POLICE REPRESSION, REGIMENTATION, SABOTAGE AND OVERT VIOLENCE IN POLAND

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP80T00246A043700020001-4
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: C
• Document Page Count: 15
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: June 15, 2010
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: August 12, 1958
• Content Type: REPORT

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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
This material contains information affecting the National Defense of the United States within the meaning of the Espionage Laws, Title
18, U.S.C. Secs. 793 and 794, the transmission or revelation of which in any manner to an unauthorized person is prohibited by law.
C-~O-N-FFIm1-FP.N T?I-A L
COUNTRY Poland
SUBJECT Police Repression,, Regimentation,,
Sabotage and Overt Violence in
Poland CST R /ICES CDRK UPT c (//
DATE OF
INFO.
PLACE &
DATE ACQ.
1.
ARMY review completed.
C--O-I-F I-0-AAT I-A L
STATE #ZIARMY bINAVY = AIR #xT FBI AEC
(Note: Washington distribution indicated by "X"; Field distribution by "#".)
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p
repressions, promised reforms,, forced labor camps,, specific and pr?bab]? in-
cidents of sabotage9 enforced regimentation,, radio 3ang9 press censorship
and known incidents of strikes and evert violence in Poland.
PR(
REPORT
DATE DISTR.
NO. PAGES
REFERENCES
AUL 1958
report containing information on
olice
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C O PJ FI DEKJTIAL
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POLICE REPRESSION, ENFORCED REGIMENTATION, SABOTAGE AND
OVERT VIOLENCE IN POLAND
Introduction
The following is a list of locations referred to in this report with coor-
dinat es
BYDGOSZCZ
DARLOWO
DEBICA
GOLDAP
GOZDNICA
JAWORZNO
JERZMANICE
KOLOBRZEG
KOWARY
LODZ
LUBON
MIELEC
MIELECIN
NOWA HUTA
PIECHCIN
POZNAN
SIERADZ
SLUPSK
STRONIE SLASKIE (N50-18, E16-53)(UTM XR-3373)
STRZEGOM (N50-58, E16-21)(UTM WS-9546)
STRZELCE OPOLSKIE (N50-31, E18-18)(UTM CA-0999)
STRZELIN (N5O-479 E17-04)(UTM XS-4628)
USTKA (N54-35, E16-51)(UTM XA-2050)
WALBRZYCH (N5o-46, E16-17)(UTM WS-9024)
WoJCIESZOW (N50-55, E15-45)(UTM WS-5239)
WROCLAW (N51-06, E17-02)(UTM XS-3468)
l.Police Repression
Infractions of the law have been constantly increasing during the post-
war years. In 1956, there were 45,000 cases of hooliganism handled by the Police,
which constituted a 25-percent increase over 1955. However, there were many
cases of hooliganism not reported, which would increase this amount tremendously.
In 1956 there were 18,000 cases of illegal financial speculation and
blackmarketeering reportedly handed by the Police; however, it could be justly
estimated that as many again were hushed by corrupt police officials.
CO N FI DE.WTIAL
(N53-09, E18-00)(UTM CD-0190)
(N54-25, E16-25)(UTM WA-9131)
(N50-03, E21-25)(UTM EA-3044)
(N54-19., E22-18)(UTM EF-8919)
(N51-26, E15-06)(UTM US-1941)
(N50-13, E19-17)(UTM CA-7663)
3 km southwest of ZLOTORYJA (jN5511-007 ,55-55)
(N54-11, E15-35)(UTM WA-3703)
(N50-48, E15-50)(UTM WS-5928)
(N51-459 E19-28)(UTM CC-9437)
(N52f-21, E16-54)(UTM XU-2901)
(N5o-179 E21-25)(UTM EA-3070)
(N53-o5, E14-55)(UTM WU-8489)
(N50-059 E20-04)(UTM DA-3448)
(N52-50, E18-03)(UTX CD-0157)
(N52-30, E17-00)(UTM XU-3080)
(N51-36, E18-45)(UTM CC-4319)
(N54-27, E17-02)(UTM XA-3237)
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Approximately 230,000 cases of armed robbery and 100,000 cases of larceny
were reportedly handled by the Police, as well as 1,300 arrests of registered
prostitutes. This latter number would be increased by 15-fold if all unregistered
prostitutes were picked up for known infractions of the law.
Official police reports regarding criminal arrests for 1956 were 3709000
incidents, or percentage wise 16 incidents for every 10,000 inhabitants in Poland.
