COMMENTS ON SOVIET INTERNAL AND EXTERNAL PROBLEMS
Document Type:
Collection:
Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST):
CIA-RDP80T00246A035200060001-4
Release Decision:
RIPPUB
Original Classification:
S
Document Page Count:
22
Document Creation Date:
December 22, 2016
Document Release Date:
September 21, 2010
Sequence Number:
1
Case Number:
Publication Date:
June 17, 1957
Content Type:
REPORT
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CyOp
INF-ORMATION REPORT INFORMATION REPORT
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
This material contains information affecting the National Defense of the United States within the meaning of the Espionage Laws, Title
18, U.S.C. Secs. 793 and 794, the transmission or revelation of which in any manner to an unauthorized person is prohibited by law.
S-F-C-R_.F-T
SUBJECT Comments on Soviet Internal and DATE DISTR. 17 June 1957
External Problems
NO. PAGES 1
DATE OF
INFO.
PLACE &
DATE ACQ.
SOURCE EVALUATIONS ARE DEFINITIVE. APPRAISAL OF CONTENT IS TENTATIVE.
A 2 .page report on Soviet internal and external nrnthl PrnP
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(Among the subjects
coverea are: the events in Poland and Hungary, Khrushchev's secret speech
and the reasons for making it known to Party members, the Soviet leadership,
light versus heavy industry, living conditions in the-Soviet Union, hiooli-
ganism, and the position of the intelligefitsia.
~%N
STATE v ARMY
FBI
(Note: Washington distribution indicated by "X"; Field distribution by "#".)
AEC
I N FORMATION- REPORT INFORMATION REPORT
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The soviet press does not refloat the aotu
ngary?
ion
tua
i
Siniet
t
but
Those who have no chance of reading aril a
h local
g
newspapers will. Of course, think that this is some sas
hich they will attach no importenee. Thosep however$
t
o w
incidento
who have the possibility of listening to the radio will have
idditional information apart from Soviet information, and these
z
naturally will reslise that our soldiers are at resent compelled
to act as hangmen of the Hunjerian people.
f
this will only increase their indignation at the terror o
Rnylat ernment.
every soviet citizen who knows atous -one
ist and will deeply sympathise with the
insurrection in Hxng.ry m
if they were able, they would take
Hungarians.
n active part in assisting them. It's only because of the
a
Iron Curtain that the ?an do nothing. But if they had a ohance,
all people would volunteer to go there.
Hungary has no conneotion what-
ever with the Soviet Union. is is an independent country which
t
Wh
a
must have the poasil'ility of electing its own government.
fter the
right have the Soviet troops to be in Hungary 11 years a
the going
tion
,
end of the war? And the patent of the insurrec
to the side of the insurgents--
over of the whcle Hungarian ;army
how that it's really an uprising of the whole nation.
t
o s
all this ?oes
The
If this revolution is suppressed
evolted
.
Hungarian peopl? have r
by Soviet armed forces, if it to drowned in blood, then the
strength of the ,,ungarian people will ba drowned as well, and
after this there will only be a re,etion in the Soviet empire.
And this will nv:tur,~lly aggravate the position of the peoples both
in 'ast ilxrope end in the soviet Union. it strange 50X1-HUM
and incomprehensible that tho free world is simply look ng on and
sympathizing when the Aungaritn people are being oppressed and
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Finland was a free countr
y,
there were no Soviet troops there, no Joviet terror, nor was
there a trQacheroua government of the Fereno* Nagy kind. If
Ferene* Nagy had not summoned the soviet troops, they would
have had no formal pretext to intervene, they would have had
no legal right to intervene; the betrayal of this one person
has led to such a catastrophe. If he had not done so, the Soviet
troops would not have started, and we would have now a free
Huns; ary .
