields in their own interest and to
make use of the existing installations.
3. The fact that the true value of the der Austria oil
and gas region was not yet recognized.
At array event, the general order was given to the Red Army that all
important materiel and installations were to be taken away.
C. Snitch to Awoke Exaloltailloon Policy
Already in June 1945 a beginning was made to the taking of
measures to organize the economic exploitation of the oil industry.
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According to the already often rationed Dr. priedi who actually
experienced these even
mixed Soviet*AuStrian oil
originally intended to form a
to be named $ov phts. The
influence of ftjor (gdit. tere above list says he was a Lt. Col.)
i tinskyr who was in charge of dissantling, waned,, while Lt. Col. Yegorov
from the Oil Ministry and geology ?rofossor Varenzov saw their* in-
was hold with representative gentlemen from Noscow
attended by the erstwhile 11 nister of Commerce Heinl and the former
representative Raab. The formation of $ov- phta did not cam about.
The Potsdam Agreement gave the Soviets th* guarantee that the
installations of the Lower Austria oil fields would "legally" be
theirs insofar as they
property.
They therefore decided to go into production. They undertook rr
with all energy with the aid of what machinery remained and those
specialists they could find to build up again the oil industry in
Austria.
Booty that had not yet b
keen away from Austria was brought
back to the oil fields and to the refineries. Sven materiel what
had been taken
brought back. Iittwever;, most of it was
by then hardly useable. A little while later even ca drilling
equipment was sent from Siberia to Lower Austria.
This was in accordance with the orders given by the Soviet offices
which were housed in the
Neusiedl and Vienna X.
1 AG in Xistersdorf
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Q,ENniINtlon._
9L -ft IM
Zn order to achieve the planned developaaent and exploitation of
the Austrian oil fields, October 1945 saw the creation of the
$ovyotsi ye $ phtyonoye Upravloniys. The Initial # stdd for the
G rrewan rendering o:
ly $owjet1xvhe *i neralsolverwaltung
Offices were at first in Vienna in the Zantgiase. Our documentation
Stresses that with this steep the and c"o to the epoch of military
adaainistr*tion of the (aril) region.
?creation and development of
specialists in the Moscow Petroleasa winist:
of SW and are not krown wi
and that Is the *0 MOO
the two were from the very be
financ
't is
Doti n
Lt of the work of
Istive positions
but on. thins is certain
one. It is also evident that
eted through the $10
clear that 11&1A and. AW gave each other mutual support
and exchanged needed supplies between then. Our specialists report
that from the very
in that 11' was obliged to
which the
Ldered too high,
economically speaking the 11W
into production and was gable to trans:
rapidly
res easily into cash.
In accordance with the Potsdaa Agent a s stipulations t took
over the fallowing
oil concerns
52
ve support to the 111 industries
s from U at prices
d therefore appear that
~tronaer since it
it spheres of influences
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z+uu--aus
l i . I ' l l and all the
assets of fit" p- in LAW*r Aust .a.
over the following refineriesi
A'
ZX'
letz re of the Lo
statnt from the Legal Divisions
"The Lobau refinery was
Lod with the following
th the aid of important
Qer f'! means aid restored after bambing attacks."
Zn 1946, Soviet administration also took over the fuel distri-
buting along with their tank installations in the Soviet
Zone. In 1947s the
merged and formed
iolin and BY (B usin- 'izol-V.rban4 )
Orop was a formal established oompin
with sharer,, formed in accordance with Austrian law. I Dwever, then
hands of '. additions Orop had to pad rent
for their seized tanks.
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According to all our i ovoation SIM was under the orders of the
relationship
best spe culls
to
and there were mntinual visits ,free the control aeea fissions .
Alter the ' did not enjoy the status of a juridical person
in the eyes of Austrian law and was not even entered In the Comercial
Aegister, the Austrian courts, nevertheless in practise, soon began
to regard it as am,
one which decided whether
it would allow itself to be as defendant in a lawsuit. never did
take part in a property suit
property was a aOtter which the , rie
d as having a collectiv{
or was not Qe n
one decided
practice#
In everything elsee# Vii' Just simply ignored the Administration
authorities. It
thereto:
event when *ad* applies -
tion for a building p omit.
seaweed to apply to the *upreae. Xining Authority# since
it appear* that Dir.ctor sasera-l *fdo nko issued Order No. 4 which
stated that the Authority was at lust to be kept informed of what
going on. Production Director O&VUhuk,
k no notice at
all of this order. Production fist were kept secret and divulged
to nobody,, not even the
thority. Drilling Director
Lovkin was equally cold to Order No. A.
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Lth exception of the not-too-clear
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'r l r+al Direction and Its Divisions were divided into plants
and su a-sidia r plants. This difference was not strong stressed in
our "$p ezialbsrtoht t Organi satorischor Aufbsu der S owjetis chon
Kineraloelvarwalt
of the divisions
ative post in the 111' was the D
not 0
doeWesntation. der, it would appear not un10orftnt that a
series of xis of important Soviet personalities which appeared to
that report mould be substantiated in this one.
r.cto7'4ene'ral (for technical
of a --Diroetor (for eaw zero: . affairs) and of their
representatives. Division nommm-ided the Divisions. The indi-
plants in the oil fields and the refineries were under the
orders
of
of the occation there were des in internal
ce, for ssm* time there was
a Labor its Division,
Division.
working regulations
Division which took
nc.
Division was
Our spec
etc. This
nee of the Accounting
by the directives of the Director-
55
Divis
such. There
it ovsr-fulfill*entt, work
19570 if ire, the differences
basis of available personal
ponsible to the Director-
absorbed by
collective contracts,
so for a time a Labor
of juridicaal labor questions ipso
absorbed by the Plans Division.
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General.
The toll
Getiletersia
n Accounting
Investments
"Sal
Housekeeping
Personnel
Plans
Audit
eologic al
amtf aoturing
fte tasks of de of the divisions
The follows
*me of
table gives a grh,
f . xpl*z*tory by their
Cation thereof,
However? let it be noted that the Secret Division, Ong other
of desuaents,, instructions and correspondence between the
Soviet authorities in Austria and in the Soviet Union. This Division was
called Division
occupied offices
tantse. The windows of these room
e tint floor of the
ed and a Russian 10 VIW
stood before the door, Personnel Director Zichniger and in his absence
his deputy ;erbier r were the onl
them. Even Russians needed a special p i
loelees who could enter
offices.
With regard to the Plans Division it mph' be noted that according
to our specialists,, those ply which affected the entirety of the
administration were laid on by :Moscow. The following divisions listed
below had their
Lvtdual plans divisions. The plans they drafted
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.{
~
_; .
4Y, u
Yl.,~-~
~uor?
1'iOce 'ct?- L~ ' 1
ril - T
ern. 8ecre Inver -Mecz
t ?lcpi_
.
i ~n
k-a, :?::
of 1955 an
As a result of wee iapr ov ee vents,
ation returned to the
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In 1947
M1t from existing furnae" a d apparatus a
cracking i arUllation 0 4 in 1948 it had as capacity of 400
day-two. In 1950, the c truction of the refinery and the redistil-
lation plant was ended and it was able to handle the bensin which
had been sent to $chwichat for proe*"I g. Wining capacity
250 day-tons and that or redistillation 200. In 19P p*xforaa nc*
eased through
?000 >ton taaatxee o* to 1,000
daaty..t'-ans of heating oil. A selective cracking process was also ins
The production of sta was increased in 1952 through the erection
of an inclined water pipe boiler
the redistillation installation
Zn 1954
transformed into a vacs installs..
tion for the production of bit ?i with a Mating oil us* of 150 day-tons.
addition to this
n 1954 the two Abe piped dating from
the time of the Germans had
eeapty# of tank
and a second heating oil till
to 1955 VIA tank
15,,E Cu.
25#000 am. a,
a bensin p eline. To speed
n st, a
into operation.
t at t s capacity was increased
t of ineney invested
by the soviets, but the sum
when the Geraaaaaens re
were a lubrication oil r*
a tat fatty
108
d not appear
intact at Voessndorf
The distillation
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and most of the reserv
oil production rapacity was only
dour not mention tiros pweriod.
destroyed. Lubrication
to
3bs.l Text
uij ment Was twin away It
e > d in 1946, the r finery's
crude ail ospaoity was &gain 6,000 tons a month. In 1949 an unused
rectification installation was changed into an atmospheric distillation
in a crude oil capacity Increase to 12,000 tons a
month.
VP until
oil (having no bensin or ps tro1. )
led saraat
vasus install "Lan. But
after the 1atsen oil field am* in orr tsen oil was handled and,
latterly,, also gehoenkirebAn asphalt
ray c .
The two distillation installation are of the contiri aeus type,,
tification installati+
: ri$es a bl ins
r direst steam hisatingo
oil,, the capacity of which
10000 tons in the period 1945 to 1950,
acid process. is 014
.
the sulphuric
Voes orf produced heavy ben"A petrolo a and as oil as well as
lubrication oil
following table
et sits in Yoessndorf s
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1945
6200000
1947
1850000
1948
183*000
19,49
75*000
1950
*7,000
1951
364,E
1952
2*000
1953
149,000
900000
a total of 1< 2,057,000
figbomm Ban=
(a)
The origin
built by the Inch. )*t of the
of $is Bring Ore *r-Raker.
capacity of t Y'A rot
Ok to 1937 when it
upplied by the firm
1944 wail
Distillation
4. P"I refining
5. Cog
6. Lubrication QS
-paeity of the Winery was p
8140)
TO
70
40
ly nil du. to the 16 N arch 19
bombing and also d U* to the destructive action of t QOVN&M *gsin*t
the in buildings and the boiler se.
The tsians did no di l nt at the Nova refi t. During Us
year 1945 the plant wor
foLu d in captured tank
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can and also with anglltrian oil.
Towards the mid of 1945 1 ref;
due to the do*W bridges. A
tamers and to ! to the so- called
waft emptied.
After the bridges were
until in 1947 two crude on pipel
w and Toby and the refry,
cause of a lack Of do.
par
with oil by water
s all was peed into
mtbe statt i o n where they
oil we b
in tank tr+ alrs
into operation between
tion it is Impossible
what types of oil were brOught AW in what quantities. Wring the
Soviet
refinery aspw
increased as follows t
1946 2 reservoirs of 5,000 . a. leach
2 n 20 5W 11 n
1947 Zrtabliskawnt of an asst ox
with a monthly capacity of 500
e of the a etc distill
ins t al. ation to about 600
1951 Modification of the ooking installation at one
of the distillation units, giving a capacity of
19.53
ttion 0
onthe a
lyand on the
y a
ids *Ise to
to
abut 7
The Modification work was
by the Soviets and done
ively with looted material and no attention was
the w
dimensions or to the right
to side to about
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size of motors, Ott,
refinery is saddled with high repair tats and its
ility is low.
It is not mown how ch mon Soviets Invested in this ree
inert' but it to estimated at about TOE 1111111,10n schi.llLTMO since
do ntation concerning the
about the Quantity of oil
that the refinery worked prscti
sever
The type of products
the Soviet Military ad>ssitnistx tiaon, bens
importance. Heating oil was delivered from y 1945 to
Blestrical Works at S msmring. ?.trolem and diesel oil
from July 1945 to
-n of lubricati oil
of a lack of sulphuric acid,, etc. this oil was not of good quality.
by little the quality of the products was ssade to conform
and iraV
q.ity resaaid below the
(b)
In 1945 when
nothing is knmm
pointed out
the time at +s teity and
over the years.
t of this is
we Lvov to xe
150 pipeline to thi
Another
00 leading
station was used for cools
947 and 1
cent:
the harvests in.
a in Jaly 1945. iiecause
to year
it rs sed one
total length
2i600 a.
so-called VOW Danube
1preline s to the Lobau
between the so-called
tilas a
of
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station nand the central. tank station,
two 150 ones for
petrolom.
daily, seen production
diesel oil.
As the p
material for
of 1947 were
s applies to the cost of
At the a of the
but they disappeared in 19
952 p
whet the east was. The
p Rk ed 120 tank trucks of its owns,
(a)
Zn 1953,E the central tank Oat
with a new tank fillIft
ore made out o
nk station was di
planned to have a won
Installation was taken over by Nova in 1956.
When the Russ ra left th~
they did take away or destroy al:
Shortly a
dry up to es
um
establishment of the
a Oent a1 poientifle Res
113
Oil and 4;
line 'Mid
gm-10000 to"
a day bens n or 950 tons
it of looted Muaterial__
territory
8 subterx an tam and 6 above
to fill,
tank
y of 1,,.50 0 tons. This
away, but
aaentation.
a plan was
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chief to be Professor 't,f ct *r'
look 0"ftr all the work entailed in research and d1v 3.ops ntt in h
the sass
this idea did not talm toz'a
the first place the
available.
had no
good theoretical background I
$ince the they had dlva
Lab t*447 have a totol staff of 43,
After the r n of the oil Indimtry
with sbread Bch had bftM broken orttrlerj
of i
78 1
di4
The 11f built
1952+
194340
betwe*n the Lobsa storage
1 crier Oil lifts 680 a qt*
lobau rot
7I7 SWUM loft
1 petroleus line, 717 eaters loft
1 gas Oil li lt,* 717 ast lli lonng
Une that Is not in
114
ore long
Specialists
eatheaestic a s
with them a
central
into ive
the 7 MR
or .
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beret n g'
2 crude oil
S ceMt ref
1 gas oil petroleum lines Ate maters long
The Lob" to Lea a.d. Thaya line was interrupted at Auerathal
and two donnecting lines laid3 one to the long-distance liras and the
other to the Auersthal pump station,
projected a long--distsn
Auersthal to
and to *oosbierbsum. The line to Korneuburg was contracted for but
was not finished until the Austrians again took over.
All railroad tank oars were declared by the Soviets to be booty
since they bore the sign DR
gt
a)
painted on this. Originally, they were administered by the military
authot
given the napber of cars they needed for
,,,w o- their operati ons , Those cars that were
to supply the daareetic
occupation area were rented to Orop. the remainder were used by JIM
for its own purposes. The major portion of these can were in good
condition but for part of them the Austrian national railroad authorities
only gave permission for their use domestically, because of the touchy
question of ownership.
As already tioned, the cars were requisitioned without regard
to the ownership or to nationality so that later? the Austrian car park
contained a great nuseber of cars belonging to French and Italtan
companies and also some that formerly belonged to Austrian, Inglish
and American fi
115
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Of the Austrian fins
Shell had a GM:
Of those *to
rye property the
by $ s
Crude oils
the German ones from 1938
a SW had no tank ships.
5) only
facilities that were requisitioned as being
llowirig weres as Par as is known, taken over
The DU facilities In smastedi, and those of the
Austrian nil administration at the Zistersdort
main station.
White products t
All storage installat,'
the air tanks at Praterspi,
at Lobau,
ZOO
the *ova
the storage
at
lities at the P.
,ow plant,
the former U station at Ibuthausen,
all street filling stations in Soviet territory which were
the property of the 'Y, Ga lin and Xitag firms.
Heating oils
the oil pools at Ladendorf and Ziersdorf.
Of these installations those of l e-uthausen, ?#tsenkjrehen, Prater-
spines and the street filling stations were rented by to Orop.
Of those storage facilities administered by 8W* Lobau had a
capacity of 160,000 cubic meters in subterranean tanks. Over and above
this 11W had facilities amounting to 4,000 cubic meters in above-wound
tanks. The Zistersdorf Main station had a capacity of 13?000 cubic
but 5,0were destroyed by fire so that in 1955 Only 8,000
116
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remained and were handed over to the Austrians. The *susiedl storage
facilities amount to 12,504 cubic meters.
The Ladendorf oil ppol had a capacity of 56,404 cubic actors and
that of Ziersdorf, 132,000. They were in use until 1956, but in view
of the lack of heating oil, had to be shut down. There was also a
loading station at the I uckirchen railroad station, but it was dis-
mantled.
The Vii' opened up an unloading station at Matzen when the Matson
fields were opened up.
During the war there were shadow refineries at Spitz a . d . Donau.,,
Lehen-8bersdorf, Tuernits, Petmrnkirchen, ltatsondorf, tuskirchsn and
gbensee. In 1945 the installations at Spits Lehen.abersdorf, Tuernits
and gtatzendort were dismantled. Those of ?*tzsnki,roh*n and Ifauskirahen
continued to work for a short true, but then were dismantled. The
ensee installation handled all the oil brought to Linz in tankers in
May 1945.
The GgggWjSM nt
According to our sources the geophysical development was based
only on reflected-seismic measurements . Other methods? such as the
magnetic one, were not used.
The seismic measurings that took place before October 1951 were
sporadic and not very scientific in character. The mmasuroments were
undertaken by two measuring teams, working with Soviet instruments.
117
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With the arrival of the Soviet Geophysicist S. 0. huitalcov in
October 1951, developmental operations were begun' along seismic lines.
The work was carried out mainly in the Vienna Basin, with the exception
of Aeewinkel in 1954. In 1952 there were three surveying to=* and in
1953 their n*ber was inc
to tour
Mtny experiments were methodically carried out. Besides the cur-
rently popular reflection ^ethod1 attests were made with a system
which registers the profiles in order to find the direction and angle
of inclination. The method of mesa i the sound of explosions was
also tried.