The Police were less evident in the streets as a general rule. In cases of
street brawls., the Police were seldom if ever present to arrest the offenders and
to reinstate order. No one ever depended on the Police in a case of emergency. In
rare cases when a policeman was around when a street brawl started., the civilian
population never lifted a finger to aid him if the odds were against him. There were
cases in WARSAW., where a person, drunk or i11,lay on the cityrs sidewalk for hours
without the aid or intervention of the Police .)r the civilian population. No one ever
wanted to be a witness for or against the police authorities when incidents were
brought into court. Secret arrests and trials were practically non-existent. The
Police generally remained at their headquarters where they were constantly busy main-
taining and issuing citizen identity cards, regi.sterlnC ti ans1 E.nt.,, book-
ing criminal and domestic ccmplaints,anu mainta..mit.rn, Leir method. of pro;51,1I Lt_ioxi
control and registration.
After 19569 there was approximately 15 percent more police in evidence than
there had been before GOMULKA came into power. On the other hand,, the fear of the
Police had lessened. In the past the inhabitants did not believe that the Police
were their protectors and the enforcers of laws protecting the people, but that they
were only used as a means of terror and pressure against the people. After 19569
the inhabitants at least looked on the Police as non-persecutors, who., however., were
without too much success in combating criminal offenders. In the past there were many
complaints against Police brutality and outrigit murder. Since GOMULKAvS investi-
ture tha Police became less brutal. Laws were established to the effect that unneces-
sary use of weapons against the people was punishable by suspension., dismissal or
imprisonment. These laws put fear into the Police to such a degree that they even
refused to use arms against outright criminals and incidents of hooliganism.
A large number of the complaints and processes were shelved and forgotten
since there was a lack of qualified personnel to handle the investigation details.
The lack of the following factors caused a low level of Police efficiencye commu-
nication, personnel, education and training, walking and motorized patrols, and
citizen support. Added to the above, there was too much paper work and too many
fields to cover for the personnel on hand. The Police were too deeply involved in
the crackdown on blackmarketeers and scalpers.
In the latter part of 1956 and early 1957 the Polish Government announced
open warfare against hooliganism, however, with no gratifying results. Many cases
of outright brutality., such as rape, murder, armed robbery and assault by the
hooligan gangs came to light daily. Many were arrested' however,, the penalties
imposed on these delinquents was not harsh enough and the percentage of those
arrested and tried was too small to make any noticeable decrease in their activities.
Those who were brought to justice were usually paroled to their parents or guardians
after being held a month or two in confinement.
In 19579 the Minister of Internal Affairs., Wladyslaw WICHA, and the Corm
man der of the Polish Citizens Militia (Polska Milicja Obywatelska), DOBIESZAK (fhu),
promised that reforms would take place. The following steps were. taken
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1) The increase in Police pay from 1200 to 2000 zlotys a month was an-
nounced. (This was still a meager salary when compared with the cost of living in
Poland.)
(2) The allocation of sufficient new and better housing facilities for
the Police and their families. (These improvements only scratched the surface of
the housing problem.)
(3) Requirements for higher aptitude and scholastic standards were in-
stituted for Police personnel and a two year trial training was established for
new recruits.
(4) Ex-military personnel were approached by recruiters for police duty.
(5) New regulations were established and those regarding the use of
weapons by the Police were modified,thereby ;affording the Police more protection
against possible prosecution.
(6) The latest known criminal laboratory equipment was purchased for
the purpose of combating crime and more communication and transportation equip-
ment was made available to the Police.
(7) Propaganda popularizing the Police became more evident.
(8) New and stricter laws combating alcoholism and prostitution were
brought into effect.
(9) New divisions for combating juvenile delinquency and hooli-
ganism and added administrative sections were formed.
(10) Brutal interrogation methods were abolished and persons could not
be held longer than 48 hours without being formally charged 4th a specific in-
fraction of the laws.
The above-mentioned reforms slightly improved the Police standards,, when
compared with the conditions of the past. The people were not favorably im-
pressed by these changes, since it was still evident that the Police acted cow-
ardly toward hooligan gangs; that the overall laws were still bad; that the Po-
lice still used their weapons unnecessarily; that the ranks of the Police still
included uneducated personnel; that brutal methods were still used in obtaining
necessary information; that the lack of sufficient patrols was still evident
and lastly that Police bribery, "bought" protection,and conceit still existed.
These facts left the people with feeling of distrust, disrespect, and scorn
for the Police.
e. Forced Labor Camps
After GOMUIKA came into power, 22 of the then existing camps were liq-
uidated. Approximately 50 percent (40.000) of the political and civil offenders
were given amnesties. In July 1957, camps existing in Poland.