If he hcd been a real Hungarian, he would have preferred to have
died himself to having thousands of his fellow-countrymen, his
fellow-citizens, killed.
he agreed in some
form or other. And if he had not wished to agree, he would not
have a-reed, even under the pressure of the soviet troops. There-
fore, it re:lly does not matter very much whether he agreed under
the pressure of the Soviet troops, or whether he agreed on his
own. The important thing is that he decided to drown the
Hungarian nation in 1 e his own skin.
is encircled by Soviet troops on two sides--the Soviet ocoupsftfa ` ~
forces in East Germany and the armed forces in the Soviet Uni~in. 1
1 Poland would probably not be 50X1-HUM
able to resist such a powerful army. And to my mind his policy
may indeed be very clever--he is gradually democratizing the oountry,
and within six months or a year he will demand in the name of
the whole people in a more or less loyal form that the troops be
removed, say by placing at their disposal a kind of Danzig
corridor as a connection with the occupation forces; and when
the Soviet troops have been withdrawn from Poland, he can-
easily follow Tito's example and sake the country comlletily-
independent, since Soviet troops will no longer be stationed
there. It is uite possible that this will bi the case. But,
on the other hand, it is just as possible that he will remain 50X1-HUM
a follower of Communism as Georghiu-Deb (Sp.?) is in Ruman
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SEC El
Internal pro ems of the Soviet
there are still four basic deficiencies that
affect the widest circles of the population. There is, first,
the fear of terror.
Perhaps it
has declined somewhat in the hope that
there 13 some somblease of legality, without the mooicery and the
tortures which existed zormorly; but everyone knows that open
trials do not exist inl leven today. :'olitical
enemies are not sentenced; they simply disappear. This is
terror and uncertainty, since everyone knows that he can be
tried at any moment and that h will not be allowed to prove
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whether or not he is guilty. The fe:r of terror is still oppressing
the people daily. The second point is the consciousness of the
people that millions of Rue>ian citizens are suffering in th
camps and in prisons, an:! that the families who have been
deprived of their breadwinners, of their fathers, their hus-
bands--and this applies to every third person--are suffering;
therefore, the people as a whole know of the eufferin'>p of these
millions. And than there is the systematic hunger in the country.
Only in the big cities, such as lioscow, Leningrad, and itiev, are
there goods in the stores. In the provinces the shops are
practically empty. On the s-arkets everything is three times
as expensive as the official prices. Even if we take Mosoow an
Leningrad, the wages of tr..: workers and the working intelli~;entsis
are so much below the living minimum that people are either
half-starving or realty starving. And if people are lacking
foodstuffs even, they are ImQking everything also too--they have
no money to buy clothing, no money to bey furniture, no money
for amusement, and none for other human re::uirements. And this
not one year, not temporarily, but for the whole life of our
generation. Thirty-eight years of the Soviet regime mein 38
years of starvation, 38 years of penury, and 38 years of terror.
The second deficiency, therefore, is poverty, poverty, half-
starvation, the most wretched life. And the next thing that is
most unpleasant, unpleasant on a large scale, is the vast decline
of the cultural standard in the country since the wart drunkenness
of the masses, hooliganism, dirt and devastation in the cities,
the acute housing crisis--conditions which are not in keeping
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_E
with the an A --1
gn ty. A decent farmer's pigs
peasant
live under better Conditions than our
These are the main problems which worry our ur p pe ae.woAnd, do.
course, also the oonsoiouenese, a very eoplle. rdnd of
of the cynical Soviet humiliating consciousness,,
propaganda which it is impossible to
oppose in any way. What people are reading in the newspapers
and hearing over the radio is In complete contradiction with
reality. If, let us say, people are forced to subscribe to
the loan and later hear over the radio and from the news-pRpers
that they rejoiced when they subscribed; if people are starving
and read in the newspapers that they are happy, such cynical
f5lsehoods are insulting, bec3use the impression is created
that the government considers the people to be either its
slaves or idiots. Idiots who do not understand that black is
not white, oi slave, who hold their to
told. Not enough, therefore, that peopearehbei g they are
that they are tortured--they are also spat uponl This Pisased,
absolutely intolerable.
e reso u one 0 the 201heCreaotion of the Population to
grass?
At the 20th Congress there was only ghrushohev's speech.
t only with it, thenithe Partyt?embers,eQndrthenetherq were acquainted
ace It
and labor unionists. And then, of Course,eal
ltthesenpeopleetolds
all the others, so that now the whole population knows about, told
And the general opinion is that not even Goebbelswould ahave it.
succeeded in compiling such an anti-Soviet document, such anti-
Soviet propaganda, as did khrushohev.