In August 1953, geophysical exploration was suddenly abandoned,
but recommenced in the spring of 1954 with the aid of two machines.
Zn the fall, work again ceased.
The seismic apparatus came from Russia. There were three ^a:chines .
They were Type CC-24- and Type CC-26-51. Another apparatus was built
in Austria In accordance with Russian plans. These apparatus are old
foR
and do not suffice today's
Surrender e
Am M
On 13 August 1955 the
ts.
handed over to the Austrian
Republic in accordance with the tease of the State Treaty.
At that time the consisted oft
1 drilling plant
6 production plants and the rtnnersdorf Installation.
{
,l gas plant
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2 an { cospanies (Nathan and Pernga*
6 refineries
1 osocsrite plant
1 Lobau reservoir station with outbuildings and pipelines
7 auxiliary plants (workshops? building plants, laboratory,
etc.)
1 tank coaepl?x formerly belonging to the Almmin onsol Associa-
tion
1 central
1 Vasa aduldidstrati
The chiefs o
Director Pavlov,, Mi*f acce
iel
ov Director raretov, gales
drew up for each plant an inventory of a eets, which.,
include the plant's
ti,
erp did not
included on a second list,
but was only quantitatively given and consisted mainly of materials.
1 enterprises and plants the" documents were signed between
8 and 12 o'clock. Austria was represented in each case by one of the
our representatives appointed by the at
of the final papers took place in Vienna at 2 o' clock
and the entire complex passed into the hands of the ?*public.
The soviets handed over (including XP4j,896 walls, whereof 673 were
in production. (Attached table shams further details.)
The average daily production from 1 January to 13 August 1955 want
9,65 tons oil
Ct. ave.
X,130#922
from 13 Augus
9,927
" " wet sam
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1,009,674
cu. a. dry
937,84 " " wet
lsrtylive drilling installations w
ling turbines Of the 8!! and 10" 81ass.
mlan drilling machinery
usiedl and Med by the Soviets
Drilling DIPM
ref
P'i
Pipes for refineries
0heuiaals
Deep well Ptomps
Steels, sheet astal,
Various drilling and
teriel was stored
no provi
it would be
The Austrian negotiators
sod that for t intern period
much of the materiel would be necessary
obtaining it for 67,#000,000 schillings.
river boats and a
.70 buses*
handed over, plus 20 drile
,,000 echillings i
use at
Bch. 18,000,000
24 ,000,000
2,,000
4,300,000
4,0800,0000
1, ,000
1,500,00"3
2,,000,,000
1*0008000
4,95000000
n stems,, etc. 5, 500r400
pant
r this
4 that it had to be taken by the
8,,,000
e1 to be examined
k rs,, loc motives,
,f at Lobau, 160 trucks and
they finally succeeded in
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The crude oil pipeline no
estimated that they hand
cubic meters of as.
uF
At six o'clock in the no,
lies were in the plant* and
62g254 to
5s682
2,554
6,317
11,921
1.349
3,807
800 . long. Soviets
as of oil and 36s 0,t ,,000
of 13 !August 1955, the following
us
diesl oil
heating
bi
aviation gas
`1'l iae s ac -rding tO w4WWell nt3
administration and
tempo
Fy
administration. The handing over of
heating oil was compensated
suer Of Ike little time a
cheek the lists submitted by the
re were discrepancies in
The following table gives a
items
1) Unsuccessful dri'
2) Cost of aa-letre projects
3) Stocks to be liquidated
4) Pound
5) Dubious d s
6) major repairs
tongs tankst
if of the Soviet
by the Austrian
tin ail, bitumen and
c plishod by 20 geptambsr 1955.
e it had
possible to
It later became apparen
sets that were I
dsa of the*
ly listed
51*81T*000 Bch.
982,000
1, 306,,
306,E
196,0
1!t ? ......
4,
121
r77,
Oil
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Piles covering the years up to I .fly 1955 were carted away by
the Soviets frOU all plants. Originally they were to be assembled
in the archives under Dr. grtericky. With the
contained diva
records of loam
etc. directly In
coms"sion consisting of
yavlov, Chief Aceftntan
took all these records
Also dissolved
gussians and in which
archives were tares sw4y.
office of the Central Tank A
mil' a foreign crude
documents.
We do not know
strasse
rested offices we
Off
Vale
their depeaaents, a Soviet
at
Wmv, Sal" Director
iron Chief Yeralov
boretr ss. 1.
office, staffed by
used. All files and
the Central Control
Alin t tion-mid the r
ae that then* filer
tied products disappeared. Por a time,,
the archives
.t Voes
let declarsti
be e
o look at these
an to the Tsbor-
1955.
cords of
rn lists did not tally with the
qty inventory. 3 ecam" of haleste, the
in practice,, however,, it be
should have been there, were not available.
192
corning the Werksc its, the loll Division,
mist rest hoes in Austria)
~t were
was accepted
t items that
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lat
air**
through the a:
show that a c
of the directors to the Dire
of
Led for,
a scavenger pro. All
available dt a PUMP
Fence would
The
forced to adopt
t sally nsedsd was
ok
With
t butt did not show on the inventory.
There was therefore a differsnci bed wtha
able
Tribute deliveries
27 dust 1955?
supposed to be avail-
Soviet Union on
of pressing problem that had to be solved
the handing over of the onto
Forty to 50
Soviet specialists had be "placed by Awstris ale, tihec ality a
crude oil had to be improved
be moved and the Supply of electric
developed, etc. Steps
they had
thuds had to
t for iats+sn had to be
oly.
.
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AwrstAal
3,48
lul d-Ul 901 a& J-3i 11 1 -
17 91 3 26 - 120 1 4 0
1- -9-1-71 110 5
i ILA
w ? ~41 r - UM w
1134
241 49 322 36 648 12 13 12 27
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`I"`i'~l ?ST I IT9-1`r3 T`TTI~
.. ..
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Third Section.
1. >: t
A. z7t
Along with the USIA Central Administration? the following adatnis
trative posts comprised the administration of industrial plants in
Austria:
1.
Maarten: Minos. Iron production.
2.
Podyonzniki
Machine construction.
3.
Autoveloa A
utomotive
4.
Zements Con
struction, construction materials, glass industry.
5.
llabelc Elec
trical cable and Is industries
6.
graska: Che
mical industries.
7.
Letexs Text
ile and leather industries.
8.
wkus: Food
LO" I Agric
and luxury industries.
ulture, forestry, paper and wood Industries.
In 1954 aka was amalgamated with Who. It is &I" possible that
in the following year Autovelo was dissolved and taken aver by Zeawnt.
Betve o t
B. JgLery
.mQ
The development of the individual administrations seems not to
have varied much. There were the following divisions: General Direction,
Technical, or Plans Division; Personnel and Cultural Division
mercial Division; Economic Division (Ache); Acco rating, and, there
were, at different times, Legal divisions.
125
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str
purchasing and sales
Wkus and Letex t
into tom.
tins which later were
the following may be said of
branches t Sanctioning of plant plans and supervial
ti diviitons developed into
ment; drafting of consumption and work nose; aid in supplying th
plants with raw, auxiliary and other materiels; aid in the sale of
of the production; organisation of the cooperation (finishing, exchange
of machinery); the according of investswrnt credits; acceptance of the
guarantee for credits of the 801 acceptance of losses and the covering
of coats for the conservation of
profits, taxes and tents
111
of
tion of
lants; c
absolutely es
examination of the doe
Certain functions have not been subs
ed by documentation but
may be accepted as fact because of the form of the USA complex and
based on a study of our papers "Soviet Plant Organization System" and
"Analysis of the Soviet Balance Plan for Austrian atsrpriaes." Such
functions were; Drafting of overall plans for production, supplies;
the cutting of prime costs;
d by
on found in the plants.
nn of production capacity;
financing and profit accuwulationy drafting of reports, concerning the
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of the higher offices# the
c%
through the intersod"ry
of the advice and Plans
plans (particularly the fulfil.
ei
2.
collaboration
t f,
offices (probably
acceptance
laboration of
y and delivery undertakings).
cy of VBU presents the following interesting
wed out ea*ng
administrations was nurtured
necessary
harmed in any way
oh wheth
and textile industries.)
industry or those of the
When any stupp
from tA concerns
my had to be obtained
possible.
The above demonstrates that Vil h ! a trade policy. The available
docusentation and statistics do not wake it possible to determine what
role the rentability princip
this harmed
103 pests
tions .
a and the individual branch
(For ex mple, it would be
the VIA Retail chain had
f thereby is meant the relation-
ship of profit to capital.
Of greater importance for the industrial policy is probably the
principle of econamy (profit to cost or turnover). is is substan-
tiated by the composition of., t tarsstla which makes it possible to
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follow the development of cost, turnover and profit. Yinally it is
noteworthy that after an
1952
1951
1952
1952
1952
1951
n rentability..-yin the most
important branches between.-1951-52 and 1954. the USIA omplex was dis-
solved after the 1955 State Treaty.
Podyonik
Autovelo
label I
label
Letex
Less
dec
1954
1954
1954
1953
The considerable decline of to
opinion, to the co
var rentability was due, in our
illation of the economic situation in Austria,
1. P.0 c.
According to our statistics investments in MA Industries were
extraordinarily little.
Gross investments were 2, 3%, net investments were 1.7% of the
turnover. It was therefore hardly
han ?10 million schillings.
It is not possible to discern the motives behind these investments from
the documentation available to
(Sse'aisos "Preliminary Report on
the Use of the Statistical Listen ft
Worthy of note is that the b
in the year 1954. Available
for this.
the USIA Industries,," page 8).
nude in VSU
statistics give no clue as to the reason
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Marten
97,004,1
1,0
61,000,000
Podynik
3?2,000,0
2.5
22900008000
Kabel 1
39,400,000
0.9
25,000,E
Kabel 2
411000, 3
1.4
290000,0000
Autovelo
35000110
1.3
25,000,000
Ze sent
72*000s000
2.2
59, 1,000
Kraska
40,000,000
0.8
21,000,000
Letex
112,000,,000
1.6
85,000,000
Loss
59#0000000
5.0
0000000
Wkus
242
-
.
824,0001
17.6
612,000,
2.
A.
(a)
ve
According to
he definitive estimates
study of statistical qty*stlo:
employ
mailable through the Austrian a
have arrived at the conch
iderably mo
of 36, 000,03K 0,000 a chi.lli n .
This is cot
Preliminary Draf
of
nd
n that the IA turnover was in the order
25) which we
1 status of USIA
turd on the value of money in 1955.
t were arrived at through
h study of the lists of
1 security offices, we
h 1957 estimate, (See
eared by
third, in considera-
t is a fact that the, examination
he entire USIA complex does not furnish any
assuming
a particularly low rate, of productivity.
With regard to our now estimate it should be noted that we settled
the q
scion of value with aid of the industrial price index. In the
ISO
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years 1951-55 the industrial price index was very stable, but has l ie
value with regs to the years before that,
Zatimation of the value also
so for the year 1949. This is also a
and that in the
fact that a part of =U's d tic turnover was not calculated on the
official pricy
but rather on the" of the black Wit, which were
appreciably higher.
reason why the price i
be put to unlimited use.
said that our statistical questionnaires were
only couple
these answers which laid
Taking these *
aion that for the
s based on official prices, i"anno'
concerns and that it was
for our new seta tte for all concerns.
me into consideration,, one comm to the concl t
19 -1955 the minimal ova was around 27#000#000,0000
schillings and the maximal 36,000,000,000.
The turnover of 36,000,000,000 was distributed sang the branches
of USIA as followss
Im9aft
vex. 01955 basis
0brten
6,560
6,093,0000,000 Bchillins
Podyotik
100,023
9e160,000,000
Kobel
3,746
4,616,0030,000
Autovelo
2,,146
1,,000,000
Zeuent
3, 589
,000,0300
Letex
5,213
5s,325000000
gran ka
2,673,000,000
Lose Industries
1,146
50,0030?0000
Wk"
24-.. 4"Ei0 x.22
USIA Indudar'1es
36, 191
36,02$,000,0000
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chine construction, mining and heavy industry (Ilk
and the electre-industry were the most important parts
complex.
(b) MM.VU
In our "Provisional
textiles
nt of the 3tatisticaI
Questisnnsires," we have shorn that the branch** attained their grsatest
output in 1952 or 1954.
ars 1950 -51
were 1949 and 1952,
d 1953 were crisis years for =U. The best
131.
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234-
35q-
7C
;1216
117
3747 r'r,
1117 112,, 1 10 71 1 1(,('0
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(a) MMAUMMU
1"!
ST
,343
3$
i0 Sul", lb* Nut p s
(d)
5
CIO 154"
h a of
flow" -v iA* t1+>IIr'
1
333
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134
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Ac itltn to okw Oat
19 pmt;
at
six e&ulen,
.to by
filler am Wtitl
,or v tiitp ow
17
ftowsmik
90W*000
0
Agt tto
tsnt
xr"ka
Lt*x
Le"
C.
,004,E
18.0
.,
1,9a8 t **w
M0000000
10.6
Sft*OW#000
2673,000
21,0
1l1.~J0O
17.6
UAA
4*3tv to the t
Die*"
t Vhdor it
it
L952 and 1954 that a big dip In d*U'w *tn
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POd nik
157
36
#i tove1o
130
51
3$
214
15
'8
10
45
Le"
nu-.i
w
so
85
do
nedtd
1933 but in 19!14 vory
Y
t#t se"t7 an whiah to
tm" policy' in the pt ;
L9,
ntstz"atLiz
(s)
nip
5t
X-t
4. *"tom
a'
401 AD-,
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2. Oar.
40
,b.
ofo>
,"ternoub W-5
"1a*.
It. AqWd*
&54
dates
1 6:, 093,c r,
of s d dui of
257'
Vario
wt
q
24,3
15.7
59-7
2XI
.0
4$0,000,000
957,1 ? OOO
3#638#000#000
+l1+1111~ Iti1AW
6,093*000,000
117
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0ynsaic o ison of turnover (esubliew on the mats of
257?60 0,000,000 Schilli s announced
Year of the highest turnover 1952
'ear of the biggest turnover increase 1952 Increase of 47% over 1951
ear of the biggest to ver decrease 1953 Decrease of 900 over 1952.
Indices for the finer
of turnover (on the basis of announced
257,600,000,000 * hi .lings) in the y
Deliveries tot 1951
Bast Bloc dch. 3?000,000
am 6,000,00 0
Divers Domestic 250000,0000
Indices of the decrease in 1953,
1952$
1952 mange
21,,0000,000 4 617%
5,000?000 100
0000000 10 90
Deliveries tot
last Bloc iah.
B"
Divers to
B}
ltiasted total Profit
Bases for oft
1951
21?0000,,000
5,000,000
23000#000
000
1952
14,0001,000
8,00000000
19,,000?0000
ility (17.6%)
Change
580
4 67%
?. 19%
Profit structures
ted on basis of 257#600#000 24h)
Type of Profit
s0nuziall.
Profits paid in
4.9
000
Administration duet
7.8
475,0000, 0000
dales Tax
14.7
2"'0000,0000
Other taxes
1140000,a 0
0 Q
_..~..,
-
17.6
1,0 2,000,0000
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P tic rentability
$ of 257,600,000,000 Seth.
Year of greatest turnover
1952 With 22.7%
Year of greatest profit
1952 22.7%
Year of greatest increase of r*htabil.ity
(increus* as sma nst 1950
1951 " + 25-20
Lowest rentability
19514 14.E
Greatest rentability drop
1953 50.3%
the increase of
19511
2:2
Imressi
Increases of
profits
Increase of smites u x
Indices for the deer* of
Dec
A-in profit's
Decrease of administration
Decrease of sales tax
0 um mu po11,
*ttiaated not invel
investments
General repairs
ant to sanest
Dynastic ci
1954.
PJ
of inv"
1.6
1.0
531
,000 schiltings
Ichillings
97,000,000
.Mvitznam
61,000,000
investment was in
(b) Ana
following plants were der " yomniac adai.nistrations
139
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10
in, Pabrik t. se Atzg.r rt
2. O"ollsdaft t'uer +drsultk et.b.H., Wien X.
3. UrAs Ri dingsr oh# fabrik, Lifing.
4.' ,x I toren brik u. Xt Mlos terei AG, Wien X.
5. Xiesse n .Wsrks #
6. Os worlds r . & t nalt~eerks G.n.b.L. Wien U.
7. X t+er & dInberg L,.s.b.X* a Wien X.
8. ~ +erirr tis+ r l ,berlunge ko, It. Valentin and Wien.
9. TO"-und X #ljalARS k, Kotherr & lehr&ntz
O.u.b.X, Wien
10. Toud ttr-Yo
11. wsagner*BAM AGO Wien
d lil echinentabrik
12. Wr. Werkzeug Irs, h .nsnlabrik. Wien XX
13. Mu neni rik Pichler & Co. Wien XXX.
14. se lthn erkohromittel, , Wien X.
15. Wr. Lokmotiv AG.
16. Wr.
Wien I.
