SUMMARY OF RECENT DEVELOPMENTS

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP80T00246A032000390001-3
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 12
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: February 16, 2010
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: January 4, 1957
• Content Type: REPORT

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Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/02/16: CIA-RDP80T00246AO32000390001-3
'R0GE;SS`^"' COPT
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
INFORMATION REPORT
S-Z-C-a-E-T
COUNTRY U.S.S.R./Poland/Huagary/East Germany/ REPORT
Com uaiat China
SUBJECT S=mary of Recent Developments DATE DISTR. 4 Jamary 1957
NO. OF PAGES 1
DATE OF INFO. REQUIREMENT NO. RD
PLACE ACQUIRED REFERENCES
THE SOURCE EVALUATIONS IN THIS REPORT ARE DEFINITIVE.
THE APPRAISAL OF CONTENT IS TENTATIVE.
Attached is al
of recent developments in the Sino-Soviet bl
W
S-P.-C-RE-T
NOY=
This material contains Information affecting the Na-
tional Defense of the United States within the mean-
ing of the Espionage laws, Title 18, U.S.C. Sees. 793
and 794, the transmission or revelation of which in
any manner to an unauthorized person is prohibited
by law.
NAVY AIR FBI AEC
L=A
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 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/02/16: CIA-RDP80T00246AO32000390001-3
ECRET
NOFORN
Khrushchev's repeated massive insults to Western diplomats eannot veil
the fact that the Soviet leadership and their policies presently show
some uncertainty. Tho speech e. g., which Zuslov in his capacity as
guardian of an ideological and political firmness of principle and as
responsible organizer of Communist party interconnections made on the
occasion of th 39th anniversary of the Russian October Revolution
reflects elements of both a revolutionary uncompromising attitude and
policies of coexistence, which made it possible that this ar.esch was
subject to conflicting interpretation abroad depending on the wishes
of those who read it.
c. (1) The problem of Titoism again forces the Soviets to take a stand after
rifts in their relations with Moscow had developed again and had
become apparent to the outside world. In spite of all oonsequenass,
which a definite clarification of the question as to whether Tito
(who was called a "true Leninist" by Bulganin during his last visit
to the USSR in the summer o:' 1956), gave Soviet Communism medicine
or poison, would have for the composition of the loading collective
and the basic line of the XX Party Congress, the Sovif)t .leaders cannot
possibly avoid such a.decision in the long run. In view of the
importance of this problem, the Soviet Union must even be expected
to be prepared to exert political pressure on Tito to obtain such a
"clarification".
(2)
Khrushchev's influence is increasing 25X1
again because of the chaotic situation which developed in Hungary and
could not yet be overcome and which seems to justify his policies.
He can, however, not accept the criticism of the Soviet system which
Tito made in Pola and his assaults against the Soviet leadership.
The *ion donflict which now again broke out between Voscow and 3lgrada
sheds a significant light o-a the difficdt situation of Tito as well
as cC Khrushche,r.
(3)
the basic readiness for compromise toward
Gomulka
and shows that the So~riets want to avoid a development inPci
elm lrir to that in Hungary. the outs
oY the 'talks in Moscow was vati~-f*cLory f,ir two parties involved,
and the Soviets succeeded in holding Gomulka by a longer 25X1
but no less firm leash. It remains doubtful, however, whet::iwr Gomul'. ,
is able to regain master of the situation in Poland as a result of
the temporary agreement he reached in. Moscow and whether the real
subotanee of the Soviet ecoiomic aid will suffice to satisfy the
still restless people in Poland. 25X1
(1)
(2)
sickef
left
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when the question of Hungary was being discussed and the wem^keraa 25X1
voiced complaints at the geyieral assembly of the Labor Union Council
that, .heir interests had not been properly "Carded - a compiannt
which ala::med the Polish Goverment. f the 25X1
Government was unable to raise effectively the low living standards
of the working masses, new iisturbances would probably result,
2. Sate1~1 t.f -aand Yuoslap
a. (1) Recognizing a certain measure of Polish independence and again
guaranteeing the Oder-Neisse line as the Western border of Poland,,
the Soviets in their talks in ;Moscow with the Polish delegation
obtained the consent to the continued presence of Soviet troops in
Poland from the Polish Government. Poland 25X1
will receive economic aid which. rakes it
ssible for U s cor try to continuo a t least for one yersr
Warsaw, on thf+ other hand, had to promise not to make 25X1
any economic or social experiments which could shake the people?sn
democratic system in Poland. Warsaw and Moscow also agreed on close
foreign-policy collaboration and Go l';.a refrained from acting as
mediator between Budapest and Moscow and left Hungary to her fate.
The Soviets also insisted cu a cooling down of Polandvs relatiorin
with Yugoslavia.
(2) Following up her policies of democratization, Poland ousted a number
of prominent-Stalinists from Government, Party and Labor Unions and,
planned a better food stuff SUPPLY 25X1
(2)
also c eitioized the attitude of The Polish miny3entatives
for the population and greater concession to individual farmers.
,Gomulka clearly emphasized, however, that Poland would not 1,*ve the
Eastern Bloc