They were located in the following acese
DEBICA JAWORZNO KOWARY
JERZMANICE, apprcodmately 3 km SW of ZLOTORYJA MIELECIN
PIECHCIN (two camps) SLUPSK STRONIE SLASKIE
STRZEGCE STRZELCE OPOLSKIE STRZELIN
WOJCIESZOW WROCIAW
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The political and civil offenders were compelled to work in lime, granite
and basalt quarries, coal and ore mines probably including uranium mines, and in
an unidentified steel and concrete prefabrication plant in JAWORZNO as well ae
many other unidentified plants and construction sites throughout Poland.
2. Sabotage
a. Minimizing the Existence of Saboteurs
The authorities labelled all accidents, economic failures and outright
mistakes as deliberate acts of sabotage. They could not claim inefficiency and
economic blunderings on Communist doctrine. It was for this reason many such
incidents were labelled Western-influenced acts of sabotage against the government.
However, the Polish people knew, that it was far the most part "ficticious sabo-
tage".
It could not be said that there were no cases of sabotage at plants,
construction sites a+?c, since many cases of deliberate intent to stop production
and output had oecurr'ed, These acts were committed by persons with grudges against
foramen, supervisors and others, as well as outright acts of spiteful hooliganism.
not know of any organized groups of trained saboteurs existing in Poland
or any which were directly or indirectly supported by a western power for the sole
purpose of committing acts of sabotage against the Polish Government. Security
agencies of the former UB had taken preventive measures against the constant occur-
rence of these incidents by making periodic security checks at all plants, facto-
ries, construction sites and her places of work, and by placing informants and
"watch dogs" at .here locations for the purpose of spying on people.
b, Specific Incidents
In 1947, the Chief of the Quartering-Construction Department (Departa-
ment Kwaterunkowo-Budowlany) of the Ministry of National Defense, Col BRONSKI,
(fnu), was executed by a firing squad for the deliberate mishandling of finances
and the acceptance of bribes, while four of his subordinates, two majors and two
lieutenants (names unknown) were imprimned (length of sentence unknown). One of
the imprisoned majors was pardoned in 1956, because of ill health, after serving
seven years in pri on. The owner of the private construction firm' SZTOMPKA,
(fnu), who was supposed to have given the bribes was sentenced to deathg however
it was later reduced 'to 15-years imprisonment.
In 1949, during the dedication ceremonies of the newly constructed
complex of buildings of the Ccuncil of Ministers Offices, located on the former
Alleja Stalina 1-3 (presently changed to Alleje Ujazdowskie) in WARSAW, a water
heater exploded (apparently due to a faulty thermostat) in the bathroom of
Premier BIERUT4 S off is e,,destroying the bathroom and partially damaging BIERUTI S
office. The director of the construction project, along with three technicians
(names unknown)3were accused of sabotage, secretly tried and sentenced to 12
years in prison.
In 1949, the Vice Minister of Public Security in charge of Economic
Sabotage Incidents, KRATKA, (fnu), accused and arrested one GROSZKOWSKI , (fnu),
who was the Director of Mining Enterprises in DARLOWO, USTKA, SLUPSK, and KOLO-
BRZEG along with a number of his Subordinates (1me s and number unknown), for mis-
appropriating government funds. They were found guilty and sentenced to 12 years
in prison. GROSZOWSKI and several others were released from prison in 1956.
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In 1950, during the construction of the building complex for the State Eco-
nomic Planning Commission (Panstwowa Komisja Planowania Gospodarczego-PKPG) in
WARSAW, some water pipes burst under mysterious circumstances.floodirag and thereby
ruining the completed construction work of the main floor and basement of the build-
ing. Construction experts claimed the accident occurred because of faulty water
pipes; however the Ministry of Public Security labelled it as sabotage and conducted
a lengthy investigation of the incident which was brought to a close, because of
insufficient evidence against anyone.
In 1952, during the construction of an Aeroplane Factory (SC-Plant) in MIELEC9
an entire assembly hall collapsed, The Ministry of Public Security labelled this
incident as sabotage on the part of Construction Engineer BULKOWSKI9 (fnu), who
was the director of the project, and who was tried and sentenced to four years in
prison. He was pardoned in 1954, after ser-.-icg two years of his sentence. Another
similar incident, occurred in 19529 at a construction site of a textile mill in
SIERADZ, where the roof of a section of the constructed complex caved in injuring
several of the construction workers. The director, (nu) of construction was sen-
tenced to seven years in prison.
In 1953, at a coal mine in WALBRZYCH, eight of the mine?s directors (names
unknown) were a~:;rused of economic sabotage and consequently -imprisoned. Later when
the output of the mine came to practically a standstill Hilary MINC, the Chief of
the State Economic Planning Commission, intervened on behalf cf the directors and
had them released from prison and reassigned to their former positions.