by the first secrets
himsef, First, it was announced
element...Second, theymodestlf;ott,tthe tno one s some
housandthldartofct truth
dapiete:' in his speech, vividly reveal the Communist Party arth
group of murderers, as a "zing of sadists. Y as a
In his speech he touches only upon it lines crimes toward the
Party leadership and the higheat Part
of the individual Party members y leadership. He Is $pea'ing
one word in ~hru9hchev', p of the commanders. There is not
speech about the million victims among
the common people; not a word about the peasants who were tortured
in the camps during the collectivization
period;
the many millions of intellectuals and workerswhonsufferedbout
during the terror in Yagoda's and in Yeshov'e eras..
about St,ilin's crimes and those of the Soviet i notinnt
field of foreign policy. The facts cited in rhrushoherne speech,
even concerning the Party and .:oviot leaders, are horrible in
their inhumanity. For example, he cites the instance with Likhe,
the Bolshevist leader in the Far ;,sat, a
prison th::t he was being unmercifully beaten,othattheiwasrbeing
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tortured, and that he was not gas y--an s le-;:t.r was simply
thrown away. And then the Leningrad affair, the doctors' case,
?to.?-whioh proved that during the entire Soviet history any
arises ajainst people were possible. A child will understand
that this cannot be the result of one man's actions, and that he
was actively assisted by all his colleagues. Second, since
this was possible, it was tolerated by the entire system, and
therefore, the uncontrolled one-Party system engenders the
possibilities of abuse of power, all kinds of violence. But
even since Khrushchev's speech nothing has changed in this system--
this was also realised b every listener; take, for instz.noe,
Beria's liquidation. assume that Beria was guilty of 50X1-HUM
.ill the crimes and that he was the greatest scoundrel. How-
ever, after they decided to put an sad to lawlessnes9, they
should have, it would sees, held an epen trial, tried Beria
in court, provided his with a defense counsel, allowed the public
to be present, called witnesses--this would have been a proper
trial. But if a person is arrested sad shot somewhere in the
torture-ohamber, and then the execution is made known, this
Js the same kind of reprisal, the same torture.'chamber, for
which the Stalin regime s sew being oritioised. And later
events have shown t)v t the system has in no way been altered,
because discussion of this speech was not even allowed within
the Party organizational th- speech was merely read, because
it was found at the very t'iret reeding that the Communists began
to criticise and to ask isport?at questions such ass "And where
were you--the speaker -inuj his fellows?" "And what has been changed
in the system? Where x=> the t,-u+trsntee that this will not occur
main?" Those who be n to ask these questions were thrown out
of the Party and put I. ailo and all further discussions were
forbidden. It bees.4 :.iear to everyone, therefore, that according
t? the admission of th< omwaisto themselves, the worst terror,
lawlessness and arlitrar.aoss were raging in the Soviet state,
and that all this--the result of the aovist system--remained as
it had been; the systss itself had undergone no changes. Every-
one knows that even today there are no open trials of political
enemies se that every... who is of a different 50X1-HUM
opinion may be arrsstod at any assent man thrown into jail.
Khruchchev's speech has therefore opened the eyes of that possibly
snail number of ;*viol citizens who were :;ive enou,.h to think,
having had no experience of their own, that the tales of Soviet
terror were perhaps exa gerstod, and that perhaps all this was
not true. Bow everyone believed this. And these who knew were
filled with particular indignation at the cheek of all this and
at the oheek of Stalin's heirs who, having declared him to be
a criminal, themselves continued on the same path. This oonsi- 50X1-HUM
derably increased the indignation among the population as a whole.
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;'hen the entire
deaago,: ryas ~i: ~c a toward ".-he g or cation of the Soviet
regime, a nusbur of people say have been misled, and the
others gagged. But now that the Soviet system had been exposed,
the people began to think and to act in this directions and
the truth is that there can be no seal-freedom; either there
is terror, when people are forced to keep quiet by being
terrorized; but it they have been told the truth, or at
least questions of truth have been touched upon, they cannot
be stopped--there must be either freedom or slavery. And
this is why the dictators will now, especially after the
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Hungarian events, be obliged to take the path of democratization
or to create a now Stalin. But to take the path of democratization
would mean for then to find themselves on the gallows. This is
why I think that they will prefer to create a new Stalin, and
they will do so at an early date.