2. X1k allv.r&rb,* t m.b.X. Wien-liebenhirten.
3. X rrste1der Netallworke AG, Xnzersf*1d4o snau Neurissenhot.
4. brik landwir cI tt1iehsr Xersete $e rnd trt Wilhelm
Abt, A.n.b.X-. Wop
nEler ,
Xlt,eee ee b Co., St. Veit s.d. 'rriesttng.
Ventiletoren & x" ntentsbrik, lioedltng.
tisenr, "r a. Winter's Ste,, Zj+enbe rg-erg.
rgi.
10. Lsbeersdorter :shin
11. c -Work e l.et. b.l.
k AS,
12. trndorter $ta1lear*nt'abrik, Werke s
14. Xteinted b
It
140
V9
T, Aeatetten,
ersdort.
Poelten.
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15. J. X. Voith St. ft*ltalen.
16. Wr. eustaadter asoh nen rke Q?at.b.*. Wiener l stadt.
17. N-e csrmann ftbrik chemischer Graves , gittsrnberg
bo Gars ae p.
This aeetku a total of 33 pl tints, which in 1954 a total of
10*023 people on their p Wa11s.
2. Data contained in statistical questionnaires give the
following concerting the perforelsnos of ftdjami
r of plants Bch returned the qt
couPleto
Bales stractw?
Do vored to
c
(Soviet
various uestie
worts to west
in
! ra1N
64.2
9.8
23.8
100.0
Dynamic sales
Year of
Year of
On 3#496#000000
1952
1952
Year of greatest sales decrease 1954
Indic** for the *&I" increase
141
17
9
8
stry a 9#160,300,000 sch1
of 2068600000000 $ch).
$chtllings
2,881,000,000
x,000,000
2,,180,0 ?,000
. ` .O.4.
9,160,0000000
t 1951 4 4
t 1953 - 7O
2,686,000,0?0 sch.) in 1952:
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Deliveries to
Ul of Met Bloc
BWR
ions Domestic
U ports to West
icee for sales dear+ a in 19'
1953
2,0!44?000
195$
change
+ 550
4 680
4 309
Total of East Bloc
Various Domes tie
RWR
Exports to West
R) BwAkUux
Estimated total J; fits i
Uh.
109,6000
,,
17
278,ooo,a w 150
9000000000 ?~ 12%
45,000,000 90
,,000 211000,0000 ;.1643%
Profit structure (ca]
atad on
rentability (19,,
ais of 3,496,000,0X sob.)
TYPO
$chiUings
Profits paid in
6.3
57T#000#000
Administration 4uoo
8.2
751,000,400
gales tax
4.6
491,0 ,000
Trade tax
4.4
37,000,0
capital
0.0
Collection dues
1?786,000,000
Dynamic rentability co
atris rs (based
3, 496,0 0000 * h. )
Year of the greatest sales rentability
1952 with 26.1%
Year of the greatest profit
1952 " 26.1%
Year of the greatest rentability increase
(increase as against 1949)
1949 + 13$
Lowest rentability,.,
1954 x
Greatest decrease (as against 1952)
1953 >430
(decrease as against 1953
1951
1952
317,000,000
46,t ,,000
94,000,, 004 122, #x,400
142
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Xndices for rentability increase in 19491
1948
Increase in profits paid in i 4,000,000
Increased administration draws 15 000,0 0
Increased sales tax
3000*000
dices of rentability decrease in 1954*
Decrease in pro.,
0e*"&sed administration dues
Decreased sales tax
creased trade tax
C) IMLINJIM ftui
*stimsted net investments
29,
1949
Chance
17,,000,000 880
29 #,000, 930
7#000#000 131%
19?4
17,000,000
,000 280000*000
24,000,000
2,
Change
-T2116
-930.
-g3%
%ofsales
New invoo tuft-to
General re
Gross inveetn
Amortization ante
Net Investments
Dynamic comparison of inv
invi
gchill ings
2#7,10000
302,000,000
229,000,000
954. (7.20 of sales, 42% of
the total gross investment .
D) Genera, Reefarenc - t
In the years 1948 to 1952 one plant had to pay a "commission" out
of profits to the Purchase and
3. We were able to gain an
ice.
(12-13% of "lea.)
into two of the biggest plants
which wore part of Fedyoanik through a study of plant methods. They
143
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were W ray-.Biro (A s C plants) in Vienna and J. X. Voith of $t.
Poeelten. (Ce area Report on the Conversation of 5 Dscamb r 1956,"
Report on C Plant of " t err- ro.
versattons of 10 and 13 December 19%.")
the sections of thee. reports so the,
referred directly to the co
According
May - and June 1945. This was to on,
of the machines
Russian thesis, all t
"pith
production cNability was more
a were to be taken whose
A be absorbed by the Austrian
market. The disasantlings were handled in both these plants by
untrained troops, aided by plaint personnel. At Voith r s the untrained
eps were replaced after a certain time by trained dia rnntling troops.
Eaagner 4iro supplies ww*
while at Voith only arse
Incorporation into VIZA occux
1946 (c Plant on I Novembw
U. The Adai nistratton duaers
for both companies. At the beginning it
7 and 14 1956. " "Can-
seem to have been the soma
10% of sala s, then 11.1%
of production prime costs. But in 1954 they We diffomt and we
hat the percentages were
profits.
original ro.
disaantli
the r+ev of
oe in
parted that according to the
144
according to the estimated
any great quantity
Waagner-dire on 1 December
Voith on 16 April 1946).
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the Rosslan drec
`tc ? )
a Director feral, -a chief of chn'ical services (Chief engineer)
and a chief of Administration. (chief Accountant).
Individual Plans divisions were meted in both plants. Along with
the bookkeeping division
work. At Waagner iro, t
Buoro for approval. The
extensive plans and reporting
on to the hessian plans
a, particularly the balances, with all
annexes, were sent by the Soviet rietul Director to the corresponding
cos.
V. The financi
plants ran carried out along the lines
contained in report "Analysis of the Soviet Balance Plan."
V. The recipients of Waa rr ,ro and Voith products in the last
Bloc are known. The exceptions are deliveries to Soviet Russia and
deliveries an special order.
ki
done
deliveries to the last Bloc stat had to have P+odyoanik's authoriza-
tion. Bus.
i'th the Soviet
through the BSIA PUrchasAn
(Central C erci-aal Office)
was composed of
4 even direct
Podyomni k,
Office (gverkon) and through Wit.
Vt. About 10 to 15 percent of Wangwr.Biro's needs in supplies
were purchased through By
20 percent of Waagner.~
t Bloc states,
Such imports included roller material, nick alloys, building and
welding rods, hoist Mors, foundry raw material whereof raw iron and
iron alloys
the Soviet Union.
145
which was a part of in. pifteen to
nto in such materials,
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which were hard to get in Austria, were ordered on a q terly basis.
V. After acceptance of the order by the Soviets, the transport
usually was undertaken by Juschwneschtr a Deliveries to Poland am
Romania went through the Uprose
Wsagner-Ririe said that the following points were used for exports t
Per Russia
China
Poland
,i C8x
W-R (Waagner ire) (A
investments were aid* or such as
to bile park. in C .-Plant
Bzeolav, Levies:,
replacement
say to lpleaant the
f~nt investments were Maas
in 1953 and particularly in 1954. In 1955 nor* than 1,0000#000 schil.
lingo were spent to build a workingien'a clubhouse.
In some cases the machinery that was delivered did not correspond
to requirement*.
U. At W-.B, the Soviets
on of dredgers,' drug
winches and corrugated iron hangars. At Voitr c s , the manufacture of
spinning machines was nbroduced into the production schedule. W
work norms were increased in 1953 &c
tive of USIA. In general, however,
At Voith, great stress was placed on
forces. (Lack of specialists).
reports by a representa-
god of work was not touched.
of available labor
X. In both th*ro was a close cooperation with USIA
exchange of plat and sub-contracts). According to W.1 IA had an
organization which occupied itself with cooperation. (Perhaps the
in*MW&d
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technical divisiont) Each n nt h, the plants had to inform this co.
operation organization i K
eir operation desires.
Cooperation plans were then formulated.
Cooperation extended to different branches. The advantages ware e
facilitation of fulfilling delivery dates, favorable prices and the
exchange of necessary vachineery. 'here was also one general admonition
and that was to sae to it that t
materials etc. of other IA bra
not lose sight of the fact that
financial advantages. ('V'oitah)
P~rrnt~a:
ft.-'..tax
The Soviet personnel ft*
a/
in 19J47, Voith had eneral Di
uirel cents in suppliees, raw
were covered. One should also
*operation want hand in hand w**
by the USIA Administration. Already
outstanding specialist.
The Infiltration of Cnis is Into the plants was in the hands
of three units which were
ly under Co=WXiist influencer
1. The Factory Organisation. (Betriebsorganization - O) A
committee of pure Communists belong;
(Cmtnist col
individual works divisions
The Works Council which was imposed in accordance with the
shop (plant) elections.
3. The Personnel Division which was staffed by ton-specialist
Conist outsiders.
With regard to the relationship of these divisions to the Soviet
chide, Voith reports that the Co unists were able to push through
147
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same of their wishes against
central Personnel Office. brewer,
kept In a plant by the Soviet plant r.
the wishes of the
C nista, even when such specialists happened to be foz er Nazis.
Finally, the Cultural Division (W
Comittee (Voith) played
of mist Party ( wo
etc.)
(c) Askania
t d
airy specialist* could be
it) o
et leadership with the aid of the
It
the Cultural
of the
visits to the Skala
1. According to a source, the a.nistration of Autovelo was
dissolved during the =U time and amalgamated with that of 2e snt.
It has not been possible to check this report. It is curtain, however,
that it was not very important since
in 1949/50 the Qoerta
Optical Works had been taken over by the Xabel administration.
probable that the following were under the Autovelo administrations
1. Draeger 0.a.b.g. Viewna?XX.
AL, Vienna X.
3. lash1er nd Xstallwarenfabrik Boll A Dr. 3trohachneider,,
Vienna C.
Rudolf Otte
to run rk
6. Adolf Mickarl, bwersdorf.
7. " X" Of nbau Q.m.b.X. VI
8. dteyr
d, G.is.b, X. Vienna XXI.
r, Vienna X., and
9. P.C. Wagner JM* El. ktr*4 ch *isswerk, Vi U.
30. Vallechirokbau, Jose
148
, Vienna
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3.1. liauihaber 8 co,, Vienna XY
12. O%wt fir, Vienna XV.
Otto gborhard, Patrofenf$brik- Rirtsnberg,
A total Of 13 pants, which in 1954 had a
of 2,146 wow.
The following data is availlabl, On their perfol"nool
number of plants who reported 6
fully camp
gLL*$tionneirea
incomplete
Total Autovelo sales* I
sales struck oalculated on
lingo.
$ of 813,400#000 sohil]ings )
Deliveries to
killings
not Sloe
41
790?000,000
Hale
251, 000, 000
Various Domestic
45
868, Eo0;, 0
Exports to west
1
19,000,E000
Dynamic c ison of sales (on basis of 813,500,0 0 sehillings) t
Year of highest sales
Year of greatest sales develo
Year of greatest "lea drop
for the increase of
in 1952.
eveiuated
149
1952
1952
1953
Red on 813,500, cab.)
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Dsly r 1 1
3 ]no*
am
Yid Dametic
his to W40t,
56,839
4450000
1952
73,991,700
C
30*20
+143-711%
4 10.6%
4, 87.E
itcls for the
19531
Os3.trsries to$
1952
1953 ChOW
Total But XLOIC
73,991,700
29,3 '',1
251.80
25,39,800
95#013#00 <
1%
BASOr" is
52,420,000
72,040,600 4
37.41
a) m
237,000,000 .
PrOftt
TV"
r:oria asa
1.7
6,7
0000000
329,000,000
75,400,
,000,000
'sr Of hilt ulss
Trir of 2restsst profit
ear of grm
tar ( sn 813,,5 ,000 s+ gulag)
1951
150
195-4 80
1954 0. T50
1951
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1950
n 19541
increase in administration
dues
9,,119,300 30?972,300
2T4,0,400 4,
in paid profits 7 ,,004 2,,886,
in
b
44
Decrease in paid profits
Decrease in administration
dues
1953
0500
1951
2,501,500 - 32.M%
,,700
Decrease In ftass, Tax 5,7910800
D ecr e
Tsr.
New investments
General tepairs
Gross Znvestn en
Amortization tents
Not investments
1,732,
M03#300
195,900
+ 269.0%
+ 39-30
Ichillings
25,000,?00
MtM&00
359000#000
1QQ00Q
25,000,000
Highest gross investments were in 1954 with total of ich. 4,121,0 3.
This is 28.5% of the to
" investtaerint.
No plant qu ntionaaires were fill
(d) a.+
1.
The following plants came ti ter labels
.nistrationi
1.
Akowlatorenfabrik G.m.b.H. Liesing
2.
pr^aht- and abelwerk Stchtermann G.a. b . i. Inz ersdorf
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3. "Ceram" &. a. b. L. Ate era
4. Ar dne Draht-und X*b*Xw
5. 0 terr . Brown Boveri-ate
Yien+
, Vienna XXX
6. Wr, Zabel nd $stallworke Ad
7. mi nion ektrimitta ots sellschaft Vi,
8. gismons oh uckertwer a O. at, b . C. Vie - I,
1a.n, die,
Yiez 44isi
10. Optisehe Ansta t W. Goerts G.m.b,L. Vi va X
This made a total of 10 plants which in 1954 had a payroll of
4,146.
tical questionnaires we were able
to take in the totality of the cable -producing industry. We have there.
fore separated the evaluation from the rest of the electrical Industry.
Mbar of plants which
Clete qusstionrAdres
, lete qu ationinaires
Xstimated total sales of Ali 2,772,000,000 sahi.hlir s
des structure (carted on the basis of 1,,500,000,000 itch.)
Deliveries
ihil1 ings
Consignments against Soviet
profit share
701,,,000,001
Responsible ac'tsinis
6.2
172?000? 0 00
(C
7.6
2110000j,000
last Bloc
00Gh0...0
40.2
114000,,,000
152
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coat I di from RrgcgdjjA e
Deliveries to
% of Sales
gch*illings
40.
1,114, 000,600
BWR
24.0
665,000,000
Various Domestic
35.2
976,000,000
Exports to W
0+
17,0001000
100.0
2,772,000,000
Dynamic comparison of sales (based on 1,500,000,000 sch.)
Year of highest sales
1952
Year of greatest sales development
1951
Year of greatest sales drop
(compared with 1952)
1953
Indices for the sales increase in 1951 (based on indications given by
firma having a totality of 70% of the sales).
Deliveries tot
1950
1951
Change
Bast Bloc
35,000#000
114,000,000
+ 226%
BWR
32,000#000
65,900,000
4 103%
Various Domestic
56,000,000
dO,UU0,000
+ 43%
Indices for the drop in sales in 1953 (based on indications given by
firsts having a totality of 70% of the sales).
Deliveries tot
1952
1953
Change
Totality of last bloc sales
116,000,000
120,000,000
4%
BWR
81,000,000
31,000#000
- 161%
Various Domestic
86,,000,000
50,000,000
- 72%
Exports to West
7,000,000
..
B) Rentability
Estimated total profit 56,000,000 sch.
Profit structure (based on 1* billion sch.)
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Type of Profit
% of l al
Schilling*
Paid profits
10.0
277,000,000
Administration tax
7.2
199, 000, 0?O
Sales tax
4.2
115j,000#000
Capital tax
0.1
5,000,000
Collection dues
0.0
Other
ois ?0
21.5
500000#000
Dynamic c+ parlson of rentability (based on
billion sch).
Year of highest sales rentability 1948 & 50 with 28%
of highest absolute profit 1952 25%
Year of greatest rentability increase 1948 + 47%
(as against 1947)
Lowest rentability 1953 with 17%
Greatest drop 1953 47%
Lidice* for rentability increase in 1948 (representative plants)
Increase of paid profits of 1947, 2 million sch. to 10,700,000 sch. # 426
Increase of acinistration dares
of 1947
Increase of sales, tax
of 1947
4,600,000 sch. to 8,600,E sch. 4 86
10100,0000 it to 3,000,000 "
Indices for rentability decrease in 1953. (Representative plants).
3 193
Decrease of paid profits of 1952
37,700,000
to 4,240,000
-.84oo
Decrease of Adain, tax
of 1952
22#100,0000
to 2;1?000,000
Decrease of sales tax
of 1952
13,100,0? 0
to 14100,000
,. 20
General remarks trade tax, vital tax, collection dues were introduced
in 1948 for the first time.
C) Investment policy
Zstimated Not Invest sent 25,000,000 sch.
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$ of Miss
Schilling*
New investments
1.1
31sOOO,000
General Repairs
RAI
842240-0
Gross investment
1.4
39OWsOOO
Amortization payments
Net Investment
0.9
25,0000000
yeic comparison of invesnts
Greatest gross investment
Lowest investment in 1949.