In 1954, at an unidentified Chemical Plant "ERG" located on the outskirts of
BYDGOSZCZ 3 which produced explosives, an explosion occurred causing the death of a
number of employees (exact number unknown) and scores of in,'-Aries as well as exx-
tensive property damage in the BYDGOSZCZ area, The incident was labeled an act
of sabotage, The investigations were conducted secretly as were the trials of the
accused (names and number of persons unknown). the incident had
instigated the proceedings for the release and consequently degrading of the then
Vice Minister of Chemical Industry, Karol AKERMAN.
In 1955 an accident in a coal mine in Silesia (exact name and location un-
known) which took the lives of approximately 4.0 miners was labeled as an act of
sabotage, planned and financed by western capitalistic powers.
3. Enforced Regimentation
a. Civilian Organizations and Societies
Enforced regimentation became practically non-existent, after GOMULKA came
into power. The following voluntary organizations and societies were F[ in
existence in Poland
(1). The Polish Soviet Friendship Society (Towarzystwo Przyjazni Polsko-
Radzieckiej). In the latter part, of 1955 this society had approximately 1,0009000
members who were both Party and non-Party members. This number dropped to 450,000
after GOMULKA camp into power. The membership dues were approximately 50 groszy
a month. The society held monthly social afternoon teas and discussion sessions
pertaining to Soviet culture, traditions and their influence in Poland. The Society
also held quarterly Soviet cultural, musical and film festivals. Most of the
non Party members belonged to this society so they would not be ha rrassed by
Party activists as being belligerent toward Polish-Soviet friendship ties.
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(2). Polish Trade Unions (Polskie Zwiazki Zawodowe)
There were approximately 21 trade unions in existence in Poland. The
total membership was approximately 7,0009000. The membership dues varied between
one-half and one percent of the members monthly gross wages. Members were supposed
to attend monthly meetings (50 percent seldom did) and a yearly election and prog-
ress review meeting. It was during this yearly election and progress review meet-
ing, that it was often necessary to post guards at all exits of buildings, facto-
ries.' etc. in order to insure 100-spercent attendance.
(3). League of Soldiers' Friends (Ligja Przyjaclol Zolnierza)
This organization was in reality a paramilitary one, although it
was not propagandized as such. Membership was voluntary and monthly dues were
small, while the courses it offered were very attractive to the younger generation.
The courses offered were ag follows-. rifle match competition, glider
flying, model building, Morse code and radio transmission, parachute jump train-
ing, boating and swimming and first aid and medical.
The League also organized welcome celebrations for military units
returning from maneuvers and sponsored air show spectacles with the cooperation
of the Polish Air Force.
Besidesthe aforementioned organizations and societies, other organ-
izations and societies (to which membership was voluntary rather than compulsory)
were the Ladies League (Liga Kobiet) and the Polish
Boy Scouts (Polskie arcers wo which came back into existence in 1955.
b. Military Training in Higher Schools of Learning (Studium Wojskowy)
There were 76 schools of higher learning in Poland and approxi-
mately 140,000 students. There were approximately 1009000 male students who were
compelled to take the military training course for a three or four year period
(particulars regarding the course were unknown). this train-
ing made 259000 young men available for officer duty yearly in Poland, in the
event of an emergency.
c. Reserve Military Training
all Polish reservists were compelled to take one
day of military training within their military district each year and three months
training every three or four years. In the 1956-1957 period there were two major
reductions in the Polish Armed Forces which relaxed the stress on general military
training throughout Poland.
d. Radio Jamming
no existing radio jamming stations or networks in
Poland after January 1957. However., it was a well known fact that during the
Poznan Riots in 1956 a radio jamming station and tower were completely destroyed
by rioters in that city. Practically similar incidents occurred in BYDGOSZCZ in
Novenber 1956 and in SZCZECIN in December 1956. After GOMULKA came to power,
it was widely propagandized, that all radio jamming stations in Poland would be
abolished. Even after this statement be 7 ame fact jamming incidents still oc-
curred, particularly around 2300 hours. hese jammings were caused
by jamming stations located in Czechoslovakia and East Germany. This did not
create much of a problem since the same trananissions by BBC, Radio Free Europe and
Voice of America could be picked up on other wave lengths and times.