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the orimes during the Stalin ora*wore
so numerous thet they were burdeninj; and pulling down all his
successors; crimes both within the country and without; and
that, by aasuaing power, they at the same time assumed the
responsibility for all these crimes...; that is, they inherited
the hatred of the people, all the crimes committed in foreign
policy which had caused the unification of the free countries
and their armament--ia other words, the stopping of potential
further Soviet a3gresiiion. And this is why they bad at first
the primitive wish to make the dead dictator responsible for
everything, as they had in the past blamed some scapegoat, some
small fry, for everything. Naturally they did not dare to so
immediately,-they only did it three years after his death. They
therefore had assumed that by laying all the blame at his door,
they themselves would be clean and would remain in power. But
t_:ey probably anticipated the effect this would have on the
people, and this is why they evidently decided to restrict
the knowledge at first to the .arty top command, so as to find
the support of the high-ranking Party aristocracy; probably they
intended to read the speech at the 20th Congress only. But it
turned out that numireus foreign delegations were present, and
for some reason or ether rumors began to spread among the people.
These rumors were even more dangerous than the speech itself,
because when they were spread, the rumors were interpreted in
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vasioq nays, that Stalin had
betas . isN the - S[ the- eat ,sfailcr d, tort se
N that r sre beano n~er1-- ' a a staple
to an O's psoplo. - ?his is its d"Mod to :b
aheslM tit report to the Ratios, of *o P$ mom. kt Pary-,
as ssa 4s belong to toailios, have t l frteadaa.. eto.0 sq
that is actual fact the speech beoars herw to the *Ole psptlat*U.
And the etteet wan evidently a complete surprise to Khrs ahoher,,
phis was iwidentiy eraisted by the tact that Yhr shahev is
certainly not a slovor person, and he had failed to for?s?e.what
aoase1uenooa this sight have. Then is no doubt that the negative
consequenoes of the apsoeh are saq tines worse than its positive
oona--queno?s. it is hardly to be ?spooted that he himself had
deoided to do the Oo aunist party amok harm, which certifies to 50X1-HUM
his shortsightedness and his lank of isaiaht.
At the beginning, Gay, during the first weok or two, the Party
members really took this to scan that broad criticism of all the
Party's errors was now admitted. This, of course, was the height
of naivett?. ..nowing the Soviet regime for what it is, it's
difficult to understand how they could think so. Well, people
began to oritioise, saying that the reason for everything was
not Stalin, not individual events, but the one?Party'dicttter?
ship;, that the oso?Party dictatorship engenders a one-ma
dictatorship, and this ?ngndese terror; and the terror of the
dictatorship ?naendesa all oriaes. This was the tread of their
questions. And than questions,.,.qu.stions loading to the one
thouvhtj And where were you? where wer? your assistants? And
didn't you become his assistants siwoly by actively aiding and
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_ ----------------------- ,r.50X1-HUM.-
the Tstt Io ......W4F. mss swa w .,rte oonrs?
x
is " navala1Z, - *1. on i 50X1-HUM-
.aw,...w a
? ;
err ?t?.jP stetted wring vt*s'
Kay o borrgeois wso
satsM-tr
h
i
W
t o
ot #
r,
of peoplo? who took advant
X
age of otitf4lq tom ostiti+ t
sib, eto. Aai there tore ether meant. of lfteieh Tttt 1tnryas im-
Dulaanin
There are many ooatrstiotop pinions. Be it tot too well known,
but opinions differ. Aap sq OR the basis of his biography that
he is as "upstart*; that be has for many yearn belonged to the
R=YD and that he wears his general's uniform only as a Party
worker. This produoos the worst possibl? impression, that is,
the fact thy: t a person worked for many years in the NMCYD and was
,promoted only on the strength of Party demagogy and not for his
fighting or working merits1 this, naturally, is sharaoterist'ib
of the person.
]First, one must make allowaaee tot the fast that he is an
old man, that he is about TO yews of age. This is why he oanaet
play any particular role MY longs:. It is known what Stalin
said about hit i* 1945 when Vito visited luesia. In 11clotov's
presence Stalin suds *Look at this person, his brain is as
ossified as the expression of his fase." StaliA, of course,
must have known what his assistants were like.