D) EM
With regards to
1954 (250 c
f the total of investments
-Sale* appear first in
1947, while appears first in 1952/53? There was a strong drop
in deliveries to the East Bloc (incl
in 1954 (. 77%) and
partial re-conquering of the domestic erket ( 4 690
M SWAMI DIUM,
Number of plants that
Fully completed quest
Incomplete
plied to the questionnaires 5
VALqg.&g1j1
A) 4ales
Ratimaeted total sales
sch. Sal" structure (catc a
ion of the induct:
2, Q45, OO0,000
n basis of 900,000,000 sch).
155
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Deliveries to
Deliveries against Soviet
part of profits
Responsible administration
R2$
BWR
Rut Bloc
Various domestic
various countries
(Rut hoc total a 34.
29.5
3.4
10.3
1.5
54.2
100.0
Dynamic comparison of sales (bsela.d on
Year of higheet sales 1952
Year of highest scales develot. 1951
Year of greatest decrease 1954
Indices for the sales increase in 19511
to the Ras
Various Domestic
1950
Bloc 4,8,0000,0000
60000
55.000
dices for the sales drop in 19541
1953
Total last Bloc deliveries 49,000?04
BWR
19,000,000
Various Domestic 64.094
B) Rentability:
So"
000
603,000,000
70,000,000
211,000,000
31*000&000
1.0108,$0000000
2,045,000,000
1950 4 330
decrease a .nst 1953 - 23%
1951 Change
58,000,030 4 20%
6,004,000 + 7%
80,0 ,000 + 45%
1954 Change
26,000,000 - 88%
29#000#000 + 53%
51,000,0 00
Estimated total profits 368,0000,0000 sch.
Profit structure (based on 900,#000#000 sch.
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kohi11 ings
Paid profits
3.4
11000000000
Administration tax
6.5
133,400rOOO
Sales tax
3.7
76, ,OOO
cede tax
0.1
2,000,000
capital tax
0.0
Cc sction dues
0.0
Divers taxsl
Total profit
18.0
368,c0,,t
Dynamic reentabi
Year of greatest level
1949 with
250
Year of greatest profit (absolute)
1952
180
Year of greatest rsntabil
cannot be calculated
Lowest rentability
1954
12%
Greatest doe""*
1954
-420
Indic** of rentability increases
Cannot be calcu1 tod.
Indices for rentability der
in paid profits
ee in 1954
37'
Decrease in admin. dues
Decrease of sales tax
Trade tax (Owerbestou*r) was
company).
being collected in 1946 (Osram
The scree applies to the cap
0 Investment poitcys
investment structure (900,000,000 ach. )
157
the collection du".
rah.
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Ty"
% of gal*0
8chillings
New Inveetments
1.
30,700,000
General repairs
22%
A t
A
,,
Gross investments
2.09
40,900,
Amortization payments
Net Investments
1.
28,600,000
Dynamic investment caena,rison=
Highest gross investmenti
D) General remarks #
The optical industry has some peck
sientative.
idly,
on, but pass
Goertz Co. was under
' Meel a inistration in 1949
or 1950 because it produced som* electrical equipment. The Goertz
sales development was unusually stable and from 1951 on was between
30-32 millions echillings a year. This net investment quota was around
30% higher than in the electrical industry. Sales to the east Bloc
were extraordinarily high, being 69% of total "lea. Approx. 130
million *chilling*). It may therefore be concluded that tho Soviets
placed special value on the products of the optical industry.
A review was made of the biggest cable works, the Vienna
Cable and Metal Works, Vienna. (Aidee
of 20
sober 1956). The first review led to the elaboration of the
"USIA plant questionnaire" and for the first time gave evidence of the
existence of important original doc ntation (balance sheets, standard
accounting fome# etc).
158
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t reported
final years # the leader'
founded
and that the plant was taken over by ?A. Prior to that the ocoup&-
Lion authorities had taken a
dismantled a part of the plant.
raw materials air and also
n dwn fluctuated between 2 and 10. and were
paid to Kabol's administration.
a USIA reegi m e,, the concern had 18 Gehierai Directors.
of whom several appeared several tin", At the beginning the chiefs
were military seen? but they were soon changed for civilians. The
ship of the concern was cos -
thr
the thief Constructor and the Cowwrelal Director, (Chief Accountant).
IV . Financing
with the usual
form alas credits for production material through , +eestment
credits through the adm n,
maintain the MR circuit
able to the plants when
on. It must be noted that in order to
administration had to a eke credits xv4
cient. This is an
1946
s General Direct or#
cation of how important isn't was consideeread.
. Exports Via,, in part
possession of "trans
were only in
" which did not contain the names of the
purchaser. Price policy: for exports to
could only
charge prime cost plus 5%. All other contracts were calculated on
western world market prices, Kbs 's administration had a say in the
formulation of price policy,
159
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nl
1. The following building and glass industry plants belonged
to Zs*ent I
Vie
1. I{einrioh Kohler, Vienna Dl
2. Union Baugeseellechaf"t ' -enns stberg
3. Union Bs aterisii ern CO- Vien
4. Allgesesine 8ta ssen a AG, Vienna
5. Allsomtne Bsuges. A. Por~r~yAG, Vierma X
6. Otto Outhan Yom. Anton Andereer, Vienna yew
7. Philipp R41 A, Vienna
8. Sager b Woornorp View* IV
9. giasf abriken OberdortU oitsberg1 Adolf Baerbitz, Vienna
IY, XVI
1?. wiener Glashuettenwerke AG, Vien
&9M ANUMS
Deutsch-Oesterr. Christ
Traiseruer
2. Brstte oesterr. letschiner
tckfabrik J. Bggeiing,
lssindu strie A$, Brunn am Gebirg e
.a.b.R., Stockersu
4.
aeosbr
Lk J
eb
5.
O.sterr.
Aebirge
'1k
] bersp"cher, Brunn a.
6.
Aktiengesel
rb and Feinkersaik, Muenchen-
$inztg Vio
(formerly Wr. Ziegelwerks) i aopoldsdort
7.
Aktiengesellschaft fuer Grob u. ?einkea k# l uenchen,
Klein Foeechiarn
biw.r t -fit
1. Granitwerke Ouson,, formerly Deutsche Bird - and $teinwerke
1. "VXDAG" Veereinigt
Amiant AG, Rechnitz.
abriken , formerly
16n
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2.
This makes a total of 19 (Translatoa
a payroll of 3# 589 *MV
'a
n 1954.
Yillaret and Alois
t 6t I Make it 20) plants with
2. The following be said of the perforaancee
copi.sw
espondedt 10
gtaestionnaires 4
6
] va Mon?
A) bL"
ieaat*d total salelat 2,663,00O# 0 schillings,
gales structure (based on
Only domestic sales
achUlings)
t;ed on 376,000,000 schillingi
Year of highest sales 1954
Year of greatest sales development 1953 Increase over 1952 4 1350
ear of greenest drop 1949 Decrease over 1948 - 23%
Indices for sales Inter
Domestic
itch,
of 376,,05000
000
1953
Change
65*0000000 41350
Indices for sales drop in 1949 (UN W on 376,000,000 sch.).
1948 1949
Domestic
000,000 - 239
Estimated total profits 282,000#000 sehilhings
.em ernts of esti matiorn,e transmitted rentability figures (10.6%)
Profit structure (calculated on basis of 376,000,000 *oh.)
161
ch,).
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Type
Schillings
paid profits
3.0
80,000,000
Administration dues
2.2
59000,000
Sales tax
5.2
138,000,000
Trade tax
0.2
5,#000
Capital tsar
0.0
Collection dues
Other taxes
0.0
Total
10.6
282#000#000
Dynamic rentability comp rison (based
376#000#000 sch.)
Year of highest sales rentability
1949 With
12.2%
Year of highest profit (absolute)
1954
10.6%
Year of greatest rentability incr
as against 1948)
20.0%
Lowest rentabili
1952 & 53
9.3%
Greatest drop
1950 -
20.0%
(drop against 1948)
Indices for the changes a
Fluctuations in the profit and
sales tax. Payments by the firms are
C) v?gi?t nt Policy
Estimated Net Investment
Z
tion
only eat
nts and in
Now Investments
2.1
56#000,000
General repairs
1
s9 Q 0
_.
Gross Investments
2=7
72,000,000
Amortization payments
9.41
i .000
Net Investments
2.2
59,000,000
162
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Dynamic comparison of Investments Your of greatest gross invosta ante
1954.
The report submitted on the Danube Shipping Company indicates
that the Porr Construction Company oect
investment system. This company
for the Xorneeuburg wharf in 1951.
concerning the glass coraar *nies,
ed a central position in the
the reconstruction plans
are no interesting reports
:plots reports show that in
1954 the exports to the Sast bloc were 6% of the total of exports and
that exports to the western states
considerably mere with 14%.
The reminder of sales went to the do tic market. In 1954 the
glass industry was still making c siderab a profits, In that year
sales rentability was 2 while in 1955 It was 330.
There were no plant rev ews .
1. As far as the into
of Xraska are concerned,
it is known that the general Directors were Strvnovich, Fadeef and
Busheaarin. Some 15 Russians are said to have been employed in the
Xraska administtion. At one time or another
chief of
the Plans Division and I*rosov, chief of the Technical Division.
(Sae report on the Chemosan- ion AG, page 67.) The following firms
were administered by Xraskaz
Visr aR
1. Bekaacite Xurstharzfabrik, G.m.b.H. Vien - green
2. F. Beeiersdorf a Co. Q.m.b.X. Vienna X
Chemische Pabrik Walleenfels, Vienna XXl
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4. Chasische -abrik,
V':
5. fora" er and Rinok
6. uygan O.m b.I
7. Remold
8. W. Megerie, view*
9. motich & 00.0 Vienna
V tamwl
Vie
erke,,
a.arcnn
10. Ferdinand *eh le na, Raa de Cologne und P f *aerisfabriks
Vienna 1V
.m.b.R~, 7ts~ XXX
12. +
~ iRem. Chm. G. m. b . r4 Vi
13. Gebr 1 t, Q.m.b.R o Atsger rf
14. Zl.dolw?rke, Siegel 6 Ca,, View* UX
15. YAr'gsungs Industrie AO, Vienna IV
16. Wither Wagner , now Guenther Wagner, Vevwaltungages
ia. b.X. , Vienna X
17. V
Vienna
18. Dr. A. Wonder& G.a.b.Lt., Vienna
1. Aktiengesellschaft fuer c hemis
r
"erIans dorf, Aieb hirteln
e. Rannersdort,
2. csrbelinau -brtk, R. Axon rius, Aastetten
3?
4.
urg
5, X.T. G1ettssawnn, Rabenitein a.d, lielach
6.
7.
Oh sche Earbenfabrik R.N. 11abich? Welt#negg
Spirt
9. Spirit tabrik looew# A
ik# fernhoten Dr. Heins Berkel,
A total of 27 plants which in 1954 had a payroll of 1,547 employees.
2. A study of the statistical questionnaires ohms that there
were 13 plants which answered the qu stionnaires. Of the 13? tour
were complete and nine were incomplete.
,, A.*., Voss+endort
,Ali
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s
UMMUM
A) UJU
Total sales of aka
Bales structure (calculated
Deliveries to
tis
$ of Sales
2 673,000,000 sch.
248,667,500 schillings).
Schilling#
Total of Bast bloc
50
1, 337000,000
BWR
*0000000
Various domestic
4309,400,000
Other countries
2,673,000
Dynastic cosparl
of sales (based on 248,667,500 $ ch. )
Year of the highest sales
Year of the greatest sales development
Year of the
Indices for the inc
Total of Zest bloc
Bit
Various Domestic
Other countries
drop
in 19541
1953
7,869,600
362,00
15,808,200
800100
Indices for the drop in sales in 195
1954
1954 + 252.7$
1953 - 13.10
1954 Change
69,477,,300 + 782.90
1,330,E + 267.4%
14,#1776#600 - 11,5%
84,400 + 3.40
1952
1953
Change
Total of zest Bloc
11,613,600
7,869,600
- 47.6%
BWR
3624,000
Various Domestic
15*585*200
15,808,200
+ 1.
other countries
87, 300
80,100
+ 9.0%
B) nt&)4 .iti
Estimated total profit 588,000,000 8tah.
Profit structure (bsus.d on 248,667,,500 Bch.)
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0 of Sales
Schillings
Paid in profit 8,4
225,000,000
Administrative tax 9.0
240,000,000
Sales tax 4.2
Other taxes
112,000,000
22.0
Dynamic rentability corist
588,004,000
Year of highest sales
1947
33%
Year of greatest profit
1954
22%
Year of greatest rentability increse
1954
+ 29%
Lowest rentability
1953
17%
Greatest decrease in rentability
1952
.. -24%
Indices for rentability increase in 19541
1953
1954
Change
Paid profits
858,304
2,062,900
+ 140.3$
Admin. dues
1,681,400
11,876,800
+ 606.3%
dales tax
1,189,500
4,284,000
4 260.2.6
Other taxes
3TT*400
865,400
4 129.3%
indices for rentability decline 19521
1951
1952
Change
Paid profits
2,833,E
1,630,900
- 73.7%
Admin. dues
1,505,900
2,192,900
+ 45.6%
Sales tax
806,400
.344,600
+ 66.7%
Other taxes
433,200
528,704
+ 22.0%
C) vet n Po c
Only insufficient data ar
available on the investment policy.
3. Only one ill plant, the Kiosterneuburg plant of Chemosan-
Union AG was examined. (Total sales d
ing the =U regime; 57, 000, 000
*ch.) The result therefore has no over-all significance!-
,I mac
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There was no dismantling. The plant was placed originally
under military administration and taken over by USIA on 1 July 1946.
It. The plant is said not to have made profit payments, but only
to have paid administration dues. This is contrast to all other plants
under Kraaka.
IM. The Soviet Directors # neral of the plant were often also
directors general of other plants (usually at two others). Annual
production plans had to be examined by the chief of the Plans Division
of Zraska. The plan calculation foraalas were the same as used in
other branches.
IV. Financing was s
V. It is interesting to note that distribution was carried out
by the central office which was located in the British Zone and there'
fors not under the USIA administration.
VI. According to the report Kraska obtained raw materials,
such as alcohol, at extremely favorable prices.
VU. Does not a
ply?
V',. There were practi
C. The Soviets forced
pharmaceuticals to cosmetics.
investments. (30,722 schillings
action to switch from that of
X. Cooperation was limited to an exchange of machines and to
purchasing when possible from USIA plants.
The plant council was under Soviet leadership, although the
Socialists were equally strongly represented. The Personnel Division,
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the "DO" and the Cultural Diflsion were staffed entirely by Communists.
Even when IA was liquidated the C tun'' Its were able to a intsin
their position in the October plant elections, whereas the Socialists
lost one mandate to the bdependonts,
1. A certain
iaf v atioen' is WnOwn about ietex,
known in German as Light Industry ( chtil trie). the report
on the Alt-Erlaasr Dye Wor
the following Soviet Directors General
T
were named t
Utkin, lkltsev,, Laptev, Chernobiulski, Alexandrov, Xbrosov. The
name Utkin, as chief of Latex is also mentioned by Dr. X. (see Report
on the Conversation of 13 and 20 December- 1956). The name Alexandrov,
alias flach n# also appears in the Special Report on the USIA firms,
Wkus, Lotex, ort was there in the year 1951. Chernobillski is
probably identical with the man of the same Howe mentioned in "Report
on two conversations with Dr. $eleeknwitach of Barthel & Co."
Chekamasav, Ougoryov and L*bedeb were mentioned as chiefs of the
technical or plans division. Sokolov and Chirin were mentioned as
chiefs of the F rrsonnel Divt*on.
From an organizatory point of view the significant development of
the trade division is well known. Betides the usual import and export
mechanism it dove;
taken over by Ort.
retail trade chain which, in 1954, was
The following firms were under Latex 4dainistx tione
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1. Zdelgarnspinnerei Aau dern & Co., Vienna-Atxsgersdorf
2. Atzgex'sdorter asec anixche Weberei, Edmund Isllner,
Atzgersdorf,
3. Bruno Georg Wunderlich, Vienna XXI
Carl BudisEchofsky & loehne Oesterr. Lederindustrte,
Vienna XXI
Lederw erke Q er ssardus KG, Vienna XX
6. dtadlauaer
7.
1k Budischofsky nrad-Zeller, Vienna M
Vereinigte Li edertaabriken A*, Vienna XX
Texti..ldruckarat J. Xsuel, Vienna4tesing
IMOX A,tM
1. August Xhrlich, T'extilwerke In, Trumaut/Aspsngbahn
2. ,rate oesterr. 4lanutoffabrik, at. Poelten
Boetzendorfer aechau i sohs Weberei M. Plobner, Goetzendort
4. Mine Janis ch, T tiai.saagrtuer
5. Paul Xollbach X1. Neu siedl
6. Theodor *a.1ler (.haa. Xeidlhuber) Trutaau
7. Wollwarenfabrik Brlach Q. s. b .fit.
8. Vereinigte Textilworke Barthel & Co. ,p Woellersdorf
9. C.A. and Paul Vorsteher, benstein at. d. Pielach
10. Weissenbacher mach. Leinen-uund Baue*cellwarennreberei,
Oskar 8unza, Weisesenbsch, Triesting
11. Wr. Neustaeedt*r $trickeretfabrik Paul $eyer, Wr. Neustadt
12. Prsmz Schmitt AG flier Lederindustrie, Rehberg b. Krems
13. Alt-Nrlasaer Faerbera4 u. Appretur AG, Erlas
14. Richard Holtkott, Wr. Linoloun-und Wachstuchwrerke,
T'raiskirehen, Brunn am Gebirge
15. Knopf?und Wadler ren,, Ketten-und Bolzwarenfabrik,
William Pry,, Weiesenbach s.d. Triesting
16. Pottachacher mach. Weberei, Pottschach
Altogether 24 plants with a payroll of 5,213 in 1954.