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roi-ana receivea 5U mi on zlotys yearly from a Soviet
Sattelite Bloc Fund for the maintenance of radio jamming stations in Poland,
BILLIG further commented that, he did not know why the Poles were so happy over the
liquidation of these stations, since it cost the Polish Government Treasury 50
million zlotys yearly, which could have been put to good use.
e, Press Censorship
Immediately after GOMULKA came into power press censorship was completely
relaxed, however, the government heads realized this was a mistake and in June or
July of 1957, press censorship and control ?;ere again put int o effect. The Press,
Publications and Pageants Control Administration (Urzad Kontroli PrASy9 Publikacji
i Widowisk) located on Ulica Bracka in WARSAW, under the Directorship of ZAWADKO
(fnu) was directly responsible for press censorship in Poland. ZAWADKO and his ad-
m_i-nistrat:ion were in t: r n responsible to Artur STAREWICZ, Rio was the Chief of the
Press Department in the Central Committee of the Polish Communist Party (Kierownik
Wydzialu Prascwego, Komitetu Ceti ralnego, PZPR) in WARSAW.
f. Job Changing
3cb changing did not pose a major problem in Poland, All
job changes had to be listed in a persons passport. The real problem of job
changing, particularly when a person went from one city to another was housing.
Persons desiring to cchange cobs from one large city to another, such as WARSAW.,
KRAKOW, POZNAN, or within the areas of the Polish Border Belt, first had to receive
a letter of acceptance from the new employer stating that 'she person would be ac=
e'pted. and wee li be given adequate living quarters upon making the job change.
Strikes and Overt Vio once
a. Striking Prior to 195b
Prior to 1956, strikes were unheard of in Poland. There were minor protests;
peaceful demonstrations and work stoppages at some plants, mines and construction
sites. These protests were treated as minor workers' grievances against the di-
rectorates of their plants. The grievance E were usually settled after some minor
official was chosen as the s apegoa'-, Promises were made for improvements? how-
ever,, few ever became realities.
These minor protests, peaceful demonstrations and work stoppages were usu-
ally instigated at Workers Meetirgs (Narady Wytworcze). They usually began with
sharp criti:>ism of the plant v' Bureaucracy"" , but never the government. Party of-
ficials always based their arguments against strikes,on claims that the party the-
ory of thr .tariat dictates" stated that the proletarian: could not strike
against I since he was a worker and everything in a workers'
state bel_6La to the worker. It _a further stated that in Capitalism, the owners
of private industries never went.. on strike against themselves.
b. Specific Incidents of Protests, Peaceful Demonstrations and Work Stoppage
Such incidents became apparent between 1953 and 1955. They had always been
settled after minor concessions and threats of expulsion and possible arrest
were made. In LODZ, the women work er ~ of an unidentified textile mill protested
that they were underpaid, forced to work under unhealthy conditions! received sus-
pensions for pilfering bits of material and yarrt`and had inadequate housing
in the mill region. Promises were made to improve general conditions; however;
they seldom if ever were carried-out.
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The miners in the Silesian Region protested because they had to work on
Sundays they were forced to work under unsafe and unhealthy conditions, they had
to compete with prison labor' and the directors and experts at the mines were
not their own people but "foreigners" sent from WARSAW to boss them.
Machine shop workers in Silesia and construction workers at large construc-
tion sites throughout, Poland protested against the increased demands of production
output without. increase in pay and the insufficient padding (niedostaeczny urzy-
tek dlugiego olowka) of production output by foremen and timekeepers,
The farmers and village folk and the intelligentsia of the cities seldom if
ever, complained about working conditions or salaries, 'heir main complaints and
protests were against the outrageous acts and wrongful arrests by the Public Se-
curity Forces (UB) of Poland,
oa The 1956 Strikes
In the early part of 19569 small departmental strikes begat to occur
in unidentified plants in LODZ and WROCLAW and then finally in July 1956, at the
Cegielski Locomotive Plant in POZNAN.
(1) The Pcznan Strike
This locomotive plant was directly subordinate to the Central Admini-
stration of Railroad Equipme: (Cent,ralny Zarzad Taboru i Sprzetu Kolejowego=-TASKO) 11 of the Ministry of Industrial Machinery The negotiations lasted for approximately
three months. The workers demanded additional pay for overtime, for difficult
working conditions, for shutdowns due to lack of materials,They also wanted to 'ie
reimbursed for unjustified witholding of wages for such as insurance, vacations and
medical care.
The plant's administ-rative body coulI not any conclusive decision
in the case and referred I he malter over to TASKO, in turn referred it to
the Minister of Industrial Machinery, Roman FIDIISK.,L -^,o referred it to Vice Prem-
ier Stanislaw LOPAT. LOPAT refused to make any conclusive decision in the matter.,
for fear of weakening his position in the government. Only after all these in-
decisive moves did the workers of the Cegielski Plant call out a general strike.
