(SANITIZED) POLITICAL DEVELOPMENTS IN POLAND

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP80T00246A034400370001-9
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: C
• Document Page Count: 6
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: February 28, 2011
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: May 15, 1957
• Content Type: REPORT

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f "At.,
of the Espionage Laws. Title
Qormation affecting the National Defense of the United States within the meaning
794, the transmission or revelation of which in any manner to an unauthorized person E prohibited nage Laws, law.
V. n 'lid i T\ " T T A T
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
COUNTRY Poland
political DATE DISTR. 5 MAY 140
NO. PAGES 1
REQUIREMENT RD
NO.
Developments in po an
DATE OF
INFO.
PLACE &
DATE AC
cnIIRCE FVALUAIIU ITIVE.- APPRAISAL OF CONTENT IS TENTATIVE.
political developmen
CO~r -T--]D E
NAVY AIR
STATE )L ARMY X
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AEC
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Developments in Poland
Developments Prior to VIII PZPR Plenum
3i Gradual relaxation of some of the security police controls over the
populace since the spring of 1955 enabled the masses of workers to ex-
press their dissatisfaction with the deplorable standard of living, and
gave the PZPR members a chance to register their complaints against Party
leaders responsible for existing economic and political difficulties.
During'1955 the criticism grew bolder;'after the denigration of Stalin
campaign started in the spring of 1956, the tempo increased with each
passing month. Although the Party made a valiant effort to contain this
unrest, dissatisfaction with the work of the Politburo reached the point
where not only the individuAl members were maligned but attacks were
directed at PZPR itself. The more "conservative" elements within the
Party suffered their first great shock when even some of the trusted
Party officials tacitly sided with the demonstrators during the Poznan
riots.
40 For many months prior to the Poznan incidents and the VIII Plenum, the
troubled PZPR members in provincial towns were in the habit of calling
upon the First Secretary of the Warsaw PZPR Committee, Stefan Staszewski,
for aid in settling their differences and to explain directives or
decisions of the Warsaw Politburo or Party headquarters. Staszewski
possessed the knack of getting along with low level members of the PZPR
organization. Even though he had always been an ardent Stalinist, his
common sense prevailed in most disputes and he had gained the friend-
ship of the rank-and-file while frequently antagonizing the country or
provincial Party secretaries. Staszewski knew from the questions asked
during informal meetings that widespread ferment existed and that
Politbuto changes would have to be made to placate the mass of PZPR
members. At some of the provincial meetings prior to October, the
situation was so bad that the presiding officers had to resort to ex-
treme measures in order to prevent the passing of resolutions demand-
ing the removal of Soviet troops from Poland, condemning the USSR for
the Katyn massacres and for the slaughter of Poles by the Germans during
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the Warsaw uprising.
Gomulka's Accession to Power
5. Under the circumstances any attempt to reverse the liberalization trend
started after the XXth Party Congress in Moscow could easily have pre-
cipitated open revolt. Election of Gomulka to the Party Secretariat en-
abled the more progressive PZPR leaders to placate the Party masses by
selecting a person who had suffered at the hands of Moscow. At the same
time, it was possible to force the Soviet leaders to accept Gomulka
because of his long history as a loyal Party activist.
5. The only real opposition to the selection of Gomulka as a replacement
for Edward Ochab during the VIII PZPR Plenum came from those elements
within the Politburo known as the 'Natolin Group".
the term '`Natolin Group" encompasses much more than the mere
handful of Party members who usually met in the Warsaw suburb bearing
this name. 'Natolinism" takes in elements at all levels from the
Politburo to the provincial candidates for Party membership. Within its
ranks are ardent Stalinists who are incapable of change, communists who
will always remain loyal to Moscow, and the countless Party "yes -men"
and opportunists who are afraid that any change will cause them to lose
their jobs.
7,
Bezpieozenstwa Publioznego - MM) issued orders to all KBW units in'
the Warsaw area to engage Soviet Army troops at the very first sign of
intervention during those critical days. To insure support for Gomulka
of the Party masses in the Warsaw area Staszeweki obtained the coopera-
tion of a Party leader named Gozdzik who armed many of the workers at
the Zeran automobile plant across the river from the capita.. These
workers were to take direct action backing Gomulka at the very first
sign of opposition to his election to the Secretariat.
Staszewski kept Gomulka informs about-the
sentiment of the workers at all times, 0 this knowledge of worker
support strengthened Gomulka's hand to the point where he was unwilling
to show subservience even to Khrushchev.
Elements of Continuing Crisis
the internal pressures which had been
intensified in the period after Gomulka assumed PZPR leadership would
develop to the point of explosion is would depend
upon a number of factors which fell into two general categories. The
first depended upon the various forms of interference from abroad,
(i.e., from the Soviet Union) and the second, upon internal economic
and sociological factors.
90
The "influence from abroad" does not necessarily have to make itself
felt through direct action, but can also be wielded through the Natolin
elements when the appropriate moment arrives. for
example, provincial PZPR organizations, acting on instructions from
Stalinist elements from above, may easily refuse to accede to directives
of Party Secretary Gomulka, Such insubordination, even on a limited
scale,,could become the excuse for Soviet interference in Polish political
activities. Even though this example represents an extreme case
~~
East. Natolin elements could easily be used to provoke violent anti-
Semitic demonstrations or they may assume the role of an opposition
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which blocks the implementation of Politburo directives through inertia.
10. At present the potential threat of the temporarily eclipsed Stalinist
elements within the PZPR presents less of a headache to Gomulka than the
severe internal economic and sociological problems. These fluid and
disruptive factors include the continuation of the extensive wartime
demoralization of the populace, the prevalence of graft and corruption
throughout the government, the great number of opportunists within the
PZPR ranks and in key positions within the government administration,
the sham and falsehood practiced in all planning and manufacture, un-
reliable statistics, extremely low standards of living, and above all
the uncoordinated industrialization of the nation which has not taken
into consideration the necessity for compensatory moves in the fields
of agriculture and reconstruction.
Gomulkats inability to
stabilize Polish economy is building up pressure among the masses.
if left alone by the Soviet Union and a,eisted
financially by the United States, Poland would stand a fair chance of
working its way out of the present difficulties. Under present
conditions a substantial dollar loan would boost Gomulka's prestige
to new heights but as long as the possibility and probability of out-
side (Soviet) interference exists the stability of the present
communist administration cannot be assured for any length of time.
the elections -of January 20, 1957 will not have a
great effect upon the future of Gomulka. It is rather the interaction
of the various internal factors with the forces acting from Moscow
which will shape future events, leading very likely to an ultimate
explosion.
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INFORMATION REPORT INFORMATION REPORT
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
This material contains information affecting the National Defense of the United States within the meaning of the Espionage Laws, Title
18, U.S.C. Secs. 793 and 794, the transmission or revelation of which In any manner to an unauthorized person is prohibited by law.
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DATE OF
INFO.
PLACE &
NO. PAGES
REQUIREMENT
NO.
5 MAY iqO
1
DATE ACQ aermsan?v, r?
Developments in Poland J!aL
political developments
STATE I ARMY X NAVY AIR FBI
(Note: Washington distribution indicated by "X"; Field distribution by "#".)
AEC
Li
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I N FORMATION REPORT I N FORMATION REPORT
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