According to our statistical questior
11 plants turned in
reports, 4 were complete and 7 incomplete.
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__gl 'eons
A)
Estimated "lost 5,024#000 schillings.
Bales structure (calculated on a basis of 594,000,400 schillings).
1e ? v?e'te t
Of 1161.02
ASUIUMI
East Bloc
44
2043000
BWR
23.7
1,261,000
Various domestic
32
1,704,000
Exports to West
~0
16000
100.
5,324,000
Dynamic comparison of sales (on basis of 863,000,00 0 Bch)*
Year of highest sales
1952,
Year of greatest sales
development
1948
increase against 1947
+ 193%
1951
1950
4 53%
Year of biggest ealee drop
1953
decrease 1952
- 9%
Indices for sales increase in year 1948e
Deliveries to
1947
1948
Change
East Bloc
3,000,000
10,000,000
+ 209%
Bw'E
800,000
4,000,000
+ 4400
Chief factor for the sales increase is the fact that the Eriaaer
Dye Works became part of =IA as of 1 December 1947.
Indices for sales drop in 19531
Deliveries to
1952
1953
Change
East Bloc
66,000?000
6,000,000
-1018%
19,000,000
16,000, 000
- 16%
Various domestic
10,000,000
70,000,000
+ 580%
a) k ntetbility
Estimated total profits
1,251,000,000
Basis for esti tet transmitted rentability (23.50).
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Profit structure (calculated on basis of 863 million schillings).
Type
% of gales
Schilling*
Paid profi ws
3.4
181,000,000
Admire dues
15.7
836,000,000
Salon tax
4.0
213,000,000
Trade tax
0.2
11,000,000
Capital tax
0.1
5,000,000
Collection dues
0.0
Various profit taxes
?
0-1
~,,
IMM
23,5
1,251,000,000
Dynamic comparison of rentability (based on 863 million $ch.)
Year of greatest sales rentability
Year of greatest profit
Year of greatest rentability increase
1950
1952
1948
with 31%
29%
4 37%
(against 1947)
Lowest rentability
1954
with 37%
Year of greatest rentability decrease
(decrease against 1953)
Indices for rentability increase in 19481
1947
1948
Change
Increase of paid profit
0#783
1,386
+ 77%
Increase of admin. dues
3,011
13.005
+ 333%
Increase of sales tax
0,416
1,463
+ 252%
(Translator's Notet Original omits to say these figures are millions
or thousands. PPestssably millions)
Indices for increase of rentability in 19541
1953
1954
Change
Increase of paid pr -fit
6,000,000
8,050,000
+ 270
Decrease in admin. dues
14,000,000
7,000,000
- 104
Increase in sales tax
6,t ?000
6,ooo,040
}
C) RdLex
Estimated net investment 85 million schillings
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Investment structure (based on 863 million *chilling).
Type
% of Sales
Schillings
New investment
1.7
91,000,000
General repairs
9
21 SGQ
Gross investment
2.1
112,000,000
Amortization payments
27,6000.000
Net investment
1.6
85,000,000
Year of the highest gross inveetmentt 1954
Examination of plants was carried out at two enterprises, Barthel & Co.
and AltwErlaser,Faerberei-und Apprettxs AG.
1. Thera are no indications of any dismantling. The Pserberei
was taken over by USIA on 1 December 1947 and Barthel in June 1946.
11. Barthel. report says that in 1947 administration dues were
5 percent and then were reduced. At the Faerberei in 1950 the dues
were 11.3 of the prime cost of production. In 1955 both enterprises
reported that administration dues were 1.07% of sales.
17.X. The reports do not indicate whether there were also Soviet
administration teams in the textile business. Military personnel was
in the Yaerberei plant until 1950 and until 1948 in the Barthel plant.
Then, with one exception, there followed a series of technical person-
net (weavers, chemists, etc.) In part,, the directors filled more than
one post. The plans, which were presented more or less in completed
form in photostat., were drafted under strong influence by Letex.
IV. Financing followed the habitual system. The Alt-Erl+eraer acre-
port shows that the Soviet Military Bank charged a 2* percent Inter*st,
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for credits for the acquisition of raw materials. This has been
otherwise confirmed.
V. Juschwneschtrans and the Hartung Express Co. were used
for deliveries to last Germany.
VI. Procurement was carried out partly through Letex and p*tly
through M.
V11. See V.
VIII. No expansion investments appear to have been made.
U. The major part of the woven materials appear to have been
destined for the Soviet Union (Clothes, bed linen). During the Soviet
regime the plants work at capacity on three shifts whereas only two
shifts were habitual in Austria, The
were changes in the norms.
X. Collaboration took three formst
1. The amalgamation of plants. Faerberei was amalgamated
with a textile printing plant in 1950. Weberei took
over another plant, Gernert & Co. as a. subsidiary plant.
2. Automobile parks were equalized.
Close connection between USIA sources of materials,
in part/ through Letex.
XI, In the Alt-lilac plant there were the following Communist
organizations: Personnel division
's and the plant council.
Barthel & Co. reports that the Ceamwtniots have lost 500 in the plant
council*,
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(h) I "D
1. Here, only the Less industries are discussed while the
land and forestry sections are dealt with in a separate place. The
following were under Lose administration#
1. Austria Holswarenfa"brik A*, Oberpiesting.
2. Beckmann & Lochner, *rbach,/ kenau.
Carl Gaspers, S'chwadorfer Saegewerk, Schwadorf bei St.
Poelten.
4. Klosterneuburger lsindustrie G.m.b.H. Klosterneuburg.
5. Stephansdach G.m.b.H. it. Aegid an Neuwald.
6. draupappenfabrik Josef Greinert, Aspeng.
7. Zehmbacher Rolsatoff-end Pappenfabrik, Willi Neubert,
Zahnbach.
Burgenland,
1. Sehilfrohrverwertung Gebr *zeller OID lteusiedi am Bee.
MM.t r
1. Groellwitz Obermuehl G.m.b.H., Obermuehl b, Rohrbach.
This makes a total of nine plants with a payroll of 1,146 in
1954*
2. Our statistical questionnaires show the following
Seven plants answered them* Pour were complete and three in-
complete.
A) MI"
Total sale* $ 1,150,,1 ,000 schg llings
No analysis was possible since for 80 percent of reported sales
there was no organization.
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Dynamic rentability comparison (based on 253,661,000 schillings).
Year of highest sales
1953
Year of greatest sales development
1948
+ 99.3%
Year of biggest sales drop
1952
16.67%
(1952 a 100)
1) Ratability
Estimated total profit: 202 million schillings
Profit structure (based on 253,700,000 schillings).
Type % of Sales
Rchillings
Paid profit
6.7
77000, 0?0
Admin. tax
6.6
76,000,000
Sales tax
4.2
49,000,000
Trade tax
-
Capital tax
17.6
202,000,000
Dynamic rentability comparison (based on 253,700,000 sahillings).
Year of highest sales rentability
1951
27%
Year of highest profits
1951
Year of greatest rentability increase
1954
+122%
Lowest rentability
1953
9%
Greatest drop in rentability
1952
- 93%
Indices for the rentability increase in 19541
1953
1954
Change
Increase in paid profits
434,000
2#943#000
+ 578%
Admin. tax
1?253,000
3*223,000
+ 157%
Sales tax
2,0900000
la985#000
50
Other taxes
14*200
14,.200
..
Indices for the drop of rentability in 19521
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Paid profit
Admin. tax
Salsa tax
Other taxes
C) v
t ax-Icy
1951
5,213,000
#291#000
1,582,000
22 s 000
1952
141,000
3s007s000
1,690,000
15,400
Change
(-3797%)
- 9.4%
+ 2.3%
.. 46.1%
Estimated not investments
58 million sch.
Investment structure (based on 253,700,000 schillings).
Type
% of Saes
Schilling,
New investments
4.3
50,000,000
General repairs
9_Opp
~illi.\~I11 A__
.i. ~r
Gross investments
5.1
590000,000
Amortization tents
1000000
Net investments
5.0
58,000,000
Highest gross investment was in 1954 with 4.986,500 ^chi naaeely,
38.90 of the total gross Investment-
Along with the two saw mills, the two paper mills were probably of
interest.
No review of the plants.
1. The W o s industries, in contrast to their retail organi-
sations, had no particular importance. The administration comprised
the following Plants t
1. Prasn+ck u. Zsthroiner, . m. b. . , VI* w* XI..
2. "-brtle"
M-lsfabrik Dr
sdubl,e lehw*chst.
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4. $eisse & Co.-, Vienna X.
5, Spiritus-und Presshefe-u Likoerfabrik 10 W'olfrulm? $tadlau.
Siemens irotfabrik, Liebich Is Co., Vienna I=.
7. Oesterr. Unilever, Vienna XXM and XX1.
m &morl
1. Friedrich Xarm Kunstmwtshle, Oailneukirchen u. Alberndorf.
owes Au t e
1. Brucker Zuckerfabrik, Clemens Auer IN., Sruck +eitha.
2. Dr. A. Oetker O N#* Baden.
3. Ing. Walter Schoen, Angern IT.
This made a total of 11 plants with a payroll of 2121 in 1954.
2. As the result of incomplete data it in not possible to give a
rounded picture of these plants' activities. However, it is believed
they did not deliver anything to Russia or to the East Bloc.
The sales rentability was about 23%. Only in the sugar industry
and in the alcohol and brandy production were sales of any importance.
(The Wolfram plant reported sales totaling 259#500#000 schillings
during the QUA tim-ae. In the alcohol and brandy production., 90% of
sales were through XWR , that is to
organisations,
through other A
There were no reviews of plants. As far as the retail organi-
zations of are concerned, there is a report entitled "Special
report on the =A Trade lane,, Wkua, Letex,, Ort. ")
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Xl. t DAMMAM
No hard and fast results have been obtained in the inquiry into
the USIA land and forestry enterprises. The inquiry was begun a short
time ago. It =wst therefore be surmised that the partial results
presented here wil undergo modifications as the inquiry proceeds.
Il v l t is t o
At the and of the war action in 1945 the great eestates, whoa.
owners had fled before the oncoming R ssians, were taken over and
ad inistered by coal missars who were subordinate to the Soviet kfl mmeand$tur.
Following publication of the so-called i rasov Order (*e Wien NEW
v
6 duly 1946) the land to
in the gist occupation zone was
taken over by throe-part divisions which were set up for the purpose.
Land and forestry was, at first;, haphasardly pulled together under the
Estates Direction, the leaders of which were subordinate to a csntgal
office in Vienna. This central office which was called "Less" after
the R *sian initials of its name become a part of USIA adald nistration.
Less tee: Soviet Administration for the Wood Uftstry and Agriculture.
The initial 30-40 estate* directions were gradually tightened up
and finallyo 12 estates directions were formed out of this, The chiefs
were called motors Sen.
Until ea r eere around the end of 1946
saetre on the
to
requisitioned east ate... did pretty coach as they me d . duet went
almost exalusiv*ly to the. occupation troops. With the, feretion and
de volopsesnt of L 4w* the guiding principles of this branch of the planned
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economy was Made to apply to the occupied zone. Within two years the
total ineptitude of the kolkhose methods Imported from Russia became
plain. Nearly all the estates were heavily in debt. Therefore, in
the fall of 1948 the Soviets attempted to lease land to mall farmers
who were being fed with stories by the a about the "land hunger
of the proletariat." But there was little demand for this land and
this obliged the Soviets to try another tack. In the fall of 1949
they tried to get big farmers interested who, according to the Soviet
idea,, were men who could take over parcels of at last 50 hectares or
when possible one entire estate.
From this time on the Soviet directors general United themselves
to supervision of the leased lands and to looking after the forest and
wine lands which in general were not leased out.
In 1951 the RPOe land organisations, working through the Communist
front organization League of Small Farmers, attempted in certain areas
to push the distribution of land to small lessees. This led some
directors general to try to take land away from the bigger lessees
despite their current contracts ate: to give them thus to Party faithful.
Novertheloss, the Soviet policy of leasing the Uvad in large
parcels remained in force up to the
2.
A. f
w* located at `IM 1',
divided Into the following diviSIMM
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_ , _,A t al ief ? His mission was liaison with the cor-
responding ministries in ibscows Liaison with the Chief
of IA; supervision of the 12 directors general.
e'~-
xuawkin (until 1948)
S J rnov ( tr 1953)
Avtayev ( r- end of 1954)
Not sown (until August 1955)
c e sign
the countersigning of
all plans; central bookkeeping for the directors general;
psyment of profits through supplementary understandings
with the plants; calculation office for the plans depart-
ment; drafting of all tasks in the individual plants;
training of the Austrian booleepers,
8tru v (until 1951)
doprativnov (until 19!
luri nev (until August
t of the annual plans
wo,od cutting# seeding the subdivision of the annual
pin into q"rta-ly ones; profit ping-profits could
neither exceed Or t"
of t
180
re out of the amortization
led for by the plan;
be cut.
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Mgrv
Fuschnov (an outstanding technician)
Others unknown
Cotm a Ec ial .9 9s' It was a subdivision of the XZB (Central
Commercial Bureau). Tasks were: liaison with the Soviet
Military Bank; transmission of delivery contracts to the
Director General; determination of production costs, profits,
delivery time, all factors which had to be transmitted to
the Director Oener*li supervision of the internal book-
keeping office.
F v t It. tasks were collaboration with USIA 's
Pe
division in the Trattnerhof j control of the
specialized personnel on the es testes j training Austrian
Communists to handle tractors and to become Overseers and
milkers; establishment of agrarian schools and setting
up training tresses; Ceseestani,st propaganda Ong the workers
yetis on the estates; negotiations with the Austrian
labor unions; admeeinistratton of the F.V.S.R. fund out of
which social benefits were paid for the employees.
aprlr4Pr (Ai tr sm mil
( stream unt
t l
55)
. as
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.eaatael pivasa-i pna Tasks were; determination of what was "German
propertyj" conclusion of leasing contracts; attempt to trans-
for property of requisitioned property to the occupation
authorities] the collection of claims by requisitioned
properties in other Austrian and German occupied zones j
negotiations over frozen bank credits.
P
j
OWLS
Name of the Russian lawyer is not known. Austrian lawyer
was Dr. Siegfried Lehi,,, now in Linz, KPOs member.
Acba nintraetW.1
tion.
Ch ial
Not known.
B. Was gf $
was a subdivision of the U8IA main acdministra-
tion o th WaIll recto jea
The so-called general directorates comprised the agricultural
estates directorships. They were:
Allentstsig (Lower Austria) with the installations;
Ludwig Lassarini
Anton Ma
Zacharias Prank ( dwigothal)
Deutsche Ansiedlutn ess-Uschaft
ches Retch, Rsichsfueeha , (Resettling)
ktsches Reich. A9119
Truppenaebumiaep Sts Doe srsh.tm)
Beer
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Angern - liarkgrafneusiedl (Lower Austria), with installations
Angern
Rohsnauernhardsthal
Dressing.-Bi chhern
Duernkmt
Coburg
J t$an
PUM
Berg
KarkgrafneusLedl
Raasdorf
Vntersiebenbrunn
Lasses
Mruerbach
Qpfenreuth
Bis+ erg
Theresienfeld
Ratseisdorf
gottingbrunn
Qberwalterodorf
Schoenau
Aspang (Lower Austria), with installat.ionss
Aspangerhof and Noenichkirchen
giegersberg
Wiesssth
Qraupsppenfabrik Aspang (Formerly F. Qreinert)
Clewing (Rohr is Qebirge) (Lower Austria), with it allstionsx
Clewing (Gut wegscheidhof) Ballestree
Vrg*rsbach 3isengewerkschatt Raysrbach.e rsu
Risvnstadt (genland)
This Soviet general directorship coisprised the estates of the
gungarian citizen Prince Ztterh"sy. The Soviets took the standpoint
that the Prince had been dispossessed by the Hungarian
Republic and that therefore his property in Austria sat be considered
as being psrian state property. Although the Austrian government
did not r ecegnise this Soviet point of view, the $Ovi*ts requisitioned
the Rsterhaasy estates with the initial excuse that they were necessary
to ensure the supply of food for the Soviet troops in Austria. Later
they maintained that the property belonged to the Hungarian state and
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that any profits should be paid over to the Hungarians. Q..tr inquiry
into this coaplex is just beginning.
Brnstbrunn (Lower Austria)* with installationst
y'uerst Reuss i Doaaeme Ernatbrunn
Deutsche Anaiedlingsgesellschaft
Ladendort
$i.derleis
]thhof, Q.a.b
Qaresanna and Aaparn aya (istat. directorship Ratibor)
Gaming (Lower Austria), with the installationst
Seuaenst.in-h.ithof
$alerberg
Auhof
Ateinwandleiten
Tannel.