They gathered in the plant's yard and several thousand workers walked out into the
streets of POZNAN. The interesting fact of the whole matter was that the workers
of the Cegielski Plant who walked out, worked under better conditions and were
paid better wages than their counterparts at other plaits in Poland. One predom-
inant factor for the walk=out was that the plant had many old workers, who com-
pared the working conditions of 1956.to those of the pre-WWII period.
When the workers walked out into the streets, rumors spread through the
crowds that the plant's delegates who were sent to WARSAW to negotiate the de-
mands were arrested by the UB. The strikers immediately began to shout anti-re-
gime slogans as well as defamatory remarks against the Ministry of Public Security
and its personnel. The striKer5 were joined by multitudes of POZNAN dwellers.,
who joined nr, ', because of the economic pay reasons the workers first, had in mind,
but because of the anger created by the mob. The entire mob marched
to the building which housed the UB Headquarters. The UB personnel in the buila-
ing immediately called WARSAW for instructions, which were "do not fire at the
workers" and an immediate decision was made to meet the workers demands. However.,
this decision was made too late to avert a catastrophe. The mob began to throw
stones through the windows of the UB Headquarters and used small arms fire from
weapons taken away from the Police. The lst Secretary of the Provincial Committee
of the United Polish Workers Party (PZPR) in POZNAN, STASIAK, (fnu), escaped from
the building and went into hiding before the mob entered the building. The 2d
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Party Secretary walked out into the street and tried to talk to the mob., but he was
beaten. The Police which were called to the scene were disarmed by the mob and
dispersed. One policeman was killed by the mob. Meanwhile the mob in front of the
UB Headquarters, set fire to a gasoline station across the street from the head-
quarters building. After four hours the UB personnel in the building opened fire
on the mob in the street. After this the demonstrators turned to rioting. The
workers began canvassing all offices and enterprises in POZNAN., instructing all
personnel to join the rioters. Other workers., who had acomplete list of all UB
personnel and their home addresses., entered their homes with the intention of
doing them bodily harm. However,, no one was found since most of the personnel were
either at the UB Headquarters or in hiding.
It was then that the government dispatched Premier CYRANKIEWICZ to POZNAN9
and Minister of Defense ROKOSSOWSKI ordered armored units from LODZ and LUBLIN to
converge on POZNAN. Simultaneously, he ordered General POLTORZYCKI to POZNAN9 to
take charge of the armored units which were sent there and he also ordered the
stoppage of all traffic out of POZNAN,, because he feared that the rioting workers
would make an attempt to incite other workers in other cities to a general strike.
The following day CYRANKIEWICZ and POPLAWSKI arrived at the airport in POZNAN and
there they began to form a plan of operation. The armored units began to arrive
at the city's outskirts from the south and the east; however,, they were ordered
not to open fire on the people. The government officials began parleys with work-
ers, assuring them that the delegates,, who were sent to WARSAW,, were in good
health and that the entire demonstration was in bad taste in the eyes of all for-
eigrera9 who were presently in POZNAN participating in the International Sports
Meet. The demonstrators destroyed an , ;:terma tower and a radio jamming station
which was within seeing distarne of the .tadium where the meets were being held.
The workers denied this act,, and said that it waq apparently a deliberate act of
destruction on the part of some hooligan gang swhict took advantage of the demonstra-
tion and confusion. CYRANKIEWICZ told the workers that the following concessions
would be made 4
(1). Pay demands would be met.
(:2). The personnel of the administrations the ministry and the ',,Tice
Prem:er?s who were responsible for the negligence of negotiating
and arriirg at, a conclusive answer to the problem would be
dealt with.
(3). The lst Secretary of the Provincial Committee of the PZPR would
be replaced.
(4). The organizers of the strike would not be punished,, but the
persons who were responsible for the deaths of the policemen
and others killed or injured during the rids and those who
tried to overthrow the government would have to face a just
court where considerations would be given the circumstances
surrounding the incident.
(5). The UB offices would either be abolished or reduced.
CYRANKIEWICZ further stated that the strike may well have been justified,,
but that open rebellion against the government was uncalled for and this made it
necessary for the responsible parties to be punished. (In CYRANKIEWICZB s own words,,
"the hand raised against the government with malicious intents would be cut off'.)
From that day on9 CYRANKIEWICZ was referred to by the POZNAN workers as the Prem-
ier with the amputated hand (Premier z odcieta reka).