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y:... ." a^ $ ,' R9a ,' d,.--V. 41ST"';" fry+.? ,t'
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There are different opinions aboat- Zbuk.v. Mlany:pIAGO their
hopes on his because he has been a'soldier, because he has
fought honestly and therefore snss-be as honest person? that is,
a person who understands the real needs of the people, and
cannot therefore be a genii. Oommunist at heart. Mart at the
same time Zhukov's speeobeos say, at'reviews,'do not produce a
pleasant impression. This is why one may take it thet Zhukov
has simply decided to pretest his own career to %he'dctrinent
of the interests of the pespee. It's possible, though, that he is
at present acting under soapaleiea; and that his real nature
will show at some later date. This would, of osurse, be very,
In."-ortant and very,valuablcs because the army is the most
organised part of the peoples iich could, indeed oppose the
government in an organised usmser.
the isolated
action of one person or of a email group cannot have the
slightest result of any importaaee, and would mean nothing but
suicide, because resistance against the general party line
is considered a heinous crisis. Therefore, if anyone were to any
anything against it, this wosid be of no use whatsoever for the
nation, while the people is qvMtioa would perish.
The Yerevan events begans as roor has it, for nationalist
reasons and, only later turned into ?snti.Nviet demonstrations.
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It began 'with a swoon natshl a Russian toss ha. oone.there, 50X1-
sad th~e was sent. aiswiderstandiag. first these were attacks
en the assisas, and then it beosne an anti-Soviet aovonont
sad finished with barricades sad asaed resistanN.
?here are lets of political saoodotos which are quickly
=Fade up. Let us say that sea* event or other takes plasol for
instanoo, the, Khrushohev36lgsais Visit to Losdsa. A tow dey$
later there are saoodotes, otroulatiag about than. A week or two
later there Are Tory good aneodet..'
for example, after
trnahohev's and Julgania s sty In Lsndont am asks Khrushohsv
how ho succeeds in a4king peepie gobesribo tg 00. State lost N'
quickly and for such substantial aaoasts, say "W is Z leave
People are not so willing. thswshohev sass "Sea 4iaply As *01
knew the propse.approash. lens, for isataas, is dog. Does
it -t sustardt" Sdeaw "for gssdaesa' asks, no. 1$ doep't eat
,oaks wen." "Bat I shall asks it eat custard," eye sulganin.
He takes sons ssstasd, rube it or the dog's tail, and the
dog immediately 11oks it off. "leis," he says, "is how our
people subscribe to the loan."
Aden is thou asked by >ulgaaias "]few do your people lure,
the lworkers?" And Eden tolls as "Our workers spend one
quarter of the wages on toed me, quarter on parohases, out
quarter on aauseceat." "And last quarter?" "Sell", that's
their own affait$ Our gwvonamll doesa' 1 interfere in their privets
affeisy. And his does your usellber live?" "Oar people can live
a whole week on their asathly salary." "Acd what about the re?
sainiag tine, how de thsl liv. thsst", "with us 'hie is their
private affair. Oar pve^Ns doom t interfere is private
aflsips, either." 50X1-HUM
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that wages are
low that everything. is
very expensive that production is is a poor state;
and that sr~osy -smang adly ssgas$sedg b raerly it was absolutely
iapossible t? sy these thin .p it at have besa oonsidt ed
anti-Soviet. Sut as, those toys are openly discussed. The
only thins that nut out be sritioised is policy.
!: people sslnrslly gm$l7 pulse troNos; sat bisoanse of thio1
as you laps, tie glob is alsVya takea !se reality. Tho people
asturally wish to lire to see the rsslisatiea of their desire.
But the fact is that the people who are peadseini more or loss
4Nply:, realise that as yatss cannot *bangs its spots, just as
tie wolf os#sot bsssrs a vogetarleap sack as he nay wish to,
otherwise be would sssso to be it r-slf1 by the sane token the
ECRET
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weryne realises naturally, that nothing will
change if he expresses his *pintos swag his frissdsi besides, he
may be denounoede
there are ne a?etiag balls or plows wboss one ?ouid speak
o a ago number of poe,L...only was a small awab?r of
colleagues or' friestds.
People hope that gradually something
may happen. Older people or people who know life better hhwe a
clear idea.