Yoeltendoerf (drill place
Dingelberg
G tettenhof
Horghof
Gine.lberg
ansau
ein-ftechlarn
Qiselhot
1slheia
*hierhoefen
Ob.rhof
sgerhof
gcharerhot
Zie lhof
Ktnterhah
3erging
Weissenburg un d Plankenstei n
Nor.
Lshenhof
Grrafenegg (Lower Austria), with
Grafenogg
fineiue-rf
Laengenfeld
Greinburg (tin a.d+
Porstbrie iert
Neot~btterskhof
18k
tallationit
furcher
Tu rborg
Austria),, with the ins tallation e s
Raiff
Re allor etrg
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Arndorf
Planke nstein
IItttsx arnsdorf
lsrlstetten
Bagenberg
Irkt lis (enland), with the following installations:
Deutsche Ansiedlingsgaselisahsit,
with the estates t
Bujahof
3Itrkt Rodin
Xohfidisch
Pinkiafeid and Grafenschachsn
Unte schuetzen
Rauchsart
Woifau
Goberiing
gtefanshaf
Zu berbach
Qestsrreichischs Bundosforate with:
fts!~Vx"Is
Alt Nodis
Pinkafold
Ooberling
Rorsdort
Prinz P riz von Bayern (Ouster X11 and Bildsin)
'ennersdorf (Walter wing)
*srksnstein (lxawer Austria), with nations,
3 srk nstein (fox tr3,y p AM
Oestsrrsichiaohs nd?sforrts
Lrendert - ,th (Out XI*In4 ,rtasca12 )
Wangg"ky (Out girc hatsig)
3 r a-hof ( Arens Riadi
A.
1Re1#3bis" mm..leer de$ge s~slevsr }tong i
$ssg.werk r (koilsn t)
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Pronsburg (Lower Austria),, with the installationsa
Irons burg
S'attau
Zogelsdorf
Walkenstein (at that time estate of the Geram Stift)
As the above shows the Soviet general directorships were regional
conglomerations of estates, forestry enterprises or
The general directorship was
ed vainly of the director
general who was always a Soviet guasian. NO was appointed or dis-
charged by the chief of the Less main administration. After the year
1950 the Soviet general directors were usually specialists, like
Director General Antonov of Anspang, and undoubtedly cote from the
Moscow *inistry of Agriculture or like the General Director of
Zrnstbrunn (name unknown) who was the former chief of a big Sovkhose
in the Ukraine. Tice second most important man was the chief book-
keeper who nearly always was an Austrian. He was Bequently the book-
keeper of the biggest estate. Qmart*r or half yearly he was given
five-day courses at the less main bookkeeping department.
to that the two could understand each other there was usually an
interpreter, usually the citizen of a southeastern state.
As has already been said the present state of the inquiry into
this branch does not enable us to sad' a great deal about the Soviet
concept of it.
rk has yet been done on Wien Blot because of the lack of
time.
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Reearks on the sales, rentability and investment policy of Wien
Film may be found on pages 36 to 40 of the report "Preliminary report
an the exploitation of the statistical questionnaires for USIA
Plantso" of November 1957.
Fourth Section,
Nip until 1938 the shares of the first Danube Shipping Company were
split up as followsa
26.173% belonged to the Austrian State
24.54+# it Creditanatalt-Dankverein
0.762% various Austrian ownership
46.296% private Italian or banking ownership
0.028% various German ownership
As a result of the events of 1938 the part belonging to the
Austrian State was taken over by the Ger Reich while the parts bs--
longing to the Creditanstalt and to the Italians were bought by A4
Hermann Goering-Reichaewerks. The result was that by 1939 the
Reiahswerke was in pos ossion, for all practical pur es,r of 99.675%
of the shares. The situation
unchanged until war a a end.
After the end of the war the DIG was carried on by a state-appointed
director, fir, who had been Viral Director of DIC All along.
h 19the Soviets took over control of the shipping and
docks in their acne and until June 1945 rain their buses from the
building of the D, h
187
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difference of opinion between the two occupying powers, the Soviets
left the DSC building and built their own in the second district,
at Tabarstrasse 2 4a,.the Soviet Administration of the First Danube
Shipping Company.
The port Installations,, the wharf at Korneuberg and all available
E
shipping we~placed under this administration. For all practical
purposes this meant that the J AC was in Soviet hands. The building
of the General Directorship and a few employees rem,i. in Western
hands as a symbolic remainder,
the most important part of DU was the wharf at Z,orneub.u g. For
the history of this enterprise see "Report on the First Danube Shipping
Company, Ships Wharf g" of August 1957 and
pages 1-2 of the
"Complementary Report on the First Danube Shipping Companys Ships Wharf
Zornsuburg" of October 1957.
it. Or *niz tion a. r M&
1.
At the end of the war Soviet navy men occupied the Zorneub crg wharf
and took over its nistratiot and administration of materiel.
Personalities s
Capt. 8isenberg
Other mates unknown
The Soviet directors of the Sbrneuburg shipyard weres
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Aoreky (until As uet 1945)
Sedich (until Jay 1947)
(until October 1949)
Mstov (until larch 1950)
Kizetyov (antil beeaea r 1954)
IftInikow (until June 1955)
Ossipov (until August 1955)
Purtheer details may be found on pages 9-11 of le ntary
Report on the Fist Danube Shipping Co many, p s I+orneubarg,"
of October 1957.
Ut. MM it Co:. Within Soiiee c Lion
1, t tod ti.on gjf v eat-omits r~
!"ollorring the occupation of the Iornet irg shipyard in April 1945
by the Soviets most of the tools, apparatus and materiel was carted
off to Russia as war booty. Soventy-one percent of the araachine park
wan dismantled and taken away. at already by the and of 1945 the
Soviet wharf directors attested to crake good the arrachin a park., to
increase the naWaer of workers and to push repairs on the ships that
had been raised from the bed of the
Already at the beginning of 1906 the Soviets began unofficial con--
veersations with various Austrian officials in order to bring about the
tranartruation of the C into a nixed Soviet-Austrian cant'. In
similar fashion the Soviets tried to interest the Auat~ in a Sov -
llaphta compow for the exploitation and developmnt of Austrian oil.
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Since the beginning of 1946 the Soviets carried on talks with
the Austrians in order to obtain their agreeawm t to the transformation
of the DSC Into a Soviet-Austrian DS+C. originally proposed a 5,1
percent Soviet participation with the Au. tr3 r holding the r iding
49 percent. During the coume of the talks it later bee plain that
the Russians w d be content with a 50 percent participation if the
Austrians would agioee to the n+t inat of a Russian Director Generl.
The Austrians turned all these Proposals down with the objection
that the DSC an well as the Austrian oil wells had already been earmarked
for natlonalixation and that therefore
t be regarded as prac-
tically nationalized and that for this reason there me no question of
them-being turned aver to other, ccapitalistic interests.
It may ther*fore be concluded that the formation d' this Soviet
cam( had the objective of creating a fictitious,, Independent
partner visa via the DISC an
as the question of participation had
been cleared up. This method had resulted in Hungary# Bulgariap Romania
and even in Yugoslavia in the formation of mixed des. One there-
fore cows to the conclusion that the formation of a Soviet state
company with national divisions and residing on a legal basis with the
inclusion of Austria had as ultimate objective the placing of all Danube
trade from V1,11"* Under Soviet control.
j1pap
2. DSC and Jas chtx s ier
l i
The Soviet administration of DSC so= entered into close collabora-
tion with Juschwneschtrans, although the date is not k mom, It uas
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probably in 1947. With the conjunction of this transport firm, the soviet
ministration of NC became a unified Soviet transport enterprise in Aus-
tria, In practice it MRS a wpvly transport enterprise for all the
USIA enterprises. 1 r+eaW Juschwneschtrsn took came of land trans-
port, including connections with he airporlmp, the fC was charged With
the mass transport of Booty by water.
Collaboration between the Soviet t .igneas, Juscschtran,
and the DSC made three things possible. One was the keeping secret of
the movement of merchandise, the other the frictionles. transit of
merchandise of different Soviet firsts and also, in collaboration with
the militaarry, the siphoning off of customs dudes and allied taxes.
Par further details concerning the tasks of Jusebwnioschtrans in
collaboration with D8Cq see Chapter II of Section five, entitled
"Trade and Transport in the Soviet Occupation Eco ay. "
3. a Xk)U iet Pout on 2M RNM-ft-
After the failure of the plans to make out of the D SC a mixed
Soviet-Austrian company* the Rt ssia e, beginning In 1949, increased
their efforts to make the DSC more and more responsive to the require-
sents of Soviet shipping and of Soviet economy in general. These plans
are closely connected with the idea of' trap rming the Iorteuburg
shipyard into a going concern.
Eiselyov was made Soviet yard director. He was an experienced
technician in this field with 30 years of endeavor behind him in Soviet
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shipyards. Under him not only were new methods of warkIng and building
introduced but he also brought in a reconstruction plan, complete in
all details and which would have required the expenditure of about
133,000,000 schillinge . ' e pages 14 and 15 of the "Coollipl tart'
Report on the DRC, Korneuburg ipyard," of October 1957.)
As this October report says, the plan pointed to the necessity for
the development of the Zorneuburg yard in the following word!t
"Creation of greater production possibilities in order to cover the
increasing need for shipping of the Soviet shipping ocs s es on the
Dandbe "
Such a statement can only be made by a man sent from Macaw if he
is certain that at least in the mind of his Ministry the inapression
exists that Austria would not be given up by the occupation authorities
in the foreseeable future.
Such a long-term plan would only have made some if a long occupa-
tion, or even permanent possession, were intended.
We were not able to discover why the plan cams to nought. It has
also not been possible to find out unequivocably whether the construc-
tion work done In 1953 and 1954 at a cost of 16#000,000 schillings was
in fact a first part in the execution of this plan. (See page 21 of
"Report on the DSC, Korn burg Shipyard," of August 1957.)
IV. &MOY of is ROM ME the -t. Ec o
Reliable doc=tentation concerning the services rendered during the
Soviet occupation were only found at the Eorrneuburg shipyard. A list
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has been reconstructed frcaat a current shipping register. According to
it from Iby 1945 to 12 August 1955 the following were delivered or
serviced s
ft man
9 goods barges of 1,000 tow each
18 lighters of 250 tons each. Riveted (SL 411)
40 lights" of 1,000 ,awls each, Riveted. (SL 638)
9 floating pile drivers
1 motor ship (I Polt a at) . Thu ship was handed back by the
Russians after signature of the State Treaty under the now
of "ior eubu g. "
5 motor tugs
4 steam tags
T tankers
35 S _ _.J des
4 special ships (floating doer, repair and M A9 ships)
lWa rs 111MM and wi z
32 motor ships
.1 *team tugs
50 tankers
32 goods barges
1 crane ship
We calculated all this, work to be worth 50,000,000 schi.llings at
a mid. A ma xin a- figure would be 100,000,000 schi.llings. (See
"Complementary Report on the DSC, Shipyard Iorneuburg," October 195T.)
To this at be added all those damages which cannot be calculated.
Such demsge would include the loss of the entire fleet of ships of the
IC and through it the lows of a leading role in the Danube trade.
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This is a loss that Austria can only make good after a return to
noz 1ity of trade relations with the satellite states.
bat this c rOge is little when compared with those suffered by the
xorneuburg yard internal construction methods were changed to
produce ocean-going ships for the new market.
am Section.
TRADE AM IRMM T8 ' " ` OC FA
I. CMILtion 10 Dnelg - t of ee and t ties
The acquisition and development of extensive s rces of production
in Austria presented the Soviets with the task of creating trade and
freighting organizations.
However, in this field it was not possible for these to proceed
according to a pattern based on domestic Soviet methods. Although the
Soviets were at painws to extend their production, planning and finaneft
methods to Austria, they were constrained, however, In the fields of
E,vc1-AVr
trade and transport to take into account that their economic ao3seeeea
lay in the area of a free economy.
First off, they had to handle problem which arose at the end of
the war Ong a population which was in a state of deprivation. The
most basic tools of production particularly those mada of leather or
textiles (such as driving belts) were lacking. The Mount of food that
could be given the population was so a all-only 1,000 calories a day
in the early sonthe--that regular and productive work could only be
demanded of theses when the essentials in commodities and cloth" had
been provided.
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The requirements in food and e r itient of the Soviet troops in
Austria also had to be
since goods
Russia.
. This eat the took more difficult
in Auatrs&
ad to supply Soviet troops in
In order to to ar care of these deems the following economic
bodies were formed:
The first, in spring 1945,
to otshem -Klan ramie t
rurchasing and Trade Office) set up to supply the a r+ xtor rs (ailiftry
stores).
In 1946 race set up the ft2anum is v
(Conaalaer Cooperative of Soviet Imp yeas in Austria). It supplied all.
People working for Soviet official and +econ is offices.
by Deus which,, hmwer, was headed by two
Austriraras, Dire Dubik and Sehlsch act.. (See our "Special report on
Cc a mist Trade Pirm Intrac, " of 1957 and "Xote* on two conversa-
tions with Dr. D on 23 and 27 ftyauber 1957.")
Letter, Latex and Woes asst ! trade functions which at the end of
1951 were handed over to Ort. Rezimpes worked for a abort tim in this
field in 1953 and 1954.
Particularly noteworthy are Intrac and the other Commist Party
enterprises, most of which were fow dad in 1948 although the" were am*,
in ex ste ncee in 1946.
Theme Gc~serenist fie aqs occupy as special plane in the real= of Soviet
o is entities inaaamch as they were not directed by Soviet amthorities?
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but by the Central COMMittee of the UOe. As a result, when the
Soviet occupation troops left, the fires were not di lvead, but con-
tinue to exist although under modified conditions.
With these exceptions, all other above-mentioned Soviet trade
organizations were liquidated at the end of the occupation.
The freighting complex presents a similar picture.
Here, we have Juschwneschtrans a41 transport and freight agent
concern dependent on Moscow. This was founded in 1946 as the'austrian
branch" of the Soviet company with the same name. It was liquidated
when the Soviet troops left.
The Party firm "Express" and international freight agent company
which had its beginning in 194u and was founded in 1947 or *arch 1948.
This firm remained in existence after the departure of the troops.
(See our "Special Report on Coomunist firms and personalities, Polcarbon,
Martin Maimann, Turuoel, Express, Kraus & Co., Wagner & Co." of
September 1957.)
II. Trade in the Occupation Economy
1. The Soviet State trade o cations and firms
Before the foundation proper of Soviet trade fires the trading
function within the Soviet military apparatus was carried on by
Zatupotshnavya T!orgovlaLva gContora (ZTiO which supplied the Yovenntorgs.
(See our report "Notes on two conversations with Dr. D. on 23 and 27
November 1957.") The Voyenntorg was located in a house on the
Kaerntnerring and had its offices on the second floor. It sold consumer
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goods of all kinds only to Soviet service personnel. 9oyenntorg bought,
in part, the necessary merchandise with schillifts on the Austrian
market.'
For the greater part,, purchases were, however, made through the
Z31 which was located in Vienna IT, 1'sniglgaaae. The chief was Captain
Sakhlennkov.
When possible, this office bought merchandise on the open Austrian
market that was need, by the Soviet troops in Austria. aver, since
the supply was greater than the deman t, it increased its purchasing
activities and began to supply troops stationed in IRussia, whose needs
were mie known through liaison officers. Since here was an opportunity
to purchase not only ccnsuser goods but also machines, finished products,
non-ferrous metals and raw materials, it was not long before all the
Moscow ministries were making use of Z to purchase items that were
in short
upply.
Officially, the ZTi was only allowed to make purchases in Austria,
but it nevertheless used middlemen to make purchases in the West,
particularly stored supplies including abandoned W.hrmacht supplies.
Payment was made in schillings which were made available by the
Austrian government as occupation costs. According to our sources, not
only goods but also hard currency, particularly dollars, were also
bought. At the beginning most of the business was on the black market
in which money was handed over for goods. Our sources believe that the
purchases totaled one billion achillings.
But with the first development and consolidation of the Austrian
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ecoymW the supply became smaller and they had to turn their thoughts
to the development of economically sound trading firm.
With the development of Soviet production entities there were two
problems that had to be solved. They were:
1. Now to supply those plants which were united in =1A, S M and
the other corporations with short ply comsodities in leather and
textiles as well as with other accessories and seem of production.
2. Now to supply those employed in these firms with food, clothes
and other csraesr ids In the face of the dearth then 'prevailing.
It was natal that the satisfaction of these seeds should have
been turned over to Letex and Una. An attawept was also made to build
up an independent distribution mechanism., destined to bring the mer-
chandise directly to the cons tr. '!twits mechanism was the , Weratiya
Consweuser Cooperative of Soviet Seployees
in Austria). (See our report "lutes on two conversations with Dr. D.
on 23 and 27 November 1957.11 )
These organizations were
of ipfIA and were under the orders of
the central office in tcow, particularly 't$1. We were not able to
determine what part, if any, the Moscow Trade Ministry, played herein.