The Polish newspapers carried many stories regarding the Poznan Riots,,
stating that foreign agents were responsible for the organization of the riots. Two
hours after CYRANKIEWICZ spoke to the rioters, order was reestablished with a min-
imum loss of blood and property damage. A very shaken CYRANKIEWICZ returned to
WARSAW,, realizing the possible consequences which could have arisen from the Poznan
Riots.
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(2) Aftermath of the Poznan Strike
CYRANKIEWICZ immediately began to work on demo;rat,i--type reforms, in-
sisting on more rights for the workers, the curtailment of UB powers and the
complete breakaway from the Stalinist methods of operation. The UB in POZNAN was
reduced in strength and reprimanded for their past actions. In Sept~iber 1956, the
remnants of UB personnel in POZNAN resigned. Their spokesman said that the gov-
ernment sold them out, after 11 years of forcing them to wore: against the people,
causing the wrath of the people of POZNAN to come down on their shoulders, and
now after they had outlived their usefulness they were being put out to pasture,
just like so many cattle. Soon after this the Polish government officially an-
nounced the liquidation of all UB offices throughout Poland.
Meanwhile, in the latter part of September, approximately 200 persons
were arrested (workers, students and intelligentsia) in POZNAN. The trials began
in October, however, in the end, all were released, with the exception of the
few who were found guilty of murder and unnecessary brutality during the riots.
The editor of the newspaper "Trybuna Ludul', Jerzy MORAWSKI, wrote an editorial
about the Poznan Riots, stating that the riots were justified in many ways. He
put a great, deal of emphasis on the fact that the Party was partially to blame,
since many Party members had pa. rtic,ipated in the r1 of s. The Soviet, newspapers
carried accounts of the riots,, putting the blame for +, rem on s~ w imperialist pow-,
er-.^ and aaid, workers of POZNAN allowed themselves to be used as pawns of
these powers. MORAWSKI in turn countered the Soviet newspaper accusations by
again stating that the fault of the riot should be laid at the feet of the Party,
since it was the Party which did not correct its errors in time to avert the
riot . I.A. wa.>> for this article i,n the Trybuna Ludu, that, MORAWSKI was released
from hi>- prs-it .o'a as editor.
The aftermath of the riots also saw the release of Minister FIDELSKI
and Vice Premier LOPATO It was from the delegates who represented the locomotive
workers of POZNAN and WARSAW that the idea of Workers Councils had crystallized
and these councils began to form spontaneously in many government, institutions
throughout Poland, after 1956.
After v'Pozna7n49 many of the politi -.al leaders who had been in office
during the crisis were di, credit ed and released. Consequently, a person was
sought after who did not have anything t. o do with the incident , in fact, one who
may have suffered some repercussions during the crisis? Such a person was GOMULKA,
who came into power in October 1956. It was not until three months after the inci-
dent that he came into the limelight of political significance. When he did, the
workers thought that now their demands would be realized to the fullest extent.
Every factory, plant, construction enterprise and other place of employment be-
gan to claim compensations from four to five years back. Workers sent delegates
to their individual ministries, who had ultimatums as follows.- "If you do not
meek; our demands we will strike, and furthermore we will not return to work un-
less positive decisions are made".
From the beginning CYRANKIEWICZ announced in a speech, that, all griev-
ances from the past four years would be compensated, and the Polish Parliament
(Sejm) passed a Workers Compensation Act, However, after a month when the gov-
ernment figured out the compense+ions due, it was established that it would be
necessary to pay out 40 b-*,..ion zlotys. (The yearly government income was appro-
ximately 250 billion zlotys). The Pay Fwnd for 7,200,000 employees in Poland
came to 116 billion zlotys. The government, was shocked at this sum, because, if
it, were p ,_ ` tion would be inevitable,, CYRANKIEWICZ, afraid to back down
on this p otty s: , .reed the whole matter over to Vice Premier JAROSZEWICZ, who
on 1 December 1956, took it upon himslef to issue a confidential circular, in-
structing all Polish Banks not to pay any compensations. In the latter part of
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December 1956, GOMULKA asked the Polish workers to voluntarily give up their due
compensations to the government. In February 1957, the newly elected Parliament
(Seam) amended the legislation passed by the former Parliament in November 1956.
Nonetheless'. between Nov nber 1956 and February 1957, the Polish Workers managed
to receive approximately eight billion zlotys in extra compensations from the
frightened ministers and directors of individual ministries and central adminis-
trations, through the constant threat of starting strikes.
During this time many small strikes occurred, which lasted one or two days
However, the threat of larger strikes was always averted when the ministries and
directorates agreed to the termsof the wca?kers. Many ministers and directors
found themselves caught between the demands of the workers and the scorn and rep-
rimands of Vice Premier JAROSZEWICZ, who was actually the only one looking out for
the country's economy. This wrath brought on voluntary resignations of many min-
isters and directors. Many Workers Councils literally "carried out ministers and
directors on slabs" when they refused to concede to the demands of the workers.