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possible to Ieaimate 4490140 hi.-%V6 404 DWI* comm"i"t ILLEGIB
would be ol?tted. On MW HNtrary, in tkat Si.. all the Coa*i n!-s$e
would be prosecuted for Ow Orin** they porpotrateaa this is
tL? reason why there oas to, no real d aey. And theft sv*t0
therefore, always exist wwo ooeroion so as to st,ifle,.s~ay
striving for Snob a dsaoo~Sy. 1a ?tb.r word.. the dietatorihip 50X1-H U M
will remain; possibly eoonoato problems will lied a better
solution, again, howsyer,.only in order to strengthen the position
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trade ad light industry cannot do without priyIsto
1h toms wbi.h -ear ~Eaalln n.wel.e tw *Ika
ors 0 o the oeuntry.oaanet be oarri?d out by the
GOOMM s P d no longer be a Communist
tv? the dictators will not care
to eommit suioidl. What reforms are really.n??ded? To stop
the armament ratio{ to stop preparing for war a" toprodnse
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g+oots the population is in need off to disband be 901000es,
to distribute the land among the peasants--and witb4n a year
there would be an abundasoo of agricultural products. As a
result of such economic measures the country would flourish in
two or throe years, and the people would be content. But if
they did this, they would not be Communists.
In the field of industry it would only be
nessasary-.under Soviet gee tins--to ?rodeos the
goods which
are really needed for national economy instead of going in for
an armament race. Of course, the Soviet ayetem suffers from
enormous industrial shortcoming., which lower the productivity
by several times as compared with the same kind of production
in the free countries. The exceedingly cumbersome bureaucratic
system, the sluggishness, the planning on paper out of keeping
with the real requirements mad possiblitiee--all this, naturally,
reduces considerably the ?fftsienoy of industry. But under soviet
conditions it is, of course, absolute impossible to abolish
this system.
n er the Soviet regime the only thing that could
be.realised is what :++aleakov, for instance, began: putting a stop
to the race of heavy industry and the armament industry and
devoting a considerable part of the means of proc:uotion to the
davelopment of the branches of industry that are needed for the.
population*
the erganisaties of industry 50X1-HU
nothing can be done in that direction under the Soviet
system. This would be something like the oonoort described by old
man Lrylov in his fable, wire the monkey, the*goat and the clumsy
bear changed places. In the ss a vW all our associations,
ministries, ministerial departaonts,ohnnge of names--all this is
futile and, to all int.wt.
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AWANOW .
the overwhelming majority of the people
understand very well t t a very flexible system is needed in the
light and food industry and in trade, a system wbioh can speedily
and sensitively respond to the demand by the population, to the
Changes of fashion, the season$ and territorial variations i4ssucis
a large country, as the Soviet Union, while the planning system unwieldy and bureauorati3 and cannot be flexible *sought Just
looki in a normal count 7 there are thousands and the "a dt of
different Lames to desig%at@ consumer golds on sale. p 1 fon
is needed herel If a st: -te factory sakes furniture, it manufactures
only one certain type of furniture, and this of poor quality.' Why?
Because this factory is - state tactft Interestenoodedd
a large o%tput, in fulfiLling its plant
quick ohr.uges, a variety of maanfeatured articles.
The situation in heavy '?nduatry is quite adifferenet. IIt.. is necessary
to produce steel to mabr east iron.
which does not depomd ca the demand of the population or on the
people's tattle; it dcea sot change. ?silroads do net depe d only
anything. In large-scale industries, in heavy industry, apeoial
in such security of the working people, say, such as mines,andurail-
fo for the e security as well as the
roads, the state oontr'.l is of course seoessary,
power of the state!
Aal as for consumer-goofs produetien, it is preciselyflexibiliity, 50X1-HUM
sensitiveness, ooapetilioa and an individual approach
d And this is
necessary! here nothLig can be planne
I Vhy is it two all through
ti
country
oIy.
clear to every
there are only two or -;hrde types of f' iture, two or three types 50X1-HUM
of suite, and all these are so shabby sod poor? Because a state-
controlled factory,oennot react to the tastes and demands ofh he
population, as far as their perseaal needs are concerned.
fore, everything that eaters N the personal seeds of the people
should be in private handh{asraillbreide, he metalf needs
industry pits,50X1-HUM
of f the whole e country,
and coal sines--should be state-owasi.
s y YVSWP
of the Soviei rule killed eves7estilre peel eras! in his
work! If a po"031 really tails that 1W is geNiag a ah, to of the
profits, that he. is a partner is b" fastory? it he has asifathing
is d:aiea I. his thg
i~t hits "p' ,.is-! s
b
sw
ul
e NWRPWW
d ree117
o
oapltOista' er so idarity," that is rear there is n,
s
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50X1-HUM
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division, say, between a mssufaotaser and a worker. One has a
lazier share, another a_sssllor~eas, let both are partners in
50X1-HUM
only people who have. net lid in the soviet Union, who do
net realise at a communist resits i?