Inquiries into this aspect of affairs was rendered particularly
difficult--this includes Art and Deli x---because when the occupation
troops left they were completely liquidated and left no successor
organizations. This was in contrast to tIA which remained in being
although the Soviet personnel disappeared.
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r
Latex had the task to procure the necessary textiles and leather
goods needed by USIA and SM. They were to be proem ed if possible
from Other MIA concerns and distributed asong the MU administrations.
Latex also had the task t procure the eqvdLpmnt and raw material needed
in USIA light industry that MIA did not produce itself from other
areas of the Austrian economy or from the Past Bloc or the on a
barter basis.
As we have seen Degs was an element in the Austrian economy until
1948. Degas took care of the distribution of those Commodities which
MIA light industry could deliver to the Austrian market. This was
done partly in collaboration with the "try of Trade. It also had
the task of procuring those aids to production and raw materials on the
Austrian market necessary for the development of MIA production.
After Dr. Dubik and Schtschka were arrested Letex carried on these
activities itself and tried to set up a barter arrangement with the
west. Prom the very beginning Latex itself took care of trade with the
Boat Bloc and the #SR.
Latex attempted to solve the second of its problems through the
establishment of stores in the plants and of public stores. This gave
rise to the so-culled Soviet Consumer Stores which were partly run by
the USIA subsidiary "mod Industries?" and by Wkus. Vkgs also opened
up retail stores of its own and also leased stores through Bezimpex.
However, finally all these attempts led to the creation of a uni-
fication of the retail stores through Ort, a division of USIA.
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o 30-1-12t MAU e in 4
Ort, a Division of lal, was founded at the end of 1951. It way
located at Yiearea IV, Argentinierstrasse 26.
tart means retail trade and is formed frtou the initials of the
Russian words a Rotndasty- n v , At its head stood
a Russian director general. (See our "gpeciael report on W BU Trading
Firs, Wkus, Latex, Ort according to documents of the years 1950 to
1955" of June 1957,) in this report we gave the addresses of 100 Ort
s torees .
Thus, out of the modest beginning when the object was to supply
Soviet troops with hard-to-got commodities there grew a giant concern.
Its stores, like those of the West# had practically everything for sale,
food, carpets, radios, perms etc.
The good longer case exclusively from =U plants, but partly
from the Soviet Zone, from the Seat 21ft: and (rare the West.
Prices were about half what they wa6" in Austrian stores. The
reason for this was that tart paid no taxes of any kind, no custom dams
and transport was frequently effected by the occupation forces. Further-
more# the stores themselves were often requisitioned and so there was
no rent to pay. One nut also take into consideration the fact that a
great part of the commodities
from the last Bloc and the Soviet
Union where merchandise has no price tag an it in our western some of
the word. The main profit for the Soviet economy lay therein that the
goods were paid for in Austrian achillings which could, in part, be
exchanged for western currency.
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According to our est1nates, during the time of the occupation
the Soviets had a turnover of eight to 10 billion schillings in these
stores; this corresponds to a net profit of about 2 billion achi.llings.
Iaweever, this is a rough estiaaete and is not backed up by figures. It
was therefore not included in our earlier estl to of the over-all
Soviet profit =de in Austria.
Hut, in addition to these finsncia, advantages there we others
that the Soviets drew fr?n their activities in this field.
1. larch andise which normally would not have been exported was
sold at retail prices against ;chill nga. Por theme sc .l..ings the
Soviets and the Mast Salon could procure important coneodities and even
procure currency on the nuimt, which again in turn could be used
to Purchase, hard-to-get amities.
2. There
political and propagandistic advantages t
fte sale of merchandise cheaply in the stores at a time when
things were hard to come by awakened the impress; ion that
the Soviet economic ctaat was better than that of the free
b) 7to V- stores served directly as propagawa offices for
the Me. There, signatures for cover Cane ist organiza-
tions (Peace COGncil, etc.) were obtained and for other
purpose" such as the protest against use of the aton bomb.
) Damage was
1geols merchants by the Soviet
storee. This signified not only a weakening of the political
enemy' but also softened threat up for Coaeeuni*t propaganda.
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d) Through theme stores it was also possible to give support
to the KPOe by giving ambers and fellow travelers well-
paid jobs in
In addition to all these advantages, there was also the damage
done the Austrian State which was deprived of taxes, custom dues, etc.
It also hurt the State through the creation of an unsupervised sector
of the econamsy and through the resulting atmosphere of uncertainty.
2. PM c
the t
In order to deal with the problems of trade wader the occupation
the Soviets not only made use of the, above-described organizations such
as Deg+os, tex, Waus and tart, but they created entirely different ones.
In our Special Reports from My to October 1957 we went into detail con-
cernirag Intrac and the Comswgnist Party firm. These firms were directly
dependent on the Pore. As far as the law was concerned they were direc-
ted by front m of the Central Committee but in fact they were owned
by the KPOe and served the financial, economic and political Ems of the
Com .mist Party.
It should be noted be" just like the Z, firm the Communist
Party ones were In the-
in )Ss cow and that
Our reseorch
ted from a central location
the Com nform and its successor organizations.
that the leading personals sties in Intrac
and the other Communist Party firms not only were in direct contact
with the Economic Division of the E e ?.S but also with the Cominform.
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An analysis of the activities of the Cc mist Parties of other
countries shows they were--like the 043e-forward positions of diet
policy, econaepr and information gathering. They were directed by the
Ceti nfors and by its cover or risatlo , partly with the aid of the
!Ministry of foreign Affairs. The central direction was thus through
the ,7ZCPSU.
While the A firms were in the last
is directed by the
Nosc ow ministrieeso the Party fires were directed by a central post
of the CPSV In Moscow.
Although in theory this would not appear to make a great difference,
in practice such differences are not to be undereestierateed. It should
be noted in particular that the fir in general were directed by
Soviet Russians whereas the chiefs of the XW* fires were meetly of
Austrian origin and spoke German even if they had spent a long time in
J scow or had paraded
work abroad for the Cosinf rs.
We have described how the ftesians used Degos to ^ake their first
contacts with the Austrian economy. Aeegc was a firm directed by
Austrians but who were nevertheless izreediateely dependent mean the RRZA
Light Itd# - Administration.
From 1948 on, the KPOe and the C central bureaus sees[ to have
come to an agreement in accordance with which the greater part of intor-
national trade and also a part of the Intrac transport work was re s,*rveed
for the Cist Party firmer and for Express..
Retail trade was entirely in the hands of U. A part of the
eastern trade and above all the supplying of t$i enterprises with raw
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materials and other necessities me to the hands of Latex, which like
Wkus, did not have to occupy itself with retail trade. The greetter
part of the International trade, particularly the barter with the free
world, was the work of Intrac and of the Communist Party firm.
Proas May through October 1957 we presented detailed reports on
these firms, giving concrete examples of their business, descriptions
of the leading man and of their connections with each other.
Our analysis shower that the Blast Bloc was supplied by the Communist
Party firms with important strategic materials such as wood, non-ferrous
metals and ball bearings. It is also clear that the Bast Bloc used
these firm to market those goods which normally would not be exported
and which could not be paid for in schillings or in hard currency.
Theme items were such things as Halton tobacco, Hungarian fowl and
fruit, etc.
A further task of these firms tsaea to spin a network of hidden con-
nections with the Free Worms economy. Although unable to analyze fully
those Co-"list firms which had their seat in Austria we nevertheless
had been able to give the names of corresponding firms in western
countries. One may suppose that they had the same duties as the Cc.-
mat firms NO and used the sense methods. There is no doubt that it
f.:
was a matter of a world-wide not of C ist-orient.d firms with
various connections with their native Communist Party and with Moscow.
They remain to be examined.
Through use of the foreign connections it was also possible to
sell a lot of merchandise in the West against currency. Chief among
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these activities was the scrap trade which brought in millions of
dollars.
That is $ brief outline of the epic task* that Intrao and the
C+ iat Party fires carried out in the interests of the Soviet ion
and, V Blast Bloc. The executiesar of these tasks
greatly facilitated
during the occation by the fact that the frontiers with CND asei
s'y more held by Soviet soldiers.. There was thus no such thing am
an Austrian cuastons service between these countries.
ohm the troops aided these firms and
reports
dark business and no atten-
tion was paid to taxes and deiees, or to the state holy on spirits
and tobacco. This went so far that the mist Party firms sometimes
engaged in black market operations in tobacco, textiles and other pro-
ducts and used rods that were guarded by the Sovietas so that the
Austrian police could not Intervene. (Bes our "Special Report on the
Crier t Trading Firms, "c# etc. on i 19W.")
The direct final i l objective of Intrun and the other Camsudat
Me to reinforce financially the Blue. As our reports show the
sonny was handed over to the
donations.
her directly or in the form of
An indirect contribution to the Oft was also the employment of a
number of Cadre son as confidential clertas, sleeping partners and
company mesrhers, eto.,, as well as giving app oyaent to Party members
and their hangers-on. We have absolute proof that the greater part
of the minor employees and workers of thaw firs were members of the
ROe and took part in Com unist and moist-friendly organizations.
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I"! Ci . 1 fi111010 411111110 i sd' Pakdy~" tuned'
Ui I" In'saime `` cif wft able to that t, pas
such sus ltram t '# W4m.r A s 4d , ae- amd-' otb s
intel
Allies =' gatl> s vitae Or dodlmesfget of *ieit we
havep svrat l tdart "to examine thorougl s indicates the nMM of leading
peersaretlit aa~e .bsi a sd hall 1 seacht eeffalre. Wnmv*r,
ssnr salt wrier WbW&' that three isdieatia are? : to" LOW rrt . than
the aetsel *atttriti xer and Omm, - "'I sarsir as that ?-*11 f st firm
the- in 4"18M ; #s .
1Nid a fells' f"fsrs the IVWt .
drat- these !iris trees bOW& d vP by 1ple w had be elslrpbdt to the
or t* the W Effie s
is war rhi1* to note the number of firm which increased their
cover in "teas' to maim saav.il base by the Vest mom diffie :t. Also
>miieeeorthy In t/bwr: rs ativ l1 saa IL ? rtr of lerad#ng? peveo=L114te0 -whose
rissres aftear, is the west direpa~rse er pests :I& them fires am, again.
It is isportast that two- M" bit abler to obtalnw the mom of
asst of an paream who MW* Samuel
tlrr 3st tart
1n the, bac is : the iblt+s .lrar 46"M *1 of 'th EQs,
FIND rabsrg hiarsaelt. Farther t re is his deter Ernestine and his
brott -is- #ir ,J* Xmm: +le tsskj ?'! were &U 'r is r dam- the
INV and are -to be _a!argarded ad, tvalttsd ` lssdig Comm. atat ass ti oalardes .
W also see that the above-mentioned party firms and the Soviet
economic tm.tsllatioaw in is trla '- -tste4- and a pas'
Yt+.n e by the selection ;of the top tears. To this circle belonged
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Dr. Heinrich lagler, a top O minform functionary, Paul Kessler,, of the
KBOe ZK. Other members are US. Eduard Gold 0 who was also in lbee ow
during the emigration, Stefan gamin., Ernst paterst, Dr. Albert Brans,
Robert Bondi, Peter iselmanna lart Bettelheist, Ignaz Slum, David Kowa
and Martin Naim ann .
All these persons were in the "migration*" most of then in
England, some in Switzerland, like Dr. Albert Kraus, or in Belgiu*,
like Peter ibiselaestnn. This is an internationally trained staff of
Coo munist economic experts who with expertness, initiative and discipline
serve the KPOe or the Cominfarm in the solution of economic problem.
In some cases they fall victim to temptation or corruption as was true
of Ernst Liebling.
In addition, there is a series of younger people who were used for
the more dangerous and mostly illy tasks of Express Co., such as
Kurt Pried, Erich Herzl, Bans Joachim der and Carl (Chaim) Faber.
It is to be noted that Fried, Berm and ltlamper served in the
English army and while they were in 'Vienna going about their Communist
economic work they were still wearing the British uniform and having
contact with the British military,
All these people had their special knowledge and their special
tasks and worked usually undisturbed together. We hear little of any
personality clashes.
In s==try it may be said that Intrac and the Costnist firms had
the following objectives:
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direct and indirect financial Ad to the KM*;
provide a liaison and
Lt
?rvice;
to further the economic interests of the Soviet Union and
those of the Bast Bloc through the procurement of important
raw materials and goods in short supply. This could be done
through the sale of surplus merchandise and the acquisition
of foreign currenc:
M. Qrg satioa and i s of
Like the trade aechan
in system was divided into
two. parts t the Soviet *"ten and that of the ZPOe ntrolled firms.
Develbpaent and activity is exactly the same as described in
Chapter II above and will not be repeated here.
In our month of lily report we wrote in detailed fashion about the
Transport and Freight Agency JuSc chtrsns, Ivan Pppoff, Vienna IV,
Wohllebengasse 8. At the same time our "Spacial
on the Communist
Firms and Personalities, Pol ce,.I rtin faimann, del, Uprose,
XZIM & Co. and Wagner & Co. on September 1957,v" on pagers 31-8? gives
a detailed account of the Express Cam, Internati,o Freight Agents
G.m.b.I., Vienna I, Wohllebengasse 18.
companies had the mission to expedite the transport of
Merchandise within the framework of the mist econanic system.
The system had financial advantages since owning their own companies
made it possible to pay profits into the Communist circuit.
In addition, they wanted to set up their own companies so that
dest#tions and corer
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This was achieved
he very careful screening of all personnel
from a Comas -istic point of view. In addition, the producing firms did
not have to pack the merchandise and put the labels on it and the trans-
port was carried out
Such freighting companies Were of
and
1 importance to the
Soviets because the greater part of the goods ordered by the and
the Zest Bloc was sent by rail. The Danube Shipping Co. did not for-
ward such during the early =u period become of a l k of shipping.
Juschwnftchtrans Worked in conjunction with the military authorities
in procuring means of transport. If there were not enough transport
available, the military requisitioned it "for military pies."
As reported in our "Special Report on transport and freight office
Juschwneschtrans, Ivan Popoff, *to.". Juschw chtrana and Express
pos ewd a virtual ao-nopoly over all transport by lAnA,, whether by road
or rail,, and also order Soviet and Satellite lines feeding aviation termi.-
Ju schwneschtrans had its own transport office in each major 4XA
firm. Their offices were everywhere directed by Russians. This also
aided the abovee-meentiod
Y- This .xp1*ins why for years the
production engineers in plants did not krww where their merchandise
was going.. Even the shipment of spare parts was organizd in the sere
fashion.
This method of transport was one of the main roanow why the extent
of trade with the East Bloc and
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throughout the years and also the reason why information services were
not able to track the dispatch of strategic materials to the Soviet
Juschwmeschtra ns also had its own division within the DSO. (See
Fh h Section.) It was may to keep the destination of merchandise
going by water secret because the shipyards could only be entered
by Austrians carrying special posses.
It must also be noted that Jus4hwneschtrans and Saps were estab-
lished to by-pow the Austriaan costemm regulations. Jtastchwne achtrans
had the protection of the Soviet Oc pation authority and was thus able
to by-pass the Austrian custom whenever desired.
Jucsc .chtrans made use of this possibility, not only when it was
Justified as it was in the case of merchandise needed by the Soviet
troops in Austria, but also in the case of shipments serving the
interests of USIA and of the Communist party firm.
There was, for ins
of the 1950 shipment of 10,000
kilogram of copper to angry. There was also the case of ball bearings
and scrap metal in the value of 1,,,000 schiilia which were also
sent to wry through the intermediary of Juschwheschtrana and
Express, in which the customm, authorities were by-psasted.
As mentioned above, Austrians had no access to the shipping stations
or to the Soviet airport at Voes t- ttingbrunn. As a result by-passing
the Austrian custom authorities became a regular thing and even in
April 1956 10,000 liters of spirit were snuggled by Express out of
Austria into CO.
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great role
and one of the beta
bok
official trade of the?t d Cast trading fires crir,. the,
occupation.
IT. Final MUM
result of
w+e3~l ~t
role in
:. trawut,.: prod, nrta8'
schillinga. Without them the So
thinkable and they
had
epic system in Austria is un-
of forming liaison and bridge-hewed
teas between Bast and West. Of special importance was Int:
role of financing the BDft
courier services.
in its
financing of the Intelligence and
for the pat f '#.c i - and
In contrast to the other parts of the Soviet economic system in
Austria the organization of the trade sector could not be organised
in accordance with strict domestic -viet regulations. Instead, they
had to find solutions which were not patterned on the d stic Soviet
system which could be adapted to conditions.
In known that similar establiskvents exist in different west
European and Asiatic countries. ?hey have the
same objectives.
The special conditions pp
find special solutions. Such were:
The organization of the retail star
which united the re
methods and the
n Austria snide it necessary to
through Art
division of uSIA)
dyatew of Latex and W us and which also included
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-4
the ll o ty et tr and BezlmWex.
The partial subtraction of international trade front Letex which
apart frost its branch adarinistration function was sajnly concerned with
supplying SIA plants with necessary raw arste ria is originating in the
asst.