The first was at the "Lenin" Steel Combine in NOWA HUTA approximately 20
km east of KRAKOW,, in October 1956. A regulation had been in effect giving a 20-
percent bonus allowance to all plant employees including common laborers and
administrative personnel, The constriction workers at the yet uncompleted part of
the plant demanded the same type compensation be paid their common laborers and
administrative personnel. The workers called a general meeting of all construction
personnel and elected delegates to deliver their argument to the proper people.
The delegates were sent; to the Minist er of Construction, Eugeniusz SZYR, who an-
swered that concessions as s;u,~;,h would be a breach of regulations. The construc-
tion workers went on strike immediately, haling all activity on the project.
The first Party Secretary of the Krakow Provincial Committees seeing all work
stopped at the project) immediately went to Minister SZYR and pressured him to meet
the demands of the workers so that the construction work would continue on the
project, SZYR made the'concessions and the strike ended. However, he was called
to appear before JAROSZEWICZ,, to whom he explained that he had no alternative in
the matter , since the Director of the Lenin Steel Combine and the Ministry of
Steel Industry had, previously set a precedent, and therefore he had no alternative
but to agree.
The seoon'l took place in LUBON, south of POZNAN, on 12 December 1956, at
an old synthetic fibers plant which was being enlarged since 1954, by the Poznan
Industrial Construction Association (Poznanskie Zjednoczenie Budownictwa Przemy
slowego) . The plant workers were receiving a 20 percent additional allowance for
unhealthy working conditions due to bad ventilation and the constant presence of
sulphur fumes and smoke in and outside of the plant. The construction workers
on the project, who worked mostly in the open air complained that they were also
subject to the effects of the sulphur fumes and smoke since they first began work-
ing on the project years earlier. In October 1956 there were several conferences
held in the construction works rsO Trade Union regarding these complaints. The Min-
ister of Cons trxcti on was forwarded a copy of the grievance and he assigned a
medical expert to substantiate the complaint. The medical expert was given a month
to bear out his findings. In December 1956 the workers refused to wait any longer
and demanded immediate action in the matter plus a two year retroactive pay of the
'^ percent that was being paid the factory workers. For an unknown reason there
wra,q no expert's report, and the construction workers went out on strike. The Poznan
Party Provincial Committee immediately notified Vice Premier JAROSZEWICZ, who be-
came uneasy about the situation, since this was also in the Poznan areal
(After
lengthy discussions, the workers relerted in their demands for the two year retro-
active pay allowances, and in turn were given the 20-percent additional allowance
COWFI DENTIAL
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COWFIDE.NTIAL
for unhealthy working conditions. the director of the construc-
tion project could have easily settled the whole matter had he not been afraid to
make any decisions.
In September 1956 the doctors and nurses in WROCLAW threatened to walk
out on strike if the Ministry of Health would not improve their pay scale and
working conditions. Promises were immediately made regarding the pay raises and
improvements, However, the concessions never became a reality until the early
part of 195". Before the concessions were made the doctors and nurses in an un-
identified hospital in WROCLAW walked out on strike for a twenty-four hour period.,
leaving behind a skeleton crew of doctors and nurses to handle the patients on
hand and to look after any emergencies that nd4it occur.
In October 1956, the dock workers and sailors in the port of GDANSK went
out on a general strike, demanding that the Director of the Sea Institute (Dyrektor
Instytutu Morskiego), DARSKI, (fnu), be reinstated to his former position as Min-
ister of Navigation, which he held from 1953 to 1955, replacing Minister POPIEL
whom they claimed incapable of performing the Job o Another demand of the strikers
was that all seamen who had in earlier years been banned from sailing on merchant
ships on the open seas because they were considered political risks, be again
allowed to sign on vessels making foreign voyages, and that the stress on polit-
ical education of merchant seamen be lessened. The first demand was granted,
whereas partial concessions were made regarding the last two demands and the
strike was called off after several days,
In Novenber 1956 the workers at the Locomotive Repair Works in POZNAN
went out on strike for one day, however; the Ministry of Railroads met all the de-
mands of the workers and the strike was called off.
CONFI DENTIAL
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C OKFI DENTAL.
2.I I it was ,.orr non practice in Poland, throughout all employment
fie sj o pad all output, or production data of the workers, thus affording
them higher wage,, although this was illegal everyone knew
It was going on,
CON'IDEJNTIAL
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