can a eve 50X1-HUM
In" Sao GOVZOV g can give- ewer a small-degree of patisfaotion
to the peoplel The Communist diets ership and the people-these
are the two entirely unreoonoilable elsientsl Absolutely unreoonoilablel
It is-thez'efore neeeseary to ;grasp the followings if we talk about
reforss, about gradual satisfaot& it the people's needs, we are
simply deceiving the peoplel =his old oreate the impression
that the Soviet regime could rra* be in conformity with the
people's interests. The Soviet is snti?demeoratio by its
very nature, it is anti-humas$ %eeefere the only eerie that can
be considered is the opposite ata it is necessary to prove to the
peopli that they have nothing to upset from the Sowlst government
but suffering, terror, starvstiaa ad poverty-just as it has been
duridg the past 39 yOWN it will eestiame in the easing 39 years, if
the regime lasts. 'flat it is time to begin finally the struggle 50X1-HUM
for froedosl
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50X1-HUM
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naturally, do not realise 50X1-HUM
wat
n
sy,
the ao
the people i
Whit i es on the very top, they know even less than is
known in the Vest, because there is a certain system of information
in the Jest, w seas in the Soviet union the people
eo arnote
deprived of any truthful information. Tb* people oat one
any clear eeaoe'Itiou of what to going on on the tot,
thin, is oleart a man is just a sang and a human being, especially
a man she has made it his goal to achieve his personal Kremlin vile
sins by any Beans whatsoever?-that is the type of thQ for the asks
ralers--the people who are striving to achieve pfver There
of power at the cost of the suffering of countless people.
are the people for whom their personal vareer in an end in-itself.
And therefore, if there are 11 or 13 persons who are in power,
doubtlessly sash one will try to become ttie firsttsaanndtonly
1, onnce
these grounds can there be tLersrd
every one of them will asp re is isose a Mw dictator, while 50X1 -H U M
a. And
the rest will try to *book his of create ewerest Vi d,
la
as for any groups from the poiwt of view K a qty with
sU
say, that some would be swstiag tM p
the DNlos@ imteseete, while*th*M won" be as 14 50X1-HUM
V_ . ~ ~ MOMMajAs ggs 98"1~410 I
en2
50X1-HUM
yM. ey are o all me sMt1', om! Aim ?" `mo'd`
a
exams-a Am am
~1!l~MSM W
ti
e
interest is not to lose poem* sM
hale would be about grabbing as paw nito siso ea* of this 50X1-HUM
. - -- --,.&Aa-- Y &Am
1a. Of Oowae.
oaA be oonoid*rod
The conditions of dail life *an also
different aspects*
are eisever 50X1-HUM
be housing oonditio it can be cult if*_-these a become
Of
different aspects. therefore, 50X1-HUM
food supplies, the ? ua a after 1949-" has as ua and 50X1-HUM
worse. There's no doubt about it l I fiusmber that - in ' 1949
in 1948 fruit and vegetables, for exasAoe could be bought freely
in state-owned stares almost the whole year round. It was also
2e c buy
was
easier in regard to dairy produate, for ezsmpduring
apples and grapes in the stores the dole year "und. And flea ile,
recent years fruit, for instance, lad smut disapp
it can be bou,,ht only for one and *so halt to two months a yeaat the height of the season. The possibilities of buying food-
stuffs in the stores hove also -denteaedi even in resoow, say#
sausages are seldom, on sale. Tell. 2 I 't visit yssoow often,
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50X1-HUM
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the Donbas is is ? priviloa*d position*
the following it... on soli in the stdress salt,, tatehee, vodka
vfsegar, coffee...
Rye broad. This is the list of predmots which are
on sale in the stores. And such things as butter, sugar, meat,
sausages are not for sale in most cities, and if they do appear,
this happens very seldom and then for about an hour, and there
are enormous lines.
Chinese shirts have
appeared during recent years in eonaiderable quantitiese
they were a sort of poplin shirts.
There were Hungarian suits and Cseoh footwear.
ootwear is not bad at all. There is-only one drawbacks
a pair of good shoes costs ;50 rubles, w+-ioh represents approxia
the monthly wages of an aveeap worker...