Finally, the foundation and development of lntrac and the C g anist
Party firms as economic organizations of the SFOe. Their had under theea
the trade with Boat and West insofar as it was not handled by Intrae.
#AM 300%&m.
TSB sacm Worm'
Motet The following chapter is based on our "Special Report on
the Soviet lq.litary Hank, No. 2111," on the "Report on the conversations
of 27, 28 June and 2 and V3 July 1957, on the indications given by the
forager level councillor of SBXA as contained in The Report on the Con-
versation of 2 October 1956" and on
organization.
of the Soviet credit
1. $i..'~.t"q' a L
1.d,tr the
According to the "Report on the Conversation of 2 October 195b,"
page 9. Soviet field bank No. 80 was transformed into S.B. No. 2111.
This bank was probably I+ town originally as "MM Field Bank ft. 2111
(Oee Report. page 15). Probably only in the course of 1946 was the
names "1lilitary ftnk of the Soviet Union No. 2111," adopted. This remained
unchanged throughout the occupation.
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The seat of the was originally located at Viz t, Graf
8tarhaa tberggssse '4-$, the same address as the UM Administration and
was moved to Vienna I#
probably in connection with the grove
of A to that address.
The original capital of the bank was probably about 534,000,004
Reichsmark,. This money was taken as booty from the B tchebank offices
in Vienna and the auxiliary offices in Graz and I oben. Other meanies
came frca the Ccap rcia1 Banks in Vienna and lAw" Austria.. It is pos-
sible that allied military achillirgs were also at the bank's die
The capital also probably cc its d some of the money that was paid the
Soviets as occupation costs. (In December 1945 alone this was 900000,,000
schillings.) (See O Report, pages 12 and 13 ff . )
2. Di .1142191an in 1215.
The dissolution of the S M in 1955 presented no difficulties after
the Austrian Control Bank took over S M's credits and after clearing up
the "current accounts."
On hand-over day, 16 July 1955,, the 3 's outstanding credits
totaled 762,887,874,48 schillings and were paid by the Control Bank
in the amount of 508,900,000 sehilli s in two installments. Details
on the liquidation of the S are to be found in our report (page 30 ffj.
II. 49s atitsa
1.
i
arectp
90
According to our "Study on the Soviet Cred
(page 1) and to
Organisation"
rt (p 4) the Soviet field banks were
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branches of the Soviet State flank. It is probable that the Soviet
State ink gave theB its capital.
The important reports and balance sheets of the SNBo the accounts
of Qosbank and of the satellite state banks as well as the military
accounts were all in the hands of Soviet personnel, so that nothing
said about then.
2. Relationship to
our sources report that the Sl!IB was not subordir*te to the 4IA
Administration. It is certain? however, that the Planning to determine
the amount of investment and plant credits of USIA, S1f, DSC and
Wien-Film was done within the i rk of lbs
over-all plan. in
this manner, the according of credits was within the competence of the
Rank while investment credits could only be accorded by the Administra-
tions.
3. Raeelati onshi to other OCLUAI.1129 ti ti
The organization of the bookkeeping of the branch administrations
of MIA and of the other organisa
in relationship to the adminie-
tration of the Soviet assets in Austria tends to show a close cooperation
between S1 and USIA. IIDat of these relationships are discussed in
Point M.
.t_jtaip
stttutio:
Originally the intention was to incorporate the SNB into a banking
system under the Austrian banking
and also through the acqui-
sition of a banking concession (Breiabach & Co.) thereby fitting it
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into Austrian legal and economic form. (See "Report to the Conversation
of 2 October 1955" with Dr. It. who was the legal councillor of USIA up
until 19418, page 9.)
After this, plan was cad,, the relations of to Austrian
institutions was limited to the taping of ,chilli. accounts in the
Austrian Rational Bank and in ease other nationalized band,
5. internal O iization
7 he following positions chart sus that all important positions
within the bank were filled by Soviets.
Director General
Russian Chief of
Credit Division
Austrian Chief
of Actin:
Russian Chief Russian
Accountant Chief Cashier
Your Russian Two Austrian
Experts
Russian Higher Four Austrian
t omptrofere Accountant Cashiers
Account Austrian Rank
Chief & Ctsaptroll.er Expert
Russian
Bookkeeper
(female)
6. Personnel
The following have been named as General Directors:
A.*. Tairulik (from the beginning to 14 September 1950.
Arrested for unknown reasons. )
A. R. Savanin (1950-1953)
1. Rsvvin (1953-1955)
Credit Division chiefs were,
I.K. ftrahanOvA (Probably from the beginning; possibly in
this function only from 1948-1951.)
I. Savvin (1951-1953)
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S. Earporich (1953-1955)
Bookkeepe rsa
probably Plotaitsky (being to 1948)
1. ifEtkDlayev (?) (1948-1951
P. Iri nilo 7 (1951-1955)
Deputy Bookkeepersa
T.D. Qlotova (beginning to 1948 and 1950-51)
A.W. Poroshin (?)(1949)
X. Kobtsev (1951-55)
Signatures at the Austrian National Banc enabled us to identify the
leading personalities in an (tea palge 18 of Report) .
M. M" of
The 81 was the accounting and treasurys cent..e r of the entire
Soviet economic system in Austria. S gave the recd plant credits
and watched over the use made by the :individual administration* of
investment credits. It was also undoubtedly the organism in charge
of international boo
particularly that of the Bast Bl
Th e AM ft AgggigI&M and t.. tut
7he SMB carried accounts exclusively of plants and organizations
within the Soviet economic systetaa. Despite many attests the accounts
of the Bast bloc trade, or those of Austrian or other western firms
were not carried. (See annex to 3* S rt,, page 2; "etas an Conversa-
tion of 13 February 1957.")
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According to our sources there was a strict order that all financial
transactions were to be carried out through i. Credits in Austrian
bans could only be touched by MU with permission of S. {1h
credits had to be transferread to . In this manner all fiduciary
transactions were centralised in 8W.
For the purpose of waking paymente, the plants and administrations
had current accounts for day-to-day laments to suppliers, for salaries
etc.
ire was a special bureau within called . Xx ,,,r kh
. gtschotov ( c), which took care of the reciprocal claim and payments
between USIA plants.
We have been able to prove the existence of this bureau back to
1947. According to the economic statistical quest ieiri s, 12 percent
of the payments of 'fit industries were
t R. (Zone
branches even made 24 percent of their payments through it.)
The reason for BUR activity in Austria might have been due to the
need for cutting down on the
of supplies and to statistical
It,, for a quick t*rnov
donations. We have presented a
detailed examination of the R organization and In it we described
more closely the functions of VM. (See Atudys "AiiiRs Soviet Dut and
Output Calculation, its importance and ,possibilities.") In order to
participate in the BWR the 30 had its own B%M accounts and B fR credit
accounts.
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2. The M' it Fc n
exclusively extended credits needed for the acquisition' of the
means of production. The types of each means of production and the
techniques used in their acquisition correspond exactly to those employed
in Soviet Russia. (C+sw4rare: W. . Batyryov and N.M. skin. Sort-
tam credit and the organization of currency circulation in ,
Die Wirtachaft, Berlin, 1954 and also our "Studies on the Soviet
Russian Organization of Credit," page 3.)
In Austria, @1 accorded the following creditat
a) Standard credits against standard stocks of raw materials,
production auxiliaries,, halt-finielmdd and finished products,
b) Extra-standard credits against such as the above,
c) Extra-standard credits am, t uncollected debts?
d) Over-drattt credits on 81 business,,
a) Over-due creditor,
t) Seasonal credits,,
g) Discount credits,
h) Credit on interest (see details in report;, pp 19-22).
A special review division was wed above all with enforcing the
rigorous observance of the bank's regulations by those seeking credit.
According to our sources the responsible administration had to sass=*
the guarantee for payment of the credits. (See MIM rs-port, page 24).
Interest rates
the time and type of credit.
For standard credit the rate was 24 percent, extra-standard credit rate
was 8-9 percent and over-duee credit was charged 11-12 percent.
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3. ton aver the Use of Credottasents
The Bank itself did not accord any kind of Investment credit.
Investment credits were only opened by the Administration. Zevertheless,
the Bank controlled the use tirade of such credits. In the case of the
accordance of investment credits,, the Bank debited the Administration
and ,gave the individual plants investment credit against their own
financing accounts. The plants could dispose over these credits within
the framework of the investment plan against orders. Through Its
Review Division the Bank watched over Installment payeaente, the obser-
vance of cost estimates and the proper use of the credit.
4. 3e of he Meg &B the tt . n tsa
The role of BM in international affairs is not very clear.
fttr.83.cs According to our source the accounts of the satellite
state banks were carried by SM. At the same time it is reported that
the business affairs within the ruble bloc were not part of S M. Even
when one takes into account paragraph 9 of the Agreement No. 02/55
regarding the reciprocal exchange of goods between the ~riar~ Bank
for Foreign Trade and the IZB, the role played by HO in Bast Bloc trade
should not be overestimated. According to this paragraph SM was not
S
included in the business of good
ext* ge.
W ass According to our source, HHA and sbank had
accounts in Western banks. They were partly under Soviet influence
(Banque du hoard, Paris.) It is reported that these accounts were used
to pay for the importation of embargo merchandise.
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According to our source, all foreign accounts were directed by
Soviet Russians. It was not possible to find any documentation on this
subject in Austria concerning S M. For this reason information con-
cerning the role of S M in the international banking field is see.
5. 8-M-1 ft t f Sov . t ,mil li
As we reported in "Annex to the Spectsl Report on Soviet Military
Bank No. 2111," the SM in Austria did not collect any taxes,, at least
not from the plants, on behalf of the Ste.
Nevertheless, there is the possibility that taxes and other dunes
were paid into the Soviet State DSink through the intermediary of the
SM. This is indicated by a reference in our "Study on the Soviet Credit
Organization" which said that the State Bank had the responsibility for
the collections and expenditures of the Soviet Treasury. This included
the collection of taxes. As a result of the lack of source material
it was not possible to determine in what form and in accordance with
what principles the Administrations made payments in favor of the
Treasury.
IV. Btfects an
't'here is no doubt that the existence of 3 had certain effects
on Austrian economy and particularly, bier se between 5-7 percent of
the Austrian money and credit vole m was withdrawn from the control of
the Austrians. In the same manner,, the currency traffic between the
East Bloc and the Western states that went through 90 was outside the
control of Austrian currency reostrictio s . Whether this was damaging
and to what degree is hard
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Seventh Section
=IS ACc T1NG SYVM
anti jimci
I. PrincIASS of Llang
The far-racing unity of the accounting eysten and its inter-
meshing devrelopwsnt moake it appear advisable to deal with them in the
same chapter.
There are two divisions to the accounting systems planning and
accounting (Including the entire reporting system) as proof of the fral-
fillaeant of the plan. Planning and ac
ting are exceedingly closely
united in their deveeloprteenst, bateame the balance sheet of the past
period trays serves as the draft for future planing.
We have been able to show that the orost iogortant paste of the
W
plant planning and accounting in MA ce'mstrsatctad entirely on the
Russian pattern. The same applied to, t w technique and means of plan-
nings to the accounting and also to the organization of plWALing.
our 3tadye "Tloe Soviet System of Plant PIAT9dng," particularly
Section M. Also "Analysis of the Soviet accounting plan for Austrian
enterprises, " Particularly Section V-)
Based on the fact that =IA plant planning and accounting mast
closely followed the Soviet syst n# it molly be a sseswd that the planning
and accounting in the tndivrUWal b ch odministrattom of MIA were
also run in accordance with the Soviet pattern.
accoMtIng of the Individual
planning and
trat es were handled in a plenum
and accounting part of the Ibis Adetinistration. It is pr efiable that
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the Plans and Accounting divisions of 1 1A-Morin Administration were
part of the Russian ' raatiorai econaereic setup and in this connection it
is possible that they were part of the in Adsiniatratton for Soviet
Property Abroad with its headquarters in scow.
To this eszsasaptioo we bring the following bits of evidences
1. 3ame account plans and sans accounting systems for all plants,
regardless of whether they were under MU, SMW or the DSC. These
eleaaleents Presuppose a unification of the balance sheets and eantrol, by
the state as is done in Russia. (Core "A*1Pais of the Soviet
SIer2.ance Sheet System for Austrian Enterprises, " page 14.)
2. Our wort shows that the branch administrations of 1A
also established balances and plans. According to it the aministr,'a-
tions established balances "by cutting up the individual bars of the
plants, stuck the line one under the other and added t em up. The
resulting total was the balance of the administration. " This Indication
by our source could not be checked. reerthele+sa, Soviet literature
constantly points to the fact that the national ecvnoyr plans c outain
the directives for the plans of the Individual induastr adainfttra-
tioaats, and the plans of the slain adnaisiatratiose the directives for
the individual plant plans. (See OW report "The Soviet System of plant
In the some eseaener the pmt balances and reports was probably
also the source of iasfoet ap ~.ng the fulfi12a mt of plans
by the, branch administration; ift le Use balance* and reports of the
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branch administrations provided the information concerning the fulfill-
vent of the total =U plan.
3. It is interesting to note that the separate parts of the
Soviet over-all economic balance contain exactly those column headings
contained in the standard forms that were used for the plant balances.
So, for example, the "Balance of the Ground Capital" (installations,
equipment and buildings) of the VSR has the cols headings which the
standard accounting foris No. 3 has and which are entitled "Report on
the Changes in Investmentsi " the simplified form No. 4 entitled "Report
on the Fulfillment of the Plan for the production of ram materials and
goods" probably served as a base for the balance of production sheet
known as "the most important in the scheme of national ecanom y."
Through the study of plant planning and the pertinent doci ents
it was possible, to a high degree, to study the system of Soviet plan-
ning. In this connection we would like to point to the following
material:
II. Plwt Planning a Accomtti
1. For Flaming Organizations "Instructions for the drafting
of plan calculatis , proposals for production costs and expense norms
within the Plant systems for the year 1955-11 This exists in photostat
and came from the Voith Plant from 1955. It contains indications of
the influence of the administrations, the eatabiisimeunt of production
plans and an the drawing up of norm.
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2. Individual Plant Plans
a) Production plan: photostat of "Plan on Production...,''
contained in the Voith Plaant, 1955.
b) Plan for the exploitation of production caapacityt photo.
d) Plus for the need of materials and fuels etc: No plans
could be found, but they ant have existed since they were
necessary for the calculations of plans, aoa a m etc.
e) Labor ibrce Pl e: Rio documents could be found. Bat we
have evidence that they existed. (Standard farm 6)
f) Plan for the Prise Coat of Products: pyres ted in photo-
stat in the "Year Plan 1955" of the Voith Plana * .
stet of "Production Level 1953-54," from the Voith Plant.
Plans for technical d velopment: Xiselov, the Reconstrue-
tion of the Korn tb Shipyard (p seated In film No. 28).
Rlaboration concerning the reconstruction of the Zorn.
shipyard .
g) Pstance Plant The plants
3.
Itaablished the bases .for the
finance plan. (lee the Soviet System of Plant Planning,
page 20.)
Plant Reporting System
This was contained in a report on "?be Reporting system in a BPtZA
textile firm, *.rtbel i Co., Woel lersdorf, " in a number of photostats.
T ere were also a or of copses of Voith Plant balm an
well as sheets from other
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The balance aaw1 reporting systems show the closest connection
with the Planning s stm.
"I. a the W&LdJjM to and n1ir tt
For the accounting between plant and the responsible =IA
adatinistration we have the "Protocol concerning the control of internal
accounting between Yeeith, St. Poelten and the Podyamik Division."
This was presented In Photostat for l rt 1954. his
dent was also Presented in our report "Accounting Dew Plant
and Ron; m m,sible Adadnistaratian. it
Accounting between Plant and its Adsinistration entailed: adatinis..
tration dues, )Profit oeet~intetxufnce of plants, se gl terry expenditures
for social purposes, araartinttion, investment overdrafts, accounting
for deliveries to the adsis3.strati on and of its, tam, etc.,
which were not paid to the Austrian State.
Further dos tation concerns Investments and general repairs.
Internal accounting gives an insight into the functioning of the
Ada inialstratiens .
XT. Z+MjPlashares eM Aot titaec
~~~lul
As we have already stated it was not possible to present material
c ceerni the planning and accounting systems of the aftimatmuons.
Nevertheless, it is ,possible to say that such systase existed. There
town: have bean ds+atartaewa tatien ihowiasg the state of sue pl pt,ptitarchases
and males, not only anew the rely. but with other oaWmdasat le s .
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FWth*V yore, the existence of an seco of a ld qn4 tmtfr,r-
at AM Mskee It ce in that the administrations had an accounting
system w i t h their p l a n t s and with t h e s u p e r i o r or nisatjons . The cot
of the a stretion me probably bed. Tis would explain
fit No. 2. ( fit and Loss acorn t) .
V.
On the basis of material, we have round it is to be assumed that the
pertoswance and success of the i y l =2A branch a dmististratjons
were natcbod by the MIA Mein Adllstn stretioen and the Main Adminutration
of t b* 8 Vi*t Assets Abroad. The fern of reporting and accounting used
in =U points In this diroct , 'die erxmw]A a cited load also to this
c ncleation.
t
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