Pere is me hidden ration-oard systems There
is praeticelly no limit to the amount of food which can be sold
one person. Nobody prevents a parses from sowing several times
buying what he wants. It has the mature of mere formality...
Prom a cultural aspect the post-war situation has deteriorated
disastrously. There has never been so such drinking, such
hooli6anies and such seglest.for housing conditions as there is
,at the present time. And it is becoming worse every year, whib
is distinctly noticeable*
and in the provinces, even In the Donbas there are very little
ba4io foodstuffs on sale in the stores, and even these are
ately
to
and
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50X1-HUM
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out in the strait, say early in the morning before
Wr Lally in factory distziets observe
+As1? erswds of ratiged people dressed LJLKJ rs, who are
standliar Rime stores and drinking vodka in the street
right-Won tk bottleo
this is by as means an espression of Prose
thiti is the result of the material conditions o i e; sateria
sad, evidently, also moral. this moans that life is so miserable,
so deprived of any prospects of agthing better that people of
w,jak will and iWenior mentality escape Late a state of drunkennes
as a means to fee st, at least for as hour or two, that uisery
which ?nrrorads them. Take into oemsideratios that housing con-
ditions are vely NM's a perssa eomas home, and what does he
see there? It is ?as ded, dirty, and there is not enough food;
is order to esaa'e from this, to forget, he goes to a best-hall
and it. drank.
the attitude of the younger generation toward the
Soviet regime at 11111s pseem*
The greater part are tamsawl members, but their being In
possession of Komsomol membership cards is a more formality, simply
because they were ssmpellsd to 3ola while they were studying at
an institute, or they jets Len they are 16 or 17 and don't
understand much yet, and t!o or three years later they begin
to understand things, but then there is no way of getting rid of
the membership oardo the majority of the tomsoael youth see life,
of course, as it is, and naturally any normal psrssm believes more
what he sees for himself than what the papers say. He has a
notion now as to how human beimms should be liviar
the simple aspiration for truthin widespread
among the youth and which manifests itsel , for instance, in verbal
protests, in demands. That is, whoa people begin to demand something
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?zw
..~`s`ALT
and to prove it, they says "But this is not justl it is not
righti" The people's aspiration for truth, for justice is# of
"Urea._ vsry keenly felt wont the youth..
50X1-HUM
there is nothing in eemuos between the technical
and the Party intelligeatsial First of all, the Party intelligentsia
cannot bo called iatelligentsial The word "intelligentsia" is de-
rived from the word iatelleotl And to be a Party worker 50X1-HUM
- no intellect is neededl they simply oannot be called so.
They n be called Party functionarsis, Party bur?eauoraoy, .?arty 50X1-HUM
officialdom, but net intelligemtsial Intelligentsia can be only
technical or humanitarian. 'but it must be in any case--int2111;entsie.
99% anti-Soviet, but every epecialist is a specialist. ,,.nd a 50X1-HUM
specialist oannot work badly, oannot want to work badly. A
specialist, therefore, when ha does his work, does it well, because
he must work to earn his living and be able to live. And if a
person is working, this means he is compelled to works every
specialist has professional ambition and loves his work.
The technical intelligentsia is
the working people, the some as peasants, a--as as workers, the
only difference being that the tect;nioal intelligentsia naturally
realites better the causes of our people's condition; it rsalises
possible prospects. Of course, it seemat me that the intelligentsia
always had in the past, and will have in Lture, the leading role
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WF'
SECRET
50X1-HUM
-=1-
among the people; it has to be? say, a "guide" g.iag.ahead of
the people. Of course the foundation of the nation- is the workifiig'
oleos and the peuantrt?-this is the foundations Daft the intollig.*aia
after zll, laths brain of the people.
?heir number is very large at proeent??there are 5,000,000 people
with college and technical education=
50X1-HUM
1st it should betaken into consideration that the technical
iathlligtntsia, Just as w411 0i all the rest of the people, is forced
to lite under ooadittows of a$selate terror and, therefore, no
matter how many aillions of igtelligentsia there's, they cannot
do anything against the MOB (Oomdittee of State 3eosztty), sinoc the
ZGP is an organised armed force, while intelligentsia represents
separated people who cannot undertake anything.
uL